September 24-28, 2018 Zaporizhzhia NPP Enerhodar, Ukraine
The Conference Organizers: George Kuzmycz Training Center for Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP”
The Conference Sponsors: Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority NNEGC “Energoatom”
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The Conference Organizing Committee
Oleksandr Korobenko – NNEGC Energoatom (Chairman of the Committee) Oleksandr Prysmytsky – Zaporizhzia NPP (Deputy Chairman of the Committee) Zlatan Delalic – Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Viktor Pashchenko – State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine Artur Nebishchansky – Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine Ihor Uholkov – National Guard of Ukraine Viacheslav Bediukh – Zaporizhzhia NPP Valentyna Kulbakova – Zaporizhzhia NPP Olena Romanova – George Kuzmycz Training Center Olena Levina – George Kuzmycz Training Center Anna Havryliuk-Burakova – George Kuzmycz Training Center (Secretary of the Committee)
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Enerhodar is a town of region significance in Zaporizhzhia region. Enerhodar is located on the left bank of Kakhovka Reservoir. The history of Enerhodar began with the fact that on June 12, 1970 the first granite stone was laid on one of the sandy hills at the intersection of roads at the entrance to the future town. This location on the sandy peninsula on the so-called Ivaniv Sands was chosen to build the largest in Ukraine Zaporizhzhia DRES (today - Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant). In 1972 this settlement was called Enerhodar. On August 14, 1985 Enerhodar with a population of 50 thousand people received the status of the town. Today about 54 thousand people live in the town. Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is located near the town of Enerhodar in the steppe zone on the shore of the Kakhovska Reservoir. It is Europe's largest and sixth largest nuclear power plant in the world. Zaporizhzhia NPP consists of 6 nuclear power units of 1 million kW each. The decision to build the ZNPP was adopted in 1978. In 1981 the phased construction of the NPP blocks began. During 1984-1987 four power units were commissioned. In 1989 the fifth power unit became operational and the sixth unit - only in 1995 after the abolition of the moratorium on the construction of nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Annually ZNPP generates about 40 billion kWh of electricity that is one fifth of the annual generation of electricity in Ukraine and half of its production at Ukrainian nuclear power plants. Following the results of 2000 Zaporizhzhia NPP recognized as one of the top three nuclear power plants in the world that fully meets the requirements of the IAEA. Dry storage facility for spent nuclear fuel was built at Zaporizhzhia NPP that is the first among the nuclear power plants of Ukraine with WWER type reactors. The technology of the Zaporizhzhia dry storage facility is based on the storage of spent fuel assemblies in ventilated concrete containers located on the site within the nuclear power plant.
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List of participants of the XV Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material
№ Name Organization Phone 1 Korobenko SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” 044-277-78-94 Oleksandr Director of department of physical protection akorobenko@direkcy. of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials atom.gov.ua 2 Mandzii SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” 044-277-78-94 Vasyl Chief of division of physical protection of vmandsiy@direkcy. nuclear facilities and nuclear materials atom.gov.ua 3 Borysenko SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” +38044-277-78-94 Arkadii Leading engineer of division of physical [email protected] protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear om.gov.ua materials 4 Borzenkov SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” +38050-431-83-93 Vladyslav Leading economist of division of physical v.borzenkov@direkcy. protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear atom.gov.ua materials 5 Stukalov SE “NNEGC “Energoatom” +38044-277-78-08 Dmytro Leading engineer of division of fuel dstukalov@direkcy. handling, department of fuel using and atom.gov.ua safety analysis, directory on nuclear and radiation safety 6 Pashchenko State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of +38044-277-12-06 Viktor Ukraine [email protected]. Deputy chief of administration on nuclear gov.ua security and safeguards – chief of division of physical protection of nuclear facilities – state inspector 7 Fazly State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of +38044-277-12-06 Oksana Ukraine [email protected] Main specialist – state inspector of transportation security division, Department on Issues of Nuclear Security and Safeguards 8 Nebishchansky Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of +38044-206-33-99 Artur Ukraine artur.nebischanskiy@ Chief of sector of physical protection of mev.gov.ua facilities of nuclear energy complex, Department of nuclear energy and nuclear- industrial complex 9 Klos Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of +38044-206-38-71 Nataliia Ukraine [email protected]. Main specialist of sector of physical ua protection of facilities of nuclear energy complex, Department of nuclear energy and nuclear-industrial complex
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10 Omelchenko SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +38050-341-85-11 Viacheslav Deputy chief of physical protection service [email protected]. on the operational management of zp.ua engineering and technical means of physical protection systems and ensuring their operation 11 Tiekhova SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +38050-552-09-70 Alla Leading engineer-technologist of nuclear [email protected] safety division 12 Prysmytsky SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +3806139-5-63-40 Oleksandr Deputy director general on physical +3806139-4-93-40 protection and regime [email protected]. zp.ua 13 Kryvtsov SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +38050-341-56-74 Oleksandr Deputy director general on personnel and [email protected]. social development - director of human zp.ua resources service 14 Sukhostavets SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +38050-322-51-49 Dmytro Deputy chief engineer for personnel training - [email protected]. ua head of the training center 15 Bediukh SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +38050-322-58-26 Viacheslav Head of physical protection service [email protected]. zp.ua 16 Kulbakova SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP” +38050-516-09-91 Valentyna Leading engineer-technologist – head of NM vkulbakova@gmail. com group of nuclear safety division 17 Orlyk SS “South-Ukraine NPP” +3805136- 419-36 Dmytro Engineer on control and accounting of +38067-518-73-29 nuclear materials, division of nuclear safety [email protected]. gov.ua 18 Kyian SS “South-Ukraine NPP” +3805136-411-79 Vitalii Engineer on physical protection of physical +38067-511-51-69 protection service [email protected]. gov.ua 19 Falkovsky SS “Khmelnytska NPP” +3803842-620-36 Pavlo 2nd category engineer on physical protection [email protected] of operational management division, physical ov.ua protection service 20 Solonenko SS “Khmelnytska NPP” +3803842-633-25 Yuliia 2nd category engineer – radiophysicist of [email protected] fuel laboratory, division of nuclear safety om. gov.ua
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21 Soltys SS “Rivne NPP” +3803636-629-11 Yurii 1st category engineer of the group of [email protected]. perspective development, planning and gov.ua analysis, department for ensuring the entry and interfacility regime 22 Omelianov SS “Rivne NPP” +3803636-610-86 Ihor Leading engineer – leader of safeguards 098-645-03-89 group, laboratory of nuclear fuel, division of [email protected]. nuclear safety gov.ua 23 Cherkas SSE “Chornobyl NPP” +3804593-433-97 Dmytro Leading engineer on nuclear material [email protected] accounting and storage of the group of nuclear material control and accounting, department of integrated radioactive material management 24 Bulochnikov SSE “Chornobyl NPP” +3804593-437-33 Serhii Leading engineer of the division of physical bulochnikov@chnpp. protection regime, group of automated gov.ua physical protection system management 25 Uholkov National Guard of Ukraine +38044-249-28-54 Ihor Chief of physical protection division, [email protected] department for vital state objects guarding, headquarters of the Main administration 26 Maksymenko National Guard of Ukraine +38066-611-52-88 Oleksandr Deputy commander on work with personnel, [email protected] 3041 military unit 27 Kolpakov National Guard of Ukraine +38066-882-09-68 Yurii Deputy commander of 3042 military unit [email protected] 28 Verheles National Guard of Ukraine +38067-586-86-05 Serhii Deputy commander of 3043 military unit [email protected] 29 Soldatenko National Guard of Ukraine +38067-518-85-34 Roman First deputy commander of 3044 military unit [email protected] 30 Rys National Guard of Ukraine +38067-685-20-63 Roman Assistant chief of staff of 3024 military unit [email protected] 31 Plokhii USC Radon +380562-31-31-82 Viktor Chief of physical protection service, [email protected] SSE “Dnipropetrovs’k SISC” om.ua 32 Hrebennikov USC Radon +38044-229-31-46 Volodymyr Deputy director on technical issues, [email protected] SSE “Kyiv SISC”
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33 Ihnatov USC Radon +38097-501-70-77 Viacheslav Director of SSE “Lviv SISC” [email protected] 34 Ivanov USC Radon +38063-397-82-29 Ruslan Chief of physical protection service, rus87ivanov@gmail. SSE “Odesa SISC” com 35 Skrypnyk USC Radon +38097-861-76-78 Mykola Chief of physical protection service, [email protected] SSE “Kharkiv SISC” 36 Vahin SSTC NRS +38050-358-01-92 Hennadii Researcher of physical protection division gm_vagin@sstc. com.ua 37 Nikitchuk SSTC NRS +38063-140-73-73 Yevheniia Leading specialist of PR division eo_nikitchuk@sstc. com.ua 38 Bibik National Technical University of Ukraine +38067-302-27-95 Tymofii “KPI” tymofii.bibik@gmail. Senior instructor com 39 Maslov Odesa National Polytechnic University +38048-709-12-15, Oleh Head of department +38067-527-65-12 maslov.v.oleg@gmail. com 40 Kuznietsova NSC Kharkiv Institute of Physics and +38099-179-83-42 Tamara Technology kuznetsova@kipt. Chief of physical protection service kharkov.ua 41 Fedotov Institute for Nuclear Research, NAS of +38044-525-31-30 Hennadii Ukraine [email protected] Chief of physical protection service 42 Strilchuk Institute for Nuclear Research, NAS of +38066-248-43-07 Mykola Ukraine [email protected] Senior researcher of the Center for Environmental Problems of Nuclear Power Engineering of the NAS of Ukraine 43 Yemets National Police of Ukraine +38097-911-82-97 Andrii Senior operations officer of the Department [email protected] of activities related to hazardous materials 44 Hubarev National Police of Ukraine +38093-629-01-31 Yevhen Senior inspector of the Department of [email protected] activities related to hazardous materials
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45 Zybin State Border Guard Service of Ukraine +38096-425-74-66 Andrii Senior Officer of the Technical Support [email protected] Department of the Azov-Black Sea Regional Directorate 46 Yakovyshyn State Border Guard Service of Ukraine +38097-343-25-15 Vadym Head of training group on prevention and [email protected] protection against weapons of mass destruction 47 Zhylenko Kirovohrad regional oncology center +38050-242-30-60 Svitlana Leading engineer radiologist [email protected] 48 Filonenko Zaporizhzhia regional clinical oncology +38068-318-88-51 Inna center innafilonenko39@ Head of the unit of remote radiotherapy gmail.com 49 Filovets SE "USIE IZOTOP” +38097-941-05-34 Serhii Leading engineer of the Service of chief [email protected] power engineer 50 Kokhan Public Joint Stock Company “Kyiv +38044-239-81-08 Vitalii Research and Design Institute [email protected] “Energoproject” Main specialist on physical protection and emergency response 51 Farrakhov State institution "Institute of +38067-436-49-11 Oleksandr Environmental Geochemistry of the [email protected] National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine" Researcher 52 Havryliuk- George Kuzmycz Training Center for 044-525-36-21 Burakova Physical Protection, Control and [email protected] Accounting of Nuclear Material Anna Leading engineer 53 Kyryshchuk George Kuzmycz Training Center for +38044-525-25-16 Volodymyr Physical Protection, Control and [email protected] Accounting of Nuclear Material Senior researcher 54 Levina George Kuzmycz Training Center for 044-525-25-16 Olena Physical Protection, Control and [email protected] Accounting of Nuclear Material Leading engineer 55 Romanova George Kuzmycz Training Center for 044-525-36-21 Olena Physical Protection, Control and [email protected] Accounting of Nuclear Material Deputy head 9
List of Foreign Organizations’ Participants
№ Name Organization Contacts Representatives from Sweden 1 Delalic Swedish Radiation Safety +46-8-799-41-04 Zlatan Authority +46-8-799-40-10 [email protected] 2 Söderman Swedish Radiation Safety +46-8-799-42-13 Jan Authority [email protected] Representative from Norway 3 Mattsson Norwegian Radiation Protection +47-6-716-15-28 Håkan Authority [email protected] 4 Bobrovskyi Norwegian Radiation Protection +47-6-716-26-33 Taras Authority [email protected] Representatives from the USA 5 Todchuk Parsons Company +38-050-352-71-90 Oleh [email protected] 6 Lamarche ARES Corporation +1-865-414-50-45 Craig clamarche@arescorporation. com
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DEAR PARTICIPANTS AND GUESTS!
There is 15th time when people who are not indifferent to the security interests of the state, society, nuclear facilities and other radiation-hazardous facilities are going to their forum. The first Conference took place sixteen years ago and covered only control and accounting of nuclear material. Later, the Conferences involved also physical protection experts. The time passed and the range of issues raised by the participants of the Conference was expanding. In recent years, the Conference raises problems whose solution requires the efforts of not only the nuclear energy complex, among these problems should be noted: - training nuclear security specialist personnel; - problem of unmanned aerial vehicles; - problem of insiders; - problems related to security of medical sources of ionizing radiation; - problems related cyber security in the field of physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear material - etc. Each Conference delivers a Resolution and a direction for the George Kuzmycz Training Centre for Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material to organize the next Conference. I must say that organization of a Conference among other things includes appropriate financial arrangements. Trust me: finding sponsors for the Conference is becoming increasingly difficult from year to year. We appreciate the many years of assistance from the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, and hope for fruitful cooperation in the future. At the same time we need to seek more extended financial contributions from our national organizations into the Conference. I am deeply convinced that annual Ukrainian Conferences on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material are a vital platform for the exchange of best practices among Ukrainian actors and between Ukrainian and international experts. In fact, annual Ukrainian Conferences are the country’s only forum for the exchange of experience in the area of physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control. I wish all Conference participants successful presentations, new friends, and enhancement of professional qualifications. Dear Conference participants, I don’t think I will be far out saying for myself and on your behalf how grateful we are to the management of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and its staff for hosting this 15th Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material and for their help in its organization.
