Truth Commissions and Their Contributions to Atrocity Prevention

March 2020 This research was made possible thanks to a grant from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development.

Contents

Introduction - 03 What Are Truth Commissions? - 05 Measuring Prevention - 07 Prior Research - 08 Research Methods - 09 Findings - 12 Guiding Principles - 23 Research Team & Special Thanks - 28 List of Truth Commissions - 29 Notes - 31 Works Cited - 33

Introduction

Transitional Justice as a concept and as a set of multi-stage process. Upstream or primary pre- practices emerged most directly out of the fall vention describes the tools stakeholders can of military dictatorships in Latin America in the use before mass killing breaks out in order to 1980s and the collapse of communism in Cen- prevent it from ever happening. Typically, this tral and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and stage of prevention involves the assessment of early 1990s. Broadly speaking, transitional jus- risk in any given society and subsequent tice refers to the full set of measures—both ju- measures to mitigate those risks so that mass ridical and non-juridical—that respond to a peri- atrocity does not occur. Midstream or second- od of systematic human rights abuses.1 As tran- ary prevention describes the political, legal, sitional justice has developed and normalized economic, and military response tools actors over the last several decades, it has increasingly can use in the midst of atrocity to bring it to an been linked by practitioners and policymakers end. Finally, downstream or tertiary prevention not only to confronting and offering redress for describes the steps taken in the aftermath of human rights violations in the past, but also to mass atrocity to respond to past harms and sim- the prevention of future ultaneously make the recur- abuses.2 To date, however, This report seeks to fill this rence of violence less likely.5 this preventive aspect of Given that societies who transitional justice has largely gap by asking an important have experienced a genocide been taken for granted; few question: how and when can in their recent past are statis- have attempted to evaluate if tically much more likely to and exactly how transitional truth commissions contribute experience genocide again,6 justice serves as a preventive to mass atrocity prevention? successful downstream pre- force. vention also involves an hon- est assessment of the risk Traditionally, atrocity prevention has been factors that led to mass violence, many of which viewed through a narrow lens. Rather than the may still exist, followed by actions to mitigate broader field of conflict prevention, which fo- those risks. As such, good downstream preven- cuses on structural causes of violence in an ef- tion is also upstream prevention, illustrating the fort to build peace, many have understood cyclical nature of this broader understanding of atrocity prevention to apply narrowly to the mass atrocity prevention. interventions (military and otherwise) that can be made in the immediate lead-up to or in the The mechanisms of transitional justice fall midst of atrocity to prevent and stop mass kill- squarely within this third stage of downstream ing.3 Increasingly, scholars and practitioners are prevention. They include all the social and polit- challenging this limited view of atrocity preven- ical tools that can be implemented to respond tion, arguing that real prevention requires a to past mass atrocities, that is, genocide, crimes much wider lens and interventions that must against humanity, and war crimes. The term occur long before the physical violence of mass “transitional justice,” however, is something of a atrocity breaks out.4 misnomer, because it implies 1) that these processes occur exclusively in periods of transition The Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of and 2) that they revolve primarily around the Genocide and Mass Atrocities understands real implementation of justice. Initially, transitional mass atrocity prevention to be a long-term, justice did, in fact, describe processes undertak-

3 en by regimes in transition—specifically, regimes moving from authoritarianism to democracy. Today, however, we are seeing the tools of transitional justice being used in other instances, as well, including regimes transitioning to authoritarianism and in regimes expe- riencing no political transition at all. Sec- ondly, while transitional justice does include mechanisms of justice and accountability, such as criminal prosecutions, it also includes an array 1) truth commissions; 2) criminal prosecutions; of other tools that have nothing to do with 3) material and symbolic reparations; and 4) criminal justice at all. Still, the term has become institutional reform.7 so ubiquitous that the name has stuck, even if it does not perfectly describe these processes. The codification of the four rights into four cor- ollary mechanisms has contributed to a sense Over the past four decades, transitional justice that transitional justice is a “checklist” of tasks has transformed from an emerging field to one that must be implemented by a post-atrocity that has become quite normalized within the society, rather than a fruitful opportunity for a international human rights regime. According society to reconsider what it is and how it oper- to international organizations like the United ates through creative ideas and practices. This Nations, transitional justice is built upon four normalization process has also contributed to pillars: 1) the right to truth, or the right of a an understanding that the truth-seeking pro- people to understand what violence occurred, cess is the primary and exclusive goal of truth how it occurred, and where the remains of vic- commissions, just as guaranteeing non- tims lie; 2) the right to justice, or the right of recurrence is the primary purview of institu- victims to see perpetrators face some level of tional reform. To date, little research has accountability; 3) the right to reparations, or sought to examine if and how a popular mecha- the right of victims to receive some form of re- nism of transitional justice, the truth commis- dress for the harms suffered; and 4) guarantees sion, contributes not only to fulfilling the right of non-recurrence, or the right of a people to to truth, but also to guaranteeing that such vio- know that they will not have to suffer such violations do not recur. This report seeks to fill lence again. As the field has normalized, these this gap by asking an important question: how four rights, which could be translated into a and when can truth commissions contribute to whole array of practices and mechanisms based mass atrocity prevention? on the specific political and social realities of any given context, have transformed into four specific mechanisms, each of which corre- sponds with one of the four pillars, respectively:

What Are Truth Commissions?

Before proceeding any further, it is essential to powered by the state under review.8 outline exactly what a truth commission is. Scholars and practitioners have offered an ar- For the purposes of this research, we have also ray of definitions as this mechanism has grown drawn from the definition of Bronkhurst, who since its first implementation in the 1970s. In defines a truth commission as: the first major book-length study of truth commissions, Priscilla Hayner defines them as such: A temporary body, set up by an official authority (president, parliament) to inves- A truth commission (1) is focused on the tigate a pattern of gross human rights vio- past, rather than ongoing, events; (2) in- lations committed over a period of time in vestigates a pattern of events that took the past, with a view to issuing a public place over a period of time; (3) engages report, which includes victims’ data and directly and broadly with the affected recommendations for justice and recon- 9 population, gathering information on ciliation. their experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final re- A few points of these definition warrant em- port; and (5) is officially authorized or em- phasis. First, truth commissions are not perma- nent institutions, but temporary bodies. They usually operate over a period of six months to two years, though there is some flexibility here. Second, the truth commissions examined here have been established by some official authority—either an executive decree, a law, or a peace agreement. Increasingly, we are seeing the emergence of unofficial or informal truth commissions taking place at more local levels or without the support of the government. These initiatives, though important and fascinating, are not the purview of this research. Third, every truth commission has a mandate that gov- erns the scope of its investigation. This mandate usually includes a specific date range for the violations and will often include specifica- tions on which types of human rights violations fall within the purview of the commission. Fi- nally, truth commissions—at least if they are to have any legitimacy and to succeed in their goal of illuminating the truth to the public— must produce some sort of final report detail- ing the findings of the commission. It has now become standard protocol that these reports include recommendations for further reform. Although Bronkhurst writes that these recommendations refer to justice and reconciliation, that is not always the case, nor is it a require- The final report of Argentina’s CONADEP, which became a ment of a truth commission. 5 bestseller when it was published in 1984.

There is some debate over which is the world’s victimized populations to testify and should first truth commission. Technically speaking, consult with relevant civil society stakeholders the mechanism was first implemented in Ugan- throughout their implementation. They need to da in 1974 by the government of Idi Amin to in- remain flexible and able to respond to changing vestigate human rights abuses perpetrated by social and political realities. Finally, truth com- his own regime. Needless to say, this truth commissions need support, both political and finan- mission is not viewed by many as legitimate. Be- cial, in order to do their job well.10 cause of this, many consider the first truth commission to be Argentina’s National Commission As is clear from this short list of commonly ac- on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP, cepted best practices, most, if not all, of these its Spanish acronym). This commission, which guiding principles have focused on strengthen- started almost immediately after the fall of Ar- ing the procedural aspects of truth commis- gentina’s last military dictatorship in 1983, in- sions, rather than increasing their capacity to vestigated the disappearances perpetrated by contribute to atrocity prevention or the non- the military juntas from 1976-83. When the fi- recurrence of violence. In other words, there nal report of CONADEP was released a year has been ample focus on building truth com- later, it became an instant bestseller and irrevo- missions to investigate well and thoroughly the cably shaped all subsequent transitional justice past and to meet the needs of victims in the measures in the country. present, but not nearly enough research exists on how truth commissions can contribute to Since CONADEP and depending on how one the prevention of recurrence in the future. This defines a truth commission, there have been research seeks to refocus attention on if and around 50 truth commissions and/or commis- how truth commissions can be conceived and sions of inquiry globally, and that number con- implemented so that they also have a preven- tinues to grow. As the practice has proliferated, tive impact. so too have a set of internationally recognized best practices relating to truth commissions. For instance, there is now general consensus that truth commissions should be independent entities that operate outside of the control of the executive. Truth commissions should work in complementarity with other transitional justice mechanisms, like trials or reparations, rather than in iso- lation. They should empower Laura Tabac (Dene) testifies at an event for the Canada Truth and Reconciliation Commission about the long-term impact of residential schools on her marriage . Photo by Michael Swan.

