John L. Roberts. Clan, King and Covenant: History of the Highland Clans from the Civil War to the Glencoe Massacre. : Edinburgh University Press, 2000. xii + 258 pp. $23.00, paper, ISBN 978-0-7486-1393-9.

Reviewed by Edward M. Furgol

Published on H-Albion (May, 2001)

Roberts has written a good derivative history with Roman Catholic or Episcopalian royalists. He of the Highland clans involvement in Scotland's continually refers to the Presbyterian clans, such national afairs in the seventeenth century. Start‐ as the Campbells, Munroes, and Sutherlands. He ing with James VI's attempts to transform the notes how personality issues prevented the Gor‐ clans into a productive and orderly part of the dons and their allies from frst assisting Montrose kingdom, he continues the study through the frst in the 1640s, and then viscount in 1689. Jacobite rebellion. Roberts' work depends upon However, he concentrates his attention on royal‐ the works of historians such as Stevenson, Cowan, ist clans (a familiar leitmotiv when writing about Dow, Lenman, Hopkins, and Macinnes.[1] He re‐ the Highlands in the 1600s and 1700s)--for exam‐ lies on previous studies even for his primary ple, the various branches of Clan Donald and the sources. The work is a synthesis with few original Macleans. The maneuverings of the Camerons (ac‐ observations, but should not be ignored for that cording to Macinnes a pro-Campbell clan located reason since so few works of merit exist for the in the midst of anti-Campbell ones) is somewhat Highlands. lost in the account. Equally, the author tends to fo‐ Roberts proceeds chronologically from 1609 cus on the clans of Lochaber and Badenoch (home until 1692 with some additional material at either to the adherents of Montrose and Dundee) to the end. His accounts of the leaders of the mid-seven‐ neglect of others. That concentration is acceptable teenth century--Argyll, Huntly, Montrose, and given the restrictions in length and those clans' Alasdair MacDonald--closely follow his predeces‐ contributions to the more dramatic actions of the sors. However, his writing style makes the story of period. royalist resurgence under Montrose and Alasdair The book consists of fourteen chapters that accessible to non-academics and undergraduates. clump into six coherent sections. The frst section Unlike previous Highland clan historians, Roberts (chapters one-three) introduces the shift in gov‐ avoids the error of correlating Gaelic speakers ernment policy (James VI's) and details the back‐ H-Net Reviews ground to the savage warfare that erupted in the real security menace following their victory in Highlands in 1644. Roberts explains how the September 1645, but one they could control. union of crowns allowed the king to implement The third (chapter eight) and fourth (chapters his long-desired policy of integration of the "bar‐ nine-ten) sections bring the story of the Highland barous" Highlands into the "civilized" Lowlands. clans from summer 1650 through March 1689. However, he tends to read too much into the ef‐ The frst portion details the service of the clans in fectiveness of the Statues of Iona. Of equivalent, if the Scottish regular army in 1651, their part in not greater, importance for the dynamics of the Glencairn's rising (1652-54), and how they inter‐ western Highlands were the decline of Clan Don‐ acted with the Protectorate regime. Roberts pro‐ ald and the establishment of part of the clan in Ul‐ vides a straightforward account of how disastrous ster accompanied by the aggrandizement of the service with army was for the clans--the Campbells led by the earls of Argyll, which Buchanans, Macleans and Macleods, for instance, Roberts explains well. Likewise he gives sound sufered horrifc losses at and treatment to the outbreak of rebellion in Scotland Worcester. He explains how the MacDonalds and against Charles I. Chapters two and three detail Camerons sustained Glencairn's efort to raise the activities between 1639 and early 1644 when Scotland for the exiled Charles. Of equal impor‐ the ninth earl of Argyll held sway over much of tance is his discussion of how the English brought the Highlands south of Inverness, while the earls peace and order to the Highlands, while utilizing of Sutherland and Seaforth controlled the remain‐ the clans against each other. der--all in the cause of the . Section four deals with the Restoration period The entire tone of the story changes in the in the Highlands. The chief themes addressed in it second section (comprising chapters four-seven) are the prosecution of the frst marquis and with the arrival of the Irish under Alasdair Mac‐ eighth earl of Argyll; the recovery of his son Donald and Montrose in Perthshire in late August (whose crushing burden of debt led to govern‐ 1644. Until the former's evacuation of Scotland in ment sanctioned campaigns against the June 1647 and the latter's execution in May 1650, Macleans). The campaign pitted Campbells versus they would shake the foundations of the covenan‐ a Maclean-MacDonald alliance from 1669 to 1681. ter state. Roberts ably retells the familiar story of Roberts also treats John Campbell of Glenorchy's how Montrose's presence as leader persuaded bid for the earldom of Caithness, the murder of clansmen, suspicious of the Roman Catholic Irish MacDonald of Keppoch and his brother, and the interlopers, to ally with the foreigners and win a last clan battle between a MacIntosh-government series of victories that left the pros‐ force and the MacDonalds and Camerons at Mul‐ trate in Scotland. Roberts makes a telling point roy in 1688. The return of disorder fomented by that Montrose's fear of losing leadership of the rapacious clans (MacGregors, Camerons, MacDon‐ militant Scottish royalists partially inspired his ac‐ alds of Glencoe and Keppoch), and cateran bands tions in 1644. This rivalry certainly adds another (unafliated brigands) exercised the Edinburgh element to the two men's feud. He continues the government throughout the period. The clans' story with defeats of Montrose (at Philiphaugh in support of the Stuart dynasty--service in the High‐ September 1645), and his inability to revive his land Host that occupied the Presbyterian south‐ fortunes due to Alasdair's concentration on ham‐ west in 1678 and the suppression of the ninth earl mering the Campbells, and the Gordons' refusal to of Argyll's (Whig) rising in 1685--also receive cov‐ assist their fellow royalist owing to Montrose's in‐ erage. By late 1688 the Highlands had returned to volvement in the arrest of Huntly in 1639. The a pattern of earlier in the century--endemic disor‐ royalist cause presented the covenanters with a