Head of GKTC Viktor Gavryliuk
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TOPICS OF THE XV UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
1. Measures to ensure the reliability of personnel of nuclear facilities and radiation hazardous facilities; 2. Measures to suppress cyber threats at nuclear facilities and other radiation hazardous facilities; 3. Ensuring the preparedness of personnel for physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials and guard force personnel to act in contingency and crisis situations; 4. The role of law enforcement agencies in detecting, preventing and averting the acts of nuclear terrorism, interaction with international counter-terrorist agencies to counter threats to nuclear facilities and nuclear materials; 5. Problems of transportation of nuclear and other radioactive materials; 6. Problems of physical protection of ionizing radiation sources; 7. Sufficiency of the existing and the need for the new topics for the advanced training of the specialists in physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials, radioactive waste and sources of ionizing radiation; 8. Human resourcing for physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials; 9. Problems of Nuclear Forensics; 10. Status of the security culture at the facilities; 11. International partnership between Ukraine and donor countries to enhance the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials; 12. Ensuring the implementation of IAEA safeguards on Ukrainian facilities.
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PROGRAMME OF THE XV UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
September 24-28, 2018, Zaporizhzhia NPP, Enerhodar
23 SEPTEMBER, Sunday
Arrival of the Conference participants to Enerhodar
24 SEPTEMBER, Monday
09:30 – PARTICIPANTS’ REGISTRATION 10:00 CONFERENCE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE MEETING 10:00 – Opening of the Conference (Head Oleksandr Korobenko) 10:10 Formation of Decision-working committee and Committee for definition of best presentations
10:30 – Olena Romanova 11:00 ROLE OF THE UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL IN EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW IDEAS AND TREN
11:00 – Coffee-break 11:30
Session 1 (Head Vasyl Mandzii)
11:30 – Nataliia Klos 11:55 PRESENTATION OF A MASTER’S DEGREE PROGRAMME IN NUCLEAR SECURITY AS PART OF NUCLEAR POWER DISCIPLINE AT KYIV SIKORSKI POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
11:55 – Tymofii Bibik 12:20 IMPLEMENTATION OF A HIGHER LEARNING DEGREE PROGRAMME IN NUCLEAR SECURITY
12:20 – Oleh Maslov 12:45 ANALYSIS OF UNIVERSITY ADMISSION TO THE MAJOR 143. NUCLEAR POWER BASED ON ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS BY THE NEW EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITY LICENSE TERMS
12:45 – Volodymyr Kyryshchuk 13:10 STATE OF THE ART PHYSICAL PROTECTION TECHNOLOGIES APPLIED IN THE PROCESS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND GUARD FORCE PERSONNEL ADVANCED TRAINING
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13:10 – Oleh Maslov 13:35 DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPUTER GAME FOR ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION ELEMENTS AS PART OF THE LEARNING PROCESS GAMIFICATION TREND
13:35 – LUNCH 14:30
Session 2 (Head Ihor Uholkov)
14:30 – Mykola Strilchuk 14:55 “NPP WITH ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM”INTERACTIVE COMPLEX
14:55 – Andrii Yemets 15:20 ROLE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE IN DETECTION, PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE OF OFFENCES RELATED TO RADIOACTIVE AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL
15:20 – Vadym Yakovyshyn 15:45 ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN DETECTION, DETERRENCE AND PREVENTION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM; INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORIST AGENCIES IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THREATS TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL (PERSONNEL TRAINING SYSTEM OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM AT THE STATE BORDER)
15:45 – Andrii Zybin 16:10 TASKS AND AUTHORITIES OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE IN COUNTERING CBRN RISKS AND THREATS AT THE STATE BORDER
16:10 – Coffee-break 16:35
16:35 – Yurii Soltys 17:00 ENSURING PREPAREDNESS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION PERSONNEL AND GUARD FORCES TO ACT IN EMERGENCY AND CRISIS SITUATIONS
17:00 – Round Table. Head Vasyl Mandzii 17:30 THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT BODIES IN ENSURING NUCLEAR SECURITY
18:00 Friendly dinner
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25 SEPTEMBER, Tuesday
Session 3 (Head Olena Romanova)
09:00 – Viktor Pashchenko 09:25 FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
09:25 – Vasyl Mandzii 09:50 SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE STATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AND THE INTEGRATED STATE SYSTEM FOR THE PREVENTION OF, RESPONSE TO AND INTERRUPTION OF TERRORIST ACTS AND MINIMISATION OF THEIR CONSEQUENCES IN UKRAINE
09:50 – Delalic Zlatan 10:15 DEVELOPING REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SECURITY OF HIGH ACTIVITY SOURCES –THE SWEDISH EXPERIENCE
10:15 – Hennadii Vahin 10:40 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF RADIATION SOURCES
10:40 – Coffee-break 11:00
11:00 – Vitalii Kokhan 11:25 PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, NUCLEAR MATERIAL, RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND OTHER SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION DURING CONSTRUCTION OF NEW RADIATION HAZARD FACILITIES IN UKRAINE
11:25 – Vitalii Kyian 11:50 CYBER TREAT PREVENTION MEASURES AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND OTHER RADIATION HAZARD SITES
11:50 – Viacheslav Omelchenko 12:15 COUNTERING CYBER THREATS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND RADIATION HAZARD SITES
12:15 – Tamara Kuznietsova 12:40 IMPLEMENTATION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR THE STATE-OF-THE-ART NEUTRON SOURCE SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR INSTALLATION
12:40 – Hennadii Fedotov 13:05 ROLE OF THE NASU INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THE INR EVERYDAY ACTIVITY
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13:05 – Round Table. Head Viktor Pashchenko 13:30 COMPLIANCE OF LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS WITH MODERN PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES TO NUCLEAR SECURITY 13:30 – LUNCH 14:30 14:30 – Tour to Training center on ZNPP personnel training 17:00 17:00 – 17:30 – Coffee-break
26 SEPTEMBER, Wednesday
Session 4 (Head Oleksandr Korobenko)
09:00 – Oleksandr Farrakhov 09:25 REQUIREMENTS TO PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN THE HYBRID WAR ENVIRONMENT
09:25 – Ihor Uholkov 09:50 HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE. ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE SECTOR OF UKRAINE. PARTICIPATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE IN NATIONAL DEFENCE
09:50 – Serhii Verheles 10:15 SYSTEM AND SPECIFICS OF ORGANISATION OF COMBAT AND SPECIAL TRAINING OF THE NATIONAL GUARD UNIT RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL
10:15 – Roman Soldatenko 10:40 ENSURING PREPAREDNESS OF GUARD FORCE PERSONNEL TO ACT IN A CRISIS SITUATION
10:40 – Coffee-break 11:00
11:00 – Craig Lamarche 11:25 Reliability programs in the United States
11:25 – Artur Nebishchansky 11:50 BUILDING A CADRE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL SPECIALISTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND COAL INDUSTRY AS A CENTRAL EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
11:50 – Oleksandr Maksymenko 12:15 HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
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12:15 – Roman Rys 12:40 ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE PERSONNEL TRUSTWORTHINESS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND RADIATION HAZARD SITES
12:40 – Yurii Kolpakov 13:05 ENSURING PREPAREDNESS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL PERSONNEL AND GUARD FORCES TO ACT IN EMERGENCY AND CRISIS SITUATIONS
13:05 – Round Table. Head Nataliia Klos 13:30 PERSONNEL ISSUES OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL
13:30 – LUNCH 14:30
Session 5 (Head Hennadii Vahin)
14:30 – Söderman Jan 15:00 NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY - WHO SETS THE OVERALL REQUIREMENTS, WHO ALLOCATES RESOURCES AND WHO EVALUATES
15:00 – Serhii Bulochnikov 15:30 CHALLENGES OF TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
15:30 – Pavlo Falkovsky 16:00 PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION
16:00 – Coffee-break 16:30
16:30 – Serhii Filovets 17:00 SECURITY CONCEPT AND APPROACH TO CREATION OF A PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AT SE USPE IZOTOP TRANSPORT AND STORAGE CENTRE
17:00 – Round Table. Head Roman Soldatenko 17:30 THE ISSUES OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION PROVIDING DURING THE TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
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27 SEPTEMBER, Thursday
Session 6 (Head Viktor Pashchenko)
09:00 – Dmytro Stukalov 09:25 HANDLING OF NUCLEAR FUEL IN UKRAINE. NUCLEAR FUEL AS A NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING ITEM
09:25 – Dmytro Orlyk 09:50 REPAIR OF WESTINGHOUSE FUEL ASSEMBLIES USING FUEL INSPECTION AND REPAIR BENCH (FIRB); NM ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AFTER FUEL ELEMENT RETRIEVAL
09:50 – Yuliia Solonenko 10:15 ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT UKRAINIAN FACILITIES
10:15 – Alla Tiekhova 10:40 IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP
10:40 – Coffee-break 11:00
11:00 – Dmytro Cherkas 11:25 IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT CHNPP INSTALLATIONS
11:25 – Ihor Omelianov 11:50 IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT RIVNE NPP
11:50 – Svitlana Zhylenko 12:15 PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
12:15 – Inna Filonenko 12:40 THE CONDITION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ENGINEERED FEATURES AT ZAPORIZHZHYA OBLAST CLINICAL CANCER DISPENSARY
12:40 – Ruslan Ivanov 13:05 THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS POTENTIALLY USABLE IN A “DIRTY BOMB”
13:05 – Round Table. Head Oksana Fazly 13:30 IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS
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13:30 – LUNCH 14:30
Session 7 (Head Artur Nebishchansky)
14:30 – Taras Bobrovskyi, Mattsson Håkan 14:55 NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN NORWAY AND UKRAINE
14:55 – Viktor Plokhii 15:20 PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM RADIOACTIVE WASTE REPOSITORY AT SSE DNIPROPETROVSK SIRSC TO SSE CERWM
15:20 – Vladyslav Ihnatov 15:45 PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF HANDLING RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND ITS STORAGE SECURITY
15:45 – Mykola Skrypnyk 16:10 PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SIR: EXPERIENCE OF OPERATION OF A PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AT SSE KHARKIV SIRSC AFTER UPGRADE
16:10 – Coffee-break 16:40
16:40 – Volodymyr Hrebennikov 17:05 CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND PROSPECTS OF ENHANCEMENT OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ENGINEERED FEATURES
17:05 – Round Table. Head Vladyslav Ihnatov 17:35 THE ISSUES OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SIRs
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28 SEPTEMBER, Friday
09:00 – Round Table. Head Oleksandr Korobenko 10:30 THE FUTURE OF UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL 10:30 – Coffee-break 11:00 11:00 – Results of the Conference best presentations contest 12:00
12:00 – Discussion of draft XV Conference Decision 13:30 13:30 – LUNCH 14:30 14:30 – Conference Decision-making 15:30 Report – Head of decision-working committee (Tamara Kuznietsova)
15:30 – ХV CONFERENCE CLOSING 16:00 Head Oleksandr Prysmytsky 16:00 – Coffee-break 16:30
29 SEPTEMBER, Saturday Departure of the Conference participants from Enerhodar
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Rules of Best Presentation Contest at the XV Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material
Organizing committee of the XV Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material will run a best presentation contest. The goal of the contest is to inspire and motivate Conference participants to prepare excellent presentations and deliver them at the Conference. The contest is open to all Conference participants The contest jury will select 3 best presentations at the Conference in accordance with best presentation contest rules described below. Winners will receive commemorative awards. Contest assessment criteria have been worked out by the organizing committee in accordance with the rules applied previously at the Ukrainian Conferences. Contest jury members will assign scores to presentations by each of the following criteria (1 being the lowest score): Presentation topicality (scored 1 through 3); Novelty (scored 1 through 5); Content (scored 1 through 5); Quality of presentation (scored 1 through 3); Quality of delivery (scored 1 through 5); Clarity and completeness of answers to questions asked on the presentation (scored 1 through 5). Thus a maximum score that may be achieved by any participant is 26. Assessment form is attached below to this document as its integral part. Decisions of the contest jury will be final and conclusive. These rules apply to the best presentation contest at the XV Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material.
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PRESENTATION EVALUATION FORM XV Ukrainian Conference on Physical Protection, Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material
September 24-28, 2018 Enerhodar, SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP”
Author: Title:
Reviewer: Date: Evaluated criteria Score 1 2 3 4 5 Presentation topicality X X Significance for MPC&A Novelty New approach New idea Old idea with new approach Content Daily issues are considered Existing problem-solving is proposed Quality of presentation X X Quality of delivery Strict adherence to a time schedule Quality of slides Knack of slides using during the presentation delivery Clarity and completeness of answers to questions asked on the presentation Total score:
Note: Each point will be scored from 1(the lowest score) up to 3 or 5 (the highest score). Maximum presentation score is 26.
