ANALYSIS DECEMBER 2016 NO: 24

THE PKK AND CAR BOMB ATTACKS

NECDET ÖZÇELIK

ANALYSIS DECEMBER 2016 NO:24

THE PKK AND CAR BOMB ATTACKS

NECDET ÖZÇELIK COPYRIGHT © 2016 by SETA All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers.

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CONTENT

ABSTRACT 7 INTRODUCTION 8 THE PKK’S USE OF VEHICLE BOMBS 9 VBIED ATTACKS BETWEEN AUGUST 2, 2015 AND AUGUST 25, 2016 10 ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TARGETS 10 ANALYSIS OF EXPLOSIVES USED IN ATTACKS 20 TYPES OF ATTACK, VEHICLES, EXPLOSIVES AND TARGET/DISTANCE RELATION 21 CONCLUSION 22 PKK’S CAR BOMBS ATTACKS AFTER AUGUST 25, 2016 22

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Necdet ÖZÇELIK Özçelik served in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) between 1993 and 2014. He was assigned duty in Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia region, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, the USA, and Afghanistan. After officiating for the Special Forces Command for many years, Özçelik resigned on his own accord in October 2014. The author is currently pursuing an MA in International Affairs at Atılım University, Ankara. He works as an independent security consultant, and is involved in fieldwork and academic studies in the areas of terrorism, counter-terrorism, insurgency and counter-insurgency, and low-intensity conflicts.

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ABSTRACT This study proposes an analytical view to better understand the dynamics of car bomb attacks carried out by the terrorist organization of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The report examines the PKK’s car bombs (hereafter referred to as This study Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device -VBIED) from the point of view of proposes an tactical needs, target analysis, and types of explosives and methods used in the analytical attacks, and also discusses the interrelationships of these attacks. To this end, a view to better total of 35 vehicle bomb attacks that PKK committed between August 2, 2015 understand and August 25, 2016 have been studied. The report analyzes the types of targets the dynamics and frequency of attacks, the cities under PKK attack, and the timeframes of of VBIED the attacks. attacks When and how the PKK commits VBIED attacks is explained in the first carried out by section. The thirty-five attacks carried out among other PKK attacks in the in- the terrorist terval of August 2, 2015 – August 25, 2016 are highlighted and background in- organization formation is given in the second section. The PKK assaults are examined under of the several headings in the third section. The fourth section analyzes the explosives Kurdistan used in the PKK attacks, while the dynamics of the attacks are discussed in the Workers’ fifth section. The final section offers recommendations for possible parameters Party (PKK). to prevent future PKK attacks. The study also tries to draw attention to how society at large is affected by the diversity of PKK attacks and the recurrence of certain types of attacks.

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ribed as non-standard explosives prepared by mixing various amounts of destructive, incen- diary, lethal and hazardous chemicals which are loaded on a vehicle and, therefore, mobilized. The use of vehicle bombs in terror acti- vities has grown to be an effective method of attack due to the availability of explosive ma- terials readily in the market and the variety of options to deliver explosives to a selected target at a certain distance within the effective blast radius. In addition to the aforementioned fa- INTRODUCTION ctors, non-state armed actors often prefer to Turkey has been exposed to acts of terror by conduct car bomb attacks due to their impact. more than one organization in the last year and Actors using illegal power in irregular wars - as a consequence Turkish public opinion has terror organizations in particular - favor vehicle repeatedly heard the expression “car bomb.” bomb attacks as they are the deadliest type of Terror groups have committed vehicle bomb attacks. attacks with the intention of targeting public The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 is order by creating pressure and fear in society considered a perfect laboratory for conventional rather than focusing on tactical terror targets. warfare tactics as it provided the opportunity for Car bomb attacks on security forces appear to defense technology innovations to demonstrate have been used as tactical leverage in order to mobile firepower in the battlefield. However, escalate terror. the advanced maneuvering capabilities, and What is a “car bomb attack” by which a the navigation and fire control systems of terror group hopes to psychologically impact tactical armored vehicles used in urban fights society and suppress the operational capabili- have faced problems in confronting irregular ties of security forces? The expression literally insurgency forces since roadside bombs means “man-made explosive laden on a vehic- -Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) laid le,” and is conceptualized as Vehicle Borne Im- along roadsides by terrorists- have evolved as provised Explosive Device (VBIED).1 The two the most effective method to impair operations main elements of the concept of a bomb-la- of regular units. Tactical armored vehicles’ den device are the explosive material itself and mobility capability depends on intercity roads the mechanism to deliver the explosive to the and roads interconnecting towns, villages and target. The type, the shape, the amount, the neighborhoods. Therefore, critical points on method of detonation, and the impact of the such roads have become junctures where IEDs explosive used in bomb devices vary; the dy- meet targeted vehicles. Vehicle bomb attacks namic nature of an explosive stems from such may be regarded as an upgraded version of variations. On the other side, variables, such as IED attacks on roadsides. Albeit the use of the type, the capacity and the environmental VBIEDs by terror organizations appears to adaptability of a vehicle carrying an explosive, be an alternative method of attack against constitute the dynamic nature of the method technological and tactical improvements in of delivery. Then, vehicle bombs may be desc- the methods of detection and detonation of road bombs, IED attacks are indispensable for 1. “US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Asso- ciated Terms”, Joint Publication 1-02, January 31, 2011, p. 391. terror groups.

