Margin Investing
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Financial Statements of the Budapest Stock Exchange for the Year 2016 Table of Contents
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE BUDAPEST STOCK EXCHANGE FOR THE YEAR 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS BALANCE SHEET 3 INCOME STATEMENT 5 NOTES TO THE 2016 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 6 BUSINESS REPORT 33 Statistical Code 12853812-6611-114-01 Company’s Reg. Num. 01-10-044764 BALANCE SHEET Budapest, 18 April, 2017 Richárd Végh Ildikó Auguszt Chairman-CEO Financial Director 3 | Financial statements of the Budapest Stock Exchange for the year 2016 Statistical Code 12853812-6611-114-01 Company’s Reg. Num. 01-10-044764 Budapest, 18 April, 2017 Richárd Végh Ildikó Auguszt Chairman-CEO Financial Director 4 | Financial statements of the Budapest Stock Exchange for the year 2016 Statistical Code 12853812-6611-114-01 Company’s Reg. Num. 01-10-044764 INCOME STATEMENT Budapest, 18 April, 2017 Richárd Végh Ildikó Auguszt Chairman-CEO Financial Director 5 | Financial statements of the Budapest Stock Exchange for the year 2016 NOTES TO THE 2016 ANNUAL REPORT GENERAL COMPANY INFORMATION Name of Company: Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság Address of Company: H-1054 Budapest, Szabadság tér 7. Company’s Registration No.: Cg. 01-10-044764 Data of persons authorised to Richárd Végh, Chairman-CEO sign the report on behalf of the Address: H-2010 Budaörs, Kálvária utca 7. Company: Ildikó Auguszt, Financial Director Address: H-1138 Budapest, Róbert Károly krt. 18/C The person charged with the management of bookkeeping tasks and the preparation of the annual report: Ildikó Auguszt (address: H-1138 Budapest, Róbert Károly krt. 18/C, registration No. 120433). Statutory audit is obligatory for the Company. Data of the Auditor KPMG Hungary, Audit, Tax and Advisory Services Limited Liability Company HU-1134 Budapest, Váci út 31. -
Up to EUR 3,500,000.00 7% Fixed Rate Bonds Due 6 April 2026 ISIN
Up to EUR 3,500,000.00 7% Fixed Rate Bonds due 6 April 2026 ISIN IT0005440976 Terms and Conditions Executed by EPizza S.p.A. 4126-6190-7500.7 This Terms and Conditions are dated 6 April 2021. EPizza S.p.A., a company limited by shares incorporated in Italy as a società per azioni, whose registered office is at Piazza Castello n. 19, 20123 Milan, Italy, enrolled with the companies’ register of Milan-Monza-Brianza- Lodi under No. and fiscal code No. 08950850969, VAT No. 08950850969 (the “Issuer”). *** The issue of up to EUR 3,500,000.00 (three million and five hundred thousand /00) 7% (seven per cent.) fixed rate bonds due 6 April 2026 (the “Bonds”) was authorised by the Board of Directors of the Issuer, by exercising the powers conferred to it by the Articles (as defined below), through a resolution passed on 26 March 2021. The Bonds shall be issued and held subject to and with the benefit of the provisions of this Terms and Conditions. All such provisions shall be binding on the Issuer, the Bondholders (and their successors in title) and all Persons claiming through or under them and shall endure for the benefit of the Bondholders (and their successors in title). The Bondholders (and their successors in title) are deemed to have notice of all the provisions of this Terms and Conditions and the Articles. Copies of each of the Articles and this Terms and Conditions are available for inspection during normal business hours at the registered office for the time being of the Issuer being, as at the date of this Terms and Conditions, at Piazza Castello n. -
Margin Requirements Across Equity-Related Instruments: How Level Is the Playing Field?
