A Psychology-Based Typology of Hawkish And
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Of Six Minds on the Matter: A Psychology-based Typology of Hawkish and Dovish Decision Makers By © 2017 Adam David Brown Ph.D., University of Kansas, 2017 M.A., University of Kansas, 2008 B.Sc., Missouri Western State University, 2006 Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Co-Chair: Mark Joslyn Co-Chair: Juliet Kaarbo Donald Haider-Markel John Kennedy Ludwin Molina Date Defended: 28 June 2017 The dissertation committee for Adam David Brown certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Of Six Minds on the Matter: A Psychology-based Typology of Hawkish and Dovish Decision Makers Co-Chair: Mark Joslyn Co-Chair: Juliet Kaarbo Date Approved: 28 June 2017 ii Abstract Foreign policy elites are often labeled "hawks" or "doves," and states’ foreign policies can vary widely depending on whether hawks or doves prevail. Yet seldom asked is this question: why are some elites hawks and others doves? I seek to answer this question. A few previous studies also address this question. However, they typically suffer one or both of the following shortcomings. First, they often overlook variations among elites within the hawk and dove categories. Second, they typically fail to systematically assess the characteristics distinguishing hawks from doves. I provide an improvement by systematically assessing the characteristics distinguishing hawks from doves and exploring differences among elites within the two categories. Specifically, I propose a psychology-based six-fold typology comprising three hawkish and three dovish decision maker types. I distinguish among the types via differing operational codes, personality traits, hypothesized susceptibilities to cognitive errors/biases, and hypothesized foreign policy positions. To test my typology’s validity, I examine content analysis of selected George W. Bush administration officials’ verbal behavior. This facilitates determining if elites are classifiable via my typology. To test my typology's hypotheses, I use congruence analysis of selected elites’ decision making leading up to the 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq. This qualitative analysis allows me to determine the errors and biases to which examined elites are susceptible and the elites’ policy positions. iii Acknowledgements I would like to offer to my committee heartfelt thanks for their assistance with what has been a long process. Juliet Kaarbo, co-chair of my committee, has been generous beyond all reasonable expectation. She has patiently encouraged, guided, and helped me even as her career took her across the Atlantic. I owe her a tremendous debt of gratitude. Mark Joslyn, also co-chair of my committee, has given me crucial moral support. Further, he and Donald Haider-Markel have played key roles in shepherding this project. I cannot overstate the importance of their support and the support of my entire committee. Above all, I thank my wife and family. They have tirelessly stood by me over the years, and the completion of my dissertation would not have been possible without them. iv Table of Contents Introduction 1-14 Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework 15-98 Chapter 2: Research Design 99-130 Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis of Personality Trait and Beliefs 131-170 Chapter 4: Qualitative Analysis of Decision Making 171-227 Chapter 5: Conclusion 228-233 References 234-246 Appendix A 247 Appendix B 248-249 v Introduction After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, as Iraq became increasingly prominent in the United States’ foreign policy agenda, President George W. Bush faced competing pressures from the so-called “hawks” and “doves” in his administration. The hawks – Vice President Richard “Dick” Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and especially Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz – proposed, and sometimes vigorously advocated, attacking Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein’s regime (Binnendjik and Lin 2014; Gordon and Trainor 2006; Ricks 2006; Robison 2006; Woodward 2002; 2004). The doves, principally Secretary of State Colin Powell, counselled against war and for a peaceful course of action under United Nations auspices (Gordon and Trainor 2006; Harnden 2003; Ricks 2006; Robison 2006; Woodward 2002; 2004). Though hawkish pressures eventually prevailed and the US invaded Iraq in March 2003, in accounts of the administration’s eventual decision for war with Iraq both the hawks and doves are key players (see e.g., Gordon and Trainor 2006; Ricks 2006; Woodward 2002; 2004). The case of the US decision to invade Iraq is not unique in being marked by hawk-dove struggles to win in foreign policy debates. “Hawks” and “doves” are often central figures in matters of war and peace, arguably the most critical aspects of international relations. Unfortunately, though, we know precious little about either hawks or doves. The labels hawk and dove are commonly, even popularly (e.g., Alsop and Bartlett 1962; Gelb 1992; Left 2002), applied to foreign policy decision