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LIST OF THE ABSTRACTS
№ Speaker Name Title of the Presentation Page 1 Bibik IMPLEMENTATION OF A HIGHER LEARNING DEGREE 26 Tymofii PROGRAMME IN NUCLEAR SECURITY 2 Bulochnikov CHALLENGES OF TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR 27 Serhii AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 3 Cherkas IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT CHNPP 27 Dmytro INSTALLATIONS 4 Falkovsky PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION 28 Pavlo OF SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION 5 Farrakhov REQUIREMENTS TO PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN THE 29 Oleksandr HYBRID WAR ENVIRONMENT 6 Fedotov ROLE OF THE NASU INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR 30 Hennadii RESEARCH PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THE INR EVERYDAY ACTIVITY 7 Filonenko THE CONDITION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 30 Inna ENGINEERED FEATURES AT ZAPORIZHZHYA OBLAST CLINICAL CANCER DISPENSARY 8 Filovets SECURITY CONCEPT AND APPROACH TO CREATION 31 Serhii OF A PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AT SE USPE IZOTOP TRANSPORT AND STORAGE CENTRE 9 Hrebennikov CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND PROSPECTS OF 32 Volodymyr ENHANCEMENT OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ENGINEERED FEATURES 10 Ihnatov PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF HANDLING RADIOACTIVE 32 Vladyslav WASTE AND ITS STORAGE SECURITY 11 Ivanov THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OF RADIOACTIVE 33 Ruslan MATERIALS POTENTIALLY USABLE IN A “DIRTY BOMB” 12 Klos PRESENTATION OF A MASTER’S DEGREE 35 Nataliia PROGRAMME IN NUCLEAR SECURITY AS PART OF NUCLEAR POWER DISCIPLINE AT KYIV SIKORSKI POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE 13 Kokhan PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION 36 Vitalii OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, NUCLEAR MATERIAL, RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND OTHER SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION DURING CONSTRUCTION OF NEW RADIATION HAZARD FACILITIES IN UKRAINE 14 Kolpakov ENSURING PREPAREDNESS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL 37 Yurii PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL PERSONNEL AND GUARD FORCES TO ACT IN EMERGENCY AND CRISIS SITUATIONS 15 Kuznietsova IMPLEMENTATION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR 38 Tamara THE STATE-OF-THE-ART NEUTRON SOURCE SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR INSTALLATION 16 Kyian CYBER TREAT PREVENTION MEASURES AT NUCLEAR 39 Vitalii FACILITIES AND OTHER RADIATION HAZARD SITES 17 Kyryshchuk STATE OF THE ART PHYSICAL PROTECTION 40 Volodymyr TECHNOLOGIES APPLIED IN THE PROCESS OF 23
PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND GUARD FORCE PERSONNEL ADVANCED TRAINING 18 Lamarche RELIABILITY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 41 Craig 19 Maksymenko HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN NUCLEAR 41 Oleksandr MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 20 Mandzii SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN 42 Vasyl THE STATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AND THE INTEGRATED STATE SYSTEM FOR THE PREVENTION OF, RESPONSE TO AND INTERRUPTION OF TERRORIST ACTS AND MINIMISATION OF THEIR CONSEQUENCES IN UKRAINE 21 Maslov ANALYSIS OF UNIVERSITY ADMISSION TO THE MAJOR 43 Oleh 143. NUCLEAR POWER BASED ON ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS BY THE NEW EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITY LICENSE TERMS 22 Maslov DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPUTER GAME FOR 44 Oleh ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION ELEMENTS AS PART OF THE LEARNING PROCESS GAMIFICATION TREND 23 Nebishchansky BUILDING A CADRE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL 45 Artur PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL SPECIALISTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND COAL INDUSTRY AS A CENTRAL EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY 24 Omelchenko COUNTERING CYBER THREATS AT NUCLEAR 47 Viacheslav FACILITIES AND RADIATION HAZARD SITES 25 Omelianov IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT RIVNE 48 Ihor NPP 26 Orlyk REPAIR OF WESTINGHOUSE FUEL ASSEMBLIES USING 49 Dmytro FUEL INSPECTION AND REPAIR BENCH (FIRB); NM ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AFTER FUEL ELEMENT RETRIEVAL 27 Plokhii PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TRANSPORTATION OF 49 Viktor RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM RADIOACTIVE WASTE REPOSITORY AT SSE DNIPROPETROVSK SIRSC TO SSE CERWM 28 Romanova ROLE OF THE UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR 49 Olena MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL IN EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW IDEAS AND TRENDS 29 Rys ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE PERSONNEL 50 Roman TRUSTWORTHINESS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND RADIATION HAZARD SITES 30 Skrypnyk PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SIR: EXPERIENCE OF 51 Mykola OPERATION OF A PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AT SSE KHARKIV SIRSC AFTER UPGRADE 31 Soldatenko ENSURING PREPAREDNESS OF GUARD FORCE 51 Roman PERSONNEL TO ACT IN A CRISIS SITUATION 24
32 Solonenko ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 52 Yuliia IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT UKRAINIAN FACILITIES 33 Soltys ENSURING PREPAREDNESS OF PHYSICAL 53 Yurii PROTECTION PERSONNEL AND GUARD FORCES TO ACT IN EMERGENCY AND CRISIS SITUATIONS 34 Stukalov HANDLING OF NUCLEAR FUEL IN UKRAINE. NUCLEAR 54 Dmytro FUEL AS A NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING ITEM 35 Tiekhova IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT 54 Alla ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP 36 Uholkov HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE. 55 Ihor ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE SECTOR OF UKRAINE. PARTICIPATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE IN NATIONAL DEFENCE 37 Vahin REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PHYSICAL 56 Hennadii PROTECTION OF RADIATION SOURCES 38 Verheles SYSTEM AND SPECIFICS OF ORGANISATION OF 57 Serhii COMBAT AND SPECIAL TRAINING OF THE NATIONAL GUARD UNIT RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL 39 Yakovyshyn ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN 57 Vadym DETECTION, DETERRENCE AND PREVENTION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM; INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORIST AGENCIES IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THREATS TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL (PERSONNEL TRAINING SYSTEM OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM AT THE STATE BORDER) 40 Yemets ROLE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE IN DETECTION, 58 Andrii PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE OF OFFENCES RELATED TO RADIOACTIVE AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL 41 Zhylenko PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SOURCES OF IONISING 58 Svitlana RADIATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 42 Zybin TASKS AND AUTHORITIES OF THE STATE BORDER 59 Andrii GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE IN COUNTERING CBRN RISKS AND THREATS AT THE STATE BORDER
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IMPLEMENTATION OF A HIGHER LEARNING DEGREE PROGRAMME IN NUCLEAR SECURITY
T.Bibik National Technical University of Ukraine “KPI”
The scope of terrorist activity in the late 20th – early 21st centuries extended beyond the boundaries of individual states to become international; there are even countries on the map of the Earth that have been declared terrorist states by the international community. Terrorist organisations – primarily those of international span – are seeking to get hold of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001 there could be no doubts that terrorists who possess such a weapon would certainly use it. Reports about a terrorist act in a certain country or a series of terrorist acts committed by a terrorist organisation in several different countries are coming almost on a daily basis. International community is greatly concerned over a possibility of sabotage against a nuclear facility or another radiation hazard site followed by a significant release of nuclear material into environment, with massive exposure of personnel, the public and contamination of the environment. Terrorists may seize certain areas in a nuclear facility or take hostages in order to coerce a state or individual government authorities into certain actions in their favour. In this light the training, retraining and advanced training in the area of nuclear security is of fundamental importance for Ukraine, since Ukraine at this time is: the Europe’s only nation in the state of war and with massive turnover of unauthorised weapons in its territory; the country having 15 nuclear power reactors and 2 research reactors; spent nuclear fuel from 13 VVER-1000 reactors is stored in Ukraine; the country having in its territory the destroyed Unit 4 of Chernobyl NPP, spent fuel from Units 1, 2, 3 and 4 of CNPP and a large amount of radioactive waste accumulated as the result of the accident at CNPP Unit 4; the country using sources of ionising radiation in industry, health care, geological exploration and academic research. Use of sources of ionising radiation also generates radioactive waste; the country handling transit and international shipments of fresh and spent nuclear fuel. Qualified nuclear security professionals are needed in Ukraine not only for nuclear power sector enterprises but, no less importantly, for competent government authorities having responsibilities in the area of nuclear security, specifically border and customs control authorities, intelligence and investigation agencies, local executive authorities responsible for the territories where radiation hazard sites are located or where the transport routes of nuclear and other radioactive material run, etc. For a number of reasons Ukraine currently has no higher educational establishment to train experts in nuclear material physical protection, accounting and control. The degree programme in nuclear security should be introduced with account for not only IAEA recommendations in NSS-12, Educational Programme in Nuclear Security, but also for social and security situation in Ukraine.
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CHALLENGES OF TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
M. Boiko, S.Bulochnikov, V.Martynenko SSE “Chornobyl NPP”
The scope of production, processing and transportation of nuclear fuel and its waste is growing: nuclear power sector generates a large share of world’s electricity – 438 nuclear reactors operate in 32 countries (including 15 in Ukraine) having the overall capacity of 351 GW, in addition to 651 research nuclear reactors (284 of them operating), and 250 nuclear fuel cycle facilities covering all cycle phases. This increases the likelihood of unauthorised access to nuclear material used in nuclear power sector (to create radiological weapons from radioactive waste), particularly during the transport outside nuclear facilities by road or by rail. In 1961, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published guidelines for the safe transport of radioactive material. These guidelines were subsequently adopted worldwide as a common basis for domestic and international transport requirements in this area. Requirements based on the IAEA standards are applied in nearly 60 countries. IAEA regularly reviews its regulations for the safe transport of nuclear and other radioactive material. However, this field still faces some practical challenges for the experts to work on, including at Chernobyl NPP. The main task of a guard force and a physical protection service is to prevent unauthorised seizure of nuclear material during transport. State Specialised Enterprise Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, undergoing the stage of decommissioning and conversion of Object Shelter into an environmentally safe system, organises safe transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) into a newly built spent nuclear fuel storage facility (SNFS-2) in the framework of the programme to remove SNF from the existing spent nuclear fuel “wet” storage facility (SNFS-1). SNFS-2 is located approximately 2 km (9 km by rail) away from the CNPP site where SNFS-1 is located. SNF transportation is planned over the CNPP approach railway line in a new container car in accordance with the requirements of the PBPRM-2006 regulation. The presentation will offer conference participants a concise overview of the organisation of physical protection of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) during its transport to SNFS-2 at Chernobyl NPP and of some problems that have to be addressed in this regard.
IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT CHNPP INSTALLATIONS
D.Cherkas SSE “Chernobyl NPP”
IAEA safeguards are based on the accountancy of nuclear material as the principal measure of safeguards implementation combined with containment and surveillance as important additional measures. The presentation will describe IAEA monitoring systems applied at ChNPP installations, the approach to NM transfers declaration via the State Declaration Portal using a code key, and will provide a brief overview of equipment used to detect nuclear material in RAW. Chernobyl NPP present activities include: the decommissioning of Chernobyl NPP Units 1, 2 and 3;
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operation of the spent nuclear fuel “wet” storage facility (SNFS-1) as a principal location where all spent nuclear fuel from ChNPP is stored; commissioning of the new container car TK-700 designed for transportation of SNF from SNFS-1 to SNFS-2; construction and commissioning of the spent nuclear fuel “dry” storage facility (SNFS-2); construction and commissioning of the multi-function facility for conversion of the Object Shelter into an environmentally safe system (the New Safe Confinement, NSC). This list of measures implemented at Chernobyl NPP, although incomplete, is demonstrative inter alia of the scope of work done by IAEA technical experts jointly with Chernobyl NPP personnel for the removal of the IAEA equipment previously installed at Units 1, 2 and 3; the upgrade of obsolete IAEA equipment at SNFS-1 and the Shelter; installation and setup of IAEA monitoring systems at newly commissioned ChNPP installations; study and analysis of the NSC project to identify potential access points into the Object Shelter for further installation of IAEA monitoring systems. Joint work of the IAEA and Chernobyl NPP resulted in the development of a Near Real Time System allowing the IAEA, based on operator information on planned NM movements and SNF handling at SNFS-2, to issue a permit for the installation of a DWC into a concrete storage cell and placing of an IAEA seal on the cell by operator’s personnel. The work is underway at Chernobyl NPP jointly with the Los-Alamos National Laboratory in the framework of the US Department of Energy assistance to Ukraine for the identification of presence/absence of nuclear material (NM) in RAW located at the ChNPP. A system to measure nuclear material in high level waste containers (the CWAD system) has been developed for ChNPP and is undergoing tests at the Los-Alamos National Laboratory.
PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION
P.Falkovsky, Ye.Istomin SS “Khmelnytska NPP”
Radioactive sources are used by every state in the world – either in industry or in science, health care, or agriculture. At the same time, high activity sources of ionising radiation attract adversaries and may be used with criminal intent. Ingredients for a radiological “dirty bomb,” isotopes that could cause sustainable transformations in human blood and increase likelihood of cancer are used in thousands of locations in more than 100 countries worldwide. Many of them are inadequately protected and are vulnerable to theft. Accordingly, the likelihood of detonation of a “dirty bomb” by terrorists is much higher than the likelihood of a nuclear detonation, considering the greater availability of radioactive sources. The study analysed the cases of negligent handling of sources of ionising radiation, their thefts and has established the importance of SIR physical protection. The consideration was given to the statistics of incidents related to SIRs in the past two years. IAEA publications with recommendations on SIR physical protection were reviewed and the progress in physical protection on the international scale as well as in Ukraine was analysed. The issue of physical protection of radioactive sources is quite topical particularly in the light of the increased terrorist treat. Apart from potential health detriment and negative economic consequences as the result of criminal use of radioactive sources there are many
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cases of negligent use of SIRs resulting in damage to health and demonstrating low level of awareness of potential danger of such sources. Focus on the issue of physical protection of radioactive sources is a justified step that would ensure protection of human health and wellbeing and prevent possible negative consequences from attempted malicious use of a SIR. IAEA proposes three protection levels – A, B, and C, with appropriate goals and objectives – for radioactive sources depending on their hazard level. Three different approaches are offered to achievement of the required tasks giving additional flexibility to the states who implement physical protection of radioactive sources. At the same time, the implementation of SIR physical protection faces a number of problems and challenges at the international and the national levels whose successful resolution would warrant improved protection of the sources. These challenges include: deficient regulatory framework to govern management of radioactive material; absence of a holistic approach and failure to implement the Radioactive Source Code of Conduct; unprotected and open objects of use of radioactive sources creating additional SIR protection challenges; poor control over radioactive material throughout and after its useful lifetime; transportation of radioactive sources. These challenges call for a series of arrangements including, where possible, replacement of dangerous high activity SIRs with alternative devices and technologies eliminating risk of illegal possession of sources. Physical protection of radioactive sources is an important component of security whose assurance is the responsibility of the international community and of each state individually.
