High Availability with Red Hat Enterprise Linux Openstack Platform 4

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High Availability with Red Hat Enterprise Linux Openstack Platform 4 High Availability with Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenStack Platform 4 Jacob Liberman, RHCE Version 1.0 June, 2014 1801 Varsity Drive™ Raleigh NC 27606-2072 USA Phone: +1 919 754 3700 Phone: 888 733 4281 Fax: +1 919 754 3701 PO Box 13588 Research Triangle Park NC 27709 USA Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. Red Hat, Red Hat Enterprise Linux and the Red Hat "Shadowman" logo are registered trademarks of Red Hat, Inc. in the United States and other countries. OpenStack is a U.S. registered trademark of the OpenStack Foundation. UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group. Intel, the Intel logo and Xeon are registered trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries in the United States and other countries. All other trademarks referenced herein are the property of their respective owners. © 2014 by Red Hat, Inc. This material may be distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Open Publication License, V1.0 or later (the latest version is presently available at http://www.opencontent.org/openpub/). The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. Red Hat, Inc. shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. Distribution of modified versions of this document is prohibited without the explicit permission of Red Hat Inc. Distribution of this work or derivative of this work in any standard (paper) book form for commercial purposes is prohibited unless prior permission is obtained from Red Hat Inc. The GPG fingerprint of the [email protected] key is: CA 20 86 86 2B D6 9D FC 65 F6 EC C4 21 91 80 CD DB 42 A6 0E Send feedback to [email protected] www.redhat.com ii [email protected] Table of Contents 1 Executive Summary......................................................................................... 1 2 Architecture Overview...................................................................................... 2 2.1 OpenStack Platform.......................................................................................................... 2 2.1.1 Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenStack Platform 4........................................................ 2 2.1.2 OpenStack Terminology............................................................................................... 2 2.1.2.1 Server Roles........................................................................................................... 3 2.1.2.2 Network Names...................................................................................................... 4 2.1.3 High Availability OpenStack Services in this Document.............................................. 5 2.1.3.1 Identity Service (“Keystone”).................................................................................. 5 2.1.3.2 Image Service (“Glance”)....................................................................................... 5 2.1.3.3 Compute Service (“Nova”)..................................................................................... 5 2.1.3.4 Block Storage (“Cinder”)........................................................................................ 6 2.1.3.5 Network Service (“Neutron”).................................................................................. 6 2.1.3.6 Dashboard (“Horizon”)........................................................................................... 6 2.1.4 OpenStack Services Not Described in this Document................................................ 6 2.1.4.1 Orchestration (“Heat”)............................................................................................ 6 2.1.4.2 Telemetry (“Ceilometer”)........................................................................................ 6 2.1.4.3 Object Storage (“Swift”).......................................................................................... 7 2.2 High Availability with HAproxy and pacemaker ................................................................ 7 2.2.1.1 HAProxy................................................................................................................. 7 2.2.1.2 Pacemaker............................................................................................................. 7 2.2.2 Highly Available Resources......................................................................................... 7 2.2.2.1 State Database....................................................................................................... 8 2.2.2.2 Messaging.............................................................................................................. 9 2.2.2.3 Memcached............................................................................................................ 9 2.2.2.4 OpenStack Services............................................................................................... 9 2.2.3 Start up Dependencies.............................................................................................. 10 2.3 Service Placement........................................................................................................... 11 3 Reference Architecture Configuration Details................................................. 13 3.1 Environment.................................................................................................................... 13 3.1.1 Network Topology...................................................................................................... 13 3.1.2 Network Addresses.................................................................................................... 14 3.2 Software Details.............................................................................................................. 15 3.2.1 Required Channels.................................................................................................... 16 [email protected] iii www.redhat.com 3.2.2 Software Versions...................................................................................................... 16 3.3 Security Reference.......................................................................................................... 18 3.3.1 Firewall Configuration................................................................................................ 18 3.3.2 SELinux Configuration............................................................................................... 18 3.4 Hardware Details............................................................................................................. 18 3.4.1 Server Hardware Configuration................................................................................. 19 3.4.2 Network Hardware and Topology.............................................................................. 19 3.4.3 Storage Configuration................................................................................................ 19 4 Implementing High Availability OpenStack..................................................... 21 4.1 Prepare the Hosts............................................................................................................ 21 4.1.1 Configure Name Resolution....................................................................................... 21 4.1.2 Configure Networks................................................................................................... 22 4.1.3 Create and Share SSH Keys..................................................................................... 22 4.1.4 Synchronize Time...................................................................................................... 24 4.1.5 Update the Systems.................................................................................................. 24 4.1.6 Disable ACPID........................................................................................................... 25 4.1.7 Mount Shared Storage............................................................................................... 25 4.2 Configure the Load Balancers......................................................................................... 26 4.3 Configure the Controller Nodes....................................................................................... 37 4.3.1 Configure the Network Bridges.................................................................................. 37 4.3.2 Prepare the Controller Nodes for HA......................................................................... 40 4.3.3 Implement HA Keystone............................................................................................ 46 4.3.4 Install Memcached..................................................................................................... 54 4.3.5 Implement HA Glance................................................................................................ 55 4.3.6 Implement HA Cinder................................................................................................. 61 4.3.7 Implement HA Neutron.............................................................................................. 67 4.3.8 Implement HA Neutron Network Agents.................................................................... 73 4.3.9 Implement HA Nova................................................................................................... 80 4.3.10 Implement HA Horizon............................................................................................. 88 4.4 Configure the Compute Nodes.......................................................................................
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