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There are a series of differences that have form of the blast are considered, the PKK succe- played a critical role in the evolution of IEDs eded in its desire to hit a strategic terror target. into VBIED attacks. The explosive used in Although the PKK’s armed wing did not claim VBIEDs hits the target in a way similar to responsibility for the attack, this was done by a when an anti-tank munition hits a target. In terrorist proxy of the PKK, the Kurdistan Free- roadside IED attacks, however, the target hits dom Falcons (TAK). Formed by Duran Kalkan the explosive. Another important difference is and Fehman Hüseyin, the group is responsible for that the weight of IEDs is limited to 50-250 attacking civilians in city centers.2 The second at- kg as a result of the concern to hide the de- tack by the PKK targeting civilians on May 25, vice in the ground or road culverts and walls. 2012 used the same method as the first. This time, On the other hand, tons of explosives, depen- the PKK hit the police station in the town of Pı- ding on the vehicle’s capacity and the distance narbaşı, Kayseri.3 The last VBIED attack took to delivery point, are used in VBIED attacks. place on the eve of the reconciliation process, kil- Furthermore, an IED attack targets a single led nine people and left 69 wounded in the sout- moving vehicle, but a VBIED attack aims at heastern city of Gaziantep on August 20, 2012.4 both mobile targets such as crowds and con- Apparently, 40-50 kg of TNT or C-4, con- voys, and fixed targets such as buildings and densed and reinforced by metal pieces (nails) were check-points. Consequently, VBIED attacks used in all of these precursor assaults. Two of the result in serious casualties. three vehicles (one minibus and two cars) used for The history of VBIED attacks in Turkey is the blast were stolen and the other was bought not old. The use of VBIEDs skyrocketed fol- from an car dealership in Ankara by the bomber lowing the invasion in Iraq and with the ci- using a fake ID. The attacks at Kumrular Street vil war in Syria, Al Qaeda introduced vehicle in Ankara and Gaziantep were organized against bomb attacks in Turkey. Eventually, the PKK less risky, more fragile and soft targets. Conver- started to commit such attacks. The terror or- sely, PKK terrorists chose Pınarbaşı Police Stati- ganization of the Islamic State of Iraq and the on because it was the first tactical target in sight Levant (ISIL, or DAESH in Arabic) has laun- following a police chase that left them panicked. ched vehicle bomb attacks following the PKK. In the attacks of Kumrular Street and Gaziantep, The PKK used IEDs for the first time in terrorists used remote controlled detonators, but the 1990s, and has carried out VBIED attacks in Pınarbaşı, a suicide bomber set off a car bomb after such attacks intensified with the civil war outside the police station. All of the explosives in in Syria. However, vehicle bomb attacks by the the aforementioned attacks were manufactured, PKK are nothing new: the group has organized and no IED was used. vehicle bomb attacks in Turkey long before its active involvement in the Syrian civil war. VEHICLE BOMB ATTACKS THE PKK’S USE OF BETWEEN AUGUST 2, 2015 VEHICLE BOMBS AND AUGUST 25, 2016 The first VBIED attack by the PKK was executed Between August 2, 2015 and August 25, 2016, on September 20, 2011 with the explosion of a the PKK executed a total of 488 attacks on re- car laden with explosives and parked on the curb 2. “Saldırıyı TAK Üstlendi!”, Vatan, September 22, 2011. of Kumrular Street, Kızılay, in Ankara. When the 3. “Emniyet Müdürlüğü’ne Canlı Bomba Saldırısı!”, Sabah, May psychological impact, casualties, damages and the 25, 2012. 4. “Gaziantep’te Hain Saldırı”, Hürriyet, August 20, 2012.

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cord.The ratio of 35 VBIED attacks to the num- ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ber of total attacks in this period is 7%. The most widespread attack was armed attack (51%). In TARGETS terms of actualization, VBIED are ranked num- As of 2011, the PKK organizes attacks against ber four in six types of attacks. The ratio of casu- two basic groups of targets: fixed targets (faci- alties caused by VBIEDs to the total number of lities) and mobile targets. The PKK’s common assaults reveals that on average four people were objective in both cases is to cause mass casual- killed and 30 were injured in each attack. The ties. But these two groups differ in significance, number of casualties in other types of attacks re- location and characteristics. The method and the mains quite below this figure. In Figure 2, the timing of attacks are determining factors. The types of attacks are given in chronological order. most critical step for security forces to develop The figure shows that the PKK uses VBIEDs countermeasures is to understand the PKK’s tar- for their high fatality ratio with the intention to get analysis. Analyzing the style of approach of overcome a tactical stalemate. the PKK threats will also contribute to innovati- The PKK terror organization committed a total of ve studies in the defense industry. In approxima- 35 vehicle bomb attacks in the period of August tely the last 13 months, the PKK has organized 2, 2015 to August 25, 2016. The attacks are anal- 26 of a total of 35 VBIED attacks against fixed yzed under four headings: the targets, the location targets and nine against mobile targets. Map 1 of the attacks, their timing, and the types of exp- depicts the geographical distribution of PKK at- losives used in the attacks. tacks. The red dots depict scenes of attacks and the figures inside indicate the number of attacks FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF ATTACKS BY TYPE in that specific location.