Fortune pgs 31-50 1/6/04 8:21 PM Page 31 Margin Requirements Across Equity-Related Instruments: How Level Is the Playing Field? hen interest rates rose sharply in 1994, a number of derivatives- related failures occurred, prominent among them the bankrupt- cy of Orange County, California, which had invested heavily in W 1 structured notes called “inverse floaters.” These events led to vigorous public discussion about the links between derivative securities and finan- cial stability, as well as about the potential role of new regulation. In an effort to clarify the issues, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston sponsored an educational forum in which the risks and risk management of deriva- tive securities were discussed by a range of interested parties: academics; lawmakers and regulators; experts from nonfinancial corporations, investment and commercial banks, and pension funds; and issuers of securities. The Bank published a summary of the presentations in Minehan and Simons (1995). In the keynote address, Harvard Business School Professor Jay Light noted that there are at least 11 ways that investors can participate in the returns on the Standard and Poor’s 500 composite index (see Box 1). Professor Light pointed out that these alternatives exist because they dif- Peter Fortune fer in a variety of important respects: Some carry higher transaction costs; others might have higher margin requirements; still others might differ in tax treatment or in regulatory restraints. The author is Senior Economist and The purpose of the present study is to assess one dimension of those Advisor to the Director of Research at differences—margin requirements. -
Margin Requirements and Equity Option Returns∗
Margin Requirements and Equity Option Returns∗ Steffen Hitzemann† Michael Hofmann‡ Marliese Uhrig-Homburg§ Christian Wagner¶ December 2017 Abstract In equity option markets, traders face margin requirements both for the options them- selves and for hedging-related positions in the underlying stock market. We show that these requirements carry a significant margin premium in the cross-section of equity option returns. The sign of the margin premium depends on demand pressure: If end-users are on the long side of the market, option returns decrease with margins, while they increase otherwise. Our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to different margin specifications and various control variables. We explain our findings by a model of funding-constrained derivatives dealers that require compensation for satisfying end-users’ option demand. Keywords: equity options, margins, funding liquidity, cross-section of option returns JEL Classification: G12, G13 ∗We thank Hameed Allaudeen, Mario Bellia, Jie Cao, Zhi Da, Matt Darst, Maxym Dedov, Bjørn Eraker, Andrea Frazzini, Ruslan Goyenko, Guanglian Hu, Hendrik Hülsbusch, Kris Jacobs, Stefan Kanne, Olaf Korn, Dmitriy Muravyev, Lasse Pedersen, Matthias Pelster, Oleg Rytchkov, Ivan Shaliastovich, as well as participants of the 2017 EFA Annual Meeting, the SFS Cavalcade North America 2017, the 2017 MFA Annual Meeting, the SGF Conference 2017, the Conference on the Econometrics of Financial Markets, the 2016 Annual Meeting of the German Finance Association, the Paris December 2016 Finance Meeting, and seminar participants at the Center for Financial Frictions at Copenhagen Business School, the CUHK Business School, the University of Gothenburg, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison for valuable discussions and helpful comments and suggestions. -
Massive Delisting on the Prague Stock Exchange
CAN THE MARKET FIX A WRONG ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION? MASSIVE DELISTING ON THE PRAGUE STOCK EXCHANGE Zuzana Fungáčová CERGE-EI Charles University Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Economics Institute WORKING PAPER SERIES (ISSN 1211-3298) Electronic Version 335 Working Paper Series 335 (ISSN 1211-3298) Can the Market Fix a Wrong Administrative Decision? Massive Delisting on the Prague Stock Exchange Zuzana Fungáčová CERGE-EI Prague, August 2007 ISBN 978-80-7343-134-1 (Univerzita Karlova. Centrum pro ekonomický výzkum a doktorské studium) ISBN 978-80-7344-123-4 (Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR, v.v.i.) Can the Market Fix a Wrong Administrative Decision? Massive Delisting on the Prague Stock Exchange Zuzana Fungáčová* CERGE-EI† Abstract This research contributes to the investigation of the emerging stock markets in transition economies, namely in the Czech Republic. We estimate the impact of the various determinants of shares delisting e.g. exclusion from public trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) during the period 1993 – 2004. Unlike its counterparts in Poland or Hungary, exceptionally large amounts of shares were delisted from the PSE. Using the data on listed and delisted companies we show that the pre-privatization and privatization characteristics of the companies were decisive for delisting. This further indicates that it would have been possible to prevent massive delisting if these factors had been taken into account when deciding which companies to place on the stock exchange for public trading. Moreover, therefore companies that were not suitable for public trading were also not suitable for voucher privatization. -
Zsolt Katona Is the New CEO of the Budapest Stock Exchange