2 H-Net Reviews der and pockets of committed loyalty to the crown scoundrel Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat and a brief (especially among anti-Campbell clans--MacDon‐ conclusion on the royal succession and divisions alds and Macleans--and clients--Camerons). in Highland society. A much longer book would Section fve (chapters 11-13) deals with a dete‐ easily have taken the story through the '15, '19, '45 riorating situation of international complexity. and abolition of heritable jurisdictions. In efect Unlike 1660 or 1638 the situation in 1688 difered, we receive only part of the story of the struggle because the British context had become intrinsi‐ between the Stuarts and their Presbyterian oppo‐ cally entwined with great matters of European nents. Having reached the crescendo of Glencoe, politics--the struggle between Louis XIV of France Roberts sweeps crumbs together in way of con‐ and his enemies led by William of Orange, the cluding the book. His failure to discuss Jacobite stadtholder of the Netherlands. William's pres‐ plots, government eforts at imposing control (for ence in southern England with an army following instance, disarming acts, garrisons, military his invasion of November 1688 led to James VII roads, and patronage to clan chiefs), and innova‐ and II's fight; and to political conventions in Eng‐ tions in the economy--forestry, iron works--leaves land and Scotland and a civil war in Ireland. the reader unsure of what happened in the frst French interference in the last threatened to over‐ half of the eighteenth century. Perhaps the author turn William's plan of integrating the island king‐ is already contemplating a second book that will doms into his coalition and gave hope to John Gra‐ cover these matters as well as the later Jacobite ham, viscount Dundee and various Highland risings, and the impact of the abolition of herita‐ chiefs. Here Roberts is at his best (following Hop‐ ble jurisdictions. Such a volume would be a wel‐ kins) as he details the saga of Dundee's rising, Kil‐ come addition for the reading public. liecrankie, Dunkeld, and the end of war in Scot‐ The book possesses limited supporting mate‐ land. His account of the events leading to the mas‐ rial. The single map shows battle sites and little sacre of Glencoe and the atrocity itself covers just else. Those without a good internal geography of over ten percent of the book. Roberts adjudicates Scotland or an atlas at hand while reading the blame for the atrocity to a wide number--not only book may loose all sense of place. The absence of the dishonorable perpetrators, the cold fury of a map generally locating clans (as in the Scottish Dalrymple of Stair the younger, the guilt by denial Historical Atlas or Adams' book on clans) is also of Colonel Hill, the connivance of William II and regrettable. As a popular work the book lacks the III, the blind obedience of Lieutenant Colonel apparatus of scholarly footnotes. A bibliography Hamilton and Major Duncanson, but also the of book length secondary sources appears after greed of the Jacobites chiefs (that delayed negotia‐ the text. Lacking any references to articles or tions and submissions) and the perorations of printed primary resources, it provides only the James in releasing his supporters. Only the earl of foundations for further research. The index is ser‐ Breadalbane (for his attempts at negotiating sub‐ viceable. The publisher's decision to omit illustra‐ missions) and two ofcers who refused to partici‐ tions is problematic. Doubtless that reduced the pate in the massacre escape the tragedy with any book's cost, but the absence of images automati‐ credit. Roberts, like contemporaries, remains ap‐ cally reduces its appeal to the intended audience palled at the lack of consequences endured by the and distances the reader from the people and guilty parties. places discussed. Perhaps someone will be in‐ The fnal section (seven page-long chapter spired by Roberts to produce a documentary, vir‐ 14), contains a summation of the remainder of tual or traditional exhibit or website. (The last William's reign, the career of the colorful would allow the inclusion of portraits, photo‐ graphs of places, historical paintings, contempo‐

