Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Public Disclosure Authorized

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World Bank Office in Ukraine

Synthesis Report Peacebuilding 1 Dniprovskiy Uzviz, 2nd Floor, Kyiv 01010, Ukraine www.worldbank.org.ua Volume I: Assessment Public Disclosure Authorized ANALYSIS OF CRISIS IMPACTS AND NEEDS IN EASTERN UKRAINE

Volume I: SYNTHESIS REPORT : Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine — Public Disclosure Authorized Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Public Disclosure Authorized

MARCH 31, 2015 Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment ANALYSIS OF CRISIS IMPACTS AND NEEDS IN EASTERN UKRAINE

Volume I: SYNTHESIS REPORT

Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine 101 Volodymyrska St. Kyiv, 01033 Ukraine Telephone: +380 (44) 390 8010 Internet: www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/

United Nations — Ukraine 1 Klovsky Uzviz, Kyiv 01021, Ukraine Telephone: +380 44 2539363 Internet: www.un.org.ua

This Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPA) report for Eastern Ukraine is a collabora¬tive product authored jointly by staff of the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and The - ings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in the RPA do not necessarily constitute the viewsWorld orBank. formal Acknowledging recommendations the institutions’ of the EU, different UN, or The mandates World andBank areas on all of issues,expertise, nor the do findthey recognized that due to different mandates not all activities set forth or proposed in the report willreflect be theshared views by ofor theengaged governing in by bodiesall the collaboratingof these institutions institutions, or their and member it is further states. understood It is also that each institution will carry out or be engaged with any such activities in accordance with its mandate, and operational policies and procedures.

The European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and The World Bank do not guarantee the ac- curacy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

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Photo Credits: Amnon Gutman Cover Design and Text Layout: Duina Reyes-Bakovic ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

he Eastern Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPA) was carried out jointly by the European Union, the United Nations,1 and the World Bank Group, and with the lead- Tership and participation of the Government of Ukraine (GoU). -

The leadership provided by senior government officials was essential, among them H.E. Mr. Volody, myr Hroisman, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada; H.E. Mr. Gennadii Zubko, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Regional Development, Construction and Municipal Economy; Mr. Volodymyr Kistion First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services; Mr. Roman Chuprynenko, Deputy Minister for European Integration, Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services; and Mr. Miroslav Koshelyuk, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services. The following ministries and administrations provided invaluable inputs: Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Ministry of Social Policy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RailwayMinistry Transport—Ukrzaliznytsia, of Infrastructure, Ministry Stateof Energy Enterprise and Coal of Postal Industry, Communication—Ukrposhta, Ministry of Health, Ministry State of EmergencyJustice, Secretariat Service, ofDepartment Cabinet of of Ministries, International State Cooperation, Employment Department Service, State of the Administration Parliament cases of and appeals, Zaporizhzhia Oblast Administration, Donetsk Oblast Administration, Luhansk Oblast Administration,The strong support Kharkiv and Oblast the contributions Administration, of andthe Dnipropetrovskmany different Oblastnational Administration. stakeholders was remarkable. The dedication of the RPA team from the three institutions was exceptional. The efforts of all made this report possible.

UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, UNEP, UN Women, UNHCR, UNOCHA, IOM, ILO, OHCHR.

Volume I: iii SYNTHESIS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments...... iii

Acronyms and Abbreviations...... 1

Executive Summary...... 3 Context...... 3 ...... 5 Institutional Arrangements...... 7 Main Findings Financing...... 8 In Conclusion...... 8 Chapter I: RATIONALE AND SCOPE...... 9 1.0 Introduction...... 9 2.0 RPA Goal and Vision...... 9 ...... 11 4.0 Limitations ...... 15 3.0 Overview of the RPA Process 5.0 Risks...... 16 Chapter II: CONTEXT ANALYSIS...... 17 ...... 17 7.0 External and Internal Factors Underpinning the Situation...... 19 6.0 Political and Security Developments in 2014: Backdrop to the Conflict 8.0 Population Displacement...... 21 Chapter III: OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY AND PEACEBUILDING PRIORITIES FOR EASTERN UKRAINE...... 23 9.0 Proposed Approach to Identifying Recovery and Peacebuilding Priorities...... 23 10.0 Underlying Principles and Considerations...... 24 11.0 Prioritization and Sequencing...... 25 12.0 Transversal Issues...... 25 Chapter IV: SUMMARY OF RPA STRATEGIC COMPONENTS...... 27 13.0 Strategic Component 1: Restore Critical Infrastructure and Social Services...... 27 14.0 Strategic Component 2: Promote Economic Recovery...... 30 15.0 Strategic Component 3: Strengthen Social Resilience, Peacebuilding, and Community Security...... 33 Chapter V: TRANSVERSAL ISSUES AND PRIORITIES...... 40 16.0 Population Displacement...... 40 17.0 Strengthening Local Governance in Recovery Efforts...... 44 18.0 Gender...... 46 19.0 Human Rights...... 47

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine iv Chapter VI: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS...... 48 20.0 Institutional Framework ...... 48 21.0 Process for Periodic Review and Updating...... 50 ...... 51

Chapter22.0 VII: Monit FINANCINGoring and STRATEGY Evaluation AND MODALITIES...... 52 23.0 Principles...... 52 ...... 52 25.0 Components of the Financing Strategy...... 53 24.0 Objectives and Core Considerations Annex I: RPA Strategic Results Framework...... 58 Draft Results Framework...... 62

List of Figures ...... 13 Figure 2. Total number of IDPs in Ukraine as of February 2, 2015, including Crimea ...... 40 Figure 1. Major thematic areas of the RPA ...... 54 ...... 57 Figure 3. Concepts and methodology applied to define the financing strategy Figure 4. The palette of financing instruments in support of RPA priorities List of Tables Table 1. Geographic focus of RPA Phase I...... 14 Table 2. Infrastructure and social services, Total estimated damages...... 27 Table 3. Infrastructure and social services—Recommended interventions and associated costs...... 29 Table 4. Economic recovery—Recommended interventions and associated costs ...... 32 Table 5. Social resilience, peacebuilding, and community security—Recommended interventions and associated costs ...... 35 Table 6. Estimated aggregate recovery needs...... 54

Volume I: v SYNTHESIS REPORT UKRAINE

Conflict & Displacement in Eastern Ukraine (February 2015) Data Sources: UNHR, UN OCHA, State Emergency Service of Ukraine, Ukrainian Ministry of Social Policy. Creative Commons by Niele, (CC BY-SA 4.0). Updated by HCPUNXKID ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BBBS Building Back Better and Smarter

CSO civil society organization

CBOCRWP communityCrisis Response-based Works organization Programme DDR disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

DRP Donbas Recovery Programme

EB executive board

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

FDI foreign direct investment

GoU Government of Ukraine

IDP internally displaced person

IFI international financial institution

ILO International Labour Organization

IOM International Organization for Migration

MoH Ministry of Health

MoJ Ministry of Justice

MRE mine risk education

MSP Ministry of Social Policy

M&ENBU monitNationaloring Bank and of evaluation Ukraine

NGO nongovernmental organization

OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OO Ombudsperson’s Office

OSCEPB Orpolicyganization board for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Volume I: 1 SYNTHESIS REPORT PCEAPIU Pprost-Conflictoject implementation Environmental unit Assessment

PCNAPTSD Pposttrost-Conflictaumatic Needs stress Assessment disorder RPA Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment

SGBV sexual and gender-based violence

SMESEA smallStrategic and Environmental medium enterprise Assessment SES State Emergency Service

SRP Strategic Response Plan

SRF Strategic Results Framework

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UXOWBG uneWorldxploded Bank ordnanceGroup

WHO World Health Organization

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context 1. Ukraine is currently experiencing a period of instability and insecurity. Large-scale demonstrations in Kyiv in late 2013 led to a change in government in February 2014. Early

2014. Following the developments in Crimea, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution presidential elections were held in May 2014 and early Parliamentary elections in November

68/262“[...] 5. Underscores on 27 March that 2014 the which referendum states that held it: in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the - tion of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol; city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any altera Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status.”2

as the Donbas—where pro-Russian separatists took control over parts of the two oblasts. In the spring of 2014, conflict erupted in the eastern oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk—known - mainsDespite uncertain. the existence of a peace agreement (the Minsk Protocol of September 2014) and the renewal of its cease-fire provisions in February 2015, the likely outcome of this conflict re 2. The conflict has had a significant and detrimental impact on human welfare, and on social and economic conditions generally.

Of some 5.2 million people in the Donbas, at- least 3.9 million have been directly affected by the conflict. In addition, the three adjoining- aryoblasts there of wereZaporizhzhia, a reported Dnipropetrovsk, 7,000 deaths (including and Khar kivmilitary have beenpersonnel), particularly some affected18,000 woundby eco- ed,nomic and disruption more than and 1.6 amillion heavy peopleinflux of displaced internally both displaced internally persons and outside (IDPs). ofAs Ukraine. of late Febru Prior

- triesto the that conflict, are located the Donbas in the region Donbas had have already experienced faced significant long-standing long-term decline challenges and have related been to poverty, demography, and its economic structure. Many of the country’s key heavy indus

further damaged by the conflict and trade disputes. The situation is likely to be compounded deterioratedby the significant levels loss of socialof services, cohesion, shelter, trust, and and livelihoods cooperation associated throughout with thethe country,conflict, which wereposes already even more eroded acute from risks years for the of divergent population’s and well-being. politically chargedThe conflict narratives has also about significantly history, language, and patriotism.

- not form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or the city of Sevastopol” (see http://www. un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262).2 On March 27, 2014, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 68/262 stating that the referenda had “no validity” and “can

Volume I: 3 SYNTHESIS REPORT 3. The Government of Ukraine (GoU) and its partners recognize the need to urgently address reconstruction, economic recovery, and peacebuilding needs in areas affected both directly and indirectly by the conflict. In mid-2014, the government requested tech-

Followingnical assistance a joint and EU, financialUN, and WBGsupport scoping from missionthe international to Ukraine community that took place to assess between and planSep- priority recovery and peacebuilding efforts in the conflict-affected regions of eastern Ukraine. recovery and peacebuilding needs. The Eastern Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assess- tember 29 and October 3, 2014, the three institutions agreed to organize an assessment of - ernmentment (RPA) control was thatlaunched would in provide October an 2014 analytical as a two-stage and programmatic process. In baseline view of for the recovery continuing efforts,conflict, identify it was urgent decided interventions, to undertake and an provide initial rapid a basis assessment, for scaling coveringup the responses areas under as needs gov

particular, the assessment of infrastructure damage is limited to the damage that occurred priorevolve to on November the ground. 2014. As such,Furthermore, these findings the number should of be registered considered IDPs—used as a snapshot as a in reference time. In

4. toThe estimate RPA is theirtherefore needs—corresponds an assessment toundertaken official government in a context estimates of ongoing as of February crisis. The 2015. con-

two scenarios would aggravate the distress of people in eastern Ukraine, and likely lead to flict could escalate and expand, become “frozen,” or be settled through diplomacy. The first - additional waves of displacement. Moreover, failure to address the severe human welfare and continuesdevelopment to deteriorateconcerns will and very worsening likely worsen socioeconomic the conflict. conditions This would cause have further serious tensions, implica it istions, essential including that increasingkey high-priority vulnerability recommendations and eroding confidencebe initiated in as the soon state. as possible, As social irrespeccohesion-

effectively implement other aspects of recovery, such as rehabilitating infrastructure, restor- ingtive socialof the services,cessation and or continuation revitalizing economicof armed conflict. activity. DoingWithout so willreconciliation—between also lay the foundation dif to- ferent members of the community, between different communities, and between citizens and authorities—lasting peace and recovery are unlikely to be achieved.

5. The RPA looks beyond immediate humanitarian needs to assess the conflict’s impact and identify key priorities for recovery and building peace. In light of the ongoing crisis, the RPA focuses on improving human welfare, particularly of the displaced and their host

communities, and avoiding the further exacerbation of conflict drivers. Geographically, the supportiveRPA focuses national-level on conflict-affected initiatives areas are under also recommended. government control The report’s in Donetsk recommendations and Luhansk, provideas well as an the initial three framework adjoining for oblasts initiatives of Zaporizhzhia, that focus on Dnipropetrovsk, short- to medium-term and Khar results.kiv. Certain This framework will also help the government and the international community to update, prioritize, and sequence recovery interventions on a regular basis as the situation evolves. Fur- thermore, the recommendations provide positive precedents for future reforms in the areas

groundwork for a second phase that supports the development of a longer-term and compre- hensiveof economic recovery policy, and governance, peacebuilding and strategy, social services. when conditions The first allow.phase of the RPA will lay the

6. Phase 1 of the RPA report (which is presented in two volumes) is anchored in three major thematic components: (i) restoring critical infrastructure and services; (ii) improving economic livelihoods; and (iii) strengthening social resilience and initiating reconcilia-

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 4 tion and peacebuilding. Volume I provides an overview of the results of the assessment, key

report. Volume II provides the detailed assessment reports for each of the three components. findings, and recommended interventions over a two-year period, in the form of a synthesis 7. The RPA’s three thematic components have been designed to be mutually complementary and strategically synchronous. For example, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure in Component 1 will provide opportunities to introduce labor-intensive construction technologies. This links with the recommendation in Component 2 to jump-start local employment by reconstructing district and community infrastructure. The RPA also provides concrete activities for host communities and IDPs to collaborate in meeting urgent needs, which helps break down prejudice and builds trust (Component 3). Similarly, key transversal issues—internal displacement, local governance and implementation capacity, gender, and human rights—are integrated across components. Criteria are suggested to support the prioritization of those recommendations that require immediate attention, either because of their urgency or because of their critical importance as foundations for recovery and peacebuilding. The report strongly recommends that, as much as possible, responsibility for the design and implementation of activities be delegated downward to subnational levels and involve all major stakeholders at the local level. Main Findings 8. Initial estimates of recovery, reconstruction, and peacebuilding financing needs total some US$1.52 billion,3 as outlined below.

9. Total recovery needs for the infrastructure and social services component are estimated at US$ 1.26 billion. The sustainable restoration and improvement of infrastructure and social services holds the key to normalizing and stabilizing society in the crisis-affected areas,

of infrastructure and service delivery will not only ameliorate the affected populations’ suffering,and to butcreating will also conditions help restore for IDP citizens’ return trust and inrepatriation. the state. In Efficient addition and to “brick-and-mortar” effective recovery damage to infrastructure, the loss of equipment, the exodus of employees, and a drop in staff skills and capacity in the directly affected regions are other challenges that need to be addressed.

10. Ensuring satisfactory provision of social services in indirectly affected areas is complicated by the influx of displaced populations. For example, preschools are fast approaching enrollment capacity; the road network is suffering from increased usage; and sewage sys-

are greatest in the transport, health, and energy sectors, at US$558 million, US$184 million, andtems US$79 need tomillion handle respectively. increased loads Needs due estimates to a steady build influx upon of the IDPs damages in various reported raions. to Needsinfra- structure to additionally: (i) reconstruct impacted infrastructure to improved standards (the “building back better and smarter” principle); (ii) restore service delivery to individuals residing in Donetsk and Luhansk, and replace facilities; and (iii) provide social services to indi-

viduals displaced as a result of the conflict.

3 Estimated reconstruction costs may continue to rise as needs are further assessed.

Volume I: 5 SYNTHESIS REPORT Recovery Needs at a Glance US$ (millions) Infrastructure and Social Services 1,257.7 Health 184.2 Education 9.7 Social welfare 329.4 Energy 78.9 Transport 558.2 Water and sanitation 40.1 Environment 30.0 Public buildings and housing 27.2 Economic Recovery 135.5 Employment 40.0 Productive capacities and livelihoods 33.0 Local economic planning 7.5 30.0 Financial services 25.0 SMEs and private sector Social Resilience, Peacebuilding, and Community Security 126.8 Understand vulnerability, risk, and social cohesion 2.5 Promote social cohesion and trust building 19.7 Promote a culture of tolerance through dialogue 11.4 5.8 Promote access to justice 8.1 Protect conflict-affected populations Provide legal assistance 6.6 28.4 Restore community security 23.9 Offer psychosocial support Prepare for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 20.4 Total 1,520.0

11. Total recovery needs for the economic recovery component are estimated at US$135.5 million. Ukraine’s current trade dispute with Russia, coupled with damage and disruptions

43associated percent withfrom the Luhansk conflict, oblast, have comparedhad significant to the economic same period implications of previous for theyear. Donbas. During InJanu the- ary–Septemberfirst 11 months 2014,of 2014, metal exports export from to Russia Donetsk declined oblast bydropped 28 percent by almost compared 30 percent to a year and ear by- lier, with the share to Russia declining to 10 percent of total metal exports from 14 percent in

decreased their economic activities by 80–90 percent, leading to a similar percentage of jobs lost.2013. This As asituation consequence has resulted of direct in and the indirectwidespread impacts, disruption small and of economic medium activity,enterprises loss (SMEs) of livelihoods and employment, and a deteriorating macroeconomic environment. In this context, this report proposes a multi-track approach to economic recovery to reduce the vulnerabil-

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 6 generating short-term employment opportunities, improving productive capacities and liveli- ity of conflict-affected populations and increase societal resilience. This approach consists of-

civilhood society, options, and strengthening the remaining local private economic sector planning, will be stimulatingessential to SMEs address and key the bottlenecks,private sec rebuildtor, and thefacilitating local economy, provision and of restore financial social services. trust. Collaboration between local governments,

12. Total recovery needs for the social resilience, peacebuilding, and community security component are estimated at US$126.8 million. had a direct and highly negative impact on social cohesion, resilience, livelihoods, community security, and the rule of law. Displacement, fear, andThe diminishing ongoing conflict levels of in trust eastern are Ukraineacute social has

regional divides, and low levels of trust in local authorities and institutions existed prior to the crisis,problems, these and have conflict-related been exacerbated distress as a is result widespread. of it, particularly While social in the fragmentation, Donbas region. prejudices, In many

As the numbers and the duration of stay for the displaced increase, pressure mounts on local resources,ways, the conflictservice delivery,and resulting livelihoods, displacement and governance. has magnified Signs ofUkraine’s increasing pre-conflict tensions betweenfragility.

law enforcement agencies, security services, and justice institutions are ill equipped to ensure respectIDPs and of host rights communities and rule of are law, becoming mitigate disputesmore evident. and tensions, Moreover, and under address conflict crime conditions, and violence. Current hostilities, related community-level violence, and misinformation contribute to polarization and deepen divisions. Impacts are especially acute in areas with a high percentage of IDPs compared to the host communities. Restoring and strengthening the social fabric—within the Donbas, as well as nationally—is therefore a critical requirement for effective and sustainable recovery. In the absence of reconciliation and peacebuilding, the risk of re-

recovery at risk. Priorities in this regard include building trust, strengthening the resilience of newed conflict will remain, which puts investments in infrastructure, services, and economic and promoting reconciliation, peacebuilding, citizen security, and access to justice. displaced populations and host communities, better protecting conflict-affected populations, Institutional Arrangements 13. For the RPA to become operational and be effective, the government must take a lead role, though it must also broadly engage national stakeholders. Government ownership

structure that has formal intragovernmental authority and a clear mandate to lead and coor- dinateover the recovery RPA process and reconstruction would greatly efforts. benefit Given from therapidly nature identifying of recovery and needs operationalizing and response a strategies proposed in the RPA, most interventions will be implemented by government agen-

therefore proposed that an intragovernmental coordination structure (for example, a Donbas Recoverycies and local Coordination governments, Committee) civil society be createdorganizations, with both and intragovernmentalthe beneficiaries themselves. authority Itand is

hybridbroad membership. arrangements, It willwith need the tointragovernmental have a dual focus onauthority (i) activities assuming in the a five policy-setting eastern oblasts; and oversightand (ii) national role. It activities.will be necessary Implementation to clarify challenges from the outset will be the best mandates met through of key flexible actors and

space for civil society organizations and the private sector to work effectively with national andestablish subnational appropriate budget but allocations. flexible mechanisms and processes. It is also essential to create

Volume I: 7 SYNTHESIS REPORT 14. It will be important to establish a process for periodically reviewing the continued relevance of the RPA’s strategy and initiatives. An RPA progress review should take place every six months, with a thorough mid-term review after 12 months. The coordination committee should organize the reviews, which need to be inclusive consultative processes in which all stakeholders can provide their views and feedback. The coordination committee should es-

- tablish a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) subcommittee. The Strategic Results Framework (SRF) presented in the report can serve as an M&E tool. Participatory M&E with the engage ment of the conflict-affected population should be used whenever feasible. Public access to FinancingM&E outputs will be essential for transparency and credibility. 15. The RPA provides an overview of recovery, reconstruction, and peacebuilding financing needs, as well as principles and options regarding both the sources of financing and associated instruments. - sponsibility that will require support from the international community. Some international partners have already earmarked Ensuring funding adequate, for flexible, eastern and Ukraine. rapid financingThe RPA willis a government help to situate re these commitments by providing a dedicated institutional framework to facilitate alignment and linkages among funding sources and enabling national and international stakeholder coordination.

