DOCSLIB.ORG

Exhibit a AFFIDAVIT in SUPPORT of VERIFIED COMPLAINT for CIVIL

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Exhibit a AFFIDAVIT in SUPPORT of VERIFIED COMPLAINT for CIVIL Exhibit A AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR CIVIL FORFEITURE IN REM OF APPROXIMATELY $119,087.69 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY FROM BANK OF AMERICA ACCOUNT ENDING IN 9049 I, Jeffrey Ferris, being first duly sworn on oath, do hereby depose and say: 1. I am a Special Agent with the United States Secret Service (“Secret Service”), and have been so employed since 2011. I am currently assigned to the Milwaukee Resident Office. My duties as a Special Agent with the Secret Service include investigating financial crimes such as identity fraud, check fraud, credit card fraud, bank fraud, wire fraud, currency-counterfeiting offenses, and money laundering. During my employment with the Secret Service, I have conducted several investigations that have resulted in seizures of criminally derived property, including monetary instruments. 2. As a Special Agent, I have conducted investigations into wire fraud, money laundering, and other complex financial crimes. In the course of those investigations, I have used various investigative techniques, including conducting and reviewing physical and electronic surveillance, conducting undercover operations, obtaining and reviewing financial records, and working with cooperating sources of information. In the course of those investigations, I have also become familiar with techniques that criminals use to conceal the nature, source, location, and ownership of proceeds of crime and to avoid detection by law enforcement of their underlying acts and money laundering activities. 3. All the information contained in this affidavit is based on my personal knowledge, including what I have learned through my training and experience as a law enforcement officer, my review of documents and other records obtained in the course of this investigation, and information I have obtained in the course of this investigation from witnesses having personal Case 2:15-cv-01490-DEJ Filed 12/14/15 Page 1 of 15 Document 1-1 knowledge of the events and circumstances described herein and from other law enforcement officers, all of whom I believe to be truthful and reliable. I have not included in this affidavit every fact I know about this investigation. 4. I submit this affidavit in support of a Verified Complaint for Civil Forfeiture in rem against the defendant property, approximately $119,087.69 in United States currency from Bank of America account ending in 9049 held in the name of HNV Shipping & Export, LLC, which was seized on or about August 20, 2015. Background 5. According to a March 2013 publication of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, consumers lose hundreds of millions of dollars annually to cross-border financial crimes. Some of the most common cross-border financial schemes originate in West African nations such as Nigeria. Law enforcement agencies therefore sometimes refer to such schemes as “West African fraud schemes.” 6. Common West African fraud schemes include: business email compromise scams (“BEC scam”), romance scams, work-from-home scams, and advance payment scams. 7. These scams work as follows: A. BEC scam – a fraudster gains unauthorized access to, or spoofs the email address of a victim and instructs the victim’s financial institution to wire money to a bank account controlled by the fraudster or his associates. B. Romance scam – a fraudster uses electronic messages, sent via email or social media services, to delude the victim in the United States into believing the victim is in a romantic relationship with the person the fraudster purports to be and the fraudster then causes the victim to wire money to an account controlled by the fraudster on false pretenses. C. Work-from-home scam – a fraudster deludes a victim into believing that the victim can work from home doing legitimate work and the fraudster causes the victim to open a domestic bank account that the fraudster uses 2 Case 2:15-cv-01490-DEJ Filed 12/14/15 Page 2 of 15 Document 1-1 to receive fraud proceeds and to then wire those proceeds to an account controlled by the fraudster. D. Advance-fee scam – a victim is deceived into believing that he has won a lottery or is to receive an inheritance from a distant relative or some other type of payment. The fraudster tricks the victim into paying an advance fee to the fraudster on the false premise that the fraudster will then pay the lottery winnings, inheritance, or other promised monies to the victim. The fraudster then keeps the advance fee or fees paid by the victim and the victim gets nothing in return. 