Measuring Prevention

Before explaining the specific research method- these risk factors for mass atrocity.11 Although ology used in this project, it is essential to first some inconsistencies exist across these models, answer a larger question: how does one meas- there is widespread consensus on many of the ure preventive capacity? Traditionally, preven- factors that put a society most at risk for geno- tion has been understood as a difficult thing to cide and other mass atrocities. If we recognize measure because, when prevention efforts suc- that no one initiative will in itself be the preven- ceed, nothing happens. This so-called “non- tive panacea, but we know the risk factors that event problem” opens space most commonly contribute to wonder whether the inter- to genocidal violence, we can vention actually succeeded at We can say, however, that measure preventive impact preventing or whether the when truth commissions by evaluating if and how an event was never going to hap- initiative or intervention pen in the first place. contribute to mitigating one contributes to mitigating one or more of the risk factors or more of these commonly There are two problems with accepted risk factors. If an this way of measuring preven- associated with mass initiative has a positive im- tion, however. First, this atrocity violence, they are pact on a risk factor, we can standard of proof makes it think of that initiative as con- impossible to prove that any- playing a preventive role, in tributing to prevention.12 Im- thing contributes to preven- addition to the other work portantly, this methodology tion. Second, it assumes that also highlights a need for one intervention can single- they are doing to rebuild a long-term thinking when it handedly prevent a massive traumatized society. comes to atrocity preven- socio-political process like tion, encouraging practition- genocide. Asking so much of a single interven- ers and policymakers to think of prevention as a tion is foolhardy. Genocide and other mass continual process, rather than a precise and de- atrocities are long-term, complex phenomena. cisive intervention once mass killing has already As such, preventing them requires complex so- begun. lutions—numerous complementary interventions, rather than a single silver bullet. Given This research takes as its hypothesis that truth that mass atrocities are complex problems that commissions are not always or inherently pre- require complex solutions, our means for meas- ventive. Notably, even if they do not contribute uring their prevention should reflect that com- to prevention, this does not necessarily signify plexity. There are much more nuanced ways to that truth commissions do not succeed at ac- assess preventive potential than the binary complishing other important tasks in a post- measure of “did a genocide occur or not.” atrocity context. We can say, however, that when truth commissions contribute to mitigat- Over the last two decades, scholars and practi- ing one or more of the risk factors associated tioners have become increasingly adept at as- with mass atrocity violence, they are playing a sessing which risk factors most put a society at preventive role, in addition to the other work risk to experience genocide or other forms of they are doing to rebuild a traumatized society. mass atrocity. This research has resulted in an array of risk assessment models that outline

Prior Research

This research builds on a handful of other re- Wiebelhaus-Brahm’s quantitative analysis finds search initiatives to measure the impact of that truth commissions have a negative impact truth commissions.13 Two of these studies have on the human rights indicators he measures and been particularly important in shaping efforts no impact on the democracy indicators. to measure the impact of transitional justice Through his qualitative analysis of four specific mechanisms, and therefore warrant some dis- cases (Chile, El Salvador, South Africa, and cussion upfront. The first of these is a study by Uganda), however, he does find evidence that Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. truth commissions have impacted both democ- Reiter that used quantitative data to measure racy and human rights in a positive manner, the impact of various transitional justice mech- even if those effects are not reflected in the anisms (truth commissions, amnesties, repara- quantitative data. tions, lustration, and criminal prosecutions) on democratization and human rights.14 Their find- While the importance of this research cannot ings, as stated in the conclusion of their study, be overstated for those of us studying the im- were as follows: pact of TJ processes, it is necessary to point out a few distinctions between these two projects None of the mechanisms by themselves and the present one. First, both are measuring proved to have a significant effect in changes to human rights and democracy, rather fulfilling both goals [strengthening de- than atrocity prevention. Some of these factors mocracy and reducing human rights vi- overlap with our own measures, as you will see. olations]. Trials and amnesties proved For instance, both Olsen, et al., and Wiebelhaus inconclusive for improving democracy -Brahm use the Polity IV scale and indicators and human rights. Truth commissions, from Freedom House to measure democracy. when used alone, have a significant, These are important measures that we also use negative effect. In other words, those here. They do a great job of providing a big- countries that use only truth commis- picture-assessment of the state of democracy sions are likely to experience a de- in a country, and the nature of a state’s democ- crease in measures of democracy and racy is certainly a component of atrocity risk. In human rights.15 our analysis, as you will see, we have tried to deepen this assessment, however, to include These results are disappointing at first glance. not only these “big picture” indicators. We also Their research did find, however, that truth measure specific aspects of democracy that we commissions, when paired with trials and am- know to be related to mass atrocity risk, includ- nesties, increased democracy and decreased ing the strength of civil society, levels of execu- human rights violations. tive constraint, and rule of law measures. This analysis paints a clearer picture of changes in A second critical study of the impact of truth atrocity risk, which is the goal of this study. commissions was conducted by Eric Wiebel- 16 Both of the above studies also measure human haus-Brahm, who also served as an expert rights violations in the same way—by pulling consultant on the present project. In this study, data from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset and Wiebelhaus-Brahm used both quantitative and the Political Terror Scale, both of which meas- qualitative analysis to measure the impact of ure threats and violations of the physical integ- truth commissions on human rights and democ- rity of individuals in a place. This is certainly an racy. Similar to Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, important aspect of human rights, but we know

8 that there are also other human rights same, as if they are all created equal. As you will measures tied to atrocity risk which these da- see below, in our quantitative analysis, when tasets may not measure. We have tried to re- we measured all truth commissions without spond to this reality by selecting indicators that qualifying them, we found similarly disappoint- represent atrocity risk factors rather than hu- ing results to those produced in these studies. man rights protections more broadly. When we filtered out truth commissions that did not meet a certain standard of “legitimacy,” Second, these studies have not made a distinc- however, the numbers changed significantly. tion between the quality of the truth commis- Adding this qualitative assessment to the quan- sion in each location. Rather, their quantitative titative measure, then, uncovers some new re- assessments measure all truth commissions the sults that are potentially more hopeful. Research Methods

We have taken a mixed-methods approach to first truth commission). For the case to be con- this research, evaluating both quantitative and sider, the violence had to have ended, but no qualitative data to measure if and how truth truth commission had been implemented in its commissions can impact the mitigation of mass aftermath. This is also an important distinction atrocity-related risk factors. A mixed-methods from past studies. Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, for approach enables us to capitalize on the instance, perform their analysis by measuring strengths of both quantitative and qualitative all countries that transitioned from authoritari- methods. For the quantitative research, we be- anism to democracy between 1970 and 2004.17 gan by creating a list of 50 truth commissions, By putting these restrictions on the sample, starting with the 1974 Commission of Inquiry however, this study ignores two contexts out of in Uganda and ending in 2012 (so that we had which truth commissions now emerge: 1) they at least five years of data to measure change can be used by non-democratic regimes (e.g. after the truth commission began). Within this Morocco) and/or 2) they can be initiated in non- set of truth commission cases, we also created a transitional societies (e.g. Canada). Wiebelhaus subset of 34 “legitimate” truth commissions. -Brahm opts for the opposite tack, including We deemed a truth commission legitimate if 1) within his sample all countries for which data the violence to which it referred had fully abat- exist. In this case, however, the sample includes ed when the truth commission began; 2) the countries that might not have a motivation for truth commission’s mandate was complete and implementing a truth commission at all. We not a form of “victor’s justice”; and 3) a final re- have opted to solve this dilemma by taking a port was produced and made public. These cri- middle route; we have selected as negative cas- teria are based on best practices of truth comes only those countries that have experienced missions, as the have been articulated by prac- internal political or ethnic violence, and there- titioners and scholars. For a list of truth com- fore have a potential motivation for implement- missions, see Appendix 1. ing a truth commission, but have chosen not to do so, regardless of their democratic status. Next, we compiled a list of 54 negative cases to serve as a control group. This list was drawn Having clearly delineated what are essentially from the Major Episodes of Political Violence our experimental and control groups, we pulled Dataset and included any country that had ex- an array of known risk indicators for mass perienced at least one year of internal political atrocity violence from three well-respected risk or ethnic violence after 1974 (the year of the assessment models: 1) the UN’s Framework of