16. A variety of financing instruments can be deployed in support of the RPA’s implementation. These will need to be predictable and harmonized, and also aligned with national and RPA priorities, the national budget process, and the government’s institutional framework for

recovery in eastern Ukraine. Options include: (i) budgetary allocations from the government; in(ii) the direct form budget of participation support from in specialized international instruments partners; (iii)and poolingguarantees; grant and financing (vi) mechanisms through a toMulti-Partner promote coordination Trust Fund with (MPTF); private (iv) sector international investments. loans; (v) support for the financial sector In Conclusion 17. The situation in eastern Ukraine is still evolving, with ongoing military operations and uncertain prospects for a lasting ceasefire. Nevertheless, it is urgent to formulate a re-

Addressing priority recovery, reconstruction, and peacebuilding needs in the short term will requiresponse andleadership provide and feasible substantial elements commitments of support onin anthe integrated, part of the fast, GoU, and along flexible with manner.support

programmaticfrom the international framework community. provided The by responsethe report, should this bewill tailored necessitate to specific specialized needs yetinstitu also- cognizant of the severe constraints posed by the ongoing conflict. Beyond the analytical and rapid disbursement, and identifying appropriate implementation capacities to achieve rapid results.tional arrangements for prioritizing interventions, flexibly aligning financing and ensuring

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 8 Chapter I RATIONALE AND SCOPE

1.0 Introduction 1.1 - affectedIn regions mid-2014, of eastern the GoU Ukraine. requested Following technical these assistance requests, and and financial within support the framework from the ofinter the 2008national Joint community Declaration to assesson Post-Crisis and plan Assessments priority recovery and Recovery and peacebuilding Planning, effortsthe EU, in UN, the and conflict- WBG agreed to support the government in undertaking a Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPA).

1.2 to undertake an initial rapid assess- This assessment follows the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) methodology. In view ofrecovery the continuing efforts to conflict inform in urgent eastern interventions Ukraine, it wasand decidedprovide a basis for scaling up recovery plan- ningment and as a responses first phase as of the activity, situation which and would needs provide evolve an on analytical the ground. and programmatic baseline for

1.3 which was undertaken in the period November 2014 to February 2015. In light of the dynamic This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the first phase of the RPA, snapshot in time. In particular, the assessment of infrastructure damage is limited to the damage thatand fluidoccurred nature on ofor thebefore situation November in eastern 2014. Ukraine,Furthermore, these thefindings number should of registered be considered internally as a displaced persons (IDPs), utilized as a reference to estimate the needs of this affected population,

2.0corresponds RPA to theGoal official and government Vision estimates as of February 2015. 2.1 - mendations on urgent priorities related to restoring critical infrastructure and services, improving economicThe goal livelihoods, of the first andphase strengthening of the RPA is socialto produce resilience a pragmatic and peacebuilding. and coherent It set is ofexpected recom that these recommendations will help inform the efforts of the government, its international partners, and other national stakeholders in improving human welfare and stabilizing social and areeconomic intended conditions as a contribution in conflict-affected to, and an areasintegral under part government of, the broader control, vision while on national efforts continuerecovery andto reach reform a definitive in Ukraine. resolution of the Donbas crisis. In so doing, the recommendations of the RPA 2.2 urgentAlthough response the from conflict both inthe the humanitarian Donbas region and has development not yet ended, communities. its impact in In the addition Luhansk to andthe Donestk oblasts, as well as in surrounding areas in Ukraine, has been significant and requires an which has also resulted in large-scale population displacement. Economic output and employ- mentsignificant in Donbas loss of has human also declinedlife, physical dramatically and human due capital to widespread have been insecurity, decimated violence, by the fighting,and the disruption of economic activity, and banks face worsening balance sheets, loss of access to collat- eral, severe liquidity strain, and soaring risks. While these are problems banks face countrywide,

Volume I: 9 SYNTHESIS REPORT they are all the more severe in Donbas, where lending has essentially halted as a result of the

- rentlyconflict. live There amid is heightened a clear and vulnerabilityurgent need to and stabilize deteriorating the conflict-affected living conditions. areas under government control and outside the zone of active conflict, and to improve the welfare of the millions who cur 2.3 - nomic Theactivity conflict and restoringin 2014 began infrastructure at a time iswhen critical the toeconomy improving of Donbas the welfare was alreadyand livelihoods in decline of thedue population, to long-standing a return systemic to the status inefficiencies quo ante andis unlikely institutional to be sustainable. deficiencies. Rather While than reviving restoring eco and the reconstruction of infrastructure should be underpinned by a new vision for the region’s economicproductive transformation sectors that had and been development. kept afloat through subsidies in the past, economic recovery 2.4 “Rebuilding better and smarter” in Donbas and nationwide should provide an opportunity to improve the state’s relationship with society. Participatory, effective, equitable, and stable governance is essential for restoring the deeply eroded state–society compact. Social cohesion needs to be strengthened, divisive narratives counteracted, and deep economic and social problems ad- making, and strengthen its accountability to the population by creating space for continuous citi- dressed. Confident local leadership will infuse transparency in economic and political decision

2.5zen participationThe relationship to influence between decisions. central and local governments, and their interaction with economic actors, also requires review. It will be necessary to further clarify the division of tasks for various levels of government, and match them with commensurate resources to avoid unfunded - mandates and promote timely and efficient recovery processes. An improved budgetary frame- stantiallywork would if local allow governments, external financial private support businesses, to flow and through civil society government function systems with fewer to a greaterformal extent, enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness. Public service delivery could also improve sub

2.6constraints, and engage each other more flexibly and effectively. to government-controlled areas of the East and across the country, and the central government’s In order to do so, several challenges need to be addressed. First, the recent influx of IDPs governments to meet their needs, pose a major and immediate challenge to the effective provision ofinability services thus and far support, to provide which adequate in turn financialis contributing and personnel to heightened support tensions to regional with host and communimunicipal- ties. To address these growing challenges, local administrations have taken emergency initiatives outside of national-level mechanisms and tried to collaborate horizontally with civic structures and other local administrations. While this is commendable, it undermines existing formal budgetary and administrative processes. In addition, local governments have serious capacity gaps, with their limited precrisis capacity further reduced by the departure of many government workers and the need to organize the relocation of others from areas outside government control. They also face an increasing workload owing to rising numbers of IDPs and the resulting demand for already strained services. 2.7 While the response at the local level will be all-important, a set of factors exogenous to the

Donbas situation as such will also shape the future of the conflict-affected areas. Key exogenous levelsfactors of include government. restoring Not peace all of andthese citizens’ factors security,are under keeping the government’s the exchange control, rate policy but most flexible de- pendwhile on containing national-level inflation, policies and which,implementing if successful, sound could budgetary strengthen and financial the basic measures functioning across of local all governments in the East and facilitate reconstruction of the social and economic fabric. This in

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 10 turn could set the stage for sustainable recovery, peacebuilding, and long-term growth, creating an environment in which infrastructure reconstruction can be financed in the absence of risk of renewed2.8 Restoring conflict andinfrastructure destruction. and social services contributes to alleviating the suffering of conflict-affected populations and to rebuilding citizens’ trust in the state. The adverse effects of essentialconflict-inflicted for societal damage normalization are disproportionately and stabilizing borne crisis-affected by poorer areas,households, and for the creating displaced, the necand- essaryother vulnerable conditions and for conflict-affectedthe return and reintegration groups. Restoring of the critical displaced. infrastructure This is particularly and service acute is thus in sectors such as housing, transportation, and the provision of critical social services (such as pensions). 2.9 Another prerequisite for effective recovery and reconstruction is the need for strengthened community security and social resilience, as well as community-level reconciliation. Cur- rent challenges include escalating crime and violence, and increasing tensions due to the mas- services and housing in host communities, which leads to social tensions between IDPs and host communities.sive forced displacement It also contributes of conflict-affected to a further populations.surge in poverty, Displacement inequality, raises and to demand the depletion for social of trust in the state. The elderly, women, children, and the disabled are most vulnerable to the degra- dation in access to social services, livelihoods, and justice, and institutional care has been greatly disrupted. 2.10 - sociated priority needs for recovery and peacebuilding. As such, recommendations in the RPA are intendedThe to first provide phase the of basis the RPA for providesan initial anframework initial assessment for recovery of theseefforts various that focus impacts on short- and as to medium-term results over a two-year period. It is hoped that such a framework will help the government and international community identify, prioritize, and sequence recovery interventions - ery needs and priorities as the situation in the East evolves. The recommendations made in the reporton a regular should basis, all start and within that it thewill next be continuously 24 months, and updated most andwill adjustedcontinue in beyond order thatto reflect time frame.recov However, the costs presented cover only the initial two years. 2.11 It is also hoped that the RPA will inform agreements and programs with important devel- - - dationsopment focusedpartners, on notably local government, those flowing community-level from Ukraine’s EU and Association microeconomic Agreement. aspects Ukraine’s of recovery, dis andcussions the restoration with the IMF of infrastructure.on macroeconomic Finally, stabilization the RPA does policies not focus also informon immediate the RPA’s humanitarian recommen needs linked to the crisis, but through its focus on durable solutions, looks beyond the humanitarian Strategic Response Plan (SRP) presented by the UN to the international community. 3.0 Overview of the RPA Process Background 3.1 The RPA process for Ukraine was initiated in September 2014, following requests from the GoU for support on the assessment of recovery needs and priorities in the Donbas region. Follow- ing a joint EU, UN, and WBG scoping mission to Ukraine that took place between September 29 recov-

PCNAand October approach. 3, 2014, the three institutions agreed to organize a two-phase assessment of ery and peacebuilding needs in the conflict-affected regions of eastern Ukraine on the basis of the

Volume I: 11 SYNTHESIS REPORT 3.2 The Eastern Ukraine RPA is guided by three primary objectives: • to support the GoU in the assessment of short-, medium-, and long-term recovery and peace- - quirements; building needs, related strategic and programmatic priorities, and associated financial re • to inform the development of a collective vision and strategy on longer-term recovery and - work of the 2015–2017 Ukraine Economic Recovery Plan and future policy reforms; peacebuilding for the Donbas and other conflict-affected regions, including within the frame • to provide a platform for coordinated and coherent provision of support from the EU, the UN, and the WBG, as well as broader donor assistance—among other things via linkages to the reform processes of interest to the EU’s Ukraine Support Group. 3.3 consisted of a rapid assessment that examined the immediate interventions necessary to stabilize The first phase of the RPA was undertaken in November and December 2014. This phase return prospects for displaced and vulnerable populations. Follow-up consultations were held in Januaryconflict-affected and February areas 2015under in government eastern Ukraine control and and Kyiv, improve with government the welfare, civil living society, conditions, and inter and- national partners. Assessment Methodology 3.4 - Phase 1 of the RPA focused primarily on assessing the impact of the 2014 conflict in the Donbas, with specific attention paid to areas under government control and adjacent areas af- fectedsary to by rehabilitate the conflict, critical including infrastructure those that and host services, large numbers improve of social IDPs. andFor theeconomic purposes welfare of Phase and 1, short-term recovery needs and priorities were defined as those interventions that are neces and resilience, and create an enabling environment for longer-term development. These inter- ventionslivelihoods follow (particularly up on the for provision conflict-affected of humanitarian and vulnerable assistance groups), and pave strengthen the way forsocial longer-term cohesion durable development efforts.

3.5 The RPA focused on three major thematic areas that correspond to its three strategic objectives (see Chapter III); each of these include treatment of the cross-cutting issues shown in Figure 1.

3.6 Phase 1 of the RPA was organized as a rapid exercise that drew for the most part on existing primary- and secondary-source information and used qualitative and quantitative methods to describe and measure impacts, assess needs, and develop preliminary and costed priority inter-

Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services and other national min- ventions. The joint EU/UN/WBG assessment team worked in collaboration with the Ministry of assessmentsistries and agencies to address (notably critical the information Ministry of gaps Social and Services, permit consultations the State Emergency with regional Services, and local and stakeholders.local oblast administrations),4 and also undertook missions to eastern Ukraine to conduct field

4 Additional elements of methodology can be found in the detailed component reports in Volume II of this RPA.

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 12 Figure 1. Major thematic areas of the RPA

Component 3 Component 1 Component 2 Social Resilience Infrastructure & Economic Recovery Peacebuilding & Social Services Community Security

- Rehabilitation and - Emergency/short-term - Displacement and reconstruction of critical, jobs resilience of host damaged physical and communities, and returnee - Productive capacities and social infrastructure reintegration livelihoods - Restoration of priority - Reconciliation, - Local economic planning social services capacity peacebuilding and confidence-building - Short-term social welfare - Micro and small support and restoration of enterprise recovery - Protection of conflict- social benefits affected population - Restoration of financial including justice and citizen - Rehabilitation of services security environmental damage

Cross-cutting issues: Gender, Human Rights, Local Governance and Implementation Capacity & IDPs

3.7 It must be emphasized that the division of the RPA into these three components is more administrative than technical. The three components have been designed to be mutually complementary and strategically synchronous. For example, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure in Component 1 will provide opportunities for introducing labor-intensive construction technologies. This is designed to link well with Component 2, priorities for jump-starting local employment, particularly in the case of subdistrict and community infrastructure. Similarly, the equitable, consistent, and harmonious delivery of basic services across host and IDP populations proposed in Component 1 will complement the outcomes of Component 3 by improving social cohesion by reducing competition for such services. Geographic Scope 3.8 of damage, and further broken down by (i) most affected; (ii) less affected; and (iii) indirectly affected areasFor this (oblasts assessment, and raions)(see the geographic Table scope 1).5 was defined on the basis of the nature and extent

5 This typology does not represent diminishing levels of damage or impact, but is rather intended as a way to demarcate areas by the type of damage—in some zone III areas, for instance, the cumulative impact of the conflict exceeded the impact in some zone II areas.

Volume I: 13 SYNTHESIS REPORT Table 1. Geographic focus of RPA Phase I Crisis impact classification Oblasts/raions covered Zone I Luhansk oblast: Donetsk oblast: Novoaider Kramatorsk Slovyansk damage and disruption of social services and Severdonestsk Artemivsk livelihoodsMost affected—significant infrastructure Stanytsya Luhanska Konstantynivka Lysychansk Krasnoarmiisk Volnovakha Volodarske

Zone II Remaining raions under Mariupol Less affected—minimal infrastructure damage, government control in disrupted connectivity and service networks, Luhansk and Donetsk hosting IDPs oblasts

Zone III Kharkiv oblast: Indirectly affected—hosting IDPs, additional Kharkiv, Izyum strain on service provision and livelihoods, To a lesser extent, the rest of BerdianskZaporizhzhia oblast: received most of the injured Ukraine DnipropetrovskZaporizhzhia

Assessment Process 3.9 - nent Terms of Reference (ToRs) and the assessment methodology. Representatives and specialists from acrossOn November the GoU’s 13–14, various the ministries RPA team and hosted sectors a workshop attended with the workshop.the GoU, outlining From the the inception compo of the RPA, the component teams worked closely with government counterparts to secure secondary data.

3.10 Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, Semenivk, Novoivanivka, Donetskoye, Slovyansk, Severodonetsk, Novoai- From November 16–22, EU, UN, and WBG sector specialists conducted field missions to dar, Lysychansk, Kharkhiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Berdiansk, Mariupol, and other rural consolidatedlocations to collect into component primary data reports. and meet with local actors. The data collected from these field missions, coupled with the existing secondary data fed into sector-specific reports, was further 3.11 of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services on December 16. Both volumesThe of assessmentthe assessment findings were were provided presented to the toGoU the in GoU late Decemberthrough a workshopfor review. at the Ministry

3.12 In January–February 2015 the RPA’s initial results were reviewed with the government through a series of technical workshops, and discussed with national stakeholders (including civil - ners through consultations organized in Kyiv and Kharkiv. This report has been revised to incor- poratesociety, feedback nongovernmental received during organizations both the (NGOs), technical and reviews the private and consultations. sector) and international part

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 14 Outputs 3.13 The following outputs were produced during the RPA Phase 1 exercise:

• —analysis of the direct and indirect impacts of the

Impact assessment, results, and findings • conflict in the various sectors/subsectors assessed. related interventions based on the RPA’s strategic objectives and outcomes. Overview of short-term (24 months) recovery priorities—identification of priority needs and • Strategic Results Framework (SRF)—overview of baseline conditions, performance indicators, and likely impact timelines of the proposed interventions. • Institutional arrangements, governance, and implementation capacity—overview of institutional arrangements and governance mechanisms necessary to implement the strategy and achieve results/outcomes; overview of implementation capacity (current constraints and priorities). • Costing of priorities/budget priority interventions. —overview of financial requirements for implementing proposed RPA Report Structure 3.14 These outputs are presented in a report comprised of two volumes:

• - mended interventions for the two-year period, in the form of this synthesis report. Volume I provides an overview of the results of the assessment, key findings, and recom • Volume II provides the detailed assessment reports for each of the RPA’s three components. 4.0 Limitations 4.1 data collection and analysis limited to a few weeks in November and December 2014), in a context The first phase of the RPA was undertaken in a short period of time (with much of the actual dataof active for theconflict Donbas and limited insecurity, the datawhere obtainable the impacts to already on infrastructure existing primary and human and secondarywelfare continue sources,and and are precluded ongoing. Limitations collection of in additional access due quantitative to insecurity and and qualitative significant data. gaps Furthermore, in the availability needs inof some sectors, such as agriculture, were not examined in depth nor were recommendations made. For this reason, the RPA report should be considered as a preliminary analytical baseline that will

4.2need to be further refined, adjusted, and expanded as conditions and needs evolve. - ment—but more the beginning of a continuous process and mode of assessment. Some sectors such asAs housing, a result, environment, the RPA report and must employment, not be seen among as a definitiveothers, require end to morethe process work due of assess to the other areas, such as social cohesion, require additional time in order to gather data given the sensitivitypresent unavailability of the issues of and full the damage longer timedata, framesparticularly required in areas to measure with active changes conflict. in social Moreover, dynamics. Given the unpredictability and uncertainty of the situation in some parts of the crisis-affected region, the government structure established to coordinate and lead recovery efforts will need to play a key role in regularly updating this assessment. This may require incorporating the data template and analysis methodology employed for this assessment into the government’s preexist- ing systems. Such institutionalization of this data-collection and recovery-planning approach will

Volume I: 15 SYNTHESIS REPORT help create a temporal, sectoral, and geographical damage and needs database of actionable and comparable information. This will contribute to more systematized and “time-sliced” recovery planning to address the unprecedented challenges and requirements posed by an ongoing con-

5.0flict, for Riskswhich RPA partners can continue to provide active technical support. 5.1 risks. Key risks in the context of eastern Ukraine include: Undertaking recovery planning in a context of ongoing crisis is never without significant 5.2 Continued uncertainty and conflict.

The outcome of the conflict in the East is currently uncertain, which renders assessment and planning of recovery activities extremely difficult. At- spective,present, therethe only is the way risk to manage that the the conflict risks associatedcould still escalatewith the anduncertainty expand, concerningor become thea “frozen” trajec- conflict. On the other hand, a satisfactory diplomatic solution may be found. From a recovery per process of continuous assessment of recovery needs, and on the other hand using an implementa- tory and duration of conflict is to maintain a dual-track approach that combines on the one hand a needs and opportunities emerge. tion framework that allows for flexible and responsive programming of recovery interventions as 5.3 National capacity on recovery. - cant burdens imposed on the government with respect to managing the multiple dimensions of the crisis (humanitarian, political/diplomatic, The ongoing security) conflict alongside in eastern the country’s Ukraine broaderand the macrosignifi- economic problems pose the risk of hampering the government’s ability to focus on and manage recovery efforts in eastern Ukraine. At the national level, this could include the inability to ensure adequate coordination between ministries, national services, and the international donor community; in eastern Ukraine, this could include the inability of local administrations to support, include the need to ensure strong political commitment at the highest levels in government for oversee, and manage the implementation of specific recovery interventions. Mitigating measures- ment structures charged with coordinating and implementing recovery efforts centrally and locally.recovery efforts, and the provision of adequate technical, staffing, and financial means to govern

5.4 Coordination capacities. - - ment, international donors, and a Multisectoralbroad array of recovery governmental interventions and nongovernmental in low-capacity actors environ and mentsimplementing heavily impactedagencies. byA prerequisiteconflict necessitate for such strong coordination coordination is the between establishment the national of a govern- lead and coordinate recovery efforts at both the national and local levels. In the absence of such ment structure with the appropriate mandate, and technical, human, and financial resources to needs in a responsive, targeted, and effective manner, which, as the experience of other crisis contextsa structure, illustrates, there is acould significant lead to risk duplication, that recovery poor efforts prioritization, will falter, major or be delays,insufficient and toineffective address programming.

