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49ers

2018 record: 4-12 Total DVOA: -20.7% (30th) 2019 Mean Projection: 7.7 wins On the Clock (0-4): 12% Pythagorean Wins: 5.6 (27th) Offense: -15.4% (27th) Postseason Odds: 31.1% Mediocrity (5-7): 35% Snap-Weighted Age: 25.7 (28th) Defense: 5.7% (23rd) Odds: 3.5% Playoff Contender (8-10): 37% Average Opponent: 1.1% (10th) Special Teams: 0.3% (14th) Proj. Avg. Opponent: 0.9% (13th) Super Bowl Contender (11+): 15%

2018: The Handsome Jimmy G era stumbles out of the blocks.

2019: Don’t trust an offense built on overpaying running backs.

y now, we were supposed to know more about this 49ers , the who was released after he was B regime. It was January of 2017 when John Lynch was arrested three separate times in 2018; and Mike McGlinchey, yanked off the Fox Sports studios set and placed behind the the right tackle who led the NFL in blown blocks last year. ’s desk, with joining him as Will the 2019 draft class have more success in Santa Clara? shortly thereafter. That fall, a midseason trade for will likely be a good NFL player, but our Sack- looked to set the franchise in the right di- SEER projections say he may have been a reach with the sec- rection, as the 49ers won each of his five starts to close the ond overall pick. His production at Ohio State was modest, year. When Garoppolo signed a massive extension after that and his performance at the combine was below average for season, most observers in San Francisco felt that the founda- most successful edge rushers. Our projections aren’t thrilled tion had been built. Even if immediate postseason contention about the wide receivers Lynch found in the second and third was unrealistic, 2018 should have seen enough improvement rounds either. Neither South Carolina’s nor that the team would need only minor tweaks to make a playoff Baylor’s did much to stand out in a mediocre pool push in 2019. of wideout talent. Unfortunately, things didn’t work out that way. Jerick McK- The obvious caveat here is that all of these players are innon, Lynch’s shiny new free-agent signee, tore his ACL in young and still have time to develop into solid pros. The point practice before the season even started. Garoppolo tore his is not to condemn Lynch for his failures, only to show that the own ACL just three weeks into the year. Each of the top three jury remains very much out on his drafting acuity. wide receivers was also lost for a significant chunk of time. A It is more fair, though, to evaluate Lynch’s free-agent six-game losing streak all but eliminated San Francisco from spending, where his prevailing strategy seems to be “solve the playoff race before Halloween, and save for a handful of all problems by severely overpaying a .” Our individual highlights—a practice-squad leading cost-benefit analysis found that was the most the team to victory here, a setting records there—the overpaid free-agent running back of 2017, and Lynch doubled 2018 season for the was largely a waste down on that by making McKinnon the most overpaid free- of time. One year later, we are left with unanswered questions agent running back of 2018. This year he added another veter- concerning Lynch’s ability to build a roster, Shanahan’s profi- an runner: , formerly of . That contract ciency at managing a team, and Garoppolo’s chances of living seems much more reasonable on the surface but given San up to his contract extension. Francisco’s existing surplus at the position, there were better We’ll begin with Lynch, who if nothing else has managed ways to spend that money. The roster still includes Juszczyk, to rebuild his roster through the draft. Lynch has now selected McKinnon, , Jeff Wilson, and , 27 players in his three NFL drafts, and at least 25 of them who was re-signed to a three-year deal just days after Cole- will still likely be on the team heading into training camp this man was acquired. Per Over The Cap, 49ers running backs year. Pending training camp battles, that includes somewhere have a combined cap hit of $20.4 million in 2019, over $3 between six and nine starters between offense and defense. million more than any other team. There’s a difference, though, between starters and good start- To be fair to Lynch, he’s not tunnel-focused on overpaying ers. Only two of Lynch’s draftees—tight end running backs; he has also overpaid offensive linemen, guar- and linebacker Fred Warner—have proven themselves to be anteeing $16.5 million to center and $4 mil- impact players in the NFL. The others have either struggled lion to guard in 2018. Richburg went on to to stay healthy or show they belong in NFL lineups. It’s worth provide 15 disappointing starts, but that is more than we can noting that Kittle was a fifth-round pick in 2017, while Warner say for Cooper, who was released before the season started. was a third-round pick the next year. Lynch’s success rate on This year’s passenger on the John Lynch gravy train is Kwon earlier picks is highly dubious. The first-round selections in Alexander, a 25-year-old linebacker coming off a torn ACL. his first two drafts include , the third overall He’s a good player, but Lynch gave him a contract worth $54 pick in 2017 who is already in danger of losing his starting job; million over four years. That’s an average of $13.5 million per 209 210 SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS

2018 SF DVOA by Week 2019 49ers Schedule 100%

Week Opp. Week Opp. Week Opp. 80%

1 at TB 7 at WAS 13 at BAL 60% 2 at CIN 8 CAR 14 at NO 40% 3 PIT 9 at ARI (Thu.) 15 ATL 20% 4 BYE 10 SEA (Mon.) 16 LAR 0% 5 CLE (Mon.) 11 ARI 17 at SEA 6 at LAR 12 GB -20% -40%

