The Marxist Dilemma in Kerala: Administration and/or Struggle Author(s): Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 11, Elections and Party Politics in India: A Symposium (Nov., 1970), pp. 993-1003 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642819 Accessed: 04-08-2015 17:32 UTC

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This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 04 Aug 2015 17:32:01 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE MARXIST DILEMMA IN KERALA: ADMlINISTRATION AND/OR STRUGGLE / RobertL. Hardgrave,Jr.

7lhepolitical polarization envisioned by somein thewake of theCongress splithas notmaterialized. It is clear,nevertheless, that the polar extremesof India's politicalspectrum are becomingmore powerful, that the Jana Sangh on itheright and the Marxistson the lefthave assumedincreasing impor- tancein India's politicallife. Their strength is geographicallyconcentrated in differentregions-the Jana Sangh in the Hindi heartland;the Marxist in WestBengal and Kerala. It is withinKerala thatthe Marxistshave had theirgreatest appeal. Investigationsof coalitiongovernment in the Indian statesand whereparties of theleft have enjoyedwide electoralappeal is of increasingimporta!nice- two dim,ensionls of party politics in India thathave receivedbut limitedattention. Kerala is a land of contradictionsin a nationof contrasts.It is a minia- tureof India,with all variablespushed to theirextremes. As India's smallest state,Kerala has ithehighest birthrate and thegreatest pressure on theland. It 'aboundsin agriculturalwealth, yet must import half ilts food supply.Its internationalexports bring 25 % of India's dollarearnings, yet Kerala's per capita incomeis thelowest in India. It has thehighest literacy rate and the highestrate of unemployment.With the largest community of Christians,it has thehighest Communist vote also. It is at once a bastionof orthodox Hinduism,with the most elaborate system (of caste rankingin India and, at thesame time, a regiondeeply affected by the processof social mobilization and change.With many of the "prerequisites"of politicalmodernization, Kerala is regardedby theC!ommunist Party of India (Marxist)-or CPM- as an advanced outpost of revolutionary struggle.1 In 1957, the CommunistParty of India formeda ministryunder E. M. S. Nambolodiiiipad and governed the state for twenty-eightmonths until a masss upsurge" brought central interventionand President's Rule. Ten

'For a discussion of the political sociology of Kerala, see Robert L. Hardgrave,Jr., "Caste in Kerala: A Preface to the Elections," Economic Weekly,November 21, 1964, pp. 1841-48; and "Caste and the Kerala Elections," Economic Weekly,April 17, 1965, pp. 669-72.

