Understanding the Land Ethic By: James Thomas Erbaugh
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Understanding the Land Ethic By: James Thomas Erbaugh Approved by: ____________________, Advisor Dr. Richard Momeyer ____________________, Reader Dr. Kimberly Medley ____________________, Reader Dr. Pascal Massie i Acknowledgements My advisor, Dr. Richard Momeyer, provided continuous support, inspired feedback, and enlightened direction throughout my research and writing. Dr. Pascal Massie and Dr. Kimberly Medley greatly strengthened my thought and writing with their careful readings and valuable critiques. Finally, the Honors Department and the Department of Philosophy at Miami University provide the opportunity to pursue an undergraduate thesis, an opportunity I have found deeply rewarding. To these people and departments: thank you. ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………i Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………...ii Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter One: Leopold‟s Land Ethic and Callicott‟s Development………………………7 Chapter Two: Critique and Defense of the Land Ethic…………………………………..22 Chapter Three: Application and Critique………………………………………………...37 iii Introduction More than a decade before the environmental revolution of the 1960s, Aldo Leopold published A Sand County Almanac. “The Land Ethic,” one of the most compelling essays in A Sand County Almanac, provides normative direction for the human relation to and use of the land. Over half a century later, the ethical maxims and directions provided within “The Land Ethic” are still being discussed; foremost among supporters—and revisers—of Leopold‟s ethical proclamations is J. Baird Callicott, a contemporary environmental philosopher. My thesis, Understanding the Land Ethic, is concerned with the original conception, subsequent adaptation, problems plaguing, and possible application of the land ethic. The body of my thesis is composed of three chapters titled: “Leopold‟s Land Ethic and Callicott‟s Development,” “Critique and Defense of the Land Ethic,” and “Application and Conclusion.” The first chapter will examine and introduce the land ethic and its contemporary adaptation, the second will explicate problems with the contemporary land ethic and (when possible) their resolution, and the third will outline a method of application for the land ethic and conclude with the demonstration of reading and writing about environmental ethics as a process that reinforces environmental responsibility, and is a form of activism in itself. It is my aim to provide a widely approachable and thoroughly informative thesis through the synergy of these parts. “Leopold‟s Land Ethic and Callicott‟s Development” first focuses on introducing the land ethic in the subsection, “Leopold‟s Land Ethic.” I address the original inspiration for the contemporary land ethic by recounting the conceptualization of land, the essential maxim posed in “The Land Ethic,” and Leopold‟s exhortation of ecology, 1 and ecological education within the essay; I hold that these are the major components of “The Land Ethic.” Also, I look at “The Land Ethic” and its relation to the professional life of Aldo Leopold. I posit that Leopold‟s life provides a biographical example of ethical advancement. That is, Leopold‟s evolution as a conservationist illustrates the critical nature of ecological understanding and evolution present within the major components of “The Land Ethic.” The next subsection, “Ethical Heritage of the Land Ethic,” is dedicated to examining the ethical pedigree of the land ethic. The land ethic will be assessed as a sentiment-based ethic and traced back to the system proposed by David Hume. Although the land ethic shares some similarity with Hume‟s sentiment-based ethic, it is not an identical system. Rather, it counts on human sentiment to be affected by scientific finding, and in this way strays from Hume‟s altogether sentiment-based ethical system. Darwin‟s theories concerning the development of ethics will also be examined, and supported, for Leopold and Callicott both encourage a development or evolution of the land ethic similar to Darwin‟s writings in Descent of Man. After tracing the ethical pedigree of the land ethic, I look at Callicott‟s contemporary adaptation of Leopold‟s work in “Callicott‟s Development.” Callicott continues in the tradition of the land ethic, encouraging an expansion of ethical consideration to the land; however, he is able to address problems and attempt resolutions more thoroughly than Leopold‟s original work. The two most important revisions supplied by Callicott include the revised, central maxim and the addition of second order principles. After summarizing and clearly articulating these additions, “Leopold‟s Land Ethic and Callicott‟s Development” will be