-60% year, second-highest in among off-ball lineback- -80% ers. If Alexander is anything less than a first-team All-Pro this -100% season, he’ll be grossly overpaid. We’re cherry-picking some of Lynch’s worst deals here. He has had other acquisitions—, Pierre Gar- con, , Malcolm Smith, Richard Sherman—that (The other was thrown by .) Every other defense were perfectly reasonable and more or less successful. His had at least seven . Fifty-two individual players best move this year was to acquire edge rusher from had more interceptions than the 49ers last year. That includes Kansas City. Lynch gave up just a 2020 second-rounder for Seattle’s , who had three interceptions before a Ford, then signed him to a five-year deal worth up to $87.5 broken leg ended his season in September. On top of that, million, but he maintained some cap flexibility -- Ford is guar- San Francisco recovered only five of 18 on defense. anteed nearly $20 million upfront, but the deal is structured so That’s seven turnovers in 174 drives, a rate of 0.040 turnovers that no further money is guaranteed until April of 2020. per drive that is the lowest of any defense in our drive stats The biggest problem with Lynch’s offseason is that he ig- database going back to 1993. nored some clear areas of need. We’ve already discussed his This is partly because turnovers are down for everyone these fetish for acquiring running backs every year, but let’s not days; last year’s Lions also show up on the list of defenses forget that he spent two Day 2 draft picks on wide receiv- with the fewest takeaways per drive, and the Steelers (0.079 ers, and also signed free-agent wideout . This takeaways per drive) and Packers (0.080) just missed (Table on a team that already had plenty of weapons—Goodwin and 1). Nonetheless, this is a stat that usually sees very strong re- out wide, Kittle at tight end, and a dozen or so gression towards the mean from year to year. Interceptions and running backs, several of whom can split out wide or in the recoveries both roughly doubled the following season slot themselves. Perhaps Deebo Samuel and Jalen Hurd will for the defenses in Table 1, and 14 of the 18 teams listed prior develop into good players—Samuel could even be a Day 1 to 2018 improved in DVOA the following year. However, that starter in the slot—but the 49ers had bigger needs. The inte- improvement was less than you might expect, just 7.9% on av- rior offensive line was denied a needed infusion of new talent. erage, and the overall results were often still quite mediocre. The secondary is left with an aging Sherman as one corner- More turnovers will help, but the 49ers will need more than that back and question marks everywhere else. Lynch even used to become a championship-caliber defense. a fourth-round pick on a , Utah’s , There’s plenty of blame to go around for San Francisco’s de- rather than adding a useful blocker or corner. fensive failures—this is on Lynch for selecting the players and Sherman’s first season in San Francisco was largely- suc the performance of players themselves, but also on Shanahan cessful, but you can’t win with one star if the and his coaching staff. , a players on the other side can’t hold up their end of the deal. product of the , gained experience in “Throw away from No. 25” was an all-too-easy strategy for Seattle and Jacksonville before joining Shanahan in San Fran- facing the 49ers in 2018. Opposing quarter- cisco. He must carry much of the burden of San Francisco’s backs threw 44 percent of their passes to the left side of the defensive performance, but as head coach Shanahan must bear field (away from Sherman), the highest rate in the league. responsibility for the whole operation. Besides, Shanahan’s And those passes usually worked—the 49ers ranked 26th in own offensive scheme has its own share of warts to deal with. DVOA against passes in that direction. San Francisco gave up In the tables in this chapter, you’ll see that San Francisco a league-high 17 passes to quarterbacks throwing finished dead last in rush offense DVOA—but you’ll also see to their left last year, three more than anyone else and nearly that the offensive line was in the top 10 in adjusted line yards, double the average of 8.9. At the same time, they were the and they got plenty of big plays in the running game, finish- only defense that failed to intercept a single pass thrown to ing in the top five in both second-level yards and open-field that side of the field. yards. How can a team that moved the ball so well finish last Of course, interceptions were a problem everywhere for in rushing offense? The first issue is fumbles—San Francisco San Francisco—they only had two all season, and one of those running backs fumbled a league-high eight times on running was thrown by so it should only get half credit. plays. Another issue is that all three of San Francisco’s start- SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS 211 ing quarterbacks—Garoppolo, C.J. Beathard, and Nick Mul- middle of the pack than not. What’s going on here? lens—had terrible rushing results. Even after removing kneel- It appears that Shanahan coaches his quarterbacks to deal downs, the trio combined for 31 carries that gained a total with pressure by hanging in the pocket and reading through of 95 yards (and also three more fumbles). That average of progressions rather than panicking and going to Plan B. Ac- 3.1 yards apiece was third-worst in the league for quarterback cording to Sports Info Solutions charting, the most common runs, just ahead of Philip Rivers and the Chargers (1.7) and Eli route thrown by quarterbacks under pressure was “broken Manning and the Giants (2.2), and barely half the league aver- play.” This is not the case in San Francisco, however, where age (5.9). All told, the 49ers had -69 rushing DYAR by quar- digs, drags, and curls were all thrown under pressure more terbacks, next to last behind Baltimore. (You can read about frequently than broken plays. 49ers quarterbacks also threw the Ravens elsewhere in this book but suffice to say our system fewer checkdowns to the flat under pressure than most quar- is not designed to measure quarterbacks who run as frequently terbacks. Shanahan may have gotten away with this in the as .) Shanahan also deprives his running backs past—even including last season, his teams have suffered of easy third-down conversions—the average 49ers handoff fewer adjusted games lost at the quarterback position than av- on third down came with 6.97 yards to go, third-most in the erage—but given those trends, it was almost inevitable that league. That’s a good way to get yardage without the kind of one of his quarterbacks eventually suffered a serious injury. efficiency that leads to a strong DVOA rating. Those are the weaknesses in the Shanahan offense, but then, Shanahan’s passing schemes leave room for criticism there are strengths too. Specifically, he’s very good at using as well. His offense is very good at getting receivers open play-action and pass patterns to scheme receivers open. Ac- for easy completions but not nearly so effective at keeping cording to NFL’s Next Gen Stats, San Francisco’s most fre- quarterbacks upright. Between sacks and hits, 49ers were quently targeted receivers—Kittle, Bourne, Garcon, Pettis, put on the ground 127 times last season, 21.6 percent of all and Goodwin—averaged 3.11 yards of separation, better than pass plays, second-most in both categories behind the Hous- the top targets on all teams but the Giants. Based on a number ton Texans. Each of the three quarterbacks who started for of factors—including receiver separation, pass length, pres- San Francisco last year—Garoppolo, C.J. Beathard, and Nick sure, and more—Beathard had the highest expected comple- Mullens—had knockdown rates of 20 percent or higher. This tion percentage in the league. Furthermore, San Francisco led was not a one-year anomaly, either. Beathard had the highest all teams by averaging 7.0 yards after the catch per recep- knockdown rate of any qualifying quarterback in 2017. Even tion. Kittle led all players with 870 YAC. In short, the job re- in 2016, when Shanahan and the Falcons made it to the Super quirements for San Francisco quarterbacks were often “throw Bowl, Matt Ryan’s knockdown rate of 18.9 percent was the the ball to the wide-open receiver, then watch as he takes off highest of his career. Each of those teams allowed a higher downfield for an easy gain.” pressure rate than average, but overall they were closer to the So if playing quarterback for Shanahan is so easy, why did Table 1: Fewest Turnovers Forced per Drive, 1993-2018 Year N Year N+1 Year Team Drives TOs/Drive INT FR DVOA W-L Drives TOs/Drive INT FR DVOA W-L 2018 SF 174 0.040 2 5 5.7% 4-12 ------2014 NYJ 178 0.056 6 7 3.5% 4-12 187 0.150 18 12 -13.8% 10-6 2006 WAS 172 0.058 6 6 15.0% 5-11 187 0.128 14 10 -7.9% 9-7 2013 HOU 187 0.059 7 4 2.5% 2-14 193 0.166 20 14 -6.2% 9-7 2015 DAL 168 0.060 8 3 4.1% 4-12 166 0.114 9 11 1.1% 13-3 2016 JAX 182 0.060 7 6 -3.1% 3-13 197 0.162 21 12 -16.2% 10-6 2016 CLE 176 0.063 10 3 14.5% 1-15 179 0.073 7 6 2.0% 0-16 2012 KC 173 0.064 7 6 13.0% 2-14 201 0.159 21 15 -6.7% 11-5 2015 BAL 181 0.066 6 8 5.1% 5-11 184 0.141 18 10 -9.9% 8-8 2016 CHI 163 0.067 8 3 5.0% 3-13 169 0.118 8 14 -1.5% 5-11 2015 SF 176 0.068 9 3 9.9% 5-11 183 0.202 10 10 12.1% 2-14 2014 OAK 186 0.070 9 5 6.3% 3-13 188 0.117 14 11 -1.5% 7-9 2014 KC 170 0.071 6 8 1.3% 9-7 179 0.156 22 7 -11.6% 11-5 2017 OAK 166 0.072 5 9 10.3% 6-10 168 0.101 14 3 12.3% 4-12 2017 CLE 179 0.073 7 6 2.0% 0-16 193 0.161 17 14 -2.5% 7-8-1 2018 DET 165 0.073 7 7 9.0% 6-10 ------2016 NYJ 174 0.075 8 6 3.7% 5-11 186 0.108 11 9 3.9% 5-11 2017 CIN 183 0.077 11 3 3.7% 7-9 172 0.105 12 6 9.0% 6-10 2005 HOU 166 0.078 7 9 20.1% 2-14 165 0.133 11 11 13.7% 6-10 2004 STL 178 0.079 6 9 14.2% 8-8 188 0.133 13 14 12.7% 6-10 Average 174.9 0.066 7.1 5.8 7.3% 4.2-11.8 182.5 0.135 14.4 10.5 -0.6% 7.2-8.8 212 SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS

Garoppolo often make it look so hard? NFL Next Gen Stats those rookies will eventually be, so how can we be certain lists a stat called “aggressiveness” that measures the percent- of what Garoppolo is? Garoppolo played well for 361 passes age of throws a quarterback attempts into tight windows with before tearing his ACL. Robert Griffin played well for 393 a defender within 1 yard of the intended receiver. Mullens’ passes before tearing his ACL, but he has not been good since. aggressiveness of 12.0 percent was the second-lowest among Garoppolo plays the position very differently than Griffin, ob- qualifying quarterbacks. Beathard’s rate of 14.8 percent was viously, but that doesn’t guarantee that he will improve in the also lower than average, but high for him—he was lowest future—and he will need to improve if San Francisco is going in 2017 at 12.5 percent. In his three starts, however, Garop- to win in the postseason. polo’s aggressiveness rate was 27.0 percent. Consider that In the long term, there is still hope for the 49ers, and for Josh Rosen’s aggressiveness of 21.6 percent was the highest Lynch, Shanahan, and Garoppolo. In the short term, though, of all qualified passers. Garoppolo also threw much deeper things won’t be easy. The 49ers will face a murderer’s row (9.2-yard average depth of target) than either Mullens (6.8) of quarterbacks—two games each against , Russell or Beathard (6.6). This may have been a three-game fluke— Wilson, and , plus , Baker Garoppolo’s aggressiveness in 2017 was 15.2 percent, though Mayfield, Lamar Jackson, Drew Brees, Matt Ryan, Cam New- his pass distance was again 9.2. ton, and in 2019. It looks like a tough schedule Still, this brings us to the heart of the matter with Garoppo- for a San Francisco team where so many important people are lo—how can anyone know what to expect from a quarterback still learning on the job. The 49ers should be better this year who has seen so little action? Garoppolo turns 28 this season, than they were in 2018, but a return to the playoffs will likely but in terms of on-field experience he remains a rookie—he be at least one more year away. has fewer career pass attempts than , , or Josh Rosen. Nobody can be certain how good Vincent Verhei