Zsolt Katona is the new CEO of the Budapest Stock Exchange Budapest, 10 May 2012 The Board of Directors of the Budapest Stock Exchange appointed Zsolt Katona to be the new Chief Executive Officer of the Budapest Stock Exchange from 15 May 2012. He is a professional with over two decades of executive experience in the financial and the stock exchange fields. He started his career over 20 years ago at one of the founding broker firms of the then reawakening BSE and has been connected to the Stock Exchange by many links ever since. He has been directing the investment services unit of the ING Group in different positions in the past 17 years while also filling several positions related to the Hungarian stock exchange and the capital market in the meantime. He was a member of the Supervisory Board of the BSE between 2002 and 2011, including a 3-year period when he was the Chairman of the BSE Supervisory Board, and he was also a member of the Supervisory Board of the Central Clearing House and Depository (KELER) between 2003 and 2004. In the last one and a half years, he has been participating in the work of the Consultation Body of the BSE, the task of which was to co-ordinate and harmonise interests in relation to the projected replacement of the trading system of the BSE. In connection with his appointment, Zsolt Katona said: “I made my first stock exchange deals in the “good old days”, at the beginning of the 90's, at the open-outcry trading floor in Váci Street, so my ties to the BSE do really go back a long way. -
Margin-Based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price∗
Margin-Based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price∗ Nicolae Gˆarleanu and Lasse Heje Pedersen† Current Version: September 2009 Abstract In a model with heterogeneous-risk-aversion agents facing margin constraints, we show how securities’ required returns are characterized both by their betas and their margins. Negative shocks to fundamentals make margin constraints bind, lowering risk-free rates and raising Sharpe ratios of risky securities, especially for high-margin securities. Such a funding liquidity crisis gives rise to “bases,” that is, price gaps between securities with identical cash-flows but different margins. In the time series, bases depend on the shadow cost of capital, which can be captured through the interest- rate spread between collateralized and uncollateralized loans, and, in the cross section, they depend on relative margins. We apply the model empirically to CDS-bond bases and other deviations from the Law of One Price, and to evaluate the Fed lending facilities. ∗We are grateful for helpful comments from Markus Brunnermeier, Xavier Gabaix, Andrei Shleifer, and Wei Xiong, as well as from seminar participants at the Bank of Canada, Columbia GSB, London School of Economics, MIT Sloan, McGill University, Northwestern University Kellog, UT Austin McCombs, UC Berkeley Haas, the Yale Financial Crisis Conference, and Yale SOM. †Gˆarleanu (corresponding author) is at Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, NBER, and CEPR; e-mail: [email protected]. Pedersen is at New York University, NBER, and CEPR, 44 West Fourth Street, NY 10012-1126; e-mail: [email protected], http://www.stern.nyu.edu/∼lpederse/. -
Guide for Margin Finance
Guide for Margin Finance Guide for Margin Finance Contents Margin Finance What is margin finance? How does margin finance take place? Risks of margin finance Acknowledgement 1 / 6 Guide for Margin Finance Margin Finance Investors should request copies from their financial brokers and familiarize themselves with the following: The guide issued by the Jordan Securities Commission, Margin Finance Instructions, the list of securities allowed to be margin financed, and the margin finance agreement. Investors should also sign an acknowledgement that they have familiarized themselves with the above in order to protect their rights. This guide aims to familiarize investors with the concept of margin finance and the risks related to it. It should be read thoroughly. 2 / 6 Guide for Margin Finance What is margin finance? The term “Margin Finance” shall mean the financing by a Financial Broker of a part of the value of the securities in the margin finance account by guaranteeing the securities in that account. How does margin finance take place? Say you are an investor and you buy shares worth JD 5,000 with your own money, then the value of these shares rises to JD 7,500, your profit would be 50%. But if you finance your purchase of these shares through margin finance the shares, you would pay JD 2,500 of your own money and your broker would pay JD 2,500, so your profit would be 100%. In other words, your profit is greater when you margin finance. If, on the other hand, the value of the shares drops to JD 2,500 after you had bought them with your own money, your loss would be 50%; but if you had bought them from the margin finance account, your loss would be 100% plus any interest payments and fees. -
EQUITY EQUITY DER- PARAMETERS METHODOLOGIES USED in MARGIN CALCULATIONS Manual
EQUITY EQUITY DER- PARAMETERS METHODOLOGIES USED IN MARGIN CALCULATIONS Manual APRIL 2021 V02.0 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive summary ...................................................................................... 3 Methodologies for determining Margin Parameters used in Margin Calculations ...................................................................................................... 5 2.1 Main parameters...................................................................................... 6 2.2 Margin Interval calculation ...................................................................... 7 2.2.1 Defining Coverage Level......................................................................... 7 2.2.2 Determining the Margin Interval for Equity cash ........................................ 7 2.2.3 Determining the Margin Interval for Equity derivatives .............................. 10 2.3 Product Group Offset Factor .................................................................. 10 2.4 Futures Straddle Margin ........................................................................ 10 2.4.1 Straddle Interest Rate Methodology ........................................................ 11 2.4.2 Straddle Correlation Methodology ........................................................... 13 2.5 Minimum Initial Margin ......................................................................... 13 2.6 Margin Intervals and Additional Margin changes ................................... 14 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This -