Analysis for Atrocity Crimes; 2) James Waller’s “Categories of Risk Factors for Violent or Genocidal Which Risk Factors Might Conflict” from Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Respon- sibility to Prevent Genocide”; and 3) the Atrocity Fore- Truth Commissions Impact? casting Project (AFP) model out of Australia National University. We culled through these models to iden- Governance Risk Factors tify all risk factors that could potentially be impacted 1. Regime Type by the presence of a truth commission and found fif- 2. State Legitimacy Deficit teen risk factors that fall into three broader categories: governance, economic conditions, and social 3. Weakness of State Structures fragmentation. 4. Identity-Based Polar Factionalism 5. Systematic State-Led Discrimination Next, in order to perform statistical analyses of how 6. Lack of Executive Constraints these risk factors have changed, we translated these fifteen risk factors into specific data indicators. 7. Lack of Security Sector Constraints Drawing from several datasets, we found data indi- 8. Lack of Rule of Law cators that closely aligned with the risk factors and used that data as a measure of each risk factor. Be- Economic Risk Factors cause many of the risk factors are quite broad, they 1. Low Levels of Economic Development required that we examine multiple data indicators. For instance, regime type is a consistent predictor of 2. Economic Discrimination atrocity risk, with democratic regimes at the least 3. Trade Openness risk, followed by authoritarian regimes, followed even still by anocratic regimes, which have some Social Risk Factors characteristics of both.18 To measure regime type, 1. Identity-Based Social Divisions then, we compiled data from 12 different indicators to evaluate democratic institutions and behavior, 2. Unequal Access to Basic Goods and giving us a fuller picture of the democratic qualities Services of each country. Collectively, for these 15 risk fac- 3. Gender Inequalities tors, we evaluated 26 risk indicators. These data 4. Restrained Civil Society were drawn primarily from four different datasets: The Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV Project, Freedom House, the World Bank, and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset. We began by measuring differences in overall risk for atrocity, according to the Atrocity We gathered data on these 26 risk indicators for all Forecasting Project’s score, by using a 104 cases (50 truth commission cases and 54 nega- “hybrid” model, which is otherwise known as tive cases). For the truth commission cases, we com- “mixed” model or “between-within” model. piled data on the year when the truth commission This model essentially predicts two kinds of began, then subsequent data for 5, 10, 15, and 20 effects: “within” effects and “between” ef- years after in order to track both short– and long- fects. Within effects refer to effects within term impacts of the truth commissions. For the nega- the same entity—put simply, variable X caus- tive cases, we compiled data for the year in which es a change in variable Y within an entity. Be- the violence ended (given that most truth commis- tween effects refer to effects between enti- sions begin 0-2 years after the end of violence), then ties—in this case, compared to a case without subsequent data for 5, 10, 15, and 20 years after. variable X, cases with variable X have some Obviously, more recent cases may not have had data difference in outcome Y. We then performed for the full 20 years; in these cases, we measured as bivariate analysis of each of the 26 risk indi- far out as possible. cators, comparing changes over time in the truth commission cases, the “legitimate” truth

Truth Commission Qualitative Case Studies

Argentina Canada Guatemala Morocco Sierra Leone South Africa Timor-Leste

commission cases, and the negative cases, in diversity of geographic, formal, and contextual order to see if and when there is a statistically realities when it comes to truth commissions. significant difference in change between these For each country, an expert on the truth com- sets of cases. We likewise ran multivariate mission completed an in-depth questionnaire models that allow us to see the impact of a vari- that asked if and how the truth commission able net of other variables in the model. contributed to mitigating various specific risk In addition to this quantitative analysis, this re- factors. The result was 239 pages of text from search also included a hefty qualitative compo- case experts on how these eight truth commissions impacted (or not) mass atrocity risks in nent. We selected eight specific truth commissions from seven different countries to examine their specific contexts. This qualitative data in greater depth: Argentina’s National Commis- served both as means to support and explain sion on the Disappearance of Persons quantitative results and to uncover other po- (CONADEP); Canada’s National Truth and Rec- tential ways that truth commissions can reduce onciliation Commission (TRC); Canada’s Na- risk that may not show up in the statistical indi- tional Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indig- cators. enous Women and Girls (MMIWG); Guate- Finally, both the quantitative and qualitative mala’s Commission for Historical Clarification data were brought before a group of interna- (CEH); Morocco’s Equity and Reconciliation tionally recognized experts on truth commis- Commission (IER); Sierra Leone’s Truth and sions over a two-day experts’ meeting in New Reconciliation Commission (TRC); South Afri- York City in December 2019. These experts ca’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission represented both truth commissioner research- (TRC); and Timor-Leste’s Commission for Re- ers and implementers. The input from these ex- ception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR). pert scholars and practitioners added yet an- These eight cases were chosen to represent a other analytical lens to this research.

Findings

Overall Risk Change in Overall Risk We began by measuring differences between positive and negative cases of truth commissions in the Atrocity Atrocity Forecasting Project Forecasting Project model. This is a model that measures overall risk that a genocide or politicide will occur within Coef. SE a country within a five-year period. To date, it is one of Between Effects the most accurate early warning predictors developed. Had TC -0.62* 0.31 Measuring risk in 142 countries globally, it correctly Year 5 -0.75 2.01 forecasts genocide onset in 90.9% of cases and correctly Year 10 1.45 1.62 forecasts which countries will not experience a genocide within five years in 79.2% of cases. Year 15 0.27 1.78 Year 20 1.15 1.61 Applying the statistical analysis described above to the Within Effects AFP model, we found that all cases—both negative and Year 5 -0.79** 0.23 positive—saw an overall reduction of risk, which makes a - great deal of sense, given that one assumes risk will go Year 10 1.06*** 0.24 down when a mass atrocity comes to an end. Cases that - implemented a truth commission, however, saw a 46.1% Year 15 1.20*** 0.26 greater reduction in overall risk, on average over time, - Year 20 1.27*** 0.30 compared with those cases that did not implement a - truth commission. Constant 5.35*** 1.03 38.84** It is important to reiterate here that correlation does not Chi2 * necessarily equate to causation. That is, even though we Variance Within 1.36 are seeing this high degree of correlation between truth Variance Between 2.02 commissions and the reduction of risk, we cannot defini- tively attribute that reduction to the truth commission. In ICC 0.4 post-atrocity societies, there are often many complex factors impacting atrocity risk, with truth commissions N=335, p<.05*; p<.01**; only being one of them. These num- p<.001*** bers may tell us, then, that, rather than causing the risk reduction, societies with a greater reduction of risk are more likely to implement truth commissions. Likewise, it could illustrate that countries with a greater impulse to prevent are more likely to implement truth commissions. More likely, the answer lies somewhere in the middle. Nevertheless, the correlation is noteworthy.

Risk Factors Related to correspond with those of earlier studies.19 When the analysis was narrowed to compare Governance the subset of legitimate truth commission cases with negative cases, however, ten of the twelve Now that we have measured overall risk, we indicators saw a statistically significant change. will turn to differences between truth commission cases and non-truth commission cases on The one indicator that was statistically signifi- the full array of risk indicators, beginning with cant at all levels was the Polity Scale, which risk factors relating to governance. measures the democratic and authoritarian components of a country on a scale of -10 (fully Regime Type authoritarian) to +10 (fully democratic). Cases with truth commissions saw, on average, a 2.93 Analyses of societies that experience genocide demonstrate conclusively that authoritarian states are more likely to perpetrate atrocities than democratic states. Furthermore, "anocracies," or states that fall somewhere between authoritarian and democratic—or that may be transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy, or vice versa—are also more likely than democracies to experience mass atrocity. Measuring the quality of a state’s democracy is a complex challenge. Other studies that have evaluated the impact of transitional justice mechanisms on democracy have relied predom- inantly on the Polity IV scale and indicators from Freedom House on civil liberties and political rights, and we have followed suit. Addition- ally, we have introduced a series of other indicators to represent a more complete picture of how democratic institutions and behaviors change over time. These include a third indicator from Freedom House measuring countries’ rule of law and eight indicators from the Varie- ties of Democracy (V-Dem) Index that evaluate more specific components of a democratic society.

Of the twelve indicators we analyzed relating to democratic regime type, we found one to be positively statistically significant when comparing all truth commission cases with negative cases. That is, in one of the twelve indicators, the cases with truth commissions saw a statistically significant increase in democratic institutions and behavior and decrease in risk relating to regime type compared to cases without truth commissions. These lackluster results largely

-point higher increase on the Polity Scale than cases that did not implement a truth commission. When the truth commission cases were narrowed to include only the subset of legitimate cases, that average increased to 5.22 points, a highly statistically significant difference.

The nine other indicators of a democratic regime that demonstrate a statistically significant difference when the negative cases are compared with the legitimate truth commission cases include: the Civil Liberties Score (Freedom House); the Political Rights Score (Freedom House); the Rule of Law Score (Freedom House); the Egalitarian Democracy Index (V- Dem); the Freedom of Association Index (V- Dem); the Equality Before the Law Index (V- Dem); the Civil Liberties Index (V-Dem); the Physical Violence Index (V-Dem); and the Ac- cess to Justice Index (V-Dem). For more information on what these indicators measure and the degree of difference, please see the red sidebar on pages 16 and 17.