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 16 Chapter II CONTEXT ANALYSIS

6.0 Political and Security Developments in 2014: Backdrop to the Conflict 6.1 In November 2013, antigovernment demonstrations erupted in Kyiv, sparked by President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to suspend preparations for the signing of an association agreement with the EU that had been under negotiation since 2007. The demonstrations, which subsequent- ly became popularly known as “the Revolution of Dignity,” gained strength and security forces employed excessive force to control unrest, particularly in Independence Square (Maidan) in Kyiv,- liamentwhere over voted 100 for people his dismissal. were killed Parliament between reinstatedJanuary and the February 2004 constitution, 2014, including thus byreverting sniper fire.to a parliamentary–presidentialOn February 22, President Yanukovych republic with left a strongerKyiv and rolesubsequently for Parliament. the country, whereupon Par 6.2 Following the developments in Crimea, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution

“[...]68/262 5. onUnderscores 27 March that2014 the which referendum states that held it: in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol; Calls upon all States,city of Sevastopolinternational on organizations 16 March 2014, and having specialized no validity, agencies cannot not toform recognize the basis any for alteration any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above- mentioned referendum and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status.”6 6.3 - netsk oblasts not under government control, following referenda that were not recognized by In May 2014, “people’s republics” were proclaimed in the parts of both Luhansk and Do the GoU and were widely criticized by large parts of the international community. On May 25,- sion2014, as Ukraine “a genuine held election early presidential largely in line elections. with international Petro Poroshenko commitments won in the and first with round a respect with for55 fundamentalpercent of the freedoms vote. The in elections the vast majoritywere qualified of the country.”by the International7 Election Observation Mis 6.4

In late May, Ukrainian forces began a concerted military response to reestablish control over areas controlled by pro-Russian separatists and gained significant ground until they were pushed back. Military clashes continue, though recently on a significantly lower level, despite the existence of a peace agreement (the Minsk Protocol) signed by Ukraine, the Russian Federation,

- not form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or the city of Sevastopol” (see http://www. un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262).6 On March 27, 2014, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 68/262 stating that the referenda had “no validity” and “can

Findings and Conclusions.” http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/119078?download=true. 7 International Election Observation Mission. 2014. “Ukraine—Early Presidential Election, May 25, 2014. Statement of Preliminary

Volume I: 17 SYNTHESIS REPORT and the separatists on September 5, 2014, a memorandum signed by all sides of the conflict on September 19, and a new package of measures in support of the implementation of the Minsk Agreements,6.5 which notably renewed the cease-fire provisions on February 12, 2015. - ernment control remaining vacant, and a new government was formed on December 2, 2014. The governmentParliamentary decided toelections cease social were serviceheld on delivery October and 26, paymentswith 27 seats to areas for areas beyond not government under gov control as of December 1, 2014; such a situation had de facto already existed for months due to the collapse of the banking system in the separatist-held region. 6.6 on social and economic conditions in the East. To date, out of the 5.2 million people who resided in The ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine has had a significant impact on human welfare and As of late February there are a reported 7,000 deaths (including military personnel), some 18,000 wounded,conflict-affected and more regions than in 1.6 the million East, atdisplaced least 3.9 both million internally have been and directly outside affected of Ukraine. by the8 The conflict. actual figures6.7 are likely considerably higher. that areBefore located the in conflict, this region the have Donbas experienced region had long-standing already faced decline significant and have long-term been further challenges dam- related to poverty, demography, and its economic structure. Many of the country’s key industries more acute risks for the well-being of the population of the East. This situation is likely to be com- aged by the conflict and trade disputes. However, the deteriorating economic situation poses even necessitating the urgent restoration of basic infrastructure, renewed access to social services, pounded by the significant loss of services, shelter, and livelihoods associated with the conflict, country—alreadyand access to employment low after or years other of income-generating divergent and politically opportunities. charged The narratives conflict inabout the East history, has language,also significantly and patriotism. deteriorated levels of social cohesion, trust, and cooperation throughout the 6.8 strengthen unity in the country, building on the desire of the overwhelming majority of Ukraini- ans to remainRecovery united. in the9 conflict-affected regions of the East therefore offers an opportunity to - uation will be a primary While concern immediate for both attention the new will government need to be and focused the population. on specific However, post-conflict fail- needs in the East, bridges must also be built between all parts of Ukraine. Ukraine’s dire fiscal sit including those outlined above, will have serious implications in terms of increasing vulnerability, ure to also address the associated humanitarian and development concerns related to the conflict, - lost confidence in the state, and risk a renewed humanitarian crisis. Ukraine’s conflict recovery asprocess—to well as to createpotential a foundation opportunities for stability to build andresilience development——must and promote civic therefore engagement. be both reflec tive and responsive to the country’s underlying structural drivers of conflict and societal tension,

8 Sources include the Ministry of Social Policy, UNOCHA, UNHCR, and UNICEF, all of which provide regular updates; and ACAPS (As sessment Capacities Project). 2015. “Eastern Ukraine: Conflict.” Briefing, ACAPS, Kiev. 9 According to a Pew Research Center Spring 2014 global attitudes survey, 77 percent of Ukrainians prefer to remain united.

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 18 7.0 External and Internal Factors Underpinning the Situation 7.1 - tem perceived as corrupt and lacking accountability, marked by weak rule-of-law institutions and a judiciaryThe Maidanthat was protests neither most independent fundamentally nor able reflected to ensure deep-seated due process dissatisfaction10 and which with was a alsosys

- minedperceived the asrelationship being highly between corrupt. citizens For many and Maidanthe state. protestors, alignment with European Union standards held the prospect of correcting these endemic governance deficits that severely under 7.2 11 was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922 and the re- mainder in 1945, and Ukraine became an independent state when the USSR dissolved in 1991.12 Most of present-day Ukraine strengthening the attachment of individuals and culturally diverse communities to a national en- Sincetity. Ukrainian independence, insufficient attention has been paid to nation building: that is,

7.3 Economic and social discontent are evident in most of Ukraine’s regions. Yet against the background of the events of 2014, perceptions of regional identity and regional differences were manipulated and used for geopolitical purposes not only by internal but also external actors, polarizing “pro-Ukrainian” and “pro-Russian” narratives and fueling tensions.

7.4 information war, has eroded social cohesion. Issues involving social payments and subsidies, em- ploymentEconomic and salaries, distress accountability (see below), mechanisms, now coupled the with role overt of personal military wealthconflict in and national a de factopoli- tics, and the transparency of budgeting and the reform process have also become highly politi- cized and stoked further grievances within the population. The Economy 7.5 In the 1990s, unemployment rose alarmingly and an emergent oligarchic class established effective controlFollowing over independence,state assets, undermining the country transparenthas experienced and effectivea significant governance. economic The contraction. economy - - began to recover in 2000, only to falter again in the global recession of 2008. In late 2014 a financial crisis loomed as a conflict-induced economic decline, coupled with rapid currency deprecia annualizedtion, rising inflation,rate of about and 20 depletion percent ofin internationallate 2014 and reserves will perhaps made be the higher rising in fiscal2015; deficit over the unsus past year,tainable real and household undermined incomes the solvencyhave dropped of a large by 5 part percent of the and banking the exchange system. Inflationrate of the reached national an currency, the hryvnia, has fallen dramatically.

7.6 The dire economic situation has been felt across the whole country: in the East, with its - gree of industrialization and has even lower GDP levels. However, key industries were already in largely obsolete and inefficient heavy industries and in the West, which lacks the equivalent de

Rights in Ukraine.” Report, UN Human Rights Council, Geneva. 10 UN Human Rights Council. 2014. “Report of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human percent11 A part in Crimea. of western Ukraine was under Polish control until the end of World War II, after which today’s borders were established. 12 On December 1, 1991, more than 90 percent of Ukrainians voted for independence with majorities in every region, including 56

Volume I: 19 SYNTHESIS REPORT - dies and by wage arrears. Amidst this economic decline, many residents in eastern Ukraine, (par- ticularlydecline; significantpensioners), components are nostalgic were for outdated,the social inefficient,safety nets andand unprofitable,managed economy financed of the by Sovietsubsi Union, and thus more oriented toward Russia as its present-day successor.

7.7 It is estimated that between 30 and 60 percent of Ukraine’s economic activity occurs in the shadow and informal economies, and therefore goes unreported and generates no direct tax revenue.13 underfunding of social programs and local budgets, resulting in worsening quality of services On the one hand, much of the resultant burden is borne by the citizenry through the

(andand higher through out-of-pocket the multiplier payments, effect contributes both official to VAT and revenue), unofficial, although in health it offersand education. no employment- On the relatedother hand, social the protection. informal sector is flexible and more easily generates employment and livelihoods

7.8 As the Donbas historically contributed approximately 16 percent to the GDP and 25 per- whole country. Trade disputes with Russia have further damaged the Ukrainian economy, again mostcent to heavily Ukrainian in the exports, East. Ukraine’s the conflict real in GDP the East is expected has had tosignificant decrease economic by 8 percent implications14 in 2014 for and the is forecast to contract by a further 7.5 percent in 2015, while the exchange rate has heavily depreci- ated since early 2014. Over the same period, registered unemployment has increased from 7.7 percentGovernance to 9.3 percent. The economic spillover of the conflict thus extends to the entire country. 7.9 reveal serious governance challenges and the absence of the elements of governance that could The current conflict, combined with geopolitical factors and social and economic volatility, and access to justice or to develop a working system of governance that is participatory, effective,manage and instability.stable. There Over are the no clearpast 10ways years, to hold little leaders progress accountable has been between made to elections,ensure rule to ensureof law transparency in economic and political decision making, or to allow effective citizen participation in governance between elections. Distrust of government runs very deep and the state–society - government’scompact has eroded. decisions Though or supervise there have its beenactions. significant15 improvements, there is still too little dia logue between the government and the citizenry, which in turn lacks the means to influence the 7.10 Government and governance methods in Ukraine are heavily centralized. Government functions are exercised through strong central state and exclusive political power, and local problems are solved primarily by transferring the issues up to the national level. Formally, local gov- administrative channels of the national government. Despite several waves of decentralization reforms,ernments public are autonomous service provision entities, is stillbut incontrolled reality are by heavily the central controlled public throughadministration. the financial However, and oblasts, raions (districts), and hromada (municipalities/local administrations) are also respon- - sible for local public service provision. This arrangement reduces the population’s ability to influ

13 A range of government and nongovernment sources cite figures in this range. reported14 World that Bank they projections. have no opportunity to supervise the activity of government structures. 15 A nationwide public opinion poll conducted just prior to the outbreak of civil unrest shows that 76.5 percent of respondents

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 20 basic public services. It also increases the incidence of corruption and misalignment of budget al- ence,locations or hold with authorities local priorities. accountable A process for, of political, decentralization financial, andstarted management in late 2014 decisions with decisions regarding on key measures for decentralization still need to be enacted. fiscal decentralization. This was followed by further legal changes in early 2015. However, many 7.11 dependent governance model discouraged horizontal cooperation between regions and also between Theselocal communities structural issues within have the same significantly region. This contributed disconnect to theexacerbated current crisis. existing The social center– differences and precipitated a misperception shared in all parts of Ukraine—that other parts of the country were better funded and that their needs were better addressed. These misperceptions have been reinforced by the electoral rhetoric of regional political candidates in their attempts to mobilize their electorate.

7.12 Corruption is a widespread problem in Ukrainian society. Ukraine was ranked 142 out of 175 countries in Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, the lowest of all eastern European countries. Transparency International estimates that 30 to 50 percent of all Ukrainians have faced governmental corruption. The intricate connections between political life

- cal,and economic,business life and, in asUkraine a result, revolve social around life. This the phenomenon influence of ais small fueled number by systemic of rich problems and powerful such individuals, commonly referred to as oligarchs, who wield disproportionate influence over politi and, until recently, the tenuous connection between the electorate and those who hold political power.as lack Itof is transparency still too early in to party judge financing, whether recentpermissive positive practices changes concerning in the political conflicts culture of interest, in this

7.13field are sustainable. - ness nexus and build a new, democratic, and “clean” Ukraine. However, the interplay between the The Maidan movement in effect became a vehicle that aimed to destroy this politico–busi country’s trajectory. While Ukraine’s civil society is relatively strong, it is still fragile; though it has beenpowerful able individuals,to make progress their patronage in engaging systems, citizens and on politicsissues such continues as local to and negatively national influence politics, the environment, health, education, and local development, its engagement in governance remains interests. The general level of trust in the media stands at no more than 40 percent and is fully trustednascent. by Its only media 3.3 is percent similarly of weak,Ukrainians. and easily16 The manipulated weak media by and pressure a growing from but official still underdevel and private- oped civil society with limited engagement around governance issues feed into limited mechanisms for citizen voice in political parties and institutions of governance. 8.0 Population Displacement 8.1 7,000 deaths and 18,000 wounded. Around 1 million people are registered as internally displaced and anotherTo date, 640,000 at least have 3.9 milliontaken refugepeople in have other been countries. directly17 affected Successive by the waves conflict, of internal with some dis-

Analysis of 2011–2013 public opinion survey data on Ukrainian society’s major problems and priority areas for development of Ukraine’s internal and foreign policy report, Social Research Center of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of16 Ukraine, 2014.

17 Sources include: ACAPS, 2015; UNOCHA. 2015c. “Ukraine.” Situation Report No. 29, UNOCHA, Kiev.

Volume I: 21 SYNTHESIS REPORT - ber of IDPs in the country rose to 54,400, including 12,000 from Crimea, as violence in eastern Ukraineplacement escalated. followed18 the first outflows of residents from Crimea in March 2014. By June, the num had reached 117,000, with 15,000 originating in Crimea.19 - By August, following an intensification of the conflict in the East, the total to regain control of territory in late summer. That month, the Despite number a cease-fire of IDPs tripled agreed to to 415,000, on Sep driventember primarily 5, violence by continued concerns overthrough physical October security, 2014 colderas government weather, forcesand the launched deterioration an offensive of services and rule of law in areas not controlled by the government.20, 21 By mid-January, the number of IDPs had risen to 660,000 and by mid-February had passed 1 million.

8.2 many IDPs do not seek out aid or register as IDPs for government services, out of fear that male membersInterviews of displaced with familiescivil society might organization be conscripted (CSO) or activistsout of concern and the about displaced how theysuggest may that be treated by the authorities, as well as anxiety over the consequences that registering may have in terms of separatist de facto authorities in their home areas.22 Furthermore, it is widely believed that those IDPs who register are among the most vulnerable subset of the IDP population23 and most in need of social support. (See Chapter V, Transversal Issues and Priorities for additional details on the characteristics of population displacement).

for diverse government services. As with all IDP numbers for 2014 cited in this analysis, the actual number may be much larger due 18 This is the figure UNHCR issued in June based on IDPs that were counted by local authorities, CSOs, and those that had registered registry, IDPs that had been exiled for some time but may have registered for aid either because of their deteriorating circumstances or otherwise,to the absence may ofappear a central as “new” registry IDPs and in internalinconsistent displacement registration tallies. methods It is possible, employed for by instance, CSOs and that local the authorities.rise in IDP numbers With no towardcentral the end of September 2014 is attributable this phenomenon.

19 See trends as described in: UNOCHA. 2014a. “Ukraine.” Situation Report No. 15, UNOCHA, Kiev. 20 Focus group data and key informant interviews, Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk in October and November 2014. Included in the withtotal were18,779 the from now Crimea 17,749 and persons 398,467 displaced from eastern from Crimea. Ukraine See (see: UNOCHA UNHCR. reporting n.d. “Internally May 2014 Displaced through Persons.” September http://unhcr.org.ua/ 2014. Most recent en/2011-08-26-06-58-56/news-archive/1231-internally-displaced-people).figures are from: UNOCHA. 2014b. “Ukraine.” Situation Report No. 16, UNOCHA, Kiev. Note that UNHCR issues figures of 417,246 IDPs,

21 These figures, as with all totals for the internally displaced issued by UNHCR and UNOCHA in the last half of 2014, were based on Ukraine SES estimates. SES data is determined using information recorded by local CSOs and the number of IDPs that have registered- for diverse government services. Actual internal displacement figures over the period were believed to be much higher (perhaps up to three times higher) as a result of the absence of a central registry, inconsistent reporting methods by CSOs, and the diverse registra tion practices of separate government agencies. (See UNOCHA, 2014a). Report,22 Interviews UNHCR, Geneva.with IDPs and CSOs assisting IDPs in Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk, October 2014. 23 See, for example: UNHCR. 2014a. “Ukraine UNHCR External Update on the Situation of Displaced Persons 5–23 September 2014.”

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 22 Chapter III OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY AND PEACEBUILDING PRIORITIES FOR EASTERN UKRAINE

9.0 Proposed Approach to Identifying Recovery and Peacebuilding Priorities 9.1 structural drivers of the crisis, both the government and its partners recognize the need to urgently Despiteaddress thereconstruction, ongoing conflict economic in eastern recovery, Ukraine and and peacebuilding the broader needshistorical, in the social, areas and affected other

(directly and indirectly) by the conflict in the East. In this context, the RPA should be seen as an improvingiterative process human to welfare, assess theparticularly impact of of the the conflict displaced, and and identify avoiding key thepriorities further for exacerbation recovery and of building peace. For the first phase of the RPA, and in light of the ongoing crisis, the focus is on should also help inform, through positive precedents, future reforms in the areas of economic policy,the conflict governance, drivers describedand social above.services, The as short-term well as a longer-term recovery interventions and comprehensive proposed recovery by the RPAand peacebuilding strategy.

9.2 In order to systematically lay the basis for identifying, prioritizing, and sequencing recovery and peacebuilding initiatives, recommendations are presented within the framework of three strategic components:

• Strategic Component 1: Restore critical infrastructure and social services. The sustainable restoration and improvement of infrastructure and social services holds the key to normalizing and stabilizing society in the crisis-affected areas and to creating conditions for IDP

will not only ameliorate the affected populations’ suffering, but also help restore citizens’ trust inreturn the state.and repatriation. In addition Efficientto “brick-and-mortar” and effective recovery damage of to infrastructure infrastructure, and the service loss of delivery equipment, the exodus of employees, and a drop in staff skills and capacity in the directly affected regions are other challenges that need to be addressed. Ensuring satisfactory provision of so-

in some cases this is quite dramatic, requiring that existing services be expanded and adjusted tocial meet services these in additional indirectly needs. affected areas is complicated by the influx of displaced populations; • Strategic Component 2: Promote economic recovery. In the context of widespread disruption of economic activity, loss of livelihoods and employment, and a deteriorating macroeconomic environment, this report proposes a multi-track approach to economic recovery

resilience. This approach consists of generating short-term employment opportunities, im- provingaimed at productive reducing thecapacities vulnerability and livelihood of conflict-affected options, strengthening populations local and economicincreasing planning, societal -

stimulatingremaining private small and sector medium will beenterprises essential (SMEs)to address and keythe privatebottlenecks sector, and and rebuild facilitating the localpro vision of financial services. Collaboration between local governments, civil society, and the

Volume I: 23 SYNTHESIS REPORT economy and social trust. • Strategic Component 3: Strengthen social resilience, peacebuilding, and community security. Restoring and strengthening the social fabric is a critical requirement for effective - ation and peacebuilding, which puts investments in infrastructure, services, and economic andrecovery sustainable at risk. Prioritiesrecovery. inThe this risk regard of renewed include buildingconflict remains trust, strengthening in the absence the ofresilience reconcili of

and promoting reconciliation, peacebuilding, citizen security, and access to justice. Cross- cuttingdisplaced issues populations of gender, and human host communities,rights, and capacity better developmentprotecting conflict-affected need to be fully populations, integrated. 10.0 Underlying Principles and Considerations 10.1 Achieving meaningful progress in recovery and peacebuilding in eastern Ukraine during

Drawing on the lessons of postcrisis recovery strategies in other countries, the following prin- ciplesa period are of proposed: continued uncertainty and conflict requires a robust approach to implementation.