Fixed Targets Terrorists count on two main factors when cal- culating the impact of a potential attack against a building: the first is the mass of the explosive material to be used in the attack and the second is the distance between the point of explosion and the target. Following a simple logic, the probability of success in a terror attack increa- ses when the mass of explosive is larger and the distance between the explosion location and the target is smaller. However, terrorists act carefully FIGURE 2. CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ATTACK not to waste their limited resources; therefore, they try to use a reasonable amount of specific explosives and develop methods of delivery in order to execute an attack at the closest proxi- mity to the targeted location. As a matter of fact, methods of attacks and security measures compete with each other in these two particular areas. Countermeasure operations by security forces are intensified over the routes along whi- ch an explosive is manufactured, stored, hidden

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MAP 1. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF 35 VEHICLE BOMB ATTACKS BY THE PKK

or delivered in order to keep the amount of The PKK carried out VBIED attacks targeting explosive at minimum level. In such operations, security facilities in an attempt to recupera- security forces take a series of physical measures te from its drastic defeat in city fights in May between a potential point of explosion and se- 2016, and to maintain presence at tactical level curity facilities. in cities. As far as fixed targets are concerned, In approximately the last 13 months, the the PKK organized most of its VBIED attacks PKK has organized 35 VBIED attacks: 26 have against gendarmerie guard posts. Obviously, in been on fixed targets and nine on mobile tar- threat assessments, the possibility of a VBIED gets. The main reason for vehicle bomb attacks attack was not considered at all when gendar- committed against fixed targets is to reach the merie post premises on roadsides were chosen in maximum casualties by a single act (74%) con- the 1980s and 1990s. Building guard posts on sidering that security personnel are gathered in roadsides enables aggressor vehicles to approach facilities. The facility-related features that result military sites. Weak construction elements, or- in high number of casualties are: easy access, dinary wires and no vehicle barriers are used for weak perimeter security, insufficient early war- the physical security of a facility. All these make ning systems, and vulnerabilities in physical it impossible to take perimeter security measu- structures. A chronological order of attacks aga- res. As a result of weak environmental security, inst fixed targets is depicted in Table 1. buildings constructed 35 meters from roadsides Thirteen of the 26 PKK VBIED attacks turn into open targets for vehicles laden with on fixed targets were against gendarmerie guard 1,000 kilograms of ammonium nitrate. posts; eight against provincial/district police fa- Vehicles approaching a facility zone are not cilities and regional traffic stations; two against warned in advance by electronic, sound and police/military checkpoints; one against the dis- lighting systems at a reasonable distance; inste- trict governorate; and one against a courthouse ad they are warned after they get within sight of housing facility. The primary reason for PKK’s guards in the outer zone. Since the early warning picking gendarmerie guard posts for VBIED at- depends on human methods, perimeter security tacks is that the group considers this a tactical cannot be provided due to personnel’s lack of necessity to ensure elbow room in rural areas. attention or distraction. The PKK takes advan-

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TABLE 1. VEHICLE BOMB ATTACKS ON FIXED FACILITIES *

CASUALTIES SCENE OF ATTACK SECURITY DECEASED DATE OF TYPE OF PERSONNEL TARGET OF ATTACK NO ATTACK ATTACK PROVINCE TOWN INJURED INJURED CIVILIAN CIVILIAN DECEASED Karabulak Vehicle Doğuba- 1 August 2, 2015 Ağrı Gendarmerie Guard 2 24 0 0 Suicide Attack yazıt Post Vehicle Suveren Gendarmerie 2 August 21, 2015 Bomb Iğdır Merkez 0 0 0 0 Guard Post Attack Vehicle October 21, Şemdinli District 3 Bomb Hakkari Şemdinli 0 0 0 0 2015 Governorate Attack Vehicle January 13, District Police 4 Bomb Diyarbakır Çınar 1 6 2 33 2016 Department Attack Vehicle Area Traffic 5 March 4, 2016 Bomb Mardin Nusaybin Directorate and 2 33 0 2 Attack Police Housing Vehicle Mermer Gendarmerie 6 March 24, 2016 Diyarbakır Lice 3 24 0 0 Suicide Attack Guard Post Vehicle Recruiting/Induction 7 April 1, 2016 Bomb Mardin Kızıltepe 0 1 0 16 Office Attack Vehicle District Police 8 April 9, 2016 Bomb Mardin Derik 1 0 1 0 Department Attack Vehicle District Gendarmerie 9 April 11, 2016 Bomb Diyarbakır Hani 2 38 0 8 Command Attack Vehicle District Gendarmerie 10 May 1, 2016 Bomb Diyarbakır Dicle 1 20 0 3 Command Attack Vehicle Üçyol Gendarmerie 11 May 4, 2016 Bomb Mardin Derik 1 4 0 1 Guard Post Attack Vehicle Anıtlı Gendarmerie 12 May 25, 2016 Mardin Midyat 3 1 0 0 Suicide Attack Guard Post Vehicle Zeyrek Gendarmerie 13 May 29, 2016 Bomb Diyarbakır Lice 0 5 0 1 Check Point Attack Vehicle Midyat Police 14 June 8, 2016 Mardin Midyat 3 0 3 52 Suicide Attack Department Vehicle 15 June 10, 2016 Şırnak Merkez Military Check Point 0 0 0 0 Suicide Attack