Within the qualitative data, we find several instances where truth commissions have impacted democratic institutions in the selected cases. For instance, in Argentina, CONADEP suggest- ed in its final recommendations that a Subsec- retariat of Human Rights be formed. That recommendation was followed, and this subsecre- tariat was formed in 1984. In 2002, this subsec- retariat was elevated to the level of Secretariat of Human Rights. CONADEP also recommend- ed that Argentina ratify or accede to all international human rights treaties, and this recommendation was implemented in the constitutional reform of 1994, within which all such

Truth Commissions and Governance

TC vs. No TC Legit TC vs. TC Legit TC vs. No TC

Civil Liberties (1-7); reverse coded N/S 1.03* 1.61***

Politial Rights (1-7); reverse coded N/S 1.89*** 1.17*

Rule of Law (1-16) N/S 3.39** 3.46**

Revised Polity Score (-10-10) 2.93* N/S 5.22***

Varieties of Democracy | Regime Type Risk Indicator Comparisons

Coefficient- TC vs. no TC Coefficient - Legit TC vs. no TC Coefficient - Legit TC vs. TC Egalitarian Democracy N/S .17** .14** Freedom of Association N/S .22*** N/S Equality before the Law N/S .22*** .14* Civil Liberties N/S .22*** .14** Physical Violence N/S .21*** .17* Access to Justice N/S .16** .14*

15 treaties became domestic law in Argentina.20 Explanation of Indicators

The qualitative data also demonstrates how Polity Scale (Polity IV): Measures the autocrat- truth commissions have contributed to an in- ic and democratic characteristics of a state on a crease in rule of law in the selected cases. In Ar- scale of -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly gentina, the truth commission’s findings were democratic) integral in bringing perpetrators of human rights violations to justice when trials were reo- Civil Liberties (Freedom House): Measures pened in 2005. This example supports other freedom of expression and belief, associational scholarship on the long-term impact of truth and organizational rights, rule of law, and per- commissions, which may continue to shape so- sonal autonomy without interference from the cieties and institutions even decades after their state on a scale of 1 (least free) to 7 (most free) enactment.21 In Canada, the TRC has led to reforms in the judicial sector, including the imple- Political Rights (Freedom House): Measures mentation of new guidelines that provide for the right to participate freely in political pro- Indigenous rights in judicial proceedings. For cesses, including voting, running for office, and example, according to the questionnaire com- joining political parties, on a scale of 1 (least missioned for this project, “judges must consid- free) to 7 (most free) er options other than imprisonment for all offenders, ‘with particular attention to the cir- Rule of Law (Freedom House): Measures the cumstances of Aboriginal offenders.’”22 In Gua- independence of the judiciary; the extent to temala, according to the questionnaire, “the which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal CEH findings formed the basis for many claims matters; the existence of direct civil control filed in the Inter-American Court, the interna- over the police; and other factors relating to tional genocide case against Guatemalan gener- rule of law on a scale of 0 (worst) to 16 (best) als in the Spanish National Court, civil and im- migration cases against Guatemalan human Participatory Democracy (V-Dem): Measures rights violators in US courts, and genocide and the active participation by citizens in all politi- human rights cases slowly lurching through the cal processes, electoral and non-electoral Guatemalan court.”23 Sierra Leone has also seen judicial reforms based on the recommen- Egalitarian Democracy (V-Dem): Measures the extent to which rights and freedoms of individ- dations of its truth commission, including a con- certed effort to decentralize the courts, moving uals are protected equally across social groups, most judicial hearings to the provincial, rather resources are distributed equally across all so- than federal, level, thus increasing access to jus- cial groups, and groups and individuals enjoy tice.24 equal access to power Freedom of Association (V-Dem): Measures State Legitimacy Deficit the extent to which parties, including opposi- Through quantitative analysis, we also assessed tion parties, are allowed to form and to partici- changes in indicators measuring four other risk pate in elections, and the extent to which civil factors related to governance. First, a state le- society organizations are able to form and to gitimacy deficit refers to the lack in trust from a operate freely citizenry that its state can govern fairly and Equality Before the Law (V-Dem): Measures to with equity. When state leaders do not respect what extent laws are transparent and rigorous- the law or the constitution, when high levels of ly enforced and public administration impartial, corruption exist, or when leaders re-write the and to what extent citizens enjoy access to jus- constitution to extend presidential terms, this 25 tice, secure property rights, freedom from state legitimacy deficit can grow. There are no forced labor, freedom of movement, physical known indicators to measure this risk factor integrity rights, and freedom of religion 16

Explanation of Indicators

Judicial Constraints on the Executive (V- Dem): Measures to what extent the executive respects the constitution and complies with court rulings, and to what extent the judiciary is able to act in an independent fashion

Legislative Constraints on the Executive (V- Dem): Measures to what extent the legislature and government agencies capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive

Civil Liberties (V-Dem): Measures an absence of physical violence committed by government agents and an absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government specifically, but we assessed truth commission Physical Violence (V-Dem): Measures freedom impact on state legitimacy by measuring three from political killings and torture from the gov- indicators from the Varieties of Democracy In- ernment dex: Civil Society Participation, Participatory Democracy, and Civil Society Organization Access to Justice (V-Dem): Measures the ex- Consultation. We have selected the first two tent to which citizens enjoy secure and effec- indicators because people are generally more tive access to justice likely to participate in systems that they deem Civil Society Participation (V-Dem): Measures to be legitimate. If they do not believe that their if major CSOs are routinely consulted by poli- vote or participation will make a difference, it stands to reason that they are less likely to par- cymakers; level of involvement by people in CSOs; if women are prevented from participat- ticipate. Furthermore, states can gain legitima- ing; and how legislative candidates are selected cy by consulting with civil society, rather than taking a top-down approach in implementing all Participatory Democracy (V-Dem): Measures policy and programs. active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral Our analysis found an increase in civil society participation to be statistically significant in all Women Political Empowerment (V-Dem): cases. When comparing negative cases to only Measures three components: the fundamental legitimate cases of truth commissions, that dif- civil liberties of women; women's open discus- ference became highly statistically significant. sion of political issues and participation in Additionally, participatory democracy, which CSOs; and representation of women in formal was not statistically significant in the first mod- political positions el, becomes highly statistically significant when measuring only legitimate TCs. CSO consulta- Women Civil Liberties (V-Dem): Measures tion, on the other hand, did not demonstrate a women's ability to make meaningful decisions statistically significant difference in either case. in key areas, including freedom of domestic movement, right to private property, freedom Several examples from the qualitative research from forced labor, and access to justice demonstrate how truth commissions may be contributing to this reduction in state legitima-

cy deficit. For example, according to a 2008 Métis children, youth and families, which, if survey in Sierra Leone to assess impact of the properly implemented, will reduce the number truth commission, around 74% of respondents of Native children under state care.31 Addition- reported that they were aware of security sec- ally, the Follow-Up Committee of the IER in tor reforms made in the aftermath of the truth Morocco “launched an ambitious program of commission. Of those, 71% reported that they communal reparations with the aim of estab- now trusted the police to protect people’s lishing socio-economic development projects in rights, demonstrating a marked increase in the identified regions that would benefit mainly state legitimacy.26 According to the question- women and the youth.” 32 These projects were naire on Timor-Leste’s truth commission, the specifically selected for their ability to inte- CAVR contributed directly “to building truth in grate women and children into political life and the new model of governance being built in Ti- to provide economic activity in areas that had mor-Leste,” which it did both by exemplifying been underserved by the state. the destructive nature of the former colonial state and using that to support the project of Identity-Based Polar Factionalism building a new democratic state in its aftermath.27 Identity-based polar factionalism is another risk factor for atrocity violence. This risk factor Systematic State-Led Discrimination refers to governments within which the reins of power are controlled primarily or solely by one Risk assessment models also point to practices identity group, while other identity groups are of systematic state-led discrimination, where- excluded from the halls of political power.33 We by the state actively discriminates against spe- assessed this factor by measuring the Power cific identity groups through either repressive Distribution by Group indicator in the Varieties measures or through disparate application of of Democracy Index, but found no statistically policies, as a risk factor for atrocities.28 We as- significant difference between positive and sessed state-led discrimination by analyzing negative truth commission cases. The qualita- changes in the Equal Protection Index (V-Dem), tive research neither provided examples of which measures how successfully a state truth commissions contributing to reduction in “grants and protects rights and freedoms even- this particular risk factor. ly across social groups.”29 We did not find a statistically significant difference between nega- Lack of Executive Constraints tive and positive cases regarding this risk factor. Our qualitative analysis, however, revealed Finally, the lack of constraints on the executive some areas in which truth commissions have appear in several risk assessment models as an impacted state-led discrimination. For instance, important indicator of risk for political vio- 34 in South Africa Apartheid excluded the vast lence. These constraints come in two forms: majority from political representation. The legislative constraints, or the extent to which overwhelming number of TRC victims were the legislature and other government agencies from the excluded majority, so in this sense the are “capable of questioning, investigating, and 35 TRC reached out precisely to those excluded exercising oversight over the executive,” and from the boundaries of citizenship prior to judicial constraints, or the extent to which the 1994.30 Elsewhere, the Canadian TRC led to executive “[respects] the constitution and the passage of several laws to respond to dis- [complies] with court rulings,” along with the 36 crimination of Indigenous populations through independence of the judiciary. We measured the child welfare system, including Bill C-92, these constraints with the corresponding indi- which affirmed the right of Indigenous peoples cators in the Varieties of Democracy Index and to exercise justice in child and family services, found both to be statistically significant, but and the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit, and only when comparing negative cases with legit-

imate truth commission cases. have led to the Canadian government investing over $3 billion thus far in reforming the Indige- Qualitative evidence also supports this finding. nous child welfare system. Although it is too In Morocco, for instance, the constitutional early to measure the impact of this level of in- changes that occurred after the IER decreased vestment, it is fairly certain that such invest- the power of the country’s monarch and in- ment would not have occurred without the 37 creased the powers of its prime minister. The TRC.40 In Guatemala, our expert reports, de- qualitative data also asserts that truth commis- spite a general lack of implementation of the sions have contributed to greater constraints CEH’s final recommendations, “the CEH report on the security sector, which is related to exec- has contributed to a decrease in state- utive constraints. For example, CONADEP in sanctioned commission of human rights viola- Argentina led to the passage of legislation that tions and increased support in some domestic prohibited the armed forces from getting in- judicial sectors for prosecution of past and con- 38 volved in issues of internal/domestic security. temporary human rights violations.”41 In Mo- In Sierra Leone, the truth commission contrib- rocco, the IER led to the formation of a National uted to wholesale reform of the military and po- Human Rights Council (CCDH), whose powers lice, which were retrained to protect the rule of and mandate have continually increased in post law and avoid interfering in politics. The success -IER Morocco.42 Finally, in Sierra Leone, our ex- of this reform was made evident when a group pert reports, the TRC has directly contributed of rank-and-file soldiers attempted a coup d’é- to a general refusal by the citizenry to accept tat in 2005, only to be stopped by the leaders of corruption as “normal”—a fact that is evidence the armed forces themselves before any vio- by the recent creation of a new Commission of 39 lence erupted. Inquiry into government corruption in early 2019.43 A few other examples from the qualitative research demonstrate some further impact that truth commissions have had on mitigating risk relating to governance in the selected cases. In Canada, the final recommendations of the TRC

