CHIEF CONCERNS

edited by Joshua A. Ederheimer Lorie A. Fridell Chief Concerns: Exploring the Challenges of Use of Force

edited by Joshua A. Ederheimer Lorie A. Fridell

April 2005 This report was funded by Motorola, Inc. The points of view expressed here do not necessarily represent the official position of Motorola, Police Executive Research Forum or its members.

© Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC 20036

Published April 2005.

Printed in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Number ISBN 1-878734-88-1

Cover and interior design by Dave Williams.

Image of police officer on front cover courtesy of Federal Emergency Management Agency, photographer: Bob Epstein. Background image of alley courtesy of istockphoto.com, photographer: Mika Makkonen.

Contents

1 3 Introduction ...... 1 Use-of-Force Tools ...... 57 by Andrea Morrozoff Luna by Joshua A. Ederheimer Definitions...... 4 K-9 Deployment as a Serious Use of Force: Agency Culture, Training and the Use of Force...... 5 Handler-Controlled Alert Methodology...... 60 by Kim C. Dine by Dennis Nowicki The Critical 15 Minutes – Perspectives of Less Lethal Weapons: Their Evolution and Chief William Lansdowne ...... 10 the Leadership of the Los Angeles County by Melissa Reuland Sheriff’s Department ...... 65 Miami PD: Striving to be One of the Nation’s Best ...... 12 by Charles “Sid” Heal by John Timoney Do Non-lethal Weapons Prevent Lethal Consequences? . . . 70 Developing an International Approach to by Lorie Fridell and Antony Pate Less-Lethal and Minimum Force Options ...... 15 Taser Research and Development in the by Joshua A. Ederheimer and Andrea Morrozoff Luna United Kingdom ...... 74 Defining Moments: Tackling Police Use of Force ...... 18 by Andrea Morrozoff Luna by Chuck Wexler 4 2 Handling the Aftermath of a Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Use-of-Force Incident ...... 83 by Beverly Anderson; Heather Davies; Policy Enforcement, and Training . . . .21 Joshua A. Ederheimer; and Stephan Loyka by Lorie A. Fridell Law Enforcement and Community Relations: A Community The Influence of U.S. Department of Justice Perspective from Reverend Reginald Holmes ...... 86 Consent Decrees on Policing in the United States ...... 24 by Stephan Loyka by Ron Davis Turning Controversy into an Opportunity for Change . . . . 90 Reducing Use of Force Through Hiring Decisions: by Andrea Morrozoff Luna Effective Prevention Measures...... 35 by Michael Butler Policing in Diverse Communities ...... 97 by Tory Caeti Reengineering Use-of-Force Systems ...... 42 by Stephan Loyka Communicating with the Public and Building Trust . . . . . 104 by David Bayless The De-escalation Discussion ...... 51 by Tory Caeti and Robert Taylor One Chief’s Perspective: A Look at Post-Shooting Decision Making...... 108 by William P. McManus Use-of-Force Investigations and Tactical Assessments . . . . 116 by Heather Davies Use-of-Force Investigative Findings ...... 122 by Matthew Klein Aftercare Terms & Definitions...... 127

Book Conclusion ...... 137

References ...... 139 About the Authors/Contributors ...... 149 About PERF...... 154 About Motorola ...... 155

Foreword

Some days you just get lucky. That day in dating back to when I first arrived at PERF some December 2003 was one of those days. Bill Lans- 12 years ago. Through my friendship first with downe, of police in San Diego, and I Rick Neal, Vice President and General Manager, were reflecting on the long and productive part- who later introduced me to Jim Sarallo, Senior nership PERF and the San Diego Police Depart- Vice President and General Manager, Motorola ment had enjoyed on advancing problem-orient- has stood out as a unique, responsible corporate ed policing. Together much had been partner and a true champion of the policing pro- accomplished over the years and it was now time fession. Our first collaboration—on the 21st to see if we could bring that same energy to a new Century Project—broke new ground in applying policing challenge. process mapping to policing. Jim was taken by I asked Chief Lansdowne what kept him up my observation that if we could identify promis- at night. He looked at me and said, “There isn’t a ing practices in use of force, not only would we police chief in this country that doesn’t worry save the lives of suspects and alike, we just about use of force.” Having led departments in might save the careers of a few police chiefs as Richmond, ; San Jose; and now San well. Jim’s boss, Greg Brown, president of Mo- Diego, Bill had experienced what every police torola’s Government and Enterprise Mobility So- chief faces—that phone call in the night inform- lutions business, enthusiastically championed ing him about a potentially “bad” shooting. Bill this project for us. wondered why each chief must face these chal- So it was early last year that we began this lenges alone. Could chiefs learn from one anoth- initiative to examine critical issues in policing, er about promising practices in this area? If beginning with the single most explosive issue PERF could bring chiefs together to share their facing police chiefs today. Under the leadership experiences and then identify successful strate- of PERF staff, Josh A. Ederheimer and Dr. Lorie gies for reducing use-of-force incidents it could A. Fridell, this massive project began. Before make a huge difference to both community joining PERF, Josh was a commanding officer in members and police officers from across the the Washington, D.C., police department, who, country. under Chief Charles Ramsey, was tasked with re- About this same time I was having discus- engineering the District’s use-of-force policies in sions with our good friends at Motorola, Inc., the wake of a Pulitzer-Prize winning investigative who were asking what they could do next to help piece on the problem by The Washington Post. the law enforcement community. PERF has had Dr. Fridell, PERF’s director of research, is an a long and successful relationship with Motorola, academic expert on use of force. Together they

Foreword — i

designed and implemented this pioneering ef- Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force you fort. We undertook a thorough review of the pre- will find many, many more. Our goal has been to vailing literature on use of force, interviewed ex- provide guidance to police executives across the perts from around the country and abroad, country on how to ensure that force is used only reviewed materials sent to us by agencies and as- when justified and to put in place the relation- sociations, and convened executive sessions ships and mechanisms for dealing openly and ap- where chiefs and other experts could share their propriately when unjustified incidents occur. We successful approaches. We synthesized all of the have focused on some of the most pressing use- information into this report. We understood the of-force topics: training, policy, policy enforce- urgency of the need for the publication. ment, investigations, tools and tactics, and officer One use-of-force incident has the potential support, among others. We are extremely grateful to dramatically alter the stability of a police de- to the many chiefs, other police professionals, ac- partment and its relationship with the communi- ademic experts, researchers, and community rep- ty overnight. An officer’s use of deadly force, in resentatives who shared their wisdom and expe- particular, can define a police executive’s career— rience with us. It is our hope that this book will or end it. help law enforcement professionals, policymak- Thankfully, in recent years a number of ers, and community leaders think through the is- strategies have emerged that have led to a decline sues, learn from the experiences and approaches in deadly use-of-force incidents. For example, of others, and advance the debate on police use of Chief Lansdowne points out in a commentary in- force. cluded in this book that the first 15 minutes fol- lowing a non-routine call can be critical. The San Diego Police Department has found that getting a supervisor on the scene within 15 minutes of Chuck Wexler such a call can reduce the chances that an inexpe- Executive Director rienced officer will use deadly force by 80 percent. PERF This is just one successful strategy em- ployed by one department. In Chief Concerns:

ii — Foreword

Acknowledgments

On behalf of PERF staff and members, we Bureau of Police; Deputy Chief Michael Berkow, thank the many people who have worked so hard Los Angeles Police Department; Chief William on this book. It has been a collaborative effort, and Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department; Alfred the collective experience and insight offered by all Broadbent, Direcor of Security, Amtrak; Captain those involved have made this book possible. As we John Brooks, Broward County Sheriff's Office; worked on this project over the past year, we be- Captain Steve Carter, Denver Police Department; came more convinced than ever that the law en- Superintendent Philip Cline, Chicago Police De- forcement profession is filled with brilliant, innova- partment; Commander David Commins, London tive people who are committed to serving the Metropolitan Police Department; Chief Richard public. We enjoyed working with police executives, Easley (retired), Kansas City (MO) Police Depart- subject matter experts, and other people committed ment; Lieutenant Eladio Estrada, City to improving police services from throughout the Police Department; Chief Julian Fantino (retired), United States and around the globe. It is our hope Toronto Police Service; Deputy Commissioner that this book will aid them and their partners in James Fyfe, Police Department; making informed decisions about police practices. AUSA John Gallagher, U.S. Attorney's Office, East- Thanks are due to our partners at Motorola, ern District of Pennsylvania; Superintendent Terry who shared PERF’s desire to bring valuable infor- Hillard (retired), Chicago Police Department; As- mation on how to address tough community prob- sistant Chief James Pugel, Seattle Police Depart- lems to the field. Motorola has been a steadfast ment; Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Depart- supporter of PERF for many years. We are grateful ment; Chief William Lansdowne, San Diego Police to Mr. Greg Brown, CEO and President of Govern- Department; Chief Edward Lohn, Cleveland Police ment & Enterprise Mobility Solutions; James A. Department; Assistant Chief Bill Maheu, San Diego Sarallo, Senior Vice President, Government & En- Police Department; Chief Robert McNeilly, Pitts- terprise Mobility Solutions; Richard P. Neal, Vice burgh Bureau of Police; Chief Constable Hugh President, and General Manager; Ken Denslow, Orde, Police Service of Northern Ireland; Chief Vice President and General Manager; and Mark Charles Ramsey, Metropolitan Police Department, Moon, Vice President and General Manager. D.C.; Major Cyril Ritter, Kansas City (MO) Police The police professionals from around the Department; Staff Inspector Wes Ryan, Toronto Po- United States, as well as Britain, Canada, Israel and lice Service; First Deputy Daniel Starks, Chicago Northern Ireland, who gathered at Motorola’s Police Department; Assistant Chief Philip Turner, headquarters in Schaumburg, Illinois, provided Louisville Metro Police Department; Chief Robert critical guidance and focus for this project. They White, Louisville Metro Police Department; and were Major General Shachar Ayalom, Israel Nation- Chief Gerald Whitman, Denver Police Department. al Police; Commander Linda Barrone,

Acknowledgments — iii

Researching and writing the content for this Ball State University; Lieutenant Nicholas Mu- book has been a mammoth task. We greatly appre- drezow (retired), Metropolitan Police Department, ciate the efforts of Dr. Beverly Anderson; Dr. D.C.; Director Carl Peed, U.S. Department of Jus- Heather Davies; Stephan A. Loyka; and Andrea tice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Ser- Morrozoff Luna for writing substantial portions of vices; Rod Reder, Hillsborough County (FL) Sher- this book. In addition, the articles by the following iff’s Office; Officer George Ryan, Los Angeles Police contributing writers have helped provide valuable Department; David Seletky, Fresno Police Depart- perspectives and are essential elements of this book: ment; Robert Stewart, Louisville Metro Police De- David Bayless, Chicago Police Department; Chief partment; Chief John Timoney, Miami Police De- Michael Butler, Longmont (CO) Police Depart- partment; and Captain Mark Warren, Baltimore ment; Dr. Tory Caeti, University of North Texas; County (MD) Police Department. Captain Ronald Davis, Police Department; The international forum in San Diego al- Chief Kim C. Dine, Frederick (MD) Police Depart- lowed PERF to highlight promising approaches ment; Commander Charles “Sid” Heal, Los Angeles from around the world. Many thanks to our con- County Sheriff’s Department; Inspector Matthew ference speakers: Assistant Chief Constable Ian Klein, Metropolitan Police Department, D.C; Chief Arundale, West Mercia Police, U.K.; Deputy Chief William P. McManus, Minneapolis Police Depart- Michael Berkow, Los Angeles Police Department; ment; Chief Dennis Nowicki (retired), Charlotte- Chief , Los Angeles Police Depart- Mecklenburg Police Department and Joliet (IL) Po- ment; Chief Michael Butler, Longmont (CO) Police lice Department; Tony Pate, Law Enforcement Department; President Chris Fox, Association of Consultant; Melissa Reuland, PERF, Dr. Robert Tay- Chief Police Officers, UK; Reverend Reginald G. lor, University of North Texas; and Chief John Tim- Holmes, Pastor, New Covenant Christian Church, oney, Miami Police Department. Denver; Major Steve Ijames, Springfield (MO) Po- Playing a critical role were many individuals lice Department; Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Po- who were interviewed or who reviewed various sec- lice Department; Chief Stanley Knee, Austin (TX) tions of the book. Their contributions and insights Police Department; Commander Cathy Lanier, are greatly appreciated. Thanks to Dr. Geoffrey Metropolitan Police Department, D.C.; Major Gen- Alpert, University of South Carolina; Officer Brent eral Mickey Levy, Former Commander, Jerusalem Ambrose, Burbank Police Department; Executive Police District, Israel; Superintendent Malcolm Mc- Director Merrick Bobb, Police Assessment Resource Farland, Police Service of Northern Ireland; Chief Center; Chief Geoffrey Chudwin, Olympia Fields Robert McNeilly, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police; Chief (IL) Police Department; Michael Finley, Director of Bernard Melekian, Pasadena (CA) Police Depart- Training at Armor Holdings; Executive Director ment; Chief Inspector Richard Prior, Metropolitan John Gnagey, National Tactical Officer’s Associa- Police Department, UK; Chief Thomas Streicher, tion; Joe Grant, Louisville Police Department; Lt. Cincinnati Police Department; Deputy Superinten- Colonel Edward Hughes (U.S. Army-retired), Penn dent Assan Thompson, Jamaica Constabulary State University Applied Research Laboratory; Dr. Force; Chief John Timoney, Miami Police Depart- David Klinger, University of Missouri at St. Louis; ment; Chief Gerry Whitman, Denver Police De- Dr. John Leathers, Penn State University; Vice Pres- partment; David Wilkinson, U.K. Home Office, Po- ident Joe Mason, IES Interactive Training; Superin- lice Scientific Development Branch; Executive tendent Neville Matthews, New Zealand Police Ser- Director David Wood, Police Ombudsman, North- vice; Colonel Andrew Mazzara (USMC-retired), ern Ireland. Penn State University Applied Research Laboratory; Of course, this book could not have been pro- Senior Executive Director Kevin Morison, Metro- duced without the incredible efforts of our talented politan Police Department, D.C.; Gregg Morrison, and dedicated PERF staff and support personnel.

iv — Acknowledgments

Executive Director Chuck Wexler guided this proj- Alliances. And thanks to Jennifer Brooks, Andrea ect from start to finish providing insights and re- Harris, Ken Hartwick, Ismaila Kane, and Raquel sources, reading all sections, and conveying rein- Rodriguez for excellent administrative support. forcement and moral support as needed. Thanks Special thanks to super PERF editor Martha Plotkin for editing and organizational help to Nathan Bal- and expert outside editor Barbara deBoinville. lard, Corina Solé Brito, Jason Cheney, David Edel- Finally, thanks to Dave Williams for his excel- son, Alex Hayes, Gail Love, and Deidre Mead. We lent work on developing the cover and layout of the had several successful meetings and conferences book. thanks to the hard work of Anna Berke and Rebec- ca Neuberger, along with David Weisz from Mo- torola’s Law Enforcement and Homeland Security Joshua A. Ederheimer and Lorie . Fridell

Acknowledgments — v

1

Introduction

by ANDREA MORROZOFF LUNA

“It is almost certain that the police today use force much less than they did a generation ago. What has changed is that we are much more aware of how much police use force, and are much less tolerant of needless force. That is a good thing.”

JAMES FYFE. 1 WASHINGTON POST, 2001

Policing affords officers the right to use rea- and media. Incidents where force is used—espe- sonable force—even deadly force—when neces- cially those involving abuse of force—often be- sary to maintain the peace and public order. come defining moments for a law enforcement Today the use of force is an issue that receives a agency and its chief executive; they require excep- great deal of attention within the policing profes- tional leadership in extraordinarily stressful sion. Its importance is reflected in training mate- circumstances. rials, the development of tactics, the provision of Officers on the street have very difficult jobs tools, and within communications to the public that require them to make split-second decisions

1. James Fyfe is a use-of-force scholar and is serving as Director of Training at the New York Police Department.

Chapter 1. Introduction — 1

with potentially far-reaching consequences under were the presentations and discussions from two great stress. The overwhelming majority of the PERF conferences: “Developing an International officers on the street want to keep the communi- Approach to Less Lethal and Minimum Force ty safe and make the right use-of-force, particu- Options” held in August 2004 in Washington, larly deadly force, decisions. A key role of law en- D.C. and “Critical Issues in Policing” held in San forcement leadership is to give these officers the Diego in December 2004. Many experienced law tools to make these difficult decisions. enforcement executives and community leaders This book explains successful approaches in the country attended both conferences, which that can be used by law enforcement agencies to were designed to produce material to inform this control the use of force by officers and promote book. constructive responses to controversial, unneces- In this chapter we provide a historical con- sary, or unjustified uses of force. The chapters text for agency efforts to deal with issues of force, identify critical issues related to the use of force review the research regarding the use and misuse that are currently facing the profession. The book of force, describe the key challenge for the law en- also offers police practitioners a useful historical forcement executive, and preview the remaining perspective on use-of-force problems that have chapters. arisen in the past and how they have been re- solved. It is hoped that lessons learned from these experiences can improve how force is used HISTORICAL B ACKGROUND in the future. The goal is to provide police execu- Prior to the 1950s, the police profession in the tives with information that will help them make United States paid little attention to force issues; informed decisions on force issues. agencies offered little guidance to officers The book addresses policy, policy enforce- through policy or training and kept few, if any, ment, training, weapons, tactics, investigations, records on instances when officers used force officer aftercare, and communications with the (Terrill and Mastrofski 2002). This changed in community and media following a force event. the 1950s and 1960s, a time of many reforms for For each topic area, the book highlights current the law enforcement profession. Use of force by issues and conveys information about some of the police became an issue of great public concern successful, or apparently successful, approaches during the movement to increase civil rights for being used by agencies nationwide and abroad. African Americans. Many of the urban riots dur- For most of the critical issues addressed in this ing that era were precipitated by perceptions that book, there is not a single, clear “correct strategy.” police had used excessive force against minori- In other words, we do not prescribe one “right an- ties. The public demanded increased scrutiny of swer” but present various strategies that execu- the use of force by police, and the law enforce- tives can consider in their quest to control the use ment profession responded. Policies regarding of force by personnel in their agencies. force became more prevalent and detailed; train- The information for this book came from a ing on when and how to use force became more number of sources. Authors reviewed the schol- frequent and comprehensive; tactics became arly and practitioner literature, collected and re- more effective; and agencies adopted measures viewed agency policies from across the nation to promote policy enforcement and improve and abroad, and interviewed scholars and practi- accountability. tioners. Other important sources of information

2 — Chapter 1. Introduction

Efforts to ensure appropriate and justified 1989, McLaughlin (1992) reported that force was use of force and to enhance agency accountabili- used in 0.65 of every 1,000 incidents in which ty have continued since that era of great turbu- written police reports were required. And ac- lence in the United States. As a result, advances cording to data from the 1999 national survey of have been made in policy making, training, ac- the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1 percent of the countability, tools, tactics, officer support, and people reporting face-to-face contacts with the communications with the community. This book police experienced either force or the threat of is meant to facilitate these important ongoing ef- force (Langan et al. 2001). Most reported the forts by law enforcement leaders. force was either only threatened or of a low level. Determining the extent to which police use force is a difficult undertaking. As challenging as RESEARCH ON THE USE AND it is for researchers to measure the general use of MISUSE OF FORCE force by police, the challenges are even greater Using various methods (observation, surveys, when researchers (or even agencies) attempt to and review of departmental records, for exam- measure the misuse of force. The findings de- ple), researchers have attempted to determine the scribed in this paragraph must be considered extent to which police use and misuse force with an important caveat in mind: none of the (Fridell and Pate 1997). While each of these methods used can produce anything close to a methods has drawbacks as a research tool, the definitive measure of excessive force. Moreover, findings are consistent in one respect. The re- many of the best studies of the use and misuse of search shows that only a small percentage of po- force were conducted years ago. We begin by cit- lice-public interactions involve the use of force, ing a retrospective analysis of observational data and the most frequent type of force used is the that were originally collected for the classic Police low-level force needed to take suspects safely into Services Study in 1977. Worden (1996) reports custody (Garner and Maxwell 1999; Garner, that police used force in just over 1 percent of the Maxwell, and Heraux 2002; Langan, Greenfeld, nearly 5,700 police-citizen encounters observed; Smith, Durose, and Levin 2001). in one-third of those encounters, the observer Black and Reiss (1967), in a classic early adjudged the force to be excessive or unnecessary. study based on the observation method, collect- Using the survey method, Bayley and Mendel- ed information on more than 3,800 police-citizen sohn asked officers whether they had witnessed encounters in three cities during the summer of an “incident that someone might consider to 1966. Using these data from the original 1967 constitute police brutality” (1969, 128). Over half study conducted by Black and Reiss, Friedrich of the officers responded in the affirmative. (1980, 86) determined that force had been used Twenty-seven percent of the officers maintained in 5 percent of the 1,565 incidents “in which po- that they had witnessed incidents which, in their lice came into contact with citizens they regarded opinion, involved “harassment or the excessive as at least potential offenders.” Bayley and Garo- use of force” (129). falo (1987, 1989) used the observation method Researchers have examined the use of force and reported that out of 467 potentially violent (and, when possible, the use of excessive force) in encounters between police and citizens, police the context of situational variables, organization- used force in 37 (8 percent). Relying on use-of- al variables, and environmental variables (see, force forms completed by Savannah officers in for example, Fyfe 1980). Situational variables

Chapter 1. Introduction — 3

include the behavior of suspects, their level of Optimizing force means that the agency is “utiliz- resistance, and their use of alcohol or drugs; the ing it as necessary to maintain order but not to type of incident to which the officer was re- the extent that is excessive and abusive” (Fridell sponding; the presence of other officers on the and Pate 1997, 217). The use of excessive force can scene; and the weapons available and used. Ex- lead to numerous negative consequences: unnec- amples of organizational variables include de- essary injury of the suspect and sometimes death, partment policies, training, and culture. ( 1.2 community complaints, distrust of police, civil contains a commentary by Chief Kim C. Dine and criminal lawsuits, civil unrest, and federal that addresses the importance of culture and injunctive orders, to name a few. Agencies also training.) In examining environmental factors, want to reduce unnecessary force, which, accord- researchers have considered the characteristics of ing to Fyfe, is force that “could have been avoid- the jurisdiction such as its crime rate, the pres- ed by measures such as better training, officer se- ence of crime-prone populations, and the avail- lection and other use of force options” (1987, 6). ability of guns. Although the use of excessive and unnecessary force has negative consequences, so does use of insufficient force. Insufficient use of force in- THE CHALLENGE FOR THE LAW creases the likelihood of an officer’s injury and ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE death, decreases the officer’s ability to enforce the The challenge for law enforcement executives is law, and heightens risks to public safety. to “optimize” the use of force in their agencies.

box 1.1 Definitions

Force. Any non-negotiable use of police authority Justifiable force. Force used in accordance with to influence citizen behavior. Includes low-level law; force that was reasonable in light of the force options (verbal commands, use of re- circumstances faced and known by the officer at straints) through high-level force options (deadly the time it was used. Used interchangeably with force). The mere presence of an officer, because “legal” use of force. of the implied authority of the uniform, is includ- Less lethal force. Also referred to as less-than- ed in this broad definition. lethal force or non-deadly force. Tools or tactics Deadly force. Force that is likely to cause serious that have less potential than deadly force to cause bodily injury or death. serious bodily injury or death. Excessive force. The illegal or unreasonable use Reportable force. The level of force for which of force, with reasonableness determined by the officer must complete a formal department whether a reasonably prudent officer would have report. used the same amount of force in the same situ- Unnecessary force. Force that might be justifi- ation, in light of the information available to the able but could have been avoided. officer at the time.

4 — Chapter 1. Introduction

COMMENTARY: box 1.2 Agency Culture, Training, and the Use of Force by Kim C. Dine, Chief of Police interactions with officers, and it wants officers to Frederick (MD) Police Department employ what they perceive as a community-ori- ented style, even as departments must increase At a recent Police Executive Research Forum officers’ firepower to survive. Communities want (PERF) meeting, law enforcement professionals officers out of their cars, on foot and on bicycles, readily agreed that two of the major issues de- yet for safety, bullet-resistant vests of increasing partments face today center around corruption effectiveness must be worn. Routine equipment and use of force. In fact, these are not new is- often includes some form of personal protective sues. They have been critical since the advent of gear and larger weaponry. Police are being modern policing and go right to the heart of a po- trained and equipped in a more militaristic fash- lice agency. ion, yet how police treat people—specifically, how As the police service has become more pro- and in what circumstances they use force— fessional over the past few decades, officers have defines the professionalism, trust, integrity, and undergone more extensive physical and psycho- reputation of a department. logical testing and more comprehensive training. I assert that community policing and arrest- Police officers have been held to higher perform- ing suspects (even if some use of force is called ance, behavioral, and ethical standards. More- for) are not mutually exclusive. The Frederick Po- over, officers are expected to be able to operate in lice Department’s vision and practice reflect that, more technical environments, whether it involves with the right culture, they often go hand in hand. using computers or semi-automatic weapons. Of- Success requires communication between com- ficers must be prepared to respond, not only to mitted officers and the people in the neighbor- what would be considered routine crime scenes, hoods they serve, supported by other sophisticat- but also to nuclear, biological, and chemical ed, dedicated, and hard-working police events and major catastrophes. Every day police personnel. It takes a compelling vision, an actual departments must rise to new challenges without community policing strategy, proper systems of compromising their integrity. As they do, citizens reporting, investigation and review, and trust be- still rightly expect a communicative and accessi- tween officers and community members to en- ble police agency with regular contact with offi- able police agencies to effectively address and cers, and routine and effective crime control manage use-of-force issues. strategies that reflect respect and restraint. Upon assuming leadership of a city police The challenge is how to address use-of-force agency, as I did in 2002, an executive must assess issues as police gangs, illegal drugs, many pressing issues such as the level of com- other crimes, and now terrorism. The authority to munity confidence and trust, homicides and use force and the context in which we use it in the other closure rates, training, equipment, missing line of duty are controversial aspects of police persons, WMD preparedness, and technical mat- work. Our society desperately wants positive ters. The use of force also is a critical issue that

Chapter 1. Introduction — 5

box 1.2 continued requires early analysis on a number of levels. Pre- Training is critical to reducing police use of liminary analysis and review must determine force, and not only from a tactical standpoint. We whether a proper reporting system exists and collaborated with a local community college to whether related directives are followed. In addi- create an enhanced course on multicultural tion, proper training and supervision are essen- awareness. Frederick Police Department (FPD) tial. Likewise, the culture of the agency as it re- personnel also took part in a unique training lates to use of force, incident reporting, course at the National Holocaust Museum in investigation, and review must be assessed. Cul- Washington, D.C., which focused on abuse of ture, vision, and practice must be consistent. In governmental power.2 The FPD also teamed with the age of COMSTAT, or what many have de- mental health professionals from several agen- scribed as geographic, statistic-driven policing, cies to create a new best-practices agencywide how do police executives encourage the assertive, course on how police can better serve people with even aggressive policing techniques required to mental illnesses. Our task force of police and effectively combat crimes and terrorism, while mental health professionals meets regularly to as- concurrently ensuring that officers provide en- sess current efforts and find creative ways to dif- lightened and useful services? The answer lies fuse difficult situations that arise between the po- largely in a culture that embraces community lice and individuals having mental health policing. problems. Examples include the training course In Frederick, Maryland, in 2002, the mayor for police, through which all of our officers have and the chief operations officer for citizens’ serv- matriculated, as well as the teaming of mental ices, working with city officials and the police de- health professionals and police officers in certain partment, divided the city into twelve Neighbor- circumstances to assist each other with crisis in- hood Advisory Council areas (NACs). Our intent terventions and reduce the potential for use of was to help community members, the police, and force. FPD expanded senior-level watch com- other city agencies identify and address neighbor- mand duties to provide additional management, hood concerns. This community policing strate- supervision, and leadership. We also provided gy—really, community government—created the additional personnel, new office space, and a foundation for many of our unified efforts. Meet- totally new tracking system to our Professional ing monthly with stakeholders in these neighbor- Standards Division to strengthen internal investi- hoods, we defined their concerns, prioritized gations. Enhanced training, a new community them, and partnered with others to address them. policing strategy, and increased supervision to- gether create a unique culture where assertive,

2. This program was originally created jointly by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the Anti- Defamation League, and the Metropolitan Police Department (Washington, D.C.).

6 — Chapter 1. Introduction

effective policing also reflects citizen input and Use of force remains one of the most critical expectations. Police-community relationships challenges in policing today. Increased demands then improve as does the effectiveness of law on police departments across the country, com- enforcement. bined with greater expectations of police, necessi- Our citizens’ police academy, a ten-week tate sustained vigilance and continual improve- course, is designed to teach community mem- ments. A culture of assertive policing, supported bers about policing, our agency, and the chal- by the community through its input as well as re- lenges of police work. Participants get hands-on sources by all stakeholders, can result in truly en- instruction and engage in practical exercises. The lightened and effective police service. Tireless program has existed for many years, but a new leadership by an entire command staff and con- initiative created an alumni association of gradu- tinued communication between the police and ates; they now attend police functions, such as the community are essential ingredients for man- promotions and graduations. We encourage aging this important issue. Through an aggres- academy graduates, with their increased under- sive and well-coordinated community policing ap- standing of police work, to get involved in their proach that includes ongoing dialogue with the Neighborhood Advisory Councils. As a result, community, extensive training opportunities, community members have gained a better appre- local government-police coordination, crime and ciation for the complexity and importance of use- calls for service analysis, and an emphasis on pre- of-force issues. vention as well as arrests, use of force can be minimized and better understood.

Chapter 1. Introduction — 7

A police executive’s goal is not to eliminate within the profession. These issues and success- use of force but to optimize force through sound ful approaches for dealing with them are present- policies and training, and the use of effective ed in Chapter 2. One ongoing discussion per- equipment and tactics. (See Boxes 1.3 and 1.4 tains to whether deadly force policy should that report how Chief William Lansdowne and include a requirement that its use be “only as a Chief John F. Timoney, respectively, have at- last resort.” Additionally, executives around the tempted to best employ force in their agencies.) country are evaluating various policy options No amount of effort to optimize force, however, with regard to the following: shots fired at mov- can guarantee that the agency will not have an ing vehicles, drawing and pointing firearms, event that is challenged by members of the pub- warning shots, flashlights as impact weapons, lic as excessive or unnecessary. The executive and the need to avoid unnecessary use of force. must be prepared to handle those events effec- Generating the most debate right now are Taser™ tively and in a manner that conveys accountabil- policies, particularly the appropriate location of ity to the public and media. tasers on the linear force continuum. A law enforcement agency’s policies have lit- tle effect unless mechanisms are in place to pro- CONTENTS OF BOOK mote their adherence by officers and to punish Every executive’s quest to optimize force involves violations. This chapter covers issues pertaining certain key components—improving policy, pol- to some of these mechanisms—for instance, use- icy enforcement, and training; choosing the best of-force reporting, complaint review, supervision tools and tactics; establishing effective communi- of officers and peer intervention, early warning ty and media relations; and resolving critical is- systems, and departmental rewards. The incredi- sues and providing officer care after force has ble advances that have occurred in force training been used—and these components are the sub- are explained as are key training issues. The cur- ject of the remaining chapters. Each chapter in- rent debate over the traditional linear force con- cludes at least one commentary written by an ac- tinuum is presented, and emerging alternative ademic or practitioner expert on a related topic. models are described. The chapter also discusses Each chapter is also accompanied by at least one state-of-the-art methods for decision-making article describing a discussion session or presen- training and for integrating training topics. tation on promising approaches that occurred as In commentaries, Ron Davis of the Oak- part of the Critical Issues in Policing Conference land Police Department argues that consent de- held in San Diego. crees have positively influenced policing, Long- mont (CO) Police Chief Michael Butler describes effective screening of police applicants, and Tory Chapter 2: Improving Use-of-Force Policy, J. Caeti and Robert W. Taylor highlight the im- Policy Enforcement, and Training portance of de-escalation training and tactics. A The general parameters on the use of deadly force panel at the San Diego conference discussed how and less lethal force are fairly consistent across and why police executives have changed their agencies—delimited as they are by U.S. Supreme use-of-force policies; a summary of this panel Court decisions. There are, however, a number of discussion is presented as well. policy issues generating discussion and debate

8 — Chapter 1. Introduction

Chapter 3: Use-of-Force Tools Chapter 3 includes commentaries by Den- Effective policy, policy enforcement mechanisms, nis Nowicki, the former Charlotte-Mecklenburg and training are necessary but not sufficient to (NC) police chief, on the use of canines; by Com- optimize and control the use of force in an mander Sid Heal on the evolution of less-lethal agency. Police executives must acquire appropri- weapons in the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Depart- ate weaponry and develop tactics that safeguard ment; and by Lorie A. Fridell and Antony M. Pate their officers and protect the community. (See in on the importance of less-lethal weapons for re- Box 1.5 a description of the PERF International ducing deadly force. The chapter also includes a Summit on less lethal and minimum force op- summary of a panel at the San Diego conference tions.) The selection of appropriate and ade- at which law enforcement representatives from quate tools must be combined with clear and the United Kingdom discussed Taser research consistent policy directives, effective training, and deployment. and supervisory review and feedback. In this way agencies can judiciously control use-of-force in- Chapter 4: Handling the Aftermath of a cidents. When law enforcement officers find that Use-of-Force Incident verbal commands and hand-control techniques are no longer effective, they need to have an array Police use of force and what may appear to be or of available alternative tools to assist them in en- actually is excessive force have attracted increas- forcing the law. There have been great advances ing public attention in recent years as a result of in less-lethal weaponry that have the potential to a number of high-profile incidents. Situations in- reduce injuries and deaths to both citizens and volving the use of force against people with men- police. Executives must decide which of these tal illnesses, unarmed suspects, fleeing suspects, less-lethal tools to acquire, to whom they should restrained suspects, and others have sparked local be issued, and the appropriate circumstances for outcry and national controversy. In many juris- their use. Chapter 3 discusses these issues as they dictions, tensions between the police and mem- pertain to conducted energy devices like the taser bers of minority communities provide the back- and StingerTM, less-lethal projectiles, and more drop for the community reaction to use-of-force traditional less-lethal tools such as Oleoresin incidents and the policy debate regarding force. Capsicum (O.C.) spray and batons. Chapters 2 and 3 of this book guide execu- When these less-lethal tools are not appro- tives in efforts to optimize force within their priate in a given situation or are not effective, agency. Chapter 4 focuses on the responsibilities lethal force may be necessary. Law enforcement of the executive following a serious and/or con- executives face many issues regarding the tools troversial use-of-force incident. (Box 1.6 con- they provide for their officers including bullet tains the reprint of an article written by Chuck size, the proliferation of assault rifles and Wexler on dealing with the aftermath of a shoot- automatic weapons in patrol vehicles in response ing.) Sections address effective community and to high-profile events, and training and supervi- media relations, investigations of serious use-of- sory practices. This chapter provides law en- force incidents, and aftercare services for officers. forcement executives with options and practical To increase the likelihood of a constructive com- advice that will help them to make better policy munity response to a serious and/or controver- and reduce unnecessary force. sial use-of-force incident, the executive must, over time, build up the trust and confidence of

Chapter 1. Introduction — 9

ARTICLE: box 1.3 The Critical 15 Minutes – Perspectives of Chief William Lansdowne3 by Melissa Reuland officers, usually the youngest people in any police department. Consequently, police executives need Throughout the nation in recent years extraordi- to focus on beat officers when providing training, nary changes in strategies have reduced the use equipment, and supervision. of force. In Portland, Oregon, Chief Derrick Fox- We know that if a supervisor gets to the worth created a community group to develop rec- scene, the chances of an officer-involved shooting ommendations for the department to help reduce are reduced 80 to 90 percent. If the less-lethal shootings. The group has put forth 89 depart- equipment is in the hands of the beat officer in ment initiatives, and the chief has already begun the 15-minute window—not in his or her trunk— to enact changes. In Cincinnati, Chief Thomas the chances of an officer-involved shooting de- Streicher had the courage and ability to make cline by 80 percent. If we get less-lethal equip- changes after an officer shot and killed an un- ment to the scene, in addition to a supervisor armed African-American youth and terrible riots who then manages the response as a team, the erupted. In Chicago in 1999, there were 71 officer- chances of having officer injuries reduces by 80 involved shootings. Chief Terry Hillard found so- percent and citizen injuries reduce by 65 percent. lutions and reduced these numbers. Chief Bill There is a misnomer in America today that Bratton, credited with demonstrating that law en- less lethal means not lethal. Instead, less- lethal forcement can control crime (if police stay fo- equipment provides a force option that reduces cused and listen to the community and their de- the possibility of death. This equipment is not a partment), is building a system that promotes panacea for problems in law enforcement. As po- accountability in Los Angeles. lice executives begin to look at solutions, they In San Diego, we have used what we know need to learn more about the problems faced in about use of force to develop effective strategies to other jurisdictions and about systems other com- reduce officer-involved shootings. A critical period munities have built that work. of 15 minutes passes from the time a call comes In San Diego the response to a recent 911 call into the department to the time shots are fired. about a woman with a knife to her throat demon- To reduce use of deadly force, agencies should strates the procedures we are using to reduce of- ensure that supervisors arrive at non-routine calls ficer-involved shootings. In the past, the protocol within 15 minutes. In San Diego, 80 percent of the was to dispatch two officers and let them deter- officers involved in shootings are not in specialized mine what additional response was needed. In units (such as burglary or ). They are beat this instance, the call prompted the radio com-

3. This sidebar is based on San Diego Police Chief William Lansdowne’s opening remarks at the PERF Critical Issues in Policing Conference.

10 — Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 1. Introduction 10

munications staff—a critical part of our revised disturbance. Response by a sergeant is critical approach—to keep the reporting party on the to the effectiveness of San Diego’s procedure telephone to get information about the weapon because sergeants are trained to work as a team, and the perpetrator’s state of mind. The dispatch- to slow things down, and accept the responsibili- ers immediately requested that a sergeant and ty of doing this work safely. the K9 unit (the less-lethal technology) respond. The response procedure in place in San Diego The dispatcher also requested special equipment does not solve all of our problems, but we have (a bean bag or Taser). Two other officers respond- seen some real success in how we manage these ed as backup. The sergeant formulated a plan, dangerous situations. That is what this confer- set up a perimeter, and made a phone call into the ence is about—a chance to share what is working residence. One of his officers was able to talk the in law enforcement agencies to reduce injuries woman into surrendering. This incident was re- and use of lethal force. Just as no single tool or solved without injury to the suspect, victim, or of- set of procedures can fully meet this goal, no one ficers. The key to success is to manage high risk person at the conference could tell others exactly events as a team. how to achieve these aims. However, the contri- Because 65 percent of all people involved in butions of many people, based on actual experi- officer-involved shootings are suffering from a ences and an honest post hoc examination of mental illness, San Diego’s protocol dispatches them, can certainly advance the profession and the specially trained Crisis Response Team (CRT). reduce unnecessary use of force. Modeled after the Memphis, Tennessee, Crisis In- Police nationwide are constantly reminded of tervention Team, the CRT responds to all calls in- the challenges in upholding our sworn oath as volving people with mental illness. In fact, this re- law enforcement officers to protect those we sponse protocol is activated for all “high risk” serve and to do everything we can to preserve calls. San Diego determines a high-risk call to be the sanctity of life. As law enforcement managers, one that involves a person with a weapon, some- we are responsible for helping officers who work one who is mentally unstable, or someone who is in difficult environments to build safety and secu- in a highly emotional or impaired state. Our ex- rity in the community. This is not an easy task. periences have shown that these calls tend to be However, we can affect safety and security by the ones most likely to result in use of force. The bringing the right people together to look at person’s “high emotional state” can be caused by this issue from a practical rather than theoretical a mental disability, drug or alcohol use, or family perspective.

11 Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 1. Introduction — 11

COMMENTARY: box 1.4 Miami PD: Striving to be “One of the Nation’s Best”

by John F. Timoney, Chief of Police, The primary mission of the department is to Miami Police Department make Miami a safer place to live, work, and visit. Under the leadership of a new team, the de- In January 2003, John F. Timoney was sworn in as partment has been reorganized and retooled to chief of the Miami Police Department. He arrived prevent and fight crime more effectively and to as cases were progressing against officers accused of improve the quality of life for all citizens. We have serious corruption and police use-of-force violations, challenged our officers to work harder and and was tasked with restoring police accountability smarter. These dedicated men and women have and the public trust. Over the next two years, Chief responded to the challenge, and their hard work Timoney’s efforts led to significant reforms. This has resulted in a safer Miami. commentary by Chief Timoney, originally printed in Last year, arrests increased by 29 percent the Miami Herald on January 9, 2005, sums up the while overall crime was reduced by an additional impact that positive leadership can have on an 8 percent from the previous year with decreases agency. in violent crime leading the way. More-focused In 2002, Mayor Manny Diaz wrote to the U.S. police strategies aimed at narcotics distribution Department of Justice requesting a formal review and the violence associated with the drug trade of the policies and practices of the Miami Police have resulted in a 10 percent drop in homicides. Department. At the time, federal indictments of Miamians are indeed safer than they were two 13 Miami officers were progressing toward trial, years ago, but crime-fighting is only one focus of and there was strong community demand for po- our goal to enhance public safety. For too long, lice accountability. Mayor Diaz recognized that Miami has been among the most dangerous traf- “Miami police officers unselfishly put their lives fic cities in the country. In 2002, Miami had 75 ve- on the line every day to protect and serve” but hicular homicides that, in a reverse of the pattern said that he wanted to ensure that they performed found in other cities, actually outnumbered crim- their duties in a constitutional manner that re- inal homicides. To address this problem, we in- spected the rights of those they served. creased the number of officers in our Motor Unit Several months afterward, the mayor swore and directed them to devote more attention to me in as chief of police. Two years have passed, dangerous driving behavior. As a result, traffic and I am proud to report that the Miami Police summonses have increased by 33 percent in the Department has regained its reputation as one of last two years. Arrests for driving under the influ- the nation’s best. Crime in the city has been ence of alcohol have increased nearly five-fold in falling while the professionalism of our officers the same period. These efforts have saved lives. and the community’s satisfaction in the job that In 2004, the number of vehicular homicides fell they are doing has been rising. to 49, down by one-third in two years.

Reprinted with permission of the author and the Miami Herald.