• Targeting. In order to ensure that recovery interventions directly impact the populations

displaced (including actual and potential returnees), resident and host communities, youth, women,most in combatants,need, they should and ex-combatants focus on specific (and population their home groups. communities). Priority groups include the • Coordination and communication. Effective coordination will be necessary to ensure that sectoral interventions are mutually complementary and achieve the combined impacts necessary for maximizing recovery and peacebuilding prospects. A clear communications strategy will also be important to ensure that stakeholders are well informed and to manage expectations. • Management of the recovery process. How a recovery process is led and managed can - - tiessignificantly and authorities impact inpeacebuilding. decentralized In decision-making this context, stakeholders’ processes willbroad be participationcritical to build and trust en andgagement ensure will responsiveness be important to to local define needs collective and priorities. priorities, while empowering local communi • Implementation modalities. Recovery provides an opportunity to not only address the - tors to improve economic welfare, societal cohesion, and service provision, and to address damages caused by conflict, but also to consider how improvements can be made across sec

toconstraints consider anda wide challenges range of that implementation existed prior mechanismsto the conflict. for Moreover, peacebuilding and in andview recovery of the need activities—includingfor flexibility, responsiveness, both government and speed and innongovernmental achieving immediate mechanisms. results, it may be necessary • Establishing an enabling policy framework for recovery. effective implementation and will require consensus building around key cross-cutting operating principles for multisectoral recovery, such as: subsidiarity This andis critical local implementation,for efficient and public sector facilitation of private sector recovery, restoring sustainable livelihoods, independent oversight and transparency, and effectively managing public expectations and grievances.

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 24 11.0 Prioritization and Sequencing 11.1

The continuation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the likelihood that the situation andwill remainresponsive volatile approach and fluid to addressing for some time recovery precludes, needs for is therequired time being,that takes the development into account andthe strongimplementation likelihood of that a comprehensive impacts, needs, recovery and opportunities plan in the will conventional change and sense. evolve Rather, over time. a flexible Such a regular basis, which would be sequenced and implemented alongside humanitarian, political, andan approach security efforts.would necessitate The following the criteriaidentification could beand considered prioritization as a ofbasis recovery for prioritizing interventions the ini on-

•tiatives Urgency in conflict-affected and criticality areasof needs, under and government the feasibility control: of rapid action (key infrastructure, short- term jobs, IDP essential welfare) • • Stabilizing affected populations (IDPs in host communities) Minimum security and operating conditions • Social cohesion initiatives • Immediately feasible, rapid, and visible impacts 12.0 Transversal Issues 12.1 the needs of the internally displaced, local governance, gender, and human rights. These are ad- dressedThe in moreRPA team detail identified in Chapter four V. issues that need to be addressed in a transversal manner:

12.2 Internal displacement. To contain the developmental impacts of displacement and leverage the skills and presence of the displaced for more positive outcomes for all, four key challenges must be addressed: delivering services such as security, education, health, and social payments, along with basic infrastructure in equal measure to the displaced and host populations; assisting the displaced regain control of land and property; reestablishing livelihoods and social bonds - sive governance and rule of law at the local level. These are the barriers to durable solutions for Ukraine’sthat are disrupted internally by displaced—and forced displacement they are,and atconflict; the same and time,establishing critical accountabledevelopment and challenges respon for the country’s entire population. The RPA integrates these concerns throughout the three components outlined above. This approach is premised on the continuation of the IDP crisis for the - nances, service delivery mechanisms, governance, and social cohesion. foreseeable future and the associated strains that such population movements place on state fi 12.3 Local governance. The crisis has had widespread impacts on local governance24 in affected areas, including on institutional capacities, assets, and infrastructure; local budgets and income streams; delivery of municipal services; local social dynamics; relations between national, regional, and local levels of government; and state–society relations and citizen–state trust. Local

Priorities.” Report, UN and World Bank, Washington, DC. A local governance function is one that is statutorily or customarily mandated 24 See: UN and World Bank. 2014. “Rebuilding Core Government Functions in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict: Key Issues and- ties, the private sector, and so on. to one or more stakeholders of local dimension, including local governments, local state administration, local CSOs/CBOs, communi

Volume I: 25 SYNTHESIS REPORT governance is an intrinsic part of recovery processes and is addressed throughout the RPA. Ensur- coordination of activities on the ground, ensure responsiveness to urgent and emerging needs, improveing support public for trustand strengthening in the capacity local of the governance state, and willpromote promote a more efficient sustainable, implementation participatory, and inclusive, and accountable recovery process.

12.4 Gender. The crisis has had different impacts on men, women, children, and the elderly. Therefore, recovering from the crisis will necessitate a recognition of, and response to, gender and age-differentiated needs. The RPA has adopted a gender-mainstreaming approach—meaning that the analysis of the crisis impacts, resultant needs, and related strategic recommendations all into the implementation of the recovery strategy as an integral dimension of successful recovery programming.take this into account.25 Moreover, it recommends that gender sensitivity be similarly integrated

12.5 Human rights. - ous allegations of human rights abuses by all parties, including gross violations such as summary executions, abductions, The armed torture conflict and ill in treatment, eastern Ukraine arbitrary has detention, been accompanied and intimidation by numer and to have resulted in some armed groups and security providers acting with impunity and a lack ofharassment. transparency The anddeterioration accountability, of law which and order adversely in conflict-affected impacts the economic communities and issocial also rightsbelieved of

- manthe conflict-affected rights–related measures populations have (including been mainstreamed displaced communities) throughout the and recommendations. citizen–state trust. The armed conflict has also weakened respect for fundamental human rights. Where appropriate, hu

- tion 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, is available to support the implementation of the RPA. 25 Significant international experience on gender-sensitive recovery programming, including from the UN Security Council Resolu

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 26 Chapter IV SUMMARY OF RPA STRATEGIC COMPONENTS

13.0 Strategic Component 1: Restore Critical Infrastructure and Social Services 13.1 The sustainable restoration and improvement of infrastructure and social services holds the key to normalizing and stabilizing society in the crisis-affected areas and to creating condi- - ery will not only help ameliorate the affected populations’ suffering, but also help restore citizens’ trusttions forin theeventual state. IDPTherefore, returns. it Efficient is imperative and effective to pay recoveryimmediate of infrastructureattention to addressing and service critical deliv

13.2service In delivery addition disruptions to the and“brick-and- shortcomings caused by the conflict. mortar” damage to infrastructure, loss Table 2. Infrastructure and social services, Total estimated damages of equipment, exodus of employees, and a drop in staff capacity in the directly af- US$ (millions) fected regions, there are other challeng- Education 4.9 es that need to be addressed. Ensuring Energy 52.7 satisfactory provision of social services Health 6.5 in indirectly affected areas is further Public buildings and housing 21.6 populations. For example, preschools Social welfare 2.9 complicated by the influx of displaced are fast approaching enrollment capac- Transport 352.0 ity; the road network is suffering from Water and sanitation 22.4 increased usage; and sewage systems need to handle increased loads caused Environment n/a Total 463 raions. Table 2 provides an overview of infrastructureby a steady influx and social of IDPs service in variousdamages. Impact of the 2014–2015 Crisis 13.3 various subsectors assessed as of November 2014. Impact on physical infrastructure and associated Thisability section to provide provides social a summaryservices can of thebe divideddirect and into indirect three broad impacts categories: of the conflict (i) damages in the antigovernment armed groups; and (iii) damages to service provision and supply infrastructure thatcaused prevent by intensive services fighting from reaching and artillery the affected usage population.around key Totalfacilities; damages (ii) the to infrastructureloss of facilities and to energy sectors constitute a bulk of the impact. While the impact on the environment could not be social services are estimated at around US$463 million. Of these, damages to the transport and include:quantified (i) indiminished Phase 1 of output the RPA, capacity it is substantial due to infrastructure and needs damageattention. and Furthermore, fuel shortages losses affecting that have been incurred in various subsectors but not fully quantified in this phase of the assessment

Volume I: 27 SYNTHESIS REPORT revenue; (ii) increased production costs and cost hikes resulting from emergency infrastructure damage (which has also been impeded by the need for emergency infrastructure repairs); and (iv)repairs; reduced (iii) abilitythe inability of consumers to efficiently to pay transmitfor services and received. deliver services because of infrastructure Rationale and Recovery Objective 13.4 Infrastructure and social services encompass a broad swath of public life. A reliable energy supply powers public, private, and government operations, helps educational institutions function, frees caretakers (mostly women) to seek employment, and allows transport networks to become the arteries of a healthy economy. As such, this component has multiple linkages with the social cohesion and economic recovery components of the RPA. For example, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure will provide opportunities to introduce labor-intensive construction technologies. This links with Component 2 priorities for jump-starting local employment, particularly in the case of subdistrict and community infrastructure. It is recommended that the government seize such opportunities to introduce social protection and cash-for-work schemes that can target the more vulnerable segments of the affected populations, particularly IDPs. Similarly, the equitable, consistent, and harmonious provision of basic services across host and IDP populations will improve social cohesion.

13.5 The interventions recommended by individual sectors are aligned with the GoU’s broad vision for recovery. While the measures proposed for each sector are designed as short-term measures to stabilize living conditions in the affected areas, they contribute to the government’s 2015–2017 reform agenda. Stabilizing living conditions in affected areas may mean reconstructing and rehabilitating infrastructure and service delivery to at least precrisis conditions, but pref- erably to improved standards. The principle of Building Back Better and Smarter (BBBS) has been applied differentially and selectively in calculating recovery costs across and within subsectors. This is to ensure cost-optimized reconstruction and recovery programs that are sensitive to the this component mostly focus on recovery that improves upon precrisis conditions. needs of vulnerable populations and those displaced by the conflict. BBBS recommendations in Overview of Priority Interventions and Financial Requirements 13.6 Total recovery needs for the IS component are estimated at around US$1.258 billion. Needs are greatest in the transport, health, and energy sectors, at US$558 million, US$184 million, and US$79 million respectively. Needs estimates build upon the damages reported to infrastructure to additionally (i) reconstruct impacted infrastructure to improved standards; (ii) restore service delivery to individuals residing in Donetsk and Luhansk, and replace facilities; and (iii) provide social services to IDPs. These also include other capacity and human development resources required to reconstruct needed infrastructure and restore social services (see Table 3).

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 28 Table 3. Infrastructure and social services — Recommended interventions and associated costs Cost Subcomponent objective Recommended interventions (US$ million) 1. Education • Reconstruct and rehabilitate education facilities in 9.71 Reconstruct government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk (on damaged education facilities; BBBS principles) Objectives:restore education services in • receiving areas Restore service delivery in conflict-affected and IDP- receiving areas; strengthen • Strengthen education authorities’ capacity to address capacitiesconflict-affected of education and IDP- recovery priorities authorities; and improve • Conduct crisis risk mitigation (public awareness protection of children and campaigns and safety impact assessments for schools) youth from security-related risks.

2. Energy • Repair and rehabilitate electrical power distribution 78.9 Rehabilitate and transmission networks and generation facilities critical energy infrastructures • Repair and rehabilitate selected coal-mining facilities Objectives:and restore services. • Repair damaged heating networks and boiler houses in Donetsk and Luhansk; expand heating services in IDP- receiving areas • Repair oil and gas pipelines

3. Environment • 30 Undertake focusing on contaminated sites Conduct post-conflict environmental assessment critical environmental • Conduct strategic environmental assessment of the Objectives:assessments and monitoring Donbas Recovery Programme efforts; address immediate • Reestablish an environmental monitoring program environmental impacts; and • Reforest and rehabilitate protected areas strengthen national capacities • Remove and dispose of debris on environmental protection. • Strengthen environmental emergency preparedness and response capacity • Reinforce national capacity to combat illegal natural resource exploitation and environmental crime

4. Health • Strengthen the health system to be able to address IDPs’ 184.2 Strengthen the urgent health needs and to support host communities health care system to address • Guarantee access to pharmaceuticals for affected Objectives:urgent health needs of IDPs communities, including IDPs and host populations, and host communities; through cost reimbursement or other methods reconstruct damaged health- • Reconstruct damaged healthcare infrastructure care infrastructure; and and provide access to tertiary-level care (facilities and reestablish tertiary-care equipment) facilities in government- • controlled areas. • Modify and develop new models of service delivery envisionedOffer social–medical in Component support 3) and health responses to gender-based violence (conflict-specific support

Volume I: 29 SYNTHESIS REPORT 5. Housing • Rebuild damaged and destroyed multiapartment and 27.2 Reconstruct single-family housing damaged and destroyed • Reconstruct and repair priority municipal and general Objectives:housing and repair public public buildings buildings.

6. Social Welfare • Reconstruct and rehabilitate social protection 329.4 Extend critical infrastructure, including pension fund offices, employment Objectives:and rehabilitate physical • Provide aid to IDPs (six month living allowance) offices, and social welfare offices infrastructurebenefits and services for delivery to IDPs • and distribution of social • Initiate active labor market measures, including public works,Provide training, unemployment and retraining benefits (to complement to IDPs measures foreseen in Component 2) welfare benefits. • Hire additional social workers to address increased

• Provide residential-care needs for vulnerable groups, includingprocessing the loads elderly, for social orphans, welfare and benefitsdisplaced people

7. Transportation • Rehabilitate the state road and bridges network, on 558.2 Rehabilitate BBBS principles and reconstruct critical • Rehabilitate municipal infrastructure (roads and Objectives:transportation infrastructure bridges), on BBBS principles and associated maintenance. • Rehabilitate rail and air transport infrastructure • Provide for maintenance of state and municipal transport networks

8. Water and Sanitation • Rehabilitate and rebuild essential water supply and 40.1 Rehabilitate sewage infrastructure critical infrastructure and • Increase the capacity of water supply and sewage Objectives:expand water supply sources distribution systems and distribution systems. • Recruit additional personnel and hardware needed for appropriate water and sanitation services • to diversify water supply sources and modernize sewage treatmentConduct plants scientific research and design development

14.0 Strategic Component 2: Promote Economic Recovery 14.1 The economic recovery component of the RPA assesses the economic impact of the crisis aon number affected of regions short- of(24-month) eastern Ukraine; and medium-term identifies strategic interventions priorities for for the promoting government early to consider.recovery and improving human welfare; quantifies associated costs of early recovery needs; and outlines and proposed interventions in the areas of (i) employment; (ii) productive capacities and liveli- It does so in the context of a difficult macroeconomic environment. The component covers needs

Impacthoods; (iii) of local the economic 2014–2015 planning; Crisis (iv) SMEs and the private sector; and (v) financial services. 14.2 Ukraine’s unprecedented economic challenges in 2014 came on the heels of two years of economic stagnation, with GDP growth averaging 0 percent in 2012–2013. For years preceding

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 30 the current crisis, Ukraine’s economy was underperforming. Characterized by systemic weakness 26 Weak macroeconomic policies and delayed structural reforms widened internal and external imbal- ances.and inefficiencies, The government the economyembarked did on much-needednot recover from macroeconomic the 2008 global adjustment economic in early crisis. 2014 and

East, the industrial heart of Ukraine. began steps to ease structural constraints to growth, but its efforts were stymied by conflict in the 14.3 Donetsk and Luhansk are economically important to Ukraine, accounting for 15.7 percent petrochemicals, and the fertilizer industry are the main sectors in these two oblasts. Around one- fourthof Ukraine’s of Ukraine’s GDP in industrialthe pre-conflict activity period and anand equal 12.5 sharepercent of ofits the exports population. came from Coal mining,these oblasts steel, months of 2014, exports from Donetsk oblast dropped by almost 30 percent and by 43 percent fromin 2013. Luhansk Of the oblast, regional compared exports, tometals the sameexports period were of high previous at around year. 6027 Givenpercent. the In geographical the first 11 location of Donetsk and Luhansk at the eastern border, they have close economic relations with Russia. During January–September 2014, metal exports to Russia declined by 28 percent y/y, with the share to Russia declining to 10 percent of total metal exports from 14 percent in 2013. As a percent, leading to a similar percentage of jobs lost. consequence of direct and indirect impacts, SMEs lowered their economic activities by 80–90 Rationale and Recovery Objective 14.4 The economic recovery component of the RPA estimates the impact of the crisis on the whicheconomy are of currently affected regions,under the identifies Ukrainian priorities government’s for effective control. and sustainableGiven wider economic impacts, recovery,recovery and quantifies their costs. The geographic focus is on those areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, main target groups for employment considerations are the IDPs displaced in Dnipropetrovsk, needs in adjacent oblasts of Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk are also considered. The

Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, and the pre-conflict existing population in 14.5all five However,oblasts concerned it must be who underscored experience that similar recovery needs prospects and problems. in the East are closely linked to, and in turn affect, Ukraine’s broader economic challenges. Recovery efforts in the East need to be viewed through the prism of the country’s unprecedented economic crisis, and additional security it is imperative to restore macroeconomic and banking sector stability; address wider structural challengesproblems in by these making regions the furtheroverall undermineenvironment investor friendlier and consumerto investors; confidence. curb widespread More specifically, corrup- istion challenging so public givenservices that can problems be delivered in the toEast citizens and overall efficiently economic and cost-effectively; problems are closely and deal linked— with withproblems links inrunning the gas in sector. both directions.These steps However, are preconditions without macroeconomic for recovery in thestabilization East. Of course, and struc this- tural reforms, it will be difficult to talk about recovery in the East in isolation. In other words, if the rest of the country does not grow and create jobs, it will be difficult to employ people displaced in the East and have the fiscal space to provide social assistance in a sustainable manner.

World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16711. 26 International Finance Corporation. 2014. “Ukraine: Opportunities and Challenges for Private Sector Development.” Report,

27 State Statistics Service of Ukraine. n.d. http://ukrstat.org/en/operativ/operativ2014/zd/oet/oet_u/oet1114_u.htm.

Volume I: 31 SYNTHESIS REPORT Overview of Priority Interventions and Financial Requirements 14.6 The cost of the proposed economic recovery interventions are estimated at US$135.5 million. The recommendations are outlined in a sequential manner that prioritizes critical and practical interventions. Considering the changing situation in the East, as well as various time frames required for allocating funds, not all suggested measures foreseen for Phase 1 can be started im- priority projects so they are “ready for launch” when conditions permit. Depending on the situa- mediately, and a more flexible approach is needed. Nevertheless, it is useful to formulate a list of for medium- and long-term projects will be evaluated. In addition to new targets, the most effec- tivetion projectsin conflict from areas Phase as well 1 would as lessons be extended learned and from expanded Phase 1 duringinterventions, Phase 2 topics (see Table and objectives4).

Table 4. Economic recovery—Recommended interventions and associated costs Cost Subcomponent objective Recommended interventions (US$ million) 1. Support for employment • Reduce legal and informational barriers to 40 creation support job seekers Support employment • Support better matching of workers to new creation for IDPs, host labor markets to increase (re)employment options Objective: • Increase income-earning opportunities through affected populations through a public and temporary works and facilitate access holisticcommunities, approach and that other combines conflict- to microcredit and grants improved labor market access, • training, short-term job increase employability Offer human capital investment opportunities to opportunities, and strengthen • the institutional capacity of state and mobility options (the latter to be coordinated Offer integration and psychological counseling employment services. with similar interventions in Component 3) • Increase the capacity of the state employment service to manage the Crisis Response Works Programme (CRWP) and new responsibilities

2. Productive capacities and • Implement livelihood programs aimed at 33 livelihoods fostering income-generating activities, including Support the agricultural and off-farm businesses in the rural development of productive areas, and community-based collective economic capacitiesObjective: and help target ventures groups meet their immediate • Improve rural extension services, including needs via livelihoods programs advisory, training, and information services to that expand opportunities to support the development of income-generating engage in productive economic activities, and establish and support the growth of activities. agricultural and off-farm businesses

3. Local economic planning • Conduct capacity-building needs assessment 7.5 Help mobilize local and delivery of corresponding training courses for resources for recovery in a productiveObjective: and inclusive manner practical application of modern economic planning local government, NGOs, and other stakeholders in by designing and implementing methods and tools local governance initiatives that • Establish “working groups” on local economic can provide solutions to planning to lead inclusive multistakeholder planning processes

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 32 communities’ immediate • Establish a small grant facility to help begin to needs using existing in situ address the priorities as they are agreed by the resources and improved community, and, very importantly, to validate local development–planning the process and support the work of the local processes. planning team (link with Component 3 community development activities)

4. SMEs and private sector • Draft and implement a highly targeted and 30 Create a business- enabling environment to ensure corresponding action plan to support existing flexible recovery strategy and elaborate the incomeObjective: generation, job creation, enterprises in the regions concerned creation of new businesses, • Facilitate further development of business and the growth of existing support infrastructure to provide advisory and businesses. training services for business start-ups and growth with special focus on export promotion, energy

efficiency, innovations, and women in business 5. Financial services • 25 Contribute to “National Saving Bonds for Development.” The Attract private capital with a post-conflict ensuring the access to basic purpose is to attract “under the mattress” savings Objective: from Ukrainian individuals and businesses to provide reconstruction and development funds remedialfinancial servicesactions to by stabilize introducing through safe deposit of savings SME loans programs and other • credit loans programs and targeted long-term/low- Encourage banking institution to develop SME development.financial services provision interest loan programs to respond to social needs in general and support SME (education, individual construction, business start- ups, consumer loans, and so on)

15.0 Strategic Component 3: Strengthen Social Resilience, Peacebuilding, and Community Security 15.1 The social resilience, peacebuilding, and community security component of the RPA is estimated to cost US$126.8 million. It considers issues related to restoring the social fabric, which populations, including the displaced, host and other resident communities, volunteers and ex- is critical for recovery processes. This includes supporting the early recovery of conflict-affected reconciliation, peacebuilding, and access to justice. Some of the recommendations should be ap- pliedcombatants, at a national and victims level to of ensureconflict that by providinglocal interventions livelihoods are support, both effective protection, and andsustainable, promoting as

Impactwell as to addressof the the 2014–2015 national impact Crisis of conflict. 15.2 - cial cohesion, resilience, livelihoods, community security, and the rule of law. Displacement, fear, The ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine has had a direct and highly negative impact on so- spread. While social fragmentation, prejudices, regional divides, and low levels of trust in local authoritiesand diminishing and institutions levels of trust existed are prioracute tosocial the crisis,problems, these and have conflict-related been exacerbated distress as a resultis wide of

Volume I: 33 SYNTHESIS REPORT it, particularly in the Donbas.28 - duration of stay for the displaced In increase,many ways, pressure the conflict mounts and on resulting local resources, displacement service from delivery, Do livelihoods,netsk and Luhansk and governance. oblasts has magnified Ukraine’s pre-conflict fragility. As the numbers and the

15.3 affected areas and displaced populations, has resulted in widespread trauma that existing medical andExposure mental health to conflict-related services are unableviolence to amongaddress. combatants, Signs of increasing as well as tensions residents between in conflict- IDPs - forcement agencies, security services, and justice institutions are ill equipped to ensure respect ofand rights host andcommunities rule of law, are mitigate becoming disputes more and evident. tensions, Moreover, and address under crimeconflict and conditions, violence. Currentlaw en hostilities, related community-level violence, and misinformation contribute to polarization and deepen divisions. Recovery challenges become more pronounced as this fragility and divisiveness become more intense.