2018 49ers Stats by Week Trends and Splits Wk vs. W-L PF PA YDF YDA TO Total Off Def ST Offense Rank Defense Rank 1 at MIN L 16 24 327 343 -3 -48% -53% -5% 0% Total DVOA -15.4% 27 5.7% 23 2 DET W 30 27 346 427 +1 -3% 11% 9% -5% Unadjusted VOA -14.4% 27 9.4% 27 3 at KC L 27 38 406 384 0 11% 19% 4% -4% Weighted Trend -16.5% 28 7.0% 25 4 at LAC L 27 29 364 368 -1 -21% -19% -17% -18% Variance 6.9% 16 3.7% 3 5 ARI L 18 28 447 220 -5 -50% -14% 25% -12% Average Opponent 0.6% 21 2.6% 10 6 at GB L 30 33 401 521 -3 6% 18% 17% 5% 7 LAR L 10 39 228 339 -4 -93% -74% 8% -11% Passing 2.9% 23 19.6% 27 8 at ARI L 15 18 267 321 +2 -55% -30% 24% 0% Rushing -22.4% 32 -11.0% 12 9 OAK W 34 3 405 242 0 47% 12% -27% 9% First Down -7.2% 21 7.9% 25 10 NYG L 23 27 374 277 -2 -5% -7% 3% 5% Second Down -20.0% 28 -4.6% 13 11 BYE Third Down -27.0% 29 16.8% 26 12 at TB L 9 27 342 412 -2 -72% -35% 37% 0% 13 at SEA L 16 43 452 331 -3 -69% -32% 31% -5% First Half -10.2% 27 6.0% 28 14 DEN W 20 14 389 274 -1 16% -10% -24% 2% Second Half -20.5% 27 5.3% 22 15 SEA W 26 23 351 385 -1 49% 10% -8% 31% 16 CHI L 9 14 279 325 +1 -26% -8% 20% 3% Red Zone -53.0% 32 22.4% 28 17 at LAR L 32 48 391 377 -4 -31% -30% 8% 7% Late and Close -31.1% 30 -0.9% 16

Five-Year Performance

Pyth Est Off Def Off Def ST Year W-L PF PA TO Total Rk Off Rk Def Rk ST Rk Rk Rk Rk Rk Rk W W AGL AGL Age Age Age 2014 8-8 7.0 9.0 306 340 +7 6.6% 11 -0.4% 16 -10.1% 5 -3.0% 24 30.0 15 71.8 31 27.6 6 26.8 16 26.4 8 2015 5-11 3.8 4.1 238 387 -5 -27.5% 32 -14.0% 28 9.9% 27 -3.6% 27 58.2 28 25.8 11 27.7 6 25.4 32 25.1 31 2016 2-14 3.9 4.6 309 247 -5 -19.6% 28 -7.2% 23 12.1% 28 -0.3% 17 39.0 21 58.5 26 27.0 13 26.2 22 26.1 17 2017 6-10 6.6 6.7 331 383 -3 -8.4% 20 -3.0% 19 8.3% 26 2.9% 11 24.7 8 66.8 32 27.3 9 25.4 29 25.8 18 2018 4-12 5.6 4.8 342 435 -25 -20.7% 30 -15.4% 27 5.7% 23 0.3% 14 54.0 26 44.2 24 26.7 17 25.1 30 25.2 30 SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS 213 2018 Performance Based on Most Common Personnel Groups SF Offense SF Offense vs. Opponents SF Defense SF Defense vs. Opponents Pers Freq Yds DVOA Run% Pers Freq Yds DVOA Run% Pers Freq Yds DVOA Pers Freq Yds DVOA 21 42% 6.4 -1.5% 51% Base 45% 6.7 -0.5% 54% Base 26% 5.3 -10.1% 11 62% 5.8 13.5% 11 39% 5.2 -11.4% 17% Nickel 40% 5.7 -9.9% 30% Nickel 72% 5.8 12.7% 12 18% 5.2 -3.0% 12 10% 7.5 -6.2% 56% Dime+ 12% 4.2 -23.8% 11% Dime+ 2% 4.2 -40.0% 21 6% 4.9 -28.4% 22 6% 4.4 -29.4% 69% Goal Line 1% 0.0 -110.8% 75% Goal Line 0% 0.8 -1.8% 22 2% 4.0 15.6% 13 1% 4.1 -46.1% 78% 613 2% 5.3 8.2% 01 1% 5.3 -62.0% 0% 10 2% 4.6 -11.0%