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Public safety cannot be achieved without the policy and our new approach to firearms training support and confidence of the community served have been commended by the NAACP and oth- by the police. As this city knows too well, a per- ers, including the Department of Justice. ception of brutality can thoroughly destroy the The culture of restraint has also been imbued bond between police and citizens. Therefore, the in our Canine Unit, where the number of dog Miami Police Department has focused special at- bites had been a concern for the Justice Depart- tention on the way officers use force in the course ment. As a result, the annual number of canine of their duties. The success that we have enjoyed bites has been reduced by two-thirds in the last in this regard has been outstanding: the dramatic two years. reduction in the number of shooting incidents in- The dramatic reduction in the number of volving our officers has set a national standard. shooting incidents and dog bites, combined with After 20 months without a single shot being a new emphasis on accountability, has created a fired by any of our police officers, our officers new community confidence in the police depart- have used their firearms only twice in the last four ment and its leadership. This confidence has pre- months. In the first incident, a felon who had vented any repeat of the tensions, even civil distur- committed armed robbery of three people turned bance, which inevitably followed previous police his weapon on responding officers; they took the shootings. There are additional dividends that action necessary to save their own lives and those have accompanied the reduction of police shoot- of other innocent citizens. The assailant died with ings and dog bites. For example, Miami taxpayers his gun in his hand. Then, just two weeks ago, have saved millions of dollars that used to be paid one of our officers was shot during a narcotics ar- out as the result of litigation following police rest. His partner returned fire, wounding the as- shootings and dog bites. In the recent past, the sailant. Thankfully, the injured officer is already on city authorized a $10 million settlement for a sin- his way to a full recovery. The actions of these of- gle police shooting. The cost savings are obvious. ficers were absolutely necessary. They had no In his 2002 letter to the Department of Jus- choice but to use deadly force to save their own tice, Mayor Diaz made it clear that he believed lives and those of others. that the men and women of the Miami Police De- Just as we salute these officers for taking partment were selflessly committed to making heroic action in the line of fire, we also salute the Miami safer. He also expressed his determination many other officers who did not resort to their that they would restore the community’s confi- guns when such action would have been justified dence in their professionalism and integrity as under the law and under the policy of our depart- well as their effectiveness as crime-fighters. ment. These officers have clearly embraced the As we enter 2005, I am proud to say that I be- essential distinction between when an officer lieve that we have achieved these objectives and “may” shoot and when an officer “must” shoot. that we will continue to build on them in the com- This distinction has been a primary focus of ing year. our shooting policy since I took over. Our new

Chapter 1. Introduction — 13

the community in the police department. His- cluding the subject of the force and the involved torically, incidents of force against minority citi- police officer. Rights vary depending on the kind zens have produced the most potent community of investigation that is underway. Two models response and earning the trust of these commu- presented in this chapter provide options for nities is of considerable importance. Chapter 4 agency executives to consider when they create an highlights methods for establishing a productive internal structure to produce investigations that dialogue with community members prior to a are effective, objective, and just. Information is force incident—channels that can readily be used presented on mechanisms used around the coun- once an incident has occurred. try to audit or monitor use-of-force investiga- In the wake of a controversial incident, one tions conducted by a department. Accompany- of the most effective means a law enforcement ing the chapter are a summary of a panel agency has for communicating with the public is discussion at the San Diego conference about the media. Police executives can influence how an use-of-force tactics and investigations and Met- incident is presented to the public by the media ropolitan (D.C.) Police Department Inspector outlets. The likelihood of fair and impartial cov- Matthew Klein’s discussion of investigative erage following a controversial incident is in- conclusions. creased if the agency has a strong working rela- Chapter 4 also discusses the importance of tionship with news outlets. Chapter 4 presents officer aftercare and the benefits of such pro- ways that police can build relationships with the grams. Officer aftercare, usually in the form of media in times of calm and describes promising critical incident debriefing after a serious use-of- practices in the wake of a serious and/or contro- force incident, is often essential for an officer’s versial use-of-force incident. The chapter in- mental health and future job performance. Ef- cludes reviews of three panel discussions at the fective aftercare may also reduce department lia- San Diego conference on community relations, bility, employee compensation claims, and offi- how chiefs have turned controversial incidents cers’ early retirement. In fact, such care is an into opportunities for constructive change, and important investment of department resources. policing multicultural communities. David J. As police executives recognize the benefits of Bayless, director of news affairs for the Chicago these support programs, more departments are Police Department, and Chief William McManus implementing promising approaches to reduce of the Minneapolis Police Department, describe the stigma commonly associated with these serv- how their departments handled the aftermath of ices. (Examples include mandatory debriefing a controversial incident. sessions after a critical incident, integration of The failure to quickly and comprehensively police psychologists into the daily police routine investigate a significant police use-of-force inci- to increase interaction and mutual understand- dent can do great damage to a police depart- ing between police and mental health profession- ment’s credibility with the community. Models als, and peer-involved or peer-led counseling ses- of use-of-force investigations vary. There are sions.) The chapter explains promising elements criminal, civil, and policy investigations of inci- of the programs and services offered by the dents. The challenge facing the executive and Washington (DC) Metropolitan Police Depart- his/her designees is to ensure use-of-force inves- ment, Los Angeles Police Department, Los Ange- tigations that are consistent, objective, and thor- les Sheriff’s Department, Pittsburgh Police De- ough. The primary goal is to protect the rights of partment, and Phoenix Police Department. all people involved in these investigations—in-

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ARTICLE: box 1.5 Developing an International Approach to Less-Lethal and Minimum Force Options by Joshua A. Ederheimer and to several consensus agreements and contributed Andrea Morrozoff Luna to the December 2004 formal signing of a Memo- randum of Understanding between PERF and As part of the Critical Issues in Policing Series, the ACPO. Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the In- ternational Law Enforcement Forum (ILEF), and The ILEF the Association of Chief Police Officers of Eng- The International Law Enforcement Forum is com- land, Wales, and Northern Ireland (ACPO)—with posed of police, medical, technology, and academ- funding and support from Motorola, Inc.—held ic experts from various countries primarily from an international policing summit on August 16, North America and the United Kingdom. Partici- 2004, in Washington, D.C.4 The summit, attend- pants are interested in furthering the development ed by forty-five participants, was entitled “Devel- of less-lethal devices and establishing uniform in- oping an International Approach to Less Lethal ternational guidelines on police use of force. ILEF and Minimum Force Options.” This summit was originally conceived at an international meet- helped to frame police use-of-force issues from ing on policing in Northern Ireland in 1999 by an international perspective—notably less-lethal members of the Pennsylvania State University’s force issues that were later discussed at PERF’s Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies December 2004, Critical Issues in Policing (INLDT) and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s De- Conference. partment. ILEF was formed to provide a scientific Key international police leaders and executives basis for understanding less-lethal options, tech- from police associations and agencies discussed nologies, and tactics being developed by manufac- the following global issues related to less-lethal turers and explored by police practitioners.5 policing: international law enforcement collabora- tion, research on less-lethal weapons and accom- ACPO panying tactics, and the possibility of establishing The Association of Chief Police Officers of England, standardized international specifications for less- Wales, and Northern Ireland assists police chiefs in lethal weapons. Manufacturers would be required the United Kingdom to provide excellence in pro- to meet law enforcement standards rather than fessional and ethical police service to communi- law enforcement simply adapting to what manu- ties, and provides professional advice to govern- facturers produce. The productive discussions led ment, law enforcement, and other organizations

4. For more information on the ILEF, visit www.nldt.org; for more information on ACPO, visit www.acpo.police.uk. 5. The 2002 International Law Enforcement Forum report entitled Minimum Force Options is available at www.nldt.org.

Chapter 1. Introduction — 15

box 1.5 continued

and individuals. The association is often viewed as explore the possibility of formalizing and institut- PERF’s United Kingdom counterpart. ing these meetings on an ongoing basis. Topics for discussion included the benefits of interna- The Summit tional policing cooperation; ways to change less- PERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler opened the lethal technology development from manufactur- August summit. Less-lethal technology is the er-led to practitioner-led; the importance of focus of great interest in the United States, he identifying international partners; and the need to noted, and he underscored the importance of engage with international manufacturers of less- less-lethal weaponry to reduce injuries and pro- lethal equipment. tect civil liberties. Wexler encouraged the sharing Discussions led to these points of agreement: of successful approaches in order to improve law • The law enforcement community should enforcement practices on a global scale. He determine the specifications and parame- praised the United Kingdom for its approach to ters for desirable less-lethal technologies. police practice research and encouraged further • The international law enforcement commu- collaboration in this area. Robin Masefield, head nity should work together to develop these of the United Kingdom’s Northern Ireland Office, specifications. explained that there had been criticism of the lack of less-lethal weapon research in the United King- • All new technology should be evaluated, dom. The issue had reached the forefront as a re- and ideally the technology should reflect sult of the April 1998 Belfast Agreement and sub- advances in technological and medical ef- sequent Patten Report recommending policing fects research. reforms in Northern Ireland.6 He commented on • Professional associations should (1) facili- the significant progress made by the Police Ser- tate the identification of best-practices, vice of Northern Ireland, as well as the creation of training standards, and evaluation guide- a Northern Ireland Policing Board. Masefield lines as they relate to less-lethal technology praised the establishment of the ILEF and ex- and (2) share information globally. pressed his support for international cooperation in developing the next generation of less-lethal technology. Summit participants also recommended the Colonel Andrew Mazzara (USMC-Retired), establishment and sharing of common terminol- the director of the INLDT at Pennsylvania State ogy; the development of international computer University, expressed two goals of the summit: to databases; the creation of effective assessment reach some consensus on key issues related to measures; discussions with less-lethal product less-lethal force options and technologies and to manufacturers; and the development of a com- munication strategy.

6. The Patten Commission Report is available at www.belfast.org.uk/report.

16 — Chapter 1. Introduction

The summit concluded with a private tour at terest, including research, practice, and proce- the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. dure; developing access to relevant police re- Attendees participated in a progressive program search held within the knowledge base of the par- entitled Law Enforcement and Society: Lessons of ties; exchanging good practice and benchmarking the Holocaust. It examined the role of law en- information on operational policing for the bene- forcement officers during the Holocaust. The fit of all police forces; and establishing joint re- program spurred discussion on the role of police search endeavors through international projects in society, moral dilemmas officers face, and the in the United States and the United Kingdom. importance of safeguards and restrictions in law enforcement today. Conclusion The summit advanced support for international The Memorandum of Understanding cooperation, collaboration, and research. PERF, At the Critical Issues in Policing Conference in ACPO, and ILEF will encourage ongoing informa- December 2004, the leaders of PERF and ACPO tion sharing on current and emerging less-lethal signed a Memorandum of Understanding that technologies and move the profession toward in- formally established a relationship between the ternational product specifications and accepted two organizations. The memorandum focuses on less-lethal tactics, ultimately raising the quality of four main areas of collaboration: exchanging rel- policing in the world. evant information on areas of agreed common in-

Chapter 1. Introduction — 17

COMMENTARY: box 1.6 Defining Moments: Tackling Police Use of Force7 by Chuck Wexler enforcement chief executive is under pressure from myriad stakeholders: The community wants In July 2004, the COPS Office facilitated an inter- swift responses and may demand disciplinary ac- active web cast discussion on police use of force. tion against the officers or a change in policy even It was open to anyone with Internet access and before an investigation, and they expect the chief broadcast to 50 cities around the country. It was to keep them informed as events unfold. The an enlightening dialogue. Ten experts, represent- rank-and-file officers, as well as the police union ing the fields of law enforcement, local govern- leadership, want their chief to provide unwavering ment, journalism, civil rights and more, spent an support for involved officers and to conduct an hour and a half discussing, debating, and probing investigation that is sympathetic and takes all fac- the issues and difficulties related to how police tors into consideration, including the stresses agencies deal with use-of-force situations. I was and perceptions of officers involved in split- privileged to moderate that very important and second decision making. And the media keeps timely discussion. the incident squarely before the public—shaped Within a month of that discussion, police by the speculations and perceptions of the re- chiefs in Los Angeles and Kansas City, Missouri, porter—ensuring that the eyes of a city, a state, or faced widely publicized incidents in which their even a nation will remain fixed on the chief exec- officers were scrutinized for using various levels utive’s actions. of force. Whether it was the arrest of a suspect in The COPS Office discussion raised important Los Angeles captured on video by an overhead questions: How does a law enforcement chief ex- helicopter or the use of Tasers™ in Kansas City, ecutive deal honestly and respectfully with the both chiefs were immediately confronted with a media when the investigation is not complete and limited set of facts that required investigation and all the facts are not yet known? Given the safe- public statements to a questioning community. guards that many police departments have put in The issues these chiefs faced reflected the debate place, how does a chief respond to the communi- on the COPS web cast, reminding us that these ty’s right to know while preserving officers’ right matters are neither abstract nor predictable. For to fair treatment? And how does a chief answer most chiefs, they are the kind of events that keep demands for a quick resolution without jeopard- them up at night. izing the thoroughness of an investigation? Use-of-force incidents become defining mo- Strong and sensitive leadership is needed, and ments for a law enforcement agency because the chief rarely has the luxury of time. they require exceptional leadership in an extraor- Allegations of racial bias can add another dinarily stressful situation. In such crises, a law layer of complexity to the situation. In our web

7. This sidebar article is based on a column published in the August 2004 issue of the Police Executive Research Forum newsletter Subject to Debate (vol. 18, no. 8).

18 — Chapter 1. Introduction

cast discussion, the director of the Pittsburgh taken and to reassure community leaders that re- Urban League, the police chief of Miami, and a cent reforms would be put to the test. He let the Cincinnati Enquirer editor were among those who community know that he understood them, while agreed that when force is used, one of the first conveying a simple, powerful message: We need questions asked is always about race. The fact time to do the job carefully and fairly. Similarly, he that this was openly discussed and agreed upon attended roll calls and met with union leaders, as- by the panel was refreshing. More specifically, suring them that the investigation would be thor- they agreed that if the incident involves a white of- ough, fair, and based on facts. Both the commu- ficer and a minority suspect, the incident could be nity and the rank and file needed to know that a lightning rod for long-standing police-minority both the process and the outcome would be han- tensions. Race matters in America, and it should dled in a professional manner. come as no surprise that race matters in street- In Kansas City, Missouri, Chief Rick Easley level encounters. employed similar strategies when a use-of-force Police chiefs confronted with these incidents case caused public concerns. He met with com- realize that their performance, their agency munity leaders and began a productive conversa- tenure, and their careers may one day be judged tion with them and with his officers. In both Los on the basis of their leadership in these crises. Angeles and Kansas City, Bratton and Easley had They are, all too often, the defining moments for met with community leaders well before these in- urban police chiefs and they require a tremen- cidents—so this was business as usual, and not a dous balancing act. How does one weigh the con- “special meeting,” convened in an emergency cerns of the community against the rights of the without any prior basis for trust. If partnerships individual officers involved? There are no easy an- are established during times of relative calm, they swers. And part of the difficulty may be that the will grow, endure, and prove invaluable during question is the wrong one to ask. times of crisis, making candid and confidence-in- Leadership in these moments is not a zero- spiring leadership an easier task to achieve. sum game; decision making is not a contest in Chief John Timoney said in the COPS Office which either the community or the department web cast that policing today poses different chal- must ultimately win out. Police chiefs cannot see lenges than policing yesterday’s America. Some the world that way. The rights of the community police chiefs in the past were ineffective in com- should not be weighed against the rights of the municating details of investigations and proce- department. As difficult as it is, effective chiefs dures. Today’s chiefs must operate with trans- see use of force situations as opportunities to parency—communicating ideas, details, and work with the community and the department in processes. This is the only way to serve both the an open and honest way. In Los Angeles, Chief community and the department. It is a difficult Bratton quickly met with community groups task, but to carry it out is to exhibit the leadership across the city to discuss the steps that would be today’s police chief must possess.

Chapter 1. Introduction — 19

CONCLUSION control. It is the agency executive who is key to Police have been given enormous power—the le- optimizing force (Sherman 1983; Waegel 1984; gitimate authority to use force, even deadly force, White 2003). The police executive must establish against the very people they have been hired to clear department policy on the use of force and serve. The misuse of force violates the rights of ensure that it is implemented; ensure that officers the person against whom it is used, and it violates have the weapons, tactics, and training they need the trust that the public places in its law enforce- to optimize levels of force; and convey to the de- ment agency. Moreover, misuse of force has led partment and to the community through actions to urban riots, criminal charges against officers, and words that the agency will be responsible civil suits against jurisdictions, and the removal and accountable in its use of force against its cit- of police executives from office. The legitimate izens. Proper support for officers involved in use of force by police is essential to keep commu- shootings and other traumatic or stressful en- nities safe and to protect the officers charged with counters must be considered as well. The goal enforcing the law. At the same time, law enforce- of this book is to help executives meet these im- ment agencies must ensure that force is used only portant responsibilities. when justified and at the level required to achieve

20 — Chapter 1. Introduction

2

Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training

by LORIE A. FRIDELL

“It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify killing the suspect.”

TENNESSEE V . GARNER 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

The goal of a law enforcement agency exec- accountability, and (3) training to ensure that of- utive is not to eliminate force but to optimize it ficers have the knowledge, skills, and judgment to (see Chapter 1). This means that force is used to act in accordance with agency policy. the extent necessary so that officers are able to conduct law enforcement functions. Force is not used when it could be avoided, and force is used HISTORICAL BACKGROUND only in the amounts necessary to achieve legiti- Policy, policy enforcement, and training have mate objectives. Critical to achieving force opti- been used by agencies in various ways to opti- mization in a department are (1) the adoption of mize the use of force. This section reviews recent sound and effective policies, (2) implementation history and relevant research findings. In all of mechanisms to promote policy adherence and three areas, agencies and researchers have paid

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 21

more attention to deadly force than less-lethal Now virtually all agencies, regardless of size, force, and this emphasis is reflected in our cover- have policies on deadly force and less-lethal force. age. (See Chapter 1, Box 1.1, for definitions of The content of deadly force law and policy in the deadly force and less-lethal force.) United States can be traced back to English com- mon law under which all felonies were punish- able by death. It was natural, therefore, that a Policy Content peace officer was allowed to kill a fleeing or resist- The breadth of activities covered by agency poli- ing felon. When English law became incorporat- cies and the number and detail of those policies ed into American law, a police officer was allowed have increased over the years. Policies related to to use deadly force to either defend life or to ef- force, particularly deadly force, are no exception. fect the arrest of any fleeing or resisting felon. In the late 1960s, the President’s Commission on In the 1970s, many states began to adopt Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice more restrictive statutes on deadly force, and (1967) conveyed concern over the lack of policies many agencies began to adopt more restrictive to guide police in their use of deadly force. The policies. All recognized the right of police to use commission noted that many officers were guid- deadly force to prevent death or serious bodily ed only by broad and difficult-to-enforce state harm to officers or others; many agencies limited statutes (White 2000). At that time many of the the circumstances under which officers could largest agencies had policies on deadly force, but shoot fleeing felons. At the jurisdiction level, these policies, even up to the early 1980s, often Sherman (1978) reports that “community out- were very general and ambiguous (Matulia rage” at shootings perceived to be unjust and/or 1982). Following are a few examples (Chapman racially biased was a potent precipitant of these 1967, as cited in White 2001): policy changes (see also Walker and Fridell 1992). • Never take me out in anger; never put me In Tennessee v. Garner (471 U.S. 1, 1985), the U.S. back in disgrace. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the • Leave the gun in the holster until you in- Common Law “any fleeing felon” rule and held tend to use it. that deadly force may be used to apprehend a • It is left to the discretion of each individual fleeing felon only if the felon poses a “significant officer when and how to shoot. threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” A survey conducted in the early 1960s, in- Four years after Tennessee v. Garner, the U.S. volving primarily small departments, found that Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor (490 U.S. twenty-seven of forty-nine departments had no 386, 1989) set parameters on the use of force gen- firearms policies (Chapman and Crockett 1963). erally—not just deadly force. The Court ruled Two decades later Nielsen (1983) surveyed small that judgments about force would be made in ac- departments (serving populations of at least cordance with the reasonableness standard of the 20,000) as well as large departments in five states. Fourth Amendment. Force was justified if its use He found that 37 percent of the responding agen- and level were “objectively reasonable” from the cies lacked a written deadly force policy. Over perspective of a reasonable officer considering half of the responding agencies in North Dakota the facts and circumstances known to the officer and Mississippi reported they had no written at the time the force was used. policies. Research has shown that policies do influ- ence the frequency and nature of force used by

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officers (Sherman 1983; White 2000; Fyfe 1978). of supervision, management, and leadership” This research—much of it conducted in the (1991, 32). Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) describe 1960s and 1970s and focused on deadly force— events in several cities in which the contents of compared agencies with more restrictive and less restrictive written policies were overwhelmed by restrictive policies or compared the same agen- the much more lax unwritten policies of the top cies before and after policy changes. For instance, administrators (see also Sherman 1983; Waegel Uelman (1973) collected information on policies 1984; White 2001). Not just the content of poli- and shootings from fifty cities in Los Angeles cies, but the administrative commitment to those County and found that the departments in the policies, is key to controlling force—both deadly most restrictive policy category had approxi- and less-lethal. mately one-half the shooting rates of depart- To optimize the use of force, a department ments with the least restrictive policies. While must convey a clear message to sworn personnel much of the variation could be explained by dif- that excessive force will not be tolerated, and un- ferences in policies regarding the shooting of necessary force must be avoided. This message fleeing felons, Uelman also found that depart- can be conveyed through applicant screening ments with the most restrictive policies had fewer procedures, monitoring of employees’ use of defense-of-life shootings as well. Walker (1993, force, a strong system for reviewing complaints, 32) summarizes this line of research: “Adminis- effective supervision mechanisms including an trative rules have successfully limited police early intervention system, and departmental re- shooting discretion, with positive results in terms wards and punishments. of social policy. Fewer people are being shot and killed, racial disparities in shootings have been reduced, and police officers are in no greater dan- Training ger because of these restrictions.” (In Box 2.1, Training helps ensure that officers have the skills, Captain Ronald Davis of the Oakland Police De- judgment, and knowledge to implement policies partment argues that consent decrees have had a on the streets of the jurisdiction. The dramatic positive impact on law enforcement policies and changes during the past several decades in force procedures.) policy have been paralleled by equally dramatic changes in training. Advances occurred first in deadly force training and later were applied to Policy Enforcement less-lethal force training. While research has shown that policies can have Rudimentary firearms training for officers an impact on the use of force, mere words within can be traced to 1895 when Theodore Roosevelt a Standard Operating Procedure manual may not established the School of Pistol Practice. Such in- have any impact unless supported by a clear mes- struction was not routine, however, until the late sage from the top echelons of the agency that the 1940s or early 1950s (Morrison 2002, 2003). For policy will be followed. Affirming the impor- this training, the recruit or in-service officer tance of clear direction by police leaders, the In- would, in a standing position, shoot an already- dependent Commission of the Los Angeles Police unholstered weapon at a static paper bull’s eye Department (also called the “Christopher Com- target (maybe 60 feet away) on command from mission”), constituted following the Rodney the training officer during daylight hours. Scharf King beating, called “the problem of excessive and Binder (1983, 202) provide one officer’s force in the LAPD . . . fundamentally a problem characterization of this type of training: “It’s

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 23

COMMENTARY: box 2.1 The Influence of U.S. Department of Justice Consent Decrees on Policing in the United States

by Ronald Davis, Captain practices in a variety of areas. Some consent de- Oakland (CA) Police Department cree provisions are based, in part, on this re- search. Yet the adoption of these practices has Over the past ten years, U.S. Department of Jus- been somewhat limited by those police agencies tice (DOJ) consent decrees have greatly influ- that resist change; they prefer familiar ways of enced policing in the United States.1 An increas- conducting business to implementing and learn- ing number of police agencies challenged by ing new policies and procedures. Before consent allegations of excessive force, misconduct, and decrees outlined some specific practices, police corruption have been required (either under a managers frequently developed their own proce- consent decree or the fear of having one im- dures based on information limited to their per- posed) to adopt “best practices” and change an- sonal experiences or that of their agency. Often, tiquated or deficient practices that otherwise these practices failed to consider lessons learned would probably not have been reformed. Consent by other agencies and law enforcement personnel decrees can provide the impetus for improve- throughout the field. ment that has been supported by a police chief— In the past decade three noteworthy reports but unrealized because of resistance within police were issued: the 1991 Christopher Commission agencies and lack of political support and re- Report, the 1992 Kolts Commission Report, and sources. Consent decrees have required the the 1994 Report; each report adoption of best practices such as the Force In- identified problematic trends and practices per- vestigation Teams (FIT) in Washington, D.C.; the taining to officer conduct—including use-of- canine protocol in Prince George’s County, Mary- force.2 Yet many of the recommendations con- land; and the foot pursuit guidelines in Detroit, tained in those reports often have not been Michigan. Now these approaches are quickly implemented elsewhere. Since 1994, the Depart- spreading throughout the field, and police execu- ment of Justice has conducted thirteen investiga- tives and political leaders are increasingly recog- tions of police agencies whose practices they de- nizing their value. termined reflected a pattern or practice of Many police organizations and associations conduct that warranted a consent decree.3 The continue to conduct research and identify best first consent decree was adopted in 1997 and the

1. As used here, the term “consent decree” includes memoranda of agreements, consent judgments, and other agreements between the U.S. Department of Justice and police agencies that outline areas for reform. 2. The Christopher Commission Report followed the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles. The Kolts Com- mission Report was an extensive review of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. The Mollen Commission Report was a review of corruption in the New York City Police Department. 3. According to DOJ’s website on January 11, 2005, thirteen agencies have entered into some type of con- sent decree, judgment, resolution, or memorandum of agreement with DOJ as a result of a “pattern and practice” investigation.

24 — Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training

most recent as of this writing was in 2004.4 of best practices and reduce the need for consent Based on the insular nature of law enforcement, it decrees, which, according to Shanetta Brown Cut- is possible that similar practices exist in other lar, chief of the Department of Justice’s Special Lit- agencies throughout the industry. But because of igation Section, is DOJ’s ultimate goal.6 Projects consent decrees and their positive influence on and research on promising approaches for ad- policing, the number of these police agencies and dressing officer accountability allow us to learn law enforcement personnel engaged in such prac- from the mistakes of the past, so that they are not tices is steadily decreasing. repeated. Consent decrees have captured the attention Eduardo Gonzalez, former chief of the Tampa of law enforcement executives and instilled levels Police Department and Independent Monitor for of accountability (and fear) that require the field to the Prince George’s County (MD) Police Depart- progress. To avoid the stigma, expense, and the ment, summarized the influence of consent de- loss of managerial decision-making ability associ- crees as “changing the DNA of policing.”7 Gon- ated with consent decrees, a growing number of zalez is correct not only in the literal sense that police executives are proactively adopting success- consent decrees are changing the mechanics of ful approaches contained within them. The De- policing, but also in the sense that they change partment of Justice has also funded the creation of the Dynamics, Nature, and Attitude (DNA) of the a technical guide of consent-decree best prac- policing profession. tices.5 This project should advance the adoption

4. The first consent decree was adopted by the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1997. The most recent consent decree was adopted by the Prince George’s County (MD) Police Department in 2004. 5. Protecting Citizens’ Civil Rights: A Best Practices Guide for Local Law Enforcement Leaders is expected to be released in 2005. 6. Meeting with Ms. Shanetta Brown Cutlar, July 18, 2004. 7. Meeting with Mr. Eduardo Gonzalez, July 19, 2004.

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 25

completely unrealistic, a police Disneyland. You Modern force training also focuses on have time to set up; no one is trying to kill you avoiding or defusing potentially violent encoun- and you aren’t completely stressed out. . . . Also ters through smart tactics and strong communi- you’re not moving and the target’s not moving. cation skills. Some training programs help offi- Otherwise the training is fantastic here!” cers to make decisions in encounters that might Some of the first improvements to deadly reduce the likelihood that force will be required. force training attempted to incorporate more re- In that same vein, agencies are emphasizing the alistic features of shooting situations. The Prac- importance of strong communication skills that, tical Pistol Course advanced this training by hav- in some situations, can be used to de-escalate an ing officers shoot from various (and more otherwise violent encounter (Fyfe 1987, 1988). realistic) distances, from various positions (for example, standing, crouching, kneeling), in the open or from behind barricades, under various CRITICAL ISSUES IN lighting conditions, and under time constraints. USE- OF- FORCE POLICY “Stress courses” incorporated physical exertion in This section discusses critical policy issues that an attempt to enhance the reality of training. pertain to deadly force, less-lethal force, or both. The enhanced reality training still focused Specifically, it explores the following questions: on how to use force and not when to use force. A Should deadly force policy designate deadly force still relatively recent advancement in force train- as “only a last resort”? Should officers be allowed ing is the emphasis on when to use force and to shoot at the drivers of moving vehicles and, if what level of force to use. This advancement in so, under what circumstances? What parameters training first occurred with respect to use of should there be on drawing and pointing deadly, rather than less-lethal, force. An early ap- firearms and on the use of warning shots? Re- plication of this philosophy was the “shoot/don’t garding less-lethal force, Taser™ policy and the shoot” program. An officer was placed in a room use of flashlights as impact weapons are dis- where a video portraying an encounter with a cit- cussed. Finally, we consider policy provisions, izen (or citizens) was projected on the front wall. relevant to both deadly force and less-lethal force The officer was instructed to act as she or he that emphasize the avoidance of “unnecessary” would if this situation happened on the job; all of force. the scenarios required a decision regarding whether to use deadly force. The better early computer models had officers make use of cover Deadly Force Used as a “Last Resort” and other tactical skills when responding to the Over the past two decades a fairly consistent na- stimuli on the screen. The corresponding appli- tional standard has evolved with regard to when cation of this advancement for less-lethal force deadly force can be used. All agencies allow for was the introduction of training not just on less- deadly force to be used to protect the officer or than-lethal tactics and weapons but on their jus- another person against death and serious bodily tified utilization in various types of police-citizen harm. Agency policies differ somewhat with re- encounters. gard to parameters on using deadly force against fleeing felons.8 An ongoing discussion pertains

8. On the ways agencies and courts have interpreted the fleeing felon aspect of Garner v. Tennessee, see Smith (1998).

26 — Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training

to whether officers should be directed in policy to in imminent danger of death or great bodi- use deadly force if it is “objectively reasonable” or ly harm. “only as a last resort.” Under the “objectively rea- • As a last resort in the defense of another sonable” policy, an officer can use deadly force if person who the officer reasonably believes he or she reasonably believes that the subject is in imminent danger of death or great poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm and who the officer reasonably bodily harm to the officer or another (or reason- believes is entitled to self defense.9 ably believes that the fleeing felon meets the stan- dard set forth in the department’s policy). The The California Peace Officers Association “last resort” policy sets a higher standard. The (n.d.) takes a different policy stand than the Ap- officer not only must reasonably believe that the pleton Police Department. It requires only that opponent poses a significant, immediate, serious the force be reasonable: “It is the policy of this threat (or meets the fleeing felon standard) but department that officers shall use only that force also must have considered other less-lethal op- which is reasonable, given the facts and circum- tions and determined that they are or would be stances known at the time of the event to effec- ineffective. tively bring an incident under control.” The Police chiefs, trainers, officers, city officials, Florida Highway Patrol is another proponent of members of advocacy groups, and community the reasonableness model. Its policy states that members share the same hope that deadly force deadly force can be used if the “member has rea- will be used only as a “last resort,” but law en- sonable cause to believe that the subject poses an forcement practitioners disagree about the advis- imminent threat of death or serious physical ability of including “only as a last resort” as a pa- harm to the member or other.” rameter in a policy statement on the use of deadly force. Those against its inclusion in poli- cy argue that such statements go beyond what is Shots Fired at Vehicles required by the courts and could, in some in- An increasing number of agencies have specific stances, increase the jurisdiction’s liability. Most provisions in their policies regarding the firing of importantly, this policy, they claim, might lead to shots at drivers of moving vehicles. These provi- a brief, dangerous moment of hesitation on the sions are prompted by a desire to reduce the po- part of the officer facing imminent harm. tential danger to officers and innocent bystanders It is not clear which of the two schools of of a moving vehicle with a wounded or dead opinion—what we call the “objectively reason- driver. The provisions are worthwhile because able” model or the “last resort” model—repre- they highlight for officers the special dangers as- sents best practice, and so we share versions of sociated with shooting at a moving vehicle. each model. The Appleton (WI) Police Depart- Some of these specific provisions merely re- ment, a proponent of the “last resort” model, iterate the agency’s general policy regarding states that “the use of deadly force is permissible deadly force, including the common provision under the following circumstances: that deadly force should be avoided, if possible, • As a last resort in the defense of one’s self if its use could harm an innocent person. For when the officer reasonably believes (s)he is instance, the model policy on use of force of the

9. This policy also includes a fleeing felon provision.

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 27

International Association of Chiefs of Police The Miami Police Department policy (IACP 1999) includes this provision: “Decisions (which is based on the policy adopted by New to discharge a firearm at or from a moving vehi- York Police Department in 1972) prohibits offi- cle shall be governed by this use of force policy cers “from discharging their firearms at or from a and are prohibited if they present an unreason- moving vehicle unless deadly force is being used able risk to the officer or others.” Similarly, the against the police officer or another person pres- Federal Law Enforcement Training Center ent, by means other than the moving vehicle” (FLETC) trains that “deadly force is justified only (Miami P.D. Departmental Order 2, Chapter 6). when the driver or other occupant of a motor ve- This policy recognizes that, if the driver is using hicle poses an imminent threat of death or seri- the vehicle as deadly force, it is unlikely that ous physical injury to an officer or others, and the shooting the driver will reduce the danger. In use of deadly force does not create a danger to the other words, it is unlikely that a person (for in- public that outweighs the benefits of its use.” The stance, an officer or other person) who is in im- policy of the Connecticut State Capitol Police ap- minent danger of being killed by a moving vehi- pears to raise the bar for deadly force against oc- cle will be saved if the driver is wounded or killed cupants of moving vehicles by including the by a bullet. Instead, it is likely that the vehicle will words “reasonably certain.” A State Capitol Po- continue on its deadly path. Some police man- lice officer in Connecticut is “prohibited from agers also advocate this policy because they be- discharging a firearm at a moving vehicle, except lieve it is the strongest in terms of delimiting the when the officer is reasonably certain that the circumstances in which officers can shoot at ve- failure to do so will result in serious physical in- hicles and doesn’t allow the officers to argue after jury or death to the officer or a third person, and the fact (truthfully or otherwise) that they could the officer’s actions do not pose a risk to innocent not, despite their best efforts, get out of the way bystanders.” This phrasing contrasts with the of the moving vehicle.10 “reasonable belief” standard that Connecticut’s The recently adopted policy of the Los An- State Capitol Police apply to deadly force use geles Police Department (Special Order No. 1, generally. February 16, 2005) is similar to that of the Miami Many policies related to moving vehicles Police Department. It reads as follow: note the officer’s role in reducing unnecessary Firearms shall not be discharged at a moving force. The Orange County (FL) policy (G.O. vehicle unless a person in the vehicle is imme- 470.0) states that deputies shall not “intentional- diately threatening the officer or another per- son with deadly force by means other than the ly place themselves in the path of an oncoming vehicle. For the purposes of this Section, the vehicle and (then) attempt to disable the vehicle moving vehicle itself shall not presumptively by discharging their firearms.” Similarly, Virginia constitute a threat that justifies an officer’s use Beach General Order 12.10 states that “officers of deadly force. An officer threatened by an oncoming vehicle shall move out of its path shall not intentionally stand and/or step into the instead of discharging a firearm at it or any of path of a vehicle, creating circumstances where its occupants. (Emphasis in original.) the use of deadly force becomes necessary.”

10. Paul Evans, the former Commissioner of the Boston Police Department, received a no confidence vote after implementing a similar policy.

28 — Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training

Commentary in the policy states: Drawing and Pointing Firearms It is understood that this policy may not cover An increasing number of agencies are adding every situation that may arise. In all situations, specific provisions to their use-of-force policy officers are expected to act with intelligence and exercise sound judgment, attending to the spir- regarding when an officer can draw and point it of this policy. Any deviations from the provi- firearms. According to the Police Assessment Re- sions of this policy shall be examined rigorous- source Center, “A key purpose in adopting a for- ly on a case by case basis. The involved officer mal rule is to provide officers with concrete must be able to articulate clearly the reasons for the use of deadly force. Factors that may be guidelines and, if necessary, to establish a basis considered include whether the officer’s life or for accountability for deviations from the guide- the lives of others were in immediate peril and lines” (2003, 39). Agencies that adopt a formal there was no reasonable or apparent means of rule restrict drawing and pointing of firearms to escape. situations where danger is expected, although they vary as to their characterization of the de- Relevant to agencies’ provisions regarding gree and certainty of danger required. In its re- shooting at vehicles is an important principle that port, the Police Assessment Resource Center applies to use-of-force policies in general: Keep it (2003) discusses various models including the simple. Particularly in the area of deadly force, following from the Los Angeles Police Depart- the officer should have a minimal number of “ex- ment and the Metropolitan Police Department in ceptions” or “special circumstances” to consider Washington, D.C., respectively: in times of high stress when a split-second deci- sion is required. Thus, the full provision of the Unnecessarily or prematurely drawing or ex- hibiting a firearm limits an officer’s alternatives following policy might say more than it needs to: in controlling a situation, creates unnecessary Firing a weapon at a moving vehicle is prohib- anxiety on the part of citizens, and may result ited, except when the officer reasonably believes in an unwarranted or accidental discharge of that: (1) An occupant of a vehicle is using or the firearm. Officers shall not draw or exhibit a threatening to use deadly force by means other firearm unless the circumstances surrounding than the vehicle; or (2) A vehicle is operated in the incident create a reasonable belief that it a manner deliberately intended to strike an of- may be necessary to use the firearm in confor- ficer and/or citizen and all other reasonable and mance with this policy on the use of firearms available means of defense have been exhausted (Los Angeles Police Department, Manual of Pol- (including moving out of the path of the vehi- icy and Procedure, Vol. 1 §556.80, 2002). cle) and the safety of innocent persons would No members shall draw and point a firearm at not be unduly jeopardized by the officer’s ac- or in the direction of a person unless there is a tions. Officers shall not intentionally stand reasonable perception of a substantial risk that and/or step into the path of a vehicle, creating the situation may escalate to the point where circumstances where the use of deadly force be- lethal force would be permitted (Metropolitan comes necessary. Police Department, Washington, D.C., General Order 901.04 at 4, 2002). Provisions (1) and (2) boil down to a de- fense-of-life standard with the added proviso: “Get out of the way if you can.” Simple rules are Warning Shots easier to recall in times of high stress. Agencies across the country vary with regard to their policies on warning shots. The movement over time has been to increase restrictions on the

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 29

use of warning shots; some agencies have policies court, in the media and in other public forums. that severely restrict their use and others have Advocates claim that Taser deployment reduces prohibited them entirely. The issue of whether the use of deadly force by officers against citizens, warning shots should be wholly prohibited or thereby saving lives. They also claim that Tasers restricted to narrow circumstances reflects a larg- reduce overall injuries to officers and subjects. er question that pertains to other use-of-force is- They can provide examples in which use of dead- sues: Is it better to totally ban an activity that, on ly force would have been justified, but officers or , produces negative outcomes, or strongly suspects suffered no long-term injuries because caution against its use and allow for discretion Tasers were used instead.11 Taser critics claim for the rare circumstance when the activity actu- that these weapons are not “less-than-lethal,”and ally produces greater good than harm? Adopting they link the Taser to more than ninety deaths of the latter principle, the IACP model policy does suspects nationwide. Critics also argue that, in not set forth a blanket prohibition against warn- some agencies, Taser deployment has increased, ing shots but rather provides for their use for not decreased, overall use of force. (On Taser re- purposes of “defus(ing) escalating and potential- search and deployment, see also Chapter 3.) ly life-threatening assault situations.” Specifical- Amnesty International (2004) articulates the ly, the policy states that “warning shots may be concerns regarding Tasers and their evidence to fired if an officer is authorized to use deadly force support those concerns; it favors a moratorium and only if the officer reasonably believes a warn- on Tasers pending further research on the extent ing shot can be fired safely in light of all circum- to which Tasers may contribute to deaths.12 No stances of the encounter” (IACP 1999). The one at the time of this report is in a position to Miami Police Department makes a distinction state unequivocally that Tasers do not contribute between warning shots and shots to summon as- to deaths in some circumstances. Equally impor- sistance. The former are prohibited, but officers tant, the extent to which Tasers might reduce in- can use their firearms to summon assistance in jury to officers and suspects and even save lives is “emergency situations when someone’s personal not fully documented either. safety is endangered and no other reasonable The arguments for and against Taser use means is available.” provide guidance for making a decision about where Tasers should be placed on a standard lin- ear continuum of force if an agency chooses Taser Policy to adopt the device.13 The placement should re- Departments nationwide are trying to decide flect an attempt to achieve a balance between whether to adopt or continue using conducted potential benefits and potential costs. This con- energy devices such as Tasers and, if deployed, the ceptual guidance leaves lots of room for differ- content of policy guiding their use. With a surge ences of opinion regarding the circumstances in of interest in Tasers by law enforcement, the de- which this balance can be achieved. Indeed, these bate regarding their use is being played out in differences highlight the importance of ongoing

11. There is anecdotal evidence that in some jurisdictions (for instance, Miami and Phoenix) the adoption of Tasers has been followed by a significant reduction in the use of deadly force (see Chapter 3). 12. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference has also called for a moratorium on the use of Tasers. 13. This continuum is discussed in more detail later in the chapter in the section on training.

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discussions involving law enforcement practi- At present, it does not appear that the balance tioners and other stakeholders. It is hoped that between potential benefits and potential costs is this discussion will be aided by more research, achieved when agencies permit use of the Taser something that both practitioners and advocacy against subjects who are not behaving in a physi- groups recommend. cally aggressive manner. One way to approach the desired cost-ben- Some agencies place Tasers at two different efit balance would be to allow for the use of levels on the continuum of force, reflecting the Tasers to achieve either or both of these two ob- application of Tasers in the dart mode and in the jectives: (1) displace deadly force; (2) prevent stun or touch mode. (In the dart mode, two significant injury to the subject, the officer, or probes attached to two wires are fired at the sub- others. Using Tasers to achieve the first objec- ject; in the stun or touch mode, the officer makes tive—displace deadly force—would allow for direct contact with the subject’s body with the their use at the level of deadly force (in the dart Taser after the air cartridge of the dart mode has mode). (As explained below, some agencies ob- been expended or removed.) In some policies, ject to such placement.) It is more difficult to Tasers in touch mode are placed lower on the turn the second objective into precise policy since continuum than Tasers used in the dart mode. reasonable minds differ as to when the Taser is in Both TASER International and Amnesty Interna- fact “preventing” injury and which injuries tional recommend that stun mode be used as should be considered “significant.” The policy of backup when dart mode has not produced suc- the Denver Police Department (DPD) achieves cessful control.14 The Mount Pleasant (SC) Po- this objective by placing Tasers at a high level on lice Department policy on touch mode reflects its force continuum. The DPD has six levels of this purpose. “The Taser touch stun method may subject resistance on its linear force continuum: be used as a secondary deployment consideration Psychological Intimidation, Verbal Non-Compli- under the following conditions: (1) failure of ance, Passive Resistance, Defensive Resistance, both probes to contact the subject, (2) sudden at- Active Aggression, and Aggravated Active Aggres- tack on the officer by the subject, and (3) attack sion (deadly force level). The DPD policy states on an officer by an additional subject after a Taser that Tasers can be used to “incapacitate a combat- deployment” (G.O. 89-1204/A-04). ive or physically resistive person whose conduct Some agencies specifically prohibit the use rises at least to the level of Active Aggression. . . . of Tasers in deadly force situations because of the This use-of-force option becomes necessary potential risk to officers. Others include special when other force options would be inappropriate provisions that are designed to address this po- or ineffective under the circumstances” (D.P.D. tential danger. For instance, the policy of the St. 105.00). The policy also allows for the use of the George (UT) Police Department states that “the Taser against a “suicidal person who cannot be advanced Taser should not be used without a safely controlled with other force options.” firearm back up in those situations where there is More research is needed to provide the law a substantial threat toward the officer(s) or oth- enforcement field with guidance on Taser use. ers present.” The corresponding Seattle Police

14. Amnesty International recommends that stun mode be used only as backup; TASER International recommends that stun mode be used primarily as a backup “when the probes have not incapacitated a suspect and the suspect continues to resist or attack” (Guilbault 2005).

