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About Austerity About Austerity By Kenneth Rogoff Austerity: When It Works and When It Doesn’t by It is important to mention that Giavazzi and I both Alberto Alesina, Carlo Favero, and Francesco Giavazzi had the late Rüdiger Dornbusch as our thesis adviser at (Princeton University Press, 2019). Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and that Alesina and I are colleagues at Harvard University. n Austerity: When It Works and When It Doesn’t, the central conclusion reached by economists HARD TOPIC, HARD TRUTHS Alberto Alesina, Carlo Favero, and Francesco That said, I do not agree with the authors of Austerity on Giavazzi is one that most modern-day Keynesians everything. For starters, I think the book should have in- and progressives will hate. In cases when circum- cluded more discussion of heterodox approaches to deal- Istances have forced a country into fiscal retrenchment, ing with unsustainable debt, such as write-downs, infla- the authors show, cutting government spending has cost tion, and financial repression. As my Harvard colleague less than tax increases in terms of foregone output and Carmen M. Reinhart and I showed in our book This Time employment. Is Different, these options can sometimes be more attrac- Readers should know that this is no ideological tive than fiscal retrenchment for countries in severe debt diatribe. Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi have conducted distress, and even many advanced economies have used cutting-edge empirical research on sixteen advanced econ- them more recently than is commonly thought. Equally omies to draw lessons that could not have been garnered important, these measures are not the same thing as aus- from analyzing any one country or episode in isolation. terity, though some journalists and other commentators Austerity is a towering scholarly achievement, embodying often treat them that way. decades of research and destined to serve as a touchstone Of course, no single book can address the full scope for future studies—both by those who will build on it and of issues, especially if its purpose is to conduct high-level by those who will try to tear it down. empirical analysis. Besides, in a great many instances, In the very first line of their book, Alesina, Favero, what policymakers in debt-distressed economies want and Giavazzi surpass the many blunderbusses that are to know first are their best options for pursuing orthodox published about austerity when they actually define the fiscal retrenchment, before contemplating any hetero- term. “Austerity,” they write, “indicates a policy of siz- dox measures. That is the question Alesina, Favero, and able reduction of government deficits and stabilization of Giavazzi have set out to answer. government debt achieved by means of spending cuts or The question is a controversial one not least because tax increases, or both.” the term “austerity” is often used polemically as a catch- As opening lines go, this might not stack up with Anna all for almost any fiscal policy that accounts for the risks Karenina or Moby Dick. But it is a breath of fresh air com- pared to angry polemics that carelessly toss around the word Kenneth Rogoff is Professor of Economics and Public “austerity” to encompass a dizzying range of economic is- Policy at Harvard University and formerly served as sues, ranging from fiscal retrenchment under market duress chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. to any policy that slows the march to socialism. COPYRIGHT: PROJECT SYNDICATE, 2019, ON POINT SERIES SPRING 2019 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 29 Rogoff and realities around government budget constraints. And, Moreover, as Alesina, Favero, unfortunately, in the current illiberal intellectual climate, and Giavazzi point out, some of merely suggesting alternatives to the mainstream progres- the best candidates for expansion- sive dogma can summon the anti-austerity thought police. ary austerity after 2008, notably So, rest assured, Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi will be Italy, did not even give it a try. tarred and feathered for daring to suggest that in countries Meanwhile, they find that “the two with large, inefficient governments, a well-timed and well- countries that did better with aus- designed fiscal re- terity were Ireland and the United Anyone not hewing trenchment can some- Kingdom,” despite Ireland’s huge times be expansionary. banking problems. Specifically, exactly to the dogmatists’ In fact, a “cursory look Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi policy mix is immediately at the data” tells them show empirically that UK growth this has been the case increased from -1 percent in 2011 dismissed as a proponent in “Austria, Denmark, (two points below the EU average) of “austerity.” and Ireland in the to 3.5 percent in 2013 (four points 1980s,” as well as in above the EU average), even as the International Monetary “Spain, Canada, and Sweden in the 1990s.” Nonetheless, Fund and many Keynesians insisted that the United Alesina has been lambasted by the likes of Paul Krugman Kingdom was heading for a second recession. in the New York Times and political