Strategic Tendencies Run/Pass Rk Formation Rk Pass Rush Rk Secondary Rk Strategy Rk Runs, first half 40% 12 Form: Single Back 52% 32 Rush 3 3.6% 25 4 DB 26% 14 Play action 26% 11 Runs, first down 50% 9 Form: Empty Back 11% 5 Rush 4 77.3% 4 5 DB 72% 10 Avg Box (Off) 6.38 4 Runs, second-long 29% 19 Pers: 3+ WR 40% 32 Rush 5 14.4% 24 6+ DB 2% 24 Avg Box (Def) 6.32 8 Runs, power sit. 60% 14 Pers: 2+ TE/6+ OL 17% 28 Rush 6+ 4.6% 20 CB by Sides 89% 4 Offensive Pace 30.39 10 Runs, behind 2H 30% 11 Pers: 6+ OL 0% 30 Int DL Sacks 37.8% 7 S/CB Cover Ratio 26% 20 Defensive Pace 30.77 10 Pass, ahead 2H 46% 23 Shotgun/Pistol 46% 31 Second Level Sacks 18.9% 23 DB Blitz 9% 14 Go for it on 4th 0.78 31

The modern NFL in a nutshell: the 49ers were dead last in usage of single-back sets and still used them on more than half their offensive plays. The 49ers were the only team in 2018 with 21 instead of 11 as its most common personnel set.  San Francisco used two players in the backfield on a league-leading 59 percent of running plays; New England was the only other team in the league above 40 percent. The 49ers performance running the ball was basically the same with one back (4.9 yards, -21.6% DVOA) as it was with two backs (4.8, -19.6%).  What happens when you don’t spread the field: the 49ers ran just 29 percent of their running back carries against small boxes (less than seven); only Tennessee ran a higher percentage of the time against seven or more in the box.  San Francisco averaged 5.9 yards after the catch on passes thrown past the line of scrimmage. No other offense was above 5.2. Yet despite all that YAC, San Francisco was actually below-average in DVOA on these passes (49.6% DVOA versus a league average of 55.4%).  The 49ers ranked seventh in defensive DVOA on third- and-short, but 28th on all other third downs.  San Francisco opponents threw a league-high 26 percent of targets to tight ends.  For a forward-thinking young head coach, Kyle Shanahan is distinctively conservative on fourth downs, ranking 27th and 31st in Aggressiveness Index in his two seasons.

Passing Receiving Player DYAR DVOA Plays NtYds Avg YAC C% TD Int Player DYAR DVOA Plays Ctch Yds Y/C YAC TD C% N.Mullens 286 4.2% 287 2151 7.5 7.0 65.2% 13 10 K.Bourne 42 -4.5% 67 42 488 11.6 3.5 4 63% C.J.Beathard -156 -24.3% 188 1101 5.9 7.1 60.4% 8 7 P.Garcon* -31 -21.3% 46 24 286 11.9 4.1 1 52% J.Garoppolo -9 -12.5% 102 620 6.1 6.9 59.6% 5 3 D.Pettis 109 16.8% 45 27 467 17.3 7.6 5 60% M.Goodwin 51 1.7% 44 23 395 17.2 5.5 4 52% T.Taylor -21 -19.4% 40 26 215 8.3 4.0 1 65% Rushing R.James 11 -2.8% 14 9 130 14.4 11.2 1 64% Player DYAR DVOA Plays Yds Avg TD Fum Suc J.Matthews 84 28.8% 28 20 300 15.0 4.2 2 71% M.Breida 58 1.3% 153 814 5.3 3 1 46% G.Kittle 207 15.1% 136 88 1377 15.6 9.9 5 65% A.Morris* -103 -30.5% 111 429 3.9 2 2 41% G.Celek 38 60.6% 8 5 90 18.0 8.6 2 63% J.Wilson -2 -9.4% 66 266 4.0 0 3 52% L.Toilolo 75 37.3% 24 21 263 12.5 5.2 1 88% R.Mostert 40 19.4% 34 261 7.7 1 1 65% K.Juszczyk 76 18.7% 41 30 324 10.8 5.8 1 73% C.J.Beathard -13 -25.2% 18 68 3.8 1 1 -- M.Breida 105 44.8% 31 27 261 9.7 8.7 2 87% K.Juszczyk -29 -86.7% 8 30 3.8 0 1 38% J.Wilson 17 4.9% 15 12 98 8.2 8.1 0 80% J.Garoppolo -14 -48.2% 7 31 4.4 0 1 -- A.Morris* 6 -6.7% 13 8 73 9.1 8.4 0 62% N.Mullens -43 -118.6% 6 -4 -0.7 0 1 -- R.Mostert -6 -32.1% 7 6 25 4.2 7.3 0 86% T.Coleman 14 -6.4% 167 800 4.8 4 1 43% T.Coleman 77 17.2% 44 32 276 8.6 8.6 5 73% 214 SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS Offensive Line Player Pos Age GS Snaps Pen Sk Pass Run Player Pos Age GS Snaps Pen Sk Pass Run Mike McGlinchey RT 25 16/16 1053 3 4.5 25 7 RG 31 16/16 998 7 3.5 13 6 LG 27 16/16 1026 8 3.0 9 8 Weston Richburg C 28 15/15 967 4 3.5 10 7 LT 35 16/16 1005 5 4.0 9 1 RG 31 14/4 371 2 2.5 5 2