8. Foreign perpetrators of such scams sometimes recruit witting or unwitting persons within the United States to open bank accounts that the foreign perpetrators use to receive proceeds of the scam. The foreign perpetrators often target persons within the United States who lack education or common sense, or who are seeking companionship, to open such accounts at financial institutions within the United States. Sometimes those accounts are opened by a victim of a romance scam. Sometimes the accounts used to receive proceeds of a West African fraud scam are opened in the name of a fictitious business, such as a limited liability company, in order to conceal the fraudulent nature of the recipient bank account from victims and victims’ financial institutions. Facts Supporting a Verified Complaint July 23, 2015 attempt to wire $10,000 in proceeds of business email compromise scam to the HNV Shipping & Export, LLC Bank of America account ending in 9049 9. During July 2015, unknown subjects tried to wire $10,000 in proceeds of a business email compromise scam, perpetrated in part in this judicial district, into the HNV Shipping & Export, LLC Bank of America account ending in 9049. 10. Specifically, on or about July 23, 2015, an unknown suspect or suspects hacked into an email account, [email protected], which belonged to the owner of Van Horn Auto Group (“VHAG”), whose initials are “T.V.,” without T.V.’s permission. 3 Case 2:15-cv-01490-DEJ Filed 12/14/15 Page 3 of 15 Document 1-1 11. VHAG’s Corporate Headquarters is located in Plymouth, Wisconsin, within the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 12. Between July 23, 2015, and July 28, 2015, the suspects used T.V.’s email account, without permission, to email messages to Bank First National and Chase Bank, where VHAG held bank accounts, to fraudulently instruct those banks to make the following wire payments: A. July 23, 2015 – $10,000.00 From: VHAG Bank First National account ending in 0419 To: Bank of America account ending in 9049 held in the name of HNV Shipping & Export, LLC B. July 23, 2015 – $5,000.00 From: VHAG Bank First National account ending in 0430 To: US Bank account ending in 8907 held in the name of an individual with initials K.S.C.H. C. July 23, 2015 – $10,000.00 From: VHAG Bank First National account ending in 0430 To: First National Bank account ending in 1517 held in the name of an individual with initials J.K. D. July 24, 2015 – $5,000.00 From: VHAG Chase Bank account ending in 0397 To: VYSTAR Credit Union account ending in 4016 held in the name of an individual with initials L.J. E. July 24, 2015 – $15,000.00 From: VHAG Bank First National account ending in 0419 To: First National Bank account ending in 1517 held in the name of an individual with initials J.K. F. July 28, 2015 – $100,000.00 From: VHAG Bank First National account ending in 2829 To: First National Bank account ending in 2196 held in the name of a business with the initials K.C. 13. As noted in the summary above, one of the fraudulent email messages sent from T.V.’s [email protected] account on July 23, 2015, instructed Bank First National to wire 4 Case 2:15-cv-01490-DEJ Filed 12/14/15 Page 4 of 15 Document 1-1 $10,000 from VHAG’s Bank First National account ending in 0419 to the account at issue in this Complaint, the HNV Shipping & Export, LLC Bank of America account ending in 9049. 14. Based on that message, on July 23, 2015, Bank First National wired $10,000 from VHAG’s Bank First National account ending in 0419 to the HNV Shipping & Export, LLC Bank of America account ending in 9049. 15. On July 28, 2015, after this suspected BEC scam was reported to the Secret Service, the Secret Service’s Milwaukee Financial Crimes Task Force and VHAG worked with Bank First National, First National Bank, Bank of America, Chase Bank, and US Bank to try to rescind the wire transfers identified above. 16. As a result of those efforts, Bank of America successfully rescinded the attempted wire transfer of the $10,000 from the VHAG Bank First National account to the HNV Shipping & Export, LLC Bank of America account ending in 9049. Bank First National, US Bank, Chase Bank, VYSTAR Credit Union, and First National Bank also successfully rescinded three other fraudulent wire transfers from VHAG accounts and thereby prevented VHAG from losses with respect to those fraudulent attempted wire transfers. 17. But VHAG did suffer losses totaling $25,000 from the two fraudulent transfers to the First National Bank account ending in 1517 held in the name of J.K. The $25,000 loss by VHAG is not at issue in this civil forfeiture case, but information obtained by Secret Service shows the following: A. According to First National Bank Compliance Officer B.C., at the time the fraudulent transfers were discovered, the account holders of the First National Bank account ending in 1517, had already withdrawn the majority of the two wire payments of $10,000 and $15,000 made by VHAG on July 23 and 24, 2015, respectively.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • U.S. V. Connie Moorman Willis