15.4 Impacts are especially acute in areas with a high percentage of IDPs compared to the host communities, such as Konstnatinyvskyi and Marinskyi raions of Donetsk oblast, Borivskyi raion- of Kharkivska oblast, and Berdianskyi and Zaporizhkyi raions of Zaporizhzhia oblast. These areas, as well as those likely to experience significant returns of ex-combatants and/or displaced persons in a post-conflict period, should serve as priority areas to be targeted for peacebuilding and theyrecovery pertain support. to IDPs Needs and poorin indirectly and vulnerable affected host areas community hosting significant members IDP alike. communities, includ ing those geographically distant from the front line of the conflict, should also be addressed, as Rationale and Recovery Objective 15.5 affected communities, especially displaced populations and their host communities; better pro- Under this strategic component, the focus is on strengthening the resilience of all conflict-- ening community safety and access to justice where conditions allow. tecting conflict-affected populations; promoting reconciliation and social cohesion; and strength 15.6 These are fundamental to sustainable recovery and peacebuilding—they lay the foundation for effectively implementing other aspects of recovery, such as rehabilitating infrastructure, of trust building and reconciliation; bringing various groups together to overcome differences restoring social services, and revitalizing economic activity. Of particular importance is the notion to be taken immediately. Without reconciliation—between different members of the community, betweenand grievances different through communities, dialogue. and This between is a difficult citizens and and sensitive authorities—lasting process, but the peace first stepsand recov need- ery are unlikely to be achieved.

15.7 As social cohesion continues to erode and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions cause

- plicitfurther peacebuilding tensions, it isactivities crucial thatsuch conflictas large-scale mitigation reintegration and reconciliation processes activitiesmust wait commence until the end as soon as possible, irrespective of the cessation or continuation of armed conflict. While more ex- of overt conflict, there is no time to waste in preventing further erosion of social cohesion. Ef

UCBI project) found that 47 percent of respondents in Slovyansk and 52 percent of respondents in Kramatorsk had a negative opinion of28 both An local opinion and nationalpoll conducted authorities. by the NGO Democratic Initiatives Foundation in December 2014 (within the framework of USAID’s

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 34 fective responses must situate social cohesion and reconciliation interventions within practical and tangible local recovery efforts, including both restoration of services and community infrastructure (as detailed in Component 1) and economic recovery, including livelihoods and income generation (as detailed in Component 2). Overview of Priority Interventions and Financial Requirements 15.8 This report recommends a number of priority interventions should begin in the next 24 throughmonths, a as process detailed that in Tableinvolves 5. Recommendationsall affected groups, also there reflect cannot international be any meaningful experience, or lasting which demonstrates that without addressing and resolving grievances and root causes of conflict- pins regional and local interventions. peace or recovery. Moreover, this cannot happen without a national policy framework that under 15.9 Recommendations are presented as distinct sets of issues but are closely interrelated in terms of both priority needs and timelines. Flexibility in implementation is important, both in response to changing circumstances and to the scale of the challenge. While deeper analysis is needed to develop a disaggregated and targeted program, this should not diminish the urgency of the response: Such analysis should be the first step of implementation. Table 5. Social resilience, peacebuilding, and community security — Recommended interventions and associated costs Cost (US$ Subcomponent objective Recommended interventions million) 1. Better understand vulnerability, • Conduct a vulnerability and social cohesion 2.55 risk, and social cohesion assessment/index to monitor and track levels Establish a baseline to better understand vulnerability, risk, • Conduct a perception survey/risk of social cohesion and conflict resurgence risks Objectives:and social cohesion. Social cohesion and assessment to monitor the dynamics of social resilience are notoriously challenging to and economic vulnerability and political fragility needs to be made in tools (polling, • Enhance the analytical capacities of local focusmeasure, groups) and athat significant can track investment a number of indicators that are essential for and provide recommendations for decision CBOs and think tanks to monitor the situation measuring whether communities making both on national and regional levels and societies are getting more or less • Introduce gender-disaggregated data cohesive. This type of data tracking and collection and analysis in government systems analysis will inform and support the prioritization of investments across the recovery spectrum (including reconstruction and service delivery and livelihoods).

2. Promote social cohesion and build • 19.68 back trust information and communication campaigns Develop national conflict–sensitive Promote the building and in collaboration with local and regional rebuilding of relationships and trust authorities and civil society actors Objectives:

Volume I: 35 SYNTHESIS REPORT in communities directly impacted by • Launch economic development projects in affected communities to provide new livelihood populations, communities with high options for the displaced, hosts, and residents levelsthe conflict of ex-combatants) (IDPs, hosts and and resident indirectly • Enact measures to promote tolerance supply-chain disruption or government throughof conflict-affected community-led areas projects and events impacted by the conflict (areas where eastern Ukraine existservice among provision resident deficits populations are felt). that •to Supportbenefit conflict-affected community- and communities national-level in haveSignificant been exposedsocial tensions to the polarizing are likely to dialogues on peace and develop a vision for a effects of violence, civil unrest, and better Ukraine polarizing media content. Both intra- • Promote trust between state and and intercommunity reconciliation will need to be supported, including by participatory, inclusive, and accountable national-level interventions. governanceconflict-affected processes communities by enhancing

3. Promote a culture of tolerance • Design and support a program of national 11.44 through dialogue and civic dialogues on common concerns to build participation bridges between all parts of the country and : Engage in inclusive dialogue reduce national divides that will support greater recognition • ofObjectives diversity and tolerance within structured dialogues between intellectuals, Support universities and CSOs to promote Ukrainian society and help reduce youth, women’s groups, and professional intercommunal tensions in Donbas and associations that encourage tolerance throughout Ukraine. Encouraging and • Support youth and women’s groups to have supporting politically neutral public exchanges within Ukraine and beyond to break discourse on issues of common interest, down unhealthy stereotyping including citizenship, the economy, • and even a vision for the future, will at improving standards among key groups of Train media on conflict sensitivity aimed also help address the growing trust journalists from affected regions • Promote youth and women’s civic engagement through programming that affecteddeficit between areas. the citizens and public promotes their roles as peacebuilders institutions, in particular in conflict-

4. Ensure social protection for • Improve information and communication 5.76 conflict-affected populations : Enhance the government’s on social payments to conflict-affected capacity to deliver social protection their host communities, which should include: Objectives communities,-- Establishing first and a web foremost portal onto IDPsrecovery- and communities and to ensure consistent oriented information and assistance benefits to conflict-affected programs -- Establishing telephone hotlines at affectedsupply of areas. benefitsa Beyond to vulnerable addressing the the central level and in the most-affected communityimmediate basic members needs in of conflict- IDPs, these regions interventions will also be essential for -- Producing and locally distributing preventing additional tensions over bulletins and manuals on IDP registration access to available services and reliance procedures and social payments on limited community resources. mechanisms -- Establishing administrative “one-stop shops” to provide support and referrals for

conflict-affected populations

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 36 • Improve procedures for delivering basic

regardsocial services to: and benefits to conflict-affected populations-- Housing and costs to IDPs, specifically with -- in areas hosting a large number of IDPs Unemployment benefits, particularly and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts) -(Donetsk,- Pensions, Luhansk, to address Kharkiv, the largeZaporizhzhia, movement of pensioners from Donetsk and Luhansk

Dnipropetrovsk oblasts oblasts to Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and 5. Promote access to justice • Develop safe and effective mechanisms for 8.10 Expand and strengthen citizens’ access to justice by increasing crime/violence, including sexual and gender- citizens to formally report conflict-related theObjectives: capacity, legitimacy, and based violence (SGBV), and to receive legal aid accountability of law enforcement and for such reporting justice institutions. Expected outcomes • Establish a clear and transparent system for comprise improved citizen security investigating allegations of violence and human and access to justice, and strengthened rights violations of civilians by armed forces capacity, legitimacy, and accountability and groups of law enforcement and justice • Support the prevention and monitoring of related grievances. areas and nationwide institutions to respond to conflict- •domestic Continue violence to monitor and SGBVall detention in conflict-affected centers in

control using the National Preventive the conflict-affected regions under government • Expand the availability of free primary legal Mechanism and through citizen support bureaus, and “one- stopassistance, shops” both in local through administrations the Ministry of Justice • Expand the network of representatives of the

capacity to help redress citizen grievances •Ombudsperson’s Support partnerships Office (OO) between and buildthe their

society and community organizations representatives of the Ombudsperson and civil 6. Provide legal assistance • Launch a legal aid program for victims of 6.60 populations have access to legal • Raise awareness to encourage victims to conflict-related crime supportObjectives: and Ensure administrative that conflict-affected assistance. report crimes and seek redress The range of priority needs for legal • Support to resolve title, property, and access advice and support among IDPs disputes when formal judicial procedures are includes restoring legal documents, involved having access to social services and • employment, establishing and enforcing the local level and train legal and judicial Mobilize additional legal expertise at property rights, supporting ongoing issues specialists on specific conflict-related legal legal proceedings and financial

Volume I: 37 SYNTHESIS REPORT obligations (such as loans and • Strengthen the capacity and accessibility mortgages in their home areas), compensation (such as registering citizens obtain redress for unjust decisions or claims for property loss or damage), unresolvedof Ombudsperson problems representatives to help and other civil and administrative

responsible for the system of free secondarymatters. The legal Ministry assistance of Justice when is required.

7. Provide psychosocial support for • Psychosocial support: 28.40 conflict-affected populations -- Develop community-based psychosocial support and referral networks -- Reinforce psychosocial support Objectives:groups such Meet as combatants the psychosocial and civilian and programs for emergency services personnel, mental health needs of conflict-affected the armed forces, security personnel, of SGBV, IDPs, returnees, and service volunteers, and their families providersconflict victims, and emergency children, survivors services -- personnel. self-help, social support, and safe school environmentsMobilize communities to develop -- Prevent trauma to children in stressed family environments • -- Provide additional training for existing Mentallocal mental health: health and medical specialists -- treatment for IDPs/returnees and combatantOffer trauma/PTSD families diagnoses and -- victims -- ProvideOffer mental rehabilitation health support services to SGBVfor ex- combatants -- substance abuse) treatment -- ImproveOffer comorbidity support services (trauma for and mental health para/professionals to reduce and prevent burnout • System strengthening: -- Strengthen psychosocial support services at the local level -- Foster coordination between the mental health systems and other sectors to ensure capacity building of the related institutions -- Build a more adapted human resource system by making changes to mental health educational curricula, and ensuring coordination of efforts between all relevant state authorities -- Develop targeted programming for vulnerable and most-at-risk populations

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 38 -- referral and support systems for victims of Encourage women’s NGOs to establish

8. Restore community security • DevelopSGBV and community-embedded other conflict-related early crimes 23.88 b Address risks to community warning mechanisms, which can also be used security, including physical hazards to analyze social cohesion trends Objectives: • Establish local advisory panels on the proliferation of illegal weapons— community security to strengthen the andsuch to as address static landmines, high levels UXOs, of distrust and relationship between local authorities and their communities community security interventions, such • asresulting demining from in physicalDonbas, insecurity.are a necessary Many include capacity building for local experts and Remove static mines and UXOs; this should precursor to activities recommended could be pursued in conjunction with area- in Components 1 and 2 concerning the based development work reconstruction of infrastructure, the restoration of services, and economic revival. To support the restoration of local safety and security, there is a need for inclusive security interventions with strong governmental and community buy-in.

9. Prepare for the disarmament, • Provide technical support to government 20.42 demobilization and reintegration counterparts for the development of a national (DDR) of returning ex-combatants DDR strategy The objective of this • Undertake socioeconomic opportunity component is twofold: (i) to support the mapping to identify job opportunities and governmentObjectives: to develop a national DDR alternative livelihood opportunities framework and plan and (ii) to support • Identify community-based, socioeconomic the reintegration of combatants in light reintegration support; identify priority support of the government announcement that options for ex-combatants to support their peaceful return to their communities early as April 2015. • Develop programs and needs assessments the first cohort may be demobilized as for psychosocial support for ex-combatants • Support socioeconomic reintegration of combatants in the immediate future a The needs and estimated costs for the repair of damages to the physical infrastructure associated with the delivery and assistance) account for 33 percent of monetary household incomes in the Donbas oblasts precrisis (Gazizullin, Ildar. 2014. distribution of social welfare benefits are included under Component 1. Public transfers (pensions, stipends, and social

“Rapid Economic Assessment: Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.” Report, UNDP). b For examples, see; Elva. 2012. www.elva.org; and WANEP Nigeria. n.d. “Conflict Prevention.” www.wanepnigeria.org/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22&Itemid=36.

Volume I: 39 SYNTHESIS REPORT Chapter V TRANSVERSAL ISSUES AND PRIORITIES

16.0 Population Displacement 16.1 The humanitarian exigencies of over 1 million IDPs are compelling, and are initially being - - addressed through the UN humanitarian appeal. Displacement flows contribute to underdevelop ment and may, if left unaddressed, drive further conflict. Forced displacement may weaken so createcial and underemployment state capacities, further and price eroding distortions. confidence Despite in government the fact that and internally increasing displaced the burden popula on- state finance and institutions. Displacement may also exacerbate threats to citizen security and affected communities, few means exist to tap into these resources. tions bring capital and skills that can be put to use in the recovery and benefit the resilience of 16.2 A number of factors dramatically increased the number of registered IDPs in December 2014, starting a trend that continued through February 2015, as illustrated in Figure 2. First, the

- arrival of winter and weakened economic resilience among residents in conflict areas increased- outflows as conditions deteriorated. Second, Government Decree 875/2014, issued in mid-No vember, closed all government offices in nongovernment-controlled areas, halting funding of pen Figure 2. Total number of IDPs in Ukraine as of February 2, 2015, including Crimea

1200000

978,482 1000000 942,748

800000

600000 542,080 Total Ukraine IDPs 494,046 (including Crimea)

400000 415,078

200000 54,400 117,000 1500 0 Jul-14 Oct-14 Apr-14 Jan-15 Jun-14 Feb-15 Mar-14 Nov-14 Dec-14 Aug-14 Sep-14 May-14

Sources: SES until December 2014, then UNOCHA/MSP figures for January 2015 onward.

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 40 andsions, social social payments benefits, are and now other only services, available while to persons also withdrawing with registered support residences to schools in and government- hospitals. Ukraine’s central bank offices also closed, limiting access to cash and banking services. Pension - tions,controlled for example, areas. The of withdrawalextraordinary of financialnumbers services of pensioners and resources leaving deepenednongovernment-controlled vulnerability and areasprompted in December outflows and of some January of theand Donbas registering region’s as IDPs most in government-controlleddesperate residents. There areas. are29 indica

16.3 A third factor contributing to an increase in IDP registrations is the late December 2014 transition from a Ukraine State Emergency Service (SES) paper–based methodology for IDP reg-

- istrations to a Ukraine Ministry of Social Policy (MSP)–managed electronic system, which more aggregaterapidly tracks formal and submissions aggregates the and numbers. check the The data MSP, at thenow regional the official level, source and aof central displacement registry sta of- tistics in Ukraine, uses a formal registration procedure, local welfare offices, regional offices that contributing to additional IDP registrations.30 fice that aggregates IDP registration data at national level. This comprehensive approach is likely 16.4 - lated areasA fourth continues factor contributingin different locations to the large along increase the front in registeredline in the IDPsEast, is prompting an intensification additional of fighting since early January. Fierce fighting and 31heavy, Leaving indiscriminate separatist-controlled shelling in areas densely is becom popu- - outflowsstruction ofof personscritical transportfrom conflict-affected infrastructure areas. such as bridges and main roads, and increasingly ing increasingly perilous due to the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mines, the de

Characteristicsrestricted freedom of ofmovement IDP Movements in and out of the in conflict Ukraine area. 16.5 that are similar to forced displacement crises in other countries. As in many displacement crises The demographic profile of IDPs in eastern Ukraine suggests several distinct patterns- munities, women and children represent a sizeable proportion of the IDP population. For the where women and children leave home areas at the first signs of violence or duress in their com eastern five oblasts, the numbers of able-bodied, working-age women (who often leave with their 17children) percent averaged in December 34 percent 2014 toof 70IDPs percent in September in January and 2015. October The 2014. relatively This smallproportion number has of since dis- abledfallen, and as the elderly number residents of disabled leaving and in elderlyearly waves among of displacementnew IDPs has isincreased common significantly—from to forced displacement crises, due to mobility challenges, fear of the unknown, misinformation or hearsay, or the areas near what they know. The current increase in displacement among older and disabled resi- insistence by long-time residents (who are also typically past fighting age) to stay in their home

29 It remains unclear how many people registering with the MSP are IDPs and how many are registering solely for the purpose of transferring their pensions, and may move back to their homes once their pensions and social benefits have been collected (UNHCR. 2014b. “Ukraine Situation.” UNHCR Operational Update, UNHCR, Geneva. http://unhcr.org.ua/attachments/article/1299/UNHCR%20 External%20Update%20Ukraine%20Situation_7%2031%2012%202014.pdf). This lack of clarity affects planning of aid provision. 30 Humanitarian actors in the field suggest that the MSP numbers still understate the true scope of the forced displacement crisis,- mentdue both of people to the indynamism real time. in Local population authorities movements and partners and the agree enduring that the reluctance discrepancy of many between IDPs the to registerreal and (See, registered for example: numbers UNOCHA. of IDPs is2015b. a major “Ukraine.” issue hampering Situation deliveryReport No. of assistance”).25, UNOCHA, Kiev; where it is suggested that the MSP system is “unable to capture the move

31 UNOCHA, 2015b.

Volume I: 41 SYNTHESIS REPORT sincedents Septemberis due to circumstances 2014, the percentage that include of able-bodied worsening men service among delivery registered deficits, IDPs weather-related in the East has remainedhardships, constant, an escalation averaging in fighting, 15–17 and percent an inability of the totalto access number official of IDPs financial in the support. East.32 In general,

16.6 that 49Over percent 96 percent of IDPs haveof IDPs stayed originate within from Luhansk the oblasts and Donetsk, of Luhansk swelling and theDonetsk. population Of these, of con 75- percent have sought refuge in host communities within33 the five eastern oblasts. More telling is

16.7flict-affected host communities nearest to the fighting. safety while remaining within a reasonable distance of homes, relatives, property, and former livelihoods.This isIn a Ukraine typical thismovement pattern pattern is likely for reinforced IDPs, reflecting by IDPs’ a fear desire of poor to achieve treatment greater if they physical move to areas further west, as well as by the movement of pensioners and other social service support payment recipients to adjacent government-controlled areas in order to register for continuation of their assistance. The result, however, is a concentration of the displaced into host areas that are poorly prepared to receive them. Conditions for both the displaced and hosts deteriorate as these

16.8inflows continue.

