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Hany Rashwan Chairman of the Board Supplement to Base Prospectus FIRST SUPPLEMENT DATED APRIL 15, 2019 TO THE BASE PROSPECTUS DATED NOVEMBER 13, 2018 A M (I N Amun AG (incorporated in Switzerland) Exchange Traded Products Programme This supplement (the Supplement) to the Base Prospectus dated November 13, 2018 (the Base Prospectus), is prepared in connection with the Exchange Traded Products Programme established by Amun AG (the Issuer or Amun). Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings assigned to such terms in the Base Prospectus. The Base Prospectus has been registered as an issuance program for the listing of exchange traded products (the ETPs or the Products) on the SIX Swiss Exchange in accordance with the listing rules of the SIX Swiss Exchange. This Supplement constitutes a supplement to the Base Prospectus for purposes of Article 12 of the Directive on the Procedures for Exchange Traded Products (DPETP) issued by SIX Exchange Regulation AG. This Supplement is supplemental to and should be read in conjunction with the Base Prospectus. To the extent that there is any inconsistency between (i) any statement in this Supplement and (ii) any other statement in or incorporated by reference into the Base Prospectus, the statements in this Supplement will prevail. The Issuer assumes responsibility pursuant to article 27 of the listing rules of the SIX Swiss Exchange and section 5 of Scheme G thereunder for the content of this Supplement and declares that the information contained in the Base Prospectus, as supplemented by this Supplement, is, to the best of its knowledge, correct and no material facts or circumstances have been omitted therefrom. AMENDMENTS TO PAGE iii OF THE BASE PROSPECTUS On page iii of the Base Prospectus the sentence "each Investor shall bear the solvency risks of the Kingdom Trust Company (Custodian or Kingdom Trust)" shall be deleted and replaced by the following: each Investor shall bear the solvency risks of The Kingdom Trust Company (Kingdom Trust), Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC (Coinbase) or any other custodian of the Underlying or Underlying Components (Kingdom Trust, Coinbase or such other custodian, the Custodian) AMENDMENTS TO THE "RISK FACTORS" SECTION Under the heading "Recognition of Security and Choice of Law in Other Jurisdictions" on page 30 of the Base Prospectus the second paragraph shall be deleted and replaced by the following: In addition, while the terms and conditions of the Products and the Paying Agency Agreement are governed by Swiss Law, the Security Documents are governed by the laws of the State of South Dakota or by the laws of the State of New York, as applicable, the Collateral Agent Agreement is governed by the laws of England and Wales, with certain provisions of the Collateral Agent Agreement being governed by the laws of Switzerland as stated within the Collateral Agent Agreement, and the Administration Agreement is governed by the laws of the State of Colorado. Any agreements with an additional paying agent (including a Swiss Paying Agent), any calculation agent or any other service provider or agent may also be governed by the laws in different jurisdictions. There can be no assurance that, upon enforcement or otherwise, a court will recognise the choice of law or apply foreign law principles in the same way as a domestic court would in respect of any Transaction Document. Under the heading "Risk Factors Relating to Specific Underlyings or Underlying Components" and prior to "Risk Factors Relating to the Amun Index As An Underlying" on page 43 of the Base Prospectus the following shall be inserted: Risks Specific to NEO (NEO) Usage Risks: NEO is designed as a next-generation smart contract platform for, among other things, decentralized applications (dApps). It therefore competes against other smart contract crypto networks, including, but not limited to, DFINITY, Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, Hyperledger, Lisk, Tron, QTUM, EOS, and Tezos. NEO is a new platform and has not yet achieved widespread use. There are other platforms, in particular Ethereum, which continue to command a large percent of smart-contract-powered applications. Failure to capture a greater share of the smart contract market might detrimentally impact the value of the NEO token. Increased Technology Risks: Unlike Bitcoin and Ethereum, NEO uses a consensus mechanism called Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus(dBFT) where proxy voting is used to 2 decide which block is appended to the blockchain. However, dBFT comes with significant centralization risk as NEO holders delegate their voting rights to a much smaller group of entities called bookkeepers. Control Risks: NEO has been accused of being centralized due to its dBFT consensus mechanism and the