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 31

Department policy pertains to all less lethal • when the subject is in a position where a fall options, not just Tasers. It states that “less lethal may cause substantial injury or death; options shall not be employed against lethal • to intimidate individuals; threats except when lethal cover is available and • to escort, provoke, or jab individuals; or in place to provide protection for the officers em- • to awaken unconscious or intoxicated ploying these tools as well as innocent parties individuals. who are not involved.” The policy of the Col- orado Springs Police Department is designed to Unless there are compelling reasons that can be achieve the same end as the policies of the St. clearly articulated, Tasers should not be used George and Seattle departments, but its wording • when the subject is operating a motor vehicle; emphasizes officers’ own judgment with regard to how they will achieve it. This policy states, • when the subject is holding a firearm (Note: SWAT and Detention Services Division are “Officers will not intentionally place themselves exempt from this provision); or other innocent persons at substantially in- • when a handcuffed prisoner resists/refuses creased risk of death or serious injury by employ- to enter a police vehicle, holding or booking ing conducted energy weapons where conditions area; would otherwise call for immediate use of dead- • when the subject is a visibly pregnant ly force.” woman; or Most agencies prohibit or strongly discour- • when the subject is extremely elderly or 15 age the use of Tasers against specific groups of impaired. people—for instance, pregnant women, hand- cuffed prisoners, children, the elderly, people in Policies and training should caution against high places who might be hurt if they fell, people repeated and prolonged shocks. Related to this, moving at high speeds such as drivers, people the Toledo Police Department policy states that who have a finger on the trigger of a gun, and “suspects or prisoners may not be jolted by more handcuffed prisoners resisting/refusing to enter a than one officer at a time. If more than one offi- police vehicle. The Las Vegas Police Department cer deploys a Taser, they are to communicate with policy distinguishes between circumstances in one another and one of the devices is to be turned which Tasers should never be used and circum- off.” Further, because, for many agencies, Tasers stances in which Tasers should not be used most of are a new less-lethal technology and because so the time. In the latter circumstances, the agency many issues about them have been raised in pub- gives officers some discretion to judge whether lic debate, agencies should closely monitor Taser the potential harm is offset by greater potential deployment for at least six months and ideally for gain. The Las Vegas policy reads: one year. The purpose of this monitoring by the agency or by an independent entity would be to At all times the Taser will not be used evaluate positive and negative impacts and to • when the subject has come into contact with flammable liquids or is in a flammable identify any issues or trends related to Taser use atmosphere; that have implications for agency policy or train- ing. As part of ongoing monitoring, agencies that

15. The IACP Model Policy on Electronic Control Weapons lists the following as “susceptible” individuals: “women who are pregnant, persons with pacemakers, those suffering debilitating illnesses, persons who are very old or very young…persons of very small stature irrespective of age” (2005, 3).

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employ use-of-force forms should include Tasers this policy, the same techniques utilized with the on the list of force types that require such forms. baton shall apply.” The policy in Orange County The IACP Model Policy on Electronic Control (FL) states: Weapons (2005) recommends that the report The flashlight should never be used as a weapon should include comprehensive information such of choice but rather as a weapon of opportuni- as whether the Taser was used in dart or touch ty…. In the event that the flashlight, or other weapon of opportunity, is used as an impact mode, the reasons why a Taser was used, the range weapon, the deputy should disengage as soon as at which it was used, the point of impact on the the situation permits and transition to an ap- subject, the actions taken by the officer(s) after proved impact weapon, chemical agent or de- the discharge, and any injuries incurred by the fensive tactic technique. subject.16 The officers should also report the number of times shocks were administered and Avoiding Unnecessary Force the length of those shocks. Departments can download the information provided by the ad- The preceding issues regarding policy content vanced self-reporting mechanisms on the devices pertain either to deadly force or to less-lethal and summarize these data in the use-of-force re- force; this final issue—avoiding unnecessary ports. force—pertains to both. All agencies should train officers to use verbal skills and tactics to re- duce the likelihood that force will be required Flashlights as Impact Weapons during an incident. Some agencies additionally The issue of using flashlights as impact weapons include in their policies specific references to returned to the fore when news media filmed an avoiding “unnecessary force.” For instance, the officer of the Los Angeles Police Department Philadelphia Police Department’s deadly force (LAPD) using a flashlight against a subject. Most policy (Directive 10) states that “police officers agency policies limit, but do not prohibit, the use should ensure their actions do not precipitate the of flashlights as impact weapons. This is the case use of deadly force by placing themselves or oth- with the LAPD policy that was adopted on the ers in jeopardy by taking unnecessary, overly ag- heels of the media-portrayed event. It reads: gressive, or improper actions.” Similarly, the “The primary use of the flashlight is for illumina- Miami Police Department policy (6.4.7. #10) di- tion purposes. Use of the flashlight as an impact rects that “police officers shall not unreasonably device is discouraged by the Department. How- place themselves in a position where a threat of ever, under exigent circumstances, the flashlight imminent danger of death or serious physical in- may be used as an impact device when use of an jury is created when attempting to approach, officer’s baton is not feasible.” Similarly, the Or- pursue, stop a motor vehicle or armed subject.” lando Police Department’s policy prohibits using There appears to be an increased emphasis flashlights “as a defensive impact instrument . . . in training and policy on temporary retreat, a vi- except in cases of aggressive resistance when the able option that may serve, in part, to reduce un- baton is not practical. When the flashlight is used necessary force. Those promoting this option as an impact instrument, within the guidelines of should realize that some officers may object to

16. To be able to assess all benefits, agencies should consider requiring form submission even when offi- cers only aim the Taser at a subject using the laser beam. Anecdotally, departments are reporting suspect compliance under the threat of Taser usage.

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 33

the concept, but attitudes can be changed (Geller This section describes these options and identi- and Scott 1992, 310). The Philadelphia Police fies successful practices. First, however, we reiter- Department tackles this objection head on in its ate a point made earlier. policy: “Retreating or repositioning is not a sign A large percentage of incidents involving of weakness or cowardice by an officer.” Com- excessive force may be caused by a small number pared to the immediate use of force, retreating or of officers; several agency reviews, including the repositioning “is often a tactically superior police Independent Commission of the Los Angeles Po- procedure.” The Denver Police Department, in lice Department (1991), suggest this is the case. the opening narrative of its policy (Section The reason may be characteristics of the officers 105.00), highlights the importance of avoiding when they are hired or socialization and control the need for force and the appropriateness of mechanisms that impact officers once they are on temporary retreat in some circumstances: the job. In Box 2.2 Chief H. Michael Butler of the “When reasonable under the totality of the cir- Longmont (CO) Police Department reminds cumstances, officers should use advisements, agencies of the importance of screening appli- warnings, verbal persuasion, and other tactics cants carefully. and recognize that an officer may withdraw to a position that is tactically more secure or allows an officer greater distance in order to consider or Use-of-Force Reporting deploy a greater variety of force options.” In one In recent decades departments have documented of its consent decrees, the U.S. Department of use of force by their officers to a much greater ex- Justice required policy revisions that “will em- tent than in the past. Once uses of force were phasize that de-escalation techniques, such as simply referenced at the officer’s discretion in in- disengagement, area containment, , cident reports. Then agencies began to mandate waiting out a subject, summoning reinforce- that certain types of force be reported in incident ments or calling in specialized units may be an documentation. Today most agencies require of- appropriate response to a situation.” ficers to complete use-of-force reports, which they mandate through policy for designated force types.17 Agencies vary with regard to what they CRITICAL ISSUES IN designate as “reportable force” (the uses of force POLICY ENFORCEMENT that must be reported) (Pate and Fridell 1993). Policy on the use of force may have little impact The IACP model policy on this subject requires on police behavior if the agency does not enforce force reporting on physical force, chemical force, its policy. To demonstrate a commitment to the impact force, use of electronic equipment, and judicious use of force—both deadly and less- discharge of firearms. The Fresno Police Depart- lethal—agencies should employ a variety of en- ment (2003, 6) requires force to be reported forcement mechanisms such as use-of-force when reporting, complaint reviews, intervention by su- • officers (including canines) use force and a pervisors and peers, and departmental rewards. person is injured; or,

17. Typically, agencies refer to these reports as “Use-of-Force Forms.” The Miami Police Department and the Colorado Springs Police Department have labeled them “Response to Resistance Reports” and “Re- sponse to Aggression Reports,” respectively.

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COMMENTARY: box 2.2 Reducing Use of Force through Hiring Decisions: Effective Prevention Measures by Michael Butler, Chief of Police, officers’ use of force. The department also re- Longmont (CO) Police Department designed its selection process to increase the probability of hiring people who fit this profile. When it comes to use of force, police depart- Four of the components of the LPD profile are ments should strongly consider the notion that listed below: “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 1. People who have no previous excessive cure.” Unfortunately, the opportunity for the most force history either professionally or in their effective intervention (prevention) has already personal lives. Any current police officer passed by the time a community is protesting an with a sustained internal affairs case for ex- incident involving force and demanding that the cessive force is eliminated. Non-police ap- police department hold officers accountable for plicants are evaluated on a case-by-case using excessive force, whether it is real or per- basis. Circumstances that could eliminate ceived. When a community is upset by allega- any non-police applicant include such tions of excessive force by police officers, it is not things as involvement in the criminal jus- uncommon for police chiefs, mayors, and other tice system for brawling/fighting, etc. Any elected officials to promise change or a “cure” by person with a domestic violence conviction initiating civilian oversight boards or independent is automatically eliminated. monitors—to hold a hammer over the heads of officers. Though it is hoped that this “pound of 2. People who have demonstrated they can cure” will have long-lasting effect, such actions CHOOSE accountability and do not need cannot fully address those officers already on the persuasion, supervision, or rules and regu- department who have a propensity to use force. lations to choose accountability for them. The ounce of prevention provided by imple- Applicants would be rejected if they need menting effective processes to recruit and select high levels of structure to make decisions. officers outweighs the benefits of the usual We focus on applicants who have demon- pound of cure when it comes to reducing exces- strated that they can choose appropriate sive use of force. Academics and police practi- courses of action in their lives and can be tioners have agreed that departments should interdependent. shift their focus and resources to address the force issue on the front end: preventing excessive 3. People who are predisposed to engage force through effective controls on officers’ re- or work with the community. We specifical- cruitment and selection. The Longmont (CO) Po- ly look for community involvement such lice Department (LPD) has done just that. It has as volunteer service on the part of the created a profile for hiring police officers that applicant. is the ounce of prevention needed to minimize

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 35

box 2.2 continued

4. People who show a strong tendency to 2. During the personal interview, the hiring solve problems with their intellect and personnel ask specific questions regarding communication skills. Through interviews, the candidate’s problem-solving skills, background checks, and psychological test- knowledge of the community and police ing, we determine how people resolve per- department, and commitment to working sonal and professional issues in their lives, with the community. such as if the applicants learned to resolve issues in their lives without being overly ag- 3. The “Oral Integrity Test” examines the ap- gressive or becoming angry. plicant’s professional and personal use of force/excessive force history. This is a one- While we have other components in our pro- on-one interview in which the interviewer is file to select police officers, these four elements asking the applicant questions about his or are associated with choosing applicants who are her background. The LPD has preset in- not predisposed to using force to solve problems tegrity standards unknown to the applicant. and who will need only minimal supervision and The interviewer is specifically trained in the structure for satisfactory performance on the job. science of detecting untruthfulness on the The LPD selection and hiring process requires po- part of the applicant. tential candidates to participate in a personal in- 4. Psychological testing further assesses the terview; complete a written application, an oral applicant’s predisposition to use force to exam, and psychological tests; and pass a back- solve problems. ground investigation, integrity interview, physical agility test, medical and drug screening, and a A background investigation verifies what the polygraph examination. The components of the applicant stated in the first four components of selection and hiring process that screen for an ap- the selection process and comprehensively exam- plicant’s propensity to use inappropriate force ines the applicant’s history. LPD conducts all consist of the following: background investigations for officer positions in 1. In completing the application, candidates person and one-on-one with all past employers, are required to write an essay responding personal references, relatives, and neighbors of to several questions about their thoughts the applicant (as well as the applicant’s current on becoming a police officer, their under- supervisor, current peers, and anyone else the standing of community policing, and their background investigation reveals we should inter- readiness to work at the Longmont Police view) to determine if the applicant has a history of Department. violence. LPD eliminates any candidate who showed a propensity to use force during previous

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employment, either as a police officer or civilian. modifying the department’s hiring and selection Domestic violence complaints result in automat- process, the LPD has seen a considerable drop in ic elimination. The considerable resources need- use of force by its police officers. Since imple- ed to conduct these reviews are well worth it. menting new selection and hiring procedures in During the polygraph, recruits are tested to detect the mid-1990s, the department has had a 45 per- any use of force or excessive force by the appli- cent reduction in use-of-force incidents over a 5- cant and for any deception during the previous year period. stages of the selection process. Police departments have a tremendous op- While the LPD has changed other aspects of portunity to reduce use of excessive force by offi- the organization and its policies and practices to cers. The recruitment and selection processes minimize use of force and excessive force, its ex- present that opportunity. Departments can perience suggests that the recruitment and selec- choose to wait for the pound of cure, or they can tion processes are where the most emphasis move forward proactively with an ounce of pre- should be placed to prevent future problems. By vention that yields far greater results.

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 37

• officers strike a person with a body part the suspect that necessitated the use of force, the (i.e., fist, foot, elbow, etc.) or any object reasons why the officer used force, as well as any (i.e., flashlight, clipboard, etc.); or, suspect complaints of injury, medical treatment • officers use (not merely display) a depart- received, or refusal of medical treatment” (Sec- ment-issued weapon (i.e., electronic immo- tion IV.A.2). A key advantage of use-of-force bilizing device, less-lethal impact projectile, forms over the old system of including narratives chemical agents, baton, firearm, etc.). in incident reports is the ability to produce aggre- gate, quantifiable information. Check or code The Denver Police Department requires of- boxes can be tabulated (for example, check/code ficers to submit a use-of-force report if a firearm boxes on officer/subject injuries, subject charac- is discharged (outside of training); if an impact teristics, levels of resistance encountered, and weapon, carotid compression technique, chemi- level and type of force used). Building upon cal agent, pepper ball, Taser, or is used; if these empirical measures, Alpert and Dunham a canine is used or certain types of physical force, (1997, 2004) developed a system for reporting such as hand strike, leg thrust, kick; if a person is force that produces a measure of the force used injured or killed; if a person complains of an in- by the officer relative to suspect resistance. For jury or may claim injuries in the future; or if the instance, if a department denotes five levels of subject is charged with resisting arrest and/or as- suspect resistance (coded as 1–5) and five levels sault on an officer. of officer response (similarly coded as 1–5), the In most departments the officers who used Force Factor is the level of force used minus the force and other officers on the scene are required level of resistance. Aggregate data can show how to provide the documentation. Some agencies, frequently officers respond with force one or however, are having sergeants respond to the more levels above suspect resistance, one or more scene and complete an immediate, comprehen- levels below suspect resistance, and/or at the level sive investigation. The Miami-Dade Police De- of suspect resistance. These data can be used to partment policy (31-01.5 – 31-01.6) requires the evaluate force use by individual officers, to com- officer who has used reportable force to notify a pare agencies to each other, or to research partic- supervisor who then responds immediately to ular aspects of an agency’s force incidents. the scene. The responding supervisor is directed An early and meaningful review of the use- in policy to prepare the written documentation. of-force forms by immediate supervisors is very The supervisor interviews the officer who used important. As Klinger (2004) points out, super- force, other officers at the scene, the person who visors should analyze these reports, “not just sign was the subject of the force, and any other wit- off.” Supervisors should talk about force inci- nesses. The supervisor also takes photos of all dents with the persons involved and with others, subjects and any other person who was injured thus using the incidents as an opportunity to during the incident (for instance, officers or teach and train. Some agencies include the train- other individuals). ing unit on the list of entities that receive and According to the IACP model policy, “All review the forms.18 By examining these forms, use-of-force reports shall specify the actions of the training unit can identify instances or trends

18. The Police Assessment Resource Center (2003) recommends that the commanding officer of the Training Division serve on the committee that reviews officer-involved shootings.

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related to unnecessary or excessive force. Training facsimile, sending electronic or regular mail, sub- can then be tailored to try to avoid past mistakes. mitting the complaint in person, speaking with a Many agencies route the use-of-force forms up supervisor, and/or by completing a form by the chain of command, and sometimes all the themselves. way to the chief. The key to the review system is A second key aspect of an effective system is not the people who receive the forms but the de- meaningful investigation of complaints. Investi- gree to which the readers carefully consider their gations should be quick comprehensive and im- contents. partial. Agencies vary widely in the comprehen- Serious uses of force require in-depth inves- siveness and quality of their investigations of tigations, a topic covered in Chapter 4. complaints. Common weaknesses in this process are (1) insufficient investigations including lack of effort to find and meet with citizen witnesses Review of Use-of-Force Complaints including complainants, (2) interviews that serve To hold officers accountable and promote the to intimidate complainants and other citizen wit- prudent use of force, departments must have a nesses, (3) inordinately lengthy investigations, strong and effective system of reviewing com- and (4) biased investigations to safeguard peers plaints. A department that is not interested in (Human Rights Watch 1998; Independent Com- controlling the use and misuse of force can easily mission of the Los Angeles Police Department make the complaint review process a frustrating 1991). and ineffectual one for community members. A third important component of an effec- Without much proactive effort, it can keep com- tive system is appropriate disciplinary action. plaints low by making the process unknown to “Light-handed counseling should never replace residents, confusing, intimidating, or even risky. strong disciplinary actions in serious cases of Even a department that allows complaints to be abuse,” according to Human Rights Watch filed can institute an investigation process that is (1998). Such counseling is “a misguided attempt weak or intimidating or ensure that sustained to help officers who should, in fact, be punished complaints result in few consequences to officers. or dismissed. Similarly, transfers should not be There are key components of a complaint used as a tool to address an abuse problem.” system that is effective. First, the system is user Agencies that have removed barriers to fil- friendly for the person who has a complaint to ing, instituted meaningful investigative processes, file. Effective systems make information about and provided for appropriate dispositions for how to file complaints available to the public in sustained complaints will have gone a long way various ways. This information can be posted in toward producing a system that is not only effec- the police department and other public build- tive but credible to the public. Community in- ings, included on the agency web site, or de- volvement in the complaint review process can scribed in printed brochures available to individ- also enhance system effectiveness and credibility. uals and community groups. The complaint Community involvement, however, remains a forms are simple, residents have clear instruc- controversial topic. Advocates argue that the in- tions for filing them, and the process is free of volvement of community members in complaint intimidation. A Department of Justice consent review systems enhance police accountability and decree requires that the public be able to file provide for a more independent and effective complaints by making a telephone call, sending a method for processing complaints. Opponents

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 39

claim that civilians are not qualified to evaluate against police officers and the role of the complaints of police practices, and that their in- IPA; and volvement in such systems undermines the au- • makes recommendations to enhance and tonomy of the law enforcement agency (Alpert improve SJPD policies and procedures (In- and Dunham 2004). dependent Police Auditor 2004, 15). In Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight, Samuel Walker (2001) describes the The Internal Affairs unit of the SJPD still variety of systems in use that involve civilians in has the major responsibilities for “receiving citi- the complaint receipt and review process. (See zen complaints, investigating the allegations, and also Walker 1995.) The “Police Auditor” determining the existence of sustainable allega- method—in place in San Francisco; Los Angeles tions” (Independent Police Auditor 2004, 29). County; Portland, Oregon; San Jose, California; Serving in a quality control capacity, the IPA re- and elsewhere—”offers the best opportunities for ceives and reviews the original complaint docu- changing police organizations and thereby en- mentation, observes (and recommends questions hancing accountability and achieving long-term for) the interviews of officers against whom com- improvements in the quality of policing” (Walk- plaints are filed and of officers who are witnesses, er 2001, 86). Civilians do not investigate individ- and maintains contact with the complainants. ual complaints, but rather review, monitor, or IPA staff review the documentation of completed audit the police department’s complaint process. investigations; this review may result in “closure An application of this model is the Office of the to the case, additional investigations, or disagree- Independent Police Auditor (IPA) in San Jose. ments with the outcome of the investigation” (In- The office of the auditor is independent of the dependent Police Auditor 2004, 33). police agency and all other city departments—re- The IPA comments on its role to make rec- porting directly to the mayor and city council. It ommendations regarding agency policies and was established as a “compromise” in 1993 when practices: community groups demanded full civilian com- One of the most important and distinguishing plaint review, and the police department insisted characteristics between a police auditor model on maintaining its full internal control over the and a review board or commission is the police auditor’s ability to effectuate systemic changes complaint process. The IPA through policy recommendations. While an • monitors and audits San Jose Police De- examination of each case takes place, greater partment (SJPD) investigations of com- emphasis is placed on spotting patterns and plaints filed against police officers to deter- trends in the complaint audits, pinpointing the origin of the conduct that gave rise to the com- mine if they were complete, thorough, plaint, and in recommending policy and proce- objective, and fair; dural changes to abate the offending conduct • serves as a location where any person can (Independent Police Auditor 2004, 13). file a complaint against a San Jose police of- ficer (an alternative location to the police As of 2003, IPA had made 95 recommenda- department); tions, 78 of which were adopted by the SJPD. • conducts public outreach to educate the Some of these recommendations pertain to com- community about the process and proce- plaint processing (for instance, complete investi- dures of the investigation of complaints gations of serious complaints within 180 days); and others pertain to the policies and resources

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that guide and facilitate the work of officers on In Pittsburgh, Chief Robert McNeilly insti- the streets (for instance, increase the availability tuted “an integrity clause” that encourages officers of less-lethal weapons, create better procedures to report anonymously any abuses of authority for forcibly extracting blood from suspects). including excessive force on the part of peers. The chief of police in San Jose, Robert (These and other efforts were described by sever- Davis, reports that the IPA model has “served the al executives at a San Diego conference panel that department well” (Davis 2004). The model is is summarized in Box 2.3.) strong, he explains, because it allows the depart- ment to maintain control over the key aspects of complaint receipt and investigation and pro- Early Intervention Systems vides for an objective entity that can confirm that The Independent Commission on the Los Ange- complaints are being handled appropriately and les Police Department (1991) highlighted the effectively. need for the collection and review of data on in- dividual officers over time. It identified 44 offi- cers each of whom had 6 or more complaints of Intervention by Supervisors and Peers excessive force or improper tactics. (In Los Ange- Agencies need to provide sufficient levels of su- les, less than 1 percent of the officers produced 15 pervision and hold supervisors accountable for percent of these types of allegations.) Some de- their officers’ use of force. According to the Fres- partments committed to monitoring adherence no Police Department (2003), “the key to pre- to force policy and preventing deviations from it venting excessive use of force is to … ensure that have adopted Early Intervention Systems (EIS). field supervisors are available and have access to The objectives of such systems are to identify of- officers in the field.” It recommends specialized ficers who are at-risk of engaging in inappropri- training for supervisors and tools for effective su- ate behaviors, such as unnecessary or excessive pervision, such as use-of-force reports and an use of force, and to provide some type of inter- Early Intervention System (EIS). vention to help correct an officer’s perform- Peers as well as supervisors should be held ance—ideally before formal disciplinary action is accountable for other officers’ use of force on the required or a critical incident occurs (Walker, job. The recently revised force policy of the Alpert, and Kenney 2001). EIS can be a powerful Miami Police Department contains the following tool for supervisors in personnel management provision: and provide a structure of accountability for the At the scene of a police incident, many officers entire police department. of the department may be present and some of- In developing a system, agencies must ficers may not be directly involved in taking po- (1) identify appropriate data elements to include, lice actions. However, this does not relieve any officer present of the obligation to ensure that (2) determine “triggering thresholds” (that is, the the requirements of the law and the Depart- level of some measure that will prompt review), ment regulations are complied with. Officers and (3) plan responses to thresholds in the form are expected to maintain control or intervene if of interventions and monitoring (Walker, Alpert, the use of force against a subject clearly be- comes excessive. Failure to do so may result in and Kenney 2001). An increasing number of both criminal and civil liability. EXCESSIVE law enforcement agencies are adopting Early FORCE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED (Miami Intervention Systems. There has been a focus on Police Department Order 2, Chapter 6, 6.1.3, the front-end part of the system—identifying emphasis in original).

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 41

ARTICLE: box 2.3 Re-engineering Use-of-Force Systems19 by Stephan Loyka decrees, serious use-of-force incidents, and/or the implementation of organizational change. In the past five or six years, several law enforce- They discussed how a law enforcement agency ment agencies across the country have been sub- can cultivate personal accountability and ject to mandated reforms as a result of U.S. De- strengthen integrity in its police force. partment of Justice (DOJ) consent decrees. Consent decrees address a pattern or practice of SUCCESSFUL APPROACHES AND conduct that deprives individuals of rights, privi- PRACTICAL ADVICE leges, and immunities secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.20 Pittsburgh Police Bureau Consent decrees are sought following an investi- The Pittsburgh Police Bureau received the nation’s gation by the Special Litigation Section of the DOJ. first consent decree in 1997, and Robert McNeilly, While government monitors and federally im- who became chief in mid-1996, was tasked with posed change are not necessarily welcome, con- implementing a number of mandated reforms. sent decrees have resulted in improvements in Chief McNeilly recognized a need to restore ac- accountability and the general delivery of police countability, integrity, and respect within the services. All law enforcement agencies hope to agency; he had come up through the ranks of the prevent abuse of authority and to minimize inci- Pittsburgh Police Bureau. Although concerned dents of use of force, and more and more execu- about organizational problems surrounding use- tives are recognizing the need to reevaluate their of-force incidents, he was more troubled by how lit- policies and procedures to meet these goals. Po- tle was being done to investigate or correct those lice leaders are proactively identifying manage- problems. When he became chief, he added an in- ment changes that will help reduce the number of tegrity clause to the department’s policy guide- incidents where excessive force is used. lines. The intent of the clause was to promote an The panel on re-engineering use-of-force sys- environment in which officers felt comfortable tems at the December 2004 Critical Issues in stepping forward to admit to (or anonymously re- Policing Conference brought together experi- port) any abuses of authority or violations of de- enced leaders in police administration—Chief partment policy. Officers could anonymously sub- Robert McNeilly, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police; mit reports of violations or general concerns to Chief H. Michael Butler, Longmont (CO) Police supervisors without the fear of retribution or os- Department; Chief Thomas Streicher, Cincinnati tracism. According to Chief McNeilly, in the Pitts- Police Department; and Chief John F. Timoney, burgh Police Bureau today, three out of four inter- Miami Police Department. These chiefs have nal investigations stem from anonymously valuable experience in dealing with consent submitted reports by other officers.

19. This article summarizes panelists’ discussion on this topic at the Police Executive Research Forum’s Critical Issues in Policing Conference in San Diego in December 2004. 20. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141.

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The Pittsburgh Police Bureau was investigated Chief McNeilly believes in proactive meas- by the DOJ for violations of the Police Misconduct ures to reduce use-of-force incidents. He believes Provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law that personnel performance tracking systems can Enforcement Act of 1994. After the investigation, a fully restore the accountability, integrity, and re- consent decree was pursued citing a pattern of spect that must exist between a community and abuse. Newly appointed Chief McNeilly agreed to its police agency. the consent decree—a view not approved of by the rank-and-file officers or the union. This decision Longmont (CO) Police Department resulted in a no-confidence vote; the vote was in- Chief Michael Butler in Longmont, Colorado, fluenced by officer resistance to proposals and re- echoed Chief McNeilly’s emphasis on the need to forms that McNeilly had been developing—many build a culture of personal accountability, and he of which were subsequently mandated in the con- underscored the importance of careful hiring, sent decree. Chief McNeilly viewed the consent quality training, and enhanced communications decree as an opportunity to implement significant skills. When attempting to re-engineer his improvements within the agency. agency’s approach to use-of-force incidents, Chief One such improvement was the expansion of Butler focused heavily on reforming hiring poli- the bureau’s computer systems to monitor and cies and practices to weed out individuals who assess individual performance within the agency. might be prone to using force unnecessarily. He The agency developed an Early Intervention Sys- believes specific characteristics can identify offi- tem called the Performance Assessment Review cers who are predisposed to exercising unneces- System (PARS). It collects, scrutinizes, and as- sary force. As discussed in Box 2.2, Chief Butler sesses information on individual officers (for ex- believes strongly in recruiting and hiring only ample, information on use-of-force incidents and those individuals who fit the agency’s profile. He use of sick leave). The system also enables super- not only “weeds out” but also “selects in” quali- visors to compare an officer to everyone in his or fied recruits. The Longmont Police Department her peer group. It is hoped that PARS will identify now hires individuals with “no prior incidents of problems before they become serious. It is a violence personally or professionally, those who tiered, color-coded system for flagging officers demonstrate accountability without needing it potentially prone to use-of-force encounters. legislated for them, and most importantly, indi- Once a month, supervisors meet with highlighted viduals who can check their personal pride or officers to discuss a number of wide-ranging bravado and utilize communication skills before issues. Further action is based on decisions resorting to force.” made as a result of these meetings. If a supervi- Intensified scrutiny during the screening and sor is unable to determine a course of action, or hiring processes can have two benefits: It can has further questions about an officer’s conduct, increase the confidence a chief has in his or her that supervisor is required to respond to the offi- personnel, and it can increase a community’s trust cer’s calls for service for a predetermined number in its police force. At some point an incident in- of times during the next review period. volving the use of force will occur, and starting

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 43

box 2.3 continued from a position of trust will help the agency as it press conference announcing his intention of writ- presents the incident to the public and communi- ing a letter to officers to discuss the state of officer cates the details of the ensuing investigation. accountability. The letter, which emphasized the need for honesty, integrity, and truthfulness, was Cincinnati Police Department greeted with widespread public support. In April 2001, Cincinnati Mayor Charlie Luken re- In addition to investigations and oversight, the quested that the U.S. Department of Justice re- Cincinnati Police Department recently developed a view use-of-force incidents involving the Cincin- communications policy governing information nati Police Department (CPD). DOJ’s subsequent flow during the critical hours following a use-of- investigation included extensive interviews with force incident. This policy directs department rep- city and CPD officials, CPD officers, leaders of the resentatives to create a presentation detailing an primary union and other labor associations, as incident. The presentation is later delivered to the well as community members and civil rights or- public during press conferences or community ganizations. DOJ reviewed all firearm investiga- meetings. Homicide and investigation units did tions completed between 1995 and June 2001, not initially approve of the new policy, believing every written complaint filed against the CPD be- that it interfered with their investigations, but they tween January 1998 and June 2001 alleging exces- came to appreciate its value. Details of a use-of- sive force, and reported uses of force from June force incident are presented to the public as are de- 2000 to June 2001. In addition to analyzing use- scriptions of the department’s use-of-force policies of-force incidents, DOJ examined management and legal issues. The Cincinnati police found that practices related to use of force, including the the public has had a limited understanding of CPD’s use-of-force policies, training curricula, su- police use of force—what is lawful, parameters, pervisory procedures, and disciplinary system. policies, etc.—and that a comprehensive and DOJ’s investigation resulted in a Memoran- transparent approach can improve law enforce- dum of Agreement (MOA) with the city of Cincin- ment–community relations. Chief Streicher nati citing mandatory changes to be made by requires the department’s inspection section to the police department. The MOA, like a consent reconstruct an incident following the conclusion decree, called for an independent monitor to of the formal investigation. The reconstruction is continually assess the city’s progress. In Cincin- developed into another presentation and included nati there had been a series of use-of-force inci- as a part of a lessons-learned curriculum during of- dents following the discharge of an officer’s ficer training. Officers work through the scenarios weapon- and the death of a young male wanted on and are asked about what other options or proce- fourteen misdemeanor offenses. Evidence uncov- dures they could have followed to avoid the use of ered shortly after the shooting indicated that the force. Chief Streicher believes it is important to officer’s statement of what happened was false, learn from an officer’s or department’s mistakes and community perceptions about the incident and that use-of-force incidents present an excellent were negative. Concerned about erosion of public opportunity to do just that. trust in the CPD, Chief Thomas Streicher held a

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Miami Police Department • Proactively train officers on alternatives to Formerly of the New York City Police Department using force. (NYPD), John F. Timoney, now the chief of the • Hire and train only individuals with skills and Miami Police Department, discussed a policy im- traits associated with integrity. plemented in the NYPD in 1972 as proof of how policy reform can have both immediate and long- • Develop lessons learned from each use-of- term effects on officer-involved shootings. On Au- force incident. gust 11, 1972, an officer shot and killed a teenage • Reform use-of-force policies to restrict shoot- boy running away from a stolen car. As a result of ings and review all discharges of firearms. this episode, a comprehensive firearms policy • Emphasize principled leadership and quality was implemented that still stands today. High- policing. lights of the policy include a prohibition against the firing of warning shots; restrictions on firing at a car unless the suspect is using deadly force CONCLUSIONS other than the car; review of every firearm dis- The discussion that followed the panelists’ pre- charge by an officer by several persons (the chief sentations addressed whether or not consent de- of personnel, the tactical captain at the firing crees and/or outside influence could make it eas- range, a legal affairs officer), as well as by the in- ier for officers to endorse changes in department cident investigation unit. The policy contributed policies and use-of-force systems. With regard to to a significant decrease in shootings. his ability to implement changes, Chief McNeilly Although the policies a department formu- credited his background (coming up through the lates provide the foundation for integrity and ac- ranks in the Pittsburgh Police Bureau), and his re- countability, it is leadership, Chief Timoney spect and understanding for the rank-and-file. If stressed, that can cement and maintain officers’ police leaders explain to officers the reasoning respect for the authority entrusted to law enforce- and intent behind certain policy changes, the ment. Continual emphasis on principled, quality changes are more likely to be well received. Ac- policing is what he credits with making a true ceptance of change has a lot to do with good in- difference in Miami and in the other departments ternal communications between management in which he has served. and the rank-and-file. Chief Butler emphasized, it is a great deal easier to enact changes during LESSONS LEARNED good times than in the heat of controversy. From the experiences of the panelists, several valuable lessons emerged. • Foster a culture of accountability to reduce use-of-force incidents and strengthen credibili- ty within the community.

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 45

data elements to be used and the thresholds to Early Intervention System—Performance Assess- trigger intervention; less is known about success- ment and Review System, or PARS—has involved ful approaches for reviewing data (who should first-line supervisors perhaps more than any review and when) and selecting and implement- other agency. Under PARS, supervisors are re- ing interventions for officers who have triggered quired to log on to the system each day before roll thresholds.21 With regard to the use of force, call to identify any officer under their command these interventions are critical. who has been involved in an incident that is The U.S. Department of Justice, in the con- recorded in the PARS system (Walker 2003). This text of several of its consent decrees and Memo- approach ensures that supervisors are aware of randa of Agreement (MOAs), recommends in- the daily activity of their officers. cluding these force-related elements in an EIS: Various intervention strategies are available uses of force, complaints alleging use of force, to assist “at-risk officers” who have been identi- civil lawsuits alleging use of excessive force, and fied by EIS: peer counseling, supervisor counsel- the outcomes of force investigations and lawsuits ing, training, reassignment, medical screening, regarding force. Assaults on the officer, resisting- and psychological counseling. However, there is arrest arrests, injuries sustained by the officer, no information on the quality, scope, and effec- and injuries sustained by opponents are other el- tiveness of these interventions as they relate to ements that could be included (Pate and Fridell use of force and other at-risk behaviors. 1993). Early Intervention Systems could also in- clude data on work attendance, accidents, vehicle stops, searches, and off-duty-employment ar- Departmental Reward Structure rests—information that could signal more gener- An agency should ensure that it is not rewarding al issues or problems experienced by officers that (overtly or covertly) inappropriate or neutral be- could lead to various out-of-policy behaviors in- havior. For example, one West Coast department cluding misuse of force. Additionally, there is in- reported to the author that it had given out creased recognition of the appropriateness of in- medals to each and every officer who was in- cluding indicators of positive behaviors (such as volved in a shooting, unless the shooting was awards, commendations, and letters of apprecia- found to be in violation of policy. Fortunately, tion) within Early Intervention Systems. the agency later realized that these awards sent a The data in the system are of no value un- message that a shooting was always a good less someone is attending to them. In its consent thing—something to which each officer should decrees and MOAs, the Department of Justice aspire. The agency now gives out medals only for requires that supervisors review the EIS data reg- shootings in which the behavior or bravery of the ularly for the officers they supervise. The data officer was worthy of special commendation. also must be reviewed when an officer is being In addition to scrutinizing awards to ensure considered for promotion, assigned as a Field that they affirm positive behaviors, agencies Training Officer, or transferred to a different should provide reinforcements for commendable command, as well as when applying to serve as an restraint and the use of tactics that lead to a non- investigator. The Pittsburgh Police Department’s force (or mitigated force) outcome (Geller and

21. A forthcoming PERF report, funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, will identify innovative practices for EIS intervention and supervision processes.

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Toch 1995; Klockars 1995). These reinforce- CRITICAL ISSUES IN ments could come in the form of a report by the USE- OF- FORCE TRAINING officer’s supervisor that would go in the officer’s In recent decades, the training police officers re- file or annual awards that recognize commend- ceive concerning the use of force has advanced able restraint and good tactics. The Toronto Po- considerably in several key respects. For exam- lice Use of Force Committee in 1998 made such a ple, the environments in which officers learn recommendation: “The chief of police [should] and test their firearms skills are more realistic. ensure supervisors recognize good judgment by They receive training, not only on force skills way of formal documentation when officers exer- but also on when to use force and how much cise restraint or minimize the use of force in vio- force to use. In addition, officers are trained in lent or potentially violent situations” (Recom- the use of tactics and verbal skills that can, in mendation 2.2). some situations, prevent force or reduce the level of force required. Use-of-force training in the classroom and COMPSTAT as a Means to in other environments should cover the follow- Promote Force Accountability ing components: An increasing number of law enforcement de- • policy/law, partments are using a version of COMPSTAT to • psychology/physiology of mind/body dur- enhance agency management and accountability ing stress, (Weisburd, Mastrofski, Greenspan, and Willis • force skills (marksmanship, defensive 2001). Traditionally, COMPSTAT has been used tactics), to track and respond to crime and disorder; some • decision making (when to use force and agencies, however, have used COMPSTAT to hold how much to use), and commanders accountable for matters considered • tactics and communication skills to prevent more internal than external to the agency. As an or mitigate force events. example, the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. has daily COMPSTAT-type meetings that focus on crime and disorder issues The Use-of-Force Continuum: and quarterly COMPSTAT meetings that require Linear and Circular Models commanders to report, not only on crime and Today law enforcement professionals are re-eval- disorder issues, but also on performance meas- uating the traditional linear (or “incremental”) ures directly or indirectly related to use-of-force use-of-force continuum as a tool for training and accountability. For the personnel under their as a means of articulating force policy (see Figure command, the commanders report on the nature 2.1).22 These complaints have been made about and level of citizens’ complaints, the status of the linear continuum: firearms recertifications, the number of use-of- • It does not allow for consideration of every force incidents, and any significant training- factor that might affect an officer’s choice of attendance issues. a response (for instance, the number of of- ficers at the scene, the strength and size of

22. Police agencies across the country differ with regard to the number and definition of force levels on this continuum.