In many areas, local officials and civic organizations have established collective centers offor necessity, the displaced. providing Many, suboptimal however, areaccommodation overwhelmed for by increasing the demand numbers for shelter. of IDPs. Several Conditions summer in camps and institutions that were abandoned as cold weather approached are now being filled out center,many centers reportedly are notdue good.to the A pressures local CSO of told divorce, visiting child Organization care, and unemployment. for Security and34 Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitors that there was a dramatic increase in alcohol abuse by women at the 16.9

Outside of the new centers and camps being established for the surging numbers of IDPs fewernear the people. line of Living contact, conditions IDPs have in somemoved apartment into host blocksareas where and neighborhoods they fill available have housing deteriorated stock or find lodging with relatives, often crowding multiple families into accommodations meant for for both residents and the displaced as IDPs crowd in. The government is identifying a significant Greaterstock of demandalmost-completed for rental accommodationnew housing throughout has led to the increases country in that brokerage can be finishedfees and in rents. order The to presencemeet some of ofIDPs the hasneed. also Other placed empty downward buildings pressure are also on being wages inventoried and upward by pressurelocal authorities. on food monetary policy at the central level, local residents often attribute these economic distortions to theprices. presence While oflarge-scale the displaced price and increases eastern are separatists. strongly 35linked to fiscal challenges, the conflict, and

16.10 Health facilities and classrooms are overpopulated in many areas, and community services

to register and instead attempt to remain unnoticed primarily for safety reasons and to avoid conscription. 32 These numbers may be low due to the reasons mentioned or, as in other forced displacement crises, Ukrainian men are reluctant

33 Analysis derived from SES and MSP data. 34 OSCE. 2015. “Special Monitoring Mission Report.” Report, OSCE, Kiev. Outside of these problems, there are additional challenges associated with not paying workers at these centers and the lack of funds for communal and food items. UNOCHA reports that some IDPs are compelled to return to unsafe environments. UNOCHA. 2015a. “Ukraine.” Situation Report No. 23, UNOCHA, Kiev. 35 See: GIEWS/FAO (Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture). 2014. “Ukraine.” GIEWS Country Brief. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GIEWS%20Ukraine%2017-December-2014.pdf; and ACAPS, 2015.

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 42 such as elderly care, child care, recreation services, and sanitation services have been affected as resource-poor authorities redirect their budgets to the needs of IDPs. This fuels mutual suspicion of Ukrainian soldiers are wounded or killed. Interactions in host areas are increasingly becoming bitterand social and confrontational,fragmentation in particularly host areas, toward particularly men fromas fighting the East intensifies who may and be suspected greater numbers of antigovernment sympathies.

16.11 The majority of the displaced in Ukraine have moved at least twice in the course of their displacement, and one-third have moved three or more times. Repeat movements are typically driven by a search for secure, adequate, and reasonably priced accommodation, but should be understood as disruptive episodes in the lives of the displaced as they search for improved cir- are depleted; as they search for the best access to services and assistance in other areas; as land- lordscumstances. are increasingly Movements disinclined are frequently to rent driven to IDPs; by the and hard as hostchoices families IDPs faceand asfamily personal members resources lose the ability (or tolerance) to support IDPs.36 Repeated dislocations due to renewed physical safety concerns are also common as many of the displaced who seek to remain near home areas have nonwinterized accommodations over the early months of winter, nearly all were moved or moved themselveshad to flee again to areas due where to heavy winter-ready nearby fighting. shelters Of the were estimated available—though 130,000 IDPs sometimes who were in housed more re in- mote locations. This has also led to the return of some IDPs to less-than-desirable situations near or in home areas, due to their dissatisfaction with accommodation options in the West and as news in the East suggested that returning to home areas is the best available option.37

16.12 With each displacement and even with returns, people must register with new government offices and local CSOs. They must also undertake a difficult search for adequate accommodation (if homes were destroyed or property was lost), enroll children in school, and navigate difficult Successivesocial relationships. moves often Social lead networks to the incremental commonly weakening weaken with of a eachhousehold’s move, andresilience. delays in finding adequate assistance or financial support sometimes trigger difficult gaps in household resources. 16.13 Even for returnees, being home does not mean returning to the status quo. “Home” will have changed for returnees since their departure. Case studies of multiple forced displacement crises underline that home regions may have changed socially, developmentally, and politically. In addition to the challenges to return posed by the destruction of homes and infrastructure and the decline in services and governance capacity, the presence of nonstate political entities and politi- becomes impossible for some groups. In cases of protracted displacement, the demographic reali- tiescal conflict will have may changed have permanently in home areas, altered and returneesthe social landscapewill experience such thatincreased return pressure to places on of scarceorigin land resources and often disputed access to the property they left behind. The role of women may have changed as well, either enhancing or restricting their freedom of movement and ability to engage in activities different from those in their predisplacement situation.

16.14 To contain the developmental impacts of displacement and leverage the skills and presence

Washington, DC. 36 See: IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems). 2014. “Public Opinion in Ukraine: Key Findings,” Special Report, IFES, in small towns’ ability to provide adequate employment opportunities and access to state assistance. Also see the IFES 2014 report for expression37 UNOHCA of return reports intentions. that challenges persist in the process of relocating to winter shelter, with high levels of dissatisfaction reported

Volume I: 43 SYNTHESIS REPORT of the displaced for more positive outcomes for all, four key challenges must be addressed—delivering services such as security, education, health, and social payments, along with basic infrastructure in equal measure to the displaced and host populations; assisting the displaced regain control of land and property; reestablishing livelihoods and social bonds that are disrupted by rule of law at the local level. These are the barriers to durable solutions for Ukraine’s internally displaced—andforced displacement they andare, atconflict; the same and time, establishing critical developmentaccountable andchallenges responsive for the governance country’s anden- tire population. The RPA integrates these concerns throughout the three components outlined above. This approach is premised on the continuation of the IDP crisis for the foreseeable future - ery mechanisms, governance, and social cohesion. and the associated strains that such population movements place on state finances, service deliv 17.0 Strengthening Local Governance in Recovery Efforts 17.1 The crisis has had widespread impacts on local governance38 in affected areas, including on institutional capacities, assets and infrastructure, local budgets and income streams, delivery of municipal services, local social dynamics, relations between national, regional, and local levels of government, and state–society relations and citizen–state trust. Local governance is an intrinsic part of recovery processes and is addressed throughout the RPA. Ensuring support for and - ties on the ground, ensure responsiveness to urgent and emerging needs, improve public trust instrengthening the state’s capacity, local governance and promote will promotea more sustainable, efficient implementation participatory, inclusive,and coordination and accountable of activi recovery process.

17.2 The crisis has acutely affected local authorities in the government-controlled areas of Lu- hansk and Donetsk. For example, half of all local administrative infrastructures in these areas are estimated to have suffered some level of damage,39 and some infrastructure in areas very close to in human resources by a decrease in the number of civil servants (in some instances, only 20 per- the front line has been completely destroyed. Apart from infrastructure, the crisis is also reflected oblast administration, and city councils and oblast administrations only have 78 percent of the staffcent ofthey the should staff positions have).40 Asare the filled; demand in other for cases,many onlymunicipal one-third services of the has staff drastically are present increased in the (especially for pensions, social assistance, and health), local bodies are facing serious shortages of capacity and in many cases, losses in capacity due to staff displacement and dismissal. These are compounded by shortages of space and equipment and by the relocation of state administration

IDPs),offices whilein the at worst the same affected time areas. their Many revenues local41 authorities’ financial situation is dire: Their budgets are insufficient to meet unforeseen expenditures related to the crisis (including social services for- have decreased as inflows from municipal services (such as communal heating and water distribution) and income taxes have plunged. Lack of fi

sector,38 See and UN so andon. World Bank, 2014. A local governance function is one that is statutorily or customarily mandated to one or more stakeholders of local dimension, including local governments, local state administration, local CSOs/CBOs, communities, the private

39 Excluding administrative buildings in rural settlements (Verkhovna Rada). as40 3–5 Ministry percent of in Economy certain villages and Trade, and ruralNovember settlements) 2014. and state transfers. The State Fiscal Administration collects taxes through its 41 The revenues of local authorities are composed of their own resources (recently averaging 46 percent of total budget but as low regional offices at oblast, raion, and hromada levels.

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 44 nancial resources can strain the ability to recruit additional staff in local administrations, and the provision of services. Several examples document the decrease in local authorities’ own source revenues.

17.3 Lack of citizen–state interaction and public councils’ reduced capacity to cope with the situation is one area that needs attention. Apart from capacity gaps, the public councils also lack - tion of the private sector and civil society. Currently, citizens—especially IDPs—rarely or never participatethe financial in and needs policy assessment, support to planning, be able toand exercise implementing their functions recovery with response. the regular Consequently, participa trust in government is low. At the same time, the stress on local authorities to deal with the con- the state–society relationship. sequences of the conflict on their own, without the necessary national support, has also eroded 17.4 Proposed priorities for strengthening local governance in the context of recovery and peacebuilding efforts include:

• Restoring local government infrastructure and assets; • Helping central government actors provide overall policy guidance and recovery planning support to local authorities; • - livery needs; Mobilizing financial and human resources and capacity to match increased local service de • Building local authorities’ capacity to effectively coordinate and support the different institutional and nongovernmental actors involved in service delivery and recovery interventions; • - cluding participatory planning processes that promote participatory, transparent, and inclu- Buildingsive local capacitydialogues to and sensitize inclusion local in appointeddecision making; and elected officials regarding processes, in • Supporting the development of an integrated approach to meeting local recovery needs; enhancing the policy dialogue on implementing decentralization. 17.5 A strategy for strengthening local governance in the context of recovery and peacebuilding - efforts is being coordinated at the national level by the Vice Prime Minister’s office, with sup increaseport from their the Ministryownership of Regionalover the processDevelopment, and ensure Construction, their needs Housing and requirements and Communal are Services appro- priatelyand the addressed.Ministry of ThisFinance. approach Local will authorities enhance should the national–subnational develop the recovery relationship strategy in and order foster to trust in the idea that government assistance is provided where needed. It is recommended that - rectly with oblast and raion council administrations and local authorities to endorse the strate- giesthe Ministry of established of Regional recovery Development, committee councilsConstruction, (which Housing are comprised and Communal of local councilServices members, work di civil society, the private sector, and also women, youth, and marginalized groups).

17.6 It is also important to establish one-stop citizens’ service centers to ensure the local population’s needs are met and to help enhance capacities for service delivery. The establishment of such centers will enable local authorities to assess the increase in demand for public services. These centers could play a critical role in the recovery process, serving as a hub between citizens and local authorities on local needs, and providing the public access to timely and reliable information on matters that affect their lives.

Volume I: 45 SYNTHESIS REPORT 17.7 Capacity development for local authorities, including administrative staff, should be addressed through knowledge-sharing platforms, peer-to-peer support, different online tools, and trainings at the local level.

17.8 Local development planning processes that are based on inclusive dialogue and promote transparency in the selection of reconstruction and recovery priorities will facilitate trust be- youth, and the elderly from the urban and rural areas—should be encouraged to participate in thetween planning local authorities process for and the communities.development ofCommunities—in their oblast/raion/municipality. particular CSOs, businesses,Policy support women, from the national level that enables local strategic participation in the planning process should be a priority.

17.9 Priority during the initial 6–12 months could be given to: (i) areas that have suffered the most damage and displacement; (ii) areas that have received the highest number of IDPs in rela- tion to their population and local authorities’ capacities for response; and (iii) areas undergoing - entiated needs and capacities of urban and rural governance systems; alignment with planned difficult political stabilization processes. Other principles could include attention to the differ the decentralization process; creating spaces for citizen participation in local decision-making processes,decentralization including reforms openings and recognitionfor the participation of the specific of IDPs, needs women, of conflict-affected and vulnerable groups.areas within 18.0 Gender 18.1 The crisis has had different impacts on men, women, children, and the elderly. The RPA has adopted a gender mainstreaming approach—meaning that the analysis of the crisis impacts, resultant needs, and related strategic recommendations all take gender into account through- strategy’s implementation, as an integral dimension of successful recovery programming.42 out. Moreover, it recommends that gender sensitivity be similarly integrated within the recovery 18.2 of both women and men affected by the crisis, and their potentially differing recovery risks, needs, Within the RPA, a gender-sensitive approach implies attention to the specific experiences- terns. The majority of displaced families are incomplete, with most now headed by women. Wom- enand constitute capacities. approximately For example, two-thirds the conflict of has able-bodied caused changes adult IDPs. in family They are relations the main and caretakers family pat of displaced children and elderly relatives and shoulder the responsibility of ensuring their families’ social and economic well-being—including managing domestic needs, securing housing, and providing economically. Young women, especially those isolated from families and social networks, of female IDPs and children is broadly supported, male IDPs can face acute stigma and prejudice inare host at increased communities, risk ofdrastically sexual violence limiting and their trafficking. livelihood Meanwhile, options and although social reintegration social reintegration potential and reducing their likelihood of registering as IDPs. An additional gender dimension relates to men who account for the vast majority of volunteer security and protection forces and the social and economic strains their families experience as a result.

18.3 Differentiated needs include gender sensitivity in supporting access to services (Chapter

- tion 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, is available in support of the implementation of the RPA. 42 Significant international experience on gender-sensitive recovery programming, including from the UN Security Council Resolu

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 46 IV, Section I) and livelihood opportunities (Chapter IV, Section II), as well as access to justice—in- recruitment of men and boys into armed groups (Chapter IV, Section III). Gender inclusiveness iscluding also highlighted for SGBV, which around is aggravatedissues of social in conflict resilience and andpost-conflict peacebuilding, settings, including as well psychosocialas for forced recovery, gender-sensitive DDR, and training men and women to become peacebuilders. The suggested institutional arrangements similarly highlight the importance of gender-inclusive partici- - aggregated recovery data collection, and gender-responsive institutional capacity for recovery at national,pation of oblast,conflict-affected and local levels,populations including in decision gender makingadvisors around within recovery institutional activities, structures. gender-dis 19.0 Human Rights 19.1 human rights abuses by all parties, including gross violations such as summary executions, abductions,The torture armed andconflict ill treatment, in eastern arbitraryUkraine hasdetention, been accompanied and intimidation by numerous and harassment. allegations The of in some armed groups and security providers who act with impunity and a lack of transparency deterioration in law and order in conflict-affected communities is also believed to have resulted populations (including displaced communities) and citizen–state trust. The context of the armed and accountability, which negatively impacts economic and social rights of the conflict-affected conflict19.2 As has already weakened noted, respect systemic for fundamentalinstitutional weaknesseshuman rights. that predated the current crisis have been further exacerbated by it, and are particularly evident in the sphere of human rights (civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights). Exacerbation of inequalities, erosion of trust in public institutions (especially notable in the law enforcement and justice systems), and the appar- ent impunity of armed irregular forces undermine the rule of law and, therefore, citizen security. Long-standing institutional shortcomings—including chronic underfunding of the justice system, asymmetry between prosecution and defense in criminal proceedings, questionable judicial independence, and excessive use of pretrial detention—further compound the problem.

19.3 While these shortcomings are best addressed in the context of a national reform of the prevent a further deterioration of the overall human rights situation and to strengthen adherence tosecurity and respect sector, for immediate human right measures norms must and standards.be taken by Targeted all actors human in the rights conflict-affected training for areas law en to- forcement agents, security providers, and combatants should be complemented by a more concerted effort to investigate reports and allegations of human rights violations by any actor. Where appropriate, human rights-related measures have been mainstreamed throughout the RPA’s recommendations. As with the overall concept of peacebuilding, however, transformative impact will depend on the central government’s promotion of a clear and strategic vision, possibly within the framework of the national reform agenda. This will need to be implemented locally in conjunction with reconciliation, access to justice, and other social cohesion interventions.

Volume I: 47 SYNTHESIS REPORT Chapter VI INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

20.0 Institutional Framework 20.1 The extent of eastern Ukraine’s recovery and peacebuilding needs will necessitate dedicated institutional capacity for recovery planning, implementation, coordination, and monitoring. This section highlights key considerations for the GoU regarding the establishment of appropriate institutional arrangements to implement RPA recommendations and wider recovery efforts. It highlights the importance of government ownership over the RPA process, balanced with widespread stakeholder engagement.

20.2 The current situation calls for an approach to recovery, reconstruction, and peacebuilding programmatic framework provided by Phase 1 of the RPA, this will necessitate specialized in- that is flexible and responsive to evolving needs and opportunities. Beyond the analytical and- ing and ensuring rapid disbursement, and identifying appropriate implementation capacities to stitutional arrangements for prioritizing urgent recovery interventions, flexibly aligning financ implementation will need to be developed by government as an immediate next step in order to facilitateachieve results RPA implementation in the short term. planning. The specific The institutional institutional architecture arrangements selected to be should adopted be suitablefor RPA for managing both:

• report’s data and analysis are regularly updated. This would include the expansion of the scopeContinuous of the monitoringRPA assessment of the to conflict’s include impactadditional and areas periodic impacted assessments and/or toexpected ensure tothat be this ac-

programmatic and results framework. cessible. Monitoring and assessment activities would be utilized to regularly update the RPA • -

canOngoing be immediately identification, implemented prioritization, to mitigate and implementation the potentially of destabilizing feasible priority effects recovery of large inter IDP concentrationsventions. This would and worsening include: (i) economic identifying and a social first setconditions—notably of priority recovery in theinterventions oblasts adjoin that- ing Donetsk and Luhansk; and (ii) periodically assessing and identifying additional recovery interventions that would be sequenced to build on humanitarian assistance and accompany improvements in the political and security situation. 20.3 Experiences from other countries that have undertaken complex postcrisis recovery and reconstruction highlight the importance of institutional arrangements that combine strong government leadership to ensure coordination across stakeholders, with representation from the wide range of sectoral line ministries, government agencies, oblast and local authorities, civil so- cross-cutting nature of recovery needs and response strategies in Ukraine, a similar institutional structureciety organizations, will thus be and necessary. beneficiaries who will play a role in the recovery process. Given the

20.4 It is therefore recommended that as an immediate priority, an intragovernmental coordination structure (for example, a Donbas Recovery Coordination Committee) be established under

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 48 This committee would be cross-sectoral and include representation from key ministries with re- the aegis of the executive level of government (either office of the president or prime minister).- sponsibility for key recovery sectors (such as the Ministry of Regional Development, Construc astion, representatives Housing and Communal from decentralized Services, thelevels Ministry of government, of Infrastructure, civil society, the Ministry and the of internationalSocial Policy, State Emergency Services, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, and so on), as well ofcommunity the overall (including coordination donors). of recovery This mechanism in eastern couldUkraine. be chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services in charge 20.5 This structure should take a lead role in coordinating and planning recovery and peace- - prehensive institutional framework required RPA implementation. The framework should be as simplebuilding as activities possible in and an drawintegrated on existing and coherent structures, manner. given A the first immediate task should need be tofor clarify priority the inter com-

20.6ventions Early and additional focus on identifying, activities for financing, the RPA and coordination implementing structure a first could set of also priority include: interventions. • including scope, objectives, policy and reform implications, resource requirements; Defining key programmatic, operational, and financial parameters for the recovery process— • Prioritizing and sequencing recovery needs and associated interventions to ensure equitable and demand–responsive recovery across various sectors and to minimize the potential for duplicated efforts; • instruments are aligned with agreed upon recovery priorities and interventions, including Developing an integrated financing framework that ensures that all financing sources and priorities (see Chapter VII); the government budget and donor financing, and overseeing resource mobilization for RPA • Undertaking baseline data collection for recovery and developing monitoring and evaluation arrangements as recommended by the RPA; • Developing a communication strategy to promote citizen engagement with the recovery process and to promote transparency and accountability.