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Vehicle Courthouse 16 June 13, 2016 Bomb Tunceli Ovacık 0 0 0 9 Personnel Housing Attack Vehicle Ömerli District 17 June 23, 2016 Bomb Mardin Ömerli Gendarmerie 0 14 1 5 Attack Command Vehicle Güzelsu Gendarmerie 18 June 28, 2016 Bomb Van Gürpınar 0 2 1 2 Guard Post Attack Vehicle Cevizlik Gendarmerie 19 July 9, 2016 Bomb Mardin Cevizlik 2 12 1 0 Guard Post Attack Vehicle Pay Gendarmerie 20 July 10, 2016 Bomb Van Erciş 2 15 0 0 Guard Post Attack Vehicle Kılköy Gendarmerie 21 July 15, 2016 Bomb Tunceli Nazimiye 0 0 0 0 Guard Post Attack Vehicle 22 July 27, 2016 Hakkari Merkez Depin Check Point 3 11 0 3 Suicide Attack Vehicle Area Traffic 23 August 15, 2016 Bomb Diyarbakır Merkez 5 11 2 34 Directorate Attack Vehicle 24 August 17, 2016 Bomb Van Merkez Police Housing 1 20 2 53 Attack Vehicle Provincial Police 25 August 18, 2016 Elazığ Merkez 3 85 0 132 Suicide Attack Department Vehicle Riot Squad 26 August 25, 2016 Şırnak Cizre 11 75 0 3 Suicide Attack Directorate Total Casualties 46 401 13 357

* The numbers of fatal casualties and injuries are for the first 24 hours following the blast.

tage of structural weaknesses of guard posts as FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF ATTACKS AGAINST FIXED TARGETS well. As they have the characteristics of frame buildings, all structural materials - except beams and columns - are damaged by the impact of a blast to the utmost degree. In particular, the se- ctions between the beams and columns are built with bricks and briquettes, so they remain more vulnerable to explosions. Structural problems are not unique to guard posts. Add-ons to the buil- dings such as garages, restrooms, decks, pergolas, etc. are causes of increasing casualties. Structural damages can be seen in Photos 1 and 2. In a 24-hour timeframe, 35% of vehicle bomb attacks against fixed targets, VBIED at- tacks, take place between 9 p.m. and 11.59 p.m.

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The PKK tries to increase the probability of suc- FIGURE 4. TIMING OF VEHICLE BOMBS TARGETING FIXED FACILITIES WITHIN A 24-HOUR TIME-CYCLE cess and decrease risks by committing vehicle bomb attacks within these hours: it is easy to send a bomb-laden vehicle to a targeted area in darkness, escape in the dark after parking the vehicle at the target location, and benefit from the scarcity of active personnel in guard posts or security/military facilities within this specific timeframe. The method used in VBIED attacks is eit- her to park the bomb-laden vehicle in targeted areas or to commit a suicide attack. Sixty-nine and Van take the lead. Vehicle bombs are installed percent of the 26 VBIED attacks against fixed and used most often on the Derik-Ömerli-Midyat targets have been executed by parking the vehicle line. They are forwarded to nearby residential areas, in the targeted areas and then detonating it with such as the towns of Nusaybin, Kızıltepe, and Çı- a remote control system. One third of the attacks nar. Rural areas on the aforementioned line allow against fixed targets are suicide attacks. In terms terrorists to hide themselves, explosives and vehic- of the impact and the fatality rate, however, suici- les as the routes connecting residential zones and de bombings rank first. desolated roads beyond routine checks facilitate the In VBIED attacks against fixed targets as far delivery of vehicle bombs to selected targets. The as provinces are concerned, the southeastern and frequency of attacks, along this line, increases with eastern Turkish provinces of Mardin, Diyarbakır the support of PKK cohorts. Ammonium nitrate used for agricultural purposes in nearby cities is dis- PHOTO 1. STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AFTER THE ATTACK patched to the Derik-Ömerli-Midyat line by PKK’s AT KARABULAK GENDARMERIE GUARD POST partners in crime. The second route that the PKK concentrates on is the Lice-Hani-Dicle line. Vehicle bombs are installed and used on this line and sent to nearby provinces, such as Diyarbakır and Elazığ. The Li- ce-Hani-Dicle and the Derik-Ömerli-Midyat li-

FIGURE 5. THE METHOD USED BY THE PKK IN CAR BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST FIXED TARGETS

PHOTO 2. STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AFTER THE ATTACK AT THE MIDYAT POLICE DEPARTMENT BUILDING