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 47

Deadly Force Taser, Impact Aggravated Weapons Aggression Empty-Hand Tactics, Active Touch Chemical Agents Aggression Control Active Officer Presence/ Resistance Verbal Direction Passive Resistance Verbal, Nonverbal Noncompliance

Figure 2.1. Example of linear use-of-force continuum

the officer compared to the strength and distinguishes between two types of circular mod- size of the opponent). els: the situational model and the tactical options • It seems to imply that an officer must ex- model. Situational models depict the officer in haust all efforts at one level on the continu- the middle of the circle with force options dis- um before proceeding to the next. Even if played on the outside edge of the circle. Many of officers are informed during training that these models place use-of-force options in ran- they are allowed to “jump steps,”the contin- dom order to prevent any implication that the of- uum is sometimes explained in court as one ficer escalating to greater force must use force at requiring step-by-step ascension. each level. The situational model also has been • It is complex and difficult to remember, po- described as a “force wheel” with “each spoke in tentially leading to dangerous moments of the wheel a type of force. When officers are pre- delay by an officer during a critical incident. sented with a situation requiring force, they ‘spin the wheel’ to that which is most reasonable” The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Po- (Fresno Police Department 2003, 15). lice (2000, 3) reports that linear models do “not The circular configuration of situational accurately reflect the dynamic nature of poten- models avoids the implied stepwise progression tially violent situations, in which the entire range of the linear models but otherwise provides little of officer, subject and force options must be con- guidance to the officers regarding force decisions. stantly assessed throughout the course of the in- The tactical options model is thought to be supe- teraction.” rior to situational models because it provides in- Circular models of force have been pro- formation regarding how the officer is to make posed to replace the linear continuum. The Aus- decisions; furthermore, some of these models tralasian Centre for Policing Research (1998) present communication, not as a single force

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option, but rather as an ongoing component of simplified in this way.) Thus, instead of numer- the interaction. One example is the framework ous levels denoting action taken by the subject produced by the Canadian Association of Chiefs (for example, presence, verbal resistance, passive of Police. This training aid (see Figure 2.2) “pro- physical resistance, active physical resistance, ag- motes continuous critical assessment and evalua- gressive physical resistance, aggravated physical tion of each situation and helps officers under- resistance), three force levels can be denoted, as stand and make use of a variety of force options was done by the police departments in Burbank, to respond to potentially violent situations” California, and Louisville, Kentucky. (Hoffman 2004). Hoffman advocates tactical op- In a three-level linear continuum, the first tions models because they “go beyond descrip- level denotes non-compliant subjects who are tion to include details about the process by which not proactively aggressive. The subjects may be an officer chooses one response option over an- manifesting noncompliance verbally, with pas- other.” sive resistance or defensive aggression. At Level 2, There is no consensus yet within the law en- the subject is actively directing force toward the forcement profession as to whether a linear or officer. He or she is manifesting active aggression circular model is better. Supporters of the linear but is not using force that is likely to cause seri- model argue that this traditional model is appro- ous bodily injury (SBI) or death. At Level 3, the priate conceptually for denoting how officers subject is directing force toward the officer or an- should use force. Force is trained and analyzed in other that could cause SBI or death. In a three- terms of “quantities” of force; subjects use a little, level hierarchy, officers are taught three corre- some, or a lot of force and an officer’s appropri- sponding levels of response, but each level ate response is linked directly to the level of force provides a number of specific force options. Be- used by the subject. Legal analyses of what is “ob- cause there are only three levels, not six or more, jectively reasonable” is related to the amounts of there are more options available to officers at force used by the subject and the officer. Analyz- each level. The officer is trained to consider all ing force in terms of these quantities is arguably factors related to the encounter (for instance, inherently linked to a linear conceptualization sizes of the officer and the subject, number of of- (Klinger 2004). Proponents of the traditional ficers at the scene, mental state of subject) and linear model criticize the circular models for pro- pick from among the array of force options. For viding “no direction on relative levels of force” instance, Level 2 responses might include joint (Puder 1993). locks, distraction techniques, balance displace- Responding to its most frequent criticism, ment, chemical agents, hard empty hand, and proponents of the traditional linear models note impact weapons. that effective training can disabuse officers of Some in the profession remain dissatisfied the notion that they must progress stepwise with the linear continuum, but it is not yet clear up the force ladder. Furthermore, a way to en- that the circular models are superior. No pre- hance clarity and increase the discretion of offi- ferred framework has yet emerged from the cers (for instance, discretion to make choices that international discussion on this matter, and we consider special circumstances of the encounter) expect the debate to continue. is to reduce the number of levels in a traditional linear continuum. (Circular models also can be

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 49

Figure 2.2. Use-of-force framework of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION

Decision-Making Training stress produced by real-life incidents is replicat- Police departments employ various training ed. (In Box 2.4, Professors Tory J. Caeti and methods to help officers use good judgment Robert W. Taylor highlight the importance of when exercising force. In the classroom, trainers training in de-escalation techniques.) can verbalize appropriate responses or show The first computer simulators portrayed videos of use-of-force circumstances and engage films of subjects to which officers responded with the class in an analysis of how best to respond. decisions to shoot or not shoot. Advances in Role playing has become a critical aspect of force these computer simulators have been significant. decision-making training; computer simulators, The modern devices are able to “marking cartridges” exercises (for instance, • use four panels around the officer, simulat- Simunitions), and live exercises featuring pseu- ing 360-degree action; do-targets on the firing range are all popular • train officers on firearms, Tasers, chemical teaching methods. These methods simulate as sprays, batons, and the use of canines; closely as possible the interactions officers can • use real (untethered) weapons modified have with subjects; in the best methods, some with cartridges (for instance, laser car- semblance of the physiological and psychological tridges) that produce recoil;

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COMMENTARY: box 2.4 The De-escalation Discussion by Tory J. Caeti and Robert W. Taylor about addressing people who have mental ill- nesses.23 As part of its consent decree, the Pitts- Some agencies provide officers with extensive burgh Bureau of Police adopted a policy that all training on how to shoot, but could offer more officers will be trained in verbal de-escalation training on use-of-force judgment and decision techniques that can, in some situations, prevent making. In the past, agencies trained their offi- the need to use force. This training includes spe- cers to shoot by firing at fixed targets from a sta- cific examples of situations that do not require tionary position with an adequate amount of force but commonly are mishandled, resulting in lighting. Yet confrontations rarely occur under force being used (for example, an officer acting these circumstances. Many police departments more aggressively when individuals verbally chal- have altered their training techniques and incor- lenge the officer’s authority or ask for the officer’s porated more realistic scenarios (Dunham and identifying information).24 Pittsburgh’s compre- Alpert 2001). In addition, some departments hensive and innovative responses to the consent offer martial arts training to new recruits or give decree led to numerous reforms and a more pos- training courses in the “ethics of using deadly itive perception of the police by the community.25 force.” Role-playing situations can help officers There have been training videos produced on learn how to peacefully resolve dangerous situa- de-escalation techniques and offers accompany- tions as well. ing courseware.26 The Buffalo Police Depart- Agreements between the U.S. Department of ment, like many others, has implemented train- Justice and local jurisdictions—generated by use- ing that emphasizes overall decision making, of-force incidents and public protests—have in- ethical situations, and de-escalating high stress cluded mandates to reform police policies and situations. As noted by one department official, training to include de-escalation tactics and other “officers are being instructed on how to talk their means to decrease use of force. For example, the way out of a situation and be more aware of their Detroit Police Department adopted policy behavior so as not to incite the situation.”27 changes intended to improve decision making by Progressive approaches to training and policy officers, clarify circumstances under which offi- development can yield immediate dividends. cers may draw their weapons, delineate alterna- They can save lives and reduce use-of-force inci- tives to using deadly force, and educate police dents in a jurisdiction, as well as minimize the

23. Available at http://www.ci.detroit.mi.us/police/dept/crib/docs/doj_cd_us09.htm#b 24. Available at http://www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/police/html/community_relationships_and_tr.html 25. Available at http://www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/police/html/consent_decree.html 26. Visit http://www.pwpl.com/law/ for more information. 27. Available at http://www.hilbert.edu/News/newsdetail.asp?ArticleId=557

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 51

box 2.3 continued

liability of police agencies. Law enforcement ex- circumstances under which it can be employed. ecutives should consider initiatives to improve The use-of-force issues facing police officers use-of-force tactics and training, including the in- today are numerous. De-escalation tactics and corporation of de-escalation techniques. training can be as integral a part of training as Knowing when to use force is an integral part training on firearms skills and defensive tactics. of the police officer’s daily job. Although most Demands that police appropriately handle highly officers will never use deadly force, they frequent- charged situations are great, even as the number ly make crucial decisions about use-of-force op- and types of weapons at the officer’s disposal tions. Indeed, force is a principal tool in police have grown. Yet of all the options at the officer’s work, though it has serious legal and social con- command, perhaps none is as valued as verbal sequences. Rules have been established to con- de-escalation techniques. trol the amount of force used and the

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• use weapons that show and record location, These exercises might take place in vacant lots or lethality, and timing of weapon discharge; buildings owned by the jurisdiction or in actual • accommodate training partners and teams venues in the jurisdiction (for instance, in (for instance, SWAT teams), not just single schools after hours). More and more agencies are individuals; using “marking cartridges” to simulate the dis- • modify lighting to produce low-light situa- charging of weapons (usually firearms); the fired tions; paint balls or other markers provide feedback on • “shoot back” at the officer from the screen shooting accuracy. Real weapons can be modified with non-lethal “bullets”; to serve as marking-cartridge weapons, and the • produce interactive options so that the in- exercises can be videotaped and critiqued. These structor can modify the unfolding of events exercises are more personnel intensive than com- depending on training needs or the officer’s puter simulators, but the equipment costs are actions; and lower. Compared to computer simulators, the • produce audio and video tapes of the ses- exercises have several other advantages. They sions for purposes of critique/analysis. allow for greater movement by trainees; they pro- duce higher stress levels (to simulate the stress in Because many agencies are not able to pur- real-life use-of-force incidents); they enable offi- chase this technology out of their own funds, cers to be trained in a greater number of force states and regions are developing agreements for options; and an unlimited number of scenarios shared ownership and usage. The municipal can be implemented. training academy for the state of Connecticut purchased a computer simulator contained in a 40-foot-long trailer. Any department can haul Integrated Training the trailer to its own headquarters and make use Agencies with state-of-the art training programs of it. The Wilson Technical Community College fully integrate the various aspects and topics as- in North Carolina purchased a (non-trailered) sociated with force training. In 1996, Arnspiger transportable machine that neighboring agencies and Bowers described a major weakness of force can borrow and set up in their own training facil- training: its disjointedness. Training had im- ities (Law Enforcement News 2004). The state of proved in terms of the number and types of top- California has set up twenty-two regional centers ics taught and in the effectiveness and sophistica- for simulator training (Seletky 2004). For in- tion of methods for training officers in stance, the Fresno Police Department houses a knowledge, judgment, and skill. The separate simulator and provides training for agencies topics/skills, however, were still being taught in within one hour’s driving time from the center. isolation: Officers learned firearms skills and de- Arterburn (2002) reports that some agencies or cisions to shoot and not shoot; then they took a groups of agencies have worked out mutually baton course covering how to use it; and then beneficial arrangements with their insurance car- they took the corresponding Oleoresin Capsicum riers to enable purchase or access to simulators. (O.C.) course, defensive tactics course, and so Supplementing or serving as an alternative forth. In separate lectures and practice sessions, to computer simulators are the role-playing exer- trainees learned about communication skills, the cises mentioned earlier in which the trainee or importance of cover, and how to explain use-of- trainees interact with live (not filmed) subjects. force decisions in court and in reports.

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 53

Cutting-edge training in the twenty-first these deficiencies were leading to many injuries century is integrated. Officers are trained to make for officers and subjects. In the revised training, decisions about whether to use force and what officers are presented with scenarios in classroom level of force to use from the full range of options and role-playing settings that can require them to (weaponless techniques, baton, O.C. spray, Taser, apply force reducing tactics, communication and so forth). Full integration also requires that skills, and/or any level or type of force. Specifi- trainees utilize, as appropriate, skills associated cally, the training scenarios, according to Arn- with preventing or mitigating the use of force. spiger and Bowers (1996), integrate the following Whereas early computer simulators trained offi- topics: cers in “shoot, don’t shoot,”now models allow for • command presence and verbalization (in- officers to select, as appropriate, a wide variety of cluding verbal judo), force options. Officers are able to use flashlights • use of cover, for illumination, take cover, and practice com- • weaponless defense, munication skills. The interactive capabilities • chemical weapons, allow the trainer to produce a prevented or miti- • PR-24 side-handle baton, gated force outcome based on the good tactics or • firearms (duty handgun and shotgun), use of effective communication skills of the • standardized high-risk vehicle stop, trainee. Other role-playing techniques, including • search of subjects, those involving marked cartridges, also encom- • handcuffing techniques, pass decision making across all levels of force (for • first aid and CPR, and instance, firearms, Taser, O.C.) and require offi- • officer rescue techniques. cers to practice tactical and communications skills. With trainers in padded “red suits,” Implementing scenario-based training trainees can even utilize various forms of impact using computers or exercises with marked car- devices and physical combat techniques. tridges can be time-consuming and expensive. Arnspiger and Bowers (1996) described the Many agencies can afford to provide this training early emphasis on integrated training in the Bur- only infrequently. To increase the exposure of of- bank Police Department that continues today ficers to scenario exercises, the Burbank Police (Ambrose 2004). The original training transfor- Department offers scenario-based training in a mation followed on the heels of a department classroom setting. While presenting and dis- survey on training conducted by the Burbank Po- cussing scenarios in class is not as effective as sce- lice Department in the early 1990s. In respond- nario training in a computer simulator or sce- ing to this survey, officers requested more defen- nario training with marked cartridges, sive tactics training and reported “an initial classroom-based scenarios can effectively supple- tendency to back off during field contacts with ment the other types of training. threatening subjects because they did not feel In the Burbank Police Department scenario confident in their ability to address such threats training includes post-scenario follow-up discus- without resorting to deadly force” (Arnspiger and sions. The trainee articulates the reason for each Bowers 1996). These survey results led the in- action he or she took—explaining tactical actions structors to review use-of-force incident reports and considerations, verbal communication, uses where they found that officers were not applying of force, and so forth. Evaluation following im- contact and control techniques properly and that plementation of integrated training revealed

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increased confidence on the part of officers and justified until thorough investigations have been fewer incidents that resulted in force and/or in completed.) This second issue of whether an of- officer/subject injuries (Arnspiger and Bowers ficer is acting inside or outside departmental pol- 1996). icy will need to be addressed during the training on the need to intervene with peers. Trainers must specify the level of certainty that is appro- Intervening with Fellow Officers priate before one officer intervenes with another In the section on policy enforcement, we de- who is using force. scribed the Miami Police Department policy re- quiring officers to intervene if excessive force is being used by a peer. The Los Angeles Police De- CONCLUSION partment recently improved the portion of acad- As explained in Chapter 1, the challenge for law emy training that teaches recruits how to inter- enforcement executives is to optimize the use of cede if a fellow officer is overreacting in an force in their agencies. In this important endeav- incident or is otherwise out of control. With role or, three elements are essential: sound policy, ef- playing as a key mechanism, recruits are learning fective mechanisms for enforcing policy and pro- how to prevent and interrupt abuse of force. ducing accountability, and integrated training There are difficult issues associated with that teaches officers when and how to use force this training and the real-life implementation of appropriately. The policing profession has made this desired intervention. First, some officers will tremendous progress in each of these areas over be very reticent to challenge the actions of their the past several decades. Today the general pro- fellow officers—even when it is clear that those visions of use-of-force policy are fairly standard actions are outside of policy. Shaping agency cul- and much more restrictive than in the past. Mea- ture to set limits on the extent to which officers sures to promote policy adherence and accounta- can and should support and protect their peers bility are more prevalent and effective in all presents a very difficult challenge for agency ex- realms of policing, including use of force. Train- ecutives. Second, there will be many instances ing has advanced from the officer shooting in in which it is not readily clear whether the officer bright light at a bull’s eye 60 feet away to techno- using force is acting within departmental policy logically advanced, highly realistic judgment and or outside of it. Some uses of force will be clearly skills training using multiple force options. outside policy, but there will be instances where Despite these impressive advances, the the second officer at the scene did not observe policing profession still grapples with critical is- the factors that led the first officer to use a speci- sues regarding use-of-force policy, policy en- fied level of force. Moreover, people can reason- forcement, and training. These ongoing efforts ably differ with regard to when and at what level signal a steadfast commitment. Law enforcement force is justified. (Conclusions often cannot be continues to strive—and likely always will reached regarding whether a use of force was strive—toward the optimized use of force.

Chapter 2. Improving Use-of-Force Policy, Policy Enforcement, and Training — 55

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3

Use-of-Force Tools

by JOSHUA A. EDERHEIMER

“Our Age of Anxiety is, in great part, the result of trying to do today’s jobs with yesterday’s tools.”

MARSHALL MCLUHAN1

Police executives recognize that the preserva- deadly force should always be an officer’s last re- tion of life is of paramount importance in the law sort during a confrontation, police leaders not enforcement profession. Giving officers the right only must equip officers with less-lethal options; tools to do their job- will minimize the risk of in- they also must be constantly vigilant in their ef- jury and death to themselves and the public— forts to identify and develop more efficient and helping them deal with confrontations in the safer tools.2 An effective policy regarding the use most reasonable and objective fashion. Since of any force must be adopted to clearly spell out

1. McLuhan, Marshall, Understanding Media: The Extension of Man, critical edition, ed. (2003). 2. For the purposes of this chapter, tools are considered items of equipment that provide law enforcement officers with various use of force options.

Chapter 3. Use-of-Force Tools — 57

the goals of the department and protect the pub- everyday part of their jobs, police may need to lic from unnecessary or excessive force. Failure to use force. The challenge for police executives is to provide officers with such tools—especially dur- manage that force by helping officers on the ing intermediate stages of a confrontation— street make sound choices when selecting tools leaves them with few options between initial con- on the use-of-force continuum. The use of any tact and escalation to the point where firearms force by police is constrained by policies and the are necessary (Fridell and Pate 1993). Because of legal framework discussed in Chapter 2. Viola- the inherent danger in their work, police are tions of these policies and laws undermine the equipped with firearms to protect themselves public support and the credibility that the police during deadly confrontations. Although relative- need to do their jobs well (Annan 1999). There- ly few police officers will ever fire their weapons fore, force must be used cautiously and judi- during the course of their careers, those who do ciously, and only to promote the safety of the often find themselves involved in the midst of community and officers (Adams 1999). controversy and legal battles. The U.S. Department of Justice estimated Use-of-force tools developed by law en- that law enforcement officers threatened to use forcement executives are of critical importance. force or used force in encounters with more than They help officers exercise discretion in using 400,000 Americans in 1999 (Langan et. Al. 2001). force, protect the lives of officers and citizens, re- In most instances police officers are justified in duce the likelihood that unnecessary or excessive their use of force to protect themselves or other force will be used, and ensure that officers do not citizens, but sometimes they use force unwar- expose their department and jurisdiction to un- ranted by the situation (Gaines, Kaune, and necessary liability and public criticism. Miller 2001). In an average year, an estimated The tools addressed in this chapter do not 600 suspects are killed by gunfire from police in reflect the plethora of alternatives available to law America, another 1,200 are shot and wounded, enforcement officers. The weapons discussed and 1,800 individuals are shot at and missed were selected based on the input of several police (Schmalleger 2002). According to the national executives from the United States and abroad. data on police use of force collected by the Bu- This chapter provides background information reau of Justice Statistics, an estimated 500,000 in- about several lethal and less-lethal weapons, dividuals were hit, held, pushed, choked, threat- highlights issues related to them, and provides ened with a flashlight, restrained by a police dog, examples of promising approaches in employing threatened or actually sprayed with chemical or them. The goal of this section is to provide po- pepper spray, threatened with a gun, or experi- lice executives with additional information about enced some other form of force. Of the 500,000, these use-of-force equipment options to help about 400,000 were also handcuffed. In 1996, the them make more informed decisions about their total estimated number of persons who were sub- use. jected to police use of force in the United States was 1.3 million. It is important to note that these statistics include incidents of force that were jus- USE- OF- FORCE T O OLS: tified in order to protect citizens and officers AN INTRODUCTION from violent suspects. To discharge their duties, police officers rely on When faced with the need to use force, ad- an arsenal of tools, ranging on the continuum of vancements in technology have greatly changed force from less-lethal options to firearms. As an the weapons used by police. Indeed, it appears

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that police defensive weaponry has come full cir- other handgun technologies); this is not surpris- cle. During the mid-1800s, police officers in ing in light of the recent emphasis on less-lethal Boston and New York relied on less-lethal weapons. Nonetheless, police executives must weapons (primarily wooden clubs). In the late grapple with issues related to the use of firearms. 1800s, in response to better-armed criminals, po- At the center of the debate is not whether police lice forces began issuing firearms to officers (Al- should carry them, but the caliber of these lison and Wardman 2004, 116). While firearms firearms and the number of rounds in the maga- are still standard-issue tools, police departments zine. High-profile, use-of-force incidents often once again emphasize less-lethal options (albeit generate attention to these issues. There have more advanced ones than in the nineteenth cen- been calls to give police greater “stopping” power, tury) in their efforts to save lives and reduce in- and many agencies have increased the size of the juries. Examples of these advancements include bullets officers carry or the number of rounds in conducted energy devices such as the Taser™, the . Following threats of domestic ter- bean bag projectiles, incapacitant sprays, and col- rorism and brazen robberies such as ones that oc- lapsible batons. It is noted that some depart- curred in Hollywood, California, and more re- ments classify the use of police dogs as a use of cently in Richardson, Texas, some police force. A commentary on the deployment of po- executives have provided their officers with addi- lice canines is included in box 3.1. tional firepower (for example, patrol rifles). This added firepower makes police tactics all the more important and increases the danger of stray bul- Firearms lets and the chances that fellow officers, suspects, Unlike their U.K. counterparts, American police and civilians could be injured or killed. It can officers have been carrying handguns for more also fuel accusations that police excessively fired than 140 years. While not originally issued their weapons. Police executives struggle to find firearms, American police began carrying them an appropriate balance, as they must also be con- for personal protection without formal depart- cerned about not providing such weaponry as mental authorization (Geller and Scott 1992, they face an “arms race” with criminals that may 248). Eventually, in 1884, Boston police issued leave their officers vulnerable. .38 caliber Smith & Wesson to officers, As in the past, advances will continue to be and the New York City Police followed in the made in firearms technology. Firearms will more 1890s by issuing .32 caliber Colt revolvers (Alli- than likely become safer and more efficient as so- son and Wardman 2004). The served as phisticated new technology is integrated into the principal sidearm for police departments in their manufacture. the United States until the 1980s when agencies began to transition to semi-automatic pistols be- cause of tactical disadvantages officers faced Conducted Energy Devices (Geller and Scott 1992, 343). Conducted energy devices have been credited Today the semi-automatic pistol is still the with reducing police use of deadly force by giving primary standard-issue police service firearm. them another less-lethal option in dealing with Demand by the police industry is not strong for suspects. Until recently, TASER International’s the development of other types of handguns (for products were the only electronic incapacitating example, gas-powered or air-powered guns or devices commercially available for police officers

Chapter 3. Use-of-Force Tools — 59

COMMENTARY: box 3.1 K-9 Deployment as a Serious Use of Force: Handler-Controlled Alert Methodology by Dennis Nowicki, Former Chief of Police, responsibility for the actions of the K-9 squarely Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department on the dog handler—where it properly belongs.5 The MPD has adopted the Handler-Controlled Many police departments overlook K-9 deploy- Alert Methodology (H-CAM).6 MPD’s policy and ment as a serious use of force. The force contin- training methods are designed to ensure that the uum of some departments does not include ca- handler and K-9 are trained to the point that the nine deployment as a force response at any level. handler can demonstrate total control over the Canine deployments are at the discretion of the dog’s actions. The canine will only engage on handler, with few restrictions on when off-leash handler command except under two very limited searches or tracks are allowed. Currently a debate circumstances: protecting the canine handler is underway within police circles over canine force from attack and gunfire. policies. Two canine policy labels define the sides H-CAM is not just a means by which a dog is in this debate: find and bite versus find and bark.3 trained. It’s a holistic approach to canine team The International Association of Chiefs of Police training and supervision that—when done cor- (IACP) promotes the find and bark policy.4 Some rectly—ensures that the handler has complete police canine associations and many active ca- control and understands that he is responsible for nine trainers argue biting is a natural response the actions of his dog. The way this is accom- for the dog and must be incorporated into train- plished differs from conventional canine training ing and practice. Still others hold that any dis- in the emphasis placed on the mindset and tacti- tinctions between the two approaches are mini- cal skills of the handler. Throughout basic and in- mal. A police canine, whether trained in a find service training, the emphasis is on both handler and bite or find and bark policy, will bite if pro- education and canine obedience. During monthly voked by the suspect. in-service training handlers are repetitively in- The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) structed on departmental policy, entry techniques, in Washington, D.C. recently revised its policy to and the ever-elusive “what if” scenarios. Each give greater guidance on when a canine can be phase of training is intertwined with information used and who can authorize a deployment. The on how the handler might use a particular tactic to department has also adopted a policy and train- reach the desired outcome. Canine control is also ing approach, one that is designed to place the stressed throughout the training. Handlers and

3. Two labels for this canine use philosophy are used interchangeably, find and bark and bark and bay. 4. See the IACP model policy and discussion paper. 5. MPD General Order GO-RAR-306.01, October 7, 2002. 6. The principal architect of this policy, and the creator of the label, is MPD Canine Sergeant Duane Buethe. Sergeant Buethe contributed to this box.

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their dogs are constantly drilled on control and level. Handlers display an understanding of the obedience, so that at the end of training the dog importance of restrained and thoughtful use of can perform an array of complicated commands. force. The department’s policy and training make Each command is designed to ensure handler the handlers fully aware that a canine bite is a se- control. Each time a dog is called on to perform a rious use of force and that they are responsible particular task, the dog will begin and finish with for their dog’s actions. an acknowledgement of obedience. Whatever policy a department adopts, police With training centered on handler control and canine tracking or searching for a wanted subject education, managers can more readily recognize is a serious use of force and must be properly handlers who demonstrate a lack of good deci- managed. Department policy should define when sion-making skills. At the end of basic training, a canine can be used and who it can be used handlers understand that they are responsible for against. Except in exigent circumstances, deploy- the dog’s actions. Though there are some limited ment decisions should be made by a supervisor, exceptions, the decision generally rests solely not the handler. The policy, day-to-day supervi- with the handler whether the dog bites the sus- sion, and training should reinforce the principle pect. The results for MPD have been positive. The that the handler is accountable for not only his ac- department has seen a decrease in canine use of tions and but also the actions of his canine. force, while its criminal apprehensions remain

Chapter 3. Use-of-Force Tools — 61

to carry (IACP 2003). As a result, the most com- with hooks) that attaches to clothing or pene- mon devices in use by law enforcement are the trates the skin after the Taser is fired, delivering Taser M26 and X26 models. However, two com- an electrical charge (Association of Chief Police panies have recently entered the market. In Jan- Officers 2004). When the barbs strike, the elec- uary 2005, Stinger Systems™ Inc. began offering trical current is sent down the wires and through its Stinger 4 Dart Less Lethal Gun, and in March the body between the two barb points. In the 2005, Law Enforcement Associates™ (LEA) touch stun mode, electrical contacts on the Taser began offering its LEA Stun Gun. It is likely that are pressed directly onto a person; there is a sim- more devices using this technology will be devel- ilar but reduced neuromuscular effect (Donnelly oped for sale to law enforcement agencies in the et al. 2002). The company claims, based on their future. This section of the chapter will focus on own research, that Tasers do not cause perma- the Taser device because of its current wide- nent physical damage or other long-term ill ef- spread deployment.7 fects. Several investigations into the safety and Taser is an acronym for the Thomas A. Swift effects of this weapon, however, are in progress at Electric Rifle, developed in the 1970s by Jack the time of this writing. Taser specifications in- Cover. Swift was a fictional character in a 1930s dicate that the Taser is effective on persons up to series of science fiction books by Victor Appleton 21 feet away; the ability of police to keep such a (Sanchez 2004). The Taser fires darts that attach distance from a suspect during a confrontation to (or penetrate) a person’s skin or clothing and enhances their safety significantly. It is noted that create an incapacitating electrical current. The a UK study questions the effectiveness range of Taser has evolved over the years. In 1999, the the device. Information about that study is in- company developed the Advanced Taser M26, cluded later in this chapter. which was powered by an alkaline battery and The Taser has been welcomed by law en- used nitrogen cartridges, rather than gunpowder, forcement agencies in the United States and which was used in earlier models, to fire projec- around the world seeking less-lethal weapons. tiles. Shaped liked a handgun, the Advanced Taser According to TASER International, more than M26 became popular with law enforcement offi- 6,000 law enforcement agencies in 2005 (prima- cers. In 2003, the company introduced the Taser rily in the United States) use Tasers, with more X26, more compact than the Advanced Taser than 1,150 agencies deploying them to all officers M26 and, according to the company, more effi- on patrol. There are more than 100,000 Tasers in cient. It is powered by a lithium battery and also use by police officers in the field (Kelly 2004). uses nitrogen cartridges to fire projectiles. These The Taser gives officers a less-than-lethal option conducted energy devices deliver an electrical in dealing with confrontational persons. Howev- current that interferes with the body’s neuromus- er, it also has sparked considerable controversy. cular system, temporarily incapacitating a target- Some question whether this type of technology is ed person. They are laser-sighted and use car- truly effective in reducing use of force by police, tridges attached to the end of the weapon’s barrel. including use of deadly force. There also are con- The Taser has two modes: “probe” and cerns that Tasers may unintentionally contribute “touch stun.” In the probe mode the cartridges to death. Debate will surely continue on their project, via a set of wires, a pair of barbs (or darts medical effects on people, their impact on other

7. Many of the same issues associated with the use of Tasers are likely to apply to the use of the Stinger and LEA conducted energy products.

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uses of force, and their location on the force con- baton rounds is extremely important; it is dan- tinuum until much more extensive, independent gerous to deploy them above the waist. Addition- research is completed. (Chapter 2 discusses Taser ally, there has been concern about the need to policy-related issues in more detail). readily distinguish these less-lethal devices from regular firearms—creating readily identifiable delivery systems such as orange stocks. Less-Lethal Projectile Munitions Here we discuss two kinds of less-lethal projectile munitions: bean bag munitions and pepper- Pepper-Loaded Munitions loaded munitions. Rubber bullets and baton Pepper-loaded projectiles, such as PepperBall™ rounds are also briefly mentioned in the next brand munitions,8 were developed as a less-lethal section. weapon for both military and civilian police agencies. These pepper-loaded munitions are widely used in North American and European Bean Bag Munitions countries, including by police forces in the Unit- The first bean bag weapon was developed in the ed Kingdom (Davison and Lewer 2003). These 1970s. Once used only by specialized police units, munitions are usually used for crowd control but bean bag munitions are increasingly deployed by can also be deployed by officers on patrol. Pep- officers on patrol (Hubbs and Klinger 2004a). per-loaded projectiles are delivered through air- Both civilian law enforcement and the military compressed launchers. These launchers come in use them. Bean bag rounds, like rubber bullets pistol and rifle versions. Rifles can deliver up and baton rounds (the latter are rubber projec- to 160 rounds. These munitions travel between tiles larger than a rubber bullet) are considered 300 and 380 feet per second. The rounds are less-lethal impact weapons. In the United States, .68-caliber marble-size plastic balls designed police have preferred bean bag munitions over to break on impact (Green 2002). The rounds other types of less-lethal projectile munitions. In are filled with either Oleoresin Capsicum (O.C.) Northern Ireland, use of baton rounds and rub- or Pelargonic Acid Vanillyamide (PAVA), a syn- ber bullets during mass demonstrations has thetic powder designed to cause burning of the sparked controversy because of instances of seri- eyes, temporary blinding, and inflammation of ous injury and death. the mucous membranes and the upper respirato- Bean bag rounds and other impact muni- ry system (Stidman 2004). A companion round tions were designed to stun or otherwise tem- designed to shatter glass can be fired in instances porarily incapacitate a suspect or dangerous indi- where suspects are enclosed in automobiles (Po- vidual so that law enforcement officers could liceOne.com 2004). subdue and arrest that person with less danger of The PepperBall System was introduced in injury or death for themselves and others (Hubbs 1999 and used by the Seattle Police Department and Klinger 2004b). The actual impact of one of during World Trade Organization demonstra- the bean bag munitions has been described as tions (Green 2002). During the 2002 Olympics, being hit by a major league baseball pitch. Prop- pepper-loaded projectiles were utilized to help er use of bean bag munitions, rubber bullets, and control a riotous crowd in downtown Salt Lake

8. PepperBall is a registered trademark of Pepperball Technologies, Inc.

Chapter 3. Use-of-Force Tools — 63

City (Reavy 2002). These munitions were also Batons procured for use during the 2004 Democratic The police baton has seen numerous styles and National Convention (Peters 2004) and are au- iterations. It changed from wood to polymer, it thorized for use at many colleges and universities, grew a handle as the PR-24, and today compact including San Diego State University (Rivard collapsible batons are widely used. Fixed length 2000). Like bean bag rounds, pepper-loaded mu- batons fell out of favor because they were too nitions have raised concerns because of deaths bulky and cumbersome; stored in “O” ring utility caused by inappropriate deployment of the belt hooks, fixed length batons repeatedly strike weapon. Projectiles that strike a subject above the the leg as an officer walks along. Exacerbating waist can be lethal. Issues related to the O.C. the inconvenience is the inability to maintain the loaded in the projectiles are discussed in the next baton in its holder when the officer sits down in section. a vehicle. Officers would remove it so they could sit down and then sometimes forget it when get- ting out of the car. As a result, upon arriving on Oleoresin Capsicum Spray the scene of an incident, officers would lack the Oleoresin Capsicum is an organic extract of availability of this less-lethal option during a cayenne pepper that is inflammatory to the eyes confrontation and increase the likelihood that a and mucus membranes. Originally used by U.S. firearm would be used. Today many police de- Postal Service carriers (Geller and Scott 1992, partments favor the collapsible baton because of 378), O.C. spray now is widely used by law en- its compactness and accessibility. forcement agencies with more than 100 officers Fitting easily on an officer’s utility belt, (Alpert and Smith 2000). O.C. spray has enjoyed today’s collapsible baton is readily available at all high levels of effectiveness with low rates of asso- times. Its light weight and retractable form also ciated injuries (Alpert and Smith 2000). A 1999 make it useful for plainclothes personnel. Three study determined that O.C. spray was effective 85 common brands of expandable batons used in percent of the time (Kaminski, Edwards, and law enforcement today are the ASP, Winchester, Johnson 1999). Many contemporary policies au- and Monadnock products. In the past, the pri- thorize the use of O.C. spray when a suspect has mary concern with the use of batons has been the indicated an intention to actively resist an officer. location of the strikes (head and bone strikes Thus, officers can deploy it before an actual phys- rather than major muscle strikes) and the num- ical confrontation. The use of O.C. spray has not ber of strikes employed by officers. Further, as caused recent significant objection by the public, noted in Chapter 2, the use of flashlights as ba- but there have been instances of in-custody tons has been controversial, and several agencies deaths that occurred in conjunction with the use have developed guidelines for their use that are of the spray. In addition, concerns have been similar to those for batons. (See Box 3.2 for an ar- raised about O.C. spray flammability—especially ticle about the evolution of less-lethal weapons in light of the increased use of conducted energy within one law enforcement agency). devices. The United Kingdom is seeking alterna- tive sprays, including the development of a syn- thetic O.C.-type formula.

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COMMENTARY: box 3.2 Less-Lethal Weapons: Their Evolution and the Leadership of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department by Charles “Sid” Heal, Commander, law enforcement provided any clear advantage. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Besides being noticeably more effective, O.C. spray had less cross-contamination than the Like most law enforcement agencies, the Los An- CS/CN spray (also known as tear gas) that was geles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) had being used at that time. Other less-lethal options been looking for years for effective less-lethal op- had also appeared, such as the stingball grenade tions without any real success. While the search and 37mm baton munitions, but they did not had always been enthusiastic, it approached near enjoy the widespread acceptance of O.C. spray desperation in the late 1970s and early 1980s and required substantially more training to safely when the popularity of PCP as a recreational drug employ. By the middle of the decade, shotgun dominated the streets of Los Angeles.9 Because launched munitions, such as the “stun bag,”10 of the effects of PCP on suspects, conventional pellet, or fin-stabilized rounds had gained a fol- pain compliance options—including “tried and lowing and were used with great success in re- true” impact weapons like the baton—proved solving situations that had traditionally required completely useless. So many deputies were in- the use of substantially more force—often jured in confrontations with suspects under the lethal—to resolve. Later, the new, improved Taser influence of PCP that the desk crews of some sta- enjoyed tremendous success and popularity. tions were comprised entirely of deputies recov- The turning point for contemporary law en- ering from their injuries. Experiments with po- forcement in its use of less-lethal options oc- tential solutions took on an almost bizarre curred on the opposite side of the globe in the character as contrivances of poles, nets, ropes, spring of 1995. The U.S. Marines had employed and chains were ineffectually employed. After a number of innovative nonlethal technologies years of searching, it became apparent that the and products ranging from “sticky foam” to technology was just not available, and while the lasers, as well some of the more conventional desire remained strong, efforts to find effective less-lethal munitions used by domestic law en- less-lethal tools waned. forcement, while evacuating the United Nations It wasn’t until the early 1990s with the advent troops from the shores of Mogadishu, Somalia. of Oleoresin Capsicum (O.C.) spray that the first The operation was an overwhelming success and significant breakthrough in less lethal options for captured the attention of the worldwide press.

9. The chemical name Phenyl Cyclohexyl Piperidine is also known as “PCP” and “angel dust,” as well as other street names. 10. Also known as a “bean bag,” probably because of the soft and resilient texture mimicking bean bags; this munition uses about 40 grams of #9 lead shot or silica sewn into a Cordura or ballistic nylon bag.

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box 3.2 continued

The principal advisor on less-lethal options for modified to be less lethal. Within the next few the operation was a U.S. Marine who also hap- years, however, breakthrough devices using elec- pened to be a LASD lieutenant. Upon return to tro-magnetic energy, pulsed energy projectiles, duty with the LASD, he was partnered with anoth- acoustical waves, chemical agents, and light will er lieutenant, a subject matter expert on force, provide incredible advantages. In providing guid- and the duo was tasked with identifying, develop- ance and direction to its deputies and to mem- ing, and integrating technologies that may have bers of the profession, the LASD shares the applications for law enforcement, with a focus on tremendous insight it has gained by overcoming less-lethal options. The LASD was fortunate to operational problems and avoiding pitfalls in de- have its technical expertise within the depart- veloping less-lethal options for domestic law en- ment, and the duo’s work marked the inception of forcement. The LASD considers itself the steward the department’s internationally recognized Tech- of this information and not the owner, freely giv- nology Exploration Program. ing it to other law enforcement agencies and de- Throughout the 1990s and into the new mil- velopers “for the good of the cause.” Through lennium, deputies from the LASD have combed leadership support, vision, and innovation, the the marketplace and federal laboratories, and met LASD has studied the evolution of less-lethal with defense contractors and private developers, technology, and it remains committed to the ef- in search of promising tools for resolving law en- fective management of use of force. Organiza- forcement problems without resorting to lethal tional focus and the desire to reduce injuries and force. These tools proved not to be new devices, death have helped the LASD to become a leader but rather existing technologies that had been in this field.

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USE- OF- FORCE TOOLS: officers from shooting at vehicles or through CRITICAL ISSUES AND doors when a suspect cannot be seen. PROMISING APPROACHES Despite the risks just described, many agen- In this section we consider the matters depart- cies of all sizes have transitioned to the more pow- ments nationwide are examining with regard to erful .40-caliber pistols. For example, the Federal police weaponry. We also present promising ap- Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, proaches taken by particular departments in their Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the Illinois efforts to address these critical issues. State Police, and the (IL) Police De- partment all use .40-caliber handguns (Rockrohr 2004). The Atlanta Police Department awarded a Firearms: How Much Firepower? contract to Smith & Wesson Corporation to pur- While the carrying of firearms by police has not chase 1,500 Model 4003 .40-caliber handguns for been questioned recently in the United States, al- its officers (Smith & Wesson 2004). One impetus though their use, whether justified or not, has cer- for this change has been highly publicized inci- tainly been controversial in some circumstances. dents involving heavily armed suspects (e.g., the At issue today, from the law enforcement perspec- Columbine High School shootings and North tive, are calls for greater firepower. As agencies Hollywood bank robberies). have converted to semi-automatic pistols, which There has also been some experimentation accommodate a greater number of bullets than with the .45-caliber round. John Gnagey, execu- revolvers, the caliber11 of bullet and firearm has tive director of the National Tactical Officers As- fostered concern. One debate centers on prefer- sociation, notes that specialized units within the ences for either 9mm pistols or .40-caliber pistols. Texas Rangers, as well as some West Coast Special When many police departments transitioned Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, have fa- to semi-automatic pistols twenty years ago, the vored the .45-caliber cartridge. These special preference was for 9mm handguns. However, .40- mission units favor the .45-caliber round because caliber pistols are more powerful, and they are of its diameter, mass, weight, momentum, and more likely to penetrate windshield glass, doors, potential penetration ability. Officers on patrol, and plywood. These more powerful weapons however, do not commonly use this caliber have better “” against a threat. weapon. They give police officers greater ability to stop a Many law enforcement executives are favor- dangerous assailant secreted behind an object— ing conversion to the .40-caliber pistols to replace reducing the likelihood of injury to officers. aging 9mm pistols. All of the provide However, the enhanced power of .40-caliber pis- some level of protection for police officers. In se- tols has some drawbacks. Although the larger cal- lecting a standard issue handgun for their offi- iber weapon offers greater power—with larger cers, in addition to officer safety concerns, law bullets that are more likely to penetrate objects— enforcement executives should consider their ju- risks of injuries to bystanders are increased. Many risdiction’s geography, population density, hous- police agencies in densely populated urban areas ing, and crime levels. One factor to assess is the try to prevent bystander injuries by restricting number of homes and apartments that are built

11. Caliber is defined as the diameter of a bullet and the size of the bore of a weapon that shoots the bullet.

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with drywall. Drywall offers less protection from However, the department will develop guidelines stray bullets than buildings built with bricks and and scenarios in which the weapons can be used cinderblock. before officers are permitted to carry them on pa- In order to deploy weapons with greater trol. In addition, the chief has prohibited the use firepower and accuracy at a distance, many police of optics, lasers, and bayonets (Minai 2004). In departments are arming patrol officers with pa- Richardson, Texas, police will place AR-15 rifles trol rifles. Historically, some police departments in all of their patrol cars as a result of an armed in the 1920s and 1930s experimented with the robbery where assailants fired multiple bursts of Thompson , but the weapon fell bullets at officers (Hundley and Jackson 2004). It out of favor (Allison and Wardman 2004), and is likely that the trend of deploying police rifles departments chose instead a standard shotgun— on patrol will continue. often a . However, shot- To foster good tactics and manage the dead- guns, loaded either with buckshot or rifle slug, do ly force issues that rifles raise, executives must not offer the precision desired by police officers; emphasize policy and training before deploying the risk of injuring bystanders increases. Rifles, patrol rifles to the field. According to a former also known as long guns, offer much more accu- commanding officer of a firearms training unit in racy than the shotgun—affording less opportuni- a major city police department, police rifles, ty to injure passersby. Rifles were used mainly by when deployed poorly, can actually hinder an of- specialized police emergency response teams ficer’s ability to de-escalate a force situation. If an (Smith 2002). However, with the onset of inci- officer has presented a rifle and then attempts to dents involving heavily armed suspects as well as make an arrest, the officer’s ability to de-escalate terrorism concerns, police departments have and engage in hand-control options may be less- again considered rifles for patrol. A standard- ened because the rifle cannot be holstered. The issue high-powered rifle for police officers on pa- same commanding officer recommends that de- trol has significant implications for use-of-force ployment of rifles be limited to situations where management that have yet to be fully addressed. multiple officers are present and available to em- ploy hand-control and other less-lethal options. In addition, he recommends that rifles be Rifles and Use-of-Force Management equipped with a sling—enabling officers to have Some police departments are moving quickly to use of both hands if needed. The Drug Enforce- get rifles into the hands of patrol officers, but first ment Administration requires a sling on its as- they must ensure that effective policies and train- sault rifles and further mandates that agents ing are in place. The chief of the Dallas Police De- carry the weapon with the muzzle down beneath partment announced plans to purchase sixty-five the shoulder (Rauch 2002). Wakefield, Massa- AR-15 rifles, and has authorized members to chusetts police have armed patrol officers with purchase their own rifles and use them on the Bushmaster AR-15 rifles, and incorporated street. The chief restricted such purchases to a guidelines for their use into departmental policy. department-approved model, and he requires of- Wakefield’s training program has drills to teach ficers to attend a 40-hour training course prior to officers how to properly use the weapon’s sling their use (Eiserer 2004). Recently, the police chief when handcuffing suspects (Cooney 2002). in St. Petersburg, Florida, decided to allow the Some community members from where pa- use of high-powered rifles by patrol officers. trol rifles are being used have expressed concern

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about stray bullets because of the rifle’s multiple prevents criminals—as well as other unautho- round capability (Minai 2004). According to one rized persons—from shooting a firearm issued to expert, in order to minimize stray bullets, agen- a police officer. In an outpatient procedure, a tiny, cies should choose weapons that have a “select- rice-size chip is implanted just under the skin in fire” feature that allows switching only between the officer’s hand—VeriChip says it’s like getting a single shot, semi-automatic, or three-round- shot. This chip matches a scanning device inside burst selections. The select-fire feature mini- an issued police handgun. Radio frequency ener- mizes the number of rounds fired in an incident. gy emits a signal transmitting the police officer’s Fewer rounds are discharged in any of the select- unique verification number. If the officer and the fire modes than in a fully automatic mode where gun match, a digital signal unlocks the trigger so there is a constant uninterrupted stream of dis- the gun can be fired (New York Times 2004; Asso- charges. ciated Press 2004a). This technology is applicable According to some experts, if an agency to both handguns and rifles, and it could be ap- elects to deploy patrol rifles, it should match the plied to other police devices. Smart guns have the caliber of the selected rifle with the caliber of the potential to reduce injuries and deaths of officers agency’s issued handgun. This promotes interop- in situations when they lose control of their erability both in training and street situations. weapons. More research is needed to better un- Others, however, are less interested in matching derstand this technology’s application in law en- rifle calibers to handgun calibers. A Special forcement, and the health and safety implications Weapons and Tactics Unit expert recommends a for the police officer warrant further study. There rifle that shoots a .223 round, which he believes is are also important tactical considerations (such as effective at stopping deadly threats at a distance. whether or not another officer would be able to In his opinion, the greater accuracy of the .223 use the firearm of an incapacitated officer during round outweighs the desire for greater interoper- a critical incident). Furthermore, there are other ability. In either case, if a decision is made to per- smart gun technologies emerging such as retinal mit patrol rifles to be carried, then it must be de- scan, fingerprint, and palm sensing devices that termined which officers will be permitted to carry will provide law enforcement officers of the future them, and where they can be carried. Some agen- even greater alternatives. (An article discussing cies have authorized all personnel to carry the less-lethal weapons and their possible impact on weapons, while others have limited those who deadly force is contained in Box 3.3) carry them to supervisors and/or senior officers. Some agencies require the rifles to be secured in a patrol vehicle’s trunk, while others permit the Conducted Energy Devices weapon to be accessible from within the seating As noted in previous chapters, conducted energy area. devices like the Taser provide officers with less- lethal options and complement other tools such as collapsible batons and O.C. spray. The Cincin- Smart Guns nati police chief has said that Tasers are deliver- The next step in the evolution of police firearms is ing “astronomical benefits” to his agency as the advent of smart guns. One company that has part of its overall reform efforts (Prendergast developed smart gun technology is VeriChip Inc. 2004). With the deployment of Tasers, the Char- (2004), The company claims their technology lotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department has

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ARTICLE: box 3.3 Do Non-Lethal Weapons Prevent Lethal Consequences?12 by Lorie A. Fridell and Antony M. Pate include the use of chemical agents, batons, tasers, stun guns, and other devices. This commentary originally appeared in the newslet- Encounters between police and citizens in ter of the ACLU of Florida. In it authors Fridell and which force is used frequently involve a sequence Pate (1993) promote the important role of less-lethal of interrelated stages. What happens, or does not weapons during a period when the national board of happen, at an early stage is likely to have an effect the ACLU was considering a policy that would dis- on what happens, or does not, at a later stage. courage police use of less-lethal weapons. Conflict between the two parties can escalate or The videotaped beating of Rodney King with de-escalate from one stage to another. Many po- department-issued batons by officers of the Los lice departments train their officers to consider Angeles Police Department has provided undeni- the use of force as a hierarchy of options, escalat- able proof of the awesome power of what are ing or de-escalating the use of force in response sometimes called “less-than-lethal” weapons. to the behavior of their opponents. Recognizing the importance of such weapons, the National Board of the ACLU has Deadly Force a Last Stage begun consideration of a new policy concerning The use of deadly force by police officers repre- “police use of disabling weapons that are not in- sents a most lamentable “last stage” of such an tended to be lethal.” This policy debate has encounter. A common reason why such deadly caused controversy over the question: At what force occurs is that officers did not use, or did not point is it appropriate to use “non-lethal” force? have available, adequate non-lethal means to maintain control before reaching the point where Options Available to Police lethal force was required. The legitimate use of force is an inherent part of Seen in this perspective, providing police offi- the job of the police officer. Unfortunately, people cers with non-lethal weapons can be understood do not always acquiesce readily in their own ar- as providing them with the means to prevent a vi- rests. In order to subdue recalcitrant suspects, olent encounter with a citizen from escalating to law enforcement officers sometimes have to re- the use of fatal force. It is therefore important to sort to more than verbal demands, using, at a recognize the important role that non-lethal minimum, a firm grip, and, in the most extreme weapons can play in law enforcement. cases, deadly force. In between these two ex- However, before any “debilitating” non-lethal tremes, there are a number of options available to weapons (such as chemical or electrical shock police in order to effect an arrest. These options weapons) are used, they should be certified as

12. This commentary was originally published in May of 1993 in “The ,” the periodical of the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida (Volume 28, No. 2, reprinted with permission). Authors made minor modifications to the article for editorial purposes.

