Experience Report: Developing the Servo Web Browser Engine Using Rust
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Differential Fuzzing the Webassembly
Master’s Programme in Security and Cloud Computing Differential Fuzzing the WebAssembly Master’s Thesis Gilang Mentari Hamidy MASTER’S THESIS Aalto University - EURECOM MASTER’STHESIS 2020 Differential Fuzzing the WebAssembly Fuzzing Différentiel le WebAssembly Gilang Mentari Hamidy This thesis is a public document and does not contain any confidential information. Cette thèse est un document public et ne contient aucun information confidentielle. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Technology. Antibes, 27 July 2020 Supervisor: Prof. Davide Balzarotti, EURECOM Co-Supervisor: Prof. Jan-Erik Ekberg, Aalto University Copyright © 2020 Gilang Mentari Hamidy Aalto University - School of Science EURECOM Master’s Programme in Security and Cloud Computing Abstract Author Gilang Mentari Hamidy Title Differential Fuzzing the WebAssembly School School of Science Degree programme Master of Science Major Security and Cloud Computing (SECCLO) Code SCI3084 Supervisor Prof. Davide Balzarotti, EURECOM Prof. Jan-Erik Ekberg, Aalto University Level Master’s thesis Date 27 July 2020 Pages 133 Language English Abstract WebAssembly, colloquially known as Wasm, is a specification for an intermediate representation that is suitable for the web environment, particularly in the client-side. It provides a machine abstraction and hardware-agnostic instruction sets, where a high-level programming language can target the compilation to the Wasm instead of specific hardware architecture. The JavaScript engine implements the Wasm specification and recompiles the Wasm instruction to the target machine instruction where the program is executed. Technically, Wasm is similar to a popular virtual machine bytecode, such as Java Virtual Machine (JVM) or Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL). -
Rich Media Web Application Development I Week 1 Developing Rich Media Apps Today’S Topics
IGME-330 Rich Media Web Application Development I Week 1 Developing Rich Media Apps Today’s topics • Tools we’ll use – what’s the IDE we’ll be using? (hint: none) • This class is about “Rich Media” – we’ll need a “Rich client” – what’s that? • Rich media Plug-ins v. Native browser support for rich media • Who’s in charge of the HTML5 browser API? (hint: no one!) • Where did HTML5 come from? • What are the capabilities of an HTML5 browser? • Browser layout engines • JavaScript Engines Tools we’ll use • Browsers: • Google Chrome - assignments will be graded on Chrome • Safari • Firefox • Text Editor of your choice – no IDE necessary • Adobe Brackets (available in the labs) • Notepad++ on Windows (available in the labs) • BBEdit or TextWrangler on Mac • Others: Atom, Sublime • Documentation: • https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document_Object_Model • https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Canvas_API/Tutorial • https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Guide What is a “Rich Client” • A traditional “web 1.0” application needs to refresh the entire page if there is even the smallest change to it. • A “rich client” application can update just part of the page without having to reload the entire page. This makes it act like a desktop application - see Gmail, Flickr, Facebook, ... Rich Client programming in a web browser • Two choices: • Use a plug-in like Flash, Silverlight, Java, or ActiveX • Use the built-in JavaScript functionality of modern web browsers to access the native DOM (Document Object Model) of HTML5 compliant web browsers. -
Flash Player and Linux
