Daniel J. Whelan
‘‘Under the Aegis of Man’’: The Right to Development and the Origins of the New International Economic Order
On September 23, 1966, the Senegalese foreign minister Doudou Thiam gave an impassioned speech to fellow delegates assembled in New York for the opening of the 21st Session of the United Nations General Assembly.1 It began as a reflection on the preceding twenty years of UN history. Despite some modest progress that the UN had achieved in meeting its three primary objectives—the maintenance of peace; the liberation of colonized peoples; and the economic and social development of mankind—this period was more notably exemplified by failures and setbacks: the war in Southeast Asia; the failure of decolonization in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa; and the failure to meet the goals of the UN’s first ‘‘Development Decade.’’2
It was on this third point that Thiam ruminated for the remainder of his speech.
The achievement of political and legal sovereignty by newly decolonized states did not resolve the existing imbalance of power between the developing and developed worlds. Thiam cited growing inequality in the share of global income between developed and underdeveloped countries: in 1938, the income disparity was 15:1; by 1966 it was 35:1, and projected to be 40:1 by 2000.
Thiam insisted that this phenomenon of underdevelopment was not determined by geography or race; it was mobile, moving about in time and space. Western pros-
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- perity vis-a-vis the Middle East, India, and China was historically recent, and the so-
called poor nations were not as poor as they were said to be: in 1963 they held 50 percent of the world’s petroleum, nearly half the copper and manganese ore, and 70 percent of the world’s diamonds. The same was true of their share of agricultural commodities.
The problem, Thiam argued, lay in the inequitable international division of labor and deterioration in the terms of trade since 1950. In the postwar global economy, the underdeveloped countries had taken on the role of producers of raw materials and importers of finished goods: ‘‘In theory, the old colonial pact was doubtlessly abolished at the end of the last century, but in practice it has been maintained for a long time . . . An actual pillage of the developing countries has been organized on a worldwide scale.’’3
Thiam called upon developing countries to act: the time had come to organize an
‘‘economic Bandung Conference’’—a reference to the 1955 Afro-Asian summit that exemplified a newly emerging spirit of postcolonial unity and solidarity. The last part of Thiam’s speech is worth reproducing in its entirety, for it introduced a novel and revolutionary concept:
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What is our task? We must lay the foundations for a new world society; we must bring about a new revolution; we must tear down all the practices, institutions and rules on which international economic relations are based, in so far as these practices, institutions and rules sanction injustice and exploitation and maintain the unjustified domination of a minority over the majority of men. Not only must we reaffirm our right to development, be we must also take the steps which will enable this right to become a reality. We must build a new system, based not only on the theoretical affirmation of the sacred rights of peoples and nations but on the actual enjoyment of these rights. The right of peoples to self-determination, the sovereign equality of peoples, international solidarity—all these will remain empty words, and, forgive me for saying so, hypocritical words, until relations between nations are viewed in the light of economic and social facts. From this point of view, the facts contradict the principles. The new world vision which the Charter of the United Nations held out to us is still only a vision. It has not yet become an international reality. The economic Bandung Conference that we are proposing should enable us to formulate a new world economic charter. We shall attend, not in order to present a list of complaints, but to demand and claim what is ours, or, more precisely, what is due to man, whatever his nationality, his race or his religion. We must define a new revolutionary attitude which, starting with the somber realities of today, will guide us toward realities that are more in keeping with the ethics of the United Nations. This means that the Bandung we are proposing will not be a Bandung of hatred; it will be a Bandung of justice, balance and reason; it will be a Bandung held under the aegis of man.4
Thiam’s speech was the first official articulation of the concept of the ‘‘right to development’’ in the history of the United Nations. The language of rights is closely tied to demands for justice: in the case of the right to development, economic justice. Pleas for global economic justice began to gain traction in the late 1950s; they rose to the level of a ‘‘demand’’ by the mid-1970s, expressed in the Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order, its accompanying Program of Action, and their companion, the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), all of which the United Nations adopted with overwhelming majority (indeed lopsided) votes in 1974.5 This essay explores the normative origins of the NIEO and especially CERDS, as they first appeared in the form of the ‘‘right to development.’’ It will explore the emergence of the rhetoric, how it was deployed, and how it eventually transformed into what I would argue was a milder ‘‘demand’’ for a new charter of economic rights and duties of states.
