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Calusource Sourcing Webinar Auctions 101 March 2019 What are Auctions and when to use them In an ordinary auction (AKA 'forward auction'), buyers (outside of our procurement team) compete to obtain goods or services by offering increasingly higher prices. In a reverse auction, the suppliers compete to obtain business from the buyer and prices will typically decrease as the suppliers underbid each other. Reverse Auctions Regular Auctions Quick RFx Revenue generation • 3 bids and a buy • Surplus Sales • Licensing Rights Reverse Auctions Benefits Things to Consider • Transparency • PRICE • Real Time Negotiations • VOLUME • True best and final offer • Specifications should be open • Effective Solicitation Process • Supplier management • Minimal Process Costs • Setting up the bid process • Accuracy in pricing • Cost Savings Project Opportunities Assessment Opportunity Factors Questions to Ask • Competition • Is there competition for this • Purchase size spend category? • Specifications • Are the specification's clear and • Specific vs vague concise? • Goal for the souring effort • Is this a political category? • Is price a major deciding factor? • What is the spend on the category? • CalUsource Spend module Reverse Auction Category Opportunities Things to Consider for each Category Facilities and Maintenance • PRICE • Large Dollars • VOLUME • Commodity & Non-Commodity Product Categories • Specifications should be open • Strong Competition • Supplier management Top Categories • Setting up the bid process • MRO • HVAC/Plumbing/Electrical • Janitorial Supplies IT – Information Technology Professional Services • Highly Competitive • Long Term Contracts • Large dollars • Larger Margins build into the contract by supplier • National/Worldwide Players • Needs the right spec Top Categories Top Categories • Desktop/Laptops • Janitorial Services • Networking Equipment • Waste Haul • Software Licensing • Security Guards • A/V Equipment • Print Management Considerations Considerations • Need IT buy in upfront • Needs to be vetted before Reverse Auction When Do we Start Building an Auction In CalUsource? 3.0 Strategy & 4.0 Develop 5.0 CONDUCT 7.0 Implement 1.0 Project Kick-off & 2.0 Category Prelim Evaluation COMPETITIVE 6.0 Negotiate New Work Plan Profile Business Case Criteria BID Agreement 3.1 Develop Sub- 7.1 Develop 1.1 Mobilize Project 2.1 Conduct Internal Category 4.1 Finalize Supplier 5.1 Develop Project 6.1 Finalize Fact- Category Benefit Team Analysis Opportunity Evaluation Criteria Document Based Negotiation Summary Baseline 6.2 Plan and 7.2 Develop 1.2 Conduct Project 22 Conduct Industry 3.2 Develop To-Be 4.2 Develop Scoring 5.2 Distribute Conduct Fact-Based Implementation Kick-off Analysis Process Flow Document Project Document Negotiation Plan 3.3 Develop & 4.3 Conduct 6.3 Develop & 1.3 Finalize Project 5.3 Evaluate & Score 7.3 Deploy Contract 2.3 Build TCO Model Summarize Category Supplier Analysis Recommend Plan Product Document Campus-Wide Strategy (RFI) Sourcing Decision Done INSIDE of Done Outside of CalUsource CalUsource Done Outside of CalUsource Creating a New Auction Creating a New Auction Auction – Event Setup Provide the basic details regarding your Auction. Auction – Event Setup Determine what type of auction you would like to run Auction – Event Setup CRITICAL: Event settings determines how the event will run Auction Setup – Event Settings • Hide supplier name is for internal use. Suppliers automatically can not see other suppliers names • Check if you do not want Internal people to see your auction Supplier Access • Enable Preview: Supplier can see the event before accepting the NDA • Enable Acknowledgement: Allows Suppliers to confirm they want to participate in the auction Determines what type of supplier bids you will allow during the auction Auction Setup – Event Settings No need to click Dictates what the suppliers can and can not see within the Auction Auction Setup – Event Settings Extension Settings: Allows your auction to stay open if suppliers continue to bid • Extension Period: the length in which the auction will stay open • Extension Trigger: The timeframe which a supplier has to bid for the event to stay open longer Example: If a supplier bids in the last minute, the event will stay open an additional minute When enabled by the Author, it provides an option (button) to the supplier, which when clicked, they will be at the number 1 position compared to the other suppliers Auction Setup – Event Settings Determines how you would like to start the bidding process. • Supplier’s lowest quote is the start price • Event Author pre-determines the start price Determines if suppliers can bid the same price. Auction – Event Setup Once the auction ends, this is the time that you are giving yourself to review the supplier responses. Good when you have a large amount of bids and lots of line items Creating an Auction Guideline Creating an Auction Guideline Creating an Auction Bidding Lot Creating an Auction Bidding Lot Anything with an * is a mandatory field for event Author to fill out. If you do not have a “unit start price”, go back to your Event settings and update your “Initial Bid settings” Creating an Auction Bidding Lot Click “Set Date & Time” to determine time and date for auction to open for this particular lot Setting Auction Start Times Set the data and time that your auction will open and close. The lots can be staggered based on your settings, or you can program them all to open at once Event will open based on the settings listed here Adding Team Members Type in your team members name and hit enter Your team member will only have viewer access to the event. They will not be able to modify any of the information listed If for any reason, you will not be able to manage you auction, please contact CalUsupport to switch users. Adding Suppliers Type in your suppliers name and click enter. The system will automatically search for the supplier names that best fit the name provided The supplier name listed will be the primary supplier listed on the account. If you would like to change the name, this will need to be done in the supplier profile. Adding Attachments For any additional documents that you would like to include, the attachments section is great place to add those documents. Publishing your Auction When you are ready to publish your auction, click the down arrow next to “Actions” Publishing your Auction Select “Publish to Supplier” Confirming you wish to publish The system will ask for confirmation, before moving forward. After you select “Yes” CalUsource will check for any errors. If the project is error free, it will prompt you to craft a letter to suppliers. Write your notice to suppliers (make sure not to include identifying information in the email) and click send. Sending Notice to Suppliers – Published Auction Write your notice to suppliers (make sure not to include identifying information in the email) and click send. Help is always available for those who ask… Internal External Part of GEP’s wide range support includes Available Today helping you with your first Auction! • CalUsupport • For GEP Support to help you, please follow [email protected] these recommendations: • CalUSource.net to access this • Complete your strategy and supplier webinar selection in advance • Contact [email protected] and Coming Soon CalUsupport a MINIMUM of two weeks in advance of creating your event in • Quick Reference Guides CalUsource • Additional training videos • Request GEP’s assistance with reviewing your Reverse Auction in CalUsource .
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