Flash Player and Linux Ed Costello Engineering Manager Adobe Flash Player Tinic Uro Sr. Software Engineer Adobe Flash Player 2007 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Overview . History and Evolution of Flash Player . Flash Player 9 and Linux . On the Horizon 2 2007 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Flash on the Web: Yesterday 3 2006 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Flash on the Web: Today 4 2006 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. A Brief History of Flash Player Flash Flash Flash Flash Linux Player 5 Player 6 Player 7 Player 9 Feb 2001 Dec 2002 May 2004 Jan 2007 Win/ Flash Flash Flash Flash Flash Flash Flash Mac Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 Player 6 Player 7 Player 8 Player 9 Sep 1998 Jun 1999 Aug 2000 Mar 2002 Sep 2003 Aug 2005 Jun 2006 … Vector Animation Interactivity “RIAs” Developers Expressive Performance & Video & Standards Simple Actions, ActionScript Components, ActionScript Filters, ActionScript 3.0, Movie Clips, 1.0 Video (H.263) 2.0 Blend Modes, New virtual Motion Tween, (ECMAScript High-!delity machine MP3 ed. 3), text, Streaming Video (ON2) video 5 2007 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. Widest Reach . Ubiquitous, cross-platform, rich media and rich internet application runtime . Installed on 98% of internet- connected desktops1 . Consistently reaches 80% penetration within 12 months of release2 . Flash Player 9 reached 80%+ penetration in <9 months . YUM-savvy updater to support rapid/consistent Linux penetration 1. Source: Millward-Brown September 2006. Mature Market data. 2. Source: NPD plug-in penetration study 6 2007 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved. -
Behavioural Analysis of Tracing JIT Compiler Embedded in the Methodical Accelerator Design Software
Scuola Politecnica e delle Scienze di Base Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Ingegneria Informatica Tesi di laurea magistrale in Calcolatori Elettronici II Behavioural Analysis of Tracing JIT Compiler Embedded in the Methodical Accelerator Design Software Anno Accademico 2018/2019 CERN-THESIS-2019-152 //2019 relatori Ch.mo prof. Nicola Mazzocca Ch.mo prof. Pasquale Arpaia correlatore Ing. Laurent Deniau PhD candidato Dario d’Andrea matr. M63000695 Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor at CERN, Laurent Deniau, for his daily support and his useful suggestions throughout the work described in this thesis. I would like to express my gratitude to both my university supervisors, Nicola Mazzocca and Pasquale Arpaia, for their helpfulness during this work and for their support during the past years at university. I feel privileged of being allowed to work with such inspiring mentors. This thesis would not have been possible without the help from the community of the LuaJIT project including all the useful insights contained in its mailing list, specially by its author, Mike Pall, who worked for many years accomplishing an amazing job. A special acknowledgement should be addressed to my family. I thank my father Guido and my mother Leda who guided me with love during my education and my life. I am grateful to my brother Fabio, my grandmother Tina, and my uncle Nicola, for their support during the past years. I also want to remember my uncle Bruno who inspired me for my academic career. I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Alicia for her unconditional encour- agement. -
Mozilla Source Tree Docs Release 50.0A1
Mozilla Source Tree Docs Release 50.0a1 August 02, 2016 Contents 1 SSL Error Reporting 1 2 Firefox 3 3 Telemetry Experiments 11 4 Build System 17 5 WebIDL 83 6 Graphics 85 7 Firefox for Android 87 8 Indices and tables 99 9 Localization 101 10 mach 105 11 CloudSync 113 12 TaskCluster Task-Graph Generation 119 13 Crash Manager 133 14 Telemetry 137 15 Crash Reporter 207 16 Supbrocess Module 211 17 Toolkit modules 215 18 Add-on Manager 221 19 Linting 227 20 Indices and tables 233 21 Mozilla ESLint Plugin 235 i 22 Python Packages 239 23 Managing Documentation 375 24 Indices and tables 377 Python Module Index 379 ii CHAPTER 1 SSL Error Reporting With the introduction of HPKP, it becomes useful to be able to capture data on pin violations. SSL Error Reporting is an opt-in mechanism to allow users to send data on such violations to mozilla. 1.1 Payload Format An example report: { "hostname":"example.com", "port":443, "timestamp":1413490449, "errorCode":-16384, "failedCertChain":[ ], "userAgent":"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:36.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/36.0", "version":1, "build":"20141022164419", "product":"Firefox", "channel":"default" } Where the data represents the following: “hostname” The name of the host the connection was being made to. “port” The TCP port the connection was being made to. “timestamp” The (local) time at which the report was generated. Seconds since 1 Jan 1970, UTC. “errorCode” The error code. This is the error code from certificate veri- fication. Here’s a small list of the most commonly-encountered errors: https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/x509Certs#Error_Codes_in_Firefox In theory many of the errors from sslerr.h, secerr.h, and pkixnss.h could be encountered. -