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safe and effective for their intended use with min- a defense-of-life situation (where deadly force imal or no side-effects that outweigh their bene- would be justified) or in a riot. By not allowing its fits. In addition, there needs to be rigorous police use at an earlier stage of the encounter prior to training in the use of these devices. where deadly force would be justified, one ends But, in a perverse manifestation of the law of up in the position of endorsing the use of batons unintended consequences, many civil libertarians in the numerous encounters where force is neces- believe that trained officers should not be allowed sary but deadly force is not appropriate. to use these safe weapons in the very situations in A more graphic understanding of the ramifi- which they might be most effective in averting the cations this severe restriction of non-lethal force use of greater force. Many feel that the use of can be appreciated from the story of a former law these weapons should be restricted to only those enforcement officer who tells of a situation where situations in which the officer or another person he and another officer faced a very drunk, very is in imminent danger of death or life-threatening angry, and very large gentleman for whom there injury. was probable cause to make an arrest. The sus- Failing to provide officers access to non-lethal pect clearly intended to forcibly resist that arrest. weapons at the critical intermediate stages of en- With the use of pepper mace, the suspect was counters, leaves a dangerous hiatus in which offi- safely in custody in minutes, and the effects of the cers are left with little else but their batons for weapon disappeared soon afterward. If non-lethal purposes of control until the situations escalate chemical weapons were restricted to “deadly to the point where their guns become necessary. force” situations as many propose, the police in This is exactly the scenario that the availability of that situation would have had no other option but non-lethal weapons ought to be able to prevent. to engage in physical battle, probably with their A case in point is the new chemical agent batons, increasing the risk that the force could es- commonly called “pepper mace” because it is calate even further. made from a derivative of cayenne pepper. If our goal is to reduce the use of lethal force, Although conclusive results of tests are not yet non-lethal weapons can be a valuable tool in available, all evidence so far indicates that this achieving that goal. Policy that would provide weapon is very effective in stopping suspects, training to police officers in the use of such even exceedingly violent ones, and has minimal, weapons that have been proven safe and effective if any, long-term effects. Assuming the benefits should be supported. And policy that would dis- of this weapon outweigh its risks, many [civil courage, rather than encourage the use of these libertarians] would still disallow its use except in weapons should be strenuously opposed.

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experienced reductions in the use of other less- Critical Issues in Policing Conference in San lethal weapons as well as a reduction in officer in- Diego). juries (Shultz 2004). The Miami Police Depart- Critics, however, claim that Tasers are not ment reported that after they adopted Tasers, necessarily less-lethal weapons and that they ac- they experienced no police-involved shootings tually result in more force being used—not less. for twenty consecutive months. During the same This was the conclusion reached by a study in Or- period, the Seattle Police Department reported ange County, Florida. Although the use of O.C. no police-involved shooting deaths after they spray and batons decreased in that jurisdiction, adopted the device, with the chief affording some the number of total force incidents (including the of the credit to Tasers (Castro 2004b). The use of Tasers) increased by 58 percent over three Phoenix Police Department, after it began using years (Berenson 2004). Tasers, experienced its lowest rate of deadly po- Police departments place conducted energy lice shootings in fourteen years (Kershaw 2004). devices at different points on the use-of-force In Portland, Oregon, police found that between continuum, although some consensus has recent- 25 percent and 30 percent of situations where the ly emerged. TASER International (2004) reports Taser was used met the criteria for the use of that almost 87 percent of police department cus- deadly force (Jones 2004). tomers place the Taser at the same level or before In the United Kingdom, the Association of O.C. spray—a percentage consistent with the Chief Police Officers of England, Wales, and findings of an August 17, 2004, survey by PERF of Northern Ireland (ACPO) conducted an opera- thirty-six law enforcement agencies. This place- tional trial of the Taser, piloting the devices in five ment on the force continuum greatly expands the British police jurisdictions. ACPO (2004) con- circumstances where the Taser can be used. Op- cluded that the Taser device was a useful and ef- portunities for inappropriate use also increase. fective piece of equipment that can help to de-es- (For a detailed explanation of linear and circular calate potentially violent situations and reduce models of the use-of-force continuum, see Chap- harm with more precision than other alterna- ter 2.) tives. In the ACPO pilot, the mere threat of using In Milwaukee, police reports during a the Taser de-escalated the situation in 57 percent twelve-week period revealed that 70 percent of of cases involving potential deployment. This in- persons hit with a Taser were injured in some cluded instances where a laser sight from the way, although none seriously (Diedrich 2004). Taser was aimed at a subject, as well as when the Critics also cite more than ninety incidents where device was pointed at a subject. However, anoth- people died after a Taser was used upon them, er UK study raised concerns about the maximum and claim that the Taser was a major causal factor range of effectiveness for the device. While the in those deaths. The manufacturer adamantly in- length of the connecting wires are 21 feet, the UK sists that none of the deaths were caused directly study found that the device become increasingly by the device (TASER International 2004). In re- inaccurate after 15 feet. The study noted that at sponse, some law enforcement executives have distances of less than15 feet, the devices were suspended authorization to deploy the Taser or found to be sufficiently accurate. (Donnelly delayed their purchase of these devices. For ex- 2002). (Box 3.4 summarizes the United King- ample, Forsyth County, Georgia, withdrew the dom’s presentation about Tasers at the PERF devices, citing possible concerns about Taser- related deaths and the need for an independent

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study (Mungin 2004). The Fort Wayne (IN) Po- At this writing, the policies of police de- lice Department delayed purchasing the devices partments vary concerning the use of a conduct- until more research could be conducted (Cortez ed energy device. Should it be used on passively 2004). The American Civil Liberties Union resisting suspects or only actively resisting sus- (ACLU) of Colorado has complained that Tasers pects? Where on the body is use permissible? are being abused by police in a manner that “con- Does the number of applications and duration of stitutes unnecessary and unreasonable force that shocks impact safety? Does use in conjunction may constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading with a flammable substance increase the possibil- treatment” (Silverstein 2004). The ACLU of ity of ignition? Should its use against certain pop- Hawaii has sought limits on Taser use and has ulations—such as juveniles, pregnant women, asked that they be used only in situations where and those suffering from known medical condi- lethal force would be justified (Associated Press tions—be prohibited? Further, how should po- 2004b). lice officers respond when confronting suspects In 2003, Amnesty International called for a who are armed with a Taser? On these important moratorium on Tasers until an independent in- questions, policies are inconsistent. Concerns quiry on the use and effects of Tasers is complet- have also been raised about the use of a Taser on ed, and in 2004 it reiterated this recommendation seniors or individuals suffering from osteoporo- (Amnesty International 2003, 2004). In the 2004 sis. A deputy sheriff suffering from this bone- report, Amnesty International offers recommen- weakening disease reportedly sustained a fracture dations to agencies that decline to suspend Taser after he was shocked during a training exercise usage. One of its significant recommendations is (Anglen 2004). Until more is known about the that police departments using Tasers strictly limit immediate and long-term effects of conducted use to situations where the alternative would be energy devices, agencies should consider placing deadly force. them higher on the force continuum and restrict- As police executives and the citizenry they ing their use to circumstances where suspects are serve continue to work to hold law enforcement actively resisting. Whenever possible, agencies officers accountable for use of force, there is a should avoid using them against pregnant need for continued development and standardi- women, elderly citizens, and others who are zation of guidelines for conducted energy tech- clearly physically impaired. (For a detailed dis- nologies like the Taser. In any police-citizen con- cussion of policies on conducted energy devices, frontation, minimizing injury and respecting see Chapter 2.) individual rights are essential goals. Less-lethal The medical effects of conducted energy weapons can help police officers attain those devices remain a primary concern for police de- goals. Police executives, however, must carefully partments. More research is definitely needed on manage how the Taser or any service weapon is the devices’ effects on people. There has been used. Obviously, any police service weapon must only cursory medical research conducted by or- be used prudently and responsibly and not in a ganizations in the United Kingdom and the Unit- punitive, abusive, or retaliatory manner. Howev- ed States. “From the available evidence,” the er, no common, widely adopted standards for the United Kingdom’s Defence Scientific Advisory use of conducted energy devices have been estab- Council’s subcommittee on the medical implica- lished. There is clearly a need for continued de- tions of less-lethal weapons concluded that “the velopment and standardization of guidelines. risk of life-threatening or serious injuries from

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ARTICLE: box 3.4 Taser Research and Deployment in the United Kingdom by Andrea Morrozoff Luna effectiveness of the device was lacking. Questions were raised about the quality and reliability of the This article summarizes the discussion on Tasers at device, its medical effects, the impact of deploy- the Police Executive Research Forum’s Critical Issues ing the device on persons under the influence of in Policing Conference in San Diego in December alcohol or illegal drugs, and consequences of its 2004. use on persons in a stressful situation—such as The panel at the December 2004 Critical Is- during or after an arrest. Additionally, the pan- sues in Policing Conference in San Diego consist- elists discussed how police executives and super- ed of policing experts—including a scientist with visors in the United Kingdom have managed im- policing expertise—on less-lethal force options in plementation of this new tool post-deployment the United Kingdom. Assistant Chief Constable while keeping these concerns in mind. Ian Arundale of the West Mercia Police Depart- ment, Chief Inspector Richard Prior of the Lon- TESTING AND EVALUATION PROCESS don Metropolitan Police Department, and David Wilkinson of the Police Scientific Development Assistant Chief Arundale provided background on Branch (PSDB) of the U.K. Home Office de- the PSDB evaluation and testing process. He be- scribed the process by which the United Kingdom lieves the process, although time consuming, is approved use of the Taser™ conducted energy de- effective in ensuring the quality of equipment vice on a trial basis in August 2004. The U.K. used by police forces in the United Kingdom and Home Office requires that all police equipment for setting accurate expectations of how equip- and new technologies be tested and evaluated by ment will perform. The process has four stages: the PSDB before they are approved for use by law 1. Defining the operational requirements for enforcement officers. The three panelists dis- the tested equipment (identifying exactly cussed critical issues associated with this evalua- what functions the equipment must per- tion of the Taser. form). The Taser had garnered much publicity—and 2. Devising and conducting operational tests support—from police officials in the United in the field based on the developed require- States. It appeared to be an effective less-lethal ments. tool that could increase the efficacy and profes- sionalism of policing in the United Kingdom while 3. Conducting an independent medical review reducing injuries and deaths of officers and citi- of the tested equipment’s effects on a zens. U.K. police officials approached their gov- range of persons within a series of foresee- ernment in an attempt to gain approval to deploy able conditions. the Taser and a formal evaluation was initiated. 4. Summarizing evaluation findings and The U.K. presenters stated that although making recommendations to the Home the Taser appeared to be a good less-lethal op- Office on the proposed equipment; an tion, comprehensive independent testing on the

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independent international panel writes a 1,200 cartridges during three days in fifteen differ- definitive statement on the equipment ent scenarios. A questionnaire solicited feedback based on the evaluation findings. from users of the device.

These stages are described below as they Independent Medical Review relate to the Taser assessment in the United The PSDB issued its initial report on the medical Kingdom: implications of the Taser in 2002. Since that time, the U.K. Defence Scientific Advisory Coun- Defining Operational Requirements cil’s subcommittee on the medical implications The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) of less lethal weapons (DOMILL) has conducted and representatives from PSDB had consulted further medical research. DOMILL is comprised with stakeholders, policymakers, and practition- of surgeons and well-respected medical practi- ers on less-lethal-force issues and determined tioners in the United Kingdom who reviewed liter- that the Taser could be an effective less-lethal ature and studied the biophysical interaction of tool. The ACPO developed twenty-two desirable the Taser’s electrical current pulses within the characteristics of a less-lethal weapon as a result body. On behalf of DOMILL, the United King- of querying practitioners and stakeholders. Al- dom’s Defence Science and Technology Laborato- though any one piece of equipment may never ry (DSTL) undertook a comprehensive review of meet all of the profession’s needs, the ACPO be- available information about the devices. Over lieves testing the equipment is beneficial in deter- 800 references were reviewed in scientific and mining how much of what is desired can be medical papers, newspaper reports, surveys, and achieved. Once operational requirements are set, various studies. DSTL considered basic neuro- then test standards for the requirements and physiological science, the effects of electrical medical reviews are created to evaluate the pro- fields on physiology, and the application of electri- posed equipment. cal safety standards to Taser outputs. DSTL also undertook computer-based modelling of the in- Operational Testing and Evaluation teraction of Taser electrical pulses with the body, The PSDB assessed the quality, accuracy, and and it qualitatively assessed the distribution of consistency of the Taser— the M26 model and currents emitted from the device. the newer X26 model. It tested battery longevity, accuracy, functioning after being dropped, cloth- Summary of Evaluation Findings and ing penetration, flammability, functioning in ex- Recommendations for Use treme temperatures, and electrical output. In ad- The presenters noted that the PSDB recommen- dition to these physical tests, handling trials were dations were indeed only that; they were not re- conducted. The PSDB observed and documented quirements until reviewed by the Home Office, how officers from twenty police forces and the and policies were established. The testing prison service performed when firing more than process, however, ensured that the government’s

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box 3.4 continued knowledge about the device was thorough, and www.homeoffice.gov.uk and at the PERF website the process fostered public trust since likely out- www.policeforum.org. comes could be predicted. For every new piece of equipment implemented by U.K. law enforce- STRATEGIES FOR POLICE EXECUTIVES ment, this in-depth testing process must be fol- lowed. If agencies desire to upgrade to a newer The PSDB evaluation and testing process identi- model, testing must be conducted and the new fied issues that should be considered when devel- model approved through the same process. Al- oping Taser operational policy. The panelists’ though the process is very time consuming—and presentation at the conference prompted a can- sometimes frustrating to those who would like to did discussion of those wide-ranging issues. Fol- implement new technology immediately—it en- lowing are five strategies to be considered by po- sures that the government knows what to expect lice executives who are contemplating whether to from the equipment in use by law enforcement. procure less-lethal technology. The United Kingdom does not involve manufac- Seek out technologies that meet your needs. turers in supporting the work, developing opera- tional requirements, or in the testing and evalua- Identify the operational requirements for your tion phase in order to ensure that the process is agency’s less-lethal equipment. Discuss force is- independent and objective. The presenters sues with department personnel in order to iden- stressed that the decision to implement new tify force needs and where current equipment or tools or technologies in the United Kingdom technologies are or are not effective. Then, seek must stand up to public scrutiny after they are in out and research the technologies that best fit use. your department’s needs. Do not assume that Findings—including preliminary results from any one new technology or piece of equipment operational medical testing—yielded the expert will become the remedy for all of your depart- panel’s recommendation that the Taser is a useful ment’s issues with use of force. and effective piece of equipment that can help to de-escalate potentially violent situations and re- Don’t rely on manufacturers to conduct duce harm with more precision than other alter- research and develop policy and training. natives. In addition, the evaluation concluded Prior to implementing a new less-lethal option, that from available evidence, the risk of life-threat- look at available research and information and ening or serious injuries from the M26 Advanced search out the recommendations and experi- Taser appeared to be very low. The presenters ences of other police departments that have im- added that U.K. police departments have begun plemented the option you have selected. Also to issue Tasers, and that the United Kingdom has study the findings of organizations, such as spent about $3 million on the testing of the Taser PERF, that have the ability to centrally collect data device. All of the PSDB reports are available at and conduct research. Use their resources to help craft department policies and training

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programs. Consider how your department will the new technology quickly. Many departments address policy, training, and supervision issues have done this by introducing the Taser on a tem- prior to purchasing less-lethal options. Do not porary basis, conducting pilot tests of the equip- rely solely on manufacturer-recommended poli- ment, and deploying it to certain officers. This re- cies or pre-produced training materials. sults in the managed deployment of a new device, while at the same time refining operational poli- Involve the community. cies and procedures. Engage the community and advocacy organiza- tions in the process of selecting less-lethal op- CONCLUSION tions. Explain how new technologies work—and The panelists concluded that the Taser was a when they are to be used. By involving communi- good option for police officers in the right circum- ty groups in discussions, agencies can preemp- stances but that its use should be carefully tively address community concerns. planned and supervised. The evaluation process used by the United Kingdom provides an example Maintain consistency between policy and practice. of how less-lethal technologies can be assessed Police executives should try to make sure that the in the future. By independently identifying needs way the device is presented to the community and products, conducting managed operational matches the way the device is actually deployed in tests, engaging in an independent medical review, the field. If the device is promoted to the commu- and documenting findings, police departments nity as an alternative to deadly force but is used and government agencies can deploy less-lethal frequently in the course of minor confrontations, technologies in the safest and most informed the disconnect will undermine police agency manner. While there is a need to balance the goals and integrity, and will cause friction be- need for evaluation with the need for deployment, tween the public and the police department. For police executives must communicate with the example, use of the Taser device to gain compli- public in order to set expectations. The sensible ance from a belligerent person, or use of the Taser combination of evaluation and communication on a handcuffed individual, will be contrary to the will have beneficial results: safer less-lethal alter- public’s and agency’s expectation. A police de- natives for police and fewer injuries and deaths. partment’s policy must mirror its practices in the field and the expectations of the public in order to strengthen community trust.

Balance the need for testing with the need for deployment. Find a balance between the need to test and eval- uate less-lethal options and the need to deploy

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the M26 Advanced Taser appears to be very low” round itself is approximately one-half ounce of (DOMILL 2004). Noting that drug use could pre- lead and is bound by heavy fabric or Kevlar. dispose an individual to a cardiac event, the sub- Original rounds, approximately 2 inches by 2 committee advises officers to be aware that the inches, were flat with squared corners. Due to the risk of an adverse response to a Taser deployment potential for injury caused by these sharply cor- may be higher in drug-impaired individuals nered munitions, new projectiles have been de- (DOMILL 2004). veloped. These munitions are round in shape Although the United Kingdom has exam- and often have a stabilizing tail, although the ined the limited deployment of Tasers, little re- tail’s effectiveness has been questioned (Donnel- search has been done in the United States. The ly 2001). Manufacturers offer several models, in- manufacturer has partially addressed that void, cluding bean-bag rounds and tail-stabilized and it has been actively tracking information and rounds. Agencies using the tail-stabilized rounds statistics on a large scale. In order to maintain include the Baltimore County Police Depart- credibility with the public, the law enforcement ment, the San Diego Police Department, and the profession needs to seek independent means to Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. To re- identify the impact of conducted energy devices duce injuries, police executives should consider and establish guidelines for their use. equipping officers with round—rather than As noted earlier, the Stinger 4 Dart Less- square—projectiles. Deployment of munitions Lethal Gun is a new conducted energy device that should require the notification and/or authoriza- has entered the market. Like the Taser, it dis- tion of a supervisor, as well as the tactical use of charges approximately 50,000 volts. The Stinger cover. shoots four darts at a greater range than the Bean bag munitions and other less-lethal Taser. Unlike the Taser, the Stinger uses black projectile munitions have proved effective against powder to discharge its darts, thus classifying it as persons with mental illness and other subjects a firearm. Stinger Systems (2004) touts this clas- during a confrontation. In a National Institute of sification as an advantage and advertises that its Justice (NIJ) study completed in 2004 (Hubbs product is “ATF Certified” because it is regulated and Klinger 2004b), 373 cases of the use of im- by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, pact weapons by 106 different law enforcement and Explosives. The LEA Stun Gun has only re- agencies were examined. Over 65 percent of the cently been offered. Information about the cases in the study involved bean bag rounds. In Stinger and LEA devices are extremely limited, nearly half of those cases, impact weapons were but it is anticipated that most of the same issues deployed against armed suspects who displayed raised about Tasers would apply to them. suicidal intent. Another 118 cases involved non- suicidal subjects who refused to comply with of- ficers’ orders. Of the total number of cases, 90 Less-Lethal Projectile Munitions percent of the targeted subjects were armed Bean Bag Munitions (Hubbs and Klinger 2004b). In the majority of Bean bag rounds are usually fired from a 12- deployments, incidents involving impact gauge shotgun or from a 37 or 40mm gas pro- weapons were resolved without officers having to pelled weapon; they travel at around 280 to 300 discharge their firearms. While the devices have feet per second. These munitions are fired been deployed successfully, there have been between 20 and 50 feet away from the target. The reports of deaths in circumstances where bean

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bag munitions were used. It is important to note less-lethal weapons since there is considerable that police officers have mistakenly fired bullets impact when the rounds hit a person’s body. The and killed people when they intended to use less- company calls this combination of chemical and lethal munitions. kinetic effects chemnetics (Davison and Lewer Police executives should review the curricu- 2003). The impact of a pepper-loaded round is 8 lum for training officers in the use of impact to 10 feet per pound compared to bean bag mu- weapons and consider whether there is sufficient nitions, which have a kinetic energy of over 120 focus on minimizing the severity of injuries feet per pound (Oldham 2001). The lower level when these devices are deployed. Research has of kinetic energy reduces the likelihood for seri- indicated that the less-lethal projectile munition’s ous injury to the suspect. impact to a person’s head, neck, or chest could There are other advantages of the pepper- lead to serious injury or death (National Acade- loaded projectiles. Unlike traditional O.C. my of Sciences 2003, Stidman 2004). These sprays, these munitions can be deployed 30 to 65 deaths and injuries have fueled continued criti- feet away, rather than 10 feet away (Reavy 2002). cism of law enforcement’s use of impact Furthermore, these rounds can saturate an area weapons. As a result, some agencies are consider- from more than 100 feet away (Green 2002). ing suspending or eliminating the use of bean This allows the deploying officer the opportunity bag weapons. The Lakeville City (MN) Police to operate from a safer distance—while still Department decreased its number of bean bag maintaining accuracy. Although these munitions weapons, replacing them with Tasers. Tactically, are generally considered less-lethal weapons, several agencies require their officers to aim at pepper-loaded munitions have caused at least “soft spots” such as the abdomen, thighs, and one known fatality. In October 2004, Victoria forearms (Castro 2004a). To lessen the problem Snelgrove, a student at Emerson College, died of officers mistakenly deploying bullets rather when a pepper-loaded projectile lodged in her than less-lethal munitions, police executives eye. The round had been deployed in an attempt should take steps to make impact weapons clear- to disperse the large and unruly crowds that had ly identifiable (Hubbs and Klinger 2004a and gathered to celebrate the Boston Red Sox’s World 2004b). The Baltimore County Police Depart- Series victory. As a result of her death, these mu- ment uses brightly colored stocks on their bean nitions have come under greater scrutiny from bag , and it also uses bean bag rounds critics who feel they should be considered lethal with clear shells so that the round itself can be weapons. “If a weapon kills you, it is lethal—case easily identified. closed,”argues David Gullette, a professor at Sim- mons College in Boston. The Boston police com- missioner initiated discussions about use of force Pepper-Loaded Munitions by police with local community leaders and The manufacturer of PepperBall Systems claims human rights groups and established the Stern that pepper-loaded munitions have a three- Commission to review the incident. Although pronged effectiveness system: psychological—the the commissioner did not support a complete surprise of being shot; kinetic—the impact of the ban on pepper-loaded munitions, she did note projectile; and chemical irritation that reclassification from non-lethal or less-lethal (PoliceOne.com 2004a). As a result, these designations to a higher one is likely (Boston weapons are not characterized only as chemical Channel 2004). Since these weapons systems are

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relatively new, little empirical data exist on the National Institute of Justice (2003) reported that potential effects or the number of deployments. inhalation alone usually does not pose a signifi- As the Boston Globe noted, “no accurate statistics cant risk for respiratory compromise. It conclud- have been kept regarding injuries sustained from ed that most of the in-custody deaths it studied pepper-filled balls” (Stidman 2004). The poten- were the result of drug use by the decedent. It at- tial for serious injury from pepper-loaded muni- tributed other deaths to a combination of drug tions holds policy and training implications for use and heart disease, as well as asthma. Notably, agencies that use them. The manufacturer rec- several people died because of positional asphyx- ommends use of a “full face mask, throat collar, ia—placement in a position where they could not and groin protection for police training with the use muscles that move air in and out of their weapons to prevent injury” (Stidman 2004). The lungs (NIJ 2003). From its examination of in- manufacturer notes in its website’s safety guide- custody deaths, NIJ found O.C. spray to be effec- lines, “Never target the head, throat, face, eyes, or tive only 20 percent of the time. While the report spine.” To enhance training capability, Advanced does note that subjects in the in-custody death Interactive Systems (AIS) has introduced a train- study had a higher rate of drug use, it cites evi- ing simulator that encourages the use of less- dence that O.C. spray is less effective on subjects lethal technologies like PepperBall (AIS 2004). who are on drugs (NIJ 2003). Bean bag and pepper-loaded munitions Based on this report, several recommenda- and other impact weapons are viable alternatives tions can be made concerning the O.C. spray to lethal force in many situations. As Hubbs and policies of law enforcement agencies. If possible, Klinger note, “Impact munitions are safe as officers should consider using another force op- measured against the likelihood of fatal injury tion if a subject who appears to be on drugs when officers shoot citizens with lethal muni- seems unaffected by a burst of O.C. spray. De- tions.” Training focusing on proper use and ac- partmental policies also should include guide- curacy—shooting the weapons below the waist of lines on how to restrain and transport people a subject—will minimize instances of serious in- who have been sprayed with O.C. in order to pre- jury or death. vent positional asphyxia. Finally, officers should, when possible, avoid using O.C. spray on individ- uals known to suffer from asthma and/or heart Oleoresin Capsicum Spray disease. Today the general consensus in the law enforce- Sparks generated by conducted energy de- ment profession in the United States is that O.C. vices can ignite and burn an individual who has spray is safe to use if deployed correctly. Like the been doused with O.C. spray. Oleoresin Cap- scrutiny now given conducted energy devices, sicum—the liquid extract of cayenne pepper— O.C. spray received close scrutiny a few years ago. is in itself not necessarily flammable. However, The ACLU expressed concerns in 1993 about ex- the liquid carrier—usually propyl alcohol, water, cessive and improper use of O.C. spray (Alpert or propellant gasses such as Freon—can be com- and Smith 2000). Over the years several studies bustible. Indeed, most alcohol-based carriers have examined the medical effects of O.C. spray should be considered flammable (ACPR 1998). on humans. As the use of O.C. spray increased, Police executives should consider determining questions arose about its safety after several the chemical consistency of their O.C. spray in-custody deaths occurred following its use. The carrier to reduce the likelihood of ignition—

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especially if there is a possibility that a conducted involves minimal distance between a police offi- energy device could be used. cer and a suspect; an officer’s fear level increases, Although the NIJ report generally con- affecting the sympathetic nervous system; and firmed that O.C. spray is reasonably safe, the blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, and the re- United Kingdom is taking a different approach. lease of adrenaline all increase. These physiolog- Citing concerns about chemicals used to grow ical factors, combined with an erratically moving peppers, as well as the inconsistent strength of suspect, increase the chances that an officer will the peppers based on different pepper harvests, unintentionally strike the suspect in the head the United Kingdom has turned to a synthetic (ACPR 1998). Officers in the midst of an intense “pepper-type” spray (Bauer 2004). In the past physical confrontation should consider various the United Kingdom used chemical spray (CS), options, including: making a temporary retreat, but concerns were raised about its medical effects using other less-lethal options, and/or awaiting (BBC News 2001). The synthetic capsicum inca- the arrival of additional officers. When using the pacitant—known as PAVA or Nonivamide—has baton, officer should strike the suspect’s legs and, properties similar to O.C. spray, but because it is in some circumstances, arms. manufactured, there is greater product consisten- Strikes to the head with heavy metal - cy. Studies are under way in the United Kingdom lights, like head strikes with batons, can be lethal. on the effectiveness of this synthetic formula now While not a baton, it is noted that many agencies being deployed by its law enforcement officers. permit the use of a flashlight as a weapon. Some agencies prohibit the practice, while others, like the Los Angeles Police Department, discourage Batons its use in that manner, but permit it in exigent The collapsible baton is considered a less-lethal circumstances. Other agencies, like the Metro- weapon, but if deployed in a certain way it can be politan Police Department in Washington, D.C., deadly. In response to U.S. Department of Justice try to avoid such an application by issuing small, consent decrees, some jurisdictions now consider lightweight, high-intensity flashlights that are strikes by a police officer to the head of a suspect portable—but not conducive for use as an im- with the collapsible baton—or any hard object— pact weapon. If a department elects to permit the as the application of deadly force. In fact, during use of flashlights as a less-lethal alternative, it is an intense physical confrontation, strikes to the recommended that guidelines and training re- head of a suspect by an officer may be difficult to flect the same requirements for the department’s avoid for the following reasons: the use of a baton service batons.

Chapter 3. Use-of-Force Tools — 81

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4

Handling the Aftermath of a Use-of-Force Incident

by BEVERLY J . ANDERSON, HEATHER D A VIES, JOSHUA A. EDERHEIMER, STEPHAN LOYKA

Incidents involving police use of force, post-incident outcome depends to a great extent as well as the perceived use of excessive force, on groundwork completed before the crisis. have tremendous potential to undermine rela- Moreover, the manner in which an agency tions between a law enforcement agency and the holds its officers accountable has an impact on community it serves. A community’s immediate the level of confidence and trust that it is afford- and long-term response to a force incident de- ed—both internally and externally. The imple- pends on many factors, and consequences of such mentation of a solid use-of-force investigation an incident can range from public criticism to ri- process is an integral part of a police executive’s oting. One of the most important factors influ- mandate to successfully manage use-of-force is- encing reactions to use of force is the level of sues. Finally, police executives are keenly aware trust that has been cultivated between a law en- that a use-of-force incident can have significant forcement agency and the community before an personal effects on individual officers, and recog- incident occurs. A constructive and nonviolent nize the need to address how their officers cope in the aftermath of a force incident.

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This chapter describes how agencies can Use of Force and Racial Tensions strengthen ties with the community before a use- Perceived misuse of force by police can precipi- of-force incident and, following an event, how tate violent reactions, particularly if the force was they can interact with the media to show ac- used against members of minority communities. countability and improve the likelihood of a con- The anger of minority groups and others in re- structive response by the community. The chap- sponse to force incidents is symptomatic of a ter also focuses on the investigations of serious larger problem. It comes against the backdrop of force incidents, and provides examples of suc- the historically strained relationship between po- cessful models. The chapter ends with a detailed lice and minority communities—in an even larg- explanation of how agencies can best serve the er context of societal discrimination and repres- personal needs of officers following a serious or sion. Recall August 11, 1965, when a routine controversial force incident. traffic stop in Los Angeles led to rioting. A young African-American male was pulled over in Watts for driving erratically while intoxicated. During C OMMUNICATING WITH THE the arrest, the protestations of the young man PUBLIC AND BUILDING TRUST drew a crowd. The crowd’s reaction had devas- tating effects. Riots lasted for 6 days, leaving 34 “It is critically important to establish relationships and credibility with the dead, more than 1,000 people injured, nearly public and the media before a major use- 4,000 arrested, hundreds of buildings destroyed, of-force incident or investigation occurs. and nearly $40 million in damage (Governors’ This can be done by building strong and Commission on the Los Angeles Riots 1965). It trustworthy leadership as well as spending was alleged that the crowd reacted violently be- resources on educating the public on cause of a perceived pattern of persistent harass- police roles and responsibilities.” ment by police against minorities, and resent- Kevin Morison, Director of Corporate Commu- ment against government for social injustices. nications, Metropolitan (DC) Police Department The police breakup of an after-hours drinking es- tablishment frequented by African Americans in Communications to the public through the local Detroit had a similar outcome. A crowd that (and sometimes national) media are a key aspect quickly gathered in protest precipitated the 1967 of an agency’s response to a use-of-force inci- riots that left 43 dead, 1,189 injured, and 7,000 dent.1 Following an event, a police executive under arrest. The factors that led to the violence must convey information about what happened and vandalism were diverse. In addition to nega- to his or her constituency in order to emphasize tive perceptions of the police department, eco- accountability and to achieve a constructive re- nomic inequality and the lack of affordable hous- sponse from the community and media. With ef- ing were cited as major factors. fective groundwork and post-event communica- Much has changed over the years to reduce tions and actions, a police executive can achieve the frequency of these violent reactions. But even this goal—even under difficult circumstances. more progress is needed. Riots in Cincinnati, Miami, and Los Angeles, as well as allegations

1. Heather Davies and Stephan Loyka of PERF wrote this section of Chapter 4.

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that police engage in racial profiling, highlight a key factor for police practitioners is minorities’ the need for continued efforts to improve police perceptions. Consistently, public opinion polls relations with minority communities. Included have shown that compared to Caucasians, mi- in this chapter is an example of successful police- norities—particularly African Americans—are community relationships located in Box 4.1 with more inclined to believe that police are biased in a summary of comments made by Reverend their use of force (Flanagan and Vaughn 1995; Reginald Holmes—Pastor of Denver’s New Huang and Vaughn 1996; Williams, Thomas, and Covenant Christian Church—at PERF’s Critical Singh 1983). Conclusions relating to police- Issues in Policing Forum. community tensions are found in the 1991 Studies indicate that minorities are, in fact, Christopher Commission report on Los Angeles, disproportionately the subject of police force published in the aftermath of the Rodney King (Bogomolny 1976; NAACP 1995; Pate and Fridell incident. The report stated, "Within minority 1993; Piliavin and Briar 1964; Reiss 1971; Smith communities of Los Angeles, there is a widely 1986; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1970; held view that police misconduct is common- Westley 1953, 1970; Worden 1996). Research dat- place.” The King incident refocused public atten- ing back to the 1960s provides evidence that tion to long-standing complaints by minorities racial/ethnic minorities—particularly African that they were treated differently from whites.2 Americans and Hispanics—are disproportion- In a poll conducted by the Joint Center for Polit- ately the subjects of deadly force and less-lethal ical and Economic Studies, almost 43 percent of force. These results, however, do not necessarily African Americans responded “yes” when asked if reflect police bias. Some of the more advanced they believed that police brutality was a serious studies starting in the 1970s tried to disentangle problem where they lived; only 12 percent of the potential causes for the disproportionate repre- general population responded this way. The sentation of minorities among subjects of force. same group conducted a study in 1997 that indi- For instance, James Fyfe’s (1978, 1980) in-depth cated that more than 81 percent of African Amer- study of the New York City Police Department in icans believed that “the police are much more the 1970s demonstrated a positive correlation be- likely to harass and discriminate against blacks tween the rate of police shootings and the rate of than whites,” whereas only 57 percent of the gen- citizen violence within precincts. A similar result eral population and 55 percent of whites believed was found when states were used as the unit of the statement was true.3 It is important to ad- analysis: Kania and Mackey (1977) found that dress perceptions of bias as well as to detect actu- levels of police violence within states correspond- al incidents. Both can be catalysts for improved ed to levels of citizen violence. These and other police-community relations. Controversial inci- studies highlight possible theories for the dispro- dents also create opportunities for positive re- portionate representation of minorities among forms, and the following discussion describes subjects of police use of force. how various agency executives turned controver- While it is important for researchers to con- sial incidents into opportunities for constructive tinue to try to disentangle the possible causes of change. higher levels of police force against minorities,

2. Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, July 9, 1991. 3. See www.jointcenter.org/.

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ARTICLE: box 4.1 Law Enforcement and Community Relations: A Community Perspective from Reverend Reginald Jones by Stephan A. Loyka incidents—especially those involving persons of color or distinct ethnicity. At a time when racial This article summarizes the views of Reverend Regi- profiling and excessive uses of force are becom- nald Holmes at PERF’s 2004 Critical Issues in Polic- ing the hot button issues of the day, cultivating ing Forum in December 2004. He shared his views trust, strengthening relationships, and facilitating on how police and the citizenry can work together communication between a law enforcement and establish trust. agency and the community it serves should be a Every law enforcement officer in the United fundamental focus for law enforcement profes- States is sworn to serve the community and pro- sionals and community members alike. tect the sanctity of life, and yet there may come a Specific steps can be taken, policies and prac- time when he or she, in the course of duty, may tices implemented, and community stability sub- be forced to take the life of someone else. The de- sequently secured if police and citizens make a cision of when and how to use force is one of the concerted effort to strengthen these relationships most difficult and controversial an officer will before an incident occurs. Neither side can affect ever have to make. The decision to apply deadly change independently. Community leaders, citi- force—even less-lethal force—can deeply affect zens, and activists are equally responsible for cul- the officer, the agency, individual citizens, and the tivating the good faith that must exist, not only to community as a whole. The circumstances of the mitigate the effects of an unfortunate and regret- incident and the subsequent investigation, as table event, such as a police-involved shooting, well as how these are presented to the public, can but also to effect actual and substantial improve- heavily influence the consequences. In fact, the ment in the delivery of community services. nature of the community response to these As the president of the New Covenant Christ- episodes will depend on a number of distinct vari- ian Church in Denver, Colorado, and an outspo- ables—the most important of which is the exist- ken community member on the topic of police ing climate of police-community relations. shootings, I lead a group of ministers called the Where there is a high-level of confidence Greater Metro Ministerial Alliance. This group at- within the community—particularly the minority tempts to change some police policies and dif- community—in the integrity and accountability of fuse the tension resulting from police shootings. a police department, an incident of police use of While it is important that police know and under- force may be resolved with few negative repercus- stand the communities they serve, it is equally sions. Conversely, in communities where ten- important that residents know their police force sions between law enforcement and the public and recognize the difficulty of their responsibili- consistently run high and where clear channels of ties. I strongly support Denver’s police chief, Ger- communication are absent, there lies potential ald Whitman, and believe that together, we have for violent and explosive reactions to use-of-force made significant progress towards strengthening

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the rapport between the police department and events, and the manner in which the department the minority community, while improving the de- communicates with the public throughout the or- livery of both police and social services. deal and afterward are handled genuinely and as One of my goals is to address the serious transparently as possible. issue of profiling in Denver and the nation as a The unfortunate truth is that use-of-force inci- whole. When dealing with the problem of profil- dents can take their toll on a community. If ad- ing—whether real or perceived—we are chal- dressed properly, however, these same incidents lenged with transforming community concerns can effect significant change. An incident that oc- and misconceptions about the credibility and le- curred in Denver in 2003 involving an African- gitimacy of the police force. To develop that good American teenager with a mental disability pro- faith, a commitment on the part of both parties is vides a good example. Paul Childs was shot to necessary. It has increasingly becoming a “badge death in his home on July 5, 2003. The teen was of courage” for young African-American teens to walking through his house clutching a kitchen be pulled over in Denver for a “DWB”—or driving knife to his chest. His sister called 911 hoping the while black. Four teenagers were recently pulled police would be able to help calm him down, as over for, in their view, having their hair braided in they unfortunately had had to do numerous times a style matching the description of suspected before. Childs’ sister and mother had called the gang members. Without placing all the blame on police for assistance more than 50 times over the law enforcement, or indiscriminately crying foul, previous three years. Paul purposely acted out to we must acknowledge the fact that young people get the police to come to his home because he need to be mindful of the way in which they carry saw the officers as his friends. When the officers themselves. Not doing so can lead to potential arrived that day, though, their repeated instruc- problems or conflict. Racial profiling is a serious tions to drop the knife—the knife that was now problem that needs to be examined closely, but, being used to seemingly threaten the mother’s more importantly, it is a problem that can be dealt life—were ignored. One officer, who had respond- with through constructive dialogue between the ed to the residence just one month earlier for a public and law enforcement. similar incident, shot and killed the boy in the We need to achieve a community in which we doorway of his home. know and understand each other. For law enforce- The nature of the situation presented enor- ment, this entails understanding the demograph- mous potential for civil unrest. The Denver Police ics of a community, economic conditions, previous Department and community leaders such as my- incidents and resultant tensions, politics, social self, worked together to diffuse community ten- mores, and the religious faiths that guide a com- sions immediately following the incident. During a munity. In turn, the community needs to feel confi- press conference following the incident, I ques- dent in the good intentions of the police agency. tioned much more than the actions of the police Communities should also feel that incidents of po- officer—an obvious focal point for the communi- lice use of force, investigations following such ty. I also questioned the scrutiny and attentiveness

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box 4.1 continued

of the 911 operators who had answered many calls the community can learn to trust each other. The for service. I questioned the diligence of the city’s community as a whole—citizens, law enforce- mental health providers, as well as the lack of in- ment, and city officials—shares both the blame volvement of faith-based organizations in re- for the Paul Childs incident and the credit for sponding to the needs of Paul Childs. We needed what came out of it. to know where the breakdowns had occurred, and Police officers are increasingly being called the community needed to take on its share of the upon to interact with individuals with mental ill- responsibility for Paul Childs’ death. Chief Whit- ness or who are emotionally distressed, a task man was not the scapegoat. This approach was that can be difficult and dangerous at times. To understandably not well received by everyone, but help officers respond to such situations, some it reinforced my strong belief that building com- police departments have introduced special pro- munity trust and providing quality community grams to train officers in how to respond. Crisis services is a collaborative effort. Intervention Teams are also being formed in An investigation into the incident was con- many cities. These teams receive special training ducted, and the officer was disciplined for violat- from mental health experts on how to deal with ing the department’s use-of-force policy. But crisis situations and deescalate any violence. The Chief Whitman did more than any chief in the teams are dispatched to defuse situations and past to quell the concerns and discontent within take people in need to local mental health crisis the community following an incident. Use-of- centers rather than police stations.4 force incidents—both in Denver and across the Following the Paul Childs incident, Denver nation—often have involved a great deal of spin Mayor John Hickenlooper set up a panel to come from the police agencies. This was not the case in up with recommendations for improving the the Childs’ incident. Chief Whitman had the city’s handling of similar cases. As a result, at courage to show compassion publicly, to apolo- least one-half of Denver police officers are sched- gize to the victim’s family, to acknowledge wrong- uled to receive training in crisis intervention tech- doing, and to be open and forthcoming with de- niques between 2004–2005, and a mental health tails of the incident and ensuing investigation. worker will be hired to train officers on how to This allowed the community to let the investiga- deal with people who have developmental disabil- tion take its course without any backlash or nega- ities and mental illnesses. tive repercussions. Whitman was being human, The Paul Childs shooting also prompted the and to be human is to be honest. Trust is born out establishment of FACE IT, the Family, Advocacy, of honesty. My hope is that law enforcement and Crisis, Education, and Intervention Team. The

4. Editor’s note: For more information on how communities are working with police to minimize use of force, and better address individuals’ needs in encounters with people with mental illnesses, see the Criminal Justice/Mental Heath Consensus Project at www.consensusproject.org.