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nes have several characteristics in common: both • Security forces do not use jammers in shuttle are PKK’s local strategic action routes on and vehicles in residential areas. around which the organization easily maintains • Shuttle vehicles routinely use certain routes. its armed presence. After running out of tactics during the secu- Mobile Targets rity operations in the southeastern Turkish towns In case of failure to plant IEDs on roadsides or of Sur, Nusaybin and Cizre, the PKK organized when they are easily noticed, terrorists park VBI- its first ever VBIED attack when an explosive- EDs along curb lines in residential areas in the na- laden car was detonated by a suicide bomber in tural flow of daily traffic. This allows them to -car Ankara on February 17, 2016. The chronological ry out attacks more effectively than IED attacks. order of similar attacks in Ankara, İstanbul and IEDs are planted on roadsides and in sub-surfaces Diyarbakır is provided in Table 2. inside culverts; they are on average 200-250 kg in weight and usually target a single armored vehicle. FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF PKK ATTACKS AGAINST A 1,500 kg explosive laden on a vehicle damages FIXED TARGETS ACCORDING TO PROVINCES more than one vehicle and causes many casualties when it targets unarmored civilian and military/ police service vehicles on surface. For this reason, the PKK chooses mobile targets. Terrorists carry out VBIED attacks against mobile targets for the following tactical reasons: • To hide and camouflage IEDs in vehicles par- ked on roadsides in residential areas is easy. • VBIED allows the use of more explosives to execute an IED attack. • VBIED attacks against unarmored, non- tactical, official vehicles in residential areas increase the probability of a high number of casualties.

FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF PKK ATTACKS AGAINST FIXED TARGETS ACCORDING TO PROVINCES

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MAP 3. FREQUENCY OF VEHICLE BOMBS USED NEAR FIXED TARGETS DETONATED BY REMOTE CONTROL (RED – HIGHEST FREQUENCY, GREEN – LOWEST FREQUENCY)

MAP 4. FREQUENCY OF VEHICLE BOMBS USED NEAR FIXED TARGETS DETONATED BY SUICIDE ATTACKERS (RED – HIGHEST FREQUENCY, GREEN – LOWEST FREQUENCY)

The PKK and the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons Suicide attacks by VBIEDs can target more (TAK), a breakaway faction of the PKK, have exe- than one personnel shuttle en route at the same cuted a total of nine attacks on mobile targets. The time and place and thus, result in a high number PKK has mostly targeted police personnel shutt- of casualties. Road curves, which cause vehicles to les, but has occasionally hit military personnel and slow down or stop in traffic, uncontrolled cross- private vehicles, and crowds, as well. The PKK for roads, and red lights or bus stops have facilitated the most part has detonated bomb-laden vehicles the target-timing optimization of such attacks. parked on roadsides by remote control; three of Evidently, in terror activities organized by plan- the nine aforementioned attacks were committed ting IEDs on roadsides against military personnel by suicide bombers. The number of casualties was shuttles in rural areas, the PKK chooses points of the highest when VBIEDs were detonated by a su- attacks on road segments which force vehicles to icide bomber. slow down, pause or come to a full stop.

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TABLE 2. VEHICLE BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS* CASUALTIES SCENE OF ATTACK SECURITY DECEASED PERSONNEL TYPE OF DATE OF ATTACK TARGET OF ATTACK NO ATTACK PROVINCE TOWN INJURED INJURED CIVILIAN DECEASED Vehicle Çankaya February 17, Military Personnel 1 Suicide Ankara (Merasim 28 61 0 0 2016 Shuttles Attack Street) Vehicle Çankaya 2 March 13, 2016 Suicide Ankara Riot Squad 0 0 27 75 (Kızılay) Attack Vehicle Security Personnel 3 March 31, 2016 Diyarbakır City Centre 7 13 0 14 Bomb Attack Shuttle

Vehicle Security Personnel 4 May 10, 2016 Diyarbakır Bağlar 0 12 3 33 Bomb Attack Shuttle

Vehicle Security Personnel 5 May 12, 2016 İstanbul Samandıra 0 5 0 1 Bomb Attack Shuttle

Vehicle 6 May 12, 2016 Diyarbakır Dürümlü Civilians 0 17 0 22 Bomb Attack Vehicle Beyazıt/ Security Personnel 7 June 7, 2016 Suicide İstanbul 7 0 4 36 Vezneciler Shuttle Attack Vehicle Security Personnel 8 August 10, 2016 Mardin Kızıltepe 1 5 2 15 Bomb Attack Shuttle

Vehicle Security Personnel 9 August 10, 2016 Diyarbakır Sur 0 5 5 8 Bomb Attack Shuttle

Total Casualties 43 118 41 204

* The numbers of fatal casualties and injuries are for the first 24 hours following the blast.

The timing analysis of VBIED attacks against rement of the vehicle and of explosives in bulk, mobile targets reveals that most of the attacks are and the preparation of the desired explosive to committed during evening rush hour. Terrorists ea- be used in a blast. Fulfilling these three require- sily monitor the movements of targeted vehicles in ments and putting them into action as an act of heavy traffic, and take advantage of security forces’ terror require sound and multifaceted efforts for distraction or lack of attention due to fatigue or ti- a terror group that is secretive in nature. To hide redness; they thus seize the opportunity to occupy the detailed operational processes of each of these the headlines in prime-time news. As for the timing factors is not easy. The PKK terror organization of the attacks, 78% of PKK attacks against mobile is known for collaborating with people - called targets occur between 4.30 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. auxiliaries - in the logistics and procurement Suicide bombings account for 33% of VBI- phases of these activities. It is crucial, however, ED attacks against mobile targets. The PKK exe- to examine the dates of the terror acts in order to cutes a potential suicide bombing based on three understand why they cannot be prevented from factors: the training of the assailant, the procu- turning into actions.