makers, and the decision makers bearing these labels can play, and indeed have played, key roles in shaping their states’ foreign policies. Hawks and doves are often highlighted by scholars’ accounts of all conflict stages – rivalry to crisis, crisis to war, war to peacemaking (e.g., Iklé 2005; Heffington 2016; Schultz 2005; Snyder and Diesing 1977; 1 Stanley 2009a, 2009b; Vasquez 1993). Yet, in spite of the frequent application of the labels and the importance of foreign policy elites bearing them, we have a very limited understanding of hawks and doves. Little work has gone into peeling back the labels to explore this question: why are some foreign policy decision makers hawks while others are doves? In fact the question is all too infrequently even asked. Without asking this question, much less answering it, we are poorly positioned either to anticipate which decision makers will be hawkish or dovish, or to understand why hawkish and dovish elites act the way they do. This lack of attention is thus problematic and in need of redressing. The dichotomous categorization inhering in the terms themselves is perhaps equally problematic. The assignment of one-size-fits-all hawk and dove labels risks papering over substantial differences among elites within each of the broad categories. A systematic way of identifying hawkish and dovish elites and distinguishing among elites of each type is sorely needed. This work lays out just such systematic means for identifying hawkish and dovish decision makers as well as ways to differentiate among elites residing within the hawkish and dovish camps. Specifically, I offer a six-fold typology consisting of three hawkish and three dovish foreign policy decision maker types. This typology is firmly rooted in psychology, with distinctions among the types based on varying beliefs, personality traits, preferences (stemming from beliefs), and perceptions of opponents’ preferences. Decision maker types are also distinguished by hypothesized varying proneness to specific cognitive errors and biases. Susceptibilities to errors and biases are, I propose, affected by the other variables that differentiate the types, but the susceptibilities also further distinguish the types and facilitate anticipating their behavior. I ultimately derive from my typology hypotheses predicting each decision maker type’s likely foreign policy positions. The validity of the typology and all 2 hypotheses stemming from it are subjected to close scrutiny via mixed-methods empirical testing. These various aspects of my study offer much in the way of correcting the current shortcomings in our understanding of hawks and doves. My typology serves to answer the questions of why some elites are dovish, why some decision makers are hawkish, and why hawkish and dovish decision makers behave as they do. Moreover, by breaking the hawk-dove dichotomy open and providing a six-fold classification of hawkish and dovish decision makers, this work helps to overcome the restrictive and over-simplified view that currently dominates thinking about dovish and hawkish foreign policy makers. The remainder of this chapter begins with a short discussion intended to illustrate hawkish and dovish decision makers’ crucial roles in matters of war and peace. I next provide a critical assessment of past efforts to define and identify hawkish and dovish decision makers. I follow this critical assessment by very briefly introducing and explaining the benefits of my own approach to defining and theorizing about hawkish and dovish foreign policy elites. I then discuss the broader contributions offered by my approach. The chapter concludes with a succinct roadmap of the remainder of this work. War and Peace: The Importance of Hawks and Doves Dovish and hawkish decision makers have often occupied a prominent place in accounts of international rivalries, crises, militarized disputes, war, and conflict termination (e.g., Colaresi 2004; Heffington 2016; Iklé 2005; Schultz 2005; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Stanley 2009a, 2009b; Vasquez 1993). A few examples illustrate the importance placed upon hawks and doves’ roles in both war and peace. John Vasquez (1993: 223), in his explanation of war between rivals, emphasizes increasing influence of hawkish elites at the expense of dovish decision makers as 3 “an important step toward war.” 1 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing (1977: 297) argue that analysis of hawkish and dovish elites “is absolutely necessary to an understanding not only of information processing in a crisis, but also decision making.” 2 In fact, Snyder and Diesing view hawkish and dovish elites as so crucial to explaining crises that they undertake the first systematic effort to describe the psychological characteristics of hawks and doves (see below). While Vasquez (1993) and Snyder and Diesing (1977) highlight the role of hawks and doves in the genesis of international conflicts, others focus on the place of doves and hawks in the termination of conflicts. Kenneth Schultz (2005), for example, places hawkish and dovish leaders at the center of his effort to model how rivalries end.