Measuring the Subjective Well-Being of Nations: National Accounts of Time
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This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Measuring the Subjective Well-Being of Nations: National Accounts of Time Use and Well-Being Volume Author/Editor: Alan B. Krueger, editor Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-45456-8 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/krue08-1 Conference Date: December 7-8, 2007 Publication Date: October 2009 Title: International Evidence on Well-Being Author: David G. Blanchflower URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5059 7 International Evidence on Well- Being David G. Blanchfl ower National Time Accounting (NTA) as propounded by Krueger et al. (see chapter 1 of this volume)—henceforth K2S3—is a way of measuring so- ciety’s well- being based on time use. It is a set of methods for measuring, comparing, and analyzing the way people spend their time: across countries, over historical time, or between groups of people within a country at a given time. The arguments for NTA build on earlier work in Kahneman et al. (2004a, 2004b) and Kahneman and Krueger (2006). Krueger et al. argue that NTA should be seen as a complement to the National Income Accounts, not a substitute. Like the National Income Accounts, K2S3 accept that NTA “is also incomplete, providing a partial measure of society’s well- being.” However, National Time Accounting, as K2S3 note, “misses people’s general sense of satisfaction or fulfi llment with their lives as a whole, apart from moment to moment feelings” (see chapter 1 of this volume). Krueger et al. propose an index, called the U- index (for “unpleasant” or “undesirable”), which is designed to measure the proportion of time an indi- vidual spends in an unpleasant state. The fi rst step in computing the U- index is to determine whether an episode is unpleasant or pleasant. An episode is classifi ed as unpleasant by K2S3 if the most intense feeling reported for that episode is a negative one—that is, if the maximum rating on any of the negative affect dimensions is strictly greater than the maximum rating of the positive affect dimensions. Once they have categorized episodes as David G. Blanchfl ower is the Bruce V. Rauner Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. I thank Andrew Clark, Dick Easterlin, Richard Freeman, Alan Krueger, Andrew Oswald, Jon Skinner, Alois Stutzer, Justin Wolfers, and participants at the NBER Conference on Na- tional Time Accounting for helpful comments and suggestions. 155 156 David G. Blanchfl ower unpleasant or pleasant, the U- index is defi ned by K2S3 as the fraction of an individual’s waking time that is spent in an unpleasant state. The U- index can be computed for each individual and averaged over a sample of individuals. There do seem to be some differences in chapter 1 on how the U- index is actually calculated. For example, in K2S3’s table 1.8, the U- index is defi ned as where “stressed, sad, or pain exceeded happy,” whereas in table 1.21 it is defi ned as the “maximum of tense, blue, and angry being strictly greater than the rating of happy.” It is apparent that K2S3 believe their index is an improvement on the use of data on life satisfaction and happiness, which they suggest has a number of weaknesses. In Kahneman et al. (2004a), these same authors have criti- cized the use of such data because they argue that there are (a) surprisingly small effects of circumstances on well- being (e.g., income, marital status, etc.), and (b) large differences in the level of life satisfaction in various coun- tries, which they regard as “implausibly large.” They go on to argue that reports of life satisfaction are infl uenced by manipulations of current mood and of the immediate context, including earlier questions on a survey that cause particular domains of life to be temporarily salient. Satisfaction with life and with particular domains (e.g., income, work) is also affected by comparisons with other people and with past experi- ences. The same experience of pleasure or displeasure can be reported differently, depending on the standard to which it is compared and the context. (430) Indeed, Kahneman and Krueger (2006, b) argue that well- being measures are best described as “a global retrospective judgment, which in most cases is constructed only when asked and is determined in part by the respondent’s current mood and memory, and by the immediate context.” Frey and Stutzer (2005) have a rather different view: As subjective survey data are based on individuals’ judgments, they are, of course, prone to a multitude of systematic and non-systematic biases. The relevance of reporting errors, however, depends on the intended usage of the data. Often, the main use of happiness measures is not to compare levels in an absolute sense, but rather to seek to identify the determi- nants of happiness. For that purpose, it is neither necessary to assume that reported subjective well- being is cardinally measurable, nor that it is interpersonally comparable. Higher reports of subjective well-being for one and the same individual has solely to refl ect that she or he experiences more true inner positive feelings. (208– 9) In the same vein Di Tella and MacCulloch (2007, 17) note, “One would expect that such small shocks can be treated as noise in regression anal- yses.” Consistent with this, however, Krueger and Schkade (2007) have re- ported that International Evidence on Well-Being 157 overall life satisfaction measures . exhibited test- retest correlations in the range of .50– .70. While these fi gures are lower than the reliability ratios typically found for education, income and many other common micro economic variables, they are probably sufficiently high to support much of the research that is currently being undertaken on subjective well-being, particularly in cases where group means are being compared (e.g. rich vs. poor, employed vs. unemployed) and the benefi ts of statistical aggregation apply. (23) In their earliest empirical analysis, Kahneman and Kruger (2006) calcu- lated a U- index using data from a sample of 909 working women in Texas and showed that those who report less satisfaction with their lives spend a greater fraction of their time in an unpleasant state. Of the respondents who reported they were “not at all satisfi ed,” 49 percent of their time was spent in an unpleasant state, compared with 11 percent who said they were “very satisfi ed.” The authors also found that those who score in the top third on a depression scale spent 31 percent of their time in an unpleasant state, whereas those who score in the bottom third on the depression scale spent 13 percent of their time in an unpleasant state. Krueger et al. extend this work and report a comparison of the U- index based on data they collected in the United States and France—and I understand that results from Denmark are coming shortly. They sampled 810 women in Columbus, Ohio, and 820 women in Rennes, France, in the spring of 2005 and obtained information on both their life satisfaction and their U- index. The American women were twice as likely to say they were very satisfi ed with their lives as were the French women (26 percent versus 13 percent). Furthermore, assign- ing a number from one to four indicating life satisfaction also showed that the Americans are signifi cantly more satisfi ed, on average. In contrast to reported life satisfaction, the U- index is 2.8 percentage points lower in the French sample (16 percent) than in the American sample (18.8 percent). Thus, the French, according to K2S3, appear to spend less of their time engaged in unpleasant activities (i.e., activities in which the dominant feel- ing is a negative one) than do the Americans in their samples. Moreover, national time- use data examined by K2S3 indicated that the French spend relatively more of their time engaged in activities that tend to yield more pleasure than do Americans. The U- index relates to a relatively short period of time. Hence, there are a number of things the U- index does not measure—it appears to miss more general factors likely to impact a citizen’s overall well- being. Examples, by country, include the fact that young people have been rioting in the streets of Paris (the U.K. Daily Telegraph headline read “Test for Sarkozy as Paris riots continue,” November 27, 2007); the French soccer team has won the World Cup and the English team has been knocked out of Euro 2008; the United States is at war in Iraq and Afghanistan; and there has been a ter- 158 David G. Blanchfl ower rorist attack, a hurricane, and even forest fi res in Malibu and fl oods in New Orleans. These may well be missed by the U- index while likely being picked up in happiness or life satisfaction measures, which relate to a more general feeling of happiness. It remains unclear whether an increase in unemploy- ment, infl ation, or inequality; a decline in growth; a drop in the stock market; or a rise in the possibility of recession the following year would raise the U- index. Does the U- index predict the outcomes of elections, or migration fl ows, or anything at all for that matter? As I will outline in more detail, it certainly seems that these factors impact our measures of well- being. In what follows I provide a somewhat selective review of evidence on well- being using cross- country data, and I try to provide a framework for reconciling the fi ndings from this work with those from the U- index.