Behavioral Subtyping, Specification Inheritance, and Modular Reasoning Gary T
Computer Science Technical Reports Computer Science 9-3-2006 Behavioral Subtyping, Specification Inheritance, and Modular Reasoning Gary T. Leavens Iowa State University David A. Naumann Iowa State University Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_techreports Part of the Software Engineering Commons Recommended Citation Leavens, Gary T. and Naumann, David A., "Behavioral Subtyping, Specification Inheritance, and Modular Reasoning" (2006). Computer Science Technical Reports. 269. http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cs_techreports/269 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Science Technical Reports by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Behavioral Subtyping, Specification Inheritance, and Modular Reasoning Abstract Behavioral subtyping is an established idea that enables modular reasoning about behavioral properties of object-oriented programs. It requires that syntactic subtypes are behavioral refinements. It validates reasoning about a dynamically-dispatched method call, say E.m(), using the specification associated with the static type of the receiver expression E. For languages with references and mutable objects the idea of behavioral subtyping has not been rigorously formalized as such, the standard informal notion has inadequacies, and exact definitions are not obvious. This paper formalizes behavioral subtyping and supertype abstraction for a Java-like sequential language with classes, interfaces, exceptions, mutable heap objects, references, and recursive types. Behavioral subtyping is proved sound and semantically complete for reasoning with supertype abstraction. Specification inheritance, as used in the specification language JML, is formalized and proved to entail behavioral subtyping. -
Comparing Javascript Engines
Comparing Javascript Engines Xiang Pan, Shaker Islam, Connor Schnaith Background: Drive-by Downloads 1. Visiting a malicious website 2. Executing malicious javascript 3. Spraying the heap 4. Exploiting a certain vulnerability 5. Downloading malware 6. Executing malware Background: Drive-by Downloads 1. Visiting a malicious website 2. Executing malicious javascript 3. Spraying the heap 4. Exploiting a certain vulnerability 5. Downloading malware 6. Executing malware Background: Drive-by Downloads Background: Drive-by Downloads Setup: Making the prototype null while in the prototype creates a pointer to something random in the heap. Background: Drive-by Downloads Environment: gc( ) is a function call specific to Firefox, so the attacker would want to spray the heap with an exploit specific to firefox. Background: Drive-by Downloads Obfuscation: If the browser executing the javascript it firefox,the code will proceed to the return statement. Any other browser will exit with an error due to an unrecognized call to gc( ). Background: Drive-by Downloads Download: The return will be to a random location in the heap and due to heap-spraying it will cause shell code to be executed. Background: Goal of Our Project ● The goal is to decode obfuscated scripts by triggering javascript events ● The problem is when triggering events, some errors, resulting from disparity of different engines or some other reasons, may occur and terminate the progress ● We need to find ways to eliminate the errors and Ex 1therefore generate more de-obfuscated scripts <script> function f(){ //some codes gc(); var x=unescape(‘%u4149%u1982%u90 […]’)); eval(x); } </script> Ex 2 <script type="text/javascript" src="/includes/jquery/jquery.js"></script> Project Overview - Part One ● Modify WebKit engine so that it can generate error informations. -