3 H-Net Reviews rary and modern maps, documents in both origi‐ sideshow. Although Alasdair MacDonald may nal and typeset format, and artifacts all sustained have had a royal commission (pp. 47-8), being by hypertext.) The dramatic and important nature backed by an army of Roman Catholic Irish made of the story told by Roberts will certainly attract it hardly surprising that men such as Seaforth, some readership, just not one as large it could Sleat, and Dunvegan ignored his blandishments. have. The use of "Argyllshire" (p. 62) instead of the shire Certain quirks and statements detract from of Argyll or simple Argyll violates conventions of the work. Roberts' constant need to cite people by rendering Scottish counties. His claim (p. 102) that their full name and title (for example, Archibald the English sought religious Campbell, eighth earl of Argyll [pp. 23, 27, 29] or freedom of conscience overlooks the army's de‐ Angus MacDonald of Glengarry [pp. 61, 65, 79], nial of it to Episcopalians and Roman Catholics. etc.) is slightly demeaning to the reader and con‐ His assertion that Charles, in early 1647, had little sumes space that could have been used to provide chance of negotiating successfully with Parlia‐ more details. He states (p. 21) that only 140 minis‐ ment (p. 103), overlooks the latter's disastrous ters attended the General Assembly of the Church mishandling of the army that prevented an agree‐ of Scotland in 1638, ignoring the fact that the ment. Claiming that David Leslie (p. 104) could body has always been representative. On the have received command of the Engager Army is same page he ignores the fact that Argyll made his nonsensical, since he refused to accept the En‐ frst public stand with the covenanters at the as‐ gagement and would later become a leader of the sembly--a signifcant addition of military strength Whiggamore Raid against the Engager party. to their cause. He also states the establishment of Roberts' argument that the should in the church dates from 1707, have levied Highland clans (p. 104) overlooks the when it is actually 1690. He portrays (p. 32) the degree of contempt that Lowlanders held them in royalist/anti-Campbell/anti-covenanter alliance as for allying with the Irish and slaughtering Low‐ pitting Roman Catholic MacDonalds against Pres‐ landers without quarter. Their inclusion in the byterian Campbells, ignoring Protestant Episco‐ Engager movement would have caused some sup‐ palian clans such as the Camerons. While under‐ porters to abandon the cause. It is essential to re‐ standing (p. 35) that activity by Randal MacDon‐ member that the Engagers were moderate and ald, 2nd earl of Antrim and Roman Catholic clans conservative covenanters. Their agreement with would hurt the crown inside Scotland, he fails to Charles I included a trial period of Presbyterian‐ recognize that unleashing that alliance would ism in England, which indicates that they were have been disastrously short-sighted as viewed not an Episcopalian or more generally royalist from England and Wales. Equally, he fails to see party. In the forces of the Whiggamore Raid, that the grant of Sunart and Ardnamurchan to Roberts omits (p. 104) the Fife and Borders ele‐ MacDonald of Sleat and the transference of feudal ments. (The former's inclusion is important, since superiority of William MacIntosh, Captain of Clan it gave the Dutch potential allies in eastern Scot‐ Chattan, from Argyll to Huntly not only harmed land.) His list of nobles on the raid unaccountably the Campbells (p. 35), but also clan Cameron neglects the earl of Buccleuch. In discussing which had a claim to those lands and disliked the Charles II's need "to sign away almost all his pow‐ Gordons as much as they detested their ancient ers" (p. 108), overlooks the fact that Charles I had enemies the MacIntoshes. The fxation with Ulster already done so in 1641. (This is repeated on p. in reference to the Irish rising (p. 37) overlooks 113, when he says the king became "a fgure‐ the primacy of the Dublin plot by the Irish Con‐ head"--in efect the very aim of the movement and federates; Ulster was the more successful nothing new in 1650.) When listing the causes of