Risk Factors Related to -based social divisions. When these divisions among identity groups lead to large-scale and Economic Conditions systematic segregation of groups, where members of groups fail to interact and engage with Various risk assessment models include eco- members of other groups, the risk for mass nomic indicators as potential risks for mass atrocity increases. This risk continues to climb atrocity, even though, as Waller states, “the when these social divisions also lead to unequal quantitative support for economic risk factors access to wealth, resources, and political pow- is not as robust as that for many of the other er.46 We measured this risk factor by evaluating 44 risk factors.” We chose several of these risk V-Dem’s index for Social Group Equality in Re- factors to evaluate. We measured low levels of spect for Civil Liberties, which evaluates if dif- economic development by analyzing changes in ferent social groups enjoy the same civil liber- three indicators from the World Bank: GDP per ties, despite differences relating to language, capita, GNI per capita, and Foreign Direct In- ethnicity, race, religion, region, or caste. Our vestment as a % of GDP. One of the first risk quantitative analysis showed no statistically assessment models designed by Barbara Harff significant difference between negative and assessed trade openness to be one of six im- positive cases over time. portant risk factors.45 We measured this by analyzing changes in Trade as % of GDP (World Qualitative analysis, however, does reveal some Bank). Finally, we assessed changes to levels of direct ways that truth commissions have ad- economic discrimination by analyzing the Equal dressed risk factors relating to identity-based Distribution of Resources Index from V-Dem. social divisions in specific cases. For instance, according to our questionnaire on the Canadian In our quantitative analysis, none of these risk TRC, the very fact that this TRC centered on factors presented a statistically significant dif- principles of inclusion of Indigenous popula- ference among negative and positive cases. tions in itself responded to the historical vio- Similarly, the experts who filled out our ques- lence that necessitated the commission.47 Our tionnaires on the eight selected cases struggled Timor-Leste expert discussed how the CAVR to provide any examples of how each truth played a crucial role in instilling a new “culture commission has contributed to reducing eco- of inclusion,” which has been reinforced by a nomic risk factors. As such, according to this refocus on human rights and a multi-party democ- search, at least, it seems as though mitigating racy. Specifically, the CAVR instituted a Com- risks relating to economic conditions is a job munity Reconciliation Procedure for low-level best suited for other mechanisms of transitional perpetrators. If these perpetrators confessed to justice—perhaps reparations and institutional their crimes, expressed remorse, and fulfilled a reforms—rather than truth commissions. sanction (e.g. a public apology or community service), he or she would be re-welcomed into Risk Factors Relating to Social the community in a public celebration that 48 Fragmentation helped to heal these social divides. Unequal Access to Basic Goods and Finally, we measured changes over time in four risk factors relating to social fragmentation: 1) Services identity-based social divisions; 2) unequal ac- Like the risk factor of economic discrimination cess to basic goods and services; 3) gender ine- in the section above, this risk factor relates to qualities; and 4) a restrained civil society. specific identity groups having disparate access Identity-Based Social Divisions to the resources or services that make life liva- ble. As was the case in the analysis above, we Every society experiences some level of identity did not find there to be a statistically significant

20 difference between negative and positive cases countries that implemented a truth commission when it comes to this risk factor. and those that did not, though this difference is not as stark as we have seen in some of the oth- Nevertheless, our qualitative research did un- er indicators. Furthermore, the Women Civil cover some instances of truth commissions miti- Liberties Index is only statistically significant gating this risk factor. For instance, many of the between negative cases and legitimate cases of communal reparations projects that the follow- truth commissions. up committee for Morocco’s IER sought to address unequal access to resources by funding Some qualitative data supports this finding. For socio-economic development projects in re- instance, community reparations projects in gions that had been underserved in the past.49 Morocco were also directed toward increasing In Canada, the billions of new funding granted women’s involvement in the political sphere.52 to reforming Indigenous peoples’ access to Additionally, in Sierra Leone, according to the health care and education are also examples of 2008 survey, more than 70% of respondents an attempt to mitigate this risk factor.50 believed that the overall situation for women and children had improved in Sierra Leone since Gender Inequalities before the truth commission.53 Further research is definitely warranted into how truth commis- Statistical analysis shows that societies that sions can both increase the involvement of treat women unequally and do not provide them women in their implementation and improve with equal access to political power and influ- the lives of women more broadly through that ence are at greater risk for atrocities than those process. with higher levels of gender equity.51 We measured gender equality by drawing from two indi- Restrained Civil Society cators from V-Dem: the Women Political Em- powerment Index and the Women Civil Liber- Countries with a closed public sphere and a si- ties Index. In both cases, we found there to be a lenced civil society face greater risk for mass statistically significant difference between atrocity violence because an active civil society

21 serves as a mitigating factor for such violence.54 ties that do not on a number of indicators. This We measured two key indicators of civil society conclusion does warrant several important ca- involvement in negative and positive cases, one veats. which measured civil society consultation and one which measured civil society repression First, it is unlikely that truth commissions alone (both from V-Dem). In neither case was there a are responsible for all the risk reduction we statistically significant difference between neg- have found. Periods of transition in the after- ative and positive cases. math of mass atrocity are particularly politically and socially complex times full of risk and op- That said, our qualitative analysis uncovered portunity. It is improbable that any one mecha- some important ways that truth commissions nism for dealing with past abuses can single- have contributed to a more robust civil society. handedly mitigate all the risk that led to mass In Argentina, CONADEP served as a major le- atrocities. Furthermore, asking so much of any gitimizing force for human rights organizations, one mechanism is certain to lead to disappoint- which are still very much a voice in Argentinian ment. Instead, it seems clear that success is politics today.55 In Canada, even if the TRC it- most evident when multiple mechanisms work self was not supporting civil society initiatives, in a complementary fashion to address all these many have emerged in response to its call. Our risks. For instance, the quantitative research expert writes that many new civil society initia- here demonstrates that societies with truth tives have emerged in direct response to the commissions do not see a statistically signifi- TRC’s Calls for Action. One particularly notable cant change in risk factors relating to economic one, Circles for Reconciliation, aims “to estab- conditions. When such risk factors are present, lish trusting, meaningful relationships between it must likely become the purview of other Indigenous and Non-Indigenous peoples as part mechanisms—perhaps reparations and institu- of the 94 Calls to Action from the Truth and tional reform—to address these risks. Reconciliation Commission.”56 In Guatemala, according to our expert, “Civil society was Second, as we hope to show through the quali- strengthened, and Guatemalan citizens tative data, truth commissions may have a sig- achieved greater political space as a result of nificant impact on some risk factors, even if the the CEH and other post-conflict efforts.”57 And numbers do not show this impact. For instance, in Morocco, which remains an authoritarian in Canada we see a vast array of policy and pro- monarchy, our expert reports that the IER grams being implemented in response to the “pushed the limits of acceptable discourse for final recommendations of the TRC. To date, Moroccan civil society,” opening new space for however, these changes are not so evident in public dissent that had not previously existed.58 the quantitative data. The lack of movement in the numbers, however, may have more to do Discussion with the fact that we only have access to nationwide numbers that do not reflect change at Based on this research, truth commissions do more local levels. Indigenous peoples represent open up possibilities for the reduction of mass less than 5% of Canada’s population. As such, atrocity risk. Whether the truth commissions even if these communities do experience posi- themselves are causing risk reduction or if the tive changes, national numbers may not reflect implementation of a truth commission is indica- those changes so well. tive of a society that is taking the right steps to Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the re- reduce risk generally speaking, it is evident sults here measure how risks have been re- that, on average, societies that implement a duced in societies that have implemented truth truth commission, especially legitimate truth commissions, and it clearly finds that societies commissions, see higher levels of positive risk with truth commissions, on average, see an in- reduction over time compared to those socie- creased reduction of certain risk factors com-

22 pared to those without truth commissions. Such If truth commissions could be contributing so is the reality even though, to date, truth com- significantly to risk reduction even when they missions have not explicitly been set up with have not been explicitly constructed to do so, risk reduction in mind. As we mentioned at the the question becomes: how much more could beginning of this report, best practices relating they reduce risk if an atrocity prevention lens to truth commissions to date have focused were actively incorporated into the founding largely on the procedural aspects of the com- and implementation of truth commissions? missions, rather than their preventive capacity. Guiding Principles