limited number of nodes which have control over block production on NEO. For example, NEO has faced problems in the past where the blockchain has been rendered unusable due to one of the nodes going offline. NEO aims to eventually move closer to decentralization by allowing commercial projects and community entities to run nodes. Risks Specific to Tron (TRX) Commercial Risk: Tron, or entities affiliated with Tron’s management team, purchased the company behind the BitTorrent protocol, which is a peer-to-peer file sharing (p2p) protocol and application to distribute data and files over the Internet. The TRX token’s valuation may be closely tied to the performance of the for-profit entities affiliated with this transaction or the non- profit entities affiliated with Tron. Age Risk: The launch of the Tron Foundation was in September 2017 by current CEO Justin Sun. The Tron main-net, its own proprietary blockchain, was launched in June 2018. Accordingly, Tron has had less time in live production compared with other Crypto Assets of similar market capitalization. As a result, there can be a significantly lower usage of Tron compared to other, larger and smaller Crypto Assets. Lower usage could result in deteriorating value and liquidity adversely impact the valuation of the asset. A significant reduction in usage could also result in a complete loss of investment. Usage Risks: Tron is designed as a next-generation smart contract platform for, among other things, decentralized applications (dApps). It therefore competes against other smart contract crypto networks, including, but not limited to, DFINITY, Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, Hyperledger, Lisk, NEO, QTUM, EOS, and Tezos. Tron is a new platform and has not yet achieved widespread use. There are other platforms, in particular Ethereum, which continue to command a large percent of smart-contract-powered applications. Failure to capture a greater share of smart contract development might detrimentally impact the value of the TRX token. Further Usage Risks: According to an April 2019 report by analytics firm Dapp Review, up to 64% of Tron is being used for gaming, a portion of which include gaming apps linked to gambling. Regulations for gambling vary from country to country and Tron has indicated they will collaborate with local regulators. An example is that on April 1, Tron has pledged to restrict gambling dApps in Japan, where gambling is prohibited. the Tron network’s reputation, and the value of the underlying TRX token, may be negatively affected. 3 Technology Risks: TRON uses a Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus mechanism wherein 27 Super Representatives (SRs) are chosen to produce blocks for the networks; these SRs are voted in by TRX holders. However, given that within any voting block the identities of the chosen SRs are limited, this exposes TRON to some amount of centralization risk. Control Risks: The TRON Independent Group (TIG) has control over large amount of TRX tokens, having been entrusted with the tokens held by TRON foundation and therefore can exercise a large amount of control through voting power over the network. TIG is composed of the 27 SRs chosen at the genesis block. Risks Specific to Ethereum Classic (ETC) Production Risk: Ethereum Classic is a mined currency, which required significant use of energy, space, and computing power. Should the incentives for miners of the Crypto Asset be insufficient or the costs of validating transactions grow disproportionately, miners could transition to other networks, which could, in turn, slow transaction validation and usage. Any disruption to the production of Ethereum Classic or the validation of Ethereum Classic transactions could adversely impact the price of the asset. Usage Risks: Given the amount of competition amongst the smart contract platforms, Ethereum Classic is exposed to some non-negligible amount of usage risk due to its competitors Ethereum, EOS, NEO, TRON, & Tezos. Moreover, the usage of Ethereum Classic as a smart contract platform lags behind that of its competitors. A large drop in usage could result in deteriorating value and liquidity for Ethereum Classic which would in turn negatively affect the valuation of the asset – posing a risk to a given investment. Increased Technology Risks: Because the network for Ethereum Classic is smaller than that of its competitors, it may be at greater risk for certain technology risks, including Double-spending attempts, block reorganization, selfish mining, or 51% attacks. Indeed, Ethereum Classic was subjected to a 51% attack in January 2019. Risks Specific to Cardano (ADA) Usage Risks: Given the amount of competition amongst the smart contract platforms Cardano is exposed to some non-negligible amount of usage risk due to its competitors
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