993

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 04 Aug 2015 17:32:01 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 994 MARXIST DILEMM4A IN KERALA years later,in 1967, Namboodiripad again formeda Government, is nine in a broadly-based,iton-Congress United Front. Although the Communims had deepenedtheir hold amongKerala's poorestclasses, particularly the agriculturallaborers, their support remained remarkably stable. Indeed, witha -highdegree of politicalliteracy and participation,Kerala reflectsa salienceof partyidentity rare in India. In the fourelections over the last decadein Kerala,the Communists have maintained approximately one-third ofthe vote, with fluctuations and a low ofsome 28% in 1965.2The Congress9 likethe Communists, has maintaineda fairlysteady third of the vote,and, an anti-Congressalliance could securelyisolate it frompower. The seven- partyUnited Front, with 52% of 'thevote, gained 117 of the 133 Assembly seats and 17 of the 18 Parliamentary seats in the 1967 election. Congress was reduced;to 9 seatsin theAssembly, despite the supportof 35%oof th(e electorate.For thesecond time, E. M. S. Namboodiripadtook over as Chief Ministerof India's "problemstate." In October1969, the United Front government collapsed after 31 monthiji in office-thelongest tenure of Kerala's ten ministriesand fiveperiods of PresidentialRule. Hangingon afterthe resignationof seven of the twelve ministersand thewithdrawal of four parties from the coalition government., Namboodiripadfinally resigned in theface of a majoritymotion in theAs- semblyon the issue of corruption.The issue of corruptionprovided a con' venientsmoke-screen around whichdivergent parties, without regard to theirclass characterand ideologicalincompatibility, might rally against the Marxists.The vote on themotion, 69-60, formalizedwhat had been the deepeningdivision among the constituentparties of the UnitedFront. A CPI Memberof Parliament,Achutha Menon, placed responsibility for theGovernment's collapse on the big partybossism of the CPM, its cdis- ruptivebehavior, and sectarianpolicies. To the surpriseof all, in a bid to avert President'sRule, Menon succeededin weldingsufficient solidarity amongthe 'heterogeneous parties to forma Government-unitedmore in their oppositionto theMarxists than in thedetermination to fulfillthe promises of the 1967 election. But on the basis of this commitment,Menon claimed his Governmentas 'heirsuccessor to the UnitedFront. The "mini-front,"' as it was called,in supplantingthe anti-CongressUnited Front became es sentiallyan anti-Marxistfront. The new Governmentcoalition, led by the, CPI, included the Muslim League, the ISP, and the Kerala Congress, with theRSP in supportoutside the Ministry. Unwilling to testhis claim t a majorityWithout Congress support by calling the Assemblyinto session, Menonalluded to supportfrom unnamed defectors from the Marxist camp. When theyidid not materialize, the Congress split convenientlyopened the possibilityof support fromthe "progressive" Indira Gandhi faction. The Marxistshad been thrownout, ostensibly on chargesof corruption.

'For the best discussionof the split and contemporarybackground of the Commnsasiist party,see Mohan Ram, Indian Commnnismn,(Delhi: Vikas, 1969).

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Ministerialcorruption, both for personal enrichment and partyaggrandize- ment,had been an issue of increasingconmrn. In itheMarxist view, how- e .er,some degreesof corruption,while not sanctioned,are perhapsinevi- table-even in themost revolutionary parties-as theystruggle in a corrupt society,to workin a dialecticalprocess within the system in orderto break the system.3Glearly, however, the real issues which broughtdown the Gov- ement werefar moreserious and lay in the natureof the UnitedFront itself. The UF had been forgedas an electoralalliance of sevenparties with a minimumnprogram.Although less eclecticthan Ram ManoharLahia's "non- Gongressism"(;advocating a frontof all oppositionparties across the politi- cal spectrumto dislodgethe Congress), the left-led United Front in Kerala cameto powerwith serious internal contradictions. It was an electoralfront withlimited programmatic objectives, but the Marxistssought to esablish theirown hegemony within the Front and to transformit intoan instrument of stTuggle. The Marxists conceive of the United Front governmentsin Kerala and WestBengal as "instrumentsof struggleMi the hands of the people,more than as governmentsthat actually possess adequate power, that can ma- teriallyand substantiallygive relief;to the people." "In clear class terms," the,CPM CentralCommittee stated in 1967, ",ourParty's participation in such Governmentsis one specificform of struggleto win more and more people,and moreand more allies forthe proletariatand its allies in the strugglefor the cause of People's Democracyand at a later stage for so- ciaiism."4 The UnitedFront then is forthe Marxistsessentially a revolu- tionaryconcept. For the CPI and others,such a stance was "big party chauvinism." The CPI has mademuch of a reportedspeech in Londonby B. T. Rana. dive,a memberof the CPM Politburo.The taskof theUF Government,he reportedlysaid, was "to unleashdiscontent" of the people rather an "to giverelief."5 Achutha Menon, Chief 'Minister of thenew mini-front Govern- met.,,in reviewingwhat happenedin Kerala, accused the Marxistsof a "'wrong, and sectarianapproach." "Of course,"he wrote,"the powerand resourcesof a state governmentfunctioning under our constitutionare limitedand we shouldcertainly not be a partyto fosterunwarranted illu. sions amongthe people that everything they desire will be done forthem. But withinall these limitations,it is possible to give some reliefto our much sufferingpeople and give thema betteradministration than the Congress haldgiven."6 The Marxistswere alleged to have used the police and thead-

interviewwith Mathew Kurian, Trivandrum,January 1970. Also see M. Basavapun- naiai in People's Democracy,Oct. 19, 1969, p. 7. 4New Situation and Party's Tasks, Calcutta: CommunistParty of India (Marxist), 1967,p. 70. 'Indian Express,June 22, 1969. lkhst Happened in Kerala, New Delhi: CommunistParty of India, 1969, p. 2.