REQUIREMENTS TO PHYSICAL PROTECTION IN THE HYBRID WAR ENVIRONMENT
A.Farrakhov, P.Ivanov State institution "Institute of Environmental Geochemistry of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine"
Definition of hybrid wars and their features. Types, causes and examples of hybrid wards; goals and areas of warfare, components. Hybrid war theory and ideology. Need for systematic work, including through establishment of new divisions at radiation hazard sites. Hybrid war as a subject of global discussion: hacker attack aspects as new hybrid war technology; terrorism as a specific hybrid warfare technology. Specific aspects of a hybrid war against Ukraine. Role of physical protection in strengthening security of radiation hazard sites in Ukraine amid a hybrid war. Activity in the area of use of nuclear energy: physical protection in the context of a hybrid war. Adaptation of regulatory framework on physical protection to the hybrid war conditions. Academic support, security culture, financing etc. in the context of a hybrid war.
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ROLE OF THE NASU INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THE INR EVERYDAY ACTIVITY
H.Fedotov Institute for Nuclear Research
The current scope of work of the Institute includes: on-going scheduled assignments to identify residual lifetime of structural materials of active power reactors by commission of Ukrainian NPPs; research to identify radiation effects on physical properties of nuclear reactor structural materials; work to select new prospective structural materials for nuclear reactor engineering; medico-biological research in neutron beam cancer therapy brought up to the practical application level; joint work with Ukrainian health care institutions on the production of radiopharmaceuticals at INR nuclear installations. Present state and role of the NASU INR research reactor physical protection system (report on arrangements and changes over 2017). Sustaining the research reactor physical protection system in the context of insufficient funding. The following is needed to sustain continued operation of the PPS: to review physical protection system staffing; to review the structure of funding to sustain operational condition of the PPS.
THE CONDITION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ENGINEERED FEATURES AT ZAPORIZHZHYA OBLAST CLINICAL CANCER DISPENSARY
I.Filonenko, T.Yeriomina Zaporizhzhia regional clinical oncology center
Throughout its lifetime since 1944 the Municipal Institution Zaporizhzhya Oblast Clinical Cancer Dispensary of Zaporizhzhya Oblast Council has operated the following departments using sources of ionising radiation: – X-ray diagnostic department; – teletherapy unit; – radiology department. The right to operate radiation sources is supported by the license to use sources of ionising radiation (SIR) by the South-Eastern State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Inspectorate of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine. Plans for 2018 include technical upgrade of the X-ray diagnostic department and procurement of modern machines reducing dose to patients and personnel and ensuring better contrast and clearer display of fine details. General infrastructure of the radiology department and the teletherapy unit. Assurance of Dispensary compliance with the decrees and orders of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, South-Eastern State Nuclear and Radiation Safety Inspectorate of SNRIU and others: – identification physical protection level based on SIR category; – financial plans for SIR physical protection and their performance reports; 30
– implementation of a management system (quality statement) for the physical protection of elements involving use of SIRs for beam therapy; – training and knowledge checks on radiation safety for personnel and officers; – supply of qualified personnel and systematic qualification improvement; – clearance for special works for structural unit manager and employees; – development and approval of the Response Plan in Case of Sabotage of Zaporizhzhya Oblast Clinical Cancer Dispensary. In the course of 2018, the Dispensary is hosting the Physical Protection System Improvement Project for Zaporizhzhya Oblast Clinical Cancer Dispensary, a physical protection upgrade project aimed for medical establishments of Ukraine ad implemented within the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). System description and main benefits. On-going problems of the Dispensary call for financial support for timely replacement of SIRs and gamma therapy equipment with modern linear accelerators to achieve better cancer treatment results and lower level of beam therapy complications.
SECURITY CONCEPT AND APPROACH TO CREATION OF A PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AT SE USPE IZOTOP TRANSPORT AND STORAGE CENTRE
S.Filovets, O.Shevtsov SE "USIE IZOTOP”
In the current environment of grave crime situation worldwide and in Ukraine security of industrial facilities becomes a topical issue. Certain level of threat for industrial installations is posed by malicious unauthorised acts of individuals (adversaries): terrorists, criminals, unscrupulous competitors etc. Their actions are unpredictable, ranging from theft of property and financial documentation to inducing an emergency at a facility (fire, demolition, flooding, accident etc.) Creation of an automated security system against unauthorised access of individuals – a physical protection system – is one of the effective preventive measures to sustain security of critical industrial facilities. The main goals of the SE USPE IZOTOP Transport and Storage Centre physical protection system is minimising opportunity for sabotage, theft or any other unauthorised removal of nuclear material or sources of ionising radiation. Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Germany, provided assistance for the enhancement of the physical protection system at SE USPE IZOTOP Transport and Storage Centre, which included: - Renovation of the outside perimeter fence. - Construction of an interlock, vehicle inspection area and anti-ram system. - Construction of additional fence around the isotope warehouse. - Construction of an isotope production and reloading room (“hot cell”). - Renovation and strengthening of the guardhouse, Transport and Storage Centre CAS and constriction of a protected guard post at checkpoint 1. - Construction of railway gate and a derailment system. - Installation of additional detection devices, access control instrumentation, and video cameras around the entire Transport and Storage Centre site. The commissioned physical protection system of the SE USPE IZOTOP Transport and Storage Centre is an aggregate of engineered protection features and a paramilitary
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protection force targeted at: - threats with aim for their physical neutralisation; - the Transport and Storage Centre in order to enhance its resistance capabilities against threat actions; - physical environment separating Transport and Storage Centre from threats for the delay and suppression of threat actions. Physical protection system upgrade is projected in the near future, to include: - modernisation of physical barriers of the isotope storage facility (replacement of doors and gates to secure at least protection class 2 under DSTU ENV 1627:2014); - upgrade of the engineered features system inside the isotope storage facility, checkpoint and central alarm station; - procurement of state-of-the-art special vehicles for transportation of NM and SIR and development of a physical protection system for the transport; - establishment of a monitoring centre to track the movement of USPE IZOTOP Transport and Storage Centre special vehicles across Ukraine.
CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND PROSPECTS OF ENHANCEMENT OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ENGINEERED FEATURES
V.Hrebennikov SSE “Kyiv SISC”
A physical protection system (PPS) of an enterprise is an assembly of legal, organisational and engineering arrangements designed to create an environment eliminating opportunities for unauthorised removal or theft of radioactive waste or sources of ionising radiation and ensuring non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism. Physical protection of not only nuclear material and nuclear facilities but also sources of ionising radiation, including RAW, is one of the key tasks in support of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and reduction of the nuclear terrorism threat. PPS effectiveness is largely determined by the content and quality of physical protection engineered features. PPS development prospects include incorporation of anti-UAV systems, novel electronic perimeter protection systems and non-lethal counter capabilities. The presentation will provide an overview of contemporary threats evolving from the development of modern communication, navigation and transportation systems and will review available countermeasures and prospects of their application in physical protection systems of high-hazard facilities.
PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF HANDLING RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND ITS STORAGE SECURITY
V.Ihnatov SSE “Lviv SISC”
The launch of special combines under SC UkrSA Radon was originally a prerequisite for assuring radiation safety and minimisation of negative radiation effects for the public and 32
the environment in Ukraine. However, as the result of undue state of physical protection at facilities using radioactive sources or generating radioactive waste, low level of nuclear security culture at these facilities, and failure to comply with radiation safety standards and nuclear and radiation safety rules in the transport of radioactive material, including material with high radionuclide content, radioactive material ends up in illicit trafficking. This report: - Reviews existing mechanisms aimed for prevention of uncontrolled proliferation of radioactive material; - Provides assessment of effectiveness of interaction between executive authorities and legal entities involved in elimination of consequences of radioactive material recovery from illicit trafficking based on case studies; - Looks into barriers and risks occurring in everyday work; - Proposes measures to enhance radiological security and prevent illicit trafficking of radioactive material. The report refers to presentations of members of the World Institute for Nuclear Security, Austria, the provisions of the Law of Ukraine On Management of Radioactive Waste dated 30 June 1995 No. 255; the Law of Ukraine On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation dated 19 October 2000 No. 2064; Cabinet Decree On Approval of the Procedure for Interaction between Executive Authorities and Legal Entities Whose Activity is Related to Use of Nuclear Power in Case of Detection of Radioactive Material in Illicit Trafficking dated 02 June 2003 No. 813; Order of SNRIU On Approval of Nuclear and Radiation Safety Rules in the Transport of Radioactive Material (PBPRM-2006) dated 30 August 2006 No. 132, and other sources. In order to form a vision of the existing situation, real cases have been analysed in the following areas: - customs control at airports; - handling of metal scrap; - rail transport of radioactive material and material with high radionuclide content; - use of construction materials with high radionuclide content. Conclusions made in the course of preparation of this report help identify priority activities in enhancement of physical protection and control of illicit trafficking in radioactive material and define main risks and barriers in implementation of the state radiological security policy.
THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS POTENTIALLY USABLE IN A “DIRTY BOMB”
R.Ivanov SSE “Odesa SISC”
Extensive application of radioactive material in science, various sectors of economy and health care creates opportunities for its use for criminal or terrorist purposes. Nuclear and radiological terrorism has been stirring keen interest all over the world – particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. Availability of radioactive substances and an unsophisticated technology raise attention to the so called “dirty bomb.” However, international concern over safety and security of radioactive sources is not a recent problem. Accidents involving radioactive sources and reports on illicit trafficking in 33
radioactive material have been in the focus as markers of potential vulnerability of radioactive sources, which has resulted in better awareness of safety and security risks related to the sources outside regulatory control or orphan sources. Radiation dispersal devices (RDDs) or “dirty bombs” pose psychological and social threats. A “dirty bomb” could be either a radioactive source or an active material in a liquid or powder form dispersed by an operator. A radioactive source – even if planted in a public place – will end up causing uncontrolled exposure of random people and thus will have no psychological effect, i. e. will be ineffective. Dispersal through explosion is more effective from a terrorist’s standpoint. An improvised bomb could be designed using standard explosive combined with radioactive material. Damage caused by the explosion is multiplied by the factor of radioactive exposure whose damage will be determined based on the radiation strength and energy, the need to evacuate the population and to decontaminate the territory. In any event, getting hold of a complete device or material to create a “dirty bomb” is not an easy task, no matter how attractive it may be for a terrorist to cause mechanical damage and radiological damage at the same time – both through explosion and due to contamination of the area by radioactive substances dispersed by the explosive device. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators, RTGs, are yet another potential hazard. They use energy of radioactive decay and were applied in space satellites, space probes, and served as independent sources of power supply for remote automatic beacons and weather stations. RTGs with strontium-90 (RIT-90 radioisotope heat sources) may have activities of up to 40,000 Curies. RTGs are so designed that loss of radioactivity is highly unlikely even in extreme environments (fire, strike, water), which also include an explosion. At the same time, RTGs pose strong radiological hazard in case of removal of bio shield due to high radioactivity. RTGs convert RIT thermal energy into electricity. RIT-90 is a sealed radiation source where fuel composition (typically, strontium-90 titanate) is enclosed tightly in a double argon arc welded capsule. Some RTGs contain strontium in the form of strontium borosilicate glass. The capsule is protected from external impacts by thick cladding of stainless steel, aluminium and lead. Bio shield is designed in such a way as to achieve a dose rate not in excess of 2 mSv/hour on the RTG surface and 0.10 mSv/hour in 1 meter. The principal RTG design flaw is lack of protection from unauthorised dismantling, which makes it a tempting target for both non-ferrous scrap scavengers and those who seek to sell radioactive material to terrorists. Unlike other powerful radiation sources used in economy and health care, RTGs scattered across the ex-Soviet territory were practically unsecured – even unattended. Cases are known of scrap scavengers to steal RTGs – luckily, leaving out the containers with radioactive isotopes. Abuse of radioactive source handling rules, human errors, lack of requisite knowledge or inappropriate attribution of disused radioactive sources to waste may have consequences by their severity similar to those of a terrorist act. The threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism has become higher in the past years. Terrorism generally moves away from being a political and social method of addressing problems inside a state and develops into a serious international factor. Terror is viewed as a powerful way to achieve a goal. Most of the citizens are insufficiently informed about specific manifestations of nuclear and radiological terrorism in different parts of the world and therefore do not entirely appreciate the reality of threat of such criminal acts.
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PRESENTATION OF A MASTER’S DEGREE PROGRAMME IN NUCLEAR SECURITY AS PART OF NUCLEAR POWER DISCIPLINE AT KYIV SIKORSKI POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
N.Klos Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine
National policy of Ukraine in the area of physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionising radiation is based on the acknowledgement of the fact that activity of individuals related to regulation and assurance of physical protection is a profession and that a state system of professional training, retraining and advanced training of specialists in nuclear material physical protection, accounting and control is needed. In the endeavours to implement agreements made by Ukraine at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, the Ministry jointly with other stakeholder agencies developed the Provision on the State System for Professional Training, Retraining and Advanced Training of Specialists in Nuclear Material Physical Protection, Accounting and Control that was approved by the Ukrainian Cabinet Decree No. 263 on 21 March 2012. Before 2014, training of professionals in nuclear material physical protection, accounting and control was based at the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry (AR Crimea) that is no longer available to Ukraine as the result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation. The University established and operated two training laboratories – for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material and for the accounting and control of nuclear material – over the period of 2005-2007 in the framework of international cooperation with the IAEA. The whole academic and educational base at the University has been destroyed; nothing was returned to the mainland Ukraine. The Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine (MoECI) as a central government authority responsible for public administration of the use of nuclear energy has the function of creation, planning and coordination of a system of training in the area of nuclear energy use (article 21 of the Law of Ukraine On Use of Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety). Thus, compliance with legal requirements as to the training of professionals in nuclear material physical protection, accounting and control becomes a priority sectoral task. Jointly with the Kyiv Sikorsky Polytechnic Institute and the George Kuzmycz Training Centre for Nuclear Material Physical Protection, Accounting and Control we actively work towards the introduction of a master’s degree course in nuclear security under the Nuclear Power discipline, to be launched in the autumn of 2019. The presentation will dwell on the training programme, enrolment requirements and problematic aspects of professional training.