Advances in Programming Languages Lecture 18: Concurrency and More in Rust
Advances in Programming Languages Lecture 18: Concurrency and More in Rust Ian Stark School of Informatics The University of Edinburgh Friday 24 November 2016 Semester 1 Week 10 https://blog.inf.ed.ac.uk/apl16 Topic: Programming for Memory Safety The final block of lectures cover features used in the Rust programming language. Introduction: Zero-Cost Abstractions (and their cost) Control of Memory: Ownership Concurrency and more This section of the course is entirely new — Rust itself is not that old — and I apologise for any consequent lack of polish. Ian Stark Advances in Programming Languages / Lecture 18: Concurrency and More in Rust 2016-11-24 The Rust Programming Language The Rust language is intended as a tool for safe systems programming. Three key objectives contribute to this. Zero-cost abstractions Basic References Memory safety https://www.rust-lang.org https://blog.rust-lang.org Safe concurrency The “systems programming” motivation resonates with that for imperative C/C++. The “safe” part draws extensively on techniques developed for functional Haskell and OCaml. Sometimes these align more closely than you might expect, often by overlap between two aims: Precise control for the programmer; Precise information for the compiler. Ian Stark Advances in Programming Languages / Lecture 18: Concurrency and More in Rust 2016-11-24 Previous Homework Watch This Peter O’Hearn: Reasoning with Big Code https://is.gd/reasoning_big_code Talk at the Alan Turing Institute about how Facebook is using automatic verification at scale to check code and give feedback to programmers. Ian Stark Advances in Programming Languages / Lecture 18: Concurrency and More in Rust 2016-11-24 Guest Speaker ! Probabilistic Programming: What is it and how do we make it better? Maria Gorinova University of Edinburgh 3.10pm Tuesday 29 November 2016 Ian Stark Advances in Programming Languages / Lecture 18: Concurrency and More in Rust 2016-11-24 Optional: Review and Exam Preparation ! The final lecture will be an exam review, principally for single-semester visiting students. -
Developing Rust on Bare-Metal
RustyGecko - Developing Rust on Bare-Metal An experimental embedded software platform Håvard Wormdal Høiby Sondre Lefsaker Master of Science in Computer Science Submission date: June 2015 Supervisor: Magnus Lie Hetland, IDI Co-supervisor: Antonio Garcia Guirado, IDI Marius Grannæs, Silicon Labs Norwegian University of Science and Technology Department of Computer and Information Science Preface This report is submitted to the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in fulfillment of the requirements for master thesis. This work has been performed at the Department of Computer and Information Science, NTNU, with Prof. Magnus Lie Hetland as the supervisor, Antonio Garcia Guirado (ARM), and Marius Grannæs (Silicon Labs) as co-supervisors. The initial problem description was our own proposal and further developed in co-operation with our supervisors. Acknowledgements Thanks to Magnus Lie Hetland, Antonio Garcia Guirado, and Marius Grannæs for directions and guidance on technical issues and this report. Thanks to Silicon Labs for providing us with development platforms for us to develop and test our implementation on. Thanks to Antonio Garcia Guirado for the implementation of the CircleGame application for us to port to Rust and use in our benchmarks. Thanks to Itera w/Tommy Ryen for office space. A special thanks to Leslie Ho and Siri Aagedal for all the support and for proofreading the thesis. Sondre Lefsaker and H˚avard Wormdal Høiby 2015-06-14 i Project Description The Rust programming language is a new system language developed by Mozilla. With the language being statically compiled and built on the LLVM compiler infras- tructure, and because of features like low-level control and zero-cost abstractions, the language is a candidate for use in bare-metal systems. -
Xtend User Guide