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FIGURE 7. MOBILE TARGETS TARGETED BY VEHICLE place; this may be related to the purge of FE- BOMB ATTACKS (%) TÖ’s intelligence members within the state and the breakdown of the FETÖ-PKK solidarity. As far as the location of attacks is conside- red, VBIED attacks against mobile targets are primarily executed in the southeastern provin- ce of Diyarbakır followed by the provinces of Ankara, İstanbul and Mardin. Considering that the explosives used in the Ankara and İstanbul incidents were supplied from Diyarbakır, the PKK’s capacity in relation to this type of assa- ults in Diyarbakır may be better understood. All of the VBIED attacks against mobile targets All of the VBIED attacks in the form of suici- have been carried out in cities and towns; no de bombings were committed before the Fetullah such attacks have been executed in rural areas. Gülen Terror Organization’s (FETÖ) failed coup attempt on the evening of July 15, 2016. That ANALYSIS OF may be considered an indication of FETÖ-PKK EXPLOSIVES USED IN solidarity nested in the state’s intelligence units. Although the network of cohorts is monitored ATTACKS and constantly kept under technical surveillance, Two features play a key role in the classifica- the type of vehicles to be used in terror acts and tion of explosive materials: detonation (blast the failure to spot the transfer of explosives are a wave propagation) velocity and the relative problem; it is also possible that on occasion they effectiveness (R.E.) factor with respect to Tri- are overlooked. Nonetheless, from an intelligence nitrotoluene (TNT). The breaching effect of a perspective, there is no excuse for the failure to de- high explosive is correlated with the detonati- tect terrorists, who are trained for suicide attacks on velocity of that explosive. The R.E. factor is by the PKK. After July 15, 2016, no VBIED at- a numeric value developed relative to TNT’s tack in the form of a suicide bombing has taken breaching effect. Each explosive has an R.E. factor value; this numeric value is used for cal-

FIGURE 9. TYPES OF ATTACK AGAINST FIGURE 8. TIMING OF VBIED ATTACKS AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS MOBILE TARGETS WITHIN A 24-HOUR TIME-CYCLE

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culating the amount of chosen explosive in we- is used as a component of explosive mixtures for ight. In short, it takes 0.74 units of C-4 and 2.38 vehicle bombs. The chemical is readily available units of ammonium nitrate to create the same in bulk; and because of its low cost, excellent cra- impact of blast caused by one unit of TNT on a tering effect, and low detonation velocity, it is oc- target. However, explosives vary according to ty- casionally used in improvised and vehicle bombs. pes of target; for this reason, other specifications of explosives are taken into account. Performan- Trinitrotoluene (TNT) - C7H5N3O6: ce and power determine the applicability of an TNT (molecular mass 227.13 gr/mol) is the most explosive on a desired target; and these specifi- common filling material for military munitions. cations determine the power and performance of Since it is a standard/base explosive, TNT is used an explosive. Comparative specifications of three to rate other explosives. TNT has an R.E. factor explosives frequently used by terror groups are of 1 per unit of explosive. TNT is manufactu- given in Table 3. red in unique shapes and weights. It is difficult to obtain, store, transfer in bulk, and to give form. TABLE 3. COMPARATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS USED IN TERROR ATTACKS However, with its excellent shattering power, TNT is used as an initiator in detonating IEDs. RELATIVE DETONATION POWER AND EXPLOSIVE EFFECTIVENESS VELOCITY PERFORMANCE FACTOR FIGURE 10. DISTRIBUTION OF PKK ATTACKS AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS ACCORDING TO PROVINCE Ammonium 0,42 4.100 Propellant Nitrate TNT 1 6.800 Breaching Breaching/ C-4 1,34 8.040 cutting

Ammonium Nitrate (AN) - NH4NO3: AN (molecular mass 80.04 gr/mol) is the most com- mon filling material used by the PKK for both planting IEDs on roadsides and in VBIEDs. Am- monium nitrate is a chemical compound (used as an oxidizer), not an explosive on its own, but

MAP 5. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PKK’S VBIED ATTACKS AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS

setav.org 19 ANALYSIS

MAP 6. FREQUENCY OF VBIEDS USED AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS (RED - HIGHEST FREQUENCY, GREEN -LOWEST FREQUENCY)