    Case 5:17-mj-01008-PRL Document 1 Filed 02/07/17 Page 1 of 14 PageID 1 AO 91 (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the Middle District of Florida United States of America ) v. ) ) CONNIE MOORMAN WILLIS Case No. ) 5: 17-mj-1008-PRL ) ) ) Defendant(s) I CRIMINAL COMPLAINT I i I, 1~he complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. On or about the date(s) of Feb. 4, 2011 through Jan. 25, 2016 in the county of Marion in the I Middle District of Florida , the defendant(s) violated: ! j Code Section Offense Description 18 u.s.c. 1 sec. 656 Theft by a Bank Employee 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341 Mail Fraud Tnis criminal complaint is based on these facts: I I See attached affidavit. I lifl Continued on the attached sheet. Charles Johnsten, U.S. Postal Inspector Printed name and title Sworn to before me and signed in my presence. Date: ~-1 - :lo Ir City and siate: Ocala, Florida Philip R. Lammens, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title I ! Case 5:17-mj-01008-PRL Document 1 Filed 02/07/17 Page 2 of 14 PageID 2 S'FATE OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 5:17-mj-1008-PRL I IOUNTY OF MARION AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT I, Charles Johnsten, being duly sworn, state as follows: INTRODUCTION 1. I am a United States Postal Inspector and have been so employed since I obcember 2016.
    [Show full text]
  • United States District Court Northern District of Alabama Southern Division
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION In re HEALTHSOUTH CORPORATION ) Master File No. CV-03-BE-1500-S SECURITIES LITIGATION ) ) This Document Relates To: All Actions ) ) In re HEALTHSOUTH CORPORATION ) Consolidated Case No. CV-03-BE-1501-S STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION ) ) CLASS ACTION This Document Relates To: All Actions ) ) In re HEALTHSOUTH CORPORATION ) Consolidated Case No. CV-03-BE-1502-S BONDHOLDER LITIGATION ) ) CLASS ACTION This Document Relates To: All Actions ) ) JOINT SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS [FACTUAL BASIS] DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 The Scheme..........................................................................................................................3 Ernst & Young’s Participation in the Fraudulent Scheme...................................................5 Underwriters’ Knowing Involvement..................................................................................8 Financial Fraud ..................................................................................................................14 Medicare Fraud ..................................................................................................................15 Passage of the Balanced Budget Act and Defendants’ Sale of Stock and Notes...............16 Defendants Reinflate the Price of
    [Show full text]
  • Identity Theft What to Do If It Happens To
    Identity Theft: What to Do if It Happens to You You apply for a credit card and get turned down because of a low credit score. Yet you know that you’ve always paid your accounts on time. A debt collector calls to demand payment on a six-month overdue account for a credit card you have never had. You receive a credit card in the mail that you’ve never applied for. What’s happening? You could be a victim of identity theft, where an imposter is using your personal information. The identity thief could use your personal information for any of the following: • They may call your credit card issuer to change the billing address on your credit card account. The imposter then runs up charges on your account. Because your bills are being sent to a different address, it may be some time before you realize there’s a problem. • They may open new credit card accounts in your name. When they use the credit cards and don’t pay the bills, the delinquent accounts are reported on your credit report. • They may establish phone or wireless service in your name. • They may open a bank account in your name and write bad checks on that account. • They may counterfeit checks or credit or debit cards, or authorize electronic transfers in your name and drain your bank account. • They may file for bankruptcy under your name to avoid paying debits they’ve incurred under you name or to avoid eviction. • They may buy a car by taking out an auto loan in your name.