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PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, NUCLEAR MATERIAL, RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND OTHER SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION DURING CONSTRUCTION OF NEW RADIATION HAZARD FACILITIES IN UKRAINE
T.Baibuzenko, V.Kokhan Public Joint Stock Company “Kyiv Research and Design Institute “Energoproject”
PJSC KIEP is the lead designer of Chernobyl, Khmelnitsky and Rivne NPPs. At the moment, this Institute works in various directions, including projects for completion of KNPP Units 3 and 4 and projects for the implementation of the Holtec International spent nuclear fuel handling technology for Ukraine and support for radioactive waste handling at Vector Industrial Complex. In accordance with applicable law, for each of the projected facilities PJSC KIEP, as a lead design organisation, should obtain an input data report from the operator to be used as the basis for the development of a Physical Protection System Design Terms of Reference. Pursuant to SNRIU requirements in Order No. 176 dated 05 November 2011, Physical Protection System Design Terms of Reference should be developed to define and elaborate requirements to the system of engineered physical protection features (EPPF) and its functions in the physical protection system and identify the scope, content and sequence of work to establish the EPPF system and justify the amount of financing required for its establishment. In some cases PJSC KIEP specialists have to develop such terms of reference on their own, in the absence of a facility-level design basis threat or other important documents to be available at a nuclear facility or a radioactive waste handling site, referring just to the assignments received from operators who are its clients. This creates obstacles for timely response to emerging sabotage threats and application of measures to prevent their actualisation. One of the major problematic aspects relevant to organisation of counteraction for hybrid war threats is the problem of protection of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure against attacks of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The report provides an overview of UAV general classification and performances. Pursuant to the Provision on Use of the Ukrainian Airspace (Cabinet Decree No. 954 dated 6 December 2017) the Temporary Provision on Use of the Ukrainian Airspace was enacted effective 1 June 2018 placing new restrictions on flights of remotely piloted aircraft (drones). Such restrictions were applied previously in respect of NPPs and critical infrastructure objects. However, no actual control has been exercised over the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in absence of a UAV use control mechanism. Considering the need to enhance the level of physical protection of nuclear facilities in the context of a hybrid war, specialists of PJSC KIEP are working on an independent research to determine the areas most vulnerable to sabotage, including with involvement of unmanned aerial vehicles.
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ENSURING PREPAREDNESS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL PERSONNEL AND GUARD FORCES TO ACT IN EMERGENCY AND CRISIS SITUATIONS
Yu.Kolpakov National Guard of Ukraine, military unit 3042
An emergency situation is the disruption of normal life and activity of people at a facility or in a territory caused by an accident, a disaster, natural calamity or any other factor that has caused or may cause death of people and/or substantial material damage. A crisis situation is a situation that has occurred or may occur as the result of commission or a threat of commission of sabotage, theft or any other unauthorised removal of nuclear material. A guard force has the following functions in an emergency situation: - making arrangements for controlled timely passage of emergency vehicles, fire brigades, ambulances to the emergency sites and locations with casualties; - first medical aid to casualties were this does not interfere with security tasks; - involvement in timely evacuation of NF personnel and other persons from limited access areas; - inspection, jointly with the NF physical protection service, of evacuated premises for the presence of people, objects or substances whose free movement is prohibited within limited access areas. Functions of the guard force in a crisis situation will be somewhat different: - deployment of response forces - interruption of adversary acts - neutralisation of adversaries, either on its own or jointly with the outside support forces - first medical aid to casualties were this does not interfere with security tasks - inspection of limited access areas cleared from adversaries for the presence of people, weapons, explosives, or incendiary agents. Guard force commander should pay continuous attention to: - use of force, special equipment, firearms, weapons and combat equipment by guard force personnel; - measures to minimise traffic accidents; - proper communications during guard force duty in emergency and crisis situations; - adequate supply to guard force personnel of group and personal protection equipment to protect against adverse factors of events that may cause an emergency or a crisis situation; - organisation and implementation of moral support arrangements during guard force combat duty. Functions of physical protection service personnel in emergency and crisis situations are to ensure: - control of PPS engineered features, documentation and preservation of all information communicated to or by the service including information incoming to or outgoing from the central, unit and standby alarm stations; - compensatory measures in case of failure of certain PPS engineered features or subsystems; - security of nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionising radiation and non-interference with operation of vital technical elements; - unimpeded egress from limited access areas of personnel, including contractor personnel and seconded personnel, and of visitors during evacuation;
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- jointly with guard force personnel, inspection of evacuated premises for the presence of people, objects or substances that may be used for terrorist purposes; - closure and placement under protection of emergency exits on completion of evacuation and inspection of evacuated premises to confirm absence of people; - jointly with guard force personnel, cordoning sections of limited access areas contaminated as the result of radioactive release; - access of emergency teams and services and response forces into limited access areas and optimum routes of their movement inside these areas; - assistance to emergency teams and services in evacuation of casualties; - information and technical support for law enforcement agencies in their investigation of an emergency or a crisis situation.
IMPLEMENTATION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR THE STATE-OF-THE- ART NEUTRON SOURCE SUBCRITICAL NUCLEAR INSTALLATION
T.Kuznietsova, V.Kosinov, A.Savchenko NSC Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology
The Neutron Source Subcritical Nuclear Installation (SNI) has been developed within the protected area of NSC KIPT under the Cabinet Decree dated 15 February 2012 No. 100 and based on the SNRIU license for the SNI construction and commissioning dated 10 October 2013 No. ЕО 001018. Neutron Source SNI is designed to research properties of subcritical systems, generate neutrons and use them in applied and fundamental research, as well as to train professionals in the area of use of nuclear energy. NSC KIPT developed design terms of reference for a system of engineered physical protection features (EPPF) for the Neutron Source SNI, which was approved by SNRIU. Based on these terms of reference the design contractor (PJSC Ukratomvydav) developed a design of the EPPF system that was submitted to SNRIU for state due diligence. The due diligence gave a positive opinion on the design but pointed out that a number of technical solutions needed update and that requirements and comments of the project client were to be taken into account. The EPPF system for the Neutron Source SNI was developed pursuant to the Working Design Documentation for the System of Engineered Physical Protection Features for the Neutron Source SNI at NSC KIPT No. 9J300123-0027A, revision 5. Configuration of the EPPF system constructed based on the said Working Documentation was not fully in line with the SNRIU Order dated 05 December 2011 No. 176. Personnel of NSC KIPT Physical Protection Service completed a formal examination of the EPPF system for the Neutron Source SNI and offered technical solutions, approved by SNIRU, to bring EPPF in line with applicable physical protection laws. After the corrections had been made, the system of engineered physical protection features for the Neutron Source SNI was subjected to a pilot operation programme. The pilot operation involved practice of the Neutron Source SNI engineered protection features control off the Central Alarm Station and of interaction between guard detail commander and facility personnel. Pilot operation confirmed operability and effectiveness of the EPPF system for the Neutron Source SNI.
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CYBER TREAT PREVENTION MEASURES AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND OTHER RADIATION HAZARD SITES
V.Kyian SS “South-Ukraine NPP”
Cyber security is a sub-discipline of information security studying processes of formation, operation and evolution of cyber objects to identify, characterise and classify contingent cyber hazards and develop regulations to be observed to ensure protection of cyber objects against cyber hazards that have been identified and analysed. Blockchain or block chain is a continuous chain of blocks of information structured in a certain pattern. Most frequently copies of block chains are stored on multiple computers independently from one another. Blockchain is a reliable way to store data on deals, contracts, transactions or anything that needs to be recorded and verified. Blockchain today has found its way into practically all spheres of life; it is about to dramatically change state financial systems and greatly simplify operations of large and medium sized businesses. Blockchain is not a secret technology: the Net offers numerous articles about its design and operating principle. In fact, this technology is intrinsically related to cyber security. It is a result of decades of research and breakthroughs in cryptography and security. Blockchain offers a completely new approach to storage of information and closure of transactions by setting new trust rules. This makes this technology more appropriate, than any other known alternative, for the IT environment with the requirements of high security and mutually unknown players. Thus, while cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are sometimes subject to rate fluctuations for economic reasons, blockchain as their basic technology has been so far (for over eight years) successfully resisting cyberattacks. Guardtime (the company specialising in cyber security and offering cryptography services to various industrial enterprises using the unique blockchain system) announced recently that it was planning to develop a protective infrastructure for nuclear power plants, flood control systems and electricity distribution facilities in the UK. The blockchain technology applied by Guardtime is different from the blockchain version used in the cryptocurrency world. In this case the technology is based on the Keyless Signature Infrastructure (KSI) process. This process does not use an “operation proof” as a data verification method. Instead, it relies on hash based cryptography. In order to warrant integrity of data, KSI verifies integrity of the hash function. As it is reported on the company’s web site, the system allows verification of three data properties. Time: the system knows when the digital signature was attached to the data. Integrity: it sees whether the data was modified. Order: it tracks the order of digital signatures attached to the data. As opposed to the blockchain technology used in the bitcoin, KSI blockchain does not grow linearly as the number of transaction increases. It experiences linear growth in time no matter how many transactions there are.
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STATE OF THE ART PHYSICAL PROTECTION TECHNOLOGIES APPLIED IN THE PROCESS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND GUARD FORCE PERSONNEL ADVANCED TRAINING
V.Gavryliuk, S.Drapei, V.Kyryshchuk, V.Parkhomenko, O.Romanova, M.Strilchuk GKTC, Institute for Nuclear Research
Over the past 10 – 15 years, engineered features of newly created physical protection systems have tended to be combined into engineered features packages that allowed for minimisation of negative impacts of the human factor on systems effectiveness. The Ukrainian law prescribes a number of requirements to such packages of physical protection engineered features and emphasises that they should be established as part of physical protection systems of facilities under construction or reconstruction or integrated into the reconstructed physical protection systems of active facilities. At the same time, successful implementation of technologies to create, implement and sustain operation of PPS engineered features packages required revision of approaches to advanced training of physical protection professionals and guard force personnel of the nuclear power sector of Ukraine and implementation of new learning technologies that would improve level of understanding of the training material and ensure clear and objective vision by the trainees of the structure and functions of an engineered features package of a physical protection system. Creation of the Engineered Features Package Training Site and its integration into the training process is one of the steps towards establishment of such new training technologies. The specific feature of our Training Site is the maximum proximity of hands-on training to the environment in which the professionals are or will be working at their facilities – primarily, NPPs. Our training technology makes our trainees active participants, rather than observers, of various physical protection system processes giving them an opportunity to interfere with the operation of detection, TV surveillance, delay, access management and control equipment and to study performances of this equipment under different conditions, set it up and change its settings. Freedom of action allowed to trainees who perform assignments on operation and control of package equipment provides them the answers they want to get as professionals. A survey recently conducted at the Training Site proved applicability of statistical methods to verification of operability of physical protection equipment. It turned out, for example, that it is enough to check only 47 detectors instead of every of the existing 120. This substantially reduces verification time and makes it achievable within a practical class timeframe at the Training Site. The time saving by this approach will be still better at real facilities, primarily NPPs, with much larger numbers of detectors. In addition to the Training Site the Training Centre has developed a NPP with PPS Elements Interactive Training Suite in a further effort to implement advanced technology in the learning process. This suite increases effectiveness of physical protection training for physical protection professionals and National Guard of Ukraine personnel. Application of the NPP with PPS Elements Interactive Training Suite stimulates creative activity and analytic thinking and provides trainees with skills and capabilities required to perform nuclear facility physical protection and guard functions. In June this year the Interactive Training Suite was successfully employed during practical lessons in the framework of two training courses. Therefore, new advanced training technologies designed at the Training Centre are instrumental in the enhancement of material understanding level thus ultimately furthering effectiveness of physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities in Ukraine.
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RELIABILITY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
C. Lamarche ARES Corporation
Facilities, organizations, and regulatory agencies have a compelling interest in ensuring that individuals who occupy critical/sensitive positions with access to sensitive information, materials, and/or programs are trustworthy and functioning at their highest level of reliability to mitigate the internal risk associated with an insider. An insider is any person who has authorized access (either escorted or unescorted) to protected areas. Insiders can be either managers or employees who could take advantage of their access (i.e., right or opportunity to gain admittance), complemented by their authority (i.e., power or right to enforce obedience) and knowledge of the facility (i.e., awareness or familiarity gained by training or experience), to bypass dedicated physical protection elements or other provisions such as safety, nuclear material control and accountancy, and operating measures and procedures. Motivations of insiders are varied and can range from ideology, revenge, ego, sabotage, or financial need to being forced through coercion by outside elements or even by family members. Reliability has a logical and direct relationship to trustworthiness because an organization is placing trust in its employees to conduct themselves in a secure, safe, and dependable manner. A reliability program provides organizations with a process to help ensure that the highest quality employees are retained in these critical/sensitive positions. The establishment of a reliability program is one way to help mitigate potential insider risk, retain valued and trusted employees in critical/sensitive positions, and ensure employees meet the highest standards of reliability and trustworthiness. Each organization and its nuclear facilities have material and information deemed essential to its national security. A reliability program can minimize the potential for infrastructure sabotage or the release of sensitive information. Safety and security systems can mitigate the risk of mechanical and systemic failures; however, because humans are the source of design for any given system, clever and motivated individuals will try to defeat any system. Each organization should evaluate the risks posed to a particular nuclear facility based on information related to activist organizations or subversives, disgruntled/disaffected employees, or other information related to the surrounding region. If significant risk from human activity exists, a reliability program can help mitigate potential damage. This presentation will introduce and briefly describe the various reliability programs utilized by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and commercial nuclear power plants.