Year Yards ALY Rank Power Rank Stuff Rank 2nd Lev Rank Open Field Rank Sacks ASR Rank Press Rank F-Start Cont. 2016 3.99 3.46 32 69% 11 22% 25 1.12 17 0.72 14 47 8.4% 30 28.6% 22 15 32 2017 4.13 4.20 10 62% 20 23% 25 1.24 7 0.76 14 43 6.8% 18 31.3% 17 22 28 2018 4.84 4.56 10 68% 16 19% 18 1.47 3 1.13 5 48 8.0% 22 31.9% 19 25 37 2018 ALY by direction: Left End: 5.31 (9) Left Tackle: 4.56 (8) Mid/Guard: 4.63 (9) Right Tackle: 3.59 (26) Right End: 4.63 (11)

As noted earlier in the chapter, right tackle Mike McGlinchey led the NFL in blown blocks in 2018. In addition, Weston Richburg ranked second among centers, and Laken Tomlinson and Mike Person both made the top ten at left and right guard, respectively. Joe Staley, meanwhile, ranked 28th among left tackles. All five starters return, so we are left with two questions for 2019: can Staley maintain that high level of play? And is there hope for improvement among the others?  Staley, of course, has been a high-quality player for a long time, but he can’t last forever. He turns 35 at the end of August; only two starting of- fensive linemen were that old in the NFL in 2019. Those two players were and Andrew Whitworth, and they will be starting again for the Eagles and Rams this fall, so success at this age certainly isn’t unprecedented. Still, at his age, Staley is more likely than not to decline. The 49ers clearly disagree—they signed Staley to a two-year extension that will last through 2021.  As for the others, the outlook is brightest for McGlinchey. He was a first-round pick for a reason, and NFL history is littered with players who struggled as rookies but improved with more experience.  There is less cause for optimism in the interior. Tomlinson ranked among the worst guards in blown blocks in 2017 as well, and there is a reason the 49ers were able to acquire him for a fifth-round pick just two years after Detroit drafted him in the first round. Richburg has spent too much time in the trainer’s room—he has missed time with concussions and battled through hand injuries, and he may miss part of training camp after offseason leg surgery. Before arriving in San Francisco, Person spent time with the Seahawks, Rams, Falcons, and Colts; the 49ers are the first team that thought it was a good idea to bring him back as a starter for a second season.  Stability at the running back position would help the line, which had radically different results depending on who was in the backfield. San Francisco’s adjusted line yards were below 4.00 when Alfred Morris or Kyle Juszczyk carried the ball, but 4.64 or higher when Matt Breida, Jeff Wilson, or Raheem Mostert toted the rock.

Defensive Front Overall vs. Run Pass Rush Defensive Line Age Pos G Snaps Plays TmPct Rk Stop Dfts BTkl Runs St% Rk RuYd Rk Sack Hit Hur Dsrpt DeForest Buckner 25 DT 16 852 70 9.1% 2 52 22 4 50 70% 62 2.5 55 12.0 7 30 3 Earl Mitchell* 32 DT 14 363 28 4.2% -- 18 3 2 23 74% -- 3.1 -- 0.0 3 6 0 25 DT 12 275 13 2.2% -- 9 3 0 9 56% -- 3.1 -- 2.0 1 14 2 D.J. Jones 24 DT 10 239 17 3.5% -- 13 1 3 17 76% -- 1.8 -- 0.0 1 4 0

Overall vs. Run Pass Rush Edge Rushers Age Pos G Snaps Plays TmPct Rk Stop Dfts BTkl Runs St% Rk RuYd Rk Sack Hit Hur Dsrpt Solomon Thomas 24 DE 16 644 31 4.0% 66 17 5 3 24 54% 87 3.1 67 1.0 7 20 0 26 DE 16 608 48 6.2% 15 28 8 8 42 55% 86 3.1 66 3.0 9 20 0 * 27 DE 16 550 36 4.7% 50 27 20 5 22 73% 51 3.6 83 5.5 10 20 0 26 DE 16 534 36 4.7% 50 28 16 3 25 76% 42 1.6 20 5.5 8 12 0 Dee Ford 28 OLB 16 1021 52 6.0% 24 38 21 3 31 68% 63 2.1 35 13.0 18 49 1

Overall vs. Run ­Pass Rush vs. Pass Age Pos G Snaps Plays TmPct Rk Stop Dfts BTkl Runs St% Rk RuYd Rk Sack Hit Hur Tgts Suc% Rk AdjYd Rk PD Int Fred Warner 23 MLB 16 1060 129 16.7% 12 66 18 11 73 60% 40 3.9 41 0.0 3 6 52 56% 20 5.6 19 6 0 23 OLB 16 476 63 8.2% 67 33 13 5 31 65% 26 4.3 63 1.0 1 5.5 25 40% 64 6.6 34 2 0 Reuben Foster* 25 OLB 6 337 29 10.0% 55 15 5 6 17 59% 48 4.2 58 0.0 2 4 15 67% -- 5.5 -- 1 0 Malcolm Smith 30 OLB 13 336 36 5.7% 82 24 5 4 23 70% 13 3.1 17 0.0 3 2.5 11 64% -- 8.7 -- 1 0 25 MLB 6 366 47 15.4% 21 24 13 7 17 53% 62 2.6 7 1.0 3 4.5 10 40% -- 8.9 -- 2 0 SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS 215

