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Alienvault Usm Appliance Plugins List

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Alienvault Usm Appliance Plugins List ALIENVAULT USM APPLIANCE PLUGINS LIST This is the current plugin library that ships with AlienVault USM Appliance as of May 21, 2019. The AlienVault Labs Security Research Team regularly updates the plugin library to increase the extensibility of USM Appliance. These plugins enable your USM Appliance to process and analyze logs produced by your existing devices and applications quickly. Plugin Name Vendor Model a10-thunder-waf A10 Thunder WAF abas abas ERP abas accellion-kiteworks Accellion Kiteworks actiontec Actiontec Verizon FIOS router adaudit-plus ManageEngine ADAudit Plus aerohive-wap Aerohive Networks Wireless Access Point airlock Envault Airlock airport-extreme Apple AirPort Extreme aix-audit IBM Aix Audit aladdin SafeNet eSafe alcatel Alcatel Arista Switch allot Allot Communications NetEnforcer alteonos Nortel Networks Alteon amun-honeypot Amun Amun Honeypot Apache Software apache Apache HTTP Server Foundation Apache Software apache-ldap OpenLDAP Foundation Apache Software apache-syslog Apache HTTP Server Foundation Apache Software apache-tomcat Tomcat Foundation aqtronix-webknight AQTRONiX WebKnight arista-switch Arista Switches arpalert-idm Arpalert Arpalert arpalert-syslog Arpalert Arpalert array-networks-sag Array Networks Secure Access Gateway artemisa Artemisa Artemisa Honeypot artica Artica Proxy artillery Binary Defense Artillery Honeypot ALIENVAULT USM APPLIANCE PLUGINS LIST aruba Aruba Networks Mobility Access Switches aruba-6 Aruba Networks Wireless aruba-airwave Aruba Networks Airwave aruba-clearpass Aruba Networks ClearPass as400 IBM AS400 ascenlink Xtera AscenLink assp Anti-Spam SMTP Proxy Anti-Spam SMTP Proxy asterisk-voip Asterisk VoIP asus-router AsusTek Wireless Router avast Avast Free Antivirus avaya Avaya VSP switches avaya-gateway Avaya Media Gateway avaya-wireless Avaya Wireless LAN axigen-mail GeCAD Axigen Mail Server azure-atp Microsoft Advanced Threat Protection barracuda-link- Barracuda Link Balancer balancer barracuda-ng Barracuda Next Gen Firewall barracuda-spam Barracuda Spam Firewall barracuda-sslvpn Barracuda SSL VPN barracuda-waf Barracuda Web Application Firewall barracuda-webfilter Barracuda Web Filter bind ISC BIND bit9 Carbon Black Enterprise Protection bit9_v7 Carbon Black Enterprise Protection bitdefender- Bitdefender GravityZone gravityzone blackboard-learn Blackboard Learn bluecoat Blue Coat ProxySG bluecoat-packetshaper Blue Coat PacketShaper bomgar Bomgar Remote Support and Privileged Access bro-ids Bro Bro NSM brocade Brocade Brocade Devices bromium-vsentry Bromium vSentry buffalo Buffalo Americas TeraStation canary-tools Canary Tools carbonblack Carbon Black Enterprise Response carbonblack-idm Carbon Black Enterprise Response cb-defense Carbon Black Defense ALIENVAULT USM APPLIANCE PLUGINS LIST cerberus-ftp Cerberus FTP Server checkpoint-mepp Check Point Media Encryption and Port Protection cisco-3030 Cisco VPN 3000 Series cisco-ace Cisco ACE Application Control Engine cisco-acs Cisco ACS Secure Access Control Server cisco-acs-idm Cisco ACS Secure Access Control Server cisco-asa Cisco ASA Adaptive Security