Paradoxically, while the right to development rhetoric grew and gained more adherents during various United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) summits, outcome documents from those meetings failed to embrace its principles in any robust fashion. By the early 1970s, advocates for the right to development were insisting upon its legal basis. But the NIEO and CERDS were largely devoid of normative, humanitarian rhetoric or principle. At the same time, just as the right to development gave way to the somewhat staid and boring sphere of international negotiations over trade and development, the idea of a right to development
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‘‘jumped the tracks’’ from the NIEO process into the very willing arms of the UN’s Commission on Human Rights, where it was embraced with enthusiasm in the late 1970s. This essay focuses primarily on the first part of this story.
The NIEO and CERDS were the culmination of nearly twenty years of conference diplomacy spearheaded by newly independent postcolonial states (organized into the ‘‘Group of 77’’) that exerted their emerging majority power in the UN system to fundamentally transform what they viewed as the unjust global trading and development order. The right to development—which was very closely associated with the right to self-determination and its economic constituent, the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources—had animated many within the G-77, shaping its economic goals throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. The final resting place of this strand of the ‘‘right to development’’ was the 1974 Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States.
Preludes
Most historical accounts of the right to development locate its key origin in an inau-
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- gural lecture given by the Senegalese jurist Keba M’Baye to the International Institute
for Human Rights (Strasbourg, France) in 1972 and then jump to the ‘‘reiteration’’ of the right by the Commission on Human Rights in 1979, starting a process which eventually culminated in the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development.6 Some of the very early literature on the right to development fills out the story a bit more, but most accounts largely dispense with historical questions and begin with the formation of the Working Group on the Right to Development in 1981.7
On its face, this is not surprising, given that the original ‘‘right to development’’ was clearly not a human right (indeed, some argue that the contemporary version fails on that score as well).8 As articulated by Doudou Thiam in 1966, the right to development was framed within an emerging postcolonial critique of the dominant strand of development thinking after World War II—‘‘modernization theory’’—which was first fully articulated in W.W. Rostow’s ‘‘take-off’’ model of economic growth published in 1960.9 This development paradigm, in which national economies pass through various stages—from preindustrial ‘‘traditional’’ society toward highconsumption, fully industrialized modernization—was challenged by many Third
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World states that were influenced by dependency theorists (such as Raul Prebisch, who was UNCTAD secretary-general from 1963 to 1969). Dependency theory maintained that declining terms of trade thwarted developing countries from moving out of production and trade of primary goods. While critical of this dominant development model, challengers nevertheless still subscribed to the notion that trade was the primary engine of development, a stance that remained a centerpiece of development policy throughout this period (as, indeed, it continues to be today). It was a central goal of the NIEO to fundamentally alter this trade model—not to replace it.
As a matter of justice, a fundamental root of the right to development (and, incidentally, its link to human rights) was the right to self-determination. While this ‘‘right’’ appears in many foundational constitutional documents of the postwar international order (especially the UN Charter), it was the identical articulation of the
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right to self-determination as Article 1 of the two human rights Covenants that clearly defined the scope and content of the right:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Including the right to self-determination in the Covenants was difficult. In 1954, the Commission on Human Rights had proposed language on this right, but after handing off the draft Covenants to the General Assembly, its Third Committee spent two years debating its scope and content—or whether it should be included as a human right at all.10 By 1956, the final draft article was approved, but discussions continued about how the right could be realized and/or enforced, especially in its economic instantiation: the right to ‘‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources.’’ Chile in particular was obsessed with this issue and took the lead in the Commission on Human Rights to urge the UN to further elaborate the scope and content of this right.
