Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States
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Interim Report
Chapter 2 Corruption in Australia 2.1 Corruption appears to exist at all levels of society. A commonly agreed definition of corruption—albeit a narrow one—is 'the misuse of entrusted power for private gain'.1 It can take many forms depending on local culture and context.2 Corruption can distort the making of public policy or the implementation of public policy. 3 2.2 The Attorney-General's Department provides an explanation of the place corruption occupies on the continuum of human behaviour: Corruption could be viewed as one end of a continuum of other undesirable behaviours, including maladministration and improper conduct. … Corruption can occur on many levels, from small illicit payments as part of routine bureaucratic processes, to the large scale diversions of public resources to corrupt individuals. Corruption affects both the public and private sectors and can be facilitated by bribery, embezzlement, money- laundering, nepotism and cronyism.4 2.3 Corruption has a negative effect on the countries, communities and institutions in which it is able to thrive. The Attorney-General's Department's 2011 National Anti-Corruption Plan discussion paper expanded on this point: Corruption is a corrosive global phenomenon that has a wide range of devastating impacts. It undermines democracy and the rule of law; discourages investment and distorts markets; diverts resources from important services like schools, hospitals and roads; and provides a breeding ground for organised crime and terrorism.5 2.4 Corruption in Australia – a very wealthy country by global standards – is not the same as corruption in a poorer country. Professor Graycar informed the committee that the kinds of corruption risk in a rich country are not typically small scale bribes to 1 Attorney-General's Department, The Commonwealth's approach to Anti-Corruption– Discussion Paper, 2011, p. -
A Changing of the Guards Or a Change of Systems?
BTI 2020 A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems? Regional Report Sub-Saharan Africa Nic Cheeseman BTI 2020 | A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems? Regional Report Sub-Saharan Africa By Nic Cheeseman Overview of transition processes in Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe This regional report was produced in October 2019. It analyzes the results of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2020 in the review period from 1 February 2017 to 31 January 2019. Author Nic Cheeseman Professor of Democracy and International Development University of Birmingham Responsible Robert Schwarz Senior Project Manager Program Shaping Sustainable Economies Bertelsmann Stiftung Phone 05241 81-81402 [email protected] www.bti-project.org | www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en Please quote as follows: Nic Cheeseman, A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems? — BTI Regional Report Sub-Saharan Africa, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020. https://dx.doi.org/10.11586/2020048 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). Cover: © Freepick.com / https://www.freepik.com/free-vector/close-up-of-magnifying-glass-on- map_2518218.htm A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems? — BTI 2020 Report Sub-Saharan Africa | Page 3 Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................... -
Regulating Lobbying Activities in the EU and LAC
EURO-LATIN AMERICAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION: Regulating lobbying activities in the EU and LAC based on the report by the Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights Co-rapporteurs: Ángel Rozas (Parlatino, Argentina) Mónica Silvana González (European Parliament, Spain) Friday, 13 December 2019 – Panama AT\1195185EN.docx AP102.537v07-00 EN EN AP102.537v07-00 2/7 AT\1195185EN.docx EN EUROLAT – Resolution of 13 December 2019 – Panama based on the report by the Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights Regulating lobbying activities in the EU and LAC The Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, – having regard to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption of 2003, which entered into force on 14 December 2005, – having regard to the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity, adopted by the OECD Council in 20171, – having to the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, adopted by the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1996, – having regard to the United Nations Resolution ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015 (UNGA A/RES/70/1), – having regard to the OECD principles for transparency and integrity in lobbying, adopted by the OECD Council as a recommendation in 2010, – having regard to Articles 41 and 42 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights2, – having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council -
Policy Template