Appliance cisco-asr Cisco ASR Aggregation Services Router cisco-call Cisco Call Manager cisco-cube Cisco Cisco Unified Border Element cisco-cucm Cisco Unified Communications Manager cisco-esa Cisco AsyncOS Email Security Appliances cisco-expressway Cisco Expressway cisco-firepower Cisco FirePower cisco-fw Cisco Firewall Services Module cisco-ids Cisco IDS Intrusion Detection System cisco-ips Cisco IPS Intrusion Prevention System cisco-ips-syslog Cisco IPS Intrusion Prevention System cisco-isa Cisco ISA cisco-ise Cisco ISE cisco-meraki Cisco Meraki cisco-nexus-nx-os Cisco NX-OS Next Generation Intrusion Prevention System cisco-ngips Cisco NGIPS cisco-pix Cisco PIX Private Internet eXchange cisco-prime Cisco Prime cisco-router Cisco Router cisco-rv Cisco RV Series VPN Router cisco-ucs Cisco Unified Computing System cisco-viptela Cisco Viptela cisco-vpn Cisco VPN cisco-wlc Cisco Wireless LAN Controller citrix-netscaler Citrix Systems NetScaler clamav ClamAV ClamAV clamwin-nxlog ClamWin ClamWin Free Antivirus claroty-platform Claroty Platform clearswift Clearswift Secure Email Gateway cloudpassage CloudPassage Halo ALIENVAULT USM APPLIANCE PLUGINS LIST Resource Group (Cluster Service) Manager clurgmgr Red Hat Daemon comodo-antivirus Comodo Antivirus contentkeeper-sig ContentKeeper Secure Internet Gateway corero-ips Corero IPS correlog CorreLog CorreLog Windows Agent and Toolkit coslat-hotspot Coslat Security Systems Hotspot courier Courier-MTA Courier Mail Server crowdstrike CrowdStrike Falcon Host crushftp CrushFTP CrushFTP cryptospot CRYPTTECH cryptoSPOT cyberark CyberArk Enterprise Password Vault cyberguard CyberGuard SG565 cyberoam Sophos Cyberoam-Firewall cyberx-xsense CyberX XSense cylance Cylance CylancePROTECT cyphort Cyphort Cyphort APT Defense Platform darktrace Darktrace DCIP datto-siris Datto Siris Platform Digital Defense ddi-frontline Frontline Vulnerability Manager Incorporated deepsec-agent Trend Micro Deep Security Agent deepsec-manager Trend Micro Deep Security Manager defender-tokengo Quest Software Defender GO-6 Token dell-chassis DELL M1000 Chassis dell-equallogic Dell EqualLogic dell-force DELL Force10 Switches dell-idrac Dell iDRAC dell-secureworks DELL SecureWorks dell-switch Dell Switches denyall-waf DenyAll DenyAll WAF dhcp Microsoft DHCP Client Service dhcp-nxlog Microsoft DHCP Client Service dlink-des D-Link DES Series dlink-firewall D-Link UTM Firewall dlink-wireless D-Link Unified Wireless Controller dovecot Dovecot Secure IMAP Server dragon Enterasys Dragon IDS draytek-vigor DrayTek Vigor ALIENVAULT USM APPLIANCE PLUGINS LIST drupal-wiki Drupal Drupal CMS dtex Dtex Systems (Pty) Ltd Dtex duo-2fa Duo Two-Factor Authentication eljefe Immunity El Jefe emc-datadomain Dell EMC DataDomain emc-isilon Dell EMC Isilon emc-recoverpoint Dell EMC RecoverPoint emc-vnxe Dell EMC VNXe emet Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit enterasys-rmatrix Enterasys Matrix N-Series eset Eset Eset exchange Microsoft Exchange Server exchange-nxlog Microsoft Exchange Server extrahop-reveal ExtraHop Reveal extreme-nac-manager Extreme Networks NetSight NAC Manager extreme-switch Extreme Networks Switch extreme-wireless Extreme Networks Summit Series f5 F5 BIG-IP f5-firepass F5 FirePass SSL VPN fail2ban Fail2ban Fail2ban