Enron's Pawns
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Media Coverage of Ceos: Who? What? Where? When? Why?
Media Coverage of CEOs: Who? What? Where? When? Why? James T. Hamilton Sanford Institute of Public Policy Duke University [email protected] Richard Zeckhauser Kennedy School of Government Harvard University [email protected] Draft prepared for March 5-6, 2004 Workshop on the Media and Economic Performance, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Center on Development, Democracy, and the Rule of Law. We thank Stephanie Houghton and Pavel Zhelyazkov for expert research assistance. Media Coverage of CEOs: Who? What? Where? When? Why? Abstract: Media coverage of CEOs varies predictably across time and outlets depending on the audience demands served by reporters, incentives pursued by CEOs, and changes in real economic indicators. Coverage of firms and CEOs in the New York Times is countercyclical, with declines in real GDP generating increases in the average number of articles per firm and CEO. CEO credit claiming follows a cyclical pattern, with the number of press releases mentioning CEOs and profits, earnings, or sales increasing as monthly business indicators increase. CEOs also generate more press releases with soft news stories as the economy and stock market grow. Major papers, because of their focus on entertainment, offer a higher percentage of CEO stories focused on soft news or negative news compared to CEO articles in business and finance outlets. Coverage of CEOs is highly concentrated, with 20% of chief executives generating 80% of coverage. Firms headed by celebrity CEOs do not earn higher average shareholder returns in the short or long run. For some CEOs media coverage equates to on-the-job consumption of fame. -
United States Court of Appeals for the DISTRICT of COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued October 7, 2016 Decided December 27, 2016 No. 15-7121 ENRON NIGERIA POWER HOLDING, LTD., APPELLEE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, APPELLANT Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:13-cv-01106) David Elesinmogun argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Kenneth R. Barrett argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellee. Before: ROGERS, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In 1999, the Republic of Nigeria entered into a power purchase agreement (“PPA”) with Enron Nigeria Power Holding, Ltd. (“ENPH”), for construction of 2 electrical facilities. Days later, Nigeria suspended implementation of the PPA, and after years of attempted renegotiation over one phase of construction proved fruitless, ENPH filed under the PPA for arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration (“ICC”). The ICC issued an Award in ENPH’s favor. When collection efforts failed, ENPH filed a petition for confirmation and enforcement of the Award in the federal district court here. Nigeria now appeals from the order granting enforcement of the Award. Invoking Article V(2)(b) of The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (known as the “New York Convention”), 21 U.S.T. 2517, Nigeria contends that enforcement of the Award violates the public policy of the United States not to reward a party for fraudulent and criminal conduct. It maintains that ENPH and Enron International Corporation (“Enron”) are alter egos, and, alternatively, that ENPH made false and fraudulent representations about Enron to induce Nigeria to enter the PPA. -
A Case of Corporate Deceit: the Enron Way / 18 (7) 3-38
NEGOTIUM Revista Científica Electrónica Ciencias Gerenciales / Scientific e-journal of Management Science PPX 200502ZU1950/ ISSN 1856-1810 / By Fundación Unamuno / Venezuela / REDALYC, LATINDEX, CLASE, REVENCIT, IN-COM UAB, SERBILUZ / IBT-CCG UNAM, DIALNET, DOAJ, www.jinfo.lub.lu.se Yokohama National University Library / www.scu.edu.au / Google Scholar www.blackboard.ccn.ac.uk / www.rzblx1.uni-regensburg.de / www.bib.umontreal.ca / [+++] Cita / Citation: Amol Gore, Guruprasad Murthy (2011) A CASE OF CORPORATE DECEIT: THE ENRON WAY /www.revistanegotium.org.ve 18 (7) 3-38 A CASE OF CORPORATE DECEIT: THE ENRON WAY EL CASO ENRON. Amol Gore (1) and Guruprasad Murthy (2) VN BRIMS Institute of Research and Management Studies, India Abstract This case documents the evolution of ‘fraud culture’ at Enron Corporation and vividly explicates the downfall of this giant organization that has become a synonym for corporate deceit. The objectives of this case are to illustrate the impact of culture on established, rational management control procedures and emphasize the importance of resolute moral leadership as a crucial qualification for board membership in corporations that shape the society and affect the lives of millions of people. The data collection for this case has included various sources such as key electronic databases as well as secondary data available in the public domain. The case is prepared as an academic or teaching purpose case study that can be utilized to demonstrate the manner in which corruption creeps into an ambitious organization and paralyses the proven management control systems. Since the topic of corporate practices and fraud management is inherently interdisciplinary, the case would benefit candidates of many courses including Operations Management, Strategic Management, Accounting, Business Ethics and Corporate Law. -