C-3/C-4: C-3/C-4 (members of the Com- kes it suitable for cratering and ditching ope- position C family of plastic explosives) is princi- rations. Although ammonium nitrate is not as pally used for filling purposes. C-3/C-4 is a com- powerful as other military explosives, it is rela- posite material with sheer destructive power, and tively less expensive than others. Ammonium consists of plastic compositions that are more ef- nitrate is used in large quantities in farming. fective than TNT. C-3/C-4 is suitable for cutting Its frequent use as a commercial and agricultu- and breaching and has high detonation velocity. ral product makes ammonium nitrate readily Since it is a manufactured explosive, C-3/C-4 is available and deliverable and for this reason the in unique forms and weights. Although difficult PKK chooses ammonium nitrate explosives for to obtain, transfer in bulk and store, C-3/C-4 vehicle bomb attacks. can easily be molded into any desired shape and made suitable for delivery. C-3/C-4 is used as the initiator in detonating IEDs. TYPES OF ATTACK, Cratering Effect and Ammonium Nitrate: VEHICLES, The cratering power of high explosives depends on the total energy produced upon detonati- EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS, on that clears broken pieces out of the crater. AND TARGET/DISTANCE The detonation velocity is not directly related RELATION to this effect. In fact, explosions with low bre- Bomb-laden vehicle attacks are carried out in aching power have higher cratering power. For this reason, the amount of an explosive needed five different ways:VBIEDs parked on roadsi- for cratering is not determined by R.E. factors. des; VBIEDs driven and then abandoned in a To create potholes and ditches in roads requi- target area; VBIEDs driven by a suicide attacker res a large amount of explosives; therefore, as onto a target; VBIEDs driven by individuals a standard cratering charge, ammonium nitra- who have been forced to do so; and VBIEDs te-based explosives are used for cratering and driven by utilizing deception techniques. So far, ditching; their low velocity blast effect gives the PKK has carried out VBIED attacks in four them a pushing or heaving effect which ma- of the above types.

20 setav.org THE PKK AND CAR BOMB ATTACKS

PHOTO 3. FIXED SECURITY FACILITY COMPOUND IN RELATION TO NEARBY ROADS/BELTWAYS

Bomb vehicles parked on roadsides: This is the Bomb-laden vehicles driven to target area and most widespread VBIED tactic that the PKK abandoned: In this type of attack, the VBIED uses against mobile targets. It is quite difficult is hastily parked in a public parking lot in front to identify a VBIED in irregular road traffic and of a guard post, or a police station, and is de- road traffic that follows no specific patterns. A tonated by a remote control shortly afterwards. parked VBIED is detonated by remote control PKK terrorists have often used this method ta- when it lines up with the selected target. The best king advantage of public parking lots in front of example is the attack committed in Diyarbakır security buildings and the slow assessment of the on March 31, 2016. situation by security personnel.

TABLE 4. SAFETY DISTANCES FROM VEHICLE BOMBS SCATTERING AMOUNT OF LETHAL BLAST SAFE DISTANCE TO VEHICLE TYPE, MAX PARTICLES EXPLOSIVE RADIUS POINT OF BLAST DISTANCE 200-250 kg explosive Hatchback (avg 227 kg) if carried 30 m 98 m 457 m Automobile in trunk 400-500 kg explosive Sedan Automobile (avg 454 kg) if carried 38 m 122 m 534 m in trunk 1.500-2.000 kg Minibus (Cargo or explosive 61 m 195 m 838 m Passenger) (avg 1.818 kg) 10.000-16.000 kg Truck and Fuel Truck explosive 137 m 375 m 1.982 m (avg 13.608 kg) 25.000-30.000 kg Truck explosive 183 m 475 m 2.134 m (avg 27.273 kg) Source: “Emergency Response Guidebook 2016”, The Transportation Ministry of Canada, http://wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/saf-sec-sur/3/erg-gmu/ erg/ied.aspx, (Access date: September 27\ 2016). setav.org 21 ANALYSIS

Vehicle bombs driven by a suicide attacker tics, terrorists always try to maintain sustainable to the target: A VBIED in a normal course of dominance over their strategic terror targets in traffic approaches the targeted area, but suddenly certain periods of time and geographical regions. maneuvers and hits the target or reaches the most For this reason, the PKK has tried to sustain its suitable distance and is detonated by the suicide strategical dominion in rural areas when it has attacker. The absence of vehicle barriers between been weakened in urban fights; and has worked the target and access routes facilitates a vehicle’s on IED, VBIED and armed attacks based on approach to its target, and increases the attack’s this strategy. probability of success. In order to measure the effectiveness of future preventive measures, the diversity of terror acts Bomb-laden vehicles used by force: The dri- of the PKK should be analyzed. The PKK has ver of a loaded fuel truck is forced to drive recently started to commit softer acts of terror, to the target region, or an ordinary vehicle is such as assassinations, kidnaping and waylays. stopped by terrorists, laden with explosives and This is an indication that the organization did then forced to hit the target region. Execution not have the desired tactical gains and the expe- of this type of an attack is difficult. Such an at- cted impact with vehicle bomb attacks. As the tack against Suveren Gendarmerie Guard Post, PKK diversifies its terror activities, it deepens in the eastern province of Iğdır, was attemp- its organized terror program as well. Similar- ted and failed by PKK terrorists on August 21, ly to the public criticism following the bomb 2015. attack in the town of Ovacık, social reactions CONCLUSION are increasing in other cities as well after diffe- rent kinds of attacks. Thus, the PKK has beco- This study has shown that VBIED attacks are me a persona non grata, or a common enemy, generally carried out against police, who is in for people living in Eastern and Southeastern charge of law and order, and military faciliti- Anatolia. es and official vehicles. Keeping this in mind, detailed analyses of vehicle bomb attacks with a focus on targets, locations, timing and met- PKK’S CAR BOMBS hods, and a risk assessment on vehicle bomb at- ATTACKS AFTER tacks are necessary. Security, safety and facility/ AUGUST 25, 2016 vehicle designs need to be developed urgently. The initial analysis covered PKK’s VBIED/SV- Fixed facilities that are vulnerable to attacks and BIED between August 2, 2015 and August 25, different types of mobile targets should be eva- 2016 and was published in Turkish in October luated respectively. For fixed facilities, selection 2016. However, the increase in PKK’s VBIED/ of compound location, structural needs, physi- SVBIED attacks led to the update of the analy- cal safety measures and effective security plan- sis so that it covered the period between August ning should be improved. The most limiting 26, 2016 and December 10, 2016. The fol- factor here is the operational needs of security lowing graphs have been added to the current forces in a facility. analysis in an additional section and present the Since they are illegal and criminal organizations PKK car bomb attacks in a comparative manner by nature, terror groups when faced with effec- for a better understanding of the nature of these tive measures are tactically dynamic, and rapidly events. Comparisons suggest a continuation of change tactics. However, regardless of their tac- the PKK’s terror trends in Turkey.

