Understanding the Land Ethic By: James Thomas Erbaugh

Approved by: ______, Advisor Dr. Richard Momeyer

______, Reader Dr. Kimberly Medley

______, Reader Dr. Pascal Massie

i Acknowledgements

My advisor, Dr. Richard Momeyer, provided continuous support, inspired feedback, and enlightened direction throughout my research and writing. Dr. Pascal Massie and Dr. Kimberly Medley greatly strengthened my thought and writing with their careful readings and valuable critiques. Finally, the Honors Department and the Department of Philosophy at Miami University provide the opportunity to pursue an undergraduate thesis, an opportunity I have found deeply rewarding. To these people and departments: thank you.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………i

Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………...ii

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1

Chapter One: Leopold‟s Land Ethic and Callicott‟s Development………………………7

Chapter Two: Critique and Defense of the Land Ethic…………………………………..22

Chapter Three: Application and Critique………………………………………………...37

iii Introduction

More than a decade before the environmental revolution of the 1960s, Aldo

Leopold published A Sand County Almanac. “The Land Ethic,” one of the most compelling essays in A Sand County Almanac, provides normative direction for the human relation to and use of the land. Over half a century later, the ethical maxims and directions provided within “The Land Ethic” are still being discussed; foremost among supporters—and revisers—of Leopold‟s ethical proclamations is J. Baird Callicott, a contemporary environmental philosopher. My thesis, Understanding the Land Ethic, is concerned with the original conception, subsequent adaptation, problems plaguing, and possible application of the land ethic.

The body of my thesis is composed of three chapters titled: “Leopold‟s Land

Ethic and Callicott‟s Development,” “Critique and Defense of the Land Ethic,” and

“Application and Conclusion.” The first chapter will examine and introduce the land ethic and its contemporary adaptation, the second will explicate problems with the contemporary land ethic and (when possible) their resolution, and the third will outline a method of application for the land ethic and conclude with the demonstration of reading and writing about environmental ethics as a process that reinforces environmental responsibility, and is a form of activism in itself. It is my aim to provide a widely approachable and thoroughly informative thesis through the synergy of these parts.

“Leopold‟s Land Ethic and Callicott‟s Development” first focuses on introducing the land ethic in the subsection, “Leopold‟s Land Ethic.” I address the original inspiration for the contemporary land ethic by recounting the conceptualization of land, the essential maxim posed in “The Land Ethic,” and Leopold‟s exhortation of ecology,

1 and ecological education within the essay; I hold that these are the major components of

“The Land Ethic.” Also, I look at “The Land Ethic” and its relation to the professional life of Aldo Leopold. I posit that Leopold‟s life provides a biographical example of ethical advancement. That is, Leopold‟s evolution as a conservationist illustrates the critical nature of ecological understanding and evolution present within the major components of “The Land Ethic.”

The next subsection, “Ethical Heritage of the Land Ethic,” is dedicated to examining the ethical pedigree of the land ethic. The land ethic will be assessed as a sentiment-based ethic and traced back to the system proposed by David Hume. Although the land ethic shares some similarity with Hume‟s sentiment-based ethic, it is not an identical system. Rather, it counts on human sentiment to be affected by scientific finding, and in this way strays from Hume‟s altogether sentiment-based ethical system.

Darwin‟s theories concerning the development of ethics will also be examined, and supported, for Leopold and Callicott both encourage a development or evolution of the land ethic similar to Darwin‟s writings in Descent of Man.

After tracing the ethical pedigree of the land ethic, I look at Callicott‟s contemporary adaptation of Leopold‟s work in “Callicott‟s Development.” Callicott continues in the tradition of the land ethic, encouraging an expansion of ethical consideration to the land; however, he is able to address problems and attempt resolutions more thoroughly than Leopold‟s original work. The two most important revisions supplied by Callicott include the revised, central maxim and the addition of second order principles. After summarizing and clearly articulating these additions, “Leopold‟s Land

Ethic and Callicott‟s Development” will be complete. This chapter will provide a base

2 for “Critique and Defense of the Land Ethic,” where the adapted land ethic will be discussed in light of persistent problems.

The problems I address within the second chapter include subjectivism, ecological dependence and development, and inconsistency. Each of these problems are examined in a separate subsection. Though they are not all be resolved—some are inherent properties of the land ethic—I hope to adequately demonstrate that, though the land ethic encounters some difficulties, it may still operate as a normative guide.

The first subsection is titled “Subjectivism and the Land Ethic,” and focuses on demonstrating that the land ethic may still be maintained, despite a propensity toward simultaneous recommendation of different actions. This problem is rooted in the sentiment-based nature of the land ethic. People are guided by their sentiments and because of this distinctness, are difficult to anticipate or determine. Thus, a range of action can be expected from different individuals who practice the land ethic. Such dependence on sentiment might be problematic if the land ethic promotes the destruction of a natural system. The problem of subjectivism promoting action antithetical to the land action is addressed through the “modicum of sentiment” argument. In this argument, it is held that human sentiments exist within a relatively small range; most people feel that murder is wrong, and that murder of a family member is gratuitously wrong. Due to this “modicum of sentiment,” it is reasonable that the land ethic will be followed in a similar manner by many different people. Therefore, the sentiments that arise out of a situation where the land ethic is being practiced should be contained within a small range of feeling. It is very unlikely many people will feel that completely denuding a virgin growth forest is advisable via the land ethic, in any scenario.