Year Yards ALY Rank Power Rank Stuff Rank 2nd Level Rank Open Field Rank Sacks ASR Rank Press Rank 2016 4.97 4.68 29 71% 28 16% 27 1.27 23 1.29 32 33 5.8% 20 22.6% 31 2017 3.82 4.09 15 64% 17 22% 9 1.05 8 0.62 10 30 5.0% 29 29.4% 23 2018 4.08 4.39 19 61% 6 17% 21 1.19 12 0.59 6 37 6.9% 18 29.9% 18 2018 ALY by direction: Left End: 5.50 (29) Left Tackle: 4.64 (20) Mid/Guard: 4.40 (15) Right Tackle: 3.35 (6) Right End: 3.21 (5)

Most of San Francisco’s success against the pass last season came on blitzes. When they used exactly five pass-rushers, they were second behind New England with a 63 percent success rate, allowing 4.8 yards per play (third) with a -16.5% DVOA (ninth). They were even better on defensive back blitzes, leading the league with a 70 percent success rate and finishing second at 2.9 yards allowed per play. They didn’t use either of those tactics very often, however—77 percent of the time, they used a vanilla four-man rush, fourth-most.  Since San Francisco likes to rush four, it’s critical they get the best four pass-rushers they can find. Enter Nick Bosa, the second overall pick in this year’s draft, and Dee Ford, John Lynch’s big-money free-agent acquisition this year (well, one of them). Bosa collected 5.0 sacks as a freshman at Ohio State and added 8.5 as a sophomore. He had 4.0 in the first three games of his junior season, then underwent surgery to treat a “core muscle injury” and missed the rest of the year. Ford, a 2014 first-round pick in Kansas City, was a late bloomer. He didn’t hit ten sacks in a season until 2016, then was limited to 2.0 sacks and only six games played in 2017 due to back injuries. He rebounded last season with 13.0 sacks and a league-high seven forced fumbles. In a best-case scenario, Bosa and Ford become the league’s premier rushing bookends and the 49ers lead the league in sacks; worst-case, both men are struck with injuries and have trouble just getting on the field.  We would be remiss if we didn’t note Bosa’s history on , a history that includes liking multiple Tweets that include homophobic and racial slurs that could make life difficult for a white man going to work in a mostly black locker room. Richard Sherman, who has never been shy about sharing his opinion, told Chris Biderman of the Sacramento Bee that it would not be an issue: “If he can play, he can play. If he can’t play, he won’t be here. But at the end of the day, that’s all that matters in foot- ball. Is he getting sacks on Sunday? Is he helping our team? Is he being a good teammate? Those are things that matter.”  In addition to Bosa and Ford, the 49ers have three other former first-round picks on the defensive line: Arik Armstead (2015), DeForest Buckner (2016), and Solomon Thomas (2017). Results there have been mixed at best. Buckner is a rock, starting 47 of a possible 48 games in his career and posting a dozen sacks last year, third-most among interior linemen. Thomas, however, has just 4.0 sacks after starting 25 games at in his first two years. He’ll move to 3-technique this season; curiously, he has prepared for the move inside by dropping to 270 pounds, 10 pounds lighter than he played last year. Armstead, meanwhile, has frequently been injured, and though he started all 16 games last year, he had little production to show for it. Trade rumors circled both Armstead and Thomas over the offseason, but each will get one last chance to live up to their draft stock in San Francisco.  At linebacker, Fred Warner was a pleasant surprise in the third round. The BYU alum started all 16 games, finished third among rookies in total tackles, and might have made the All-Rookie team in a non- season.  Joining Warner will be Kwon Alexander, who has superstar potential (he was third in the league in total plays made in 2016) but has missed at least four games in three of his four seasons and is coming off a torn ACL.  Warner and Alexander will be the key players responsible for solving San Francisco’s problems against screen passes. The 49ers were 28th on defense in DVOA on passes thrown to receivers behind the line of scrimmage last year. Mind you, they were 29th on passes thrown to receivers beyond the line of scrimmage, so the secondary needs work too. Speaking of which…

Defensive Secondary Overall vs. Run vs. Pass Secondary Age Pos G Snaps Plays TmPct Rk Stop Dfts BTkl Runs St% Rk RuYd Rk Tgts Tgt% Rk Dist Suc% Rk AdjYd Rk PD Int Richard Sherman 31 CB 14 836 41 6.1% 77 15 6 3 9 33% 56 6.3 38 45 14.0% 6 12.0 60% 9 7.4 35 4 0 24 CB 14 700 41 6.1% 77 13 1 7 14 43% 36 7.7 58 69 25.6% 73 14.0 52% 37 7.1 31 4 0 K'Waun Williams 28 CB 14 595 47 7.0% 64 18 11 4 15 33% 56 5.5 22 36 15.7% 18 7.7 47% 56 7.5 37 2 0 28 SS 15 594 44 6.1% -- 16 4 8 22 36% -- 9.1 -- 14 6.1% -- 14.9 36% -- 11.5 -- 7 1 27 SS 8 437 43 11.2% 26 20 9 5 21 62% 6 3.5 1 18 10.7% 51 7.3 39% 66 7.3 40 2 1 28 CB 9 388 23 5.3% -- 2 0 1 8 13% -- 9.1 -- 21 14.1% -- 12.9 52% -- 8.1 -- 0 0 D.J. Reed 23 FS 15 360 36 5.0% -- 14 4 4 19 37% -- 7.5 -- 15 10.8% -- 10.5 53% -- 6.9 -- 0 0 25 SS 8 358 30 7.8% -- 18 6 9 16 81% -- 2.8 -- 12 8.7% -- 6.6 50% -- 6.8 -- 0 0 26 FS 7 320 21 6.2% -- 3 2 4 6 0% -- 11.7 -- 7 5.7% -- 13.3 14% -- 13.9 -- 1 0 23 CB 16 232 21 2.7% -- 8 2 2 6 50% -- 6.2 -- 17 19.0% -- 12.1 47% -- 5.8 -- 2 0 216 SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS

Year Pass D Rank vs. #1 WR Rk vs. #2 WR Rk vs. Other WR Rk WR Wide Rk WR Slot Rk vs. TE Rk vs. RB Rk 2016 28 19.1% 31 7.6% 24 -7.0% 9 -4.9% 13 16.1% 28 17.5% 27 17.1% 27 2017 28 21.1% 27 -1.6% 16 30.7% 32 17.3% 30 20.2% 27 -19.5% 5 13.2% 24 2018 27 4.8% 19 18.5% 26 36.9% 31 -9.9% 11 36.7% 32 9.6% 21 5.7% 19

That defensive backs table for San Francisco is an absolute mess—which means it’s an accurate summation of the 2018 49ers secondary. Six different players started at safety, but none of them started more than eight games. Six other players started at corner, and most of them were negatives. The only one here who was uncategorically good was Richard Sherman, and even he looked more vulnerable than usual. He gave up four catches for 81 yards to the Cardinals (the Cardinals!) in Week 8 and four catches for 100 yards to the Bucs in Week 12. Sherman turned 31 in March; at that age, it’s quite likely that his best days are behind him.  Mind you, Sherman at 80 percent would still have been San Francisco’s best corner last year. There is hope that Ahkello Witherspoon could rebound to his rookie form, when he was among the top four in both success rate and yards allowed per target, albeit in just nine starts. As for K’Waun Williams, 2018 was the first time in his five NFL seasons he played enough to qualify for our tables. A 47 percent success rate is less than ideal, but teams did not pick on him as much as you think, and he didn’t surrender many big plays.  The here is , who made the with the Chargers in 2015 but has played in only five games since. Verrett’s injuries include both a torn ACL and a torn Achilles, but if he could somehow play a meaningful chunk of the season at anything close to his former level, San Francisco’s whole defense would start to look a lot better.  Speaking of players with severe injury concerns, let’s discuss hypothetical starting safeties Jaquiski Tartt and Adrian Colbert. Tartt, the box safety, has tantalizing playmaking potential, as seen in his superlative run-tackling stats. He has 19 defeats the last two years despite playing in only 17 games (to put that in perspective, only three safeties had more than that in 2018), and at 215 pounds showed surprising speed running down from behind on a long kickoff return against Seattle in Week 13. Colbert, the deep man, has started a dozen games by default since he was drafted in the seventh round in 2017 and has failed to make any kind of impact.  For the sake of completeness, we will point out that Jimmie Ward—who has spent five years bouncing back and forth from safety to nickelback but failing to play well or stay healthy at either—has already suffered his first significant injury of 2019, breaking his collarbone in OTAs. He is expected to recover by Week 1; he was playing free safety before the injury and would likely replace Colbert as the starter.

Special Teams Year DVOA Rank FG/XP Rank Net Kick Rank Kick Ret Rank Net Rank Punt Ret Rank Hidden Rank 2016 -0.3% 17 3.9 8 -2.7 23 -6.7 29 5.1 9 -0.9 14 -1.2 19 2017 2.9% 11 14.2 2 3.0 10 -6.4 32 3.6 13 0.0 16 4.9 10 2018 0.3% 14 6.6 7 -0.4 17 1.7 8 0.0 17 -6.4 30 3.6 10

Since joining San Francisco two years ago, leads the NFL in both total field goals (72) and conversion rate (96 percent) … so of course he is now the center of a nasty contract dispute. John Lynch slapped the franchise tag on him. Gould responded by pulling out of contract negotiations and demanding a trade, a trade which the 49ers have refused to consider. Ordinarily we’d caution a team against overpaying for a kicker, let alone one who turns 37 this season, but this might not be an issue if the team hadn’t spent more than $20 million on running backs. (Just before we went to press, Gould signed a four-year, $19-million deal with the 49ers.)  had negative punting value in each of the last three seasons, so he’s gone, replaced by fourth-round draftee Mitch Wishnowsky. Wishnowsky won the as the nation’s best punter at Utah in 2016. His next two seasons weren’t quite as spectacular, but he should be reliable at avoiding returns and pinning opponents inside the 20, though there are questions about his ability to boom long punts out of his own end.  The 49ers were strong on kick returns, thanks in large part to rookie , who had a 97-yard touchdown against Seattle in Week 15. D.J. Reed, another rookie, added his own kickoff return for a touchdown against Detroit, though it was called back due to his own face mask penalty.  Things weren’t nearly as good on punt returns. Dante Pettis averaged 14.2 yards with an NCAA record nine at the University of Washington but gained only 27 total yards on nine returns in his rookie year in San Francisco. James and were hardly any better.