4 H-Net Reviews defeat at (p. 114) Roberts omits the un‐ derry marks a tremendous failure of French readiness of the Scots army due to the extinguish‐ naval strategy in British and Irish waters between ing of matches for the and the ofcers' 1689 and 1692. The British and Dutch, on the oth‐ desertion of their units to fnd covered lodging. In er hand, appreciated the advantages of naval recounting the battle of Inverkeithing, the author power--secure movement of troops and supplies, oddly fails to state that the Maclean motto (which interdiction of enemy movements of the same, translates as "Another one for Hector") came from and devastation of enemy trade and preservation the clan's desperate attempt to save the chief's of friendly commerce. French failure to under‐ life. In recounting the impact of the Popish Plot in stand these concepts allowed Mackay of Scourie Scotland, Roberts states "Argyll" erred (p. 150), to bring his troops from the Netherlands to Scot‐ when he meant Lord Macdonell. In referring to land, saved Londonderry, permitted an anti-Jaco‐ the frearms of the Highland Host of 1678 he calls bite buildup in Ireland (1689-1690), and meant the Highlanders' matchlocks "old-fashioned" (p. that Dundee and his successors could not ade‐ 153), which is incorrect since British regulars did quately tap the resources of Ireland. In essence not entirely receive fintlocks until after 1700. His France's inability to utilize its naval resources en‐ claim that Sir Ewan Cameron of Lochiel fought at sured the defeat of its allies in Scotland and led to Worcester (p. 175), is simply wrong--the chief nev‐ a waste of investment on behalf of its client James er left Scotland in 1651. In discussing Lord Strath‐ Stuart in Ireland. Roberts' discussion of post-1688 naver in 1689 (p. 183) it would be more accurate bigotry against Scots Episcopalians overlooks the to say that he "rallied to the" Presbyterian, not fact that they had implemented the same draconi‐ Protestant, cause since the Jacobites Dundee and an policies against Presbyterians from 1660 to the Camerons (at least) were Episcopalians--hence 1685. Protestants, too. In discussing the efect of the Although many deserted Simon Fraser to gain Highland (p. 185) he overlooks the critical the favor of the earls of Atholl, Fraser retained the role at Culloden and Sherifmuir of musketry not loyalty of the Forbeses of Culloden, the Brodies of cannon fre, while entirely overlooking the ability Brodie and some of the Grants. Either for person‐ of cavalry to defeat Highlanders. Likewise the en‐ al or political reasons he maintained ties with tire concept of efective fre as developed some respectable families until the '45. Roberts' in the British army in the 1700s, when troops retailing of Fraser's story without reference to the were trained to hold their initial volley until the Scots Plot is unfortunate. The Jacobites sent Fraser enemy reached merely 40-50 yards away, is ig‐ to Scotland to sound out their supporters. When nored in his discussion of Killiecrankie (pp. 190, he realized he could use Jacobite plotting to his 192). The discussion of Hugh Mackay of Scourie's advantage, he incriminated his enemy Atholl. By order of battle at Killiecrankie (p. 187) seems to doing so he stirred up a hornet's nest in Scotland, have changed three additional infantry regiments forcing him into exile again, but equally disturbed into "three more companies of foot." The state‐ the French and their Jacobite allies by whom he ment that Mackay's army carried "old-fashioned" was imprisoned. The account of the '15 (p. 245), plug bayonets (p. 190) is incorrect; they were the which neglects the Jacobite activities of Macken‐ best British regulars had until socket bayonets be‐ zie of Fraserdale (titular Lord Lovat and thus Si‐ came standard c.1700. mon Fraser's rival) compresses the story rather In referring to the relief of Londonderry in too much and makes the revival of Simon even 1689, Roberts implies (p. 197) that the British mili‐ more remarkable than it was. Roberts would have tary units lifted the . In fact two ships of the done better to have removed Simon Fraser and Royal Navy saved the town. The relief of London‐ treated matters such as government attempts to