complete. This chapter will provide a base 2 for “Critique and Defense of the Land Ethic,” where the adapted land ethic will be discussed in light of persistent problems. The problems I address within the second chapter include subjectivism, ecological dependence and development, and inconsistency. Each of these problems are examined in a separate subsection. Though they are not all be resolved—some are inherent properties of the land ethic—I hope to adequately demonstrate that, though the land ethic encounters some difficulties, it may still operate as a normative guide. The first subsection is titled “Subjectivism and the Land Ethic,” and focuses on demonstrating that the land ethic may still be maintained, despite a propensity toward simultaneous recommendation of different actions. This problem is rooted in the sentiment-based nature of the land ethic. People are guided by their sentiments and because of this distinctness, are difficult to anticipate or determine. Thus, a range of action can be expected from different individuals who practice the land ethic. Such dependence on sentiment might be problematic if the land ethic promotes the destruction of a natural system. The problem of subjectivism promoting action antithetical to the land action is addressed through the “modicum of sentiment” argument. In this argument, it is held that human sentiments exist within a relatively small range; most people feel that murder is wrong, and that murder of a family member is gratuitously wrong. Due to this “modicum of sentiment,” it is reasonable that the land ethic will be followed in a similar manner by many different people. Therefore, the sentiments that arise out of a situation where the land ethic is being practiced should be contained within a small range of feeling. It is very unlikely many people will feel that completely denuding a virgin growth forest is advisable via the land ethic, in any scenario. 3 Therefore, the land ethic provides normative promotions—suggestions much less obvious than the previous example—and so may still be followed, though such promotions may vary within a limited range. The second subsection within “Chapter Two” addresses the difficulty of basing an ethical system on the dynamic science of ecology. This subsection, “Ecology and the Land Ethic,” will address the problems of ecological dependence and development. The land ethic is inextricably tied to the science of ecology but, because ecology is a changing body of knowledge about environmental interrelationships, this link is subject to change over time. Leopold‟s original maxim and the need for Callicott‟s revision serve as examples of the land ethic‟s dependency upon ecology. Therefore, as more ecological knowledge is garnered, the land ethic is subject to change, but this reveals it as an alterable ethic that might promote inconsistent or possibly paradoxical actions as more, and possibly different, ecological facts are revealed. This problem, as articulated, cannot be solved. However, in “Ecology and the Land Ethic,” I encourage the reader to understand the land ethic as an ethic grounded in the present and aimed at the practical goal of natural system conservation through the best means provided by ecological knowledge. Conceived in this way, ecological dependence can be conceived as a benefit, not a problem. The third and final subsection of “Critique and Defense of the Land Ethic” is titled “Is the Land Ethic Inconsistent?” The problem of inconsistency within the land ethic occurs because Callicott‟s revised maxim denies large-scale, man-made destruction of natural systems, but permits large-scale, natural destruction of natural systems. It would seem, by virtue of Callicott‟s revised maxim, that any rapid, large-scale 4 disturbance of a natural system would be impermissible and so, human beings have an ethical obligation to stop flooding, hurricanes, wildfires, and other such disturbance regimes; such an obligation is unfeasible in addition to being rather absurd. Many organisms and natural systems depend on disturbance regimes for propagation. To address this problem, I point to the unfeasible nature of such ethical obligations and, through invocation of Callicott‟s second-order principles, show how such an obligation is dismissed. By addressing these problems, I aim to portray and discuss some of the problems that face the land ethic. I hope to reveal it as a sensible system, one the reader may be willing to follow. The third chapter continues this revelation through an example of application and a hopeful conclusion. In “Application and Conclusion,” the third and final chapter, a method of ethical analysis inspired by, and relevant to, the land ethic will be introduced in the first subsection. The first subsection, “The Land Ethic Applied,” promotes a method for applying the