July 31, 2013 Local Government Assistance & Economic Analysis
July 31, 2013 Local Government Assistance & Economic Analysis Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts P.O. Box 13528 Austin, Texas 78711-3528 RE: Application to the Fort Stockton Independent School District from Barilla Solar, LLC FIRST QUALIFYING YEAR 2014 To the Local Government Assistance & Economic Analysis Division: By copy of this letter transmitting the application for review to the Comptroller’s Office, the Fort Stockton Independent School District is notifying the Applicant Barilla Solar, LLC of its intent to consider Barilla Solar, LLC’s application for appraised value limitation on qualified property. The Applicant submitted the application to the school district on July 22, 2013. The Board voted at a properly posted Board meeting to accept the application on July 22, 2013. The application was determined complete by the school district on July 31, 2013. Please prepare the economic impact report. The Applicant has included confidential materials with the application. The materials have been provided both in electronic and hard copy format. We have not attached the confidential materials to this email to avoid the unintended disclosure of these materials. Barilla Solar, LLC has also requested that Page 8 of the Application and Schedules A-D attached be kept “Confidential”, as well. Your office has already determined that information regarding investment levels and employment cannot be kept confidential. Even though the Applicant has written Confidential across the top of the Schedules, such information must be published on the website. Letter to Local Government Assistance & Economic Analysis Division July 31, 2013 Page 2 of 2 No construction has begun at the project site as of the date of the filing of the application and the District’s determination that the application is complete. -
Former Enron Broadband Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Rice Sentenced on Securities Fraud Charge
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CRM MONDAY, JUNE 18, 2007 PH: (202) 514-2007 WWW.USDOJ.GOV/ TDD: (202) 514-1888 Former Enron Broadband Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Rice Sentenced on Securities Fraud Charge WASHINGTON – Kenneth Rice, a former chief executive officer of Enron Broadband Services (EBS), was sentenced to 27 months in prison and ordered to forfeit approximately $15 million to be used to compensate victims of the Enron fraud, Assistant Attorney General Alice S. Fisher of the Criminal Division announced today. Rice was sentenced today at a hearing before Judge Vanessa Gilmore at U.S. District Court in Houston. Rice pleaded guilty on July 20, 2004 to the securities fraud charge, and cooperated with the government’s investigation into the collapse of Enron. Rice admitted that while he was at EBS, a unit of the now-defunct Enron Corp., he and others made a series of false statements about the products, services and business performance of EBS in order to mislead investors and others about the success of the company and to inflate artificially the price of Enron stock. Rice admitted that while serving as EBS’s CEO, he conspired with others to make false statements about the company’s development of various software capabilities and its fiber-optic network. Rice admitted that he falsely portrayed EBS as a commercial and business success, and falsely claimed that network control software developed by EBS was “up and running” – when in fact the software had not progressed beyond the internal development stage. These and other misrepresentations, including a failure to disclose to the investing public that the company stood to sustain operating losses in 2001, contributed to a sharp rise in Enron’s stock price. -
P:\Heather\Opinions to Be Docketed\04Cr025 Full Document.Wpd
Case 4:04-cr-00025 Document 494 Filed in TXSD on 10/17/05 Page 1 of 68 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CRIMINAL NUMBER H-04-025-SS § RICHARD A. CAUSEY, JEFFERY K. § SKILLING, and KENNETH L. LAY, § § Defendants. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pending before the court are Kenneth L. Lay’s Motion to Dismiss the Securities Fraud and Wire Fraud Counts of the Second Superseding Indictment [Defense Motion No. 2] (Docket Entry No. 386),1 and Jeffery K. Skilling’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 23, 24, 26, and to Strike Various Allegations as Prejudicial Surplusage [Defense Motion No. 4] (Docket Entry No. 394).2 The pending motions challenge charges brought against Lay for securities fraud and wire fraud and against Skilling for securities fraud as part of a 53-count Second Superseding Indictment ((SSI) Docket Entry No. 97). For the following reasons the motions will be denied. 1By notice filed with the court, Lay’s co-defendants join in this motion. See Jeffrey Skilling’s Joinder in Support of Defendant Kenneth Lay’s Defense Motions (Defense Motions Nos. 1 and 2)(Docket Entry No. 392); and Notice of Joinder (Docket Entry No. 420), executed by all three defendants. 2By notice filed with the court, Skilling’s co-defendants join in this motion. See Defendant Richard A. Causey’s Joinder in Various Defense Motions (Docket Entry No. 376)); Kenneth L. Lay’s Notice of Joinder of Co-Defendants’ Motions (Docket Entry No. 380); and Notice of Joinder (Docket Entry No. -