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team, organized with my help and that of Chief training officers in conflict and crisis resolution, Whitman, is a coalition of church, law enforce- and establishing channels of communication be- ment, and mental health leaders. This initiative is tween law enforcement officials, the media, and centered in two community centers where fami- the public. Bonds of trust are developed over time, lies facing crises can get help. The centers, which and it is a great deal easier to build strong relation- will be located in churches, will offer families a ships if the effort begins before an incident occurs. range of services, including counseling, social Communities need to know that officers will be services, and referrals to organizations that help held accountable for their actions. And greater the developmentally disabled and the mentally ill. transparency in the investigation of complaints is Center officials will be trained to work with these needed. Complainants should be kept regularly in- individuals so they can alleviate problems before formed of the progress of investigations. The out- they escalate. An on-site counselor and a member come of all criminal, disciplinary, and administra- of the clergy will be on-call 24-hours-a-day. If there tive investigations into alleged violations—and is a situation in which the FACE IT team is unable into all disputed shootings and deaths in cus- to assist, someone from the police department’s tody—should be made public promptly. Finally, a Crisis Intervention Team—a 250-officer group in dialogue must be established and maintained be- Denver—will be called out for assistance. The tween law enforcement and community leaders. FACE IT program was made possible by commu- Officers should know the communities they serve nity donations, pledges, and grants totaling and should work to establish trust. $300,000. The group hopes to expand over the There is real hope today that all individuals, next several years and set up similar centers in six regardless of color, creed, or ethnicity, can be af- other neighborhoods around the city. FACE IT is forded equal treatment. There is also hope that extremely important in getting officers and the everyone in the community can recognize the community to work together to address the needs value of good law enforcement. I credit Police of the public. Chief Gerald Whitman for working with me to Use of force by police—especially against a give life to that hope. Motorola and PERF should person of color or distinct ethnicity—presents a be praised for bringing law enforcement and com- predictable set of flashpoints. But these flashpoints munity leaders together to discuss these issues can be kept from igniting by investing early in that are so important to all of us in a manner that strengthening relationships with the community, is simply honest—and human.

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ARTICLE: box 4.2 Turning Controversy into an Opportunity for Change 5

by Andrea Morrozoff Luna of his career. The controversy began with the shooting of a 22-year-old African-American Use-of-force incidents can ignite controversy in a woman who had mental and emotional disabili- community, and in some jurisdictions bring to ties. The Austin Police Department (APD) had re- light underlying tensions between racial minori- sponded to her home numerous times for distur- ties and the police. Although a police executive bances. In this instance, the woman attempted never seeks this type of controversy, it can be the to stab her apartment manager with a knife and impetus for publicly making changes—some- failed to drop the weapon after repeated requests times long overdue changes—in the department. by the responding officer. She was shot by the officer. USE-OF-FORCE INCIDENTS AND In a second use-of-force incident in the same UNDERLYING CRITICAL ISSUES month, an APD officer stopped a vehicle that had been reported stolen. The driver of the vehicle Participants on this panel—Chief Stanley Knee, and suspect was a young African-American male. Austin Police Department; Executive Director The officer approached the car and attempted to Chris Fox, Association of Chief Police Officers, take the suspect into custody. The suspect began United Kingdom; Chief Bernard Melekian, to drive away, trapping the officer in the doorway Pasadena Police Department; and Chief Gerald and dragging him. The officer shot five rounds Whitman, Denver Police Department—were se- and struck the suspect five times, killing him lected to speak at PERF’s December 2004, Criti- instantly. cal Issues Forum because of how they handled re- Racial tensions in the community and the cent use-of-force controversies in their close occurrence of these events in time ignited communities. Each panelist discussed efforts to immediate controversy. In July 2003, the local balance the department’s need to enforce the law newspaper, the Austin American Statesman, sub- effectively and safely with the need to preserve mitted an information request under the Texas the rights of individual citizens and maintain the Public Information Act to the city of Austin. The trust of the community. In the face of these chal- newspaper asked for police reports, statistical lenges, the panelists responded to their con- data, and an electronic database of every use-of- stituencies by improving police-community rela- force report by the APD over a 6-year period. In tionships and changing use-of-force policies. early 2004 the paper ran a series of four articles entitled “Unequal Force.” An entire page of edito- Chief Stanley Knee, Austin Police Department rials from community members commented on In June 2002, Chief Stanley Knee embarked on the articles and recommended action. what he described as the most difficult 18 months

5. This article summarizes panelists’ discussions on making reforms amidst controversy at PERF’s Critical Issues in Policing Conference in San Diego in December 2004.

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The first article stated that police in Austin created a speakers bureau for young officers to used force more often against Hispanics (25 per- help them feel comfortable discussing the police cent more) and against African Americans (100 department and its initiatives in front of a group percent more) than against Caucasians. Subse- of people. Having the department well represent- quent articles in the series discussed an in-cus- ed at all local events was effective in reaching out tody death involving police use of force of a sus- to the community and in telling the department’s pect in 2002, APD’s early warning system for story. Chief Knee initiated a partnership with the officer use of excessive force, a department analy- Texas Police Officer Association to develop and sis of force reports, and potential tools for reduc- implement community education programs on ing use of force. At the end of the newspaper se- police use of force. The department also con- ries, church leaders in the African-American tracted with PERF to evaluate and restructure po- community asked for the resignation of the police lice training based on input from the community chief and the city manager. and expert review. Chief Knee issued a statement regarding his Other agency efforts focused on officer selec- intention to restore race relations, and he present- tion, accountability measures, and less-lethal op- ed a community action plan on how this would be tions. APD began to look closely at the officers it done. The plan described each task, how it would was hiring. At citywide meetings with communi- be implemented, and the department’s goal for ty members, members of non-profit social service addressing use of force. Following are some of organizations active in the city and clergy pointed the critical issues addressed by this action plan: out that young, inexperienced officers assigned to (1) written consent forms for consent searches; high crime areas could be scared, and their patrol (2) improved police training on defensive tactics, style might reflect this inexperience and fear. As racial profiling data collection and reporting, cul- a result, APD began recruiting more mature indi- tural diversity, addressing people with mental ill- viduals (28-30 years old) with a college education nesses, communication, professionalism, and de- and a desire to make a positive change. APD has escalation skills; (3) greater availability and use of placed cameras in every vehicle equipped to make less-lethal weapons; and (4) improved police- a car stop and has increased less-lethal options community education and outreach. by deploying beanbag shotguns and Tasers. Chief Knee believed one thing he could have handled better was to tell the department’s story Chief Bernard Melekian, directly to the public—he had been relying solely Pasadena Police Department on the media to provide the agency’s side initial- Bernard Melekian began his tenure as chief of po- ly. He later increased the department’s commu- lice for the Pasadena Police Department (PPD) in nication with the community by having trained 1996. In the years before Chief Melekian joined officers attend nearly every community event the department, Pasadena averaged 15 to 20 in Austin. To ensure officers were equipped to ad- gang-related homicides per year. A number of the equately represent the department, Chief Knee victims were juveniles. In 1997 the department

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box 4.2 continued

began a No More Dead Children program to try and resentment. The second issue was a per- and stop violence in the community and prevent ceived lack of respect in how they were treated by the killing of youth suspects by police. Subse- the officers in the Special Enforcement Section. quently, overall homicides declined, police force Officer turnover, especially within the Special En- incidents decreased, and there were fewer contro- forcement Section (with its age and physical re- versial incidents involving police in the communi- quirements), resulted in many young officers on ty. However, in April 2004, officers from the Spe- the force, the age group most likely to become in- cial Enforcement Section (SWAT) shot a volved in use-of-force incidents. One of the rea- suspected gang member. The officers had tried sons for the youth of the section was that duties to stop the suspect, but he turned while running included membership on the Special Weapons and fired a handgun at the officers. Officers re- and Tactics Team. One of the major changes was turned fire and killed him. to designate four of the fourteen positions as The investigation indicated that the shooting non-SWAT positions. This resulted in several was legally justified and within department policy, more senior officers applying for the section. but it sparked a public outcry. The media filmed Chief Melekian also focused on rebuilding interviews with community members who community relationships and building trust. After claimed that the suspect was carrying a cell the 2004 shooting described above, Chief phone, not a gun, and that police had wrongfully Melekian invited the FBI to take part in the depart- killed him. It was noted that the officer who shot ment’s investigation. Inviting in an outside agency and killed the suspect had no history of firing his “took some of the firestorm” out of negative weapon or using lethal force on others. Because media reports and reduced public criticism of se- of his assignment to the Special Enforcement crecy, he said. The department also fostered a Section and his contact with gang members, the closer partnership with the NAACP, including con- officer was well known in the community. Ru- ducting a series of community meetings. The ini- mors emerged in the community that the officer tial meetings aired resentments in the community was a gang member and had killed five other rival that had built up over many years. Although he gang suspects. came prepared to speak to the group, he quickly “This event took a number of months to un- realized that the community wanted to express fold,” explained Chief Melekian. “My belief from their opinions. The chief left with a plan of action the beginning was that the shooting was only to help resolve the issues and concerns. In addi- marginally the issue.” The chief identified two is- tion to meeting with community members, the sues at the heart of the problem. The first issue chief stayed in touch with the officer involved in was a deep frustration over lack of jobs, housing the shooting and with other officers to ensure con- and education. Most of the young African Amer- cerns were addressed while providing critical in- icans contacted repeatedly by the police depart- ternal support. The chief stressed that in any long- ment felt as if they had no options in life. Being term solution the involvement and commitment stopped by the police added to their frustration

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of the officers is as important as the involvement community. Subsequent use-of-force events have and commitment of the community. not elicited the same outrage, reflecting the com- Chief Melekian also began to address nega- munity’s improved trust, understanding, and tive media accusations directly. For example, in support for the department. response to accusations that the police depart- ment was not interested in hearing complaints or Executive Director Chris Fox, solving the problems, the department distributed Association of Chief Police Officers, UK complaint forms throughout the community. No The challenges and controversies confronting po- complaints were received by the end of that week. lice executives in the United States differ from He also invited religious leaders in the communi- those facing law enforcement professionals in the ty to ride with the police. These “ride alongs” United Kingdom. Government standards regulate helped these leaders develop a greater under- police training, equipment, and policy in the Unit- standing of policing and the problems officers ed Kingdom. The struggle for law enforcement in face. The department also initiated a project the United Kingdom was to convince government called Partners in Peace. The department hired a officials and politicians that new force options community member under a city contract for 12 and equipment were needed. months to help them find meaningful ways to im- In the late 1990s, Director Fox became increas- prove the partnership with the community. The ingly concerned about law enforcement officers’ contractor, Chief Melekian says, “paid for himself ability to respond to different situations requiring a 10 times over.” range of use-of-force options. During this time Other changes in equipment, policies, and two major incidents occurred: one involved a sus- tactics ensued. The department recalled the stick pect with a gun, and the other involved a suspect baton and issued collapsible batons to all offi- wielding a sword. The responding officers did not cers. Tasers were implemented on a six-month believe they had the tools they needed to resolve experimental basis, and tape recorders were is- these situations appropriately and did not want to sued to the Special Enforcement Section officers use deadly force. Although both officers resolved to use when talking to suspects. The tape the incidents without employing deadly force, they recorders had an especially dramatic impact on put their own safety at risk. complaints of misconduct by officers. Tape Many of the physical tactics relied on by offi- recorders provide a level of oversight, offering cers for the past two decades were no longer ac- both citizens and officers protections from mis- ceptable to the community. For example, com- understandings. Finally, the department re- munity members did not want to witness street viewed the requirements for assignment to the fights between suspects and the police. There Special Enforcement Section. As part of their was a need for additional less-lethal options and duties, members of the team were required to equipment that all officers could use. The com- attend community meetings and to bridge the munity insisted the police must be able to handle gap between these specialized officers and the suspects better, yet the national government said

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box 4.2 continued it could not issue the equipment needed. By a developmental disability. This incident became working closely with the community and govern- a flash point in the community because the in- ment in the late 1990s, Director Fox began a se- volved officer had violated a tactical use-of-force ries of initiatives to expand the range of force op- policy. (The department later took disciplinary ac- tions available to police and to update training tion against the officer). In a second incident, a and policies. suspect died after officers shot him with a con- Director Fox balanced the needs of the police ducted energy device (i.e., Taser). In another inci- with the needs of the community and politicians. dent, DPD officers entered a dwelling where a “Convincing the community is not enough,” he woman was being held hostage and they mistak- explained. “You need to convince the government enly shot a person who was not directly involved and politicians.” To support his presentations to in the incident. These events ignited public con- government officials, he used research findings cern that resulted in tension between the commu- and case examples. He also asked community nity and the department. members to demonstrate their interest by taking When a use-of-force incident does occur, po- their recommendations for the police commis- lice leaders need to be open, fair, and timely in sioner directly to government officials with deci- their response to the community. For example, sion-making authority. New technologies or immediately after the incident involving the youth changes, he said, should be implemented on an with a developmental disability, Chief Whitman experimental basis for a specific period of time to shared as much information to the public as he determine benefits. In the end, the United King- could. There was some information he could not dom did change its training curriculum, accredi- share because of the several ongoing investiga- tation guidance, and standards. It still struggles, tions—and he explained these constraints to the however, with making available a range of effec- public. He and other city officials met with con- tive less-lethal options. Tasers have been issued cerned residents in a number of different forums. only to some officers. To deploy the Taser, those The chief described these as painful, but critically officers have to be called to the scene. Director important. Fox advises other police executives to be direct Actions taken by the police department paid and forthright in getting support, offering strong off when later incidents occurred. The Chief’s at- leadership on where the department should go. tention to the concerns of the community, his forthrightness, and his attempts to be fully trans- Chief Gerald Whitman, parent produced greater trust between the citizens Denver Police Department and the police. Chief Whitman recommended During a twelve-month period Gerald Whitman, that others “front load” efforts to improve com- chief of the Denver Police Department (DPD), munity relations, and that these efforts produce faced several incidents that tested his ability to many benefits—including a positive communica- make decisions in the heat of controversy. One tion and trust when use-of-force incidents occur. incident involved an African-American youth with

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Also, Chief Whitman recommended involving The panelists recommend being mindful not an oversight group in monitoring and reviewing to neglect their officers by directing all attention police discipline, and noted that resources need to the community. Chief executives may also to be made available to support this monitoring. want to take officers with them to community He added that there was not a shortage of ideas, meetings. but a shortage of resources to expand on strate- gies that have worked. For this reason chiefs are Be proactive rather than reactive. sometimes constrained in their ability to imple- What is done before a use-of-force incident to ment these successful approaches. build relationships and put effective police poli- cies and procedures into place can have great LESSONS LEARNED bearing on the outcome of a use-of-force incident. Although the incidents and circumstances de- Agencies can anticipate possible scenarios and partments face differ, all police executives know community responses, and proactively put meas- the following principles reduce critical force inci- ures in place to prevent or address these issues. dents and help them make wise decisions in the The police executive must know in advance what heat of controversy. his or her response will be to a critical incident.

Build and maintain good relations Be open, honest, and timely. with the community. After a use-of-force incident, police executives Ties with the community are built during the must be open, honest, and timely in their re- “good” times in the day-to-day duties police per- sponse to the community and to department per- form. Activities to improve relationships with sonnel. Setting time requirements for the depart- each major population or community group in ment to meet in issuing press releases after a your jurisdiction should be built into normal work critical incident can ensure a quick response. routines. During a critical incident, executives should not expect the media to be the sole repre- CONCLUSION sentative of the police to the community. Instead, Each of the four panelists faced controversies in agencies should have well-prepared officers repre- their communities following use-of-force inci- senting the department at every community event. dents. Each executive turned the negative events into opportunities to implement measures to op- Address the needs of officers. timize force and to strengthen relationships with A police executive must address a wide range of their communities, particularly minority commu- constituencies, including the public, government nities. The lessons that they learned are shared officials, and department personnel. This is espe- by many other chief executives. cially critical in the midst of a public controversy.

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Essential Groundwork by show their constituency each day on the job. Law Enforcement Agencies Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane (2003) conduct- As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there ed a study that included a survey of individuals are important ways in which law enforcement on public opinions of police. Citizens’ direct con- agencies can positively influence a community’s tact with officers was shown to be a key element response to a use-of-force incident. Strengthen- of satisfaction. Forty-seven percent of the survey ing ties with all members of the community, but respondents reported having had informal con- particularly with minorities, is an end in itself tact with police (including conversations with of- and will build up the “capital of good will” that a ficers on patrol, interactions with police at com- police executive will be able to draw upon when a munity meetings, participation in police- critical incident does occur. Police executives sponsored youth activities and community safety who have built up sufficient capital can achieve a fairs). These informal contacts were reported to constructive public response to perceived and ac- have significantly affected job approval ratings of tual misuses of force because the community will police by respondents. Vehicle stops are a mech- believe that alleged misuse of force is an aberra- anism by which many citizens come into contact tion and not a sanctioned behavior. Further, the with police. If police are committed to treating community will perceive that a department with each driver with courtesy and respect, the payoff a strong and objective investigation process will in terms of goodwill will be considerable. respond appropriately, and that citizens will be kept well informed by a department accountable Promising Examples of to them. Though tragic, some uses of force are Police Communications with the Public necessary and justified. But these circumstances need to be recognized by the community—which Decades ago, Westley (1970) noted that the pub- is much more likely if trust and understanding lic’s perception of police brutality is based in part exist.6 on misunderstandings of police work. Education Modern policing at its best is characterized on the routine and ordinary aspects of police by responsiveness to community concerns and work can build constructive community relations partnerships with citizens to solve problems. and improve negative public attitudes toward Whether labeled community policing or not, it is police use of legitimate force (Flanagan and good policing. An executive can develop sound, Vaughn 1995). Citizen academies are a popular trust relationships by running a professional po- means of providing this education. Courses often lice department that reaches out to diverse com- cover force policy and issues. Attendees might be munities to address crime and quality-of-life is- asked to take on the role of an officer in a “Shoot- sues. A summary of the panel presentation at the Don’t Shoot” video simulator exercise or be chal- PERF Critical Issues Forum on successful ap- lenged to pull a gun out of the holster before the proaches to policing in diverse communities is knife-wielding “suspect” covers the 20 feet of included in Box 4.3. ground between them. One of the aspects of citi- An important aspect of the department’s zen academies that most influences attitudes professionalism is the respect that line personnel about the police are ride-alongs (Jordan 1998).

6. For more information on how to address the perceptions and actual incidents of racially biased policing, please see the PERF publications Racially Biased Policing and By the Numbers by Lorie A. Fridell at www.policeforum.org.

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ARTICLE: box 4.3 Policing in Diverse Communities7

by Tory J. Caeti Chief William Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department Policing in communities with racial and ethnic di- Chief Bratton referred to a 1968 Time Magazine versity presents a host of issues and complex cover story that featured Thomas Reddin, then problems for law enforcement executives. Racial chief of the Los Angeles Police Department. issues can boil to the surface in use-of-force inci- Chief Reddin had been interviewed about policing dents, particularly when a member of a minority in distressed communities and the existence of a community is thought to be the victim of exces- “thin blue line.” The article indicated that fear, re- sive force. Such incidents have sometimes led to sentment, and chaos reigned in vast areas of civil disorder in communities across the nation. American cities that resembled “combat Policing in diverse communities requires a great zones”—and that the police officer was the “sol- deal of planning, sensitivity, education, training, dier of the city.” Chief Reddin recalled that there and a commitment by the police to perform their needed to be a new relationship with the police, duties fairly and impartially without regard to race and that a new philosophy of community policing or ethnicity. Los Angeles Police Chief William was needed. Bratton, Jamaica Constabulary Force Superinten- Chief Bratton indicated how these themes dent Assan Thompson, Police Service of North- some 30 years later are still relevant. He noted ern Ireland Superintendent Malcolm McFarland, that if we could make progress in policing, those and Israel Police Major General Mickey Levy dis- advances would help address another seemingly cussed their experience in policing diverse com- intractable problem in America—racial bias and munities as panelists at PERF’s December 2004, intolerance. Police are in a unique position to ad- Critical Issues Forum. dress problems and could influence thinking about race in America. Use of force by police is PANELISTS’ EXPERIENCES often the centerpiece of the tension between the community and the police. Effective policy and The panelists were selected because they have had communication about use of force can go a long extensive experience in policing areas of the world way in building trust with the community as well with racial and ethnic diversity. As Chuck Wexler, as the rank and file. He emphasized that a sub- executive director of PERF, stated in his opening stantial effort by the police is needed to overcome comments, “each of these participants has had underlying mistrust that can surface when use-of- considerable experience in bringing together di- force incidents occur. verse communities, and each has had to build trust between the communities and the police.”

7. This article summarizes panelists’ discussion on working with diverse communities at PERF’s Critical Issues in Policing Conference, held in San Diego in December 2004.

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box 4.3 continued

Superintendent Assan Thompson, police-community relations, and police-involved Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) fatal shootings in the past two years have been Superintendent Assan Thompson discussed how reduced. he and members of his agency deal with issues of conflict and justice every day in a country where Superintendent Malcolm McFarland, police are often not fully trusted by the communi- Police Service of Northern Ireland ty. Recently, however, he noted that the JCF As we well know, problems between Catholics and adopted a series of initiatives and programs de- Protestants in Northern Ireland are deeply rooted, signed to improve relations with the community. and perpetuated by years of conflict and hostility. Every member of his force is issued a document Superintendent McFarland described the delicate describing the JCF mission to uphold and protect policing situation in his home country, and noted the human rights of everyone in Jamaica. He that the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) noted that the JCF conducted research that found faces the challenge of building trust among all of that many citizens did not trust the police, and the factions in Northern Ireland. Keeping the conversely, many police officers were fearful in channels of communication open with all con- certain communities. He noted that over the past stituencies is essential to any reforms. ten years, at least twelve police officers had been Superintendent McFarland noted that build- killed in the line of duty every year, and fatal po- ing rapport with the community involves a three- lice-involved shootings were numerous. One of pronged approach: First, the community must be the steps taken by the JCF in the trust-building encouraged to work with the police; second, there process began through work with PERF. PERF must be direct communication by the police with has been involved in developing a model commu- the community that is candid and frequent; and nity policing program in the Grants Pen section of third, a complaint investigation process must be Kingston through initiatives like safe encounters completely independent. He noted that adding training for officers, collaborative problem solv- to the complexity of policing diverse groups is an ing with the community, and the training of exec- influx of Eastern Europeans into Northern Ire- utive staff at the Senior Management Institute for land, and a number of these immigrants arrive Police (SMIP). The JCF has worked hard to create with an inherent distrust or apprehension of po- trust in other ways as well. For example, in the lice systems because of their experience with Grants Pen section of Kingston, as many as four regimes in their country of origin. officers were assigned to each car—dressed in military-type fatigues—in order to respond to Major General Mickey Levy, Former Commander, basic calls for police service in the past. A new Jerusalem Police District, Israel focus on community policing has resulted with The challenges faced by police leaders in building officers using bicycles as transportation, often en- trust with the diverse community in East gaging with the community in a positive manner. Jerusalem have been formidable. They are tasked The JCF has also increased training to support with keeping the peace between Israelis and

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Palestinians, as well as protecting the city and Another chief stressed that relationships country against crime and terrorist attacks. The need to be firmly established before incidents Israel Police were tasked with protecting all per- occur. He has put transparency of police opera- sons, including both Israeli and Palestinian wor- tions at the core of his mission, and has tried to shippers. In a city where tension is palpable, this develop trust between the police and community. situation required an innovative and proactive po- When critical incidents and use of force by the po- lice approach. General Levy developed a new lice escalate tensions, police chiefs must be em- strategy of openness by meeting with Palestinian pathetic and honest. Panelists agreed that police leaders and establishing ground rules for mass executives should put ego aside and pursue very assemblies. He created and assembled a joint specific strategies to police diverse communities committee of Palestinian community members successfully. Citizens can be involved in forming and Israeli Police who worked together to jointly policy, reviewing less-lethal equipment and even solve problems. These problem-solving meet- conducting training. The involvement of citizens ings—which took place inside an Israeli police in critical processes is the key to increasing open- station—met monthly to address issues of mutu- ness and trust in a community. In one city, crisis al concern. While initially unprecedented, the es- response teams—made up of citizens—respond tablishment of such lines of communication— to critical incidents and inform the public about and building trust—between Israeli police and what is happening. The chief also personally vis- Palestinians has reduced the potential for vio- its family members of persons killed by officers, lence and disorder. and explains to them the circumstances of the in- cident, what the department knows, and what PANEL DISCUSSIONS processes have been initiated. In the same city, citizens sit in and are voting members on use of In a discussion of race and the history of race-re- force review boards. Police also train citizens lated tension, one chief noted that police often about use of force, and citizens participate on encounter a range of opinions. Some citizens al- ride-alongs. All of these efforts have strength- lege that police are biased in their enforcement of ened the relationship between the community the law, and that others view crime as simply the and the police department. manifestation of larger social inequities that the Among the many efforts described by partici- police are forced to address. Chief Bratton stated pating chiefs were face-to-face meetings between that for a long time the role of police focused officers and citizens that foster minority commu- solely on dealing with crime. But a shift in think- nities to mutual understanding and greater sensi- ing has led police to believe they can deal with the tivity to concerns related to race and ethnicity causes of crime and disorder. In his opinion, race Another agency’s police academy recruits are relations have substantially improved as a result. given community projects in diverse communi- Reducing crime through respect and understand- ties to interview residents before they police those ing has had a beneficial impact on race relations. areas. They become familiar with the community

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box 4.3 continued

members, their concerns, and their cultures. Po- embrace diversity as a positive feature of the lice have received a positive response from the community and not a fundamental problem. community, and residents have acknowledged that the police care about them and their prob- Communicate with the community and be open lems. Communication and openness is the key to build- As another example, the Chicago police de- ing trust and to serving diverse communities ef- partment uses a series of videos to train its offi- fectively. The police must be committed to main- cers in dealing with people of various religious taining the highest professional standards. faiths. Community leaders have praised the Rapport between the police and community videos, concluding that they have substantially members must be cultivated before critical inci- improved relations between religious groups and dents occur, and could include department policy the police. Five videos, each about 10 minutes, that considers diverse groups’ input. were produced to communicate more effectively with different religious groups after the attacks of Invest in efforts to build trust between September 11, 2001.8 The videos depict Sikhs, the community and police Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and Hindus inside An investment and commitment must be made by their homes and houses of worship, and religious cities and police departments—both with officers and community leaders explain aspects of their and the community—in order to achieve confi- faith (Kinzer 2005). The videos include practices dence. One participant described forming a the police should be careful to avoid, like eating commission on police and human relations. non-kosher food inside a synagogue or asking a The commission brought together residents, ad- Sikh to remove his turban in public. vocacy groups, police officers, and political repre- sentatives to examine use of force by police in PROMISING APPROACHES their community. All commission members at- Building trust in a racially and ethnically diverse tended a citizen’s police academy that that suc- community is a difficult process. Following are cessfully fostered an understanding of police pro- several points derived from practitioners’ practi- cedures. The department also asked members cal experiences. Each lesson flows from the fun- of the media to participate in the academy, damental philosophy that the police must per- who later noted that they did not realize the exten- form their duties without bias and that they must sive training police officers receive and the difficul- ties officers face. Another example of community

8. For more information about how law enforcement can better serve diverse communities in a security- conscious time, see the PERF-produced white paper, Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Volume 2: Working with Diverse Communities available for free download at www.policeforum.org.

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investment included a U.K. Independent Com- to simply tell officers they must be sensitive to plaints Commission that emphasizes the impor- people of different backgrounds. tance of addressing the needs of the family of someone who has been the subject of police use Work with the media of force. A chief constable from the U.K. explained The final lesson is the importance of working with that she always writes a letter to bereaved family the media—a complex and sensitive challenge for members—as well as department staff. Another any police executive. Dealing effectively with the chief shared that his department trains officers in media also requires establishing relationships be- family relations, and underscores the importance fore a serious incident occurs. In high-profile inci- of apologizing to family members of people shot dents, police chiefs should be careful not to alien- by police. ate local media by accommodating only the interests of national media. The police must work Educate officers about race-related issues and with reporters, not only during a crisis but at all train them using practical exercises times. By cultivating strong ties with the media, po- Effective training must be developed and practical lice executives can successfully tell their story and examples used to spotlight the problems and communicate their commitment to policing with- misperceptions engendered by ignorance out racial bias. They can also draw on the strength of diversity issues. Today training on diversity and contributions of diverse communities. A good issues has become more common in policing. relationship with the media will also be important Training must include real-life scenarios of the in explaining why certain conclusions cannot be kinds of problems that can arise. It is not enough drawn in an ongoing investigation.

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Police agencies are increasingly using ride-along Among the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (N.C.) programs, with or without the full citizen police Police Department’s efforts to strengthen public academy, to enhance citizens’ understanding of relations was a retreat in which 100 community what police do and the challenges they face. members were invited to learn about and discuss Agencies hope that this greater understanding the department’s policing philosophy. The chief will foster constructive responses by the public to also has held community focus groups to discuss use-of-force incidents. the complaint-investigation process. He devel- The Camillus (NY) Police Department oped a racial profiling citizen advisory commit- combined education and outreach in the Build- tee and met with about fifteen community ing Community Bridges program it initiated. groups to explain the development of the depart- The program was intended to improve access to ment’s data collection policy. the police department for members of minority The Chicago Police Department has spon- groups and other individuals that have had sored a series of forums—funded by the U.S. De- strained relations with police. Representatives of partment of Justice Office of Community Orient- diverse groups were invited to department plan- ed Policing Services—to improve police-minority ning sessions, where they were given an opportu- communications and joint problem solving. nity to voice their concerns and priorities. The Community activists were invited to help the de- chief also reached out to diverse leaders within partment identify where it was effective, as well as the community in order to educate them about areas that needed improvement. One topic of department policies and use-of-force issues. The concern was the issue of “racial profiling.”Depart- department chaplain was asked to manage the ment staff of all ranks were also invited to partic- proceedings because of the good relationship he ipate. Before the first forum, participants were had with all parties. Attendees included repre- surveyed for their opinions about racially biased sentatives from many human rights advocacy policing and the department’s strengths and groups and organizations. Elected officials from weaknesses. Ideas about how to improve police- the town participated in the meetings as well. minority relations and resolve issues were solicit- The Tallahassee Police Department has also ed. Over the course of the past four years the de- sought to address the sobering problem that a partment has asked PERF Executive Director sizable portion of the city’s population—minori- Chuck Wexler to serve as the moderator of these ties, particularly young males—distrusts law en- forums. During the first forum, community forcement. One of the interventions associated members shared their thoughts, experiences, and with The Minority and Youth Community Out- concerns in the morning, and police staff were reach Program (MYCOP) was the opening of a asked to listen and hold their responses. In the af- satellite office for internal affairs in a predomi- ternoon, police staff shared their thoughts and re- nately minority community. Residents of this actions to the morning session, and the citizens community could lodge complaints at this satel- were instructed to hold their responses. During lite office and complete all interviews at that lo- the final session of the day all participants joined cation without traveling to police headquarters. in a discussion of the issues and ideas raised earli- After it became apparent that the project was a er. Subsequent discussions have identified specif- success, a second satellite office was established in ic actions to be taken by both the police and com- a different section of the city; this one was co- munity members to address concerns. Since the sponsored by the local branch of the NAACP. first year, these forums have broadened in focus to

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include multicultural issues, involvement of the crisis. Amassing the greatest support, however, faith community, violent crime, accountability, requires a cooperative relationship with the local and use of force. media.9 As police executives nationwide well The Hillsborough County (FL) Sheriff’s know, the media can either calm or exacerbate Office has improved communications following tensions. Police executives again have a lot of use-of-force incidents that led to better police re- groundwork to do to increase the likelihood of lations with different minority groups. Several fair and impartial coverage following controver- minority councils were created. For example, sial incidents. The principles that guide the members of the Black Advisory Council and His- agency in developing its relationship with the panic Advisory Council—community leaders press during times of calm will similarly guide it and citizens—are allowed to sit in on proceedings after a serious use-of-force incident. Included in of the shooting review board, ask questions, and Box 4.4 is the perspective of David J. Bayless, provide their perspectives on the incident. Director of News Affairs for the Chicago Police The Metropolitan (D.C.) Police Depart- Department. ment established a community partnership in an area that is racially and ethnically diverse. The partnership between ministers, community lead- Building a Relationship with the Media ers, and law enforcement representatives is de- There is a long history of tension between the signed to address community concerns and sup- media and law enforcement. Law enforcement port fair and sensitive approaches. A positive officers sometimes feel like “victims” of the consequence has been to mitigate negative public media’s quest for controversial, negative stories. reaction after a use-of-force incident by demon- The media sometimes see police as secretive and strating compassion and concern for victims of uncooperative and, in some jurisdictions, as cor- force incidents. Following a critical incident, a rupt or otherwise dysfunctional. More and more community or faith-based leader responds to the police executives are trying to replace an antago- scene or to the home of the involved citizen or nist relationship between law enforcement and citizen’s family. They attempt to calm tensions in the media with one that is cooperative and mutu- the wake of a controversial incident. The part- ally beneficial. These executives recognize that the nership with community and faith-based leaders media—as watchdogs of government—are serv- provides a means for constructive dialogue, and ing a critical role in a democratic society. These it is being replicated in other parts of the District executives also recognize that they must tolerate of Columbia. the external scrutiny that comes with police au- thority. The media, in part, serves to also help law enforcement agencies remain accountable to the Media Relations public. A constructive relationship with the By strengthening ties between the police and the media, as with the community, is not normally community, law enforcement agencies increase forged during times of crisis. Through continual the support that can be called upon in times of long-term efforts by the law enforcement agency

9. Lawrence (2000) analyzes more than 500 use-of-force incidents covered by and the Los Angeles Times from 1981 to 1991. The book explores how such incidents are defined and examines their representation and effect on the media.

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COMMENTARY: box 4.4 Communicating with the Public and Building Trust by David J. Bayless, Director of News Affairs, leadership in managing the incident and commu- Chicago (IL) Police Department nicating effectively with the media and the public. Instead of “jumping in the bunker” and offer- “Chicago’s Rodney King.” That is how one com- ing no comment, the CPD viewed this incident as munity member described a videotape that sur- an opportunity to deliver to the community a faced after an arrest on the of Chicago “zero tolerance” message on officer misconduct in April 2003. The incident—videotaped by a cit- and use of excessive force. Superintendent izen—involved four men who refused police or- Hillard delivered the message by calling a press ders to exit a van. Chicago Police Department conference soon after the incident occurred to (CPD) officers had stopped the van because of an comment on the actions of officers on the video- outstanding warrant for the arrest of one of the tape, to answer the media’s questions, and to de- van’s passengers. After the subjects ignored re- scribe the steps taken to further investigate the peated commands to exit the van, the officers matter. The department also distributed copies took further action. The officers broke the van’s of the tape to all of the local media outlets—an windows, discharged Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) unprecedented move that afforded the depart- spray, and then pulled the subjects out of the ve- ment additional credibility and helped ensure that hicle. These actions were consistent with CPD’s CPD would be the primary source of information use-of-force guidelines. However, after the sub- about the incident for the media. jects were removed from the vehicle, two officers The Chicago Sun-Times headline the following were captured on the videotape kicking and day read, “Hillard ‘upset’ by cops’ conduct.”10 punching one of the subjects. The headline and the story discussed the police These videotaped images were potentially ex- superintendent’s response to the tape and put plosive, and one local television station already the focus of the story squarely on the police de- had the video. It was only a matter of time before partment, not elsewhere. The police defined and every local news station was airing the tape, and drove the story instead of merely reacting to it. national and cable networks were covering the in- The media coverage of the incident that followed cident. The department faced a possible media was not about an “out of control” police depart- crisis and public outcry. How CPD chose to han- ment or a department apathetic to allegations of dle the crisis would define how large and damag- excessive force. The stories were about the su- ing the story would become. This incident would perintendent’s firm response to possible miscon- challenge CPD officials, especially Terry Hillard, duct by his officers, and his actions to investigate then-police superintendent, to demonstrate true the matter further.

10. Golab, Art, Chicago Sun-Times, April 26, 2003, page 6.

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and the media, mutual respect can be developed. perceptions of how the department is meeting The person within the agency charged with media those needs. Some chiefs even have a permanent contacts—whether a full or part-time Public In- open-door policy, although this tends to work formation Officer (PIO) and/or the chief execu- better in smaller communities and departments. tive—should attempt to establish a solid profes- Some police have engaged in innovative strate- sional working relationship with local media gies to strengthen the relationship with the representatives prior to the occurrence of critical media. The former police commissioner in New incidents. When the PIO in Hillsborough Coun- York City took late-night tours with reporters in ty, Florida started his job, he sat down with repre- the 1990s—taking a cue from one of his prede- sentatives at each media outlet in an informal set- cessors, Teddy Roosevelt (Rosen 1999). The ting. He introduced himself and shared how he Miami police chief frequently submits op-ed hoped to perform his job to their mutual benefit. pieces to his local newspapers.11 He believes that During the course of his PIO assignment, he had it is not always what is said, but the fact that in- several key objectives: to meet the media’s needs formation is flowing that resonates with the pub- for timely, accurate news with visuals or audios; to lic and shows a commitment to keeping the com- deal with everyone fairly and equally—showing munities informed. His policy of openness was no favoritism; to share as much information as he reflected when he was chief of police in Philadel- could; and to explain when he could not share phia, where he opened daily COMPSTAT meet- more. ings to the press. He also implemented a progres- To be more accessible, many departments sive approach when he “embedded” reporters hold regular meetings with press representa- with officers during Miami’s Free Trade Area of tives—sometimes annually, sometimes more the Americas protests. frequently—to discuss their needs and their

Successful management of the incident is il- Telling the good news is the easy part of lustrated by what did not follow in the aftermath. media relations. However, police executives This incident did not become national news; demonstrate true leadership when they can skill- nor did it result in mass public outcry, rioting, or fully handle the media, face tough questions, con- a call for the superintendent’s resignation. The trol damage to the department’s reputation, and story lingered for a few days and was then re- maintain community trust in the wake of a crisis. placed by other news. When recommendations How police executives address incidents—such for discipline were filed a few months later, the as this one—says as much about their leadership department diligently shared that information ability and relationship with the community as it with reporters. does about adept media management.