In the same vein as truth commissions, which role in identifying the risk factors that are still offer final recommendations as a result of their present in a post-atrocity society, opening a investigations, we end this report with our own pathway for thinking actively about how these set of recommendations. These guiding princi- risks can be reduced. ples are suggestions for how truth commissions can be shaped with an atrocity prevention lens, Broad mandates can provide more freedom to in the hopes of increasing their preventive im- commissioners, but this requires commission- pact beyond where it already may be. Ultimate- ers who are willing to think big. ly, based on this qualitative and quantitative research, we see five points of intervention— Every truth commission has a mandate it is es- five key stages of every truth commission—in tablished to investigate. This mandate outlines which a preventive lens could shape how a the types of crimes and the period of time to be truth commission is formed and operates. evaluated by the commission. Increasingly, the These points include the truth commission’s mandates of truth commissions are broadening, mandate, structure, implementation, recom- as they ask commissioners not only to investi- mendations, and follow-up. We will take each of gate the crimes themselves, but the histories of these in turn. abuse that led to these crimes. Although there is some potential that these broad mandates can lead to higher levels of disappointment Mandate when truth commissions do not meet expecta- tions, we assert that broader mandates also Risk assessment should be incorporated with- provide more political space in which commis- in the truth commission’s mandate. sioners can maneuver, leading to more creative Every truth commission is established with a choices and potentially more productive out- specific mandate that outlines the scope of its comes. For instance, the broad mandate of the investigation. Typically, this mandate addresses Guatemalan commission allowed commission- a set period of human rights abuses in the past. ers to outline how histories of colonialism con- Increasingly, truth commissions are also evalu- tributed to the lead-up to genocide. Likewise, ating the structural risk factors that led to the the broad mandate of the National Inquiry on perpetration of this violence. By asking com- Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and missioners not only to evaluate these structural Girls in Canada allowed commissioners both to risk factors from the past, but also which risk describe the crimes as an ongoing atrocity and outline the structural risk factors that contrib- factors continue to exist, the truth commission 59 could take on a more future-oriented valence. ute to these ongoing crimes. Of course, these Truth commissions can therefore play a key broad mandates require creative and conscien-

23 tious commissioners to take advantage of their their structural capacities should help over- broadness. Less proactive commissioners can come any challenges these realities may pre- be intimidated by a non-explicit mandate, and sent. A good example of this comes from the as a result they may set stricter boundaries two commissions of Canada. The National than necessary on the scope of a commission’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission faced a investigation.60 number of problems obtaining the documents and materials it needed. Because it was estab- Just because certain issues have been dealt lished at the national level, they encountered with through other mechanisms does not particular challenges obtaining certain materi- mean the truth commission should not also als at the provincial level. Moreover, because it confront these issues. was established as a result of a court ruling rather than on the initiative of the state, commis- Oftentimes, the notion of complementarity is sioners also faced legal battles over obtaining interpreted to mean that the goals of each tran- evidence from the national government, which sitional justice mechanism should not overlap often attempted to railroad commissioners.62 with others’ goals. This interpretation, howev- When the National Inquiry on Missing and Mur- er, ignores the reinforcing role that truth com- dered Indigenous Women and Girls was estab- missions and other mechanisms can play. Even lished several years later, these challenges if certain aspects of human rights abuses are faced by the previous commission were taken being addressed explicitly by other transitional into account in the way this new commission justice mechanisms, the truth commission can was established. Rather than one nationwide still support and reinforce those efforts. For ex- commission, from a legal perspective, the Na- ample, in Timor-Leste, security sector reform tional Inquiry was established as one national was not a result of the truth commission; it was commission and thirteen provincial and territo- an aspect of the peace process and was already rial commissions, all operating in parallel. This occurring in parallel to the CAVR. Nevertheless, legal structure allowed for greater ease in ob- the truth commission ultimately included secu- taining and, when necessary, subpoenaing doc- rity sector reform within its final recommenda- uments.63 tions…even though those reforms were already underway. The fact that the commissioners in- The mainstreaming of traditionally excluded cluded this within their mandate, however, groups needs to happen from the very begin- served to reinforce and legitimate the ongoing ning, not as an afterthought. reform processes. Moreover, it has more re- cently opened the door for further human If one of the central goals of a truth commission rights training of police and military forces by is to respond to the abuses faced by a group the Centro Nacional Chega!, which has cited that has been historically excluded in some way the truth commission recommendations to give from political life, efforts must be made from legitimacy to these new reform efforts.61 the very beginning to include those groups within the structure and mandate of the truth Structure commission. Obviously, this means that traditionally excluded groups must be consulted on The truth commission’s structure should re- their needs in the process of setting up the flect the risks and challenges that it is likely to commission. They should be represented within face. the commissioners and staff of the truth commission throughout its operation. Efforts must Every truth commission is operating within a be made to ensure the participation of excluded political environment that will shape its capaci- groups in offering testimony and evidence to ty and its success. When they are established, the truth commission. Finally, this process of these realities must be actively considered, and consultation should not be a one-time effort

24 that is then abandoned. Rather, there should be Increasingly, truth commissions are incorporat- a continual engagement with all stakeholders, ing a gender lens into their operating structure, especially traditionally excluded ones, through- and a new focus has been given to the gendered out the process of implementation. aspect of violence faced by women in periods of atrocity. This development should continue. Im- Implementation portantly, however, women are not only victims of sexual violence and should not be viewed ex- Working groups and/or special sessions and clusively through this lens. Women are also sta- hearings with specific identity groups can help tistically more likely to be victims of socio- to address identity-specific risk and to gather economic crimes during periods of mass vio- solutions from impacted stakeholders. lence. By acknowledging and investigating this reality, truth commissions can also shine a light Increasingly, truth commissions are incorporat- on structural risk factors relating to gender ine- ing within their structure working groups that qualities, opening avenues for these risk factors deal with specific relevant issues and special to be addressed through subsequent policy hearings with specific victim groups. For in- measures. stance, the Sierra Leone TRC was the first in the world to incorporate children into all aspects of Commissions should evaluate and respond to its implementation. Given that children were a economic risk factors that may prevent ex- targeted victim group during the civil war, the cluded groups from participating, and actively TRC organized dedicated hearings, reparations work to mitigate that risk throughout imple- programs, and final reports specifically for chil- mentation, thus increasing participation. dren.64 Similarly, Canada’s National Inquiry made a special effort to involve the All too often, the groups who have been most 2SLGBTQQIA (Two-Spirit, Lesbian, Gay, Bisex- victimized during periods of atrocity have the ual, Transgender, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, least resources (both time and money) to par- and Asexual) communities within the Inquiry, ticipate in transitional justice processes like recognizing that, without special effort and truth commissions. Often, this lack of means recognition, it would be less likely that this reflects the underlying risk factors that have led group would be represented.65 We support to the historic persecution of targeted groups. such special efforts to incorporate relevant Truth commissions must take these economic identity groups within the process of implemen- factors into account and actively respond to tation. In addition, we see these processes of those factors to increase the participation of inclusion as a novel opportunity to consult with relevant groups. In Guatemala, for instance, this traditionally excluded groups, who can help to took the form of interviewers traveling to rural identify identity-specific risk that may not be so Maya communities with interpreters so that evident from the outside. Rather than only Maya men and women could offer testimony in their own language without having to travel identifying risks, however, these stakeholders 66 can also be consulted to gather potential solu- long distances. In the Canada National In- tions to mitigating these risk factors. By incor- quiry, commissioners arranged and paid for the porating such groups within the political deci- travel of witnesses to sites where they could sion-making process, commissions can at once give testimony. They were also presented with discover creative solutions that they may not the option of bringing another person as a form have otherwise uncovered and provide space of emotional support. For those who needed it, childcare was also provided by the commis- for the political participation of groups who 67 have historically not been granted such space. sion. Implementing such initiatives that are sensitive to the economic needs of stakeholders Women should be approached as more than requires a real evaluation of economic risk fac- victims of sexual crimes. tors, and such an evaluation can also be vital in shaping the scope of the investigations.