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ministrativemachinery Iof the state government'as an,adjunct of the party, theirefforts being directedmainly against the 'CPI. They were also accused of interferingwith the administrativespheres under the control of other parties,notably agricultureand industry,under CP'I ministers.At the same time, withinthe areas of their own administrativeresponsibility, the Marx- ists failed to provide any effectiverelief to the people-as in theirhandling of the food procurementprogram and in the two year delay in passage of the land reformact. The Marxists thuswere charged with seekingto advance theirown position at the expense of allied parties withinthe United Front on the one hand and with failure to implementthe minimumprogram on the other. The Namboodiri'pad-government'did indeed emerge with a relativelylow performancerecord on a number of accounts, but ironically its failure to implementmore of the minimumprogram wasidue in considerable measure to caution. In choosing to work within the system, 'theywere inevitably limited by it, conditioned by "the possible" in the system's terms. Indeed, some six months'after 'the UF governmentcame to power in 1967, the Cen- tral Committeeof the CPM was 'highlycritical of the Marxist leadership in Kerala for its failure to "'independentlymobilize the people" and for put- ting forward "only such proposals as are likelyto be immediatelyaccepted by 'otherpartners."7 A year later, the Central Committeeagain took note of the "serious shortcomings",of the Kerala leadership. It warned of the dan- gers inherentin the type of parliamentarystruggle engaged in and of the "reformistand constitutionalillusions it breeds."8 While the CPI attacked the Marxists fo'r failure "to give relief," the "Naxalite" groups in Kerala, adhering ;to a Maoist line of revolutionary struggle,attacked the Marxists for their revisionistconcern for incremental reform.Efforts to provide surplus land to the landless,is regarded by the Naxalites, for example, 'as involving a danger of "en-bourgeoisficiation," ,thuscreating a class of small peasants withlittle revolutionary potential. The Marxists,as Lenin earlier had done, reject the a-rgumentthat only through intensificationof poverty can a revolutionarysituation emerge, i.e., the worse it is, the better it is. In rejecting the left 'sectarianthesis, however, the Marxists 'have not really ,answeredthe problem. There are indeed serious risks in 'a program 'of land reform when there is simply not enough land for 'those to whom it has been promised, 'when the only viable economic answer in Marxist terms,is not land-to-the-tiller,but collectivization. The Naxalite gr'o'upsin Kerala have received wide publicity and 'have aroused much 'concern.9With its leadership jailed or dead, the movement -never really larger than some 4,000 activists-has been severelysetback.

'Central CommitteeResolutions, adopted at Madurai, August 18 to 27, 1967, p. 33. 8Political-OrganizationalReport, Central Committeeof the 8th Congress of the CPI (M), Cochin, December 23-29, 1968, Calcutta: CPI (M), 1969, p. 177. 9See Marcus F. Franda's analysis of the Maoist groups in India in "India's Third CommunistParty," Asian Survey,IX:12, December 1969, pp. 797-817.

