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Multiple Referral and U.S. House Legislative Success in the 1990s Glen S. Krutz and Courtney L. Cullison We examine the impact of multiple referral on legislative processing in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1991-98. Previous literature leaves off with the 1980s, but party control of the House changed in the 1990s and with it, came a new approach to multiple referral. Did this change alter the impact of multiple referral status on bill progression? In the main, our analysis confirms certain previous findings, while adding some interesting new twists. While multiple referral hurts a bill’s chances of success in some stages of statute-making (committee passage, floor passage), a finding consistent with the literature, we find that it provides a boost to chances of receiving com- mittee attention in the first place. Moreover, we find that the hit that multiply-referred bills take in committee and on the floor is much greater than suggested previously. Separate analyses conducted before and after the Republican reforms of 1995 reveal distinct differences. For example, in the Re- publican-controlled environment from 1995-1998, multiple referral bills were slightly more likely to see the House floor, whereas they were less likely to make it in the Democratic House from 1991-94. The ability for the Speaker (and Parliamentarians) to refer bills to more than one committee was among the most visible changes enacted during the 1970s House reforms. Reflecting the tendency of House committees to in- creasingly share issue jurisdictions, this institutional change made sense to many. While the adoption of this reform, like many other changes across congressional history, may be logically traced to the dual goals of improving congressional capacity and appeasing power bases in the committee system (King 1997; Schickler 2001; Smith 1989), understanding the impact of mul- tiple referral is less obvious. On the one hand, it induces committees to share expertise on bills that pertain to more than one committee, which could lead to cooperation and, hence, legislative productivity (King 1997). On the other hand, multiple referral creates more veto points for pieces of legislation as they traverse the daunting legislative process (Rieselbach 1994). We examine the impact of referral from the point at which the literature leaves off—the always fascinating 1990s, which featured three different Speakers and a return to Republican rule. After reviewing the state of the literature on multiple referral, we discuss our design and method. We then ______________ We thank the Political Science Department and the Carl Albert Center at The University of Okla- homa for the general support provided for this study. Stanley Bach, Gary Copeland, Michael Givel, Paul Goren, Patrick Kenney and Cindy Simon Rosenthal provided helpful comments on this subject. We also thank the Editor and three very thorough anonymous reviewers. GLEN S. KRUTZ is the associate director of the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center and an associate professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma. COURTNEY L. CULLISON is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Texas at Tyler. The American Review of Politics, Vol. 29, Spring, 2008: 65-81 ©2008 The American Review of Politics 66 | Glenn Krutz and Courtney Cullison present the findings and conclude with a discussion about the implications of this institutional change. Previous Research The practice of referring bills to more than one committee is a rela- tively new procedure in the House of Representatives. First instituted as part of the 1974 overhaul of committee jurisdictions, multiple referral was in- tended to do several things. First, it was intended to produce better legisla- tion by allowing for input from several different committees and bringing more individuals into the consideration of bills. In addition, it was expected that multiple referrals would encourage cooperation across committees and keep jurisdictional conflicts in check. There was also a political motive—the option of multiply referring a bill was expected to strengthen the Speaker- ship and the Rules Committee (Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart 1988). Since 1975, multiple referrals have become common in the House, and, as of 1990, accounted for fifteen to twenty percent of all measures intro- duced and reported (Young and Cooper 1993, 213).1 This rising significance led several scholars to turn their attention to the effects of this new congres- sional practice. The joint result of this literature is the conclusion that mul- tiple referrals have affected virtually all aspects of the legislative process, from committee consideration to leadership power and, finally, the success of legislation.2 Committee Consideration Multiple referral has affected the dynamics of committee consideration. Committees now must engage in strategic actions when considering multiple committee measures, or even before a bill has been referred. A committee may choose a strategy of cooptation, seeking to limit or even negate the effect of other committees in the process. If such a strategy is chosen, it will most often take place during the drafting of the legislation. Predictably, this type of strategy increases conflict among committees, intensifying jurisdic- tional disputes and ultimately sounding the defeat of a measure that may have otherwise had a good chance of success (Young and Cooper 1993). A second strategy option for a committee is cooperation. In fact, com- mittees may even interact in a cooperative manner prior to referral. Com- mittee and staff members may be simultaneously involved in the drafting of legislation, or may agree to some sort of pre-referral bargains. These bar- gains may be an agreement about what type of referral to request, or an agreement regarding which sections of the bill will be handled by each com- mittee (Young and Cooper 1988). Multiple Referral and Legislative Success in the 1990s | 67 Once a bill has been formally referred by the Speaker (in reality, the Parliamentarian) and is under consideration by more than one committee, the process may follow a few different paths. Committees for which jurisdic- tional overlap is the norm may proceed differently than committees for which multiple committee legislation is a rarity. Committees often paired by multiple referral are most likely to develop a set of standard practices for handling legislation. Committees that do not often work together may have more divergent perspectives, and thus find it more difficult to process legis- lation (Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart 1998). Any time a committee receives a bill that has been multiply referred (regardless of the frequency of multiple referrals to the committees), it must closely monitor the other committees handling the bill. If the legislation has broad support, the general pattern is for one committee to take the lead by referring the bill to subcommittee for hearings. The other committees will hold off in their consideration until they are certain that the lead committee wishes to act on the bill (Young and Cooper 1993). It has been observed that committees often directly communicate with each other over the course of bill consideration. This communication can prevent the duplication of effort and streamline the process of committee consideration, as well as further the reconciliation of differences of the com- mittees. However, Young and Cooper (1993) found no evidence of greater occurrence of joint hearings as multiple referrals have become more common. Other scholars have argued that multiple referral has undermined committee autonomy and encouraged committees to guard their territory. Though many committees have developed a set of informal norms that govern joint consideration and reduce open jurisdictional conflict, these understandings do not restore autonomy. Committees that were once free to act independently are now placed in interdependent relationships with two or more committees on a regular basis (Smith and Deering 1990). Floor Action and Conference Multiple committee bills can prove difficult to manage on the floor. Before such a bill can move to the floor, any differences among the com- mittees must be ironed out with compromises, bargains, and prearranged amendment rules (Young and Cooper 1993). If a compromise cannot be reached, the Rules Committee is faced with the decision of which commit- tee’s version to bring to the floor and allowing the other committee’s version to be offered as an amendment. This may result in open conflict on the floor. To avoid this potential hindrance, the Speaker or members of the Rules Committee may step in as a broker or arbitrator (Smith 1989; Young and 68 | Glenn Krutz and Courtney Cullison Cooper 1993). This need for compromise after a bill is reported out of com- mittee is another area where committees have lost autonomy. One committee can no longer determine the context of floor consideration; that is, a single committee may harbor less influence with the Rules Committee on a mul- tiple committee bill. The increase in multiple referral has also contributed to the growth of special rules. One of the most common special rules is the provision for alternative substitutes. Multiple committee bills are seven times more likely to be given such a rule, partially due to their complex and controversial nature (Smith 1989). Restrictive rules have also proved useful in the floor management of multiple committee bills. A restrictive rule can ensure pro- tection of committee compromises, and thus committees may be more will- ing to make such compromises. A restrictive rule can also give committee leaders the option of leaving more controversial provisions in a bill to a floor vote without fear that the entire bill will be dismantled (Young and Cooper 1993). Multiple referral may also affect the House beyond their passage of a bill. If a bill survives both House and Senate floor consideration, House con- ferees may be disadvantaged if the bill was handled by multiple committees.