U.S. v. BISHOP 335 Cite as 910 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) in favor of the non-moving party. Boucher, 880 F.3d at 365. In this case, it appears UNITED STATES of America, that the district court drew at least one Plaintiff-Appellee, inference against the non-moving party. v. But any error was harmless. First, the district court had already stepped through Edward BISHOP, Defendant-Appellant. the correct contractual analysis and made No. 18-2019 its conclusion before any discussion of in- ferences to draw from the parties’ behav- United States Court of Appeals, ior after the incident had occurred. Sec- Seventh Circuit. ond, and more importantly, even if we Argued November 14, 2018 were to draw the opposite inference in Vesuvius’s favor, it would make no differ- Decided December 7, 2018 ence. We might infer that Vesuvius genu- Background: Defendant was charged inely believed that it had complied in full with discharging firearm during drug with its obligations under ¶ 22 by notifying transaction. The United States District ACBL of the problem on February 20, Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 2015. Vesuvius might then have genuinely No. 3:17-cr-55 RLM-MGG, Robert L. Mil- believed that it had all the time in the ler, Jr., J., denied defendant’s motion to world to bring suit, and it did so two years suppress evidence obtained during search later. But because we find that the con- of his cell phone, and, after jury convicted tract is not ambiguous, the parties’ actions him, 2018 WL 1616892, denied his motion after they signed the contract are irrele- for new trial. Defendant appealed. vant to the meaning of the contract itself. Regardless of whether we were to infer Holding: The Court of Appeals, Easter- from Vesuvius’s actions that it genuinely brook, Circuit Judge, held that search war- believed its own position or whether it rant satisfied Fourth Amendment’s partic- knew that its suit was untimely, the mean- ularity requirement. ing of the contract is the same. Affirmed. III. CONCLUSION Standing on its own, perhaps the limita- 1. Controlled Substances O147 tions provision of the contract might be With respect to the Fourth Amend- ambiguous. But read in context with the ment’s particularity requirement, a war- rest of the contract, there is no question rant authorizing a search of a house for that Vesuvius was required to file suit no drugs permits the police to search every- later than four months after it discovered where in the house, because ‘‘everywhere’’ the damage. Because Vesuvius waited two is where the contraband may be hidden. years to bring its claim, the district court U.S. Const. Amend. 4. properly dismissed it as untimely. Accord- ingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 2. Searches and Seizures O148 district court. With respect to the Fourth Amend- ment’s particularity requirement, a war- , rant authorizing a search for documents that will prove a crime may authorize a search of every document the suspect has, 000001 336 910 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES because any of them might supply evi- EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. dence. U.S. Const. Amend. 4. A drug deal went wrong. After receiving a dose of pepper spray from his customer, 3. Searches and Seizures O125 Edward Bishop shot her in the arm. A Search warrant, which permitted jury convicted him of discharging a fire- search of every document on defendant’s arm during a drug transaction, 18 U.S.C. cell phone, satisfied Fourth Amendment’s § 924(c), and the judge sentenced him to particularity requirement; warrant stated 120 months’ imprisonment. He presents the crimes under investigation, i.e., crimi- one contention on appeal: that the warrant nal recklessness with deadly weapon and authorizing a search of his cell phone—a drug dealing, and police did not know search that turned up incriminating evi- where defendant kept his drug ledgers and dence—violated the Fourth Amendment’s gun videos until they searched the phone. requirement that every warrant ‘‘particu- U.S. Const. Amend. 4. larly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’’ 4. Searches and Seizures O125 This warrant described the ‘‘place to be With respect to the Fourth Amend- searched’’ as the cell phone Bishop carried ment’s particularity requirement, it is during the attempted sale, and it described enough if the warrant cabins the things the things to be seized as: being looked for by stating what crime is any evidence (including all photos, vid- under investigation. U.S. Const. Amend. eos, and/or any other digital files, includ- 4. ing removable memory cards) of suspect identity, motive, scheme/plan along with 5. Searches and Seizures O124 DNA evidence of the crime of Criminal With respect to the Fourth Amend- Recklessness with a deadly weapon ment’s particularity requirement, a war- which is hidden or secreted [in the cell- rant may be thought too general only if phone or] related to the offense of Deal- some more-specific alternative would have ing illegal drugs. done better at protecting privacy while That is too general, Bishop asserts, be- still permitting legitimate investigation. cause it authorized the police to rummage U.S. Const. Amend. 4. through every application and file on the phone and left to the officers’ judgment the decision which files met the descrip- Appeal from the United States District tion. The district court found the warrant Court for the Northern District of Indiana, valid, however, and denied the motion to South Bend Division. No. 3:17-cr-55 RLM- suppress. MGG—Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge. [1, 2] Bishop is right about the facts. This warrant does permit the police to look Nathaniel Whalen, Attorney, OFFICE at every file on his phone and decide which OF THE UNITED STATES ATTOR- files satisfy the description. But he is NEY, Hammond, IN, Plaintiff-Appellee. wrong to think that this makes a warrant William J. Stevens, Attorney, Bridgman, too general. Criminals don’t advertise MI, for Defendant-Appellant. where they keep evidence. A warrant au- thorizing a search of a house for drugs Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and permits the police to search everywhere in SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. the house, because ‘‘everywhere’’ is where 000002 U.S. v. BISHOP 337 Cite as 910 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) the contraband may be hidden. United instrumentalities and evidence of States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21, 102 crime at this [time] unknown. S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Steele v. 427 U.S. at 480–81 n.10, 96 S.Ct. 2737 United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. (emphasis added). Andresen accepted the 414, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925). And a warrant propriety of looking at every document in authorizing a search for documents that his possession but maintained that the ital- will prove a crime may authorize a search icized phrase entitled the agents to seize of every document the suspect has, be- anything they wanted. The Justices con- cause any of them might supply evidence. cluded, however, that, when read in con- To see this, it isn’t necessary to look be- text, the contested language did no more yond Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, than permit the seizure of any other evi- 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), in dence pertaining to real-estate fraud, the which the Court considered a warrant that subject of the warrant. Id. at 479–82, 96 permitted a search of every document in a S.Ct. 2737. lawyer’s files. Agents were authorized to [3, 4] Just so with this warrant. It per- search for: mits the search of every document on the title notes, title abstracts, title run- cell phone, which (like a computer) serves downs; contracts of sale and/or assign- the same function as the filing cabinets in ments from Raffaele Antonelli and Andresen’s office. See Riley v. California, Rocco Caniglia to Mount Vernon De- 573 U.S. 373, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2489, 189 velopment Corporation and/or others; L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). And as with filing lien payoff correspondence and lien cabinets, the incriminating evidence may pay-off memoranda to and from lien- be in any file or folder. That’s why courts holders and noteholders; correspon- routinely conclude that warrants with dence and memoranda to and from wording similar to the one at issue here trustees of deeds of trust; lenders in- are valid. See, e.g., Archer v. Chisholm, structions for a construction loan or 870 F.3d 603, 616 (7th Cir. 2017); United construction and permanent loan; dis- States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 996–97 (7th bursement sheets and disbursement Cir. 1998); Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search & memoranda; checks, check stubs and Seizure § 4.6(d) (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. ledger sheets indicating disbursement 2018) (citing many other cases). It is upon settlement; correspondence and enough, these decisions hold, if the war- memoranda concerning disbursements rant cabins the things being looked for by upon settlement; settlement statements stating what crime is under investigation. and settlement memoranda; fully or [5] Andresen and its successors show partially prepared deed of trust releas- that specificity is a relative matter. A war- es, whether or not executed and rant may be thought ‘‘too general’’ only if whether or not recorded; books, rec- some more-specific alternative would have ords, documents, papers, memoranda done better at protecting privacy while and correspondence, showing or tend- still permitting legitimate investigation. ing to show a fraudulent intent, and/or See United States v.