22 setav.org THE PKK AND CAR BOMB ATTACKS

The PKK has carried out a total of 42 AUGUST 2, 2015 - DECEMBER 10, 2016 bomb attacks since August 2, 2015 when the 7 attacks between August 26, 2016 and De- cember 10, 2016 are added to the 35 attacks of the period between August 2, 2015 and Au- gust 25, 2016. The 7 new attacks were carried out against fixed targets; the new attacks had no impact on the nature of the attacks against mobile targets which were studied in the ini- tial analysis. The comparisons of the attack dy- namics based on the different parameters of the three different periods since August 2, 2015 can be found below.

Comparison of the Attacks Based on Comparison of the Attacks Based on Provinces Target Selection AUGUST 2, 2015 - AUGUST 25, 2016 AUGUST 2, 2015 - DECEMBER 10, 2016

AUGUST 26, 2016 - DECEMBER 10, 2016 AUGUST 2, 2015 - DECEMBER 10, 2016

setav.org 23 ANALYSIS

AUGUST 2, 2015 - DECEMBER 10, 2016 AUGUST 2, 2015 - DECEMBER 10, 2016

Comparison of the Attacks Based on the Attack Method:

AUGUST 2, 2015 - AUGUST 25, 2016

Comparison of the Attacks Based on the Attack Timing

AUGUST 2, 2015 - AUGUST 25, 2016

AUGUST 26, 2016 - DECEMBER 10, 2016

AUGUST 26, 2016 - DECEMBER 10, 2016

AUGUST 2, 2015 - DECEMBER 10, 2016

24 setav.org THE PKK AND CAR BOMB ATTACKS

CASUALTIES BY SVBIED/SVIED ATTACKS BY PKK ATTACK ANALYSIS PERIOD SECURITY CIVILIANS PERSONNEL KILLED WOUNDED KILLED WOUNDED 2 August 2015-25 August 2016 89 519 54 561 26 August 2016-10 December 2016 49 60 24 247 2 August 2015-10 December 2016(Overall Total) 138 579 78 808

VBIED/SVBIED ATTACKS CARRIED BY PKK BETWEEN AUGUST 26TH AND DECEMBER 10TH, 2016

ATTACK CASUALTIES ATTACK ATTACK ATTACK LOCATION ORDER ATTACK TARGET Security Personnel Civilians DATE METHOD # Province District Killed Wounded Killed Wounded September AK Parti Provincial 1 VBIED Van Downtown 0 4 0 49 12, 2016 Office Building

October 6, Yenibosna 75th Polis 2 VBIED İstanbul Yenibosna 0 0 0 10 2016 Station

October 9, Durak Gendarmerie 3 SVBIED Hakkari Şemdinli 10 11 8 16 2016 Post 4 Kasım Provincial Police HQs 4 VBIED Diyarbakır Bağlar 2 0 7 94 20016 Annnexed Building November Provincial Governor 5 VBIED Adana Downtown 0 0 2 33 26, 2016 Office Building December Teknebaşı Gendar- 6 VBIED Diyarbakır Hazro 0 0 0 0 9, 2016 merie Post Riot Police Standby/ December 7 SVBIED İstanbul Beşiktaş Control Location nearby 37 45 7 45 10, 2016 Besiktas Stadium Total Casualties 49 60 24 247

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his study proposes an analytical view to better understand the dynamics of bomb-laden vehicle attacks carried out by the terrorist organization Kur- Tdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This report evaluates the tactical need, target analysis, types of explosives, and the methods of PKK’s vehicle bomb attacks, and the interrelationship of such attacks. To this end, a total of 35 vehicle bomb attacks committed by the PKK between August 2, 2015 and August 25, 2016 have been investigated, alongside the types of targets and frequency of attacks, the cities under attack, and the timeframes of the attacks. The first section discusses when and how the PKK commits vehicle bomb attacks. The second section looks at 35 attacks carried out in the period of August 2, 2015 to August 25, 2016. The PKK attacks are examined in detail under several diverse headings in the third section, followed by an analysis of the explosives used in the attacks. Subsequently, the dynamics of the attacks are discussed and possible parameters to prevent future PKK attacks are recommended in the final section. The study also draws attention to how society at large is affected by the diversity of PKK attacks and the recurrence of certain types of attacks.

ANKARA • İSTANBUL • WASHINGTON D.C. • KAHİRE

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