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Post-Incident Interactions with the Media investigations. PIOs and police executives some- Following a controversial incident, the way times disagree on how much information to an agency interacts with the media can have share, although the movement in the profession is major ramifications for how the incident is cov- to provide all information that is relevant and that ered, thus significantly shaping the community’s can be shared without harming the ongoing in- perceptions of it. An agency should consider de- vestigation and forthcoming legal proceedings veloping a general plan for use following a criti- (Pangi 2002). cal incident. This plan could outline who will A Florida PIO suggests that getting informa- convey what types of information and the nature tion out quickly increases the likelihood of pro- and extent of information to be released. For ex- ducing a one-day versus multiple-day story. He ample, in Hillsborough County, Florida, the PIO noted that because Florida has very liberal open reports factual information to the press regarding records laws, he knew that it was likely that infor- an incident—including information on the mation he didn’t share would be revealed eventu- specifics of the use of force, the officer, and the ally, ultimately making the department look less subject against whom force was used. If it is a than forthcoming. When asked if he would have controversial incident, the sheriff personally ad- shared less information if he worked in a jurisdic- dresses issues relevant to the controversy. This tion with less-stringent open records laws, he in- forthright and consistent handling of the inci- dicated that he would still disclose the same infor- dent conveys a sense of transparency and engen- mation. He believes that a broader disclosure will ders trust with the public. Further, if there are in- help create a sense that the police department is dications that a deputy misused force, the sheriff fully accountable. He shares information about relays this information, and notes that the actions an involved officer that is public record and rele- do not represent department policy nor reflects vant (for example, involvement in prior incidents the behavior of all deputies. of force and the officer’s training). In addition, In terms of the content of information re- the Florida PIO would not release the name of the leased, agencies should not appear to be defensive, officer until after the officer’s immediate family but when feasible, should appear forthcoming— had been notified about the incident. He noted and be forthcoming. Many community members that information regarding the subject also would base their perceptions of a critical incident on the be provided, such as information that appears police executive’s or PIO’s communications with directly relevant to the incident (for example, reporters—including whether or not the tone is history of violence, history of assaulting officers, hostile or defensive (Doniel 2002).12 By providing history of weapons possession, etc.). He noted the media with information on the incident, law that public opinion of the police can actually be enforcement agencies minimize the likelihood undermined if residents perceive the police to be that reporters will conduct their own independent engaging in what could be perceived as a “smear”

11. A January 9, 2005, op-ed item written by Miami Police Chief John F. Timoney is reprinted in Chapter 1. 12. The Florida Regional Community Policing Institute at St. Petersburg College, under a cooperative agreement from the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, offers courses in effective media skills for law enforcement and use-of-force issues in a community policing environment. The institute also provides free community policing training to law enforcement officers, community residents, city employees, social services agencies, and private sector representatives throughout Florida. For more information, visit http://cop.spjc.cc.fl.us/cop/Courses/Fl%20RCPI% 20Courses%20Frame.htm.

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campaign against the subject of a police use-of- building relationships prior to a critical incident force incident. is essential to successfully establishing trust with Some police executives will make extensive the media and the public. Furthermore, follow- efforts to provide information to the media and ing a critical incident, transparency and consis- public. After a thirteen-year-old was shot in a ve- tency, coupled with the timely and comprehen- hicle in Los Angeles in February 2005, Chief Brat- sive release of information, will contribute to the ton provided a wide range of information in strengthening of that relationship. order to disclose accountability and to dispel ru- mors. A Los Angeles Times article described the Los Angeles Police Department briefing on the in- INVESTIGATIONS OF cident as “unusually detailed.” The briefing in- POLICE USE OF FORCE cluded a laser-produced reenactment of the teenager’s car hitting a police cruiser, a display of “Police departments everywhere have no photos of skid marks to convey how fast the sub- greater responsibility than to ensure that our officers, who are entrusted by the ject’s car was moving when it hit the police vehi- public to use force in the performance of cle, and the playing of a recording of the call the their duties, use that force prudently and officer made to the dispatcher before the vehicle appropriately. And when deadly force is pursuit was initiated. The Los Angeles Times arti- used, police departments have a solemn cle noted that “the briefing was a notable break obligation—to the public and to the from the secrecy that traditionally has shrouded officers involved—to investigate these LAPD investigations of shootings by police” (Gar- cases thoroughly, accurately, and expeditiously.” vey, Zamichow, and Lait 2005). Taking a similar- Chief Charles H. Ramsey, Metropolitan (D.C.) ly unique approach was Minneapolis Police Chief Police Department William McManus. He emphasized transparency and communication following an October 2004 fatal police-involved shooting. Chief McManus Today when a police officer is involved in a seri- kept local leaders informed by briefing them in ous use-of-force incident, a series of reviews are his home shortly after the incident, and later con- initiated. These detailed examinations scrutinize ducting a PowerPoint presentation with details an officer’s decision to use force and the tactics he and information about evidence related to the in- or she employed. Reviews can take place in many vestigation. He personally explained the circum- ways, from official investigations by local police, stances of the incident—including explaining federal agencies, and prosecutors, to informal why he felt the shooting was justified—to surviv- reviews by the media, advocacy organizations, ing family members. Chief McManus also re- and citizen groups. Internal investigations by law leased the entire case file to the public so that the enforcement agencies of the use of force are often community could better understand how the de- handled in the same manner as a criminal inci- partment investigated a police-involved shooting. dent, and are heavily documented and eviden- A commentary about this incident by Chief Mc- tiary. Nongovernmental reviews may be less com- Manus is included in Box 4.5. prehensive, and they sometimes highlight only These efforts reflect how police executives specific aspects of a force incident. What is clear are trying new strategies to better communicate is that an officer involved in a serious use-of- with the public and the media. It is clear that force incident can expect an exhaustive analysis of his or her decision to use force, and the failure

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COMMENTARY: box 4.5 One Chief’s Perspective: A Look at Post-Shooting Decision Making by Chief William P. McManus, I had decided months before that the Minneapo- Minneapolis Police Department lis Police Department would no longer refer offi- cer-involved shootings to an outside agency for No one ever calls a chief of police with good news investigation, which had been the case for in the middle of the night—so I knew something the past several years, and we would investigate it bad had happened when my cell phone woke me internally. up very early on a Sunday morning last October. This would be the first test of my new policy. The watch commander was on the line with a The incident, and how we investigated it, had all worst-case scenario: a white police officer had the ingredients to test the trust I had worked so just shot an African-American teenager who ap- hard to build with the community—not to men- peared to be armed with a pellet gun. The 15-year- tion my relationship with the officers who were old boy, Courtney Williams, was at the hospital still getting used to me and a new way of doing but was not expected to survive. business. My first step at the homicide office was I quickly put on my uniform and rushed to the to check on the officer involved in the shooting. I scene on the city's North side—an area where po- also ran into the police union attorney and the lice and members of the African-American com- city attorney. There was disagreement over munity have had a contentious relationship and whether the involved officer's partner should be history of complaints about mistreatment by the compelled to give a statement. I instructed he police—a story heard in many cities across the was to be given the Garrity warning and the state- country. At the scene, I was briefed by the official ment taken. in charge on what appeared to have happened. On my way home, I called key community As I took in the scene, I also began mentally reen- leaders, including members of the Police Com- acting the shooting based on the information, munity Relations Council—a group of citizens preparing for what I knew be would be plenty of formed as the result of DOJ intervention into rela- questions from Courtney's family and the com- tions between the Minneapolis Police Depart- munity. I also encountered several of Courtney's ment and community—and invited them to my distraught relatives, including his mother, who house later that morning to brief them on the didn't yet know that by that time he had already shooting. I wanted them to get their information died at the hospital. I tried to talk to Courtney's unfiltered and directly from me. I was well aware mother who was looking for more information that how I communicated information in these than anyone had at the time. It was a very emo- first few hours was critical and would set the tone tional situation. From the scene I headed to the for the difficult months ahead, as the investiga- homicide office at police headquarters downtown. tion unfolded. I was also keenly aware how This would be the first fatal officer-involved shoot- volatile this shooting situation could be—involv- ing since I became chief eight months earlier. ing a well-liked, African-American teen with no

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major run-ins with the law and a white police of- on whether the shooting of Courtney Williams ficer. About a dozen leaders gathered around my was administratively justified. Some officers kitchen table about 9:00 A.M. I briefed them on openly balked at my efforts to stay connected to what I knew at the time and dispelled rumors that the community during this challenging time, ac- were quickly spreading within the community. cusing me of allowing the community to "drive The tone of the 45-minute meeting, as you would the investigation." The lack of insight into how imagine, was very serious. I also told them what I important and necessary this communication would say at a news conference scheduled for was became frustrating. But it did not deter me about 10:00 A.M., and promised to keep them in- from doing what I believed was the right thing to formed as the investigation progressed. Some of do. the community leaders later joined me before the Throughout the investigation, I took every ef- cameras at the media briefing that morning. Oth- fort to prevent even the slightest appearance of ers chose to stay in the background, just listening bias. I was fortunate to have two homicide inves- and observing. Some friends of Courtney's family tigators available who were well respected in the also appeared, allegedly fueling rumors that he community, and I assigned them to handle the in- had been shot in the back. Having confirmed with vestigation. This went a long way to maintaining the homicide lieutenant earlier, I made it clear the fragile trust in the months ahead. Their rela- that this was not true. I went so far as to arrange tionships would also prove critical in obtaining with the medical examiner and the family to allow information from key witnesses who were with a retired African-American police chief and a local Courtney Williams the night of the shooting. As minister to examine the body and report back to time went on, it became increasingly clear that the family and community whether or not the de- the officer was justified under the circumstances ceased had been shot in the back. to use deadly force. A grand jury was going to re- As you can imagine, the shooting led the view the evidence and a make a formal decision, evening newscasts that Sunday and would re- but I couldn't see any other conclusion, based on main in the news for several weeks. Behind the the totality of the investigation. I also knew this scenes, I met regularly with the investigators and finding would not be well received by some com- supervisors working on the case. I also kept key munity leaders and Courtney's family and friends. community leaders informed at each step of the After the grand jury decided on a no-bill, I investigation as rumors continued to fly and com- arranged to meet with the leaders and Courtney's munity tensions continued. I answered ques- family for a private briefing, complete with a for- tions and promised the leaders at the meetings mal presentation by homicide investigators. that I would have my investigators prepare a pres- Although just a few questions about the distance entation that would review every detail of the case of the pellet gun from Courtney’s body immedi- and each piece of evidence. When our investiga- ately after the shooting and the position of Court- tion was over, I wanted no question left unan- ney’s hands in the seconds before the shooting, swered as to how the final decision was reached the presentation was respectful and left no other

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box 4.5 continued

conclusion that the officer had no choice other expect, not everyone in the community was satis- than to use deadly force based on the circum- fied with the results of our investigation. But what stances he faced. One of the toughest experi- was remarkable, and noted in the news media, ences was when I looked Courtney’s aunt in the was how calm the community stayed under emo- eye, and with a lump in my throat, told her why I tional circumstances. There were no anti-police believed the shooting of her nephew was justified. marches on city hall and no street riots. As a parent, I could feel for the loss of a child. Be- Looking back at the Courtney Williams case, I fore we left the meeting, Courtney's aunt put her am convinced the relationships I established with hand over my heart and said to tell the officer she minority community leaders, even before I was loved him, and that she understood what he and sworn in as chief of police, proved critical in the his family had been going through. aftermath of the shooting. From the earliest days Following the meeting, we met with the when I arrived in Minneapolis, we exchanged cell media where I publicly stated the shooting was a phone and pager numbers to stay in touch and to tragedy for everyone involved, but that under the solicit community input. I would be the first to circumstances it was justified. Later, I visited with admit it is a fragile relationship that takes con- students at Courtney’s High School, and briefed stant, open communication and unrelenting hon- them about the circumstances and outcome of esty. But building and cultivating trust between the incident and investigation. The entire case police and community members is essential for file was also released to the public so anyone everyone. I hope by sharing this example, I have could see how the MPD investigated a high- advanced the debate on what decisions police profile, officer-involved shooting. As one would chiefs should consider following a shooting.

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to implement a comprehensive internal process many police executives believe internal review will result in greater external scrutiny. mechanisms provide the most effective means of Law enforcement agencies’ investigation of holding police accountable for incidents of police police use-of-force incidents must be objective, use of force. However, the nature of internal ac- extensive, and transparent. However, compre- countability makes such police review systems hensive investigations are a relatively recent phe- very controversial (Geller and Toch 1995). Fail- nomenon. Until the riots of the late 1960s, the ure to implement an internal process that is effec- professional criminal justice community, and tive and trustworthy has led to more intense ex- most of the public, paid little attention to how ternal review and oversight, which in turn leads wisely or how well police used force (Fyfe 1999). to agencies’ loss of independence. Supporters of As discussed in Chapter 1, it was within the con- external review claim that internal investigations text of the civil rights movement that restrictions favor police officers (Crank, Kuykendall, and on police use of force developed (Geller and Scott Roberg 2000). Most police departments use the 1992). Use-of-force policy must be accompanied internal approach. by mechanisms to ensure that personnel under- As with different levels of force, there are stand it, adhere to it, and are disciplined if they different levels of force review. Lower levels of do not (Alpert and Anderson 1986). force (hand control, O.C. spray, etc.) are often in- vestigated by line supervisors—sometimes fol- lowed by an assessment by a review or tactics Internal and External Investigations board. In these types of cases, the special skills of The need for accountability has led to both inter- an independent investigator are not necessary nal and external approaches to investigating po- (Geller and Toch 1995), and often the cases are lice use-of-force incidents. In an internal system, simply documented by a reporting form as dis- all investigative processes are conducted within cussed in Chapter 2. However, cases involving the agency by agency personnel, while external more serious use-of-force incidents require in- systems involve non-department employees and vestigations that are much more comprehensive. sometimes community members in some aspect Such investigations are generally required for of the process.13 more serious occurrences such as deadly force An effective internal investigation mecha- (primarily firearm discharges and blows to the nism is a critical component of a police depart- head with a blunt instrument), incidents result- ment’s efforts to control force and foster public ing in subject hospitalization, canine bites, trust. Proponents of internal review claim that alleged criminal conduct, and instances of in- external processes are politically influenced and custody deaths. dilute the authority of a police chief. Many in the profession prefer an internal agency approach, citing political independence, professional ex- Post-Incident Realities pertise of investigators, and understanding of po- Failure to quickly, comprehensively, and objec- lice field situations. It is for these reasons that tively investigate a police use-of-force incident

13. Joshua A. Ederheimer of PERF wrote this section of Chapter 4.

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can damage a police department’s credibility of all individuals involved—including police with the community. Even when force is used officers. with restraint, in the aftermath of a force incident In order for an internal use-of-force investi- confusion often reigns concerning the type of re- gation process to be credible, standardized poli- view facing police officers who were involved. cies and procedures must be in place. This is es- There also may be uncertainty about who will sential to promote consistency and objectivity. conduct the investigation. In many instances, the Investigative reports should be completed in a lines have blurred between the criminal investi- standardized format (e.g., a template) to ensure gation of a use-of-force incident and the admin- that questions unique to a use-of-force investiga- istrative (or policy review) investigation. As a re- tion are addressed and documented in a uniform sult, police officers, citizens, and sometimes even manner. Establishing a transparent investigative prosecutors get confused about a police officers’ process is needed to gain the confidence and trust rights and status following a use-of-force inci- of the public and police officers alike. The dent. It is important to note that after an inci- process must be able to withstand both internal dent, police officers become the target of a crim- and external review. Police executives can be cer- inal investigation that could lead to criminal tain that use-of-force investigations will be scru- and/or criminal civil rights charges. Complicat- tinized by the courts (both criminal and civil), ing matters further is essentially the need to con- the media, labor unions, and review boards. duct four concurrent investigations that involves Moreover, federal agencies (such as the Federal all of the same information. Those investigations Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Department include the of Justice) may review the investigations as well. • criminal investigation of the incident that led up to the use of force, • criminal investigation of the involved offi- Constitutional Protections cers’ actions, Police officers—like any citizens—cannot be • possible criminal civil rights investigation compelled to give self incriminating testimony. of the officers’ actions, and The use-of-force investigation must balance the • administrative (or policy review) investiga- public’s demand for timely information against tion of the officers’ actions. police officers’ rights. Obtaining the involved of- ficer(s)’ statement is perhaps the most crucial Another possibility is a civil trial based on and sensitive aspect of a use-of-force investiga- civil litigation stemming from a use-of-force inci- tion. Police officers are constitutionally protect- dent. The constitutional protections afforded of- ed against self incrimination by the Fifth Amend- ficers during the course of all of these investiga- ment and against unreasonable searches by the tions and reviews depend on the kind of Fourth Amendment. They have the right to investigation that is conducted. The challenge counsel under the Sixth Amendment and are en- is not only to set up different operational mecha- titled to due process under the Fourteenth nisms for each type of use-of-force investigation, Amendment. They are entitled to Miranda warn- but to do so in a manner that respects the rights ings14 and Garrity warnings15 that ensure this

14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 15. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).

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protection. The threshold for review in a crimi- of a voluntary statement—is mitigated. Some- nal investigation is probable cause (beyond a rea- times union representatives or counsel will cau- sonable doubt), while the standard in an admin- tion officers against providing immediate inter- istrative investigation is the less stringent views because they are concerned that the trauma preponderance of the evidence (more likely than associated with a shooting will affect the accuracy not). Criminal investigations could result in a and tenor of officer responses—given what is at police officer’s incarceration; administrative in- stake, some officers may be advised to wait for vestigations could result in discipline, termina- counsel. tion, or other personnel action. The rights of of- ficers vary depending on the kind of investigation that is under way. It is critical that internal inves- The Traditional Model of a tigators understand these complexities while Use-of-Force Investigation conducting use-of-force investigations, and they One of the most common models of a use-of- must be trained to address these intricacies. force investigation divides the circumstances of a Many prosecutors believe that it is in the force incident into two separate investigations best interest of police officers to fully cooperate handled by distinct sets of detectives from differ- and provide voluntary statements after a force in- ent organizational divisions. In this traditional cident. From a criminal liability perspective, model, one investigative group is composed of prosecutors review the actions of a police officer regular field detectives (often homicide unit in- in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court case vestigators) assigned to handle the criminal in- of Graham v. Conner.16 The Graham decision es- vestigation of a force incident—both the crime tablished the legal and police industry standard leading up to the use of force and any possible for judging a police officer’s use of force. Specif- criminal negligence on the part of the officer. ically, the decision states that the reasonableness The other group is composed of internal affairs of an officer’s use of force must be judged “from investigators assigned to handle the administra- the perspective of a reasonable officer on the tive (or policy review) investigation of an officer’s scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind- conduct. This bifurcated structure originally sight.” Thus, if a police officer provides a volun- emerged to address the need to gather informa- tary statement, prosecutors must consider the tion quickly—while respecting the constitutional involved officer’s perspective of the incident at rights of involved police officers. The separation the time it occurred—including the information was intended to address evidentiary require- (or lack thereof) that the officer had in formulat- ments protecting a police officer from self in- ing the decision to use force. This is a very high crimination, while at the same time gathering in- prosecutorial standard. Moreover, if officers pro- formation by compelling involved officers to vide an immediate statement following a use-of- provide a statement solely for administrative pur- force incident, they enjoy another benefit—the poses. Criminal investigators could not compel strengthening of community trust. The public is a police officer to provide a statement because reassured that officers are cooperating, and the of Miranda protections, but administrative inves- perception of misconduct—fostered by the lack tigators could compel statements because the

16. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).

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administrative investigation was “separate” and from PERF’s Critical Issues Forum are included no constitutional guarantees applied. However, it in Box 4.6 in this chapter. was critical to keep compelled statements isolat- ed from criminal investigators in order to prevent information—and the fruits of that informa- The Washington, D.C., Model tion—from being legally tainted. Often, to main- In 1999, the chief of the Metropolitan (D.C.) Po- tain this separation, officers provided separate lice Department (MPD), Charles Ramsey, created statements to both sets of investigators at differ- the Force Investigation Team (FIT) to investigate ent times. police use-of-force incidents in the nation’s capi- This structure has proved to be trouble- tal. The unit is assigned to the MPD’s Office of some, creating confusion among both members Professional Responsibility, which reports direct- of the public and police officers alike. This ly to the chief of police. The chief’s action was process can lead to unintentional contradictory part of several reforms that he instituted in re- statements and sometimes conflicts in written re- sponse to a Pulitzer-prize winning series in the ports between the criminal and administrative Washington Post entitled “Deadly Force.” The se- investigations—often because of long time peri- ries highlighted the department’s inordinate ods (sometimes months or years) between inter- number of police shootings and serious prob- views conducted by the various sets of detectives. lems with its use-of-force investigation processes. Furthermore, regular field detectives are often Chief Ramsey took the opportunity to complete- not trained to conduct use-of-force investiga- ly reengineer MPD’s use-of-force investigation tions and may overlook important force-related systems. The department had been using the tra- information. For example, use-of-force investi- ditional bifurcated use-of-force investigation gators consider the availability of other force op- model, which was the subject of much criticism tions or equipment, civil rights and policy con- in the newspaper series. MPD’s “separate divi- cerns, and justifications for force use (e.g., sion” approach led to the problems described justification for every bullet fired during the earlier in this chapter—low-quality investiga- course of a police shooting). Conversely, the ad- tions, content inconsistency, as well as long peri- ministrative investigators sometimes play “sec- ods of lag time between incident and administra- ond fiddle” to the criminal investigators, and are tive resolution. Finding the traditional model not privy to essential information early in their duplicative and inefficient, the MPD developed a administrative review—later learning of key facts consolidated model. from prosecutors or reading about them in crim- inal case files. These conflicts eventually led to Structure and Responsibilities uneven, incomplete, and untimely use-of-force investigations—and ultimately a lack of account- The MPD merged all use-of-force investiga- ability. Two police departments provided project tions—both criminal and administrative— staff with information on how they recently for review by one single team. The new unit was reengineered their use-of-force investigation to provide MPD with an established system processes to address these issues and the unique in which a neutral internal entity could complete challenges associated with these complex reviews. a standard comprehensive investigation of force Perspectives on various investigative models incidents. Originally, the team investigated only police shootings, but the team’s success and

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high-quality investigations led to its expansion, Investigative Process with the establishment of a second team respon- Formal internal reporting and investigative sys- sible for investigating incidents when less-lethal tems are needed to ensure quality control and ac- force was used. Regardless of the type of force in- countability. The teams, which took a business- vestigated, the processes are identical. related perspective to force investigations, have The FIT has two operational units (called been recognized for their high-quality investiga- teams) that are available for on-duty or callback tions and unique approach to use-of-force issues. response twenty-four hours a day, seven days a At the outset, the MPD Force Investigation week: the Deadly Force Team and the Less-Lethal Team initiates two investigations: the criminal Force Team.While both teams concentrate on se- and the criminal civil rights investigations of the rious use-of-force incidents—not minor force police officer’s decision to use serious force. incidents investigated by line supervisors—one While FIT investigators do liaison with the field team focuses primarily on firearm incidents and detectives investigating the underlying offense circumstances resulting in death, while the other that led up to the incident (for example, the jew- investigates serious uses of less-lethal force. Re- elry store robbery that led to the use of force), sponsibilities are divided as follows: FIT personnel are solely responsible for inter- viewing the officers who used force, and are re- Deadly Force Team quired by policy to read involved officers their • Firearm discharges (except range and train- Miranda/Garrity protections. This requirement ing incidents, and discharges at animals) ensures that statements are not compelled. While • Uses of force resulting in death involved officers are never compelled to answer • In-custody deaths questions during this criminal portion of the • Officer suicides (with service weapon) force investigation, they may do so voluntarily. Often police officers confer with their attorneys Less-Lethal Force Team on the scene of the incident or via telephone. • Uses of force resulting in a broken bone The great majority of D.C. officers waive their • Injuries requiring hospital admittance as a Miranda/Garrity protections and provide a full result of police use of force statement about the incident (often participating • Head strikes with impact weapons or hard in a “walk-through” at the scene). FIT investiga- objects tors may compel statements later during the ad- • Uses of force resulting in a loss of con- ministrative phase. sciousness, risk of death, serious disfigure- In addition to taking the statements of in- ment, or disability or impairment of the volved officers, the FIT investigators collect all re- functioning of any body part or organ lated information, manage the collection of evi- • Incidents where persons receive a bite from dence by technicians, and attend autopsies when a MPD canine applicable. The FIT investigators complete a pre- • Serious use-of-force referrals from the Of- liminary report—in an enumerated format— fice of Citizen Complaint Review that are and provide it to the chief of police by the next forwarded to the United States Attorney’s business day. After completing a preliminary Office for review report, members of the FIT present the facts of • Criminal allegations of police use of exces- the incident to their local prosecutor’s office— sive force which in the District’s case is the United States

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ARTICLE: box 4.6 Use-of-Force Investigations and Tactical Assessments

by Heather Davies A second critical issue panelists discussed in- volved the use of tactics that can reduce incidents Deputy Chief Michael Berkow of the Los Angeles of use-of-force. One participant noted three as- Police Department, PERF Senior Associate Joshua pects of officer conduct that can lead to use of Ederheimer, and Executive Director David Wood force. First, law enforcement officers need to from the Police Ombudsman’s Office of Northern consider their own safety when handling a diffi- Ireland discussed use-of-force investigations and cult encounter with a suspect, and they cite self- tactical assessments at PERF’s December 2004 defense as the reason for use of force. There was Critical Issues in Policing Conference. disagreement among conference attendees about Investigations of police use of force typically what actions are reasonable in achieving self-pro- address three general areas: whether the officer’s tection. For example, one attendee commented actions were justifiable under criminal law; that the practice of handcuffing a suspect and whether the officer’s actions were justifiable placing him or her on the curb while an officer under departmental policy; and whether the tac- conducts a search of a car—under the umbrella tics used by the officer were appropriate. The of officer safety, can be demeaning and disre- panelists emphasized the importance of a having spectful. Others commented that agencies that a well-established, thorough investigation emphasize officer safety to the exclusion of other process in place prior to use-of-force incidents, concerns may, in fact, encourage officers to take and they offered suggestions for reengineering risks and even escalate the need for force. Some existing policies. participants believed that officers could be more aggressive with suspects if they are taught that OVERVIEW OF CRITICAL ISSUES their own safety trumps other responsibilities. Conversely, others emphasized the importance of The first critical issue addressed by the panel was officer safety when assessing tactical decision- how best to structure investigations of use-of- making. These executives believed officer safety force incidents. Joshua Ederheimer described is critical to support. However, use-of-force inci- three models that agencies currently follow to dents can occur when officers deliberately and conduct use-of-force investigations. In the tradi- unnecessarily put themselves in a dangerous sit- tional model, field investigators focus on criminal uation. For example, officers who become frus- aspects of an incident, while internal investiga- trated by a suspect’s refusal to abide by a com- tors focus on departmental policies and proce- mand may move closer to the suspect than is dures. In the single-team model, the two types of safe. This action increases the possibility that investigations are conducted by a single unit. In force will be used. Some participants suggested the single-division model, two teams working that police organizations should train officers to under a single command investigate the two help “manage their own jeopardy,” and take types of investigations. (These models are de- greater risks. scribed more fully in this chapter.)

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A third issue raised by the panel was the need witnesses and not interview them in a group— to instill in officers an awareness of the differ- which is especially important for witnesses who ences between necessary force and justifiable force. are officers. As in any criminal case, the first Use-of-force investigations reveal that officers forty-eight hours are essential when investigating sometimes use force that is likely justifiable use of force by police. The panelists discussed the under the law but could have been avoided if the need for the investigative process to respect offi- officer considered other tactics or strategies to cers’ constitutional rights and treatment. handle the situation. Another chief reiterated this David Wood discussed his agency’s use of a point, citing the possibility that officers may use unified team to investigate use-of-force incidents. force because policies permit them to do so—not The Police Ombudsman’s Office is an official in- because their lives are in danger. Deputy Chief dependent government agency tasked with inves- Berkow described these use-of-force incidents as tigating the conduct of members of the Police “awful, but lawful.” Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The Om- budsman’s Office investigates all firearm dis- SUCCESSFUL APPROACHES AND charges, in-custody deaths, and misconduct alle- PRACTICAL ADVICE gations involving members of the PSNI. Their goal is to ensure the best possible police service Successful approaches in use-of-force investiga- and public confidence in policing. The Ombuds- tions address several considerations. One con- man’s Office involves all parties (families, sideration is to facilitate the efficiency, fairness, lawyers, community members, police officers) in and accuracy of the investigative process. Anoth- the investigation, and it seeks to provide stake- er consideration is the desire to improve an holders with productive feedback. Involved par- agency’s ability to learn from investigative find- ties are informed of an investigation’s emerging ings in order to enhance policies, procedures, findings. and training. After the investigation, the Ombudsman’s Of- For conducting use-of-force investigations, fice develops lessons learned, which are used to agencies should consider establishing a single make significant recommendations on how to component (either a single team or dual teams of train officers and develop policies. “In forward- specialized detectives to investigate criminal and thinking communities,” said Deputy Chief policy aspects of an incident). Panelists agreed Berkow, “internal affairs departments and their that use-of-force investigations should apply investigations of officer complaints drive the the same standards as are applied in all criminal training agenda for the next year.” To foster these investigations—using similar protocols. One connections, force investigation teams should participant recommended conducting an investi- have close relationships with the agency’s policy gation process with the same speed and accuracy office and training unit. Lessons from use-of- as a traditional criminal investigation. For exam- force investigations support new policies and ple, it was suggested that investigators separate training programs that emphasize appropriate

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box 4.6 continued tactics and decision-making. For example, during fenses, one police executive wrote an op-ed arti- the course of a use-of-force investigation, Deputy cle and discussed the proposed changes with the Chief Berkow learned of problems with communi- local police union. Another chief found that his cation dispatchers in Los Angeles. To remedy the presence at roll calls fostered positive policy ex- situation, he brought dispatch commanders to- planation and implementation. gether for appropriate training to ensure a more The panelists emphasized organizational in- efficient response. In Washington, D.C., reenact- tegrity and the need for officers to identify any in- ments of force incidents are used in role-play appropriate conduct by coworkers. Unfortunately training to improve tactics and officer safety. some law enforcement agencies sometimes fail Some agencies emphasize training and tactics to create a safe and confidential environment for immediately. For example, the Montgomery officers to come forward and report misconduct County, Maryland, police department ensures by other officers. Another participant under- that an instructor from the training academy is scored that officers are not comfortable reporting dispatched to all police shooting scenes to obtain other officers’ misconduct if sergeants and lieu- information that may enhance training. tenants do not enforce the rules and regulations. By changing use-of-force policies, police exec- He warned that the failure of supervisors to inter- utives can better manage use-of-force tactics. vene when misconduct occurs indirectly endors- The Metropolitan (DC) Police Department’s poli- es wrongful behavior. cy changes included stronger restrictions on use of police firearms, training enhancements, and PROMISING APPROACHES greater accountability through reengineered in- vestigations. One policy change restricted shoot- Panelists and forum participants shared some ing at vehicles (and prohibited considering a ve- promising approaches that they’ve learned from hicle as a weapon). Miami’s police chief and handling use-of-force investigations and modify- Minneapolis’s chief shared that they also imple- ing policies in their departments. The following mented policies that restricted their officers from are several suggestions that emerged during the shooting at vehicles. panel’s discussions: PERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler asked Construct a unified force investigation unit the forum participants for suggestions on how to that investigates both criminal and administrative implement policy changes—while being sensitive aspects under a single command. to officers’ concerns—which might also preempt a no-confidence vote by police unions against po- A unified specialized investigation team (or two lice executives. One Chief commented that an teams—criminal and administrative—under a implementation strategy should begin with the single command) is advisable when resources training division and should include communica- are available. It promotes uniform management tion with the community on the policy changes. of a force incident as well as consistent policy Before restricting vehicle pursuits in certain of- changes in officer tactics, strategies, and training.

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A use-of-force investigation process should apply tics that can deescalate confrontations. Even after the same standards as in any other criminal case. successful encounters, agencies should continue to train officers in ways to avoid using force when Implement policy and training changes possible—even though force might be justified. based on investigation findings. Strengthen the relationship and open communi- Promote detection systems that involve officers. cation between force investigators and personnel Law enforcement agencies should create an envi- in a law enforcement agency’s policy office and ronment that is conducive for officers to report training unit. An instructor from the training improper and/or unlawful conduct by their peers. academy can be dispatched to police use-of-force Managers and supervisors—especially sergeants incidents or work closely with the force investiga- and lieutenants—need to be consistent in over- tors to improve training. Further, immediate seeing policy and encouraging open discussion changes should be made in training in order to re- on use-of-force issues, policy, and tactics. flect new policies.

Emphasize tactics to avoid using force in addition to officer safety. The investigation process should help officers un- derstand the importance of employing good tac-

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Attorney’s Office (USAO)—within three busi- and whether that number is consistent with the ness days. Once the criminal and criminal civil number of rounds fired. The team makes inves- rights investigations are completed, the USAO is- tigative conclusions in the final investigative re- sues a written decision indicating whether the in- port that reflect both the legal and policy-related volved police officer will be prosecuted. Only findings. The categories of findings are described after the USAO issues a written declination does in an article written by D.C. Police Inspector the administrative (or policy review) portion of Matthew Klein located in Box 4.7. the investigation begin. It is noted that the same Detectives assigned to these teams receive set of facts and circumstances apply to both the specialized training that covers the unique as- criminal and administrative investigations, thus pects of a use-of-force investigation. Experi- the administrative investigation has, in effect, enced criminal investigators are recruited to be been ongoing since the incident occurred. Initial- on the teams, and they receive traditional inves- ly, the USAO was concerned about the ability of tigative training such as the training provided at the FIT to protect the criminal investigation from homicide and crime scene certification schools. being tainted if a compelled statement was neces- Additionally, team members attend civil rights sary. However, its concerns were addressed when classes sponsored by the Department of Justice FIT personnel formalized a policy to read officers and the FBI, as well as focused training on topics Miranda/Garrity warnings in every incident. such as “ by cop” and on internal depart- Because of this “single-team” approach, the ment policies. time it takes to complete the administrative re- The Force Investigation Team ultimately view is significantly reduced; case information al- completes a comprehensive final report that ana- ready has been collected, and the same detective lyzes the involved police officer’s adherence to that worked the criminal investigation completes departmental policy and training, force options, the administrative investigation. Of course, in and tactics. The team’s operations are encapsu- the rare case that there is a decision to prosecute, lated in an operational manual that is updated criminal proceedings will begin. During the ad- frequently, and which contains updated template ministrative (or policy review) investigation, offi- examples for preliminary and final investigative cers can be compelled to make statements con- reports. In order to promote transparency, the cerning the deadly force incident. Figure 4.1 manual and templates are shared with the public, depicts the MPD’s overlapping investigative and are available on the Internet. This single- processes. team approach is part of an established system The preliminary and final investigative re- that fosters an efficient use of resources. Case res- ports follow a standardized template based on the olution is faster and processes are less redundant needs of identified stakeholders. Important inves- because force investigators are already well versed tigative activities (traditional criminal investiga- on the facts and circumstances of the case, as well tive activity and activity unique to force investiga- as the requirements associated with the complex tions) are documented. For example, the nature of a force review. The transparent stan- template ensures that investigators document dardized process protects individual rights while less-lethal equipment available to an officer at at the same time holding officers accountable. It the time of an incident, the number of bullets has gained the support of both internal and ex- found in an officer’s gun after a shooting incident, ternal stakeholders.

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1

Criminal Criminal Investigation Civil Rights 2 Investigation

FACTS

FLOW OF INVESTIGATIONS

Policy Review Criminal and Criminal Civil 1 (Administrative) Rights aspects of a use of force Investigation Policy Review (administrative) 2 investigation

Most of the facts apply to all three investigations

Figure 4.1 Use-of-force investigations (MPD)

The Los Angeles Model bifurcated model explained earlier. Upon assess- The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) ing the new processes, LAPD Chief William Brat- model built upon the general structure of the ton wanted a more effective method for conduct- MPD model. However, it addressed some of ing use-of-force investigations. the concerns previously made by prosecutors— primarily worries about tainting the criminal in- Structure and Responsibilities vestigation by using information from compelled statements. LAPD had overhauled its use-of- In August 2004, Chief Bratton created a new force investigation processes in response to a 2000 structure that replaced the CIID for investigations consent decree with the U.S. Department of that had components of both the single-team ap- Justice. It was at that time that LAPD created proach and the bifurcated traditional model. the Critical Incident Investigation Division Chief Bratton created the LAPD Force Investiga- (CIID). While this structure led to higher quality tion Division (FID) composed of two separate investigations, it was still based on the traditional teams of investigators—one team to conduct the

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COMMENTARY: box 4.7 Use-of-Force Investigative Findings by Matthew Klein, Inspector, A “Justified, Within Departmental Policy” de- Metropolitan (DC) Police Department termination is made when all agency guidelines were followed, and the use-of-force comports The Force Investigation Team (FIT) of the Wash- with all laws and procedures—both legally justi- ington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department fied and within departmental policy. A “Justified, (MPD) has investigated hundreds of incidents of Policy Violation” refers to a use of force that met officer-related uses of force since its inception in all legal and departmental standards but violated 1999—from shootings that killed a suspect to a peripheral departmental policy prior to, or con- bites from police dogs. The team has become a current with, the use of force. For example, an of- model of competence and impartial investigation ficer used force while off duty. The investigation of police practices. Undoubtedly, it has helped re- revealed that the officer used the proper level of duce the staggering number of uses of force seen force to meet the threat he faced, and the force in years prior to FIT’s creation. used met all departmental guidelines and train- The Force Investigation Team follows a multi- ing. However, during the course of the investiga- tiered investigative process formalized in an oper- tion, it was revealed that the officer was working ational plan. The plan is handed to every new an unauthorized off-duty job, thereby violating a member assigned to the unit. To ensure consis- departmental guideline tangential to the use of tency—and more important, impartiality—it em- force. ploys templates for all phases of use-of-force in- A “Justified, Tactical Improvement Opportu- vestigations. For example, templates shape nity” determination is made when the use of force preliminary reports, supplemental documenta- was justified and did not violate departmental tion, case files, and the final investigative report guidelines. Nevertheless, an analysis of the tac- that includes findings. Each final report created tics used by the officer revealed deficiencies when by the FIT is classified in one of the following compared to the instruction given by the agency. ways: It is the policy of the MPD to forward recommen- dations to the agency’s training staff so that the • Justified, Within Departmental Policy officer can receive supplemental training. • Justified, Policy Violation A “Not Justified, Not Within Departmental • Justified, Tactical Improvement Opportunity Policy” is made in response to a use of force that does not meet departmental or legal standards. • Not Justified, Not Within Departmental The MPD sends all such cases to the agency’s Policy.17

17. Examples of these classifications are found in the FIT 2002 Annual Report found at http://mpdc.dc.gov/news/pubs/pdf/fit_ar_02.pdf.

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criminal investigation and another to conduct the The LAPD assigns additional duties by administrative review. However, both sets of de- tasking the division to investigate use-of-force in- tectives are assigned to a single division—promot- cidents involving officers from other jurisdic- ing internal quality control through consistency tions that occur within the boundaries of the city and communication, while at the same time al- of Los Angeles. lowing for the ability to obtain compelled state- ments separate from the criminal investigation. The Force Investigation Division has three Investigative Process distinct responsibilities: assessing the criminal In reengineering its use-of-force investigation culpability of the civilian suspect; determining the processes, LAPD executives recognized that a sin- legal justification for the officer’s use of deadly gle-team structure would not be feasible for their force; and evaluating the officer’s compliance with agency. The culture in the LAPD was such that administrative policies. The division investigates officers did not routinely provide voluntary state- “categorical uses of force,” which consist of the ments to investigators, requiring force investiga- following: tors to compel statements from them (Berkow • incidents involving the use of deadly force. 2004). As a result, LAPD selected a dual struc- • use of an upper body control hold (includ- ture—a criminal team and an administrative (or ing a carotid neck restraint), policy) review team—but placed them under a • use of force resulting in an injury requiring single command. A graphic depicting the LAPD hospitalization, FID’s investigative protocols are reflected in Fig- • head strikes with an impact weapon, ure 4.2. In this model, the criminal team con- • uses of force resulting in death, ducts a criminal investigation of a force incident • in-custody deaths, and using physical evidence and witness statements, • incidents where a member of the public is but not using the officer’s compelled statement. bitten by a police canine and hospitaliza- However, the administrative teams takes com- tion is required. (Note that a canine bite is pelled statements. The compelled statements can not considered a use of force.) be used to determine duty status, administrative

disciplinary review division for an assessment organizations. Each use-of-force case is carefully of appropriate discipline—from suspension to dissected; every decision by the officer and every termination. tactic employed during the incident are examined. The FIT has proven to be an invaluable tool The benefits of the Force Investigation Team are for the agency in the investigation of uses of force unmistakably clear and should be seriously con- by its officers. The unit and its methods have sidered by other police agencies looking for ways become embedded in the agency’s culture— to reduce uses of force by officers. a difficult if not impossible task for large police

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sanctions, and identify tactical improvement files—complete an administrative report. Both needs. The “single-division” concept fosters con- reports, which simply convey findings of fact and sistency by creating sets of specially trained de- not recommendations, are eventually presented to tectives under a single command that allows both the LAPD’s Use of Force types of investigations to proceed without con- Review Board. The board makes a policy determi- flict. The dual structure lowers the risk of “inves- nation and in some cases recommends action tigative contamination” by tasking the most ex- against the involved officer(s). perienced investigators to conduct the criminal The MPD and LAPD models represent in- investigation while allowing other detectives novative approaches to addressing the unique from the same division to immediately initiate challenges of conducting use-of-force investiga- the administrative investigation. The single com- tions. Police executives considering reengineering mand ensures consistent training and informed or creating new investigative processes can look decision making. to these two approaches, and can incorporate Under the LAPD model—like the MPD aspects that can be successfully integrated into model—detectives assigned to the criminal and the culture and within the statutory parameters administrative teams receive specialized training of their own agency and jurisdiction. The MPD that addresses the unique aspects of a use-of- model works well in an environment where force investigation. Criminal and administrative involved officers routinely provide voluntary investigators train together to ensure continuity statements, while the LAPD model works well in and communication. Required training includes a department culture in which compelled state- homicide investigation schools and supervisory ments are necessary. In both models, streamlined skills classes. FID investigators attend state- investigative processes utilizing reporting tem- sponsored officer-involved shooting classes and plates and highly-trained specialized investigators quarterly full-day training sessions on specialized have led to high quality investigations and greater topics determined by management officials. For internal and external trust and confidence. example, investigators will receive training on forensics or interviewing practices. Training is ongoing, and topics for specific sessions are fluid POLICE USE OF FORCE: and are determined based on needs and recent THE ESSENTIALS OF information. OFFICER AFTERCARE The Force Investigation Division completes Police officers are no longer regarded as invinci- two separate reports. The division’s criminal in- ble and impervious to the ravages of traumatic vestigators write a report forwarded to the District events.18 This fact was never more evident than Attorney’s Office for a criminal assessment. This in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of Sep- report does not contain compelled statements nor tember 11, 2001. The world watched in horror as any information gleaned from them. Simultane- the twin towers collapsed, entombing thousands ously, administrative investigators—who have of innocent people along with the police officers complete access to all of the criminal investigators’ and firefighters who had rushed into harm’s way

18. Dr. Beverly J. Anderson (B.C.E.T.S.), Clinical Director/Administrator, Metropolitan Police Employee Assistance Program, Washington, D.C. wrote this section of Chapter 4 on officer aftercare.