    [Show full text]
  • Fraud, Forgery and Vigilance in Banking Sector
    THAVAN IJREB Vol-1, No-2 Jan-Mar 2012 ISSN: 2277-1476 Fraud, forgery and Vigilance in Banking Sector Alekhya Reddy Student, HNLU, Raipur, [email protected] Abstract- Banks are the engines that drive the 1969 and 6 more on 15 April 1980. The Indian operations in the financial sector, which is vital banking system is indeed unique and perhaps for the economy. With the nationalization of has no parallels in the banking history of any banks in 1969, they also have emerged as country in the world.1 engines for social change and have become indispensable in a modern society. Banks play a The Indian Banking system performs a crucial critical role in economic development of a role in economic development of India through nation. The increase in banking operations is saving-investment.2Banks are the engines that now accompanied by an increase in frauds in drive the operations in the financial sector, the banking sector. In this paper the first chapter which is vital for the economy. With the deals with an introduction to banking and nationalization of banks in 1969, they also have related frauds. The second chapter focuses on emerged as engines for social change. After Fraud and Forgery, subsequently the Next Independence, the banks have passed through Chapter deal with Fraud and Forgeries in three stages. They have moved from the Banking sector with relevant legal provisions. character based lending to ideology based The fourth chapter deals with measures for lending to today competitiveness based lending prevention and detection of such discrepancies, in the context of India's economic liberalization followed by the vigilance in banking sector and policies and the process of linking with the the fifth chapter deals with Legal regime global economy.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Securities Fraud?
    BUELL IN PRINTER PROOF 11/11/2011 5:38:12 PM Duke Law Journal VOLUME 61 DECEMBER 2011 NUMBER 3 WHAT IS SECURITIES FRAUD? SAMUEL W. BUELL† ABSTRACT As Rule 10b-5 approaches the age of seventy, deep familiarity with this supremely potent and consequential provision of American administrative law has obscured its lack of clear conceptual content. The rule, as written, interpreted, and enforced, is missing a fully developed connection to—of all things—fraud. Fraud is difficult to define. Several approaches are plausible. But the law of securities fraud, and much of the commentary about that body of law, has neither attempted such a definition nor acknowledged its necessity to the coherence and effectiveness of the doctrine. Securities fraud’s lack of mooring in a fully developed concept of fraud produces at least three costs: public and private actions are not brought on behalf of clearly specified regulatory objectives; the line between civil and criminal liability has become unacceptably blurred; and the law has come to provide at best a weak means of resolving vital public questions about wrongdoing in financial markets. The agenda of this Article is threefold. First, this Article illuminates and clarifies the relationship between securities fraud and fraud and structures a discussion of legal reform that more explicitly connects Copyright © 2011 by Samuel W. Buell. † Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful for the helpful questions and comments of Tom Baker, Sara Sun Beale, Stuart Benjamin, Ben Depoorter, Lisa Kern Griffin, Kim Krawiec, Dan Markel, James Park, and participants in workshops at Duke University School of Law, Willamette University College of Law, Notre Dame Law School, and Florida State University College of Law.
    [Show full text]
  • Mail and Wire Fraud: an Abbreviated Overview of Federal Criminal Law
    Mail and Wire Fraud: An Abbreviated Overview of Federal Criminal Law Charles Doyle Senior Specialist in American Public Law Updated February 11, 2019 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R41931 SUMMARY R41931 Mail and Wire Fraud: An Abbreviated February 11, 2019 Overview of Federal Criminal Law Charles Doyle The mail and wire fraud statutes are exceptionally broad. Their scope has occasionally given the Senior Specialist in courts pause. Nevertheless, prosecutions in their name have brought to an end schemes that have American Public Law bilked victims out of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars. The statutes proscribe (1) [email protected] causing the use of the mail or wire communications, including email; (2) in conjunction with a scheme to intentionally defraud another of money or property; (3) by means of a material For a copy of the full report, deception. The offenses, along with attempts or conspiracies to commit them, carry a term of please call 7-.... or visit imprisonment of up to 30 years in some cases, followed by a term of supervised release. www.crs.gov. Offenders also face the prospect of fines, orders to make restitution, and forfeiture of their property. The mail and wire fraud statutes overlap with a surprising number of other federal criminal statutes. Conduct that supports a prosecution under the mail or wire fraud statutes will often support prosecution under one or more other criminal provision(s). These companion offenses include (1) those that use mail or wire fraud as an element of a separate offense, like racketeering or money laundering; (2) those that condemn fraud on some jurisdictional basis other than use of the mail or wire communications, like those that outlaw defrauding the federal government or federally insured banks; and (3) those that proscribe other deprivations of honest services (i.e., bribery and kickbacks), like the statutes that ban bribery of federal officials or in connection with federal programs.