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There iarenow some six distinctgroups: an ineffectual,largely verbal CPI (Marxist-Leninist) group, centered among the Trivandrum employees of the Indian Life Insurance Corporation; the CommunistRevolutionary Party and its splinter, both led by .defectorsfrom the CPM; the "Kosalramdas groups," anotherMarxist offshootwith a limited,trade union following; the Kunnikalites,the group which led the abortive raids in North Wynaid in late 1968; land 'a Kunnikalite faction,nurtured by the conviction that their leader, Kunnikal Nairayan,betrayed the revolutionby surrenderingto the police. Beyond the handful of Naxalites, however, there exists within the Marxist party considerable sympathyfor the extremistposition and a feel- ing of general unease with parliamentary-or at least governmental-par- ticipation. Criticized by the CPM Central Committeeand increasingly sensitive to the attackfrom the left-4oth withinthe Kerala Marxist party and fromthe Naxalite'splintergroups-the CPM assumed a more aggressive stance with.- in the UF, particularly afterthe Marxist success in the West Bengal mid- termelections and perception.of expanding power on the part of coalition partners. This 'was most apparent in -thecase of the Mu-slimLeague. The League had, to 'beginwith, come into the United Front under very favorable conditions. With 'a geographic stronghold,they elected 14 ioftheir 15 can- didates. Four of ;theeleven UF ministerswere Muslim, 'althoughMuslims formonly 18 per cent of thepopulation 'ofKerala. Under the UF Government, the League won recognitionfor Muslim private sohiools,a Muslim majority districtwas created in Malabar, middle-class positions opened in the bu- reaucracy to Muslims, and a Muslim was appointed to the High Court. With the electorate of the Malabar region divided in a three-waysplit between Congress, the Muslim League, and the Marxists, the League holds the 'bal- ance. In courtingit, however,the Marxists.had contributedto 'theLeague's enhanced status among all Muslims, thus threateningthe Marxist hold among the poor Muslim peasantry and agriculturallabor. The benefitsse- cured byftheLeague were in factlargely for the middle.~class-and the Le'ague leadership remained, as before, in the hands of a wealthymercantile class. The League had, however,received 'a new respectability:its communal and feud-alcharacter had been soft-pedaled by the Marxists themselves. The Marxists eventuallyfelt it imperative to recoup,their position among the landless laborers 'of the Muslim community.The League in.consequence be- came immediately defensive. The CPI seemed to' be -theother beneficilaryof the United Front Govern- ment. The splitin 1964 had leftthe CPI withlittle more than its.leadership, a hold on the trade union movement, land a, pocket 'of support among the cashew workers,of Quilon District.Using the industryand agricultureport- folio's the CPI soulgphtto advance its position. Its policies, appealing to the middle peasant and the ulrbianmiddle-class, came into direct conflictwith the Marxist position from the beginning. Within.the early months of the ministry,the CIPI had 'alreadybegun -themaneuvers which were to culminate

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 04 Aug 2015 17:32:01 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 998 MARXIST DILEMMA IN KERALA in theisolation of theMarxists in thecoalition. The CPM reacted"from below"in moreaggressive trade union activity, cutting at thealready mini- mal base of CPI supportthrough the creationof paralleland competitive unionsin some cases, or, in others,complete capture of the unionsfrom within."From above," theMarxists treated the CPI as the "main enemy" withinthe UF Governmentand soughtto undercutits ministerialposition. If theMarxist attitude toward its coalitionpartners became more "big brotherly,"however, the fear of losing officethrough central intervention led, forall thetalk of confrontationwith the Center, to ensnarlementin the bureaucraticimbroglio so muchdespised by theMarxists. Their experience did indeeddemonstrate the difficultiesof managinga coalitionin a state governmentunder the Indian constitution,but thismade littleimpression on the people.And withtheir ignominious departure the Marxistslost the potentialbenefits of being cast fromoffice because theyhad acted in the nameof thepeople. Had theMarxists, once in power,simply begun to im- plementradical land reformmeasures, for example, rather than to placate theircoalition partners and waitinterminably for Presidental approval, the Governmentmight well have been forcedto resign,but thepolitical capital accruedwould have beenenormous. Ranadive perhaps was suggestingsuch a tacticwhen he urgedMarxist ministers "to pressahead withlegislations whichwere likely to be vetoedby the centeror the High Court.Such con- frontations,"he continued"were designed to tellmasses of the impossibility of carryingthrough fundamental reforms under the present constitution."10 The Marxistsunder the UF Governmentsought to combineadministra- tion and struggle,popular initiativeplus utilizationof the administrative machineryfor the advancement of the "basic classes."The CPI, on theother hand, sought"efficient administration." M. N. GovindanNair, the CPI leader and AgricultureMinister under the UF, denouncedthe Marxist strategy:"Administration and strugglecannot go together:either give up administrationand continuethe struggle or give up the struggleand carry on the administration."" For all its administrativefailures, however, the Marxist Government had notbeen withoutachievements. It was arguedthat whatever possible relief shouldbe given,but that given "the extremely limited and curtailedpowers and resourcesof the stateGovernments," only meager ameliorative relief measurescould be provided.It was arguedthat "the devastatingeffects of the deepeningeconomic crisis . . . can onlybe redressedby a radicaland revolutionarychange in the entiresocial setup."'2 With little potential for immediateeconomic growth and dependentalmost wholly on theCenter for financialsupport, politics in Kerala approachesthe character -of a zerosum