Final Recommendations nomic disparities faced by said groups, which results in a higher likelihood of their facing per- The recommendations process can also in- secution again, a reparations program should volve other stakeholders, not only commis- seek to mitigate this still-present risk factor in sioners. an effort to prevent this risk from escalating. Framing the recommendation as an answer to a Traditionally, the final recommendations issued still-present threat may increase a sense of ur- by a truth commission have been determined gency to respond to its call. by the commissioners and staff based on the research they have gathered over the course of Sometimes vague recommendations leave the commission. We recommend that the pro- open more space over a longer period for in- cess of drafting final recommendations can and novative public policy when it comes to pre- should also involve other stakeholders, in par- vention. ticular members of victimized populations, who Final recommendations can be incredibly spe- are better equipped to articulate exactly what cific in what they call for. At times, specific and they would like to see change in response to narrow recommendations can be useful, as it is the abuses they have suffered. A remarkable much easier to determine if and when they example of such an initiative comes from the have been successfully implemented. But this Canadian NIMMIWG, which requested victims does not mean that all recommendations need and those who gave testimony to submit their to be so specific. Sometimes vague recommen- own recommendations for the report. The In- dations can be equally effective. For instance, quiry received over 8000 recommendations recommendation 3.1.1 of the CAVR states, from affected families. These recommenda- “The Government of Timor-Leste adopts a hu- tions were processed and coded to uncover re- man rights approach to governance, policy- current themes, which were then used to shape making and development so that all decisions the final recommendations in the final report.68 across the whole government system are in- By providing affected groups with a direct role formed by human rights principles.” This rec- in determining the final recommendations, the ommendation does not state exactly how such Inquiry responded to and mitigated risk factors an approach should be implemented. Instead, it relating to group exclusion and the legitimacy leaves open spaces for political maneuvering of the commission. and the different realities that various minis- Recommendations can be framed in a way tries and institutions may face. Vague recom- that asserts risk and presents recommenda- mendations, then, open a space for creative tion as a mitigator of that risk. policymakers to maneuver, potentially generat- ing policy that would never have occurred had Typically, final recommendations have been the recommendation been more specific. framed as responses to things from the past that have “gone wrong.” Instead, we suggest an Follow-Up opportunity lies in final recommendations being more “future-focused.” Each final recom- If it’s not seen, it doesn’t exist. mendation, for example, can assert a still- present risk factor to which it is responding, Currently very little time is allocated for truth offering itself as a means for mitigating said risk commissions to do any follow-up work once the factor. For example, rather than merely recom- final report is released. These temporary bod- mending that a reparations program be imple- ies are often set to dissolve mere weeks after mented for a certain group because of what the publication of a final report, leaving little they have experienced, the same recommenda- time for efforts to disseminate and educate tion could assert that, given the current eco- about the commission’s findings. Not allowing

for the commissioners and staff to also have a all too often the question of establishing a fol- hand in disseminating and educating the public low-up mechanism only comes up toward the about their findings is a missed opportunity, very end of the process. Furthermore, the particularly when it comes to prevention. After mechanisms are often underfunded and under- all, it is not the truth commission itself, neces- resourced. For follow-up mechanisms to work, sarily, but the socio-political changes it facili- their structure and funding should be consid- tates where real structural change can take ered as early as possible, while the truth com- place. mission is still in the midst of functioning.

Some sort of follow-up mechanism is neces- Follow-up mechanisms should look not only at sary. implementation, but at risk, as well.

It has become increasingly clear that some Once this follow-up mechanism exists, it should mechanism is necessary to monitor and pro- incorporate a prevention lens in its mandate mote the implementation of final recommenda- from the beginning. Rather than only evaluating tions after the truth commission has come to an the implementation of final recommendations, end. Without such an institution advocating ac- this mechanism should also have the mandate tively and publicly for the promotion of the to perform consistent risk assessments of the truth commission’s findings and recommenda- given country, asking which risks from the past tions, it can become too easy to rest on the lau- still exist and which new risks are emerging. In rels that the commission happened at all, put this way, the implementation of recommenda- the truth commission’s findings in a box, and tions can be shaped and understood as a form move forward with the daily work of govern- of long-term prevention work, just as the mech- ance. This follow-up mechanism should be sep- anism can serve as a barometer on the fulfill- arate from the truth commission itself to main- ment of that important fourth pillar of transi- tain the independence of the commission. But tional justice: guarantees of non-recurrence.

Conclusion

In the first comprehensive text on truth com- Hayner is correct, of course, but it is our hope missions, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice that this research has outlined how truth com- and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, Priscilla missions can even go a step further. Rather than B. Hayner writes: only articulating the factors that have contributed to violence, truth commissions, in the ways [A truth commission] can reveal a glob- they are structured and implemented, present al truth of the broad patterns of events, opportunities for reversing or mitigating vari- and demonstrate without question the ous of these factors, as well. By applying an atrocities that took place and what forc- atrocity prevention lens to truth commissions es were responsible. If it is careful and from the beginning, we can only dream of how creative, it can also go far beyond simp- much more they can contribute to the non- ly outlining the facts of abuse, and con- recurrence of violence that, in the end, is the tribute to a much broader understand- hope of all who enact this and other transitional ing of how people and the country as a justice mechanisms. whole were affected, and what factors contributed to the violence.69

27 Research Team

Kerry Whigham, Principal Researcher; Academic Programs Officer, Online Education and Research Initiatives, AIPG; Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, Bing- hamton University, New York, USA Clara Ramírez-Barat, Researcher; Director, Educational Policy and Programs, AIPG Tibi Galis, Researcher; Executive Director, AIPG Jack Mayerhofer, Project Manager; Deputy Executive Director, AIPG Special Thanks

This research would not have been possible without the following scholars and practitioners who gen- erously contributed their time and expertise:

• Emilio Crenzel, Investigador Principal, CONICET; Professor of Sociology, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina

• Geoff Dancy, Associate Professor of Political Science, Tulane University, Louisiana, USA

• Pablo de Greiff, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transitional Justice Program, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, School of Law, New York University, USA; Former UN Special Rappor- teur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence

• Zoe Dugal, Senior Deputy Director of Operations, CANADEM National Civilian Response Corps

• Karine Duhamel, Acting Manager, Public Programs, Canadian Museum for Human Rights; Director, National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls

• Laura Frizzell, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Sociology, Ohio State University, USA

• Benjamin Goldsmith, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Australia National Universi- ty, Australia

• Philip Luther, Research and Advocacy Director for the Middle East and North Africa, Amnesty In- ternational • Hollie Nyseth Brehm, Associate Professor of Sociology, Ohio State University, USA

• Max Pensky, Professor of Philosophy; Co-Director, Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Pre- vention, Binghamton University, New York, USA

• Natalie Romeri-Lewis, Founder, Global Truth Commission Index Project, Brigham Young Universi- ty, Utah, USA

• Nicky Rousseau, Senior Lecturer, University of the Western Cape, Bellville, South Africa • Victoria Sanford, Director, Center for Human Rights and Peace Studies, Lehman College, New York, USA

• Pat Walsh, Human Rights Advocate and Practitioner, Timor-Leste

• Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Associate Professor, School of Public Affairs, University of Arkansas- Little Rock, USA

• Kelebogile Zvobgo, Pre-doctoral Fellow for Academic Diversity in International Relations, William & Mary, Virginia, USA 28

Appendix 1 | List of Truth Commissions

(“Legitimate” Truth Commissions in bold)

• Uganda’s Commission of Inquiry into the • Germany’s Commission of Inquiry for the Disappearances of People in Uganda since Assessment of History and Consequenc- 25 January, 1971 (1974) es of the SED Dictatorship in Germany (1992-1994) • Brazil’s Commission of Inquiry (1979- 1982) • El Salvador’s Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (1992-1993) • Bolivia’s National Commission for Investi- gation for Forced Disappearances (1982- • Ethiopia’s The Special Prosecution Pro- 1984) cess by the Office of the Special Prosecu- tor (1993-2007) • Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (1983-1984) • Honduras’ Independent inquiry undertak- en by the National Commissioner for the • Zimbabwe’s Zimbabwe Commission of In- quiry into the Matabeleland Disturbances Protection of Human Rights (1993-1994) (1983-1984) • Rwanda’s International Commission of In- vestigation on Human Rights Violations in • Uruguay’s Commission for the Investiga- tion of the Situation of the Disappeared Rwanda Since October 1, 1990 (1993) and Related Events (1985) • Sri Lanka’s Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappear- • Peru’s Commission of Inquiry to Investi- gate the Massacre of Prisoners (1986- ance of Persons (1994-1997) 1988) • Haiti’s National Commission for Truth and Justice (1994-1996) • Philippines’ Presidential Committee on Human Rights (1986-1987) • Germany’s Study Commission for the Overcoming of the Consequences of the • Uganda’s Commission of Inquiry into Vio- SED Dictatorship in the Process of Ger- lations of Human Rights (1986) man Unity (1995-1998) • Nepal’s Commission of Inquiry to Locate the Persons Disappeared during the Pan- • Burundi’s International Commission of chayat Period (1990) Inquiry (1995-1996) • South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation • Chile’s National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (1990-1991) Commission (1995-2000) • Ecuador’s Truth and Justice Committee • Chad’s Commission of Inquiry on the (1996-1997) Crimes and Misappropriations Commit- ted by the Ex-President Habré, His Ac- • Guatemala’s Commission for Historical complices and/or Accessories (1990- Clarification (1997-1999) 1992)

• Nigeria’s Commission of Inquiry for the • South Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Investigation of Human Rights Violations Commission (2005-2010) (1999-2001) • Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Com- • Indonesia’s Commission for Human Rights mission (2006-2009) Violations in East Timor (1999) • Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Com- • South Korea’s Presidential Truth Commis- mission (2007-2015) sion on Suspicious Deaths (2000-2004) • Ecuador’s Truth Commission to Impede • Cote d’Ivoire’s Mediation Committee for Impunity (2007-2009) National Reconciliation (2000-2001) • Kenya’s Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation • Uruguay’s Commission for Peace (2000- Commission (2008-2012) 2002) • Mauritius’ Truth and Justice Commission • Panama’s Truth Commission (2001-2002) (2009-2011)

• Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- • Solomon Islands’ Truth and Reconciliation sion (2001-2003) Commission (2009-2012)

• Timor-Leste’s Commission for Reception, • Honduras’s Truth and Reconciliation Truth and Reconciliation (2002-2005) Commission (2010-2011)

• Serbia and Montenegro’s Commission for • Brazil’s National Truth Commission (2011 Truth and Reconciliation (2002-2003) -2014)

• Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2002-2004)

• Algeria’s Ad Hoc Inquiry in Charge of the Question of Disappearance (2003-2005)

• Chile’s National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (2003-2005)

• Democratic Republic of Congo’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2003-2007)

• Ghana’s National Reconciliation Commis- sion (2003-2004)

• Central African Republic’s Truth and Rec- onciliation Commission (2003)

• Paraguay’s Truth and Justice Commission (2004-2008)

• Morocco’s National Commission for Truth, Equity, and Reconciliation (2004- 2005)

Notes

1 For more information on transitional Nations, “Framework of Analysis for Processes, Weighing Efficacy; Sikkink, The justice, see Barkan, “Historical Reconcil- Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention”; Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Pros- iation: Redress, Rights, and Politics”; De Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our ecutions Are Changing World Politics; Brito, Gonzaléz Enríquez, and Aquilar, Responsibility to Prevent Genocide. Taylor and Dukalskis, “Old Truths and The Politics of Memory: Transitional Jus- New Politics: Does Truth Commission 7 International Center for Transitional tice in Democratizing Societies; Elster, ‘Publicness’ Impact Democratization?”; Justice, “What Is Transitional Justice?” Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Van der Merwe, Baxter, and Chapman, Historical Perspective; Herz, From Dicta- 8 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transition- Assessing the Impact of Transitional Jus- torship to Democracy: Coping with Lega- al Justice and the Challenge of Truth Com- tice; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commis- cies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarian- missions, 11–12. sions and Transitional Societies: The Im- ism; Kritz, Transitional Justice: How pact on Human Rights and Democracy. 9 Qtd. in Brahm, “What Is a Truth Com- Emerging Democracies Reckon with For- mission and Why Does It Matter?” 14 Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, Transitional mer Regimes; Murphy, The Conceptual Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Foundations of Transitional Justice; Simić, 10 For more information, see de Greiff, Weighing Efficacy. An Introduction to Transitional Justice; Pablo, “Report of the Special Rappor- Teitel, Transitional Justice; Verdeja, Un- teur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, 15 Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, 153. chopping a Tree: Reconciliation in the Af- Reparation and Guarantees of Non- 16 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commis- termath of Political Violence. Recurrence,” August 28, 2013; Gonzá- sions and Transitional Societies: The Im- lez Cueva, “Where Are Truth Commis- 2 See de Greiff, Pablo, “Report of the pact on Human Rights and Democracy. sions Headed?”; Hayner, Unspeakable Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truths: Transitional Justice and the Chal- 17 Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, Transitional Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guaran- lenge of Truth Commissions; International Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, tees of Non-Recurrence,” October 12, Center for Transitional Justice, “ICTJ Weighing Efficacy. 2017; de Greiff, Pablo, “Joint Study on Factsheet on Truth Commissions.” the Contribution of Transitional Justice 18 Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our to the Prevention of Gross Violations 11 Goldsmith et al., “Forecasting the On- Responsibility to Prevent Genocide. and Abuses of Human Rights and Seri- set of Genocide and Politicide: Annual 19 Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, Transitional ous Violations of Humanitarian Law, Out-of-Sample Forecasts on a Global Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Including Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Dataset, 1988-2003”; Goldstone et al., Weighing Efficacy; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Cleansing and Crimes against Humani- “A Global Model for Forecasting Politi- Truth Commissions and Transitional Socie- ty, and Their Recurrence”; Mayer- cal Instability”; Harff, “Assessing Risk of ties: The Impact on Human Rights and De- Rieckh and de Greiff, Justice as Preven- Genocide and Politicide”; University of mocracy. tion: Vetting Public Employees in Transi- Maryland, “Minorities at Risk Project”; tional Societies. United Nations, “Framework of Analysis 20 Crenzel, “Questionnaire on Argen- for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Preven- tina’s National Commission on Disap- 3 Carnegie Commission on Preventing tion”; United States Holocaust Memori- peared Persons.” Deadly Conflict, “Preventing Deadly al Museum, “Early Warning Project — Conflict: Final Report.” 21 Ferrara, Assessing the Long-Term Im- United States Holocaust Memorial Mu- pact of Truth Commissions: The Chilean 4 McLoughlin, The Structural Prevention seum”; Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Truth and Reconciliation Commission in of Mass Atrocities: Understanding Risk and Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide. Historical Perspective. Resilience; Waller, Confronting Evil: En- 12 Whigham, “Remembering to Prevent: gaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Gen- 22 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Canada’s The Preventive Capacity of Public ocide; Whigham, “Remembering to Pre- Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” Memory.” vent: The Preventive Capacity of Public 23 Sanford, “Questionnaire on Guate- Memory.” 13 Appel and Loyle, “The Economic Ben- mala’s Commission for Historical Clari- efits of Justice: Post-Conflict Justice 5 Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our fication.” and Foreign Direct Investment”; Ben- Responsibility to Prevent Genocide. Josef Hirsch, MacKenzie, and Sesay, 24 Dugal, “Questionnaire on Sierra Leo- 6 Goldsmith et al., “Forecasting the On- “Measuring the Impact of Truth and ne’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- set of Genocide and Politicide: Annual Reconciliation Commissions: Placing sion.” Out-of-Sample Forecasts on a Global the Global ‘Success’ of TRCs in Local 25 Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Dataset, 1988-2003”; Harff, “Assessing Perspective”; Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, Responsibility to Prevent Genocide. Risk of Genocide and Politicide”; United Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing

26 BBC World Service, International 41 Sanford, “Questionnaire on Guate- 57 Sanford, “Questionnaire on Guate- Center for Transitional Justice, and mala’s Commission for Historical Clari- mala’s Commission for Historical Clari- Search for Common Ground, “Peace, fication.” fication.” Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra Leo- 42 Luther, “Questionnaire on Morocco’s 58 Luther, “Questionnaire on Morocco’s ne: A Survey of Knowledge and Atti- Equity and Reconciliation Commission.” Equity and Reconciliation Commission.” tudes towards Transitional Institutions in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone”; Dugal, 43 Dugal, “Questionnaire on Sierra Leo- 59 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- “Questionnaire on Sierra Leone’s Truth ne’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- da’s National Inquiry on Missing and and Reconciliation Commission.” sion.” Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls.” 27 Walsh, “Questionnaire on Timor- 44 Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Leste’s Commission for Reception, Responsibility to Prevent Genocide, 173. 60 Hayner 2001, 76. Truth, and Reconciliation.” 45 Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the 61 Walsh, “Questionnaire on Timor- 28 Walsh; United Nations, “Framework Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide Leste’s Commission for Reception, of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool and Political Mass Murder since 1955.” Truth, and Reconciliation.” for Prevention.” 46 Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our 62 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- 29 Varieties of Democracy, Varieties of Responsibility to Prevent Genocide. da’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- Democracy Codebook, 50. sion.” 47 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- 30 Rousseau, “Questionnaire on South da’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- 63 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Com- sion.” da’s National Inquiry on Missing and mission.” Murdered Indigenous Women and 48 Walsh, “Questionnaire on Timor- Girls.” 31 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- Leste’s Commission for Reception, da’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- Truth, and Reconciliation.” 64 Dugal, “Questionnaire on Sierra Leo- sion.” ne’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- 49 Luther, “Questionnaire on Morocco’s sion.” 32 Luther, “Questionnaire on Morocco’s Equity and Reconciliation Commission.” Equity and Reconciliation Commission.” 65 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- 50 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- da’s National Inquiry on Missing and 33 Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our da’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- Murdered Indigenous Women and Responsibility to Prevent Genocide; Unit- sion”; Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Can- Girls.” ed Nations, “Framework of Analysis for ada’s National Inquiry on Missing and Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Preven- Murdered Indigenous Women and 66 Sanford, “Questionnaire on Guate- tion”; Harff, “Assessing Risk of Geno- Girls.” mala’s Commission for Historical Clari- cide and Politicide.” fication.” 51 Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our 34 Goldsmith et al., “Forecasting the On- Responsibility to Prevent Genocide. 67 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- set of Genocide and Politicide: Annual da’s National Inquiry on Missing and 52 Luther, “Questionnaire on Morocco’s Out-of-Sample Forecasts on a Global Murdered Indigenous Women and Equity and Reconciliation Commission.” Dataset, 1988-2003”; United Nations, Girls.” “Framework of Analysis for Atrocity 53 BBC World Service, International 68 Duhamel. Crimes: A Tool for Prevention.” Center for Transitional Justice, and Search for Common Ground, “Peace, 69 Hayner 2001, 84. 35 Varieties of Democracy, Varieties of Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra Leo- Democracy Codebook, 46. ne: A Survey of Knowledge and Atti- 36 Varieties of Democracy, 46. tudes towards Transitional Institutions in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone.” 37 Luther, “Questionnaire on Morocco’s Equity and Reconciliation Commission.” 54 United Nations, “Framework of Anal- ysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Pre- 38 Crenzel, “Questionnaire on Argen- vention.” tina’s National Commission on Disap- peared Persons.” 55 Crenzel, “Questionnaire on Argen- tina’s National Commission on Disap- 39 Dugal, “Questionnaire on Sierra Leo- peared Persons.” ne’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- sion.” 56 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- da’s National Inquiry on Missing and 40 Duhamel, “Questionnaire on Cana- Murdered Indigenous Women and da’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- Girls.” sion.”

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