    [Show full text]
  • FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE May 9, 2019 for More Information, Contact
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE May 9, 2019 For more information, contact: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs 202-514-2007 U.S. Attorney’s Office Northern District of Florida 850-216-3845 [email protected] SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT ADDS DEVELOPER/ENTREPRENEUR TO RACKETEERING CONSPIRACY TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA – A federal grand jury has returned a forty-seven count superseding indictment against suspended Tallahassee City Commissioner Scott Charles Maddox, 51, Tallahassee political consultant Janice Paige Carter-Smith, 54, and John Thomas Burnette, 42, all of Tallahassee, Florida. Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney Lawrence Keefe of the Northern District of Florida, Special Agent in Charge Rachel Rojas of the FBI’s Jacksonville Field Office and Special Agent in Charge Mary Hammond of the IRS Criminal Investigation (CI) Tampa Field Office made the announcement. In December 2018, a federal grand jury charged Maddox and Carter-Smith in a forty-four count indictment for conspiring to operate a racketeering enterprise that engaged in acts of bank fraud, extortion, honest-services fraud and bribery. That indictment also charged Maddox and Carter-Smith with substantive counts of bank fraud, false statements to financial institutions, extortion, honest-services fraud, use of interstate facilities to facilitate bribery, false statements to federal officers, conspiracy to interfere with the lawful function of the IRS, and filing false tax returns. The superseding indictment adds Burnette as a defendant and charges him with participating in the racketeering conspiracy and extortion, honest services mail fraud, the use of facilities in interstate commerce to facilitate bribery, and making false statements to federal officers.
    [Show full text]
  • Employee Fraud Detection Under Real World Conditions
    Zurich Open Repository and Archive University of Zurich Main Library Strickhofstrasse 39 CH-8057 Zurich www.zora.uzh.ch Year: 2010 Employee fraud detection under real world conditions Luell, J Abstract: Employee fraud in financial institutions is a considerable monetary and reputational risk. Stud- ies state that this type of fraud is typically detected by a tip, in the worst case from affected customers, which is fatal in terms of reputation. Consequently, there is a high motivation to improve analytic de- tection. We analyze the problem of client advisor fraud in a major financial institution and find that it differs substantially from other types of fraud. However, internal fraud at the employee level receives little attention in research. In this thesis, we provide an overview of fraud detection research with the focus on implicit assumptions and applicability. We propose a decision framework to find adequate fraud detection approaches for real world problems based on a number of defined characteristics. By applying the decision framework to the problem setting we met at Alphafin the chosen approach is motivated. The proposed system consists of a detection component and a visualization component. A number of imple- mentations for the detection component with a focus on tempo-relational pattern matching is discussed. The visualization component, which was converted to productive software at Alphafin in the course of the collaboration, is introduced. On the basis of three case studies we demonstrate the potential of the proposed system and discuss findings and possible extensions for further refinements. Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-44863 Dissertation Originally published at: Luell, J.