5 H-Net Reviews control the Highlands after 1700 or Jacobite in‐ the House of Stuart and their opponents in the trigues. On the same page he underrates the en‐ Highlands. hanced political power of the dukes of Argyll, Note whose control of political patronage allowed them [1]. D. Stevenson, Alasdair MacColla and the to control many more parliamentary seats than Highland Problem in the Seventeenth Century (Ed‐ the seventeenth century earls had done. Along the inburgh, 1980); E.J. Cowan, Montrose: For same line, he observes that chiefs abandoned vio‐ Covenant and King (London, 1977); F.D. Dow, lent feuding for politics, but overlooks the legal Cromwellian Scotland (Edinburgh, 1979); B. Len‐ feuds in which they indulged. The list of later Ja‐ man, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1749 cobite risings (p. 245) omits the '19, which while (London, 1980); idem, The Jacobite Clans of the inefectual allowed the Hanoverian government Great Glen 1650-1784 (London, 1984); P. Hopkins, to raise the specter of Tory disloyalty. Although Glencoe and the End of the Highland War (Edin‐ Roberts is correct that "the very nature of clan‐ burgh, 1986); and A.I. MacInnes, Clanship, Com‐ ship had began to dissolve" before 1745 (p. 246), merce and the House of Stuart 1603-1788 (East he overlooks the insight of at least one important Linton, 1996). contemporary. The duke of Argyll in the prelude to the '45 realized the dangers of leasing land sole‐ Copyright 2001 by H-Net, all rights reserved. ly on economic grounds. To preserve his power H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of base he instructed his factors to favor Campbells this work for nonproft, educational purposes, as leaseholders overturning his predecessor's pol‐ with full and accurate attribution to the author, icy of taking the highest bid. His decision turned web location, date of publication, originating list, largely on the recognition that a highland chief's and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. power still came out of the barrel of a gun. Indeed For any other proposed use, contact the Reviews government policy of commissioning chiefs as editorial staf at [email protected]. regular and /fencible colonels after 1748 in‐ dicated that latent military power could still serve useful purposes in maintaining one's status and wealth. The closing statements (p. 247) that Jaco‐ bite chiefs and clansmen had a commitment to the , neglects the corollary Whig allegiance of the same classes in maintaining the Hanoverians. The author's failure to evaluate the impact of the abolition of heritable jurisdictions in 1748 is remarkable. Without their jurisdictions the chiefs lost the power of pit and gallows--an es‐ sential coercive element in clan control. Ignoring its demise, seen by lowland lawyers as a rational act of improvement (along the lines of the Statues of Iona), seems unimaginable given its tremen‐ dous immediate and long-term impact on High‐ land society. Despite these problems, the book re‐ mains one worthy of attention for those uninitiat‐ ed in the seventeenth century struggles between

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Citation: Edward M. Furgol. Review of Roberts, John L. Clan, King and Covenant: History of the Highland Clans from the Civil War to the Glencoe Massacre. H-Albion, H-Net Reviews. May, 2001.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5128

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