20.7 - tunities to promote synergies and links between different sectors and recovery objectives and to ensureMoving effectively forward, integrated a key andongoing multisector task of the recovery coordination program structure development. will be Linkages to identify between oppor public recovery efforts and civil society or private interventions and between national, regional, and local initiatives should also be carefully promoted and facilitated. Given that many of the drivers and impacts of the crisis are shared by communities around the country, it will be important to - side countrywide recovery activities to promote peacebuilding, tolerance, and reconciliation, and tohave support a dual the focus reintegration on activities of specifically IDPs, armed related forces, to and the volunteerrecovery ofcombatants. conflict-affected areas, along

20.8 At the level of implementation, hybrid institutional arrangements—which are a mix of ded- - - tityicated mandated central agenciesto lead recovery and existing efforts institutions—may should assume a centralbest suit role the with challenges respect toof policyensuring setting, effi implementationcient and effective oversight, recovery and of the performance conflict-affected management areas. As at described a core programmatic above, the government level. Various en sector-, oblast-, and raion-level line agencies and departments will likely carry out actual imple-

Volume I: 49 SYNTHESIS REPORT mentation. However, making such a hybrid arrangement work will require clarifying from the outset the operational mandates of key recovery actors and mechanisms for policy development, coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting. Special mechanisms for resource alloca- transparency, communications, and grievance redress will also need to be established. tion, financial management procurement, capacity development and staffing, quality assurance, 20.9 - - ship andRegardless to take charge of the specificof the day-to-day arrangement coordinating selected by and government, monitoring the of intragovernmental RPA implementation. co ordination structure would benefit from a Technical Secretariat to provide technical-level leader support RPA implementation, to identify areas of overlap, fragmentation, or gaps in support, and ensureThe Technical funds are Secretariat aligned with would priority also play activities. a role The in coordinating Secretariat could the financing include staff instruments from govern that- ment and possibly, subject to further exploration and each organizations’ rules and procedures, the three principal organizations supporting the RPA (the EU, the UN, and the WBG). The technical secretariat would be expected to include a combination of analytical, monitoring, and technical expertise to both support RPA implementation and facilitate the functioning of the coordina-

20.10tion structure Capacity and building RPA financing. for RPA implementation structures—including technical support and specialist expertise from experts involved in past recovery processes—should be an immediate specialist units for monitoring and evaluating the RPA—as well as for cross-cutting issues such aspriority gender to sensitivity ensure efficient and the RPA inclusion planning of vulnerableand implementation. groups, human Within rights, the Technicallocal governance, Secretariat, and IDPs—could also be anticipated.

20.11 Civil society and the private sector should be involved in recovery planning and decision making, as they are important actors in postdisaster and postcrisis recovery. They have a proven ability to mobilize sizable funding and social capital, and can often be sources of valuable expertise. Civil society organizations often have well-cultivated links to the affected communities that can be valuable in project implementation. Creating space for civil society organizations and the private sector in the institutional arrangements of crisis recovery will help promote an effective - ing delivery systems, raising funds, and bringing in expert resources to help guide the recovery process.and inclusive This recoverymay also process,include creatingincluding recovery meeting planning the staffing forums needs for of involvingrecovery, subnationalmobilizing exist government, civil society, technical institutions, academia, private sector, and affected communities. 21.0 Process for Periodic Review and Updating 21.1 its partners. Therefore, it will be necessary to integrate a process for reviewing the continued The recommendations of the RPA provide considerable flexibility to the government and crisis—in national contexts, legal or policy frameworks, the activity or capacity of stakeholders relevance and appropriateness of the strategic approach. Over time, changes in the nature of the- ing or reorienting the strategy. Similarly, as some interventions prove more timely or effective thanand implementing others, interventions’ partners, focus available or prioritization financing flows, may andalso localbe usefully needs—may adapted. necessitate Therefore, revis it is strongly recommended that an RPA progress review exercise be planned every six months, with a slightly more intensive mid-term review replacing the progress review after 12 months of implementation. The mid-term review would be a particularly useful juncture at which to consider the alignment between this first phase of the RPA and the eventual second phase, and to identify how

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 50 to transition or integrate successful interventions into longer-term development strategies. The coordination structure would be expected to be the lead agency for the RPA progress reviews, but the reviews themselves should be based on strongly consultative processes in which all stakeholders are able to provide feedback on RPA implementation to date. 22.0 Monitoring and Evaluation 22.1 proposedMonitoring by the RPA and for evaluation recovery interventions(M&E) is an essential is the SRF, function which capturesfor measuring the priority progress outcomes in the recovery strategy’s implementation and achievement of intended objectives. The main M&E tool period of RPA implementation (see Annex I). and indicators identified by each component to monitor progress over the twenty-four-month 22.2 intragovernmental coordination structure. This will depend on activities managed and data collected Itby is line recommended ministries, localthat responsibilityauthorities, and for otherM&E coordinationimplementing and agencies. oversight As residesuch, a with system the

- for cross-sectoral M&E collaboration should be an early priority, and include senior43 and officials resources; from developingall implementing and agreeing agencies on to ensurereporting high-level procedures support with for implementing M&E activities. partners, Additional including priority line ac tions should include establishing a specialist M&E unit with adequate capacity - ministries and relevant oblast and local staff; training and capacity building for the M&E unit and all implementing partners on M&E procedures; and developing a management information sys availabletem. Ensuring online public and widelyaccess todisseminated M&E data will to bethe essential public via to thekeeping media implementation and other communication transparent and credible. Regular M&E reports and updates to the Strategic Results Framework should be should also be designed and promoted wherever feasible. channels. Participatory M&E processes that support the engagement of conflict-affected areas

43 The specific composition of the M&E unit will need to reflect the need for dedicated M&E specialists at central and local levels and should include expertise in data analysis and management, conflict monitoring, gender disaggregation, and IT.

Volume I: 51 SYNTHESIS REPORT Chapter VII FINANCING STRATEGY AND MODALITIES

23.0 Principles 23.1 Addressing priority recovery, reconstruction, and peacebuilding needs in the short term will require leadership and substantial commitments from the GoU, along with support from the

- international community. This chapter proposes a financing strategy to meet urgent recovery and andpeacebuilding key considerations support needsto encourage identified collective in the Eastern responsibility Ukraine for RPA. outcomes. It describes the main objec tive and key components of such a strategy, including the main financing sources and instruments 23.2 The situation in eastern Ukraine is still evolving, with ongoing military operations and un- they are further assessed. Nevertheless, it is urgent to formulate a response and provide feasible certain prospects for a lasting ceasefire. Estimated reconstruction needs may continue to rise as aimelements to leverage of support the different in an integrated, available fast, funding and flexible sources. manner. The response should be tailored to ongoing needs yet also cognizant of the severe constraints posed by the ongoing conflict. It should 23.3 The government has earmarked recovery and reconstruction funding for the eastern re- humanitariangions in the 2015 and budget, early recovery but faces needs difficult cannot resource be met and by institutional the government capacity alone. constraints. Therefore, Given in- this, and the overall economic hardships of the communities affected by the conflict, Ukraine’s ternational development partners will be called upon to finance part of the short-term recovery actorsneeds. Overin the time, design the andgovernment administration will need of tothe make recovery fiscal spaceand peacebuilding to take over more interventions, of the recovery and, critically,spending. create It will thealso conditions need to enhance and space the forefficiency competitive of public private-sector spending, engage activities. nongovernmental 24.0 Objectives and Core Considerations 24.1 -

The overall objective of this financing strategy is to strengthen the effectiveness of the im mediate post-conflict reconstruction effort by linking different financing sources and instruments together in support of identified priority activities. By doing so, the goal is to encourage collective responsibility for delivery, a higher degree of integration of resources (human and financial), and 24.2coordinate technical support and risk management during the post-conflict recovery period. from a combination of regular budget allocations and loans, while grants are likely to make up a Ukraine is a middle-income country, and recovery financing is expected to come primarily following:smaller proportion of the total. To ensure synergies between the different sources of financing and effective use of different funding instruments, the financing strategy will be grounded in the • Prioritization between different needs in the RPA, based on a combination of urgency, criticality, and feasibility;

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 52 • A comprehensive overview of possible funding sources (from the national budget as well as from loans, grants, and bilateral programs) and their scope and limitations; • A recognition that collective action and responsibility for results is important, in particular for activities that aim to strengthen social cohesion, reconciliation, and peacebuilding; • - commodate changes in needs and priorities; A responsive approach that can ensure flexible and rapid financing and disbursement to ac • they emerge (for example, based on expanding the geographic scope of the RPA). An approach that allows for scalability to accommodate future financing needs as and when 24.3 - tent to which it will promote coordination and collective responsibility for delivery of results in An important consideration when formulating a financing strategy for the RPA is the ex- nancing sources and instruments, especially when these rely to a large extent on sovereign loans andconflict-affected guarantees. Yetareas. integration There are at thelimits outcome to shared level accountabilitycan be achieved for by results focusing across on a subsetdifferent of ac fi- tivities where a broader coalition and collective action is both possible and warranted in response to high risks, insecurity, and limited capacity of government to deliver. In these cases, specialized manage these during RPA implementation. solutions should be drafted for pooling certain resources (human, procedural, financial) to jointly 24.4 - ment. While grants are expected to only account for a smaller percentage of the total resource A second consideration relates to the utility of pooling grant financing in a specific instru- - tatingflows, collectivea pooled fundaction can and still risk perform management. important Importantly, functions a by pooled preventing fund can duplication provide a andplatform frag mentation of activities, filling critical gaps in financing, promoting economies of scale, and facili - to finance those priority areas where collective focus and attention is absolutely critical, and/or where financing through country systems at the necessary scale is less likely (such as for spe cific capacity strengthening activities and projects focused on social cohesion, reconciliation, and establishingpeacebuilding). a pooled A key fund.consideration during the finalization of the RPA will be to explore whether a critical mass of grant financing can be mobilized to justify the initial higher operating costs of 25.0 Components of the Financing Strategy 25.1

Establishing a financing strategy involves four key steps: (i) agreeing on a set of priorities instruments(financing needs) needed within for delivery the overall (strategic cost envelope allocation of framework);the RPA; (ii) mappingand (iv) establishing the various approprifinancing- atesources institutional that can arrangements, be accessed to including deliver on governance these priorities; and accountability (iii) identifying mechanisms, the range to of promote specific joint responsibility for outcomes. Figure 3 illustrates this process, while each step is further described in the subsections below. Overall Financing Needs 25.2 The total cost envelope for the RPA has been estimated at US$1.520 billion. Needs are di- vided into three components (see Table 6). Within the RPA, components also include several categories of spending that would possibly merit a more integrated approach, such as priorities relate to generating knowledge, strengthening capacities, and providing technical assistance.

25.3 The RPA team is also putting forward a set of criteria to encourage further prioritization

Volume I: 53 SYNTHESIS REPORT Figure 3. Concepts and methodology applied to define the financing strategy

Eastern Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assesment (RPA)

METHODOLOGY TO DEFINE FINANCING STRATEGY

Identify Gaps & Critical Financing Sources Financing Needs Constraints/Opportunities

Financing Propose Financing solutions Instruments addressing challenges

Develop the Financing Strategic Allocation Governance & architecture Framework Financial Architecture

of those activities that require immediate attention, either because of their urgency or because of their critical importance for the sustainability of the recovery effort.

25.4 categories of spending that would possi- Table 6. Estimated aggregate recovery needs Across the RPA, there are specific bly merit a more integrated approach. In US$ (millions) particular, a number of priorities relate to generating knowledge, strengthening Infrastructure and social 1,257.7 services capacities, and providing technical assistance. Similarly, several priority activi- Economic recovery 135.5 ties will address localized peacebuild- Social resilience, peacebuilding, 126.8 ing efforts through direct engagement and community security with hard-to-reach communities. Finally, critical priorities can be found in more Total 1,520.0 sensitive areas that are directly related to stabilization, peacebuilding, and strengthening social cohesion, notably for reconciliation, support to IDPs, demining, and support for reintegrating ex-combatants. Given their criticality for

Sourcesconflict resolution, of Financing these aspects will require dedicated arrangements during implementation. 25.5 Even in a period of stress, part of Ukraine’s funding needs must be met from the national - budget. Different types of remaining needs will attract a variety of sources of financing. For in stance, general balance of payments financing is typically provided by the IMF; multilateral bank

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 54 in a middle-income country like Ukraine; while urgent recovery requirements, civil society sup- loansport, or are community-level the natural financing peacebuilding source for are infrastructure often funded needs by grants. beyond what the budget can cover

25.6 Financial requirements are likely to exceed currently available national and international resources. Thus, the RPA will need to be supported by strong measures to increase fiscal space. A 25.7proper mapping of available financing is needed as basis for operationalizing the RPA. - nian government is largely shut out of private capital markets. This mainly takes the form of ear- Grant financing from international donors will be particularly important while the Ukrai earmarked for immediate interventions that support recovery and peacebuilding. Grants may be channeledmarked funding as direct to specific budget supportprogrammatic to the governmentareas. Grant orfinancing local entities. can help But access because flexible of the funding impact of the crisis on institutional capacities, grants implemented by specialized agencies (national or variety of organizations can attract international donors if they see programmatic risks mitigated byinternational) an effective maynetwork enhance of such financing organizations. opportunities. In a post-conflict context, working with a

25.8 recovery and setting the basis for sustainable development and stability. Foreign direct investment (FDI)Private-sector can be critical financing for sectors and investments such as mining, are of telecommunications, major importance for and fostering construction. economic En- couraging social investments (such as employing and training nationals, and using local suppli- ers) can magnify the benefits to the local economy, help create jobs, and build the tax base while producing necessary goods and services. Remittances are also significant from a macroeconomic point of view, providing households with family members working abroad an important financial ofsafety effective net. Buteconomic conflict regulation and economic and rising instability corruption. pose a substantial risk to private sector inflows owing to asset destruction, weakened property rights, inflation, currency depreciation, and lack Defining the Mix of Financing Instruments 25.9 instruments, including: From the above it is clear that financing for RPA implementation will come from a range of • The national budget (including direct budgetary support): The budget will be the main

and to cover recurrent costs associated with the reestablishment of government capacities source of financing, in particular to ensure sustainability of the recovery efforts over time

and services in the conflict-affected areas. A budget allocation of UAH 300 million has already • Lending instruments been confirmed. of loan-funded projects are already in place, and it is expected that these will be scaled up (investment financing, reorientation of existing projects): A number- structure reconstruction. These are predominantly implemented through national systems andor reoriented thus aligned over to time budget to financepriorities. RPA A priorities,key challenge in particular will nonetheless in terms be of to large-scale ensure that infra the various working groups and project implementation units (PIUs) that have been set up to support these loans are aligned and able to coordinate with each other. • Grant financing:

Grants will be particularly Grants will critical likely in constituteareas of the an RPA important that try to part address of RPA challenges financing, of even social if the relative amounts are expected to be small compared to external financing through loans.

Volume I: 55 SYNTHESIS REPORT cohesion, stability, and reconciliation; and where coordination is critical to avoid duplication

key thematic support in areas where the government’s ability to borrow might be limited, and/or(that is, where knowledge, the risks assessments, of engagement technical on sensitive assistance). issues Grants are too will high also for be partners needed to takefinance on individually. 25.10

It may be expedient for the majority of grant financing to be pooled into a Multi-Partner- Trust Fund (MPTF), as has been the case in several other post-conflict recovery contexts. An strengthensMPTF would collective ensure that understanding support that ofexplicitly the context targets and issues evolving of cohesion, risks. In thestability, case ofand Ukraine, reconcili an ation is financed in a coordinated manner that builds synergies between different activities and

MPTF could have the benefits of:

1. Supporting overall coherence by filling critical gaps and underfinanced priorities;

2. 3. LeBuildingveraging capacity national to investmentscreate enabling by providingconditions cofinancing for overall implementation;in critical areas; and -

4. Providing specific expertise and support on thematic issues not naturally covered by oth 25.11er financing instruments. design Severaland administrative international arrangements institutions have will significant depend both experience on the agreedadministering activities such that facilities, will be and examples also exist in which private firms have taken on fund administration. The specific models and the need to ensure that country systems are used to the largest extent possible, an prioritized and the available financing to be pooled. Based on experiences from past trust fund topic for discussion between the RPA implementation coordination structure and donor agencies. MPTF may be highly relevant in Ukraine. A possible MPTF would be recommended as an early 25.12 - - The interventions and their implementing entities within a possible MPTF would be select ed through a collective decision-making process involving both national representatives and fi nancial contributors. The projects would directly contribute to the objectives defined in the RPA’s- vironment;SRF and would a political report solutionon their toachieved issues relatedresults into acapacity, consolidated coordination, manner. andThe coherenceMPTF can thusof such be understood as a technical solution to the challenges of delivering results in the post-conflict en and justify its operational cost, a critical mass representing a minimum of 10 percent of overall support; and an effective mechanism to pool and manage risks. To fulfill the described functions

25.13RPA funding Support would through be recommended bilateral aid channels to be mobilized will also through support an RPA MPTF. implementation. There are policies, cater to different constituencies, or because of procedural constraints that prevent pool- ingmany of reasonsfunds. However, why donors in the might context prefer of continueda high-risk, bilateral weak capacity–implementing support, such as to promote environment specific

- sistencyin eastern with Ukraine, the recovery a “spaghetti strategy. bowl” These of bilateral in turn financingcould lead runs to the a high duplication risk of being of implementa inefficient- tionand ineffective.modalities, Theexcessive main demandsreasons for on this local are implementing likely insufficient partners, coordination and fragmentation and possible of smaller incon projects that address overlapping parts of the same priority.

25.14 To the extent possible, it will be important for the RPA to integrate a maximum number of

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 56 RPA coordination structure without violating the integrity of individual instruments and the spe- financing instruments. Figure 4 shows how this can be done under the general umbrella of the prevent direct resource pooling. The institutional and governance arrangements section below describescific accountability how collective and procedural responsibility requirements for outcomes associated can still with be achieved each, which within might the in joint some facility, cases and highlights the role of the Technical Secretariat in this process.

Figure 4. The palette of financing instruments in support of RPA priorities

RPA Coordination and oversight by a Policy Board chaired by the government

Technical RPA Immediate Priorities Secretariat Coordination- Joint Analysis Lending instruments MPTF Project implementation unit Fulfill specifics

Governed by an Executive Board and Bilateral projects National budget supported by Project implementation a secretariat Governmental structure unit

Coordination of Financing Instruments 25.15 As detailed in Chapter VI, the proposed intragovernmental coordination structure could priorities to be aligned with the various funding channels and instruments and allow for strate- also oversee the RPA financing strategy, including resource mobilization. This would allow RPA gic reorientation of individual financing instruments when necessary. The Technical Secretariat would remain in close contact with the multiple financing instruments to target available financing- ing,to priority for example, needs oversightand reduce by potential the intragovernmental duplication or coordinationgaps. Some financing structure mechanisms, and administration such as byan MPTF,the technical would besecretariat), expected tobut work may under also require the overarching complementary RPA coordination accountability framework arrangements. (includ

Volume I: 57 SYNTHESIS REPORT Annex I RPA STRATEGIC RESULTS FRAMEWORK

n SRF will measure progress regarding how the RPA strategy is implemented and how its intended objectives are achieved. It seeks to capture progress toward priority indicators Aand the outcomes they represent across each component of the RPA. As a representation - dence-building and for strategic communication. A disconnect between the population’s expecta- tionsof visible for recoveryprogress andtoward peacebuilding peace, the strategic and the results frameworkthat are visible is also to athe tool population for trust- and(or aconfi lack of understanding of what progress has been made toward peacebuilding objectives) could drive meaningful indicators, clear measures of visible progress, and transparency and regular com- distrust and suspicion and be a conflict-multiplier. However, a strategic results framework with process. munications can be deeply significant for the population and stimulate support for the recovery The RPA currently presents a wide range of progress indicators across each component for the government and its recovery partners to consider. The next step will be for government to lead a - erationalization planning. This exercise would review the current set of indicators proposed; asprocess to refine and prioritize these indicators, as part of RPA implementation planning and op of recovery and peacebuilding; identify additional indicators that may be needed, including those sess the scope and reach of each; reconfirm the ongoing relevance of each indicator as a measure that reflect specific outcomes for vulnerable groups or different regions; identify the interim and acrossfinal targets the 24-month for each durationindicator, of including RPA implementation gender disaggregation (and beyond). as is Examplesrelevant; andof how ensure existing that indicators arecould sufficiently be converted modular into strategic-leveland phased to allowindicators for progress are included to be below.meaningfully measured

This exercise would be expected to result in two separate tools: (i) an SRF, which will include a limited number of key indicators that will most visibly demonstrate progress toward peace in

- toringthe eyes Framework of the population would be as a a key whole; management and (ii) an tool Implementation for the intragovernmental Monitoring Framework,coordination which committee,would be as awell crucial as individual tool for monitoring ministries progress and implementing at the technical partners. level. The The SRF, Implementation meanwhile, wouldMoni be the foundation for a social contract between citizens and the state on recovery—and represent are proceeding in the right direction and yielding tangible results. As such, it would be expected toindicators be widely that shared would and reinforce visibly discussed the faith andas part confidence of the six of monthly the population RPA progress that recovery reviews. efforts

In selecting indicators for the SRF, the following principles are recommended:

• -

Indicatorsdirection. should be measures that can be tangibly defined and recognized by the popula tion, and can credibly increase the population’s confidence that recovery is going in the right • Indicators should be compelling and generate support for their achievement across different stakeholder groups.