failsafe Damballa FailSafe falconstor FalconStor Software IPStor fatpipe-mpvpn FatPipe Networks MPVPN fidelis IBM Fidelis Network Data Loss Protection fireeye FireEye MPS fireeye-cm FireEye CM fireeye-hx FireEye HX Series forcepoint-dlp Forcepoint DLP forescout-nac ForeScout CounterACT fortiauthenticator Fortinet FortiAuthenticator fortigate Fortinet FortiGate fortiguard Fortinet FortiGuard fortimail Fortinet FortiMail fortiweb Fortinet Fortiweb fortiWLC Fortinet fortiWLC freeipa FreeIPA FreeIPA freeradius FreeRADIUS freeradius fw1-alt Check Point FireWall ALIENVAULT USM APPLIANCE PLUGINS LIST fw1-cef Check Point FireWall gajproactive gajshield gajproactive geist-watchdog Geist Watchdog gfi GFI Vipre Antivirus glastopng Honeynet Project GlastopfNG Honeypot Global Technology gta-firewall Firewall Associates h3c-ap H3C AP h3c-switch H3C Ethernet Switch ha-proxy HAProxy HAProxy harpp-ddos HARPP HARPP DDoS Mitigator heartbeat Linux-HA Heartbeat hitachi-hnas Hitachi NAS Platform honeybot Atomic Software Solutions HoneyBOT honeyd Honeyd Honeyd Virtual Honeypot hp-chassis HP BladeSystem Chassis hp-eva HP EVA Storage hp-msm-controller HP MSM Integrated Controller hp-san-switch HP SAN Switch hp-switch HP Switch hp-wireless HP E-Series Mobility hpe-3par HPE 3PAR hpe-ilo HPE Integrated Lights Out huawei Huawei NG-Firewall huawei-ips Huawei IPS huawei-router Huawei Enterprise Router hytrust-keycontrol HyTrust Key Control ibm-imm IBM Integrated Management Module ibm-infosphere- IBM InfoSphere Guardium guardium ibm-tam IBM Tivoli Access Manager WebSEAL ibm-websphere IBM Websphere iboss IBoss iboss iis Microsoft IIS Internet Information Services iis-nxlog Microsoft IIS Internet Information Services imperva-securesphere Imperva SecureSphere impravata-onesign Imprivata Onesign incapsula Imperva Incapsula WAF infoblox Infoblox DNS Server ALIENVAULT USM APPLIANCE PLUGINS LIST intrushield McAfee IntruShield IPS ipfw FreeBSD IPFW Firewall iprism Edgewave iPrism iptables Suse IPTables ironport Cisco IronPort isa Microsoft ISA Internet Security and Acceleration Server jboss Red Hat JBoss Middleware juniper-ex Juniper Networks EX Series juniper-idp Juniper Networks IDP Series juniper-mx Juniper Networks MX Routers juniper-nsm Juniper Networks NSM Network and Security Manager juniper-srx Juniper Networks SRX Series juniper-vpn Juniper Networks SA Secure Access Series kaspersky Kaspersky Antivirus kaspersky-sc Kaspersky Security Center kaspersky-sc-db Kaspersky Security Center kemp Kemp Technologies VLM-2000-W kerio-connect Kerio Technologies Kerio Connect kismet Kismet Kismet Wireless Linq2FA Innovative Solutions LinQ2FA linux-usergroupadd Linux Useradd/Groupadd linuxdhcp Linux DHCP linuxdhcp-idm Linux DHCP Server logbinder-sp LOGbinder LOGbinder for SharePoint lucent-brick Lucent VPN Firewall Brick m0n0wall M0n0wall M0n0wall Embedded Firewall malwarebytes Malwarebytes Malwarebytes malwarebytes-br Malwarebytes Breach Remediation malwarebytes-es Malwarebytes Endpoint Security mcafee McAfee Antivirus Engine mcafee-antispam McAfee Anti-Spam mcafee-db McAfee Database Security mcafee-epo McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator mcafee-mvision McAfee MVISION Cloud mcafee-mwg McAfee McAfee-MWG
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