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Anti-Jewish Tropes in Modern Philosophy Svenungsson, Jayne

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Anti-Jewish Tropes in Modern Philosophy Svenungsson, Jayne Enlightened Prejudices : Anti-Jewish Tropes in Modern Philosophy Svenungsson, Jayne Published in: Rethinking Time : Essays on History, Memory and Representation 2011 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Svenungsson, J. (2011). Enlightened Prejudices : Anti-Jewish Tropes in Modern Philosophy. In H. Ruin, & A. Ers (Eds.), Rethinking Time : Essays on History, Memory and Representation (Vol. 9, pp. 279-290). Södertörn Philosophical Studies. 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LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00 Published in Andrus Ers and Hans Ruin (eds.), Conceptualizing History: Essays on History, Memory and Representation, Södertörn Philosophical Studies 11, Huddinge: Södertörn University, 2011, 279–290. ISBN: 978-91-86069-32-2. Jayne Svenungsson Enlightened Prejudices: Anti-Jewish Tropes in Modern Philosophy In November 1894, Alfred Dreyfus, a young artillery officer of Jewish descent, was convicted for military treason against the French state. When in 1896 evidence came to light that proved Dreyfus innocent, high-ranking officials in the military tried to suppress the new information. The event evolved into a major political scandal which divided French society into Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. Thanks to the involvement of a number of leading liberal intellectuals, all the accusations were finally shown to be false and Dreyfus was exonerated and reinstated in the French army. In history books in Europe, the Dreyfus Affair is presented as one of the defining moments of the Enlightenment legacy: a prime example of how rationality, tolerance, and universal ideals of justice finally conquered prejudice, intolerance, and nationalist sectarianism. Indeed, this portrait of the Dreyfus Affair is a portrait of how, in one particular case, modern liberal ideals prevailed against ideological prejudice. It is also, however, part of a larger ideological narrative which recounts how modern Europe came into being through a process of successive universalization of ideals such as freedom, equality, and fraternity. In the wake of the atrocities of the twentieth century, this standard account of the Enlightenment, as a warranty of universal ideals of rationality and morality, has been challenged from a number of different angles. As long ago as 1947, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer advanced the bold thesis that fascist and Nazi barbarity was, in fact, the dialectical other of the Enlightenment project.1 Even the “Dreyfusards” – the defenders of tolerance and justice – had subtly perpetuated prejudices that had paved the way for modern anti-Semitism and other forms of ideological prejudice. The malign logic of this dialectic ultimately concerns the way in which a seemingly universal Enlightenment idea tends to obfuscate its own particular conditions, thereby excluding ideals and identities which these conditions implicitly challenge or contradict. In this article, I want to highlight this dialectic further by demonstrating how, to a significant extent, two of the greatest philosophers of reason, Kant and Hegel, underpin their universal principles with prejudiced stereotypes about Jews and Judaism. More particularly, I will 1 Published in Andrus Ers and Hans Ruin (eds.), Conceptualizing History: Essays on History, Memory and Representation, Södertörn Philosophical Studies 11, Huddinge: Södertörn University, 2011, 279–290. ISBN: 978-91-86069-32-2. illuminate the way that both Kant and Hegel secularize and politicize a number of age-old anti-Jewish tropes which are deeply rooted in the Christian tradition; tropes which serve to reinforce their notions of freedom and enlightenment. Clearly, these tropes take on a different meaning once they are removed from their original theological context. The target of the stereotyping is no longer the individual Jew but, rather, Jewishness as a particular identity which stands in the way of universal ideals of freedom and rationality and which must be overcome in order for Jews to become free individuals. Even so, the same dialectics, between the universal and the particular, is at work – and particular Jewish individuals are still affected by the prejudices of a seemingly formal universalism. In the last section of the article, I will draw attention to the recurrence of this troubling dialectic in still more subtle fashion, namely, when the universalist heritage of Christianity is invoked as a resource in contemporary philosophical debate. I am thinking in particular here of the efforts by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek to formulate a new political universalism. What is striking about their efforts is how “Jewishness” is once more invoked as a signifier of particularity. However, it should be clarified immediately that “Jewishness”, less even than for Kant and Hegel, here refers to particular Jewish individuals. Rather, it is used as a rhetorical marker which is interchangeable with any particular predicate that obstructs a truly universalist political order. Nevertheless, it is a good question as to whether the use of these longstanding anti-Jewish tropes does not reveal the lasting tensions generated by a universalist legacy that is dialectically reliant upon eliminating conflicting claims on definitions of the universal. The Idealistic Body Politic In his celebrated work The Stillborn God, Mark Lilla lucidly illustrates the “great separation” between religion and politics that took place in early Western modernity. With the Enlightenment, religion was severed from both politics and philosophy in an unprecedented fashion, and new ideals – focusing exclusively on human nature and human needs – replaced theological speculations about society, morality, and knowledge.2 Lilla’s narrative of the subordination of religion by political philosophy forms part of the standard account of the Enlightenment alluded to earlier. What makes his work original, however, is that he does not end the story there but goes on to illustrate how the process toward secularization was partly reversed when the Enlightenment reached German soil. In 2 Published in Andrus Ers and Hans Ruin (eds.), Conceptualizing History: Essays on History, Memory and Representation, Södertörn Philosophical Studies 11, Huddinge: Södertörn University, 2011, 279–290. ISBN: 978-91-86069-32-2. contrast to most English, Scottish, and French Enlightenment thinkers – who opposed religion in the name of reason – the major proponents of the German Aufklärung sought to reconcile religion with reason by incorporating religious truths into their rational discourses. This process is perhaps nowhere more clearly manifested than in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Unlike Hobbes, Locke, or the French encyclopédistes, who saw in religion nothing but man’s stubborn ignorance and emotional flight from pain, Kant recognized religion as a permanent human need and even a precondition for man’s moral improvement. He did so, however, only by placing its doctrines well “within the boundaries of reason,” as the title of his most famous work on religion indicates.3 Kant’s basic idea concerning religion is that it exclusively deals with the practical aspects of human life. Religion offers no valid contribution to rational knowledge; its only contribution is to the history of morality. As Yirmiyahu Yovel has observed, Kant borrowed this idea from his Jewish friend and colleague, Moses Mendelssohn.4 In locating the essence of religion solely in practical commands, Mendelssohn endeavored to demonstrate that the particular creeds of the religion of his fathers need not stand in conflict with the Enlightenment ideal of universal reason. Unlike Mendelssohn, however, Kant was not particularly interested in seeking harmony between a specific religious tradition and universal reason. Rather, he made use of Mendelssohn’s argument only in order to reinforce his own conviction that religion per se, being a purely practical affair, offers no rational grounds for morality or knowledge. The only legitimate ground for morality, Kant famously proposed, lies in the purity of the human will (as opposed to blind obedience to an external law). Nonetheless, positive religion can be a source to morality, precisely to the extent that it mirrors the moral law which issues from free human reason. The task of the moral philosopher is thus to reveal the kernel of morality that lies beneath the creeds, ceremonies, and historical narratives of each religion. Kant’s argument also has a historical aspect. Like many subsequent philosophers and anthropologists in the nineteenth century, Kant placed the historical religions on
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