Xtend User Guide September 10, 2013 Contents I. Getting Started 5 1. Introduction 6 2. Hello World 7 3. The Movies Example 9 3.1. The Data . .9 3.2. Parsing The Data . 10 3.3. Answering Some Questions . 11 3.3.1. Question 1 : What Is The Number Of Action Movies? . 11 3.3.2. Question 2 : What Is The Year The Best Movie From The 80's Was Released? . 12 3.3.3. Question 3 : What Is The The Sum Of All Votes Of The Top Two Movies?................................. 13 II. Reference Documentation 14 4. Java Interoperability 15 4.1. Type Inference . 15 4.2. Conversion Rules . 15 4.3. Interoperability with Java . 16 5. Classes and Members 17 5.1. Package Declaration . 17 5.2. Imports . 17 5.3. Class Declaration . 18 5.4. Constructors . 19 5.5. Fields . 19 5.6. Methods . 20 5.6.1. Abstract Methods . 20 5.6.2. Overriding Methods . 21 5.6.3. Declared Exceptions . 21 5.6.4. Inferred Return Types . 21 5.6.5. Generic Methods . 22 2 5.6.6. Dispatch Methods . 22 5.7. Annotations . 26 5.8. Extension Methods . 26 5.8.1. Extensions from the Library . 27 5.8.2. Local Extension Methods . 28 5.8.3. Extension Imports . 28 5.8.4. Extension Provider . 29 5.9. Interface Declaration . 29 5.10. Annotation Type Declaration . 30 5.11. Enum Type Declaration . 30 6. Expressions 31 6.1. Literals . 31 6.1.1. String Literals . 31 6.1.2. Character Literals . 32 6.1.3. Number Literals . -
Giant List of Web Browsers
Giant List of Web Browsers The majority of the world uses a default or big tech browsers but there are many alternatives out there which may be a better choice. Take a look through our list & see if there is something you like the look of. All links open in new windows. Caveat emptor old friend & happy surfing. 1. 32bit https://www.electrasoft.com/32bw.htm 2. 360 Security https://browser.360.cn/se/en.html 3. Avant http://www.avantbrowser.com 4. Avast/SafeZone https://www.avast.com/en-us/secure-browser 5. Basilisk https://www.basilisk-browser.org 6. Bento https://bentobrowser.com 7. Bitty http://www.bitty.com 8. Blisk https://blisk.io 9. Brave https://brave.com 10. BriskBard https://www.briskbard.com 11. Chrome https://www.google.com/chrome 12. Chromium https://www.chromium.org/Home 13. Citrio http://citrio.com 14. Cliqz https://cliqz.com 15. C?c C?c https://coccoc.com 16. Comodo IceDragon https://www.comodo.com/home/browsers-toolbars/icedragon-browser.php 17. Comodo Dragon https://www.comodo.com/home/browsers-toolbars/browser.php 18. Coowon http://coowon.com 19. Crusta https://sourceforge.net/projects/crustabrowser 20. Dillo https://www.dillo.org 21. Dolphin http://dolphin.com 22. Dooble https://textbrowser.github.io/dooble 23. Edge https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/microsoft-edge 24. ELinks http://elinks.or.cz 25. Epic https://www.epicbrowser.com 26. Epiphany https://projects-old.gnome.org/epiphany 27. Falkon https://www.falkon.org 28. Firefox https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/new 29. -
Understanding and Mitigating Attacks Targeting Web Browsers
Understanding and Mitigating Attacks Targeting Web Browsers A Dissertation presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Information Assurance by Ahmet Salih Buyukkayhan Northeastern University Khoury College of Computer Sciences Boston, Massachusetts April 2019 To my family, teachers and mentors. i Contents List of Figures v List of Tables vii Acknowledgments viii Abstract of the Dissertation ix 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Structure of the Thesis . .2 2 Background 4 2.1 Browser Extensions . .4 2.1.1 Firefox Extensions . .5 2.1.2 Extension Security . .7 2.2 Vulnerabilities in Web Applications . .9 2.2.1 Vulnerability Reward Programs and Platforms . .9 2.2.2 XSS Vulnerabilities . 10 2.2.3 XSS Defenses . 12 3 CrossFire: Firefox Extension-Reuse Vulnerabilities 14 3.1 Overview . 14 3.2 Threat Model . 15 3.3 Design . 16 3.3.1 Vulnerability Analysis . 17 3.3.2 Exploit Generation . 19 3.3.3 Example Vulnerabilities . 20 3.4 Implementation . 23 3.5 Evaluation . 23 3.5.1 Vulnerabilities in Top Extensions . 23 3.5.2 Random Sample Study of Extensions . 25 3.5.3 Performance & Manual Effort . 27 ii 3.5.4 Case Study: Submitting an Extension to Mozilla Add-ons Repository . 28 3.5.5 Jetpack Extensions. 30 3.5.6 Implications on Extension Vetting Procedures . 31 3.6 Summary . 31 4 SENTINEL: Securing Legacy Firefox Extensions 33 4.1 Overview . 33 4.2 Threat Model . 34 4.3 Design . 35 4.3.1 Intercepting XPCOM Operations . 36 4.3.2 Intercepting XUL Document Manipulations .