Fundamentalism in Africa: Religion & Politics
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Review of African Political Economy No.52:3-8 © ROAPE Publications Ltd., 1991 ISSN 0305-6244; RIX #5201 Fundamentalism in Africa: Religion & Politics Pepe Roberts & David Seddon ROAPE has never published an issue on religion in Africa. We have carried several articles on the subject in the past - but they are as likely to have been entitled Ideology' as 'Religion' and to have mainly addressed the second theme of this issue's sub-title: Politics. We approach this new theme with some cau- tion and quite a lot of heart-searching! We are unfamiliar with the idea of taking beliefs seriously. In preparing this issue, we have become more familiar with a literature which does; literature which is on the one hand sectarian or partisan or, on the other, blatantly and sometimes horrifyingly proselytising. And it is clear that the intellectual pigeon holes into which we previously pushed belief (the pigeon holes of 'imperialism', 'ideology' and 'the personal') are no longer satisfactory - even to us - as depositories of explanations of the phenomena of religious resurgence, conversion and belief, on a grand scale, which is occurring in Africa and, we emphasise, throughout the world. In this issue on the relationship between religion and politics in Africa, we focus particularly on those movements and groups which have come increas- ingly over the past decade or so to be referred to popularly as 'fundamentalist7. In western Christianity, where the term was first applied, 'fundamentalism' has come to identify conservative evangelicals inside the mainline Protestant denominations, as well as the charismatic sects which comprise what is now the fastest moving current within the Christian world. In the US, it denotes an aggressive and confident religious movement which, in coalition with con- servative forces (the *New Right'), seeks to combat what is regarded as the liberal takeover of the state, family and the church and the even greater threat of socialism and communism. But the term is now widely applied, not just to the groups and activities of 'the new religious righf within the Christian fold, but also to the militantly 'orthodox' sections within the Jewish population, separatist and nationalist elements in the Sikh community and radical reac- tionary Hindu groupings, among others. In the west, 'fundamentalism' has come, during the 1980s, to be associated particularly - and for some exclu- sively - with the various tendencies in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere, with what some refer to as 'Islamism': the militant ideology of contemporary Islamic movements. But 'fundamentalism' is not confined only to religious beliefs and movements, as Sholto Cross points out wryly in his review of Charles Bloomberg's study of 4 Review of African Political Economy Christian-Nationalism and the rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond with his reference to the Marxist-Leninist 'fundamentalism' of the South African Communist Party (also see the article by Carol Pearce, 'A Critique of Marxism-Leninism as Theory and Praxis' in ROAPE 50). The collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe has hastened the demise in Africa as elsewhere of 'fundamentalisf Marxism-Leninism; it has also opened up the space in 'civil society' for the emergence of new political forms and identities. Martin Doornbos observes that the manifold uncertainties about the present and future of African politics are reflected in the mushrooming debate on the role and significance of ethnic- ity. He emphasises that, if ethnicity can constitute a liberating force, generating solidarity and cultural identity for social movements seeking escape from op- pression and arbitrary rule (a sort of liberation ethnicity'), it can also give rise to an uglier, more chauvinistic, 'fundamentalisf politics. Tundamentalism', it would appear, is a pervasive, even global, phenomenon of the 20th century. But 'fundamentalism' is as much myth as reality. Those labelled 'fundamentalisf are often portrayed as fossilised relics, 'tradi- tionalists' clinging to an imagined past in stubborn and irrational resistance to changing circumstances - the very epitome of reaction. But it is widely agreed by those who have examined and considered 'fundamentalism' and 'funda- mentalist movements' in their social and historical context that they must be seen as quintessentially modern. That is they constitute a complex, heterogene- ous and often ambiguous response (albeit arguably one with certain crucial common characteristics) to events and processes - and above all to crises - in the contemporary world. The simple distinction sometimes drawn between 'progressive radicalism' and 'reactionary fundamentalism' is often misleading (as those of us in Britain who suffered under Thatcherism recognise all too well) and essentially mythical. At the same time, the increasingly alarmist response within the west to 'the rising tide of third world fundamentalism' in which the new religious groups and movements are identified as a major threat to global order and stability, must also be understood in its social and historical context as part of the construction of a mythical new world order which has profound political implications. For if it is the case that many of 'the new religious righf in the US and elsewhere still consider 'communism' the major global threat to western civilisation, there are signs that, with the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of state social- ism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the new 'spectre' may prove to be that of 'third world fundamentalism'. Thus, for many right-wing Christian 'fundamentalisf groups, it is the distinctive combination of 'liberation theol- ogy', communism and terrorism that increasingly characterises the main en- emy today. In Western Europe where there is increasing pressure (as 1992 approaches) from the far right - and the not-quite-so-far-right - to tighten still further the restrictions on 'alien' immigrants and to stem 'the rising tide of refugees', the fear of fanatics and fundamentalists is actively promoted to con- trol both immigrant and resident Muslim populations. Given the fear and the fervour surrounding the issue of 'fundamentalism', it is all the more important Editorial 5 for us to examine and analyse, soberly, and more seriously than we have been inclined to do hitherto, the complex relationship between 'ideology', religion and politics. This issue of ROAPE carries articles on both Islamic and Christian 'fundamen- talism'. As far as the former is concerned, there is now a relatively well devel- oped, and rapidly growing, literature and argument, on the left, concerning the historical political economic context of what Youssef Choueiri terms 'Is- lamic radicalism' and its relationship to imperialism, underdevelopment, na- tionalism, class and gender. The early, often rather abstract or at least over- general debates about whether Islamism was essentially 'progressive' or 'reactionary' - which originated most significantly out of the experience of the left in the Iranian Revolution - has opened out into a far richer and more complex discussion, in which the heterogeneity of political and ideological forms and the specificity of local circumstances is emphasised. The issue re- mains, however, one of crucial importance in most concrete political situa- tions. For many, clearly, 'Islamic radicalism' may constitute - as Nkrumah argues in this issue - a progressive force, rallying the oppressed against injus- tice and repression; nevertheless, for most socialists and socialist feminists in particular, the generally authoritarian characteristics of the 'Islamic fundamentalisms' ensure that they remain 'within the purview of right-wing polities', as Choueiri suggests. Ren£e Pittin, for example, presents a clear argument, on the basis of her long- term research in northern Nigeria, for the identification of Islamist ideology and practice as authoritarian, with the control of women playing a crucial role in the constitution of a new orthodoxy, as other feminists have emphasised is generally characteristic of 'fundamentalisms' (whether Islamic, Christian, Jew- ish, Hindu or whatever). With respect to ethnic politics also, the same ques- tions - progressive or reactionary? - apply. But, in practice, as with Islamism, 'the dividing line between "liberating" and "chauvinistic" versions of ethnic perspectives on a just future can actually be extremely thin, and at times only a closer look at the wordings chosen may give a clue as to the social basis from which a particular perspective is being advanced'. Also, as with nationalism - another ambiguous basis for cultural identity and political practice - 'articula- tions of ethnicity and ethnic identity may go through cyclical processes: emerg- ing as populist, tentatively progressive forces, they may increasingly come to represent narrow conservative tendencies and interests'. In this issue, however, we concentrate rather more on Christian fundamentalisms, and here we move into a territory of the politics of belief which seems much less explored, even if some of the issues for the left appear similar to those raised by Islamism. Indeed, we are struck by how little has actually been researched and published, in Africa at least, on the "born again', . evangelical, charismatic 'fundamentalisms' which have been attracting mil- lions of adherents over the last two decades. We devote a considerable part of the issue (in the Briefings) simply to the documentation of that process and to the establishment of a very preliminary