:tIlndianExpress, June 22, 1969. "Quoted by E. M. S. Namboodiripadin Right CommunistBetrayal of Kerala U.F. merd Government,Calcutta: CPI (M), 1969,p. 7. "Political OrganizationalReport, op. cit.,p. 173.

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 04 Aug 2015 17:32:01 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR. 999 game.The Marxists'achievements came at theexpense of otherparties; the reliefof certainclasses at the expenseof others. Withlimited resources, the Marxists relied more on symbolicoutput than on a redistributionof wealth.The Marxistpolice policy is a case in point. The Kerala HomeMinistry specified as it did underthe Communist Govern- mentin 1957, thatthe police shouldnot interferein mass strugglesexcept whenthere was an actualoutbreak of violence.The police,as an instrument of the State,would no longerbe used againstthe people for the protection of vestedinterests. The gherao,coercive encirclement for "quick justice," was acceptedas a formof peacefuldemonstration and thereforeas legit- imate.The policywas attacked,however, as beingselectively enforced so as to advanceMarxist struggles. Local police werealleged to be willingto act only on the expressinstruction of Marxistcadre. The perceivedthreat to the propertiedclasses was equatedwith a "breakdownof law and order." Like themass upsurgeof tenyears before, the situation was highlycolored by class perspective. 0. P. Sangal has notedthat:

The veryfact of the CPM emergingas thedominant political force in theState changed the psychology of the overwhelming majority of the downtroddenand oppressed masses. They felt as ifthey had themselves comeinto power. And this feeling was strengthenedby theireveryday experience.For example,without any legislative or executiveaction on thepart of the government, the wages of agricultural workers increased farabove the normal market rate just because of the changed political atmospherein thestate. It becamepossible for ordinary workers and peasantleaders to get anyoppressive government official transferred fromhis favoritearea of operation.

"The greatestmistake that the CPI appearsto have committedin Kerala," Sangal argued:

is itsfailure to make an objectiveassessment of the CPM's strength,its massbase and its place in the politicallife of the State.If the CPI leaderswere not suffering from gross subjectivism, they would have seenthat the CPM hadbecome the chief vehicle and the main organiza- tionalexpression of the communist movement in Kerala.Whatever mis- takesthe CPM mighthave committed in thepast or maycommit in the future,the CPI can neverhope to replaceit.13

Duringthe period of "administrationand struggle,"the Marxists sought to extendtheir social base-particularlyamong agricultural labor. The re- actionof the otherparties in the UF was acceleratedby the eventswithin theCongress. The Congresssplit provided the ideological escape, for in the conceptionof the Indian situation held by theCPI, collaborationwith "pro-

"3TheCitizen, November 8, 1969,p. 24.