EN RON CORP. NOTICE of ANNUAL MEETING of SHAREHOLDERS May 2, 2000
EN RON CORP. NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS May 2, 2000 To THE S I-I AREHOLDERS: Notice is hereby given that the annual meeting of shareholders of Enton Corp. ("Enron") will be held in the LaSalle Ballroom of the Doubletree Hotel at Allen Center, 400 Dallas Street, Houston, Texas. at 10:00 a.m. Houston time on Tuesday, May 2, 2000, for the following purposes: I. To elect eighteen directors of Enron to hold office until the next annual meeting of shareholders and until their respective successors are duly elected and qualified; 2. To ratify the Board of Directors' appointment of Arthur Andersen LLP, independent public accountants, as Enton's auditors for the year ending December 31, 2000; 3. To consider a shareholder proposal from Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth Action; 4. To consider a shareholder proposal from Dr. Julia M. Wershing; and 5. To transact such other business as may properly be brought before the meeting or any adjoumment(s) thereof. Holders of record of Enron Common Stock and Cumulative Second Preferred Convertible Stock at the close of business on March 3. 2000. will be entitled to notice of and to vote at the meeting or any adjoumment(s) thereof. Shareholders who do not expect to attend the meeting are requested to sign and return the enclosed proxy, for which a postage·paid, return envelope is enclosed. The proxy must be signed and returned in order to be counted. By Order of the Board of Directors, REBECCA C. CARTER Senior Vice President, Board Communications and Secretary Houston. -
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT Managing Corporate Reputation and Risk.Pdf
Managing Corporate Reputation and Risk Developing a Strategic Approach to Corporate Integrity Using Knowledge Management This Page Intentionally Left Blank Managing Corporate Reputation and Risk Developing a Strategic Approach to Corporate Integrity Using Knowledge Management D N Amsterdam Boston Heidelberg London New York Oxford Paris San Diego San Francisco Singapore Sydney Tokyo Butterworth–Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier. Copyright © , Dale Neef. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Recognizing the importance of preserving what has been written, Elsevier Science prints its books on acid-free paper whenever possible. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Neef, Dale, – Managing corporate reputation and risk / Dale Neef. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN --- . Corporate image. Corporations—Moral and ethical aspects. Business ethics. Integrity. Risk management. Knowledge management. I. Title. HD..N .–dc British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The publisher offers special discounts on bulk orders of this book. For information, please contact: Manager of Special Sales Elsevier Science Wheeler Road Burlington, MA Tel: -- Fax: -- For information on all Butterworth–Heinemann publications available, -
Docket No. EC11-81-000, the AES Corporation, DPL Inc., the Dayton
20111115-3055 FERC PDF (Unofficial) 11/15/2011 137 FERC ¶ 61,122 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman; Philip D. Moeller, John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur. The AES Corporation Docket No. EC11-81-000 DPL Inc. The Dayton Power and Light Company DPL Energy, LLC ORDER AUTHORIZING MERGER AND DISPOSITION OF JURISDICTIONAL FACILITIES (Issued November 15, 2011) 1. On May 18, 2011, The AES Corporation (AES), DPL Inc. (DPL), and DPL’s subsidiaries, The Dayton Power and Light Company (DP&L) and DPL Energy, LLC (DPLE) (collectively “Applicants”) filed, pursuant to sections 203(a)(1) and 203(a)(2) of the Federal Power Act (FPA),1 a joint application for authorization of a proposed transaction in which AES will acquire DPL (Proposed Transaction). The Commission has reviewed the application under the Commission’s Merger Policy Statement.2 As 1 16 U.S.C. § 824b (2006). 2 See Inquiry Concerning the Commission’s Merger Policy Under the Federal Power Act: Policy Statement, Order No. 592, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,044 (1996), reconsideration denied, Order No. 592-A, 79 FERC ¶ 61,321 (1997) (Merger Policy Statement). See also FPA Section 203 Supplemental Policy Statement, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,277 (Aug. 2, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,253 (2007) (Supplemental Policy Statement). See also Revised Filing Requirements Under Part 33 of the Commission’s Regulations, Order No. 642, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,111 (2000), order on reh’g, Order No. 642-A, 94 FERC ¶ 61,289 (2001). See also Transactions Subject to FPA Section 203, Order No. -