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LAPD Force Investigation Division Protocol Categorical Use of Force

FID Criminal FID with Administrative Criminal/ FID Administrative Monitor Admin

•Crime scene, canvass •Monitor criminal investigation •Interview all civilian witnesses •Conduct compelled interviews and non-involved department and walk-through employee witnesses •Determine criminal culpability •Determine whether force was of civilian suspect justifiable •CUOF report

Figure 4.2 FID investigative protocol

to rescue them. These selfless acts of bravery wit- encounter traumatic experiences day after day nessed by a stunned nation were not a new phe- over a period of twenty-plus years. nomenon but in the aftermath of that horrific Law enforcement, the media, and the public day, these unsung heroes captured the hearts of frequently perpetuate the myth that police offi- Americans even if for only a brief moment. cers can handle any crisis without being affected. Not surprisingly, the public’s interest in the The profession demands emotional stamina and effects of traumatic exposure has waxed and resilience, but shootings and other critical inci- waned throughout history. It seems to peak im- dents can be traumatic even to the most well-ad- mediately following mass catastrophes like the justed officers. No one, no matter how healthy, attacks of September 11th and more recently well trained, or well adjusted, is immune to the the tsunami disaster in Asia and East Africa. normal reactions following a critical incident. Nonetheless, for the thousands of law enforce- Repeated, cumulative exposure to victims of ment officers who risk their lives every day, trau- violence, natural and man-made disasters, and matic exposure is a very real part of their jobs. the threat of personal assaults and death places More than ever, the increase in violence in our police officers at risk for developing stress-related society echoes throughout the law enforcement problems that can affect them personally and community. Unlike combat veterans to whom professionally. police are often compared, police officers

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In addition to the tremendous human costs (1998) and Honig and Sultan (2004) of the Los to officers who are valued by their agencies and Angeles County Sheriff’s Department are of par- communities, there are costs that policy makers ticular interest. The studies were conducted in and other leaders should understand. Each offi- 2004 with 982 subjects and in 1998 with 348 sub- cer represents an investment of thousands of dol- jects. (The 348 subjects in the first study were in- lars. The effects of stress and traumatic exposure cluded in the 982 subjects of the second study.) exact a high toll in lost dollars and inferior serv- Over 90 percent of the approximately 430 critical ices rendered to the department and the commu- incidents studied were officer-involved shoot- nity. The cost of worker’s compensation, absen- ings. The subjects were evaluated by the authors teeism, permanent disability, or replacing officers within 3 to 5 days of the incident and prior to due to psychiatric retirement can be staggering. participation in the department’s mandatory de- Moreover, agencies are exposed to civil liability briefing. The study was voluntary and confiden- that could exceed millions of dollars when the tial and yielded 100 percent participation. The use of force by officers is adjudicated to be exces- post-shooting reactions reported by 30 to 50 per- sive. It is essential that police executives provide cent of the respondents within 3 to 5 days after prevention and early intervention strategies to the incident included increased startle response, ensure that their officers have the proper tools to nightmares, sleep disturbances, flashbacks, intru- cope with the stress of use-of-force incidents. sive recollections, increased feelings of anger and rage, a sense of vulnerability and/or heightened sense of danger, and fear about future situations, Background concentration problems, and physical distress Influenced primarily by contemporary media, after the shooting (Honig and Sultan 2004). Not there is a misperception by the public that police- surprisingly, the authors elucidated “fear and vul- involved shootings are a routine part of police nerability” as key factors in post-incident adjust- work.19 In reality, however, they comprise a very ment. The results of their post-shooting inter- small part of the police experience. Nonetheless, ventions will be discussed in the section on when an officer fires a weapon in the line of duty, critical incident debriefing. the scrutiny devoted to the shooting is signifi- The results of another important study cant. In the weeks and months that follow, the funded by the U.S. Department of Justice (Award criminal justice system and the department will 97-IJ-CX-0029) and reported in 2001 bears men- decide if the officer’s “split-second” decision to tion. Conducted by sociologist and former police shoot was justified. officer David Klinger, this study examined the There is a paucity of empirical data regard- reactions of officers during and after shooting in- ing the post-shooting adjustment of police. cidents. The eighty study participants hailed However, several surveys and valuable clinical from nineteen different municipal and county data have been collected in the past two decades agencies in four states. Each participant com- by police and trauma psychologists who have pleted a seventeen-page questionnaire and sat for worked directly with officers. The results of two an audio-taped interview with Klinger. Entitled large studies conducted by Honig and Roland Police Responses to Officers Involved in Shootings,

19. In fact, most police officers never fire their weapon during the course of their entire career.

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box 4.8 Aftercare Terms and Definitions

Traumatic event: An event or events that involved of chemicals that also affect behavior (Kirschman actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a 1997). threat to the physical integrity of self or others; Reactions to critical incidents can last any- and the person’s response involved intense fear, where from a few hours to several weeks after the helplessness, or horror (American Psychiatric As- event and may include any of the following symp- sociation 1994). toms (Bohl 1995; Kirschman 1994; Kates 1999; Traumatic events or critical incidents in polic- Honig and Sultan 2004; Bonifacio 1991). ing include • police-involved shootings; Emotional Signs • death or injury of a fellow officer; • Impatience, irritability, anger, aggression • serious injury or death of a child; • Recurrent thoughts about the event • gruesome homicides; • Depression, anxiety, guilt • natural, accidental, and man-made • Thoughts of suicide disasters; • Emotional numbing • failed or prolonged rescues; • Under-reacting or over-reacting • viewing and handling decomposing • Feeling hopeless and/or powerless bodies; • Feeling vulnerable • police officer suicide; • automobile accidents resulting in serious Physical Signs injuries or death; and • Headaches, indigestion, tightness in the • performance-of-duty injuries that are chest serious or life-threatening. • Hypervigilance, easily startled • Dizziness, trembling, excessive sweating Post-traumatic stress/critical incident stress: The • Sleep problems, nightmares, loss of reactions caused by exposure to an event or appetite, diarrhea events that are of such intensity that a person’s normal coping patterns are disrupted. Traumatic • Fatigue, muscle aches, hypertension events often shatter a person’s assumptions about the predictability of life and control over it. Behavioral Signs Post-traumatic stress is a normal reaction to an • Tearfulness, angry or violent behavior abnormal event and involves the person’s • Avoidant behavior, withdrawing from thoughts and emotions. The person’s autonomic friends and family nervous system activates the brain’s production • Increased use of alcohol, tobacco, food, or medication

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box 4.8 continued

• Increase in risk-taking behavior, different. I reacted more quickly. I was more recklessness paranoid and distrustful. There were certain be- • Changes in work habits haviors that I would no longer tolerate. I would catch myself becoming enraged—something that • Engaging in other self-soothing behaviors never happened before my shooting. I would no like gambling, promiscuity, credit card longer discuss with a citizen ‘why’ I was writing a abuse ticket. I found myself fighting back when I was as- saulted versus getting them down and in hand- Cognitive Signs cuffs. My fiancé and I split up after being togeth- • Problems with memory, focus, and er for three years.” concentration • Forgetfulness, trouble with decision Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): A diag- making nosable disorder brought on by exposure to • Confusion and disorientation severe, usually life-threatening events. It causes • Disruptions in logical thinking considerable disruptions in thoughts, feelings, and behaviors and lasts for more than a month. These words of an officer after his second (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Only shooting illustrate the psychological impact of a professional can make a diagnosis of post- a police shooting: “I didn’t want to talk to any- traumatic stress disorder. Factors that can predis- one about my shooting. I refused to go to de- pose a person to PTSD are the following: absence briefing despite being ordered by the department. of a support system, the inability to talk about dis- I tried not to think about it. Looking back on tressing events, past unresolved traumas, a poor it now, I guess I felt ashamed for having to kill sense of self, the need to feel invulnerable, and this young man and angry because he gave me poor coping skills. no choice. But, when I returned to work, I was

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the entire work is a “must read” for police execu- • What were the precipitants of the shooting? tives. While some question a few of the “psycho- (“Suicide by Cop?”) logical” interpretations that Klinger makes as a • Grotesqueness of the shooting. nonclinical professional, the study examines the • Physical proximity of the officer to the sus- most salient issues regarding police departments’ pect. policies and procedures for handling police-in- • Disruptions of the officer’s expectations. volved shootings. Klinger discusses officers’ per- (For example, a young woman asks an offi- ceptual distortions during the shooting and cer for directions, then shoots at him at memory deficits in the aftermath (for example, “point blank” range.) forgetting how many shots were fired). Investiga- • Were citizens’ lives in danger? tors should realize that an officer’s recall may be • Were officers’ lives in danger? inaccurate. This does not mean the officer is dis- • Potential for liability. honest. Klinger cautions that investigators need • Degree of warning. to take the officer’s account as a point of depar- ture for the rest of the inquiry and work back and Officer Demographics forth between this testimony and other evidence • History of prior shootings or critical inci- to develop the most accurate possible picture of dents. what occurred (Klinger 2001). • Officer’s reaction immediately after the The Metropolitan Police Employee Assis- shooting. (Did he/she feel vulnerable?) tance Program (MPEAP) in Washington, D.C., • Officer’s coping style (withdraws, uses alco- has provided debriefing to over 800 officers in- hol, for example). volved in shooting incidents in the past 20 years. • Officer’s prior learning or mastery (previ- General Order 201.28 requires that officers at- ous training/debriefing). tend a total of six mandatory debriefing sessions • Amount of stress, change, or losses in the conducted by therapists who staff the program. officer’s life at the time of the shooting. In 1998 The Police Post-Shooting Impact Scale was • Nature and degree of family support. created by the MPEAP to identify those factors • Officer’s financial status. (for example, that influence the impact of deadly force encoun- credit card debt that is a source of stress). ters on police officers. Using the criteria in the • Assessment of alcohol use. scale helps to predict, with considerable accuracy, • Ability of officer to accept help from a sup- how officers will respond after they have been in- port system. volved in a shooting. These criteria are listed below: External Factors • The police department’s response. Magnitude of the Event • Was the officer debriefed? How soon after • Was the officer(s) injured? If so, how seri- the shooting? ously? • Were peers supportive? • Was the officer’s partner injured or killed? • What was the media’s response? (Were the • Was the suspect injured or killed? facts distorted?) • Who was the suspect? (for example, a child, • What was the community’s response? mentally ill person)

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The stress of a shooting can be compound- Critical Incident Stress Debriefing: ed by the actions taken by the police department The Standard for Officer Aftercare in the aftermath. The following suggestions for The term critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) departmental post-shooting procedures were is most widely associated with the work of Jeffrey made by officers attending the MPEAP debrief- Mitchell, Ph.D., who designed a system of brief ing groups over a fifteen-year period: group meetings based on the principles of crisis • Officers should be given time off to recover intervention practice and theory (Mitchell 1983). from negative reactions of a shooting with- The meetings take place in the aftermath of a out being made to feel guilty. critical incident such as a police shooting. There • Police departments should not release the are several variations of brief psychological care name(s) of officers involved in shootings. following traumatic events such as mass disas- The practice of releasing this information ters. Mitchell, however, was the first to introduce to the press is detrimental and perhaps even a structured model based on his work with emer- dangerous to officers and their families. gency services personnel in the early 1980s. The • Police officials should receive training re- desired outcome for all models is the mitigation garding the dynamics of shooting incidents. of symptoms that may occur after exposure to • Police officials should discourage rumors traumatic events. within the department by providing accu- Sufficient empirical data do not exist at this rate information to fellow officers regarding time to prove the efficacy of CISD in preventing the circumstances of the shooting. post-traumatic stress disorder; however, that • Police officials should call the officer who is does not mean that CISD is not a necessary and out on administrative leave after a shooting valuable tool. Even detractors of the critical inci- to provide information and to communi- dent stress debriefing model advise some form of cate concern and interest for the officer’s clinical screening and intervention for individu- well-being. als who are at risk for developing the disorder— • Some officers are not comfortable working for example, those with a history of prior trauma, on a limited duty assignment in the station low social support, hyperarousal (Bonnano 2004, immediately after their shooting, especially 22). Critical incident debriefing is most effective if they are assigned to work the desk taking when it takes place as soon as possible after the citizens’ complaints. incident (ideally within the first 24 to 48 hours) • Some officers feel vulnerable when the de- before officers isolate and suppress the thoughts, partment takes their weapons in the after- emotions, and reactions that occur naturally after math of a shooting. Arrangements for a a critical incident. “loaner” weapon should be made as soon as The goals of critical incident stress debrief- possible after the shooting. The process for ing are: obtaining a “loaner weapon” should not be 1. To mitigate the painful effects of the inci- lengthy or time-consuming. Officers are dent. (Debriefing allows officers the oppor- sometimes easily frustrated when they are tunity to vent their feelings in at atmos- forced to deal with complicated or confus- phere of support and understanding.) ing bureaucracy. 2. To provide valuable education about criti- cal incident stress and how to inoculate against cumulative stress.

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3. To normalize the many reactions that offi- not view the sessions as helpful because they felt cers experience after a critical incident. that the department’s only interest was in cover- 4. To offer a safe, confidential environment ing itself from a liability standpoint. Conse- where officers can share their experiences quently, these officers reported that they either with other officers who have experienced a withheld information from the mental health critical incident. professional hired by the department or “flat-out 5. To communicate to officers that they are the lied” because they did not wish to offer up any in- most valuable resource the department has formation to a “stranger” who was affiliated with and that the police family takes care of its their department. own. Debriefings should be a part of a compre- 6. To restore the officer to a fully functioning hensive, integrated program of stress education level so that he or she can return to work. that begins in the police academy and continues throughout an officer’s career as part of retrain- Countless surveys of debriefing partici- ing. Mandatory debriefing and follow-up after- pants have yielded consistently high marks as to care should be given officers involved in critical its beneficial effects. Findings in Honig and incidents, and police managers should be trained Roland (1998) and Honig and Sultan (2004) were in identifying officers who may be suffering as a consistent for resiliency, the type and frequency result of exposure to traumatic events. Critical of reactions experienced, the tendency to not incident stress debriefing is likely to stand the test seek services voluntarily, and the extremely high of time as the standard of care for law enforce- rate of subjects who found these interventions ment officers. valuable (Honig and Sultan 2004). Following the initial study in 1998, the authors noted that vir- tually all subjects reported finding the interven- Overview of Officer Aftercare Programs tion valuable. In addition, an evaluation of both Some police officers are inherently distrustful of worker’s compensation claims and stress disabil- mental health services. Although job-related ity retirements among this group lend further stress increases in proportion to levels of violence support to the usefulness of this type of interven- and traumatic exposure, officers are less likely to tion. Although all of the study participants re- seek help than the average person. While many ported that the debriefing was valuable, 60 per- occupations give rise to a variety of stressors, cent of the officers stated that they would not most do not constitute the culture of law enforce- have attended the debriefings if they had not ment. No matter how “numbed out” police offi- been ordered to do so by the department. The cers appear, they are not impervious to the psy- high degree of reactivity (3 to 5 days after the chological assaults of their work. Therapists shooting) reported by 30 to 50 percent of the re- cannot be of real help until they come to under- spondents and the measurable results regarding stand the danger that accompanies the police on overall adjustment support the efficacy of critical every tour of duty. incident care. It appears that the law enforcement profes- Klinger (2001) found that the efficacy of sion’s acceptance of the need for mental health post-shooting interventions depended upon the services for police officers emanated less from an context within which the counseling sessions overall understanding of “occupational stress” than took place. Many of the officers in his study did from the emotional series of several traumatic and

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highly publicized incidents involving police offi- What Do Officers Want from a cers. Although employee assistance programs Counseling Program? (EAPs) have existed since the 1940s in business, in- In a 1998 survey of 150 police officers of the Met- dustry, and government, in law enforcement they ropolitan (D.C.) Police Department (cited in An- came much later. It was not until 1968 that the Los derson 2002) the following characteristics of a Angeles Police Department became the first law police counseling program were ranked in this enforcement agency to employ a full-time police order of importance: psychologist, Dr. Martin Reiser. His duties were 1. Licensed professional therapists who are all-encompassing and included treatment for offi- completely separate from the department cers and their families, testing, hostage negotia- to ensure strict confidentiality. tions, and management consultations. Among the 2. Long-term counseling for me and my fam- many articles and books that he authored, Reiser’s ily for as many times as we need. most noted work was entitled The Police Depart- 3. Therapists who have many years of ment Psychologist (Reiser 1972). experience with the Metropolitan Police As a result of an increased awareness about Department. the deleterious effects of traumatic exposure, 4. Ongoing stress training for officers and many departments provide some form of psy- management. chological services for officers and their families. 5. Private, comfortable offices far removed Counseling programs consist of three basic op- from any police facility. tions: “in-house” programs staffed by depart- 6. Free services. ment employees; contracted “external” programs 7. Debriefings and mandatory counseling that offer services independent from the police after critical incidents, like shootings. department; and a combination of both these models. Many departments also use police peer These results were similar to those reported counselors who have been trained to provide by Ebert (1986). Dr. Marketa K. Ebert, an em- critical incident debriefing. The Los Angeles ployee assistance counselor for Anne Arundel County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) pairs offi- County, Maryland, administered a needs assess- cers who have been involved in a shooting with a ment survey to seventy-four Anne Arundel “mentor” officer who has also experienced a County police officers. Officers were asked shooting and can offer a unique kind of support. to check all applicable factors out of a list of Other departments offering unique peer support fourteen that would make it easier for them to programs include the Ohio State Highway Patrol seek help. They are listed in Table 4.1 in order of and the Virginia State Police. Rybicki and Nutter importance. (2002) found that nearly 55 percent of the de- Not surprisingly, in the surveys by both An- partments they surveyed offered some form of derson (2004) and Ebert (1986), officers ex- peer support program. Officers derive comfort, pressed concerns related to privacy and confiden- support, normalization, and validation from fel- tiality as well as therapist competence. The most low officers who have been involved in shooting crucial issues to be considered for the success of incidents. While all employee assistance pro- any law enforcement program are program struc- grams have their advantages and disadvantages, a ture and staffing, program location, and the pro- department should select a program that fits its gram’s relationship to the department. To ensure unique needs and funding resources. that the best interests of the officers are served,

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counseling components should be separate from psychologist, the Chapel Corps is available for of- evaluative units. A detailed description of pro- ficers who feel more comfortable in that setting. grams for law enforcement agencies is provided As noted earlier, the Los Angeles Police De- in Finn and Tomz (1997). partment was the first department to hire a full- time police psychologist. In 1968 it initiated an innovative program to encourage interaction be- Promising Approaches to tween officers and the department’s mental Officer Aftercare Programs health professionals. In 2000, department psy- Although many departments offer innovative ap- chologists were assigned to each of the divisions proaches to officer aftercare, the following pro- where they were integrated into the daily police grams contain some of the key elements high- routine by participating in roll calls, supervisor lighted in this section. meetings, and ride-alongs. This interesting ap- The Phoenix Police Department offers a proach, profiled in Police Chief Magazine in 2003, comprehensive program consisting of peer sup- encourages relationship building between psy- port on the scene of a use-of-force incident and a chologists and police officers. Dr. Christopher mandatory post-incident debriefing facilitated by Gerber, LAPD police psychologist, believes that a contracted mental health professional and integrating psychologists into the police routine CISM members. (Officers cannot return to full encourages familiarity between line officers and duty until the debriefing is completed.) Counsel- psychologists who can ease officers’ concerns re- ing is available on an as-needed basis around the garding confidentiality. As mutual respect be- clock, and five follow-up sessions are provided at tween the two professions grows, old stereotypes no cost to the officers. Command personnel may are diminished, resulting in higher utilization of also contact officers and their families to provide the mental health professionals. agency support and assistance. Officers who are The Metropolitan (D.C.) Police Depart- involved in use-of-force incidents resulting in the ment’s program opened its doors in October of serious injury or death of a suspect may be as- 1988. The Metropolitan Police Employee Assis- signed to their homes for three days after the in- tance Program (MPEAP) combines the advan- cident and then given a non-enforcement posi- tages of the “in-house” and “contracted” program tion pending the department’s administrative models. It is a joint union/management program review. However, the chief of police retains the under Article 45 of the collective bargaining authority to return the officer to full duty prior to agreement between the Metropolitan Police De- the review board’s findings and upon the recom- partment in Washington, D.C., and the Fraternal mendation of the officer’s division commander. Order of Police Labor Committee. Operating as a The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police provides free, comprehensive, long-term, counseling pro- mandatory debriefing by the department psy- gram for police officers and their families, the chologist who is dispatched to police headquar- MPEAP also provides a range of services in a pri- ters immediately following a shooting. Officers vate location far from any police facility. Neither are placed on paid administrative leave during the department nor the union has access to the initial phase of the department’s internal in- records or information about officers seeking vestigation. Returning to full duty is based on the help. General Order 201.28 makes critical inci- recommendation of the police psychologist. In dent debriefing mandatory for all officers involved addition to the services of the department in shootings and other traumatic incidents. The

Chapter 4. Handling the Aftermath of a Use-of-Force Incident — 133

Table 4.1 Preferences of police officer sample (N=74) regarding psychological help

Total number Factor of points Strict confidentiality 117 Costs partially or fully covered by the department 87 Professional has no connection with the police department 65 Ready availability and flexible hours 55 Office located away from headquarters 50 Professional shows interest in police work 48 Program available for the entire family 36 Peers’ positive attitude toward psychological help 26 Mandatory counseling following high stress situations 25 Supervisors’ positive attitude toward psychological help 19 Personal acquaintance with professional 14 Services provided by a member of the clergy 13 Professional employed by the police department 11 Services provided by police officers trained as counselors 10

staff of the MPEAP does not perform fitness-for- retreats for specialized units, team building, and duty evaluations. A separate police and fire clinic human factors training. To date, the MPEAP has program performs that function. provided counseling and debriefing to over 6,500 There are four full-time MPEAP therapists. officers and their families and critical incident They are on call 24 hours a day and respond to debriefing to approximately 800 officers involved officer-involved shootings and critical incidents. in shootings. It has also trained over 10,000 offi- Other program services include marital and rela- cers, police officials, family members, and com- tionship counseling, alcohol recovery and relapse munity groups. In 1991 it was chosen as a model prevention groups, conflict resolution, domestic for all law enforcement agencies by the U.S. violence education, grief counseling for families House of Representatives Select Committee on of officers killed in the line of duty, children’s play Children, Youth, and Families in the hearing On therapy, expert witness testimony, hospital and the Front Lines—Police Stress and Family Well- home visits, stress management, educational Being.

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Conclusion An understanding of the stress caused by use-of- force encounters has led to the implementation of progressive programs in officer aftercare. De- partments are providing more comprehensive and proactive intervention services, and the re- sults have been noteworthy: Officers feel more valued and supported; lower turnover of officers; fewer early retirements and workers’ compensa- tion claims due to stress-related disabilities; and reduced potential for civil liability due to “exces- sive force” complaints. Police officers are a de- partment’s most important resource—a com- pelling reason in itself to provide thorough aftercare for those who protect and serve.

Chapter 4. Handling the Aftermath of a Use-of-Force Incident — 135

136 — Chapter 4. Handling the Aftermath of a Use-of-Force Incident

Book Conclusion

Policing has changed considerably in the past training was primarily “on the job” and, at best, fifty years. Nowhere is this metamorphosis more force training consisted of shooting an already- evident than in the increased attention paid to is- unholstered gun at a bull’s eye. Officers now re- sues of force. Whereas once even large-city police ceive training in how to use force and when to departments had minimal policies on the use of use force in training environments that are high- deadly force against citizens, today agencies of all ly realistic. Additionally, departments document sizes have comprehensive policies on what types and require review of all but the lowest levels of of force can be used and in what circumstances. force, conduct comprehensive investigations of Accordingly, deadly force by law enforcement is serious uses of force, and pay attention to the on the decline.1 For many years, law enforcement psychological consequences to officers who use weaponry consisted of a gun and a baton. Today high levels of force, including deadly force. some officers complain that they don’t have The profession can be extremely proud of enough room on their belts to hold the increased the progress it has made, albeit under intense ex- array of less-lethal technologies such as O.C. ternal pressures. As explained in Chapter 1, the Spray and conducted energy devices. Some of challenge for police executives is to optimize the the current chiefs joined law enforcement when use of force, and great strides have been made to

1. Geller, W. and M. Scott (1992). Deadly Force: What We Know. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.

Book Conclusion — 137

this end. Chiefs and sheriffs are putting into toward what would be optimal force in all practice various methods for strengthening po- circumstances. Choosing to deploy conducted lice relations with diverse communities. By shar- energy devices might save the life of a suicidal ing information about force policies and inci- resident or person in crisis or possibly lead to in- dents with residents, they have fostered mutual cidents where the device unintentionally con- trust and demonstrated accountability of police tributes to a death—or do both. And in the end, officers to the public they serve. By examining it all comes down to split-second decisions made use-of-force issues currently facing agencies and by humans in extremely stressful situations. describing what appear to be promising practices It is imperative that chiefs and sheriffs re- for addressing them, this book, it is hoped, will ceive guidance to help them address critical issues continue the progress already made in this field. concerning officers’ use of force. Some of this in- The specific challenges related to force that formation could and should come from large- law enforcement leaders face may change in the scale research projects that examine the impact of future, but the challenge will always exist. It is various decisions by executives on outcomes. For highly unlikely that a flawless blueprint for opti- example, research is needed on the effects of de- mizing force will ever be developed. As this book cisions concerning weapon adoption, policy con- goes to press, law enforcement leaders are faced tent, and choice of tactics on outcomes such as with complex decisions such as what parameters officer injury, subject injury (including in-cus- to place on shootings at vehicles and whether to tody deaths), law suits, complaints, and nature adopt conducted energy devices. Tragic incidents and level of force. Guidance can also come from involving vehicle shootings and in-custody the lessons learned in departments nationwide. deaths highlight the high stakes of police execu- Chiefs and sheriffs must look to their peers for tives’ decisions concerning use-of-force policies promising practices and, in turn, share their own and practices. Unfortunately, there is no crystal successes. We hope that this book will facilitate ball or that perfect guide to propel the profession this sharing.2

2. Check the PERF website at www.policeforum.org for links and frequent updates to use-of-force documents and information.

138 — Book Conclusion

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About the Authors/Contributors

ABOUT THE EDITORS Policing in Public Housing, and How One Depart- ment Improved Deadly-Force Investigations Through Joshua A. Ederheimer Leadership Models and Business Theories. He holds a bachelor’s degree in justice from American Univer- Joshua Ederheimer is a senior research associate for sity, and a master’s degree in management from the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in Johns Hopkins University. Washington, D.C. He joined PERF in January 2004 after a successful career with the Metropolitan Po- lice Department of the District of Columbia. In Dr. Lorie A. Fridell that capacity he acquired expertise as a command- Dr. Lorie Fridell is the Director of Research at the ing officer in several areas, including the internal af- Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). Prior to fairs, use of force, equal employment opportunity, joining PERF in August 1999, she was an associate and civil rights divisions. Ederheimer is currently professor of criminology and criminal justice at responsible for providing technical assistance to Florida State University (FSU). She has 20 years of criminal justice agencies and manages national experience conducting research on law enforce- criminal justice research and policy development ment. Her subject areas include police use of dead- projects. He has traveled extensively in the United ly force, use of less-than-lethal weapons, police-mi- States and abroad consulting, evaluating, and in- nority relations, police pursuits, violence against structing law enforcement professionals and gov- police, and racially biased policing. She published, ernment officials about leadership, change manage- with Tony Pate, a two-volume report entitled Police ment, business process reengineering, and police Use of Force: Official Reports, Citizen Complaints accountability issues. Ederheimer is also an adjunct and Legal Consequences, and co-authored with professor at American University’s Department of Geoff Alpert a book entitled Police Vehicles and Law, Justice, and Society, where he has taught both Firearms: Instruments of Deadly Force. Scholarly ar- graduate and undergraduate courses. Scholarly ar- ticles and chapters on the use of force have includ- ticles and chapters on the use of force have includ- ed “Use of Force: A Matter of Control,” “Toward ed Chief Concerns: Exploring the Challenges of Use of the Uniform Reporting of Police Use of Force: A Force, Collecting Use of Force Statistics, Examining National Survey,”“Forces of Change in Police Poli- International Use of Force Policies and Analyzing the cy: The Impact of Tennessee v. Garner,”“Police Of- Use of Tasers, Using Experiential Learning Tech- ficer Decision Making in Potentially Violent Con- niques to Emphasize Human Rights and Improve frontations,” and “Justifiable Use of Measures in Quality in Law Enforcement, Investigation of Police Research on Deadly Force.”Fridell is the first author Use of Deadly Force: A New Model, Complex Crime, of the PERF book on Racially Biased Policing: A

About the Authors/Contributors — 149

Principled Response, and the author of By the Num- to address local law enforcement’s concerns in pre- bers: A Guide for Analyzing Race Data from Vehicle venting and preparing for terrorist acts. This project Stops. She completed her bachelor’s degree in psy- consists of a series of five executive sessions and a chology at Linfield College in McMinnville, Ore- subsequent white paper series. Prior to joining gon, and both her master’s and Ph.D. in social ecol- PERF, Davies was a senior research associate with ogy at the University of California at Irvine. the American Bar Association’s Center on Children and the Law, and the Criminal Justice Section. Davies holds a bachelor’s degree in sociology from ABOUT THE AUTHORS Virginia Tech, and a master’s degree and a Ph.D. in justice, law and society from American University. Dr. Beverly Anderson Dr. Beverly Anderson, clinical director and program Stephan A. Loyka administrator of the Metropolitan Police Employee Stephan A. Loyka joined the PERF legislative affairs Assistance Program in Washington, D.C., has held staff in 2003 after spending a year with the United that position since the program’s inception seven- States Senate Small Business Committee. Loyka has teen years ago. Her career spans 20 years of experi- since taken on collaborative roles in the research and ence in the delivery of psychological services to law management services departments at PERF by con- enforcement officers. She is a qualified legal expert tributing to several projects including the white in the field of trauma in law enforcement and has paper series Protecting Your Community from Terror- consulted to over seventeen law enforcement agen- ism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement. He is the cies, and has instructed at the FBI Academy and the co-author of the fourth volume, Production and FBI National Academy. Anderson provided expert Sharing of Intelligence. He has represented PERF at a testimony on stress in law enforcement officers and number of forums dealing with homeland security their families for the Select Committee on Children, and information-sharing issues. He also participated Youth, and Families. She created the term “Police in a working group tasked with creating a training Trauma Syndrome” to describe the long-term cu- curriculum on criminal intelligence sharing for law mulative effects of traumatic exposure in police of- enforcement executives. Loyka holds a bachelor’s de- ficers and has authored several assessment scales gree in political science from the Johns Hopkins specifically for the law enforcement community. University, and he will receive his master’s degree in She has been a featured guest on Good Morning government and homeland security studies from the America, Good Morning America Sunday, CNN, and Johns Hopkins University in 2005. on several news documentaries including Beyond the Badge and Behind the Badge. Andrea Morrozoff Luna Dr. Heather Davies Andrea Morrozoff Luna, a PERF research associate, provides project management and financial and ad- Heather Davies, Ph.D., is a research associate at ministrative oversight and support to Building PERF currently responsible for managing national Community Capacity: A Partnership for Developing research and policy development projects. She was Trust and Reducing Violence in Inner City Commu- the project coordinator and contributing author on nities, a project funded by the U.S. Agency for Inter- a BJA-funded project Managing Multijurisdictional national Development (USAID) and operating in Cases: Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation. Kingston, Jamaica. Luna serves as a PERF liaison to She is the project director of a COPS-funded project USAID and national and international project con- and white paper series, Protecting Your Community sultants and staff to facilitate achievement of the from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement, project goal. Prior to joining PERF, She served in a

150 — About the Authors/Contributors

variety of criminal justice-related research and Dr. Tory Caeti grant administration positions. She has a master’s Dr. Tory Caeti is an associate professor in the De- degree in criminal justice from the University of partment of Criminal Justice at the University of Memphis and a bachelor’s degree in interdiscipli- North Texas where he has worked for eight years. nary studies from Virginia Polytechnic Institute While on the faculty at North Texas, Caeti has con- and State University. ducted numerous management studies and worked extensively with law enforcement agencies around the country. He also served as chair of the Civil Ser- ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS vice Commission for the City of Denton, member of the Institutional Review Board for Research at David Bayless, Chicago Police Department the University, assistant director for the North David Bayless serves as director of communications Texas Police Academy, and as a faculty member at and chief media spokesman for the Chicago Police the Institute for Law Enforcement Administration Department to local, national, and international in their Command College, Supervision School, print and broadcast media outlets. Since joining the and Managerial Training programs. He holds a Chicago Police Departmentin 2000, Bayless has im- bachelor’s degree in political science from Colorado plemented successful media strategies tied to major State University and both a master’s degree and initiatives including terrorism readiness; the de- Ph.D. in criminal justice from Sam Houston State partment’s ongoing violent crime reduction efforts; University. and major revisions to the department’s use of force and vehicle pursuit policies. Captain Ronald Davis, Oakland (CA) Police Department Chief Michael Butler, Ronald Davis is a captain with the Oakland, Cali- Longmont (CO) Police Department fornia, Police Department with 19 years experience. Chief Michael Butler has worked in the policing He serves as the department’s Inspector General re- profession for more than 26 years. He has served as sponsible for internal audits and oversight of the chief of police in Longmont, Colorado, since 1993. department’s compliance efforts with court-or- Prior to becoming chief, he worked with the FBI in dered reforms. Captain Davis is a member of two Washington D.C., and then for the Boulder, Col- independent monitoring teams responsible for orado, Police Department for 16 years. He is a grad- oversight of consent decrees between the U.S. De- uate of the University of Maryland and the FBI Na- partment of Justice (DOJ) and the Washington, tional Academy. He holds memberships in many D.C., and Detroit Police Departments. He has a organizations, including the International Associa- bachelor’s of science degree in education from tion of Chiefs of Police, Police Executive Research Southern Illinois University (SIU), and he is a grad- Forum, and the Society for Police Futurists Interna- uate of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy tional. In 2001, the Longmont Police Department School of Government Senior Executives in State was named one of the “Top 10 Community Policing and Local Program. Departments in the Nation” by the U.S. Depart- ment of Justice Office of Community Oriented Chief Kim C. Dine, Policing Services (COPS). Frederick (MD) Police Department Chief Kim Dine is completing his third decade in policing. In July 2002, he became chief of police in Frederick, Maryland. Previously, he was a member

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of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police De- Chief William P. McManus, partment for 26 years, attaining the rank of assis- Minneapolis Police Department tant chief. He is a graduate of the FBI National Chief William McManus has been part of the law Academy and is a member of a number of organi- enforcement profession for 30 years. He became zations, to include the Police Executive Research chief of police in Minneapolis in February 2004, Forum, the International Association of Chiefs of after serving as chief in Dayton, Ohio. Previously, he Police, and the Maryland Chiefs of Police Associa- was a member of the Washington, D.C., Metropoli- tion. Chief Dine holds a bachelor’s degree from tan Police Department for 26 years, attaining the Washington College in Chestertown, Maryland and rank of assistant chief. He is a graduate of a master’s degree from American University in the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia, Washington, D.C. and PERF’s Senior Management Institute for Police. Chief McManus holds a bachelor’s degree from Vil- Commander Charles Heal, lanova University, and a master’s degree in manage- Los Angeles County (CA) Sheriff’s Department ment from Johns Hopkins University. Charles “Sid” Heal is a commander with the Los An- geles County Sheriff's Department and has been in Chief Dennis Nowicki (ret.) law enforcement for more than 29 years, more than Dennis Nowicki is a senior law enforcement profes- half of which has been spent in units charged with sional whose career spans over 40 years of public handling law enforcement special and emergency service. He retired as chief of police for Charlotte- operations. As a collateral assignment, he is in Mecklenburg, North Carolina, in 1999. He also charge of the department’s internationally recog- served as chief of police for Joliet, Illinois, and spent nized technology exploration program, which seeks to 26 years with the Chicago Police Department where identify, develop, exploit, and integrate new tech- he attained the rank of deputy superintendent. nologies for law enforcement. Nowicki is currently director of the Institute for Public Safety Partnerships at the University of Illi- Inspector Matthew Klein, nois at Chicago. He holds a master’s degree in man- Metropolitan (DC) Police Department agement of public service from DePaul University and a bachelor’s in personnel management from Matthew Klein is an Inspector with the Washing- Northwestern University. ton, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department where he serves as the director of the office of internal af- fairs. He is the former commanding officer of the Antony Pate civil rights and force investigation division. Prior to Antony Pate has more than 30 years of experience this, Klein commanded the Emergency Response with criminal justice research. One of the authors Team (SWAT) where he oversaw the successful res- of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, olution of hundreds of barricade situations and Pate has conducted ground-breaking research on a high-risk warrants. He holds a bachelor of science wide variety of topics, including response time, foot degree in criminal justice from the University of patrol, police use of force, felonious killings of po- Maryland, and a master of science degree in public lice officers, community policing, police responses policy from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wil- to domestic violence, community crime preven- son School of Public and International Affairs. tion, and many other issues. Pate served as director of research at the Police Foundation from 1989 to 1995, served as senior research associate at the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at

152 — About the Authors/Contributors

Florida State University, and as senior research as- Previously, he served four years as the police com- sociate at COSMOS Corporation. missioner of the Philadelphia Police Department. He started his career in law enforcement with the New York City Police Department in 1969, which Melissa M. Reuland culminated in his appointment as first deputy com- Melissa Reuland, a senior research associate at missioner on January 13, 1995, the second highest PERF from 1995 to 2004, now consults on research rank in the NYPD. A significant achievement was and technical assistance projects addressing domes- the reorganization of the department including the tic violence partnerships and the police response to merger of the NYPD with the Transit & Housing people with mental illness. She has expertise in Police Departments. Commissioner Timoney has a qualitative and quantitative research methodolo- bachelor’s degree from John Jay College of Crimi- gies, and is the author of many articles for various nal Justice, a master’s degree in American History publications. Ms. Reuland earned a bachelor of arts from Fordham University, and a Masters degree in degree in psychology from the University of Michi- Urban Planning from Hunter College. gan, and a master’s in criminal justice from the University of Baltimore. Executive Director Chuck Wexler Chuck Wexler was appointed as the Executive Di- Dr. Robert Taylor rector of the Police Executive Research Forum Dr. Robert W. Taylor is currently a professor and (PERF) in 1993. During his tenure at PERF, Wexler the chair of the department of criminal justice at has been directly involved in numerous technical the University of North Texas. Before assuming this assistance, research and consulting projects to im- position, he was a professor of criminal justice and prove the delivery of police services. Prior to join- public administration, and director of the Office of ing PERF, he worked as an assistant to the nation’s Research Services at the University of Texas in Tyler, first Director of the Office of National Drug Con- Texas. In 1995, Taylor took a leave of absence from trol Policy. He also headed the Professional Devel- university administration and teaching to join opment Division of the International Association of Emergency Resources International, Inc., the par- Chiefs of Police where he designed a national pro- ent company of the famed Red Adair firefighters. gram for the selection of police chiefs and re- He is co-author of the leading text, Police Adminis- vamped and broadened executive development tration: Structures, Processes, and Behavior, current- programs for police executives. Dr. Wexler graduat- ly in its fifth edition with Prentice-Hall. He is also ed from Boston University with a liberal arts degree. the senior author of Juvenile Justice: Policies, Prac- He earned a master’s degree in criminology from tices and Programs with Glencoe/McGraw-Hill. Florida State University and a Ph.D. in urban stud- ies and planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Chief John F. Timoney, Miami (FL) Police Department John Timoney was appointed chief of police of the Miami Police Department on January 2, 2003.

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About PERF

ERF is a professional organization of progres- and executive development training to police chiefs Psive chief executives of city, county and state law en- and law enforcement executives. Convened annual- forcement agencies, who collectively serve more ly in Boston, SMIP instructors include professors than 50 percent of the nation’s population. Mem- from leading universities, though they are primari- bership includes police chiefs, superintendents, ly from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of sheriffs, state police directors, university police Government. chiefs, public safety directors, and other law en- PERF has developed and published some of forcement professionals. Established in 1976 as a the leading literature in the law enforcement field. non-profit organization, PERF is unique in its com- Recently, PERF released a series of white papers on mitment to the application of research in policing terrorism in the local law enforcement context, Pro- and the importance of higher education for police tecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for executives. Besides a commitment to police inno- Local Law Enforcement, which examined such issues vation and professionalism, PERF members must as local-federal partnerships, working with diverse hold a four-year college degree. communities, bioterrorism, and intelligence sharing. PERF continues to conduct some of the most Other recent publications include Managing a Mul- innovative police and criminal justice research and tijurisdictional Case: Identifying Lessons Learned from provides a wide variety of management and techni- the Sniper Investigation (2004) and Community Polic- cal assistance programs to police agencies through- ing: The Past, Present and Future (2004). Other PERF out the world. PERF’s groundbreaking work on titles include an authoritative work on racial profil- community and problem-oriented policing, racial ing, Racial Profiling: A Principled Response (2001); profiling, and crime reduction strategies has earned Recognizing Value in Policing (2002); The Police Re- it a prominent position in the police community. sponse to People with Mental Illness (2002); Citizen PERF is one of the founding agencies of the Com- Review Resource Manual (1995), Managing Innova- munity Policing Consortium and the Commission tion in Policing (1995); Crime Analysis Through Com- on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies puter Mapping (1995); And Justice For All: Under- (CALEA). PERF continues to work toward in- standing and Controlling Police Use of Deadly Force creased professionalism and excellence in the field (1995); Why Police Organizations Change: A Study of through its publications and training programs. Community-Oriented Policing (1996); Police An- PERF sponsors and conducts the Senior Manage- tidrug Tactics: New Approaches and Applications; and ment Institute for Police (SMIP). This program Under Fire: Gun-Buy Backs, Exchanges and Amnesty provides comprehensive professional management Programs (1996).

To learn more about PERF visit www.policeforum.org.

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About Motorola

otorola is a Fortune 100 global com- requirements of public safety, government, and en- Mmunications leader that provides seamless mobility terprise customers worldwide. It also designs, man- products and solutions across broadband, embed- ufactures, and sells automotive and industrial elec- ded systems, and wireless networks. Seamless mo- tronics systems and telematics systems that enable bility means you can reach the people, things, and automated roadside assistance, navigation, and ad- information you need in your home, auto, work- vanced safety features for automobiles. place, and all spaces in between. Seamless mobility Mobile Devices offers market-changing icons harnesses the power of technology convergence and of personal technology—transforming the device enables smarter, faster, cost-effective, and flexible formerly known as the cell phone into a universal re- communication. Motorola had sales of U.S. $31.3 mote control for life. A leader in multi-mode, multi- billion in 2004. Today, Motorola is comprised of band communications products and technologies, four businesses: Connected Home Solutions, Gov- Mobile Devices designs, manufactures, sells, and ernment & Enterprise Mobility Solutions, Mobile services wireless subscriber and server equipment Devices, and Networks. for cellular systems, portable energy storage prod- Connected Home Solutions provides a scala- ucts and systems, servers, and software solutions and ble, integrated end-to-end system for the delivery of related software and accessory products. broadband services that keeps consumers in- Networks delivers the infrastructure, network formed, entertained, and connected. Its technology services, and software that meet the needs of oper- enables network operators and retailers to create ators worldwide today, while providing a migration and execute on new business opportunities by pro- path to next-generation networks that will enable viding innovative products and services to the them to offer innovative, revenue-generating appli- home. cations and services to their customers. Networks Government & Enterprise Mobility Solutions also provides wireless handheld devices and infra- is a leading provider of integrated radio communica- structure for iDEN® integrated digital-enhanced tions and information solutions, with more than 65 networks. years of experience in meeting the mission-critical

For more information go to http://www.motorola.com.

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