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 04 Aug 2015 17:32:01 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1000 MARXIST DILEMMA IN KERALA gressive" elementsof the Congress is possible. Herein lies the narrow, yet crucial ideological distinction,between National Democracy, as held by the CPI, and People's Democracy, as held by the CPM. Both are regarded as transitionalstages to socialism and involve the same class alliances-a coali- tion of the anti-feudal,anti-imperialist, and anti-monopolyclasses. People's Democracy, however, presupposes the hegemony of the working class, and such hegemonyis only to be achieved by protractedstruggle. The Marxist assessment!of the character of the Indian State is specified in the party program: "The present Indian state is the organ of the class rule of the bourgeoisie and landlord, led by the big bourgeoisie, who are increasingly collaborating with foreign finance capital in pursuit of the capitalistpath of development."'4The CPI denies that the Indian leadership is dominatedby the monopoly bourgeoisie: "The State of India is the organ of the class rule of the national bourgeoisie as a whole, in which the big bourgeoisie holds powerful influence.This class has strong links with the landlords.These factorsgive rise to reactionarypulls on the State power."'5 The CPI takes the Congress split as opening "a new stage in the differentia- tion between the representativesof the monopoly and non-monopolystrata of the bourgeoisie in the Congress" and "a new alignmentof political forces in the country."'6 The various Maoist groups share the basic assessmentof the CPI (Marx- ist-Leninist): "The Congress Governmentrepresents the interests of the Indian feudal princes, big landlords and bureaucratic-compradorcapital- ists."117There are no contradictionswithin the enemy camp, and the bour- geoisie in its entiretymust be fought together. The Marxists regard the Naxalite position as politically unrealistic,a formof political expressionism best characterized by Lenin's diagnosis, "an infantiledisorder." However, romantic the appeal of instant revolution,India is not at this stage in a revolutionarysituation. The organization and consciousness of the working class remains "at la pitiably low level."'8 This is feltto be the case since, "despite the intensifyingeconomic-politi- cal crisis and the sharpening of class contradictionsand the class struggle, movingthe masses into action on an ever-increasingscale, the political crisis is far from maturing into a revolutionarycrisis or ripening into a revolu- tionary situation."'9 A raid on a police station or the assassination of a landlord may reap psychic benefitsto those engaged in such furtiveefforts, but theycannot substitutefor political organization and protractedconflict

"Programme,Calcutta: CPI (M), 1964,p. 25. 1""Programmeof the CommunistParty of India," in Documents Adopted by the Eighth Congressof the CommunistParty of India, Patna, February 7-15, 1968, p. 297. "Mohit Sen, "DifferentiationWithin the Indian Bourgeoisie," Mainstream,Decem- ber 13, 1969,p. 28. "Quoted fromthe CPI (M-L) programby E. M. S. Namboodiripadin an interview in The Radical Review (Madras) Vol. 1, No. 2 (January1970), 17. "8PresentPolitical Situation,Report adopted by the Central Committeeof the CPI (M)I Calcutta,February 2.7, 1970, Calcutta: CPI (M), 1970, p. 19. "'Ibid., p. 25.