TOWN OF GAWLER POLICY Policy Section: 1. Corporate Governance Policy Name: Whistleblower Protection Policy Classification Public – Council Policy Adopted: 28 July 2015 Frequency of Review: Biennial Last Review: September 2017 Next Review Due: September 2019 Responsible Officer(s): Chief Executive Officer Governance Officer Policy and Code of Practice CC10/2601 Manual File Ref: Council File Reference: CR16/37298 Legislation Authority: Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 Related Policies: Internal Review of a Council Decision Ombudsman Enquiry and Investigation Management Related Procedures: Whistleblower Investigation Procedure 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 The Town of Gawler is committed to upholding the principles of transparency and accountability in its administrative and management practices and, therefore, encourages the making of Disclosures that reveal Public Interest Information. 1.2 The purpose of this Policy is to ensure that the Town of Gawler: 1.2.1 properly fulfils its responsibilities under the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993; 1.2.2 encourages and facilitates Disclosures of Public Interest Information which may include occurrences of Maladministration and Waste within the Council, and corrupt or illegal conduct in general, so that internal controls may be strengthened; 1.2.3 provides a process by which Disclosures may be made so that they are properly investigated; CR16/37298 Page 1 of 12 The electronic version of this document is the controlled version. Printed copies are considered uncontrolled. Before using a printed copy, verify that it is the current version. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION POLICY 1.2.4 provides appropriate protection for those who make Disclosures in accordance with the Act; and 1.2.5 recognises the need to appropriately support the Whistleblower, the Responsible Officer and, as appropriate, those Public Officers affected by any allegation that affects them. -
Exploring Corruption in Public Financial Management 267 William Dorotinsky and Shilpa Pradhan
Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized 39985 The Many Faces of Corruption The Many Faces of Corruption Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level EDITED BY J. Edgardo Campos Sanjay Pradhan Washington, D.C. © 2007 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org E-mail: [email protected] All rights reserved 2 3 4 5 10 09 08 07 This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgement on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; telephone: 978-750-8400; fax: 978-750-4470; Internet: www.copyright.com. -
Corruption Perceptions Index 2020
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2020 Transparency International is a global movement with one vision: a world in which government, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption. With more than 100 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, we are leading the fight against corruption to turn this vision into reality. #cpi2020 www.transparency.org/cpi Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of January 2021. Nevertheless, Transparency International cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts. ISBN: 978-3-96076-157-0 2021 Transparency International. Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under CC BY-ND 4.0 DE. Quotation permitted. Please contact Transparency International – [email protected] – regarding derivatives requests. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2020 2-3 12-13 20-21 Map and results Americas Sub-Saharan Africa Peru Malawi 4-5 Honduras Zambia Executive summary Recommendations 14-15 22-23 Asia Pacific Western Europe and TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE European Union 6-7 Vanuatu Myanmar Malta Global highlights Poland 8-10 16-17 Eastern Europe & 24 COVID-19 and Central Asia Methodology corruption Serbia Health expenditure Belarus Democratic backsliding 25 Endnotes 11 18-19 Middle East & North Regional highlights Africa Lebanon Morocco TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 180 COUNTRIES. 180 SCORES. HOW DOES YOUR COUNTRY MEASURE UP? -
Anti-Corruption Agencies in Asia Pacific Countries: an Evaluation of Their Performance and Challenges
Anti-Corruption Agencies in Asia Pacific Countries: An Evaluation of their Performance and Challenges Jon S.T. Quah, Phd, Anti-Corruption Consultant, Singapore Author: Jon S.T. Quah, Phd, Anti-Corruption Consultant, Singapore Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as November 2017. Sponsored by: Transparency International cannot accept any responsibility of the content of this report nor for the consequences of the use of this report for other purposes or in other contexts. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 1. INTRODUCTION 5 2. DEFINITION AND TYPES OF ACA s 6 3. POLICY CONTEXTS IN ASIA PACIFIC COUNTRIES 7 4. LEARNING FROM SUCCESS: RECIPE FOR EFFECTIVE ACAs 10 A. STRONG DOSE OF POLITICAL WILL 10 B. ESTABLISH A TYPE A ACA WITH ADEQUATE BUDGET AND PERSONNEL 10 C. TYPE A ACA MUST BE AN INDEPENDENT WATCHDOG WITH OPERATIONAL AUTONOMY 12 D. PUBLIC SUPPORT IS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE ACA FROM ITS ENEMIES 13 5. PREVENTING FAILURE BY AVOIDING TWO MISTAKES 15 A. AVOID MISUSING THE ACA AS AN ATTACK DOG 15 B. AVOID CREATING THE ACA AS A PAPER TIGER 16 6. CHALLENGES FACING ACAs IN ASIA PACIFIC COUNTRIES 18 A. GROWING THREAT OF PRIVATE SECTOR CORRUPTION 18 B. BATTLING POLICE CORRUPTION 19 C. ATTRACTING AND RETAINING TALENTED PERSONNEL 20 7. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ACAs 23 8. CONCLUSION 24 REFERENCES 25 APPENDIX A: ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES IN ASIA PACIFIC COUNTRIES 30 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The effectiveness of Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in combatting corruption has resulted in the establishment of many anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in other Asia Pacific countries over the past 65 years. -
Thesis Rajin Rgd.Pdf
A model for the prevention of corruption and corruption-related offences at Gauteng police stations by Ronnie Gonasagaran Dayananda Rajin submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Literature and Philosophy in the School of Criminal Justice at the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR H.F. SNYMAN May 2017 i Summary The research entailed an exploration of the reasons behind corruption and related offences in selected Gauteng police stations of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Corruption refers to the illegal and unlawful activities performed by police officials when they enrich themselves by taking money and other valuable property from offenders, victims and other people they come into contact with. The participants in this study were purposefully chosen and comprised of two groups. The first group included ex-police officials convicted and sentenced for committing corruption and related offences. The second group were active police officials suspected to have committed corruption and related crimes and some in this group were dismissed by disciplinary tribunals. The research was done at four of the police stations in Gauteng Province. There were 18 participants interviewed and nine were chosen from these police stations, with the remaining nine from two correctional facilities in Gauteng. The participants were asked an open-ended question which aimed at exploring convicted police officials’ reasons for having committed corruption. The interviews were recorded with the participants’ permission. The recorded data were transcribed verbatim and analysed. The five main themes that emerged are the high incidence of corruption involving all levels of police, multiple environmental factors which contribute to corruption, forms of corruption, dynamics resulting from corruption and anti-corruption mechanisms to prevent corruption. -
Iraq: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption
www.transparency.org www.cmi.no Iraq: overview of corruption and anti-corruption Query Please provide an overview of corruption and anti-corruption efforts in Iraq. Purpose become increasingly aware of the enormous corruption challenges it faces. Massive embezzlement, We would like to provide all country offices with an anti- procurement scams, money laundering, oil smuggling corruption country profile to inform their contribution and widespread bureaucratic bribery have led the portfolio analysis country to the bottom of international corruption rankings, fuelled political violence and hampered Content effective state building and service delivery. 1. Overview of corruption in Iraq Although the country’s anti-corruption initiatives and framework have expanded since 2005, they still fail to 2. Anti-corruption efforts in Iraq provide a strong and comprehensive integrity system. 3. References Political interference in anti-corruption bodies and politicisation of corruption issues, weak civil society, insecurity, lack of resources and incomplete legal Caveat provisions severely limit the government’s capacity to This answer does not extensively deal with the efficiently curb soaring corruption. Ensuring the integrity specificities of the Kurdistan Regional Government of the management of Iraq’s massive and growing oil (KRG) and primarily focuses on corruption and anti- revenue will therefore be one of the country’s greatest corruption in the rest of Iraq. challenges in the coming years. Summary After a difficult beginning marked by institutional instability, Iraq’s new regime has in recent years Author(s): Maxime Agator, Transparency International, [email protected] Reviewed by: Marie Chêne, Transparency International, [email protected]; Finn Heinrich, Ph.D, [email protected] Date: April 2013 Number: 374 U4 is a web-based resource centre for development practitioners who wish to effectively address corruption challenges in their work. -
Corruption Worse Than ISIS: Causes and Cures Cures for Iraqi Corruption