    [Show full text]
  • Comal County Sheriff's Office Financial Crimes Reporting Package
    Comal County Sheriff’s Office Financial Crimes Reporting Package Identity Theft, Forgery, and Credit Card/Debit Card Abuse are among the most difficult offenses facing citizens today. In our ongoing efforts to combat these problems the following information is being offered by the Comal County Sheriff’s Office, Financial Crimes Unit. Please refer to the “Frequently Asked Questions” section on the following pages to find answers to questions regarding these offenses. This section will also guide you to the specific forms that need to be completed for each specific offense. The forms are included in this packet. Please note that it is very important that all instructions are followed regarding these forms and that each form is completed thoroughly and accurately for the investigator(s) to perform an extensive, detailed, and well documented investigation. If you have questions that are not answered in the “Frequently Asked Questions” section, you can contact the Comal County Sheriff’s Office, Criminal Investigation Division-Financial Crimes Unit, Detective Richard K. Smith at 830-643-6685. Once you complete the forms, you can hand deliver, mail or fax to the following address or number: Comal County Sheriff’s Office Completed, notarized forms can ATTN: Financial Crimes Unit also be faxed to Criminal 3005 W. San Antonio Street Investigations at 830-608-8269, New Braunfels, Texas 78130 Attn: Financial Crimes Unit Please note the business hours are Monday-Friday 8:00am-5:00pm. Security video is used in the prosecution of most cases. Unfortunately some businesses do not keep video for extended periods of time. It is important that you make every effort to complete and return this Financial Fraud Package as soon as possible.
    [Show full text]
  • Check Fraud Working Group, a Subgroup of the Interagency Bank Fraud Working Group
    This booklet was prepared by the Check Fraud Working Group, a subgroup of the interagency Bank Fraud Working Group. That working group includes representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board, Internal Revenue Service, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, National Credit Union Administration, and U.S. Secret Service. The Check Fraud Working Group was convened to provide a forum to explore ways to combat check fraud perpetrated against insured deposito- ry institutions. Check Fraud: A Guide to Avoiding Losses February 1999 1 Background schemes and presents tactics for use in combating check fraud. It cannot describe comprehensively all types of check fraud or check fraud schemes, because the variations are limitless. heck fraud is one of the largest challenges facing financial Although this booklet is a general guide, financial institutions institutions. Technology has made it increasingly easy for should look to state and local laws for other guidance. It can, criminals, either independently or in organized gangs, to C however, get bankers, tellers, operations personnel, and security create increasingly realistic counterfeit and fictitious checks as officers to think about the problem and show how they can help well as false identification that can be used to defraud financial protect their institutions from check fraud. institutions. The scope of the problem can be shown by some recent statis- Significant Terms tics. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) 18 Month Some technical terms relating to checks and drafts2are worth Analysis of the Suspicious Activity Reporting System (SARS), defining.
    [Show full text]
  • Identity Theft
    IDENTITY THEFT WHAT IS IDENTITY THEFT? HOW IDENTITY THEFT OCCURS Identity theft is when someone takes, uses, sells or transfers Skilled thieves get your personal identifying the “personal identifying information” of someone else information by: without that person’s approval, with the intent to use the • Stealing your ID employees at stores, information for an unlawful purpose. cards, credit cards restaurants or hotels. and bankcards. IDENTITY THIEVES USE THE INFO TO: • Pretending to be • Stealing personal your landlord or • Call you credit card issuer and, information from employer to get your pretending to be you, ask to change your home. credit reports or the mailing address on the account. HOW TO PROTECT personnel records. As bills will go to the new address, YOURSELF • Stealing mail, it may take some time before you To help minimize the risk of including account • Diverting your mail realize there is a problem. becoming a victim, take a statements, pre- using a change of approved credit address form. • Open a new credit card account few simple steps. To start, using your name, date of birth and remember the word “SCAM.” • “Skimming” your information. social security number. When they credit card through S: Be STINGY about do not pay the bills, the delinquent • Stealing credit or a special information giving out your personal account is put on your credit report. debit card numbers device that stores information to others unless as the card is being the card information. • Establish a phone in your name. you have a reason to trust processed. • “S • Open a bank account in your name them, regardless of where • Going through the overhear or see any and write bad checks on that account.
    [Show full text]
  • 18 U.S.C. § 1962(D)
    18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 Page 1 Effective:[See Text Amendments] United States Code Annotated Currentness Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos) Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos) Chapter 96. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (Refs & Annos) § 1962. Prohibited activities (a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pat- tern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com- merce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of con- trolling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such pur- chase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer. (b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an un- lawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is en- gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
    [Show full text]