Humean Moral Motivation

Desire and the Rationality of Virtue by Andrés Carlos Luco Department of Philosophy Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Owen Flanagan, Co-Supervisor ___________________________ David Wong, Co-Supervisor ___________________________ Allen Buchanan ___________________________ Kevin Hoover ___________________________ Alexander Rosenberg Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2009 ABSTRACT Desire and the Rationality of Virtue by Andrés Carlos Luco Department of Philosophy Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Owen Flanagan, Co-Supervisor ___________________________ David Wong, Co-Supervisor ___________________________ Allen Buchanan ___________________________ Kevin Hoover ___________________________ Alexander Rosenberg An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2009 Copyright by Andrés Carlos Luco 2009 Abstract A classic question in moral philosophy asks “Why be moral?” In other words, what reason or motive do people have to act in accordance with the requirements of morality? In the tradition of Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, this project defends the thesis that nearly all people have reason to be moral nearly all of the time, because moral conduct generally serves individuals’ desires and needs. It’s argued, first, that a reason for action must be capable of motivating an agent to act, and second, that reasons for action motivate through the desires of the agent. This view is defended against the objection that reasons for action are not contingent on any particular agent’s desires. Turning to morality, the case is made that the desires of an individual can be consonant with the demands of morality in any of three possible ways: (1) moral action serves one’s other-regarding desires to help others; (2) moral action serves one’s moral desires, which are formed when one internalizes the moral norms of his or her community; and (3) moral action serves one’s self-regarding desires to avoid punishments that one incurs by violating moral norms. In the final chapter, it is acknowledged that the moral norms which happen to prevail in a society sometimes conflict with the moral convictions of individuals. Under certain conditions, however, it can be rational for nearly all members of a society to collectively change existing moral norms. Furthermore, it is within the power of individuals to foment the conditions for collective transitions to alternative moral norms. iv Dedication To my family v Contents Abstract.............................................................................................................................. iv List of Figures..................................................................................................................... x Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ xi Introduction: Desire and the rationality of virtue ............................................................... 1 1. Chapter 1: Practical rationality and the internalism-externalism debate ...................... 13 1.0 What is practical rationality? ................................................................................ 13 1.1 Instrumentalism about reasons.............................................................................. 17 1.2 Historical origins of instrumentalism.................................................................... 38 1.3 Instrumentalism and internalism about reasons.................................................... 41 1.4 Actual reasons internalism.................................................................................... 45 1.4.1 Procedural vs. substantive rationality .............................................................. 45 1.4.2 Instrumentalism as an actual internalism......................................................... 49 1.4.3 Williams’s actual internalism .......................................................................... 54 1.5 Counterfactual reasons internalism: Practical reasoning beyond the motivational set? .............................................................................................................................. 77 1.6 Reasons Externalism: Practical reasoning beyond the explanatory constraint? ... 87 1.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 102 2. Chapter 2: Practical reasons and motivation............................................................... 105 2.0 Normative versus explanatory reasons for action............................................... 105 2.1 The master argument for Williams’s explanatory constraint.............................. 109 2.2 “Reasons Imply Can”.......................................................................................... 118 2.3 Acting for reasons............................................................................................... 123 vi 2.4 Reasons as causes ............................................................................................... 134 2.5 Lingering doubts about (E-W)............................................................................ 165 2.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 175 3. Chapter 3: Humean moral motivation......................................................................... 177 3.0 Introduction......................................................................................................... 177 3.1 Moral action and practical reason....................................................................... 178 3.2 Moral motivation: Humeanism vs. Anti-Humeanism......................................... 190 3.2.1 Practical rationality, moral motivation, and “Why be moral?”...................... 190 3.2.2 Motivational Humeanism............................................................................... 196 3.2.3 Anti-Humeanism............................................................................................ 210 3.3 For Humeanism: The argument from continuity ................................................ 223 3.4 For Humeanism: The argument from Morgan’s Canon ..................................... 241 3.5 The default status of Humeanism ....................................................................... 261 3.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 271 4. Chapter 4: The practical evaluation of ends ............................................................... 273 4.0 Introduction......................................................................................................... 273 4.1 Can desires ground practical reasons? ................................................................ 275 4.2 External reasons and the practical fallibility of ends.......................................... 290 4.3 Practical rationality and human flourishing........................................................ 295 4.3.1 Aristotelian roots............................................................................................ 295 4.3.2 Natural goodness............................................................................................ 301 4.3.3 Watson’s dilemma ......................................................................................... 310 4.4 The instrumental rationality of ends ................................................................... 325 vii 4.4.1 Balancing two intuitions: the subjectivity of reasons vs. the fallibility of ends ................................................................................................................................. 325 4.4.2 Choosing and pursuing ends .......................................................................... 329 4.4.3 Reflective instrumentalism: leaving no loose ends........................................ 336 4.4.4 Unification: the fallibility of ends and the subjectivity of reasons ................ 343 4.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 349 5. Chapter 5: The rationality of moral compliance......................................................... 351 5.0 Introduction......................................................................................................... 351 5.1 Moral norms and being moral............................................................................. 356 5.2 Moral norms and mixed-motive games .............................................................. 366 5.3 Moral norms make a difference .......................................................................... 375 5.4 The instrumental rationality of following norms................................................ 389 5.4.1 Punishment and rule egoism: Hobbes’s reply to the fool .............................. 390 5.4.2 Norm-conformity as a virtue: Hume’s response to the sensible knave.......... 406 5.4.3 Overlapping reasons to be moral ................................................................... 422 5.5 Unpopular norms: the dark side of conformity..................................................

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