Corruption Worse Than ISIS: Causes and Cures Cures for Iraqi Corruption Frank R. Gunter Professor of Economics, Lehigh University Advisory Council Member, Iraq Britain Business Council “Corruption benefits the few at the expense of the many; it delays and distorts economic development, pre-empts basic rights and due process, and diverts resources from basic services, international aid, and whole economies. Particularly where state institutions are weak, it is often linked to violence.” (Johnston 2006 as quoted by Allawi 2020) Like sand after a desert storm, corruption permeates every corner of Iraqi society. According to Transparency International (2021), Iraq is not the most corrupt country on earth – that dubious honor is a tie between Somalia and South Sudan – but Iraq is in the bottom 12% ranking 160th out of the 180 countries evaluated. With respect to corruption, Iraq is tied with Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, and Eritrea. Corruption in Iraq extends from the ministries in Baghdad to police stations and food distribution centers in every small town. (For excellent overviews of the range and challenges of corruption in Iraq, see Allawi 2020 and Looney 2008.) While academics may argue that small amounts of corruption act as a “lubricant” for government activities, the large scale of corruption in Iraq undermines private and public attempts to achieve a better life for the average Iraqi. A former Iraqi Minister of Finance and a Governor of the Central Bank both stated that the deleterious impact of corruption was worse than that of the insurgency (Minister of Finance 2005). This is consistent with the Knack and Keefer study (1995, Table 3) that showed that corruption has a greater adverse impact on economic growth than political violence. -
Electoral Integrity in the 2018 American Elections PEI-US-2018
Electoral Integrity in the 2018 American Elections PEI-US-2018 Pippa Norris, Holly Ann Garnett and Max Grömping May 2019 www.electoralintegrityproject.com 1 Department of Government and International Relations Merewether Building, HO4 University of Sydney Sydney NSW, 2006, Australia John F. Kennedy School of Government 79 JFK Street Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Phone: +61(2) 9351 2147 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com Dataverse: http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI Twitter: https://twitter.com/ElectIntegrity Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/electoralintegrity Blogger: http://electoralintegrity.blogspot.com.au/ Copyright © Pippa Norris, Holly Ann Garnett and Max Grömping 2019. All rights reserved. Cover Photo Credit "VOTE buttons" by US Department of State is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0 How to cite the report: Pippa Norris, Holly Ann Garnett, and Max Grömping. 2019. Electoral Integrity in the 2018 American Elections (PEI- US-2018). Sydney: The Electoral Integrity Project, University of Sydney. 2 Contents I: Overview ....................................................................................................................................................... 4 II: Methods ....................................................................................................................................................... 5 Conceptual framework ..................................................................................................................................... -
UC Santa Barbara UC Santa Barbara Previously Published Works
UC Santa Barbara UC Santa Barbara Previously Published Works Title HAS LIBERIA TURNED A CORNER? Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4394423f Journal JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 29(3) ISSN 1045-5736 Authors Spatz, Benjamin J Thaler, Kai M Publication Date 2018-07-01 DOI 10.1353/jod.2018.0052 License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 4.0 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Has Liberia Turned a Corner? Benjamin J. Spatz, Kai M. Thaler Journal of Democracy, Volume 29, Number 3, July 2018, pp. 156-170 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0052 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/698925 No institutional affiliation (16 Jul 2018 18:21 GMT) HAS LIBERIA TURNED A CORNER? Benjamin J. Spatz and Kai M. Thaler Benjamin J. Spatz is a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He has worked on Liberia since 2005, including serving on the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia during 2012–15. Kai M. Thaler is assistant professor of global studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. The January 2018 inauguration of Liberia’s newly elected president George Weah marked the small West African country’s first transfer of power between democratically elected leaders since its founding 171 years earlier. After an electoral process marred by charges of irregularities and court-ordered delays, Weah’s clear runoff victory was followed rapidly by the concession of his opponent, Unity Party (UP) candidate and incum- bent vice-president Joseph Boakai.