3 Therefore, the land ethic provides normative promotions—suggestions much less obvious than the previous example—and so may still be followed, though such promotions may vary within a limited range.

The second subsection within “Chapter Two” addresses the difficulty of basing an ethical system on the dynamic science of ecology. This subsection, “Ecology and the

Land Ethic,” will address the problems of ecological dependence and development. The land ethic is inextricably tied to the science of ecology but, because ecology is a changing body of knowledge about environmental interrelationships, this link is subject to change over time. Leopold‟s original maxim and the need for Callicott‟s revision serve as examples of the land ethic‟s dependency upon ecology. Therefore, as more ecological knowledge is garnered, the land ethic is subject to change, but this reveals it as an alterable ethic that might promote inconsistent or possibly paradoxical actions as more, and possibly different, ecological facts are revealed. This problem, as articulated, cannot be solved. However, in “Ecology and the Land Ethic,” I encourage the reader to understand the land ethic as an ethic grounded in the present and aimed at the practical goal of natural system conservation through the best means provided by ecological knowledge. Conceived in this way, ecological dependence can be conceived as a benefit, not a problem.

The third and final subsection of “Critique and Defense of the Land Ethic” is titled “Is the Land Ethic Inconsistent?” The problem of inconsistency within the land ethic occurs because Callicott‟s revised maxim denies large-scale, man-made destruction of natural systems, but permits large-scale, natural destruction of natural systems. It would seem, by virtue of Callicott‟s revised maxim, that any rapid, large-scale

4 disturbance of a natural system would be impermissible and so, human beings have an ethical obligation to stop flooding, hurricanes, wildfires, and other such disturbance regimes; such an obligation is unfeasible in addition to being rather absurd. Many organisms and natural systems depend on disturbance regimes for propagation. To address this problem, I point to the unfeasible nature of such ethical obligations and, through invocation of Callicott‟s second-order principles, show how such an obligation is dismissed.

By addressing these problems, I aim to portray and discuss some of the problems that face the land ethic. I hope to reveal it as a sensible system, one the reader may be willing to follow. The third chapter continues this revelation through an example of application and a hopeful conclusion.

In “Application and Conclusion,” the third and final chapter, a method of ethical analysis inspired by, and relevant to, the land ethic will be introduced in the first subsection. The first subsection, “The Land Ethic Applied,” promotes a method for applying the land ethic. In order to practically apply the land ethic and demonstrate its method of assessment, I examine how the land ethic might recommend a ten acre parcel of land in the Oxford Community Park be treated. Through the ethical analysis of the situation, I formulate a normative solution via the land ethic.

The second subsection of the final chapter is “A Hopeful Conclusion.” In this subsection, I consider the land ethic as situated within the longstanding tradition of virtue ethics, and demonstrate how consideration of the land ethic is helpful to ethical development and environmental activism. To depict the land ethic as a type of virtue ethic, I use the Platonic dialogue “Meno,” and the development of its title character, as a

5 pedagogical aid. The act of philosophizing about ethical systems—this includes writing and reading about the land ethic—increases personal awareness and aims to discover a fair system of ethical analysis and action. Hope for environmental responsibility lies in the continuous contemplation of how human beings ought to act toward the land, both generally and in specific instances.

I aim to present the land ethic clearly, as it was originally developed, and as it has been altered by Callicott. I provide commentary on its contemporary adaptation, address relevant problems, and make suggestions for correction. To enable the reader an example of application, I illustrate the way in which the land ethic might encourage action for a tract of land in Oxford, Ohio. Throughout the three chapters of my thesis, I seek to foster an enhanced understanding of the land ethic, and in doing so, scrutinize a valuable component of ethical consideration.

6 Chapter One: Leopold’s Land Ethic and Callicott’s Development

1.1: Leopold’s Land Ethic

In 1949, Aldo Leopold published A Sand County Almanac and through the observations and articulations found within it, became a world-renowned naturalist. His greatest legacy in environmental ethics, and perhaps in general, is the seminal essay in A

Sand County Almanac, “The Land Ethic.” In this essay, Leopold describes the land as a circuitous system where energy is constantly recycled and people do not dominate but exist as equal citizens among other living organisms. Due to this relation to the land,

Leopold posits that ethical treatment ought to be expanded to include the ecological whole, that is, the entire community where energy circulates. The three most important aspects of “The Land Ethic” include the conceptualization of the land, the essential maxim of Leopold‟s land ethic, and the exhortation on ecology and ecological education.

Though “The Land Ethic” must be read in its entirety to be understood best, summarization of its most essential tenets ensures an understanding to enable subsequent development and critique.

Leopold‟s first task in “The Land Ethic” is to establish an environmental paradigm that promotes proper ecological understanding and human sentiment. He writes “we can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in.”1 In an attempt to dispel the belief that land is lifeless soil atop barren rock, upon which a host of automata-like organisms are dependent, Leopold describes the land pyramid. The land pyramid is a convoluted set of relations where

1 Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic.” The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994), 102.

7 energy is passed from biota to biota, with the beginning and ending of the energy relations rooted in the abiotic environment, upon which all life is dependent.2 The presentation of the land pyramid reveals all ecological relations as complicated, diverse, and subtle. If the land pyramid is complicated, diverse, subtle, and ultimately responsible for the continued existence of life, it may appear as something we can “see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in.” Thus, land arises as something toward which we can be ethical. Leopold reinforces his portrayal with three further propositions:

(1) Land is not merely soil (2) Native plants and animals kept the energy circuit open; others may or may not. (3