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
O.Maksymenko National Guard of Ukraine, military unit 3041
In the context of the military conflict in the part of the Ukrainian territory with a large number of nuclear and radiation hazard facilities proper enhancement of the level of public safety against consequences of potential terrorist acts, sabotage and other illegal acts, including the suppression of their threats, is conditional upon integration of nuclear safety
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and security and is closely related to the appropriate level of holistic support of the physical protection system and the high standard of training of guard force personnel. Human resource development in physical protection is of utmost importance since a well-trained professional is a token of security, reliable facility protection, and successful performance. Protection activity is currently the responsibility of the National Guard of Ukraine. The following issues will be covered as part of this presentation’s subject: - selection of candidates into guard force units; - combat training of personnel; - arrangements to be implemented in guard forces to secure proper physical protection of nuclear power plants in Ukraine’s current circumstances.
SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE STATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AND THE INTEGRATED STATE SYSTEM FOR THE PREVENTION OF, RESPONSE TO AND INTERRUPTION OF TERRORIST ACTS AND MINIMISATION OF THEIR CONSEQUENCES IN UKRAINE
V.Mandzii SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”
The state physical protection system has the legal status defined by the Law of Ukraine On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation and operates in accordance with the Cabinet Decree dated 21 December 2011 No. 1337 On Approval of the Procedure for the Operation of the State System of Physical Protection, Presidential Decree dated 27 August 2015 No. 520-14т/2015 on approval of the Design Basis Threat for Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation in Ukraine, and the Cabinet Decree dated 24 July 2013 No. 598 On Approval of the State Response Plan for Central and Local Executive Authorities in Case of Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation in Use, Storage or Transport and of Radioactive Waste Being Handled. Operation of the integrated state system for the prevention of, response to and interruption of terrorist acts and minimisation of their consequences is governed by the Law of Ukraine On the Suppression of Terrorism, the Provision on the Integrated State System for the Prevention of, Response to and Interruption of Terrorist Acts and Minimisation of Their Consequences (approved by the Cabinet Decree dated 18 February 2016 No. 92) and other restricted regulations. The Procedure for the Operation of the State System of Physical Protection paragraph 12 provides for the following types of conditions in which the system may operate: normal operation; high alert; crisis operation; recovery to normal operation. No regulations relevant to physical protection currently define high alert and thus no specific measures are provided that should be applied by the operator and other participants of the state physical protection system in the state of high alert or in crisis operation. The Provision on the Integrated State System for the Prevention of, Response to and Interruption of Terrorist Acts and Minimisation of Their Consequences paragraph 7 provides the following levels of terrorist threat based on available intelligence on a threatening or 42
actual terrorist act: grey level (possible threat), where factors or conditions are in place that facilitate commission of a terrorist act; blue level (potential threat), where non-verified intelligence is in place that a terrorist act is being prepared; yellow level (likely threat), where credible (verified) intelligence is in place that a terrorist act is being prepared; red level (real threat), where a terrorist act has been committed. A level of terrorist threat may be announced on a temporary basis for all or only some specific participants of anti-terrorist activity either for the entire territory of Ukraine or for certain regions or facilities that are potential terrorist targets. A crisis and an emergency situations are defined in paragraph 1.2. of the Requirements for Identification of the Course of Action of Personnel of the Physical Protection Division and Personnel of the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Division in Crisis and Emergency Situations, while their paragraph 2.4. names socio-political events that may cause a crisis situation, including events related to terrorist activity. In any event that may evolve into a crisis situation a NPP should activate the Facility- Level Response Plan in Case of Sabotage whose tasks include assurance of successful suppression of any attempts of adversaries defined in the facility-level design basis threat to commit sabotage or theft of nuclear material, radioactive waste or other sources of ionising radiation or any other illegal actions against the facility. This threat description is used as the basis for drilling facility-level response plans and tactics of NPP military guard forces. The presentation will also take a look on deficiencies in the operation of the state physical protection system in a crisis situation and problematic aspects of interaction between the state physical protection system and the integrated state system for the prevention of, response to and interruption of terrorist acts, and will offer corrective approaches.
ANALYSIS OF UNIVERSITY ADMISSION TO THE MAJOR 143. NUCLEAR POWER BASED ON ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS BY THE NEW EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITY LICENSE TERMS
O.Maslov, V.Kravchenko Odesa National Polytechnic University
Human is a key element of NPP safety and the university training of future professionals defines future profiles of NPP personnel. The last year’s presentation covered the analysis of the 2017 admission process to the first year for the major of 143.Nuclear Power based on the target public order system for specialist training. This system of admission has been in effect for bachelors since 2016 and for the master’s course since 2017. The results of the three admission campaigns in 2016-2018 thus give enough ground for analysis of the dynamics of the student body at all higher learning institutions offering bachelor programmes and of the qualitative evolution of applicants. The analysis of applications in 2016 and 2017 shows the reduction in the number of applications, which is quite substantial for Lviv Polytechnic (LP) and Odessa National Polytechnic University (ONPU). However, although the number of first-priority applications for ONPU remains stable and is close to that for NTU KPI, the quantity of first-priority applications at LP is rather low. In fact, the number of first-priority applications generally has not changed, which is the evidence of a high level of awareness of 43
applicants who choose this major. A more important trend is related to a change in the profile of applicants’ academic achievements: an average grade is going down. Unfortunately, the data from the Konkurs Information System (http://www.vstup.info) on the formation of the passing scores in 2016 and 2017 is different. Therefore, the presentation will offer a more detailed analysis based on the 2018 results. An important indicator relevant to university training is academic quality and performance, i. e. percentage of students achieving excellent and good grades and having no outstanding programme requirements. Evolution of these indicators over time is even more important. Pursuant to the relevant Cabinet decree, academic progress made by most of the students is now published on rating lists for the scholarship purposes. This provides an opportunity to analyse the evolution of academic progress made by applicants over time. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine emphasises high social responsibility of master degree seekers in the major 143.Nuclear Power by offering to introduce a single graduation qualification exam. Another meaningful innovation is the Educational Activity License Terms approved in 2018 to change requirements to tutorial and academic staff involved in the education process and requirements to assurance of the education process. A more detailed analysis of changes and their impacts on the admission process in 2018, as well as their potential influence on future specialist training will be provided in the report based on the admission results.
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPUTER GAME FOR ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION ELEMENTS AS PART OF THE LEARNING PROCESS GAMIFICATION TREND
O.Maslov, O.Blazhko, Yu.Troyanovska Odesa National Polytechnic University
General definition of gamification is the application of game-based mechanisms to non- game processes. Gamification is widely applied in numerous areas of activity, primarily in education. Several Ukrainian universities are currently involved in implementation of the Erasmus+ KA2 international project, University-Enterprises Cooperation in Game Industry in Ukraine – GameHub. The goal of the project is to bring different areas of specialist training (IT, engineering, humanitarian and economy studies) together into an integrated training process for the development of computer games reflecting real operational cycles with account for student competences and interests and to provide students with knowledge and skills that would improve their chances to get jobs and achieve self-actualisation. Academic goals: - research in the area of development of training games (serious games); - methodology surveys to select and codify theoretical fundamentals for the training modules being developed. GameHub training includes a set of specific training modules designed to develop necessary competencies. As it was mentioned above, multidisciplinary focus of the project assumes that the GameHub results will be used not solely in the IT sector but, among other things, for the analysis of physical protection elements. Game-based approach in the physical protection education is an obvious choice in many respects: dynamic “military” computer games, including those involving multiple users, are very popular. This includes software products for modelling and quality assessment of real physical protection systems, including design programmes, and computer based training simulators, such as software suites Sandia’s Interactive System Simulation & Assessment (http://umbra.sandia.gov), AVERT (http://aressecuritycorp.com), Vanguard (http://www.rhinocorps.com), and others.
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Gamification elements are one way or the other reflected in these programmes. We suggest a slightly different approach to introduction of gamification elements into the training process. The idea is for a student to create a computer game to model movements of adversaries inside the controlled facility, their detection and apprehension. Since gamification involves application of game mechanisms to real life it will be useful to understand which of the specific features of games will be adopted for the learning process. These include a goal to be achieved; limitations, rules and incentives; and competition, all of them embedded in a certain context. The new learning task is to master the system analysis technique applied to effectiveness, security and reliability of physical protection systems and systems of a nuclear power facility. Thus the goal of game development is to provide for familiarisation with system analysis methods. Students themselves establish a game scene in the form of a plan of a room, a building or a territory, place sensors of the intrusion detection system, define the start and the end points of the route and the parameters of the game (two players or a player against the computer), allocate roles of a guard and an adversary and set game rules and conditions of victory. Level of detail of game scenes and game rules and their correspondence to real life depend on the developer skills. Game is implemented through automata-based programming: a transient graph is built through the states of each of the scene objects. Such graphs will be built in Unity3D using PlayMaker software suite. This suite is commercial (was provided by the GameHub project) and is installed and set up in the presence of the trainer for the time of game development. Use of automata-based programming gives virtually any engineering student a capability to develop a game. Currently the system is being tested on relatively simple game scenes in order to evaluate methodology approaches.
BUILDING A CADRE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL SPECIALISTS FOR THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND COAL INDUSTRY AS A CENTRAL EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
A.Nebishchansky Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine
The implementation of the state government optimisation policy in the context of contemporary challenges requires creation of a division responsible for security issues at the level of the nuclear power sector at the headquarters of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine. There are plans to amend the organisation structure of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine by way of establishment of a Nuclear Power Directorate and an Expert Team for Physical Protection and Counter-Terrorist Activity of Nuclear Power Sector Facilities as its part. The main tasks of the Team will include: implementation of the state policy in the area of physical protection of facilities under enterprises in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine; involvement in organisation of physical protection in, and control of, the transport of radioactive material; development and approval of departmental and sectoral regulations on physical protection and their implementation; proposal of amendments to laws and acts of President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; 45
organisation and implementation of departmental control of physical protection at the enterprise level; arrangements for the implementation of the state policy in the accounting for and control of nuclear material; implementation of measures to prevent and detect terrorist acts and terrorism related crimes at nuclear power sector facilities; implementation of physical protection requirements; development and implementation of state programmes, plans and measures for the physical protection of nuclear facilities at each phase of their lifecycle; organisation of technology, research and development support of physical protection at the enterprise level; acting as an employer of the state research programmes in physical protection; organisation of activities related to identification, creation and operations support of enterprise level physical protection systems, their refurbishment and re-equipment; control of compliance with international agreements of actors of the state nuclear material accounting and control system; inspection of response plans for the interaction of guard forces and outside support forces; development of departmental lists of physical protection information containing state secrets and other restricted information and protection of the same; organisation of background checks and processing of clearances for special works at nuclear facilities, with nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionising radiation for personnel of the headquarters of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine and for enterprise executives; development of proposals for uses and allocations of funds for recipients under state budget funded programmes; review and approval of regulations concerning identification of enterprise physical protection level, enterprise physical protection financing plans, approval of facility-level design basis threats, facility-level response plans in case of sabotage and enterprise nuclear facilities and nuclear material physical protection plans; participation in threat assessments for sabotage, theft or other unauthorised removal of radioactive material and in identification of the design basis threat; cooperation with the IAEA and other international organisations on matters pertaining to nuclear material physical protection, accounting and control; establishment and sustainability support of the state system for training, retraining and advanced training of nuclear material physical protection, accounting and control professionals; institutional and methodology guidance of the activity of corporate paramilitary guard forces of nuclear power sector enterprises, work on interagency commissions for organisation of enterprise protection by units of the National Guard of Ukraine, corporate paramilitary guard duty and watchman service; organisation and implementation of arrangements for the formation and maintenance of nuclear security culture among enterprise personnel; organisation of anti-terrorism and anti-sabotage security of nuclear power sector facilities; organisation and assurance of protection of nuclear power plant vital infrastructure; implementation of safeguards and assurance of Ukraine’s compliance with its international obligations in the area of nuclear non-proliferation in accordance with the Agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA on Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Additional Protocol to this Agreement. 46
Concentration of these functions in a single organisational division of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry – the Expert Team for Physical Protection and Counter-Terrorist Activity of Nuclear Power Sector Facilities – will be the solution offering a comprehensive approach to coordination of and interaction in these matters and ensuring the staffing level adequate for the proper, timely and professional addressing of the tasks provided by applicable laws and regulations in the area of use of nuclear energy and of radiation safety. The Expert Team (the team leader and experts) is planned to be manned on a competitive basis in accordance with requirements of the National Agency of Ukraine for the Public Service, with consideration for past professional experience in the relevant fields and professional qualities. A worthy level of compensation will be one of the factors preventing corruption or conflicts of interests.
COUNTERING CYBER THREATS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND RADIATION HAZARD SITES
V.Omelchenko, V.Bediukh SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP”
Measures to counter cyber threats at nuclear facilities and other radiation hazard sites. The following issues will be covered in the context of the proposed subject: - cyber security: definition, impact, threats; - current cyber security targets at nuclear facilities and other radiation hazard sites; - computer (information) security – ways to achieve; - Ukrainian laws in the area of cyber security and computer security; - threats, risks, definition of a cyberattack; - goal of developing and sustaining a high level of cyber protection; - cyber security planning for a specific nuclear facility; - importance of nuclear facility personnel awareness of computer (information) security. The above issues will be used as a basis for analysis of the level and state of cyber security at nuclear facilities and other radiation hazard sites and of measures required to assure high quality of cyber protection. Justification of importance of personnel awareness of potential consequences of non- compliance with computer (information) security requirements. Based on cyber protection goals, implementation and support of a cyber security programme involves: integration of a cyber security programme in a physical protection programme; cyber security means; defence-in-depth strategy; on-going monitoring and assessment; addition and modification of digital resources; mitigation of consequences of an attack and response to incidents; incident response plan in the area of cyber security; training and awareness in the area of cyber security; cyber risk assessment and management; cyber security programme overview; control, preservation and processing of documentation. Cyber security problems should be addressed not only at a facility level but also at 47
the level of the state and require development of specific planning efforts and counteractions to be implemented at all levels including the nuclear facility level.
IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT RIVNE NPP
I.Omelianov SS “Rivne NPP”
1. The functioning of integrated safeguards. 2. IAEA technical visits. 3. Assurance of storage of nuclear material accounting records and actions of Nuclear Safety Division personnel in case of an accident or emergency. 3.1 List of information (backup copies) 3.2 Internal crisis centre 3.3 Actions in case of emergency or in an accident. 4. Storage of spent nuclear fuel from VVER-440s. 4.1 Deficiencies of an original storage pool rack design. 4.2 Advantages of replacement of lower storage pool racks with sealed storage racks. 4.3 Fuel storage in upper racks. 4.4 SNF inspection at the storage pool by IAEA inspectors.
REPAIR OF WESTINGHOUSE FUEL ASSEMBLIES USING FUEL INSPECTION AND REPAIR BENCH (FIRB); NM ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL AFTER FUEL ELEMENT RETRIEVAL
D.Orlyk SS “South-Ukraine NPP”
1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 WR ВА3314 fuel assemblies operation and repair history. 2 FIRB UPGRADE TO LIFT DESIGN CONSTRAINTS ON SEARCH OF FAILED FUEL ELEMENTS IN WR FUEL ASSEMBLIES. 3 INSPECTION AND REPAIR OF WR ВА3314 FUEL ASSEMBLIES DURING THE 2018 PLANNED PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE CAMPAIGN 3.1 Procedure for the identification of failed fuel element coordinates. 3.2 Sequence of WR ВА3314 FA dismantling and fuel element retrieval. 3.3 FIRM basket with a failed fuel element as a separate accounting item for the purpose of NM accounting and control. 4 NM ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 4.1 Application of STAR software for fuel element retrieval from the assembly. 4.2 Example of preparation of an electronic inventory change report after repair of a WR ВА3314 fuel assembly.
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PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM RADIOACTIVE WASTE REPOSITORY AT SSE DNIPROPETROVSK SIRSC TO SSE CERWM
V.Plokhii, A.Halushka SSE “Dnipropetrovs’k SISC”
The main activity of SSE Dnipropetrovsk State Interregional Special Combine (SIRSC) is acceptance, transportation, treatment, temporary storage and transfer for disposal to SSE CERWM repositories of radioactive waste and disused sources of ionising radiation previously applied at enterprises and various facilities within the Special Combine’s catchment area. The radioactive waste repository at SSE Dnipropetrovsk SIRSC contains category two radioactive waste (RAW) and category one sources of ionising radiation (SIR) requiring level three nuclear material physical protection. Pursuant to the Law of Ukraine On Management of Radioactive Waste, the radioactive waste repository should provide for RAW isolation from environment, its physical protection, radiological monitoring, as well as a capability for its future retrieval, treatment, transportation and disposal. RAW transportation for disposal at SSE CERWM repositories should be carried out in strict compliance with applicable rules, regulations and standards in the area of radioactive waste transport. Transportation is the most vulnerable stage of the radioactive waste management cycle. In today’s environment, RAW transport security has evolved to become a priority task since waste is transported through public areas, by various routes and over various types of terrain. Various contingency situations are possible during the transport of RAW. It will be noted that safety of people involved in the transportation is currently maintained at a satisfactory level, however, likelihood of potential adversary acts, including sabotage, has substantially increased. In the present context, making and maintaining arrangements to minimise opportunities for sabotage, theft or any other unauthorised removal of radioactive waste or other sources of ionising radiation becomes one of the key tasks of SSE Dnipropetrovsk SIRSC.
ROLE OF THE UKRAINIAN CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL IN EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW IDEAS AND TRENDS
O.Romanova GKTC, Institute for Nuclear Research
The annual Ukrainian Conference on Nuclear Material Physical Protection, Accounting and Control is an important event in the activity of the Ukrainian physical protection professionals. The Conference is the Ukraine’s only forum bringing together specialists from ministries, agencies, operators and other licensees in the area of nuclear security. The Conferences are attended not only by Ukrainian professionals, but also by experts from other states and international organisations. The Conference format is instrumental for better understanding the tasks and problems faced by not only Ukrainian specialists but also other countries and helps establish working and friendly relationships between them. Each Conference discusses topical issues important for the present day as well as for the future. 49
Many such discussions were subsequently reflected in appropriate regulations. Participation of young professionals and the opportunity to make their presentations and take part in discussions furthers their professional growth and stimulates appreciation of their personal roles in nuclear security. The Conferences between 2003 and 2018 were possible due to the international sponsorship. The presentation will review other issues relevant to the role of the Conference in evolution and development of nuclear material physical protection, accounting and control in Ukraine.
ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE PERSONNEL TRUSTWORTHINESS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND RADIATION HAZARD SITES
R.Rys National Guard of Ukraine, military unit 3024 (Pavlohrad town)
The human trustworthiness challenge lies in inadequacy of existing methods of insider identification which, in turn, is the result of absence of a single state personnel trustworthiness programme in Ukraine. At the same time, a lot of attention is paid in Ukraine to prevention and suppression of the insider threat. For instance, the Law of Ukraine On Use of Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety provides for a procedure, requirements and limitations concerning clearance of individuals for work at nuclear facilities with nuclear material and other sources of ionising radiation in order to prevent employment of potential insiders. But what about personnel who has been working for years at modern Ukrainian enterprises whose activity is related to operation of nuclear facilities (NF) or radiation hazard sites (RHS)? What is the way to organise insider prevention work among such personnel? This is where the single state personnel trustworthiness programme in Ukraine should come into the picture. Insufficiency of arrangements to ensure NF and RHS personnel trustworthiness: personnel background check methods applied at modern Ukrainian enterprises whose activity involves operation of nuclear facilities or radiation hazard sites were introduced in the Soviet time and fail to capture the entire spectrum of risks offered by the contemporary reality. It is also quite true that physical protection managers of these enterprises are trying to additionally implement novel measures to prevent illicit acts of personnel, however all these efforts are sporadic and exist at an enterprise (organisational) level. Existing NF and RHS personnel trustworthiness arrangements are the legacy of the Soviet system and were developed on the foundation of the Communist ideology resting upon the idea of the developed socialism, conscious society and the demonization of the Western world at the public level. Anything not characteristic for the behaviour of an average Soviet worker would be immediately noticed by colleagues and, as a duty of a conscious citizen, reported to the management. KGB agent network, global in its span and controlled from the top echelons of government, was an important element of these personnel trustworthiness arrangements. KGB not only worked towards assurance of personnel trustworthiness but was also a punitive authority. In the Soviet reality all this was quite effective. However, after dissolution of the USSR the modern Ukrainian society developed a different set of moral values that need to be taken into account in implementing NF and RHS personnel trustworthiness arrangements. Suggestions for a NF and RHS personnel trustworthiness programme, i. e. main aspects of the single state personnel trustworthiness programme are as follows: 50
1. Preventive measures at the stage of preliminary screening of candidates (covering all screening elements). 2. A set of preventive measures for existing NF and RHS personnel: - implementation of routine measures to exclude potential insiders among persons with access clearance; - implementation of ongoing personnel trustworthiness check (assurance) measures; - arrangements to sustain nuclear security culture; - continuous surveillance system; - programme to provide specific social assurances to employees, including to retired personnel (to raise staff satisfaction level).
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SIR: EXPERIENCE OF OPERATION OF A PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AT SSE KHARKIV SIRSC AFTER UPGRADE
M.Skrypnyk SSE “Kharkiv SISC”
The US DOE Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is a vital part of efforts aimed for combatting nuclear and radiological terrorism. GTRI efforts are focused on the first line of defence: physical protection of vulnerable nuclear material and nuclear waste at facilities. Improvements of a physical protection system are based on tasks and requirements set forth in the IAEA NSS 11, Security of Radioactive Sources for security level A and on the Law of Ukraine On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Material, Radioactive Waste and Other Sources of Ionising Radiation, as well as on other regulations in the area of physical protection, and ensure comprehensive approach to prevention of access of terrorists to nuclear material and radioactive waste. In the framework of the International Project “Improvement of the Physical Protection System at SIRSC RADON Kharkiv,” supported by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Battelle Memorial Institute (USA), the contractor ETC Atomenergotraining completed an upgrade of physical protection system engineered features at SSE Kharkiv SIRSC in 2016- 2017. A year’s operating experience of the engineered features after the upgrade (since September 2017) proved indisputable benefits of the upgraded system but also revealed a number of deficiencies of both organisational and technical nature. These issues and further prospects of operation of the engineered features of the physical protection system will be reviewed in the presentation.
ENSURING PREPAREDNESS OF GUARD FORCE PERSONNEL TO ACT IN A CRISIS SITUATION
R.Soldatenko National Guard of Ukraine, military unit 3044
1. Positive developments in the training of guard force personnel and their reasons. 2. Training guard force personnel to act in emergency and crisis situations as part of a guard detail and an alert unit. 51
3. Training guard force personnel to act in emergency and crisis situations as part of a reserve force.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT UKRAINIAN FACILITIES
Yu.Solonenko SS “Khmelnytska NPP”
1. Brief information about KNPP. Separated Subdivision Khmelnitsky NPP is a division of State Enterprise NNEGC Energoatom. The design of Khmelnitsky NPP envisaged construction of 4 serial nuclear units with VVER reactors having the overall capacity of 4 thousand MW. At present, Units 1 and 2 are in operation. Reactor type is VVER-1000. Construction of Units 3 and 4 is planned to be completed. Fresh fuel storage is designed for 4 units. 2. SNF management at Khmelnitsky NPP. 2.1 SNF storage (handling diagram). Safety. Spent fuel assemblies after retrieval from the reactor core are stored at the reactor storage pool on sealed storage racks. Spent fuel assemblies in storage are arranged vertically inside hexagonal tubes (wrapper tubes) made of borated corrosion resistant steel (1% of natural boron) 4.2 mm thick. Racks used at Unit 1 are manufactured at PC Izhory Plant (spent fuel assemblies arrangement spacing on sealed storage racks is 300 mm), and at Unit 2, racks by Skoda, Czech Republic are used (SF spacing on sealed storage racks is 288 mm). SNF storage system safety is sustained by adherence to design criteria in normal operation conditions and during design basis accidents. 2.2 Preparation of SNF shipment: logistics. Preparation of SNF shipment includes several stages: Submission of a request, preparation of SNF list Preparation of equipment and systems for spent nuclear fuel discharge from the storage pool. Notification of IAEA in the framework of inspection planning. 3. HOLTEC technology effects for the implementation of safeguards 3.1 The programme of upgrade of the SNF management system is currently underway at KNPP. Implementation of the HOLTEC technology will allow shipment of SNF from KNPP to the Centralised SNF Storage Facility. 3.2 Tests of FDET fork detector, designed to verify presence of NM in spent fuel assemblies before placement into container, were conducted with the involvement of IAEA inspectors at KNPP units in the framework of HOLTEC technology implementation. The tests were conducted based on the Technical Solution for the Tests of the FDET Detector at KNPP Units 1 and 2 No. 0.ЯБ.1945.TP-OZ dated 11 July 2017 (approved by SNRIU letter dated 02 August 2017 No. 15-14/6-1/4677). A special SNRIU authorisation was obtained for the tests. The tests included: assembly of the FDET detector by IAEA technicians with the assistance of Nuclear Safety Division personnel. The pole was assembled of 3 tubes: 2*2 m tubes and 1*1 m tube. The total length of the assembled pole with the detector neared 5.4 m;
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detector was installed on the main joint seal bracket using the 10 t polar crane hoist; is was checked that the refuelling machine mast fits in the detector fork without the detector grinding or displacement; IAEA inspector confirmed possibility to measure spent fuel assembly characteristics. Successful tests have made the detector usable during SNF shipment by the HOLTEC technology.
ENSURING PREPAREDNESS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION PERSONNEL AND GUARD FORCES TO ACT IN EMERGENCY AND CRISIS SITUATIONS
Yu.Soltys SS “Rivne NPP”
As provided in the IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5), the overall goal of the state nuclear security regime is to protect people, property, society and environment from criminal acts against nuclear material and other radioactive material. Attainment of this goal largely depends on effectiveness of physical protection division and guard force personnel in crisis and contingency situations. In accordance with the General Requirements to Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Material Physical Protection Systems, a crisis situation is defined as a situation that occurred or may occur as the result of commission or a threat of commission of sabotage, theft or any other unauthorised removal of nuclear material. In order to ensure successful suppression of any adversary attempts to commit sabotage or theft of nuclear material, radioactive waste, another source of ionising radiation or any other unauthorised activity against a facility the operator should develop a facility-level response plan. An emergency situation is disruption of normal operation of a facility as the result of a natural or man-induced event that may cause or has caused harm to health, death of persons within the facility protected area, significant material damage, or radioactive release into the environment at the level exceeding permissible limits prescribed by the law. Enterprises should have in place emergency response plans in order to sustain the existing level of physical protection in an emergency situation and to mitigate or minimise radiological consequences of sabotage, human errors, equipment failures, or natural disasters. The operator makes arrangements to ensure preparedness of physical protection service and guard force personnel to act in the crisis and emergency situations in view of their important role in achieving nuclear material and nuclear facility physical protection goals. This context emphasises high significance of initial training of facility personnel to act in the emergency and crisis situations and emergency and terrorism response exercises and drills at the facility.
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HANDLING OF NUCLEAR FUEL IN UKRAINE. NUCLEAR FUEL AS A NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING ITEM
D.Stukalov SE “NNEGC “Energoatom”
1. Introduction. 2. Description of fuel assembly types used at Ukrainian NPPs (overview of assemblies ТВС-А, ТВС-WR, ТВС-440). 3. New types of fuel planned to be used at Ukrainian NPPs. ТВСА-12. 4. Handling of nuclear fuel in Ukraine. 4.1 NF supply to NPPs; 4.2 NF operation in reactor core; 4.3. SNF long-term storage; 4.4 SNF transportation for reprocessing. 5. Nuclear material accounting in fuel assemblies (fuel assembly dismantling and repair).
IMPLEMENTATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP
A.Tiekhova SS “Zaporizhzhia NPP”
Establishment of a nuclear material accounting and control system; organizational order to establish the nuclear material accounting and control system; development of Design Information; development of a Guideline for Accountancy and Control of Nuclear Material Subject to IAEA Safeguards; installation of ZAP-Star software to account for nuclear material and develop accounting records; initial nuclear material physical inventory takings; organisation of workstations for IAEA experts in a clean area and a restricted area; conduct of IAEA special inspections; development of operating documentation for the nuclear material accounting and control; development of process documentation for the handling of IAEA containment and surveillance systems and for organisation and safe conduct of work by IAEA inspectors at ZNPP; installation of IAEA containment and surveillance systems (subsequently, upgrades of the IAEA equipment); organisation of a NM accounting and control system for locations outside facilities; development of a Procedure for Application of IAEA Safeguards Criteria to Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipped from Zaporizhzya NPP Units 1 – 6 for storage to the SNF Dry Storage Facility (DSF), adaptation of ZAP-Star NM accounting and control software at ZNPP to account for the SNF DSF process involving combination of batches (specific NM accounting algorithm for spent nuclear fuel dispatched to the SNF DSF for storage); overview course for ZNPP personnel to be delivered by nuclear material accounting 54
and control professionals to cover the IAEA inspection activity at ZNPP, implementation of integrated safeguards at ZNPP, IAEA equipment used to verify nuclear material at ZNPP Units 1 – 6.
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE. ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE SECTOR OF UKRAINE. PARTICIPATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE IN NATIONAL DEFENCE
I.Uholkov National Guard of Ukraine, Main administration
The National Guard of Ukraine was first established in 1991. It was later re-established in March 2014. In both cases the creation of the National Guard was determined by a difficult socio- political situation and the need for a rapid response to new challenges and threats. In spring 2014, during one of the toughest periods in the history of the independent Ukraine the National Guard units were the first ones to respond to the crisis caused by indirect hybrid actions against our state. Law enforcements could not influence the situation created by the takeover of public authorities in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. However, the situation in Kharkiv and Mariupol was taken under control solely due to bold and resolute actions of National Guard personnel. Best examples of activities of the National Guard included their deployment for stabilisation of the situation in Odessa, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, release of Kharkiv Oblast State Administration and suppression of armed criminal groups in Mariupol. The Russian military aggression that began with the annexation of the Crimea and destabilisation of the situation in the East of Ukraine prompted the government decision to create a new model of a mobile independent force with a high level of operational alert able to promptly dispatch assigned missions in any region of the state, including in the ATO zone. Pursuant to the Law of Ukraine On the National Guard of Ukraine, the modern National Guard is a military force with law enforcement functions within the organisation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. These tasks are mostly related to the enhancement of military functions of the National Guard. They include: participation in the suppression of armed aggression against Ukraine; participation in arrangements aimed for termination of armed conflicts at the national border; suppression of terrorist activity, actions of illegal paramilitary or armed formations (teams), terrorist organisations, organised groups and criminal organisations; participation in the restoration of the constitutional order in case of an attempt to take over government or dismantle statehood. Practice of combat deployment of the National Guard in the ATO zone has demonstrated the usefulness of independent units able to discharge combat missions by military force, having appropriate organisation and staff structure and training and provided with modern weaponry and materiel. The National Guard of Ukraine is one of the essential components of the Ukrainian defence and security sector. 55
In accordance with the law, the National Guard of Ukraine is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs organisation as a military formation with law enforcement functions; during the law martial state 80% of the National Guard moves under command of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. The Law of Ukraine On the National Guard of Ukraine defines 21 key functions that could tentatively be organised in three groups as follows: Group one: military functions discharged jointly with the armed forces and other formations and specific to defence forces. Group two: protection functions. Group three: law enforcement functions specific to security forces. National Guard units are organised in accordance with their functional roles: operational units; public order enforcement units; critical state infrastructure protection units; special teams (forces); diplomatic missions and consulates protection units; National Guard units tasked with escort, extradition and safe-keeping of prisoners; logistics support depots; training establishments (centres).
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF RADIATION SOURCES
V.Pashchenko1, V.Kravtsov2, I.Kuzmiak2, H.Vahin2 1SNRIU, 2SSTC NRS
Existing regulatory framework in the area of nuclear security of sources of ionising radiation (SIR) in Ukraine generally provides the necessary basis for effective SIR handling security measures at all stages of their lifecycle. At the same time, recent regulatory changes, including the ones aimed to assure compliance of the Procedure for Determination of SIR Physical Protection Level Based on Activity Level (Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 625, as amended on 21 October 2016) with IAEA requirements, call operators and licensees, primarily health care institutions, power sector enterprises, mining and oil and gas sectors, to enhance radioactive source physical protection measures. In addition, a number of Ukrainian regulatory instruments await development, revision or amendment. These include: a) regulations for the physical protection of sources of ionising radiation; b) general requirements for the physical protection of sources of ionising radiation. Joint work of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine and the Norwegian regulator NPRA to analyse gaps in the existing regulatory framework on physical protection of radioactive sources is currently underway with the goal of updating certain regulations to the most recent requirements.
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SYSTEM AND SPECIFICS OF ORGANISATION OF COMBAT AND SPECIAL TRAINING OF THE NATIONAL GUARD UNIT RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL
S.Verheles National Guard of Ukraine, military unit 3043
The unit of the National Guard of Ukraine assigned by the applicable law to provide protection and defence of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionising radiation is one of the key actors in the state physical protection system. In the context of the hybrid warfare in the east of Ukraine there is a need to reconsider approaches to the development of a protection and defence system for nuclear facilities. Nuclear facility guard forces are actively working on the creation of new and upgrade of existing security and defence components and on implementation of progressive methods of training, retraining and advanced training of personnel to breed up a qualified cadre of specialists in physical protection, which is one of the main prerequisites of assuring nuclear security and creating reliable physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. An important aspect in addition to service and combat missions is combat and special training, which is a key element of everyday duty of National Guard personnel. The goal of combat training is to organise classes, training sessions, battle assemblies, tactical and field exercises to develop personnel knowledge, capabilities and skills required in the line of duty and to ensure their character education. This presentation will familiarise the audience with the system, form and methods, as well as with specific aspects of organisation of combat and special training of the units involved in protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material.
ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN DETECTION, DETERRENCE AND PREVENTION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM; INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORIST AGENCIES IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THREATS TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL (PERSONNEL TRAINING SYSTEM OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM AT THE STATE BORDER)
V.Yakovyshyn, Yu.Sklianchuk State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Place of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) as an actor of the state physical protection system among other Ukrainian law enforcement agencies. State border as a second line of defence. Countering proliferation of nuclear/radioactive (RN) material and international nuclear smuggling. Personnel and equipment of SBGS allocated to the suppression of RN material proliferation. Information and technical support of state border protection divisions and units. System of training and advance training of State Border Guard Service personnel in non- proliferation of radioactive and nuclear material. Evolution of the personnel training system. Topicality of detection equipment maintenance by SBGS resources.
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Interrelation of learning and technical components in personnel training. Development of personnel training curricula. Personnel in-service training. Concealed inspection as an element of the training process. Importance of officer training to shape key personnel responsible for NP material detection. Further training of graduates of the SBGS National Academy courses. Equipment base for personnel training. Results achieved in personnel training. Analysis of nuclear and radioactive material detections at the border. International cooperation and interaction with educational establishments in the training of personnel on detection of nuclear and radioactive material and suppression of nuclear terrorism and nuclear smuggling. Exchange of experience and adoption of best practices and methods of personnel training.
ROLE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE IN DETECTION, PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE OF OFFENCES RELATED TO RADIOACTIVE AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL
A.Yemets, Ye.Hubarev National Police of Ukraine
1. The National Police of Ukraine as a central executive authority charged to combat offences related to RN material and to provide immediate response in case the rules for their handling are violated. Prevention of RN crimes as a task within the structure of the National Police of Ukraine. 2. Investigative support for the prevention of RN crimes as a function of criminal police. Key activities of the Hazardous Materials Department in the prevention of RN offences. 3. Operating procedure for police units (detachments) in case radioactive or nuclear material is detected or in case intelligence has been received that such material is handled improperly or illegally. 4. Continuous preparedness of the Hazardous Materials Department for RN incidents. 5. Examples of incidents involving radioactive and nuclear material. 6. Cooperation in the countering of RN challenges. 7. Topical problems in the countering of RN challenges. 8. Development prospects in the area of combating the RN challenge.
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SOURCES OF IONISING RADIATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN NUCLEAR MATERIAL PHYSICAL PROTECTION, ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
S.Zhylenko Kirovohrad regional oncology center
1. Information on Ukrainian health care establishments using sources of ionising radiation. 2. List and characteristics of clinical departments using radioactive sources; types of 58
radioactive sources; installations containing radioactive sources. 3. Physical protection system. Its condition and operation at Kirovohrad Oblast Cancer Dispensary. Protection as an activity in the area of use of nuclear power is one of the key elements to physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. - Assessment of threat of illicit activities against system objects; - Identifying and maintaining design basis threat; - Continuity of NF protection; - Support for continuous interaction and coordination of efforts with the National Police, SSU, local administrations and other executive authorities. Enterprise-level physical protection system is an assembly of legal, organisational and technical means designed to create an environment that would prevent unauthorised removal or theft of radioactive waste and sources and that would ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism. Effectiveness of a system of physical protection of radioactive sources and RAW is largely determined by the scope and quality of engineered physical protection measures. Physical protection of radioactive sources in storage and during operation is ensured by special equipment and engineered systems applied in controlled areas. Engineered features of physical protection are an integral component of the system of physical protection of radioactive sources operated at Kirovohrad Oblast Cancer Dispensary. Engineered protection features are applied as part of the facility protection system to enhance reliability of protection and to provide for secure operation and timely notification of appropriate government oversight agencies and response forces in case of an offence or an emergency. In accordance with the Procedure for the Operation of the State System of Physical Protection (Cabinet Decree dated 21 December 2011 No. 1337), licensees are responsible for developing and obtaining approval for facility-level design basis threats and for assuring compliance of such facility-level DBTs with the national DBT. Currently, the national design basis threat is determined and maintained with the involvement of actors of the state physical protection system (SNRIU, SSU, MIA, central executive authorities and licensees), as provided in the Procedure for the Operation of the State System of Physical Protection (Cabinet Decree dated 21 December 2011 No. 1337). At the same time, efforts exerted by the state agencies to assure compliance of facility-level DBTs with the national DBT leave much to be improved. Interaction of SSU and MIA with health care licensees is virtually non-existent. PPS human resource restrictions: no relevant staff positions exist at health care establishments.
TASKS AND AUTHORITIES OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE IN COUNTERING CBRN RISKS AND THREATS AT THE STATE BORDER
A.Zybin State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) is a special law enforcement agency. Pursuant to the national law, SBGS is tasked inter alia to counter terrorism. As actors of the terrorism suppression activity, SBGS Administration and state border protection divisions make should make arrangements for “…prevention, detection and interruption of attempts of terrorists to cross the state border of Ukraine or illegally traffic
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weapons, explosives, toxic or radioactive substances or other objects that may be used for commission of terrorist acts across the state border of Ukraine…” Based on the above tasks, SBGS divisions involve in the following activities: investigative activity for detection of attempted trafficking of unauthorised radioactive material across the state border; arrangements to detect illicitly trafficked radioactive material; search of vehicles crossing the state border for detection of radioactive material; Cabinet Decree dated 21 December 2011 No. 1337 primary survey of detected nuclear/radioactive material (object) and establishment of boundaries of a temporary control area; physical protection of radioactive material recovered from illicit trafficking during illegal crossing of the state border outside legitimate border crossing points pending its further transfer to appropriate authorities. On detection of radioactive material at the state border SBGS personnel shall make arrangements for confirmation, search, location and primary identification of the material. Customs and State Environmental Inspectorate personnel at the appropriate border crossing shall be duly notified. Where the decision is made that attempted transfer of radioactive material or goods containing natural radioactivity is legitimate the appropriate vehicles or cargoes shall be allowed to cross the state border. In the event illicitly trafficked radioactive material has been detected or a violation of the radioactive material shipment procedures and rules has been registered the suspect vehicles or cargoes shall not be permitted to cross the state border, in which case SBGS shall initiate the process of notification of central executive authorities specified in the National Response Plan. These authorities include: local administrations; National Police; Security Service of Ukraine; State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate; State Emergency Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Health; SE Ukrainian State Association RADON; Institute of Nuclear Research, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Analysis of effectiveness and productivity of efforts for detection of radioactive material at the state border in the past 5 years demonstrates a consistent upward trend of the number of instances of state border crossings by radioactive cargoes and persons who underwent radiopharmaceutical treatment (diagnostics). In this year alone, over 8 thousand instances of response to radioactive cargo transfers across the state border – predominantly NORM containing goods (ceramics, construction materials, etc.) – and 1672 border crossings by individuals after [radiological] treatment/diagnostics were registered at border crossing points. In 13 instances transfers across the state border were stopped and 24 radioactive material containing objects and a shipment of sawn lumber containing Caesium-137 (Cs-137) were seized. An example of detection of radioactive material outside an official border crossing: a source of ionising radiation was detected the last week by a border patrol in the village of TYMKOVE (Kodym district, Odessa oblast) in the area of responsibility of Podilsky Border Detachment at the distance of 500 m from the border line. Based on this fact, administration of the Border Detachment initiated activation of the procedure under the Cabinet Decree No. 813 dated 02 June 2003. 60
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