In 1959, the UN General Assembly established a nine-country Commission on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSONR) to study the issue.11 It met in three sessions from 1959 to 1961. Its first session outlined the scope of a study to be prepared by the Secretariat, with a wide range of views expressed. Chile was most interested in the issue as it related to resource extraction—it wanted sovereign control over its precious copper resources but acknowledged the need for outside technical assistance and cooperation to do so. The USSR believed the Commission should report and uncover violations of the right as evidence of ‘‘neocolonialism.’’ Western states were concerned about nationalization against the dictates of international law. The Secretariat’s report was discussed and debated during the Commission’s second session, and the Commission suggested further revisions.12 Deliberations at the third session led to the draft resolution on PSONR that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1962.13 While not formally considered to be a ‘‘Declaration,’’ the resolution does declare certain principles with respect to various aspects of the right and how it should be interpreted, while not actually defining the right’s scope or content. The resolution does not outline any specific obligations (beyond respecting the right itself), nor does it establish any machinery to monitor the right. Its language is straightforward, sober, and fairly technical—it does not cite ongoing colonialism, exploitation, or injustice as animating its goals or content.
Another key genealogical root (perhaps the first) in the establishment of a common
Third World stance on development policy was the 1962 Conference on the Problems
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of Economic Development, held in Cairo. The ‘‘Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries,’’ issued at the end of the Conference, was subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly.14 The basic seeds of the NIEO program are featured in the Declaration, albeit the tone of the document is quite sober, as was the rhetoric on display at the Conference.15 Dominating the deliberations were the international obstacles to ‘‘development,’’ with many delegations preferring the phrase ‘‘underdeveloped countries’’ to ‘‘developing countries’’ to underscore the idea that structural obstacles were thwarting the process of development itself. The Conference records reflect the human impact of underdevelopment: some Head-of-Delegation speeches are peppered with references to poverty, human dignity, and the well-being of people—language that would all but disappear by the time the NIEO and CERDS were adopted in 1974. The Cairo Conference was instrumental in the UN’s decision to establish the Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which held its first summit in Geneva in 1964.
The Right to Development Emerges: The Algiers Summit and UNCTAD II
Doudou Thiam’s ‘‘right to development’’ speech in the General Assembly in 1966 came as frustration grew over the failure of the international community to meet the goals established by the resolution declaring the 1960s as the UN’s ‘‘Development Decade’’ and the trade commitments (as modest as they were) that were hammered out in Geneva two year earlier.16 In October 1967, the Group of 77 held its first Ministerial Meeting in Algiers to chart a common agenda in advance of UNCTAD II, which would be held in New Delhi the following year. Many of the discussions revolved around the attitude the G-77 should take relative to the developed countries, especially about trade, aid, and development assistance. The summary records indicate a fairly large divide about these questions. Most of the statements were sober about the agenda, sticking largely to technical trade-related issues that they believed the G-77 should emphasize. Others offered their unvarnished views about the power struggles between the developed and developing worlds—Algeria’s Houari Boumediene was a notable archetype:
While the imperialist powers kept wars going on in various parts of the Third World [for example, Vietnam] . . . the colonialists and segregationist regimes kept up a relentless struggle against those countries which had not yet attained their independence . . . By their violent reaction, the imperialist and neo-colonialist countries had betrayed their fears lest the peoples of the Third World should decide their own economic future and achieve development based on genuine social justice. Those countries were mobilizing vast resources in order to entrench their political and economic dictatorship through regional agreements [i.e., the European Economic Community] concluded at the developing countries’ expense.17
Although less strident, Nigeria agreed that developing countries should not ‘‘fall over one another to invite the neo-colonialists to come to their territories to preside over their fortunes.’’ Doing so would only allow ‘‘poverty, ignorance, and disease’’ to persist.18