scientist Mark Blyth I suspect that many Amazon reviewers will read the in Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea for raising title of Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi’s book and conclude similar points in his earlier work. that it was written by some dark lords of neoliberalism who love austerity for its own sake. But this would be a BARK OF THE DOGMATISTS bit like saying that doctors who deal with pandemics must Macroeconomic issues are inherently complex, which love plagues. If readers could only make it to the second means that definitively proving anything in the field is in- paragraph, they would encounter this key point: “If gov- herently difficult. Having not conducted serious empirical ernments followed adequate fiscal policies most of the research on expansionary austerity myself, I don’t bring time, we would almost never need austerity.” strong preconceptions to the issue (and for the same reason, In other words, when governments do not follow basic nor should Krugman). Still, I stand by scholars’ right to ex- fiscal prescriptions, they can be forced into circumstances plore and express their ideas freely without being subjected in which there are few or no alternatives to belt-tightening. to personal attacks by other academics when they dare to “The bottom line,” the authors write, “is that austerity mea- disagree with narrow-minded Keynesian dogma. sures are sometimes required because of past policy mis- Keynesian stimulus was clearly called for during the takes, or a combination of past policy mistakes […] and 2008 financial crisis. But it is odd that the dogmatists have unexpected negative shocks. The latter are fortunately rela- given short shrift to complementary ideas such as write- tively rare, so austerity is almost always the result of poor downs for subprime debt—as economists Atif Mian and foresight and overspending relative to tax revenues.” Amir Sufi recommend in their superb book House of Debt—and the suspension of inflation targets. RIGOR AND RIGMAROLE Worse, anyone not hewing exactly to the dogma- Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi’s book makes a number tists’ policy mix is immediately dismissed as a propo- of important methodological contributions. It introduc- nent of “austerity.” For example, though it is difficult es a data set for two hundred multi-year austerity plans to fathom his logic, Robert Skidelsky has described the across sixteen advanced economies from the late 1970s notion that governments might to 2014. In each case, the authors extend the maturity of their rising refer to the original documents to debts (to reduce long-term refi- Knowledgeable readers might be determine policymakers’ intent. nancing risks) as an argument for wondering if Alesina, Favero, and Moreover, the book assesses the “austerity.” A noted biographer of success or failure of each plan from John Maynard Keynes, Skidelsky Giavazzi have read former IMF a multi-year perspective, instead tends on occasion to neglect some chief economist Olivier Blanchard’s of year by year, as has been cus- of Keynes’s most important writ- tomary in the literature until now. ing on this topic, as Reinhart has recent address at the American And, perhaps most important, the previously noted. Economic Association. authors are rigorous in addressing 30 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY SPRING 2019 THE MAGAZINE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 220 I Street, N.E., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20002 Phone: 202-861-0791 • Fax: 202-861-0790 Rogoff www.international-economy.com [email protected] questions of cause and effect, and Alesina has been lambasted by the Italy is a country of great controlling for monetary policy, wealth and potential. But with a deregulation, and other factors that likes of Paul Krugman in the New debt-to-GDP ratio of over 130 would affect ultimate outcomes. York Times and political scientist percent, it has experienced essen- In fact, back in 2011, three Mark Blyth for raising similar points tially zero growth in the twenty- International Monetary Fund first century and is in steep demo- economists published a study cri- in his earlier work. graphic decline. Worst of all, Italy tiquing Alesina’s earlier work, has extremely high levels of tax arguing that the secret sauce of expansionary austerity is evasion and corruption compared to Northern European really just a low interest rate policy. But, as anyone who countries, and it suffers from frequent bouts of near-total knows anything about monetary policymaking under- government dysfunction. stands, with the exception of a few safe-haven countries, it Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that Italy is much easier to keep interest rates low when fiscal policy also suffers periodic episodes of financial-market panic. If is under control. global real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates ever were to At this point, knowledgeable readers might be won- rise, Italy could be an early casualty, dragging the entire dering if Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi have read former eurozone back into crisis.
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