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 58 • Indicators should be a subset of key outcomes for each component. They should illustrate the big picture objectives to which each subcomponent aims to contribute, but need not represent each subcomponent individually. • components). Ideally, no more than 15 indicators would be included (no more than five for each of the three • -

thatFor eachprogress indicator, is on short-termtrack. Longer-term and long-term indicators objectives would shouldbe targeted be defined. toward Short-termthe end of thein 24-monthdicators could RPA beimplementation process- or output-oriented, period and would and be will a more help outcome-oriented build confidence andmeasure ensure of recovery.

•For Limitthe Implementation each outcome toMonitoring a small number Framework: of indicators that include a sense of scope. • Seek to highlight visible goals, particularly in recovery sectors where goals can seem abstract or might not be visible to the population. • Integrate a clear timeline for indicators to be achieved. • Develop a review process for the framework that will allow for incremental changes and mid- course corrections in indicators as needed.

In addition to these principles, it is also recommended that the existing draft indicators proposed by the RPA component teams be refined by the government to make sure they fully reflect the government’s specific strategic and implementation level objectives. While both the SRF and the theirImplementation frequency andMonitoring sensitivity. Framework Strategic willindicators be informed will need by theirto resonate overall strongly purpose with of fostering citizens trust and confidence in the recovery process, they will need to be uniquely designed in terms of serve as signals of recovery and reconciliation. Implementation monitoring indicators, however, need(conflict-affected to demonstrate populations, forward momentum IDPs, host communities, in delivering recoveryand citizens and around peacebuilding the country) programming and will and credible incremental spending of financing for recovery investments. elements—for example, in rebuilding schools and helping teachers and students recover from trauma.Many RPA Education outcomes, results such couldas restoring thus be access framed to as: education, can integrate both “hard” and “soft”

Outcome Baseline Conditions Indicators

Education facilities 126 education 1. Civil works contracts signed for rehabilitation reconstructed in target facilities, formerly areas of Luhansk serving __,000 2. Standard training program under design for and Donetsk oblasts; students, damaged of __% of the 126 facilities to be repaired. physical reconstruction enough by the complemented by schools on PTSD (teachers) and MRE (students). psychosocial services or dysfunctional. rehabilitated education facilities. 3. % of students with renewed access to safe, and mine risk education conflict to be unsafe schools with PTSD counseling (teachers) and 4. % coverage of teachers and students in target (MRE). MRE (students).

Volume I: 59 SYNTHESIS REPORT the RPA. Indicators 3 and 4, meanwhile, would be more medium-term and show results through- Indicatorsout the RPA 1 period.and 2 are The more SRF short-term would focus and on would one important demonstrate milestone progress for in each the firstindicator, 6–9 months showing of where the RPA expects to be at each six-month review, whereas for implementation monitoring, each indicator would be broken down into several incremental milestones that would be moni- tored and would quickly illustrate any delays. partners to formulate indicators in a way that makes them clear, understandable, and measurable forIn reviewing the population, and finalizing and also indicators,minimizes potentialit will also intergroup be crucial tensions. for the government For example, and some its recoverykey indicators may seem apolitical but could be regarded as giving preference to one group over another. within relevant indicators in order to demonstrate the evenhandedness of the RPA. In such cases, such as restoring power, it will be key to build in transparency about beneficiaries Outcome Baseline Indicators Conditions

Power distribution and 35,000 Current indicators: transmission networks residents in 1. # of residents with renewed power supply and power-generating 33 settlements capacity are restored without Possible alternative with greater clarity on beneficiaries: 2. % of energy facilities restored and operational. power. 1. (Short-term) __ of 33 settlements now have power infrastructure with civil works contracts issued for their repair.

by2. (Medium-term) host communities, __% IDPs, of affected and businesses. populations have power supply restored, with beneficiaries disaggregated - ling for the average citizen. Financial services is one such example. Other indicators may be unobjectionable and uncontroversial, but could be made more compel Outcome Baseline Indicators Conditions

Financial Financial sector Current indicators: services and faces a major 1. Credit lines or guarantees from IFIs such as the WBG or crisis. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) stabilization. are ensured. financial sector Possible alternative with greater clarity on beneficiaries: 1. (Short-term) Credit lines or guarantees from IFIs are secured.

transparently2. (Medium-term) communicated Recovery investment and shared plan in all and areas, and linkspolicy to reform the RPA agenda are clearly underpinned reported by upon IFI financing in media .are

Similarly, objectives and aspirations should be easily understandable to average citizens and populations could be reformulated. linked to measurements that have meaning for the citizenry. Trust between the state and conflict-

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 60 Outcome Baseline Conditions Indicators

Current formulation: High levels of mistrust and 1. # of pilot social accountability initiatives, Trust between on service delivery and on the use of funds affected communities. allocated to recovery uncertainty in conflict- affected populations Local authorities’ capacity improvedstate and conflict-through is limited due to destroyed participating in decision making for recovery 2. % of IDPs and local communities enhanced infrastructure and/ projects governance or overload with new processes. challenges society activities trained on gender-sensitive 3. % of local civil servants and # of civil

Possible alternative: High levels of trust and post-conflict policy Deepened practical uncertainty, and limited have agreed on joint social accountability 1. __% of target pilot communities who cooperation between capacity of local authorities. initiatives linked to service delivery and use local authorities, of recovery funds host communities, and IDPs. participating in joint decision-making fora convened2. __% of IDPs by local and authoritieslocal host community to make decisions on and oversee spending of

recovery financing Finally, a strong measure of results should be included for each indicator.

Outcome Baseline Conditions Indicators

Enhanced sensitivity Unequal treatment of Current indicators: and tolerance in the tolerance and peace media. issues in national and capacity-building training on peace and tolerance local media. 1. # of media representatives and CSOs receiving Possible alternative with stronger results focus:

training on peace and tolerance (monitoring indicator)1. Coverage of target media reps and CSOs receiving 2. Frequency and quality of media mentions of

friendly” messages (strategic indicator) conflict and tolerance issues with “peacebuilding-

Volume I: 61 SYNTHESIS REPORT % of rehabilitated and equipped education facilities; and equipped education facilities; % of rehabilitated education access to with improved # of children support; # psychological received who # of children in MRE trained were who of children psychosocial requiring and youth 25% of children support are in education and beyond # of professionals children’s ensure mechanism is in place to trained; education to right with developed students and parents # of reached information and the government MRE program system % of supply; power with renewed # of residents restored facilities energy that meets planned coal production # of monthly volumes # persons to - heating services recovered has been recovered and oil supply of gas - recovery # consumers to in budgets of relevant - amount of funds earmarked programs IDP reimbursement oblasts for Indicators DRAFT RESULTS FRAMEWORK At least 126 education facilities damaged by the armed damaged by least 126 education facilities At conflict and communi - IDPs support for psychological Limited on program training no comprehensive ties available; MRE local NGOs by performed Small-scale activities in capacities of educational professionals Limited the educa - from support; risk of exclusion psychosocial tional system pub - hazards; potential impact assessment for No safety and hotline of the MSP SES materials lic relations in 33 settlements without power 35,000 residents territories) 6 mines damaged (on analyzed and boiler houses damaged in af - Heating networks areas fected dam - due to disrupted systems Gas- and oil-transmitting ages is in place IDPs Social assistance for Baseline Conditions - - Education facilities reconstructed in liberated in liberated reconstructed facilities Education - in conflict-affect Support of service delivery students; affected support for Psychosocial Capacity of the authorities (in conflict- the crisis mitigated to related Risks - trans power distribution networks, Power restored Coal mine operation and boiler houses Damaged heating networks and ser repaired Gas and oil pipelines are displaced to budget reimbursement State

ties are restored and operational restored ties are areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts areas oblasts ed and IDP-receiving missed have students who classes for catch-up displacement or conflict due to school days respond to regions) and IDP-receiving affected the armed conflict by challenges brought to strengthened 2: Energy Subcomponent capaci and power-generating mission network, recovered vices operational for and gas persons and cost of thermal energy oblasts ensured five Strategic Component 1: Restore critical infrastructure and social services critical infrastructure 1: Restore Component Strategic Outcomes 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Subcomponent 1: Education Subcomponent

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 62 - # of properly staffed, equipped, and functional insti staffed, # of properly in place tutions; # of analyses # ha rehabilitated; - total facilities treatment wastewater removal, # of waste rehabilitated with # of facilities reconstructed; % of facilities of tertiary-level equipment; availability regained services needs allocated IDPs’ health budget for % of total pharmaceuticals access to having % of eligible IDPs mechanism via reimbursement shelter # of people with recovered shelter # of people with safe # of houses repaired; # of public buildings repaired reconstructed facilities % of infrastructure benefits; # of getting unemployment are % of IDPs benefits and aid get unemployment IDPs # of serviced citizens hired; 500 social workers 10% by increased # of km rehabilitated; # of bridges rehabilitated; # of bridges rehabilitated; # of km rehabilitated; and number of bridges and railways, km of roads rehabilitated - Environmental governance capacities are low (incl. no low capacities are governance Environmental Programme) of the Donbas Recovery SEA PCEA, or protected; not rehabilitated are areas Protected and disposed; environmental debris is not removed disrupted services in cities are damaged; equipment losses; no 9% of infrastructure available facilities tertiary-level without considering budget calculated Health system needs IDPs’ scale mechanism used on a limited Reimbursement and 7 multiapartment least 2,366 single-family At houses damaged own residents’ by been performed have Some repairs means of public buildings damaged in Donetsk 12 categories and Luhansk oblasts rehabilitation requires 5% of infrastructure labor market participating in active are 0% of IDPs measures hired No additional social workers 10 bridges af affected; and railways 1,100 km of roads fected; roads and bridges affected roads fected; Environmental governance in the crisis- governance Environmental to restoration visible environmental Achieve a precrisis to recovered Health infrastructure to oblasts strengthened of five Health system IDPs to pharmaceuticals provided to Access of owners of eligible indemnities to Payment Damaged multiapartment houses repaired and reequipped Public buildings repaired - reconstruct infrastructure Social protection labor benefits, and active Aid, unemployment capacities strengthened Authorities’ - infra as municipal transport as well State

affected areas reestablished and strengthened reestablished areas affected peacebuilding to contribute 4: Health Subcomponent level health needs IDPs’ address 5: Public buildings and housing Subcomponent houses, multiapartment buildings single-family 6: SocialSubcomponent welfare ed IDPs to provided measures market 7: Transportation Subcomponent rehabilitated structure Subcomponent 3: Environment Subcomponent 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1

Volume I: 63 SYNTHESIS REPORT - recon and sanitation facilities water % of destroyed structed effectively % of service departments operate the decentralized by provided supply % of water regions in affected systems Indicators cases # of solved work # of people able to pursue finding a suitable job to # of job seekers mechanism with job-searching - satisfaction # of job referrals # of applications serviced service employment using the state # of employers workers source to of employment # of weeks employment in temporary # of individuals offered # of courses and training # of jobless completing training accessing work # of trainees # of applications serviced Water and sanitation facilities destroyed in affected in affected destroyed and sanitation facilities Water of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts areas due to low and sanitation services capacities are Water and lack of of employees, equipment damage, departure access supply of water system centralized Highly Baseline Conditions them from issues that constrain # of people with legal or opening a business working vacancies medium–skill, and high-skill # of low-skill, posted at each local employment of referrals levels Current seeking and actively work and able for # of people ready employment offered currently # of courses and training train to # of jobless people wanting and applications # of IDPs - - Water and sanitation facilities in highly af - in highly and sanitation facilities Water and sanitation service of water Operation decen and sanitation service delivery Water through facilitated employment to Access through facilitated employment to Access opportunities are employment Temporary investments enhanced through Employability suitable local more to Mobility of job seekers

fected and less-affected areas restored restored areas and less-affected fected departments in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts restored of the region sources supply and water tralized diversified are recovery economic 2: Promote Component Strategic Outcomes creation 1: Employment Subcomponent barriers and legal informational reduced services and mobility support referral improved created in human capital improvement use of mobility vouchers ities enhanced through Water supply and sanitation supply 8: Water Subcomponent 8.1 8.2 8.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 64 - # of works programs planned programs # of works offered # of trainings serviced # of job seekers - efficiency improved # of new businesses and implement initiated projects # of development local communities ed by household statistics - improved services in the of extension # of new providers concerned regions counseling ses - (training, # of services provided sions, and so on) consultations established for groups - local working trainings # of capacity-building # of people trained imple - initiatives # of local community development mented and oblast officials raion for # trainings eased # of regulations reduced # of taxes - budget spending changes IFIs such as the from lines or guarantees - credit ensured WBG or EBRD are - - - # of current works programs planned programs works # of current offered trainings # of current areas in targeted employed # of currently con in the regions service providers # of extension statics on main performance cerned and their corporate is launched the project on the date indicators plan development local inclusive or nonexistent Low ning planning inclusive for Lack of structures Nonexistent and the cur and taxation of regulation levels Current private-sector to not conducive budget status are rent recovery a major crisis faces financial sector Ukraine’s - - Capacity of state employment services and employment Capacity of state areas in targeted improved Livelihoods opportunities and productivity Livelihood local and inclusive effective Capacities for - activi Initial local community development is stimu and growth recovery Private-sector is stabilized The financial sector

local governments to manage CRWP enhanced manage CRWP to local governments capacities and livelihoods 2: Productive Subcomponent programs livelihood community-level through - exten of agricultural provision through improved sion services planning 3: Local economic Subcomponent economic planning enhanced plan inclusive through ties planned and initiated community development (link to ning processes in Component 3) activities recovery 4: SMEs and private-sector Subcomponent lated 5: Financial services Subcomponent 1.6 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 5.1

Volume I: 65 SYNTHESIS REPORT - - - - social cohesion data collected from all eastern all eastern from - social cohesion data collected oblasts - pro reports social cohesion tracking - quarterly duced stakeholders key by of reports - validation and Social Cohesion Assessment/ - vulnerability Index official data of gender-disaggregated - availability building conflict and peace tolerance to related moni - to and think tanks of local CSOs # of trainings recommendations the situation and provide tor communities benefitting from % of conflict-affected projects recovery broadcast hours of peacebuilding programming nationally public media cam by % of the population reached peace and tolerance paigns for pilot social accountability initiatives, # of supported to and on the use funds allocated on service delivery the recovery and local community participating in deci % of IDPs the country around facilitated # of dialogue events dialogue facilitators, % of localities with trained facilitators women including % of trained capacity-building % of local authorities receiving on peace and tolerance training Indicators projects recovery sion making for society activ and # of civil servants % of local civil post-conflict policy on gender-sensitive ists trained Absence of baseline data on conflict impacts social Absence cohesion policy and base for evidentiary or inaccurate Weak decisions programmatic lack of trust in conflict- social relationships, Fractured communities affected of the conflict and societal tensions narratives Polarized - of mistrust and uncertainty in conflict-affect levels High ed communities destroyed due to Local authorities’ capacity is limited with new challenges or/and overload infrastructure of the conflict, but also of polarized narratives Highly national reform to linked and grievances other tensions agenda peace and tolerance promote skills to local-level Weak of tensions sources manage potential and to Baseline Conditions - - Analytical baselines and monitoring tools tools baselines and monitoring Analytical on vulnerabil data and analysis High-quality social cohesion in conflict-affected Improved and conflict-affected state between Trust and community- established for Platforms

produce reliable data reliable produce policy and risk, and social cohesion informs ity, decisions programmatic and build back trust social cohesion 2: Promote Subcomponent communities enhanced gover through populations improved nance processes and peace - dialogues on tolerance national-level building Strategic Objective 3: Strengthen social resilience, peacebuilding, security and community social resilience, 3: Strengthen Objective Strategic Outcomes 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.1 Better understand vulnerability, risk, and social cohesion understand vulnerability, 1: Better Subcomponent participation dialogue and civic through of tolerance a culture 3: Promote Subcomponent

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 66 - - - - ing SGBV # of media representatives, CSOs receiving capacity- receiving CSOs # of media representatives, on peace and tolerance building training exchange cultural and interethnic # of interregional and youth children women, for events - train capacity-building NGOs received # of women’s ing and hosts on recovery-orient IDPs portal for - a web shops” established “one-stop - administrative cases of victims registering % of police precincts crime and violence conflict-related and complaints being actively % of allegations investigated concluded and/or resolved % of investigations crime and conflict-related registering for Procedures in all police established and available violence are address for including special procedures precincts, and judges and military prosecutors % of civilian and protection in violence prevention trained and crimi humanitarian law aspects of international nal law of trust in justice institutions levels - improved cases of victims registering % of police precincts crime and violence conflict-related investigated actively complaints and allegations of % and concluded/resolved ed information is established ed information hotline is established - a telephone proce - bulletins and manuals on IDP registration available are dures - Unequal treatment of peacebuilding and tolerance is - of peacebuilding and tolerance Unequal treatment sues in the national and local media commu - bridge building between opportunities for Few parts of the country nities in different and host communities on recov Confusion among IDPs assistance programs, ery planning, subsidies, decrees, and so on social services and benefits of delivering Administration populations is inefficient conflict-affected to violence of citizens to exposure High crime and violence of conflict-related Underreporting - investi for and resources Lack of specialized expertise and prosecution. gation populations in justice Lack of trust conflict-affected institutions violence of citizens to exposure High Sensitivity and tolerance in the media en - and tolerance Sensitivity on engagement civic and women’s Youth the to availability information Improved basic delivering for procedures Improved citizen security and access to Improved and legitimacy, capacity, Strengthened and moni - prevention Domestic and SGBV

hanced and strengthened peacebuilding promoted populations for conflict-affected social protection 4: Ensure Subcomponent and assistance displaced on programs conflict-affected social services and benefits to populations justice to access 5: Promote Subcomponent justice and justice enforcement accountability of law the conflict to institutions related and areas in conflict-affected supported toring nationwide 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3

Volume I: 67 SYNTHESIS REPORT - -

- OO regional offices established in all conflict- af - OO regional and adjoining oblasts fected the OO net by and resolved # of cases registered work. legal population with access to % of conflict-affected assistance quali - communities in which % of conflict-affected support is available fied psychosocial medical and social specialists receiving % of current trauma on conflict-related training for # of counseling services and rehabilitation women groups # of local community reference technological low-cost of user-friendly, - availability management platforms information systems incident monitoring - number of area-based in place cleared - number of mines/UXOs/ERWs and land certified as safe of contaminated - hectares - national DDR framework is developed, including is developed, - national DDR framework budget and implementation arrangements includes all members of - national DDR framework bat - and volunteer national guard, the armed forces, talions and is gender sensitive established for are - clear triggers and processes launching the plan returned to productive use for local population use for productive to returned - OO offices are not present in all conflict-affected oblasts in all conflict-affected not present OO offices are additional needs addressing for and lack structures the conflict by generated legal address to system Lack of an efficient and effective conflict-affected needs for assistance and information populations con support for psychosocial Insufficient capacity for and communi - populations including IDPs flict-affected combatants, and so on conflict areas, ties adjacent to mecha - warning early community-embedded Develop nisms lethal residual due to Risk of post-conflict loss life material of of contamination and awareness levels Unknown among local populations in conflict areas UXOs Absence of a national plan for DDR, including economic, of a national plan for Absence assistance for reintegration social, and psychosocial ex-combatants - A strengthened national network of the OO national network A strengthened access to populations have Conflict-affected to assistance is available Skilled psychosocial mecha - warning early Community-embedded demined areas Conflict-affected DDR of combatants is avail for Framework

to support conflict-affected populations to access populations to support conflict-affected to needed support and services assistance legal 6: Provide Subcomponent assistance support and administrative legal populations support for conflict-affected 7: Offer psychosocial Subcomponent populations conflict-affected security community 8: Restore Subcomponent and tensions and mitigate nisms help prevent community security problems 5.4 6.1 7.1 8.1 8.2 ex-combatants for DDR of returning 9: Prepare Subcomponent 9.1 able

Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine 68 Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine 101 Volodymyrska St. Kyiv, 01033 Ukraine Telephone: +380 (44) 390 8010 www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/ Ukraine United Nations – Ukraine 1 Klovsky Uzviz, Kyiv 01021, Ukraine Recovery and www.un.org.ua

World Bank Office in Ukraine

Synthesis Report Peacebuilding 1 Dniprovskiy Uzviz, 2nd Floor, Kyiv 01010, Ukraine www.worldbank.org.ua Volume I: Assessment ANALYSIS OF CRISIS IMPACTS AND NEEDS IN EASTERN UKRAINE

Volume I: SYNTHESIS REPORT : Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine — Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding

MARCH 31, 2015