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Others disagreed. Ethiopia believed the purposes of UNCTAD II should not be misunderstood as ‘‘involving the compilation of unreasonable demands to be forced upon the advanced countries.’’19 Morocco urged the G-77 not to go to New Delhi as ‘‘beggars or accusers but as interlocutors fully aware of their own position’’; they should not go there to ‘‘wring money’’ out of the developed countries.20 F. RibeiroAyeh of Ghana acknowledged that while there had been colonial exploitation in the past, the G-77 needed a unified, solutions-based approach to their negotiations with the developed world, achieved through ‘‘objective examination’’ rather than confrontation, ‘‘which was usually characterized by impulsive attacks and apportionment of blame.’’21 While Ribeiro-Ayeh agreed that developed countries needed to make concessions in the spirit of mutual cooperation, the G-77 needed to make reasonable and practical requests that took into account the real interests of those from whom ‘‘sympathy and concessions’’ were sought:
In the past, some developing countries had adopted the attitude that because the developed countries had exploited their ancestors, they were obliged to return some part of the spoils to the developing countries. That was tantamount to a demand for the payment of conscience money . . . that was no longer a realistic approach to the problem. It would be better [for the developing countries] to make great efforts to catch up . . . with the developed countries instead of approaching them hat in hand.22
In between the firebrands and the conciliators were other sharp yet somewhat circumspect positions. Concerning the duties and obligations of the developed countries toward the Third World, especially with regard to aid, Jacques Rabemananjara of Madagascar remarked,
It should not be forgotten that many of the developed countries had grown rich largely by exploiting the developing countries for decade after decade. Surely they should return in a gesture of friendship what they had taken by force. For that reason [Madagascar] felt no loss of dignity in accepting aid: quite the contrary, developing countries should ask for even more in view of the blood shed by their forefathers—though no financial payment could really compensate for human values lost.23
Arguing that ‘‘the continued under-development of one half of the world constituted a grave threat to peace and to the future of mankind generally,’’ Senegal’s Thiam echoed a sentiment that was oft-repeated during the summit: that while the ‘‘first’’ responsibility for development rested with Third World governments themselves, meeting those responsibilities must be tied to the fulfillment of duties held by developed countries:
Action at the national level against under-development was a matter for the developing countries alone; but some questions called for international action—for instance, relations between nations, primary commodities, technical assistance and the financing of development aid. Once those questions had been discussed at the New Delhi conference the developing countries would be able to judge whether
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or not the developed countries had accepted their responsibilities. Underdevelopment was a new form of twentieth-century slavery and it should be rapidly abolished, once and for all.24
After a few weeks of deliberations, the Conference adopted the ‘‘Charter of
Algiers,’’ the second significant normative ancestor of the NIEO.25 Compared to the 1962 Cairo Declaration, which was much shorter and focused mostly on setting guidelines for the first UNCTAD conference, the Charter of Algiers was a more robust document that established the pattern and structure that the NIEO outcome documents would take in 1974. The Charter of Algiers begins by proclaiming that ‘‘the lot of more than a billion people of the developing world continues to deteriorate as a result of the trends in international economic relations.’’ Those trends relate to declining terms of trade; a drop in the share of exports of the developing world in the global economy, and thus of their purchasing power; growing indebtedness of the Third World; the inability of most countries to take advantage of improvements in technology; and the ‘‘virtual stagnation’’ in food production, which, coupled with population increases, ‘‘aggravated the chronic conditions of under-nourishment and malnutrition.’’
Part II of the introductory section of the Charter outlines the failures of the agreements reached at UNCTAD I to materialize—again, with an emphasis on the worsening conditions of trade relative to the early 1960s. Part III underlines the obli- gation of the international community to ‘‘rectify these unfavorable trends and to create conditions under which all nations can enjoy economic and social well-being, and have the means to develop their respective resources to enable their peoples to lead a life free from want and fear.’’ These key words and phrases reflect the normative dimensions of the concerns of developing countries, although these passages are the only ones to refer to ‘‘obligations’’ and ‘‘peoples’’ in the Charter. Despite some of the more pointed discussions during the General Debate at Algiers, there is not a single reference to colonialism or neocolonialism, imperialism, exploitation, poverty, or the ‘‘right to development’’ in the Charter.
Nevertheless, the Charter of Algiers was the ‘‘new world economic charter’’ that
Doudou Thiam envisioned in his 1966 General Assembly speech. He was thus determined to drive home the sense of moral obligation reflected in the Charter. After its formal adoption at Algiers, Thiam praised the spirit of unity of the developing countries, which had repudiated ‘‘the Cartiers of this world’’ who believed that the Charter would ‘‘point an accusing finger at the great Powers,’’ or that the Algiers summit would turn out to be ‘‘a beggar’s conference’’: