The Generalship of Muhammad University Press of florida Florida A&M University, Tallahassee Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton Florida Gulf Coast University, Ft. Myers Florida International University, Miami Florida State University, Tallahassee New College of Florida, Sarasota University of Central Florida, Orlando University of Florida, Gainesville University of North Florida, Jacksonville University of South Florida, Tampa University of West Florida, Pensacola This page intentionally left blank The Generalship of Muhammad Battles and Campaigns of the Prophet of Allah Russ rodgers University Press of Florida Gainesville · Tallahassee · Tampa · Boca Raton Pensacola · Orlando · Miami · Jacksonville · Ft. Myers · Sarasota Copyright 2012 by Russ Rodgers All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America on recycled, acid-free paper 17 16 15 14 13 12 6 5 4 3 2 1 All maps by Russ Rodgers library of Congress Cataloging-in-PUbliCation data Rodgers, Russ The generalship of Muhammad : battles and campaigns of the Prophet of Allah / Russ Rodgers. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8130-3766-0 (alk. paper) 1. Muhammad, Prophet, d. 632—Military leadership. I. Title. BP77.7.R64 2012 297.6'3—dc23 2011037547 The University Press of Florida is the scholarly publishing agency for the State University System of Florida, comprising Florida A&M University, Florida Atlantic University, Florida Gulf Coast University, Florida International University, Florida State University, New College of Florida, University of Central Florida, University of Florida, University of North Florida, University of South Florida, and University of West Florida. University Press of Florida 15 Northwest 15th Street Gainesville, FL 32611-2079 http://www.upf.com To my wife and daughter, who continue to teach me joy and gratitude. This page intentionally left blank Contents Introduction 1 1. Revolution 22 2. The Insurgency Grows 51 3. The Road to Badr 78 4. From Elation to Despair 104 5. From the Mountain to the Trench 133 6. The Surge 168 7. Triumph 193 8. The Generalship of Muhammad, the Prophet of Allah 231 Glossary of Terms 251 Notes 255 Bibliography 299 Index 309 This page intentionally left blank Introduction It is necessary to provide you, the reader, with an idea about the scope and nature of this military analysis of the campaigns of Muhammad, along with a few of the important specialized terms and the types of sources used. In the modern world of military historical literature there are a number of terms used to describe how weaker movements engage and defeat stronger opponents. Today such terms as insurgency, asym- metric warfare, and irregular warfare are commonly used to explain such movements, and yet these terms were unknown to military think- ers until most recent times. When one speaks of insurgency today, they typically refer to a weaker group that uses methods of warfare often cited as irregular, unconventional, or asymmetric, and that strives to overcome what is considered an established government or organiza- tion. But even such a definition raises the question of what irregular, unconventional, or asymmetric warfare is. Such terminology can actu- ally engender confusion among readers and military practitioners alike. For the purposes of this work, “irregular” or “unconventional” war- fare refer to organizational methods that eschew clear and deliberate organization and operations, especially one that clearly defines the differences between combatants and civilians. But more importantly, terms such as “insurgency” or “asymmetric warfare” highlight a differ- ence in actual tactics and operational techniques used by a particular movement. Therefore, irregular warfare should not be confused with insurgency, or unconventional warfare confused with asymmetric 1 warfare. So what do these terms actually mean, and what is the best way to define them? In the context of the modern world, “insurgency” refers to any move- ment bent on overthrowing an established government or organiza- tion. With this said, we must next understand the difference between a symmetric and an asymmetric insurgency. While it is fashionable for some to think that insurgency and asymmetric warfare are the same thing, to do so does violence to the strict definition of the word “asym- metric.” Symmetric or asymmetric refer simply to methods. To be sym- metric simply means to use methods nearly identical to one’s enemies, while to be asymmetric would be to move outside an enemy’s realm of experience. In this manner we can see that anyone in history can engage in both, perhaps even simultaneously, while also engaging in insurgency or conventional military operations. However, such a defi- nition did not exist in the ancient world, and certainly not in the world of Muhammad’s seventh-century Arabia. Therefore, for the sake of this study, these terms have been superimposed over the historical activities of Muhammad and his companions to help us understand how he cam- paigned and won. Therefore, to clarify, an insurgency is a movement to overthrow an existing or established government or organization while asymmetric or symmetric warfare are merely techniques to achieve this end. With this in mind, it can be seen that any form of warfare can be asymmetric or symmetric. During World War II, Germany used an asymmetric doctrinal approach of mobile warfare to defeat France in 1940, the latter organizing its defense around the idea of positional military thought. Popularly known as the blitzkrieg, or lightning war, the Germans were able to overrun France and defeat an army that was larger and better equipped than their own. By using an asymmetric approach, they were able to defeat a doctrinally ill-prepared opponent. In contrast, the Allies largely used a symmetric approach to defeat Germany three years later. Allied forces mirrored the German army in almost every aspect, and defeated them by often overwhelming them with material superiority. By the time the Allies reached the western border of Germany, the war devolved into an attritional contest as the forces slugged it out for months along the German frontier. While few would argue against the idea that conventional war- fare can be symmetric or asymmetric, it becomes more controversial when discussing insurgency. Once the shooting starts, insurgencies 2 · The Generalship of Muhammad are typically asymmetric, but this is more out of necessity than a mat- ter of choosing the best technique to achieve victory. If given a choice and the resources necessary, almost any leader in history would chose to achieve victory more quickly through conventional means than to opt for the drawn-out lengthy conflict called insurgency or guerrilla warfare. Insurgencies cannot face an established government on equal terms, or, put another way, symmetrically. This is the portion of insur- gency that most see and that is written about in the popular texts of today. But what is typically missed is that insurgencies are far more about philosophical and worldview transformation than about ambushing government forces from a jungle or mountain sanctuary. The initial phase of an insurgency strives to alter the mind of people, particularly key leaders, to support a new worldview that is in contrast to their established one. Indeed, this is arguably the most important aspect of any insurgency, and it is almost exclusively symmetric, apart from the differences in the worldviews. Once the fighting begins, much of an insurgency movement has already passed by the snoozing leaders of a targeted culture. In this way, the insurgency moves from a symmetric to an asymmetric approach in order to build the force necessary to push a sleepy majority of a culture into succumbing to the insurgency’s demands. Once having achieved the level of force necessary, the in- surgency transforms once again from an asymmetric to a symmetric approach to bring about the final triumph. When looking at insurgency from this perspective, one can see that the dictum of Carl von Clause- witz that war is the extension of politics by other means can be flipped to its inverse, that politics is an extension of war by other means.1 In- surgency starts in the realm of philosophy and ideology to lay the foun- dation and is followed by the physical violence necessary to impose its principles on a culture that otherwise would not have accepted such views. This book deals with Muhammad’s insurgency campaign to gain dom- inance over Makkah, and ultimately Arabia. It examines how he or- ganized his philosophical insurgency while residing in Makkah, and how he altered his techniques to engage in a more active insurgency that applied economic and social pressure on the people of Makkah to eventually succumb to his call to the sole worship of Allah and ac- ceptance of himself as Allah’s last prophet. While military operations Introduction · 3 are a significant part of this work, the philosophical aspects are not neglected. Both are examined to see how they influenced the course of events and the decision making of the antagonists. Muhammad’s early life is examined to set the stage for the direction he chose for himself and his followers. This is followed by a discussion of the operations he undertook to achieve dominance over Arabia. Finally, an analysis is made of Muhammad’s generalship and how he performed in light of past and more recent contemporaries. It must be noted that there are some aspects of Muhammad’s life that do not receive a detailed examination because these would be periph- eral to the intent of the text. The primary focus of this work is to analyze how Muhammad campaigned and won, and just as importantly, how the Quraysh, the dominant tribe that controlled Makkah, lost, bringing with it the subjugation to the Prophet of most of Arabia. Researching and writing a military biography of Muhammad, the Prophet of Allah, encounters a number of challenges.