Optical PUF for Non-Forwardable Vehicle Authentication
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Computer Communications 93 (2016) 52–67 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Computer Communications journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/comcom R Optical PUF for Non-Forwardable Vehicle Authentication ∗ Shlomi Dolev a,1, Łukasz Krzywiecki b,2, Nisha Panwar a, , Michael Segal c a Department of Computer Science, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel b Department of Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Poland c Department of Communication Systems Engineering, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Article history: Modern vehicles are configured to exchange warning messages through IEEE 1609 Dedicated Short Range Available online 1 June 2016 Communication over IEEE 802.11p Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment. Essentially, these warning messages must associate an authentication factor such that the verifier authenticates the message origin Keywords: Authentication via visual binding. Interestingly, the existing vehicle communication incorporates the message forward- Certificate ability as a requested feature for numerous applications. On the contrary, a secure vehicular communica- Wireless radio channel tion relies on a message authentication with respect to the sender identity. Currently, the vehicle security Optical channel infrastructure is vulnerable to message forwarding in a way that allows an incorrect visual binding with Challenge response pairs the malicious vehicle, i.e., messages seem to originate from a malicious vehicle due to non-detectable Verification message relaying instead of the actual message sender. We introduce the non-forwardable authentication to avoid an adversary coalition attack scenario. These messages should be identifiable with respect to the immediate sender at every hop. According to a coalition attack scenario, the group of adversaries in coalition adopt the fabricated attributes of a target vehicle and resembles it to be alike. The adversaries in coalition then reroute the eavesdropped messages in order to impersonate the target vehicle. We propose to utilize immediate optical response verification in association with the authenticated key exchange over radio channel. These optical response are generated through hardware means, i.e., a certified Physically Unclonable Function device embedded on the front and rear of the vehicle. To the best of our knowl- edge, this is the first work proposing a solution based on physically unclonable function for a secure non-forwardable vehicle to vehicle authentication. In addition a formal correctness sketch is derived using Strand Space methodology. ©2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Furthermore, vehicles are customized to predict a crash event ahead of time through ultrasonic and infrared radars, detection Vehicle networks [21,24,50] provide safe and efficient maneu- vs ranging optical-sensors, and a night vision camera [59] . A de- vering among the vehicles and across the road. Smart vehicles are centralized multi-channel communication [80] is standardized in equipped with wireless radio devices and comply with the Ded- IEEE 1609.4 [8] . Our protocol is secure to create an information icated Short Range Communication (DSRC) IEEE 1609 [1,9] and rich map of the surrounding vehicles and correspondingly attribute Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) 802.11p [61] . these messages (arriving through the radio) to the correct vehicle in the map. Such an up-to-date map would assist in real-time deci- sion making, e.g., accelerating, decelerating, or lane changing. Once R A preliminary version of this paper has appeared in proceedings of the 14th the vehicle has established a secure session with a near-by vehicle IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (IEEE NCA) the map can be updated using the information received over the 2015 [14] . radio channel, thereby, attributing the responsibility of any mal- ∗ Corresponding author. functioning. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Dolev), [email protected] (Ł. Krzywiecki), [email protected] (N. Panwar), [email protected] (M. Segal). Wireless radio communication is widely supported by the 1 Partially supported by the Lynne and William Frankel Center for Computer Sci- portable user devices. There exists a sufficient number of Authen- ences, Rita Altura Trust Chair in Computer Sciences, Ben-Gurion University of the ticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols for a secure wireless com- Negev and Israel Science Foundation (Grant Number 428/11); the Israeli-Italian Sci- munication. Interestingly, the majority of these AKE protocols are entific & Technological Cooperation grant; the Israel-Taiwan Scientific Research Co- implemented over the radio channel for identifying a valid public operation grant and Israel Prime Minister Office, BGU Cyber Center. key holder and establishing a session key. However, these ap- 2 The research was financed by the Polish National Science Centre decision (DEC- 2013/08/M/ST6/00928), project HARMONIA. proaches do not suffice for a more sophisticated form of a coalition http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2016.05.016 0140-3664/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. S. Dolev et al. / Computer Communications 93 (2016) 52–67 53 attack. In order to avoid such attacks a correct mapping to the ac- ing vehicle attributes and public key) are actually far away from tual vehicle in secret session is necessary. Subsequently, a location- the communication range still connected through an adversary information rich map can provide a precise identification of the coalition channel. The term adversary coalition denotes the fact original source. Recently, authors in [62] have presented a far prox- that adversary is allowed to forward and re-route messages to- imity identification approach by measuring overall multipath prop- wards a second adversary via separate channel. Interestingly, the agation effect, although it estimates that a specific target is at least static [13] and dynamic attribute [11,15] based authentication is not a certain distance away (conceptually quite opposite to the exist- sufficient to avoid the coalition attack scenario. ing distance bounding protocols [6] ); however, the source of sig- Evidently, a non-forwardable authentication property must be nal origination is still unidentifiable and seems to comply with the augmented to expand more upfront schemes based on static and certified credentials. In particular, the dispersed nature of the ra- dynamic attributes. Specifically, the technique should prevent the dio signals might impose an incorrect binding between the ses- verifier to visually misidentify the attacker (that only forwards sion messages and the actual source of the message. Our scheme messages) with the original authenticator (that actually produced promises a correct binding between the session messages (over a the authentication messages). wireless radio channel) and correspondingly identifiable source of Apparently, some ad-hoc solutions such as timing analysis, ra- the message (certified attribute holder). dio fingerprinting, regular mirror and holographic mirror identifi- We utilize the (inherently) directed nature of optical channel cation, potentially seems to immune against the coalition attack to produce optical fingerprints in association with a secure radio scenario. We further elaborate these solutions with respect to the channel. Optical communication (or an equivalent technology for a inapplicability against a coalition attack scenario. It must be no- clear geographic mapping and to identify communicating vehicle ticed that the coalition attack is unavoidable within the existing monolithically-coupled with the information received) is an im- state of vehicle to vehicle security standards IEEE 1609.2 [2] . In- portant ingredient in our proposed scheme. The directed nature terestingly, neither the wireless radio nor the optical communica- of the optical communication channel eliminates the possibility of tion channel, individually is enough to provide a complete solu- an adversary, present in the line of sight between mutually au- tion against the coalition attack scenario. We require a dynamic thenticated vehicles. However, the optical communication or di- scheme for immediate commitment verification that would not re- rected microwaves alone are not sufficient and requires additional main static for a long time. Our goal is to couple the communi- assumptions to enable the existing DSRC IEEE 1609.2 [2] infrastruc- cating vehicles within the scope of multiple channels such as an ture immune against a coalition attack, as presented in this paper. optical and radio channel. An optical channel is essential during Vehicles authenticate a peer vehicle over radio channel to be the the authentication phase and the radio channel resumes beyond same vehicle as visually identified over the optical channel. Our the authentication phase for the authenticated message exchange. Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) based solution can withstand Optical PUF assisted unforgeable fingerprints provide a robust vehi- more sophisticated adversarial coalition attacks than in previous cle identification. The proposed authentication approach utilizes a works [11–13,15] . non-forwardable fingerprint from the peer vehicle. A PUF [41] de- We propose to achieve a secure binding property with respect to vice is used to produce these output responses and a supplemen- vehicles and corresponding communication channels. Essentially, tary optical communication is used to convey PUF input