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 04 Aug 2015 17:32:01 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ROBERT L. HARDOGRAVE, JR. 1001 guidedby a sense of whatcan in factbe achieved.Going back to Lenin, MathewKurian, Marxist theorist and economist,argues that extremism is anotherform of opportunism."Both revisionismand extremismare two formsof expression of the same middle-class, petty bourgeois vascillation."20 In thepath between the "revisionism"of theCPI and the"left sectarian- ism" of the CPI(M-L), the Marxistshave been willingto align withthe non-monopolybourgeoisie for tactical purposes "in theinterests of thebig- gerbattle." They regard the contradictions within the Indian bourgeoisie as real and seek to fullyexploit them. Indeed, even the Indian monopoly bourgeoisiemay come in conflictwith foreign monopolists, and in such in- stancesthe Marxists are preparedto cooperatewith the class enemyin anti- imperialiststruggle. The Marxists,however, have regardedthe CPI's stance as beingone ofsubservience to thenational bourgeoisie, and theirquarrel withthe CPI, intensifiedby the internalconflicts of the UF governments, blindedthe Marxists to thedeepening strains within the Congress. After the Congresssplit in February1970, the CentralCommittee of the CPM ad- mittedunderestimating "the inner contradictions in theCongress combine." In "utilizingthe two UF stateGovernments of Kerala and WestBengal as the advancedoutposts of the democraticrevolutionary movement for un- leashingbig class and mass forces. . . we were,for the most part emphasis- ing the intensificationof the class and social contradictionsand the con- sequentsharpening of the class strugglein the countryand tended to underestimatethe political impact of thedifferences and spliton theruling Congress party and Government."'21 In seekingto combineadministration and struggle,the Marxistshave been unwillingto abandonthe opportunitiesafforded by electoraldemoc- racy forthe isolation of the underground,although they remain prepared to do so in theface of serious attempts to outlawthe party or to forceit into politicalisolation. "Elections," says P. GovindaPillai, editor of theMarxist Malayalamdaily, "are a means to reach and mobilizelarge numbersof people."22The politicalcampaign becomes a vehicleof theparty's expand- ing social base. It reachespotential allies which violenceand terrorism wouldonly alienate and repel.While "the ruling classes allow the luxury of parliamentary!democracy only so long as theirown class interestsare not threatened,Nambooldiripad, in so faras possible,would use theconstitution as "an instrumentof struggle."'23"Our partyis of theview that, so long as this systemcontinues, it is in the interestof the workingclass . . . to so

20Interview,Trivandrum, January 1970. 2"PresentPolitical Situation, Report adopted by the Central Committeeof the CPI (M) Calcutta,February 2-7, 1970, Calcutta: CPI (M), 1970, p. 21. 22Interview,Cochin. December 1969. 23The Republican Constitutionin the Struggle for Socialism, R. R. Kale Memorial Lecture, Poona: Gokhale Instituteof Politics and Economics, 1968, p. 1. In this im- portantstatement, E.M.S. spells out the Marxist stance in relation to the constitution and introducesa programfor overhauling the state structure,with the "widest autonomy forthe various states." pp. 16-20.

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 04 Aug 2015 17:32:01 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1002 MARXIST DILEMMA IN KERALA utilizethe institutions as builtup on thebasis (ofthis Constitution as to fur- therconsolidate and strengthenthe struggles of the working people for basic social transformations."24 "Anypolitical party," Kurian states, "however revolutionary, if it under- standsreal politicsfunctioning within the bourgeoissystem, must play the game of thesystem, but thoughsometimes compromise may be necessary, a revolutionaryparty cannot build its programon bourgeoismethods like horse-trading."25Thus, in additionto and inseparablefrom parliamentary tactics,the Marxists insist upon thenecessity of extra-parliamentaryforms of struggle.Success is thecriterion by whichtactics are to be judged. "The only criterionon whichMarxism-Leninism bases itselfwhen it selectsa particularmethod for bringing about social transformations,"according to Namboodiripad,"is whetherit willserve the purpose." He does notreject or extolany particularform of strategy,violent or nonviolent,but he notes, "theform depends on themood of thepeople, their sentiments, their unity and cohesion."26 The militantposture assumed by theMarxists immediately after the mini- frontcame to powerserved to cementwhat would have been an almostim- mediatelyunstable coalition. As it was,even the right wing Kerala Congress wentalong with the land reformimplementation. Frustration seemed more to dictatethe Marxist tactic than a sensitivityto thesituation. On all sides, however,it was admittedthat the CPM had notlost anyiof its own support. The Marxistshold theallegiance of theincreasingly conscious and militant landlesslaborers, but their activities 'have alienated them from the broader base of supportrequired to securean absolutemajority in an election.27 The September1970 electionsin Kerala wouldseem to confirmthis per- spectiveand to underscorethe basic stabilityof electoralbehavior in the state.While the resultsare not yet fullyavailable as this journal goes to press,the Marxists,though reduced from 49 to 30 seats in the Assembly, retainedthe 23.5% ofthe vote they had capturedin 1967. Even withoutadd- ing thevotes of the threeMarxist-supported independents, who have since joined theparty, the CPM emergesas thelargest political party in Kerala, a positionpreviously enjoyed by theundivided Congress. The call forelections had come as a surprise.The contradictionswithin themini-front Government were becoming increasingly evident with the de- mandsfor an expandedministry. Buoyed by confidenceof his own success, ChiefMinister Achutha Menon dissolved the Assembly in Juneand calledfor freshelections in theearly Fall. The move was designedto strengthenthe positionof the CPI as well as to securea decisivemajority for the Govern- ment.Under the impendingstrain of demandsfor the apportionmentof seats,the tensions within the mini-front deepened. The Kerala Congressand