Who Regulates Whom? an Overview of the US Financial Regulatory
Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Framework Updated March 10, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44918 Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Framework Summary The financial regulatory system has been described as fragmented, with multiple overlapping regulators and a dual state-federal regulatory system. The system evolved piecemeal, punctuated by major changes in response to various historical financial crises. The most recent financial crisis also resulted in changes to the regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA; P.L. 110-289). To address the fragmented nature of the system, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a council of regulators and experts chaired by the Treasury Secretary. At the federal level, regulators can be clustered in the following areas: Depository regulators—Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve for banks; and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) for credit unions; Securities markets regulators—Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) regulators—Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), created by HERA, and Farm Credit Administration (FCA); and Consumer protection regulator—Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created by the Dodd-Frank Act. Other entities that play a role in financial regulation are interagency bodies, state regulators, and international regulatory fora. Notably, federal regulators generally play a secondary role in insurance markets. -
Margin-Based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price
Margin-based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price Nicolae Garleanuˆ University of California Lasse Heje Pedersen New York University In a model with heterogeneous-risk-aversion agents facing margin constraints, we show how securities’ required returns increase in both their betas and their margin require- ments. Negative shocks to fundamentals make margin constraints bind, lowering risk-free rates and raising Sharpe ratios of risky securities, especially for high-margin securities. Such a funding-liquidity crisis gives rise to “bases,” that is, price gaps between securities with identical cash-flows but different margins. In the time series, bases depend onthe shadow cost of capital, which can be captured through the interest-rate spread between collateralized and uncollateralized loans and, in the cross-section, they depend on rela- tive margins. We test the model empirically using the credit default swap–bond bases and other deviations from the Law of One Price, and use it to evaluate central banks’ lending facilities. (JEL G01, G12, G13, E44, E50) The paramount role of funding constraints becomes particularly salient dur- ing liquidity crises, with the one that started in 2007 being an excellent case in point. Banks unable to fund their operations closed down, and the fund- ing problems spread to other investors, such as hedge funds, that relied on bank funding. Therefore, traditional liquidity providers became forced sellers, interest-rate spreads increased dramatically, Treasury rates dropped sharply, and central -
Failure Is an Option: Impediments to Short Selling and Options Prices
Failure is an Option: Impediments to Short Selling and Options Prices Richard B. Evans Christopher C. Geczy David K. Musto Adam V. Reed* This Version: May 25, 2006 Abstract Regulations allow market makers to short sell without borrowing stock, and the transactions of a major options market maker show that in most hard-to-borrow situations, it chooses not to borrow and instead fails to deliver stock to its buyers. Some of the value of failing passes through to option prices: when failing is cheaper than borrowing, the relation between borrowing costs and option prices is significantly weaker. The remaining value is profit to the market maker, and its ability to profit despite the usual competition between market makers appears to result from a cost advantage of larger market makers at failing. * Evans is from the Carroll School of Management at Boston College. Geczy and Musto are from The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Reed is from the Kenan-Flagler Business School at the University of North Carolina. We gratefully acknowledge important input from an anonymous referee, Michael Brandt, Greg Brown, Jennifer Conrad, George Constantinides, Patrick Dennis, Darrell Duffie, Bin Gao, Eitan Goldman, Jonathan Karpoff, Richard Rendleman and seminar participants at Notre Dame, USC, UT, Wharton and the Western Finance Association Meetings. We thank Wes Gray for excellent research assistance. The Frank Russell Company generously provided constitution lists for their Russell 3000 index. Corresponding Author: Adam Reed; Campus Box 3490, McColl Building; Chapel Hill, NC 27514. Phone: (919) 962-9785. E-mail: [email protected]. The market for short exposure in the United States clears differently from the market for long exposure.