Enron: Market Exploitation and Correction
Financial Decisions, Spring 2002, Article 1. Enron: Market Exploitation And Correction Ronnie J. Clayton William Scroggins Christopher Westley1 Department of Finance, Economics and Accounting, Jacksonville State University Abstract This paper chronicles the rise and fall of Enron, Inc., the once powerful energy firm based in Houston, Texas. The history of the firm is reviewed, the November 2001 financial restatement is examined to show the impact of the failure to report the appropriate financial position for the firm, and reasons for the firm’s downfall are considered. While Enron’s decline may currently be considered a market failure, it is likely that the events surrounding the firm in 2001 will ultimately be considered a case in which the market worked to ferret out deception and poor judgment on the part of Enron’s management. I. Introduction Early in the year 2002 one could not escape the continuing publicity concerning the once powerful, now bankrupt, Enron, Inc. In a span of less than two months during the autumn of 2001, the firm fell from business idol to congressional doormat, or somewhat more importantly, from the new business model to a model of business greed and ultimate failure. Of course the fall of Enron did not occur in the few days of October and November 2001. The event that started it all was the 1993 formation, in partnership with the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), of the Joint Energy Development Investment Limited Partnership (JEDI).2 The ultimate failure was designed by JEDI and set into place in a galaxy not so far away and in a time not so long ago. -
Open PDF File of Data Source
Members List U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Companies International Members Associate Members EEI is the association that represents all U.S. investor-owned electric companies. Our members provide electricity for 220 million Americans, operate in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, and directly and indirectly employ more than one million workers. Safe, reliable, affordable, and clean energy powers the economy and enhances the lives of all Americans. Organized in 1933, EEI provides public policy leadership, strategic business intelligence, and essential meetings and forums. U.S. Investor-Owned Utilities AES Corporation Emera Maine OGE Energy Corporation Dayton Power & Light Company Empire District Electric Company Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company Indianapolis Power & Light Company Entergy Corporation Ohio Valley Electric Corporation ALLETE Entergy Arkansas Oncor Minnesota Power Entergy Louisiana Otter Tail Corporation Superior Water, Light and Power Company Entergy Mississippi Otter Tail Power Company Alliant Energy Corporation Entergy New Orleans PG&E Corporation Ameren Corporation Entergy Texas Pacific Gas & Electric Company Ameren Illinois Eversource Energy Pinnacle West Capital Corporation Ameren Missouri Exelon Corporation Arizona Public Service Company American Electric Power Baltimore Gas & Electric Company PNM Resources AEP Ohio Commonwealth Edison Company PNM AEP Texas PECO Energy Company TNMP Appalachian Power Pepco Holdings Portland General Electric Indiana Michigan Pepco PPL Corporation Kentucky Power Atlantic City Electric -
The Financial Collapse of the Enron Corporation and Its Impact in the United States Capital Market by Prof
Global Journal of Management and Business Research: D Accounting and Auditing Volume 14 Issue 4 Version 1.0 Year 2014 Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA) Online ISSN: 2249-4588 & Print ISSN: 0975-5853 The Financial Collapse of the Enron Corporation and Its Impact in the United States Capital Market By Prof. Edel Lemus, M.I.B.A Carlos Albizu University, U nited States Abstract- The purpose of this article is to review the collapse of the Enron Corporation and the collapse’s effect on the United States financial market. Enron Corporation, the seventh largest company in the United States, misguided its shareholders by reporting $74 billion profit of which $43 billion was detected as fraud. Moreover, according to the association of fraud examiners $2.9 trillion was lost because of employee fraud. For example, as presented by Kieso, Weygandt, and Warfield (2013), in a global survey study that was conducted in 2013, it was reported that 3,000 executives from 54 countries were involved in fraudulent financial reporting. Therefore, the world of accounting is dominated by the top four accounting firms known as (1). PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), (2). Deloitte & Touche (DT), (3). Ernst & Young (EY) and (4). KPMG which represent a combined income of $80 billion. Keywords: enron corporation, bankruptcy, securities and exchange commission (sec), generally accepted accounting principles (gaap), sarbanes-oxley act of 2002, section 404, corporate governance, auditing, and economic crime. GJMBR-D Classification : JEL Code: M49 TheFinancialCollapseoftheEnronCorporationand Its ImpactintheUnitedStatesCapitalMarket Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of: © 2014. Prof. Edel Lemus.