"Ibid.,p. 3. "Interview,Trivandrum, January, 1970. 2"Ibid. interviewewwith K. P. Karunakaran,Trivandrunm, January 1970.

This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 04 Aug 2015 17:32:01 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR. 1003 theISP withdrew,and an opposition"Democratic Front" was formedwith an alliancebetween the Kerala Congressand theorganization Congress, in electoraladjustment with the ISP, theJana Sangh, and theKerala Karshaka Party.The Marxistbloc remainedintact, with the SSP, KTP, and KSP. The incumbentmini-front, composed of the CPI, the MuslimLeague, and the RSP, added the Praja SocialistParty and, mostsignificantly, entered into and "understanding"with Indira Gandhi's"new" Congress. The threefront election, attracting visits by nationalparty leaders, in- cludingPrime Minister Indira Gandhi, brought roughly a 70% turnout.The electioncaptured national headlines with the dramaticshowing of the new Congress,portending the possibility of generalelections in February1971. Aftervirtual eclipse in the Assembly,the Congresswas again a forceof considerablepower, with 32 seatsinstead of itsprevious 5. Althoughchoos- ingto remain outside the Government, the Congress provides Achutha Menon withthe secure majority he sought.The newCongress received 19.2% ofthe vote,a declinefrom that secured by the undividedCongress in 1967, but thevotes still held by theold Congresswere insufficient to gain it even one seat in the Assembly.The victoriesof the new Congressbring into Kerala politicsa powerfulinfluence of youth,for much of the energybehind the partyarises from the pro-Indira Gandhi Youth Congress and fromthe Con- gress-affiliatedKerala StudentUnion, which controls some 70% of the col- lege unionsin thestate.28 The Congressvictory was clearlynot the triumphover the Marxists pro- claimedso widelyin the Indian press.The Marxistshad, in fact,not only held theirown in thepercentage of votes,but withthe inclusionof the in- dependents,had actuallyaugmented their position. The impressiveCongress victories-as theirdefeats in 1967-were fundamentallythe product of front tactics.This is especiallyclear in Malabar, wherethe Marxistssuffered severelosses at thehands of the Congress because 'of the latter's understand- ing withthe Muslim League. But the heraldeddefeat of the Marxistcan- didatesdid not apparentlycut intotheir percentage of the votes. The electionsrevealed the weakness of theNaxalites. All six of the"rev- olutionarycommunists" who contested the elections lost their deposits. The Marxists,however, have movedvigorously since their ouster in 1969 to es- tablishtheir own militant credentials. Struggle was the dominanttheme of theircampaign, and theyare unlikelyto set it aside in electoraldefeat. The Marxistshave retainedtheir base of supportamong the poor and landless of Kerala, and,with time, it is likelyto expand.Under such circumstances, theirreduction of seats and isolationin the Assemblymay well serveas a catalystto increasingmilitancy and theroad of revolution.

2BTheHindustan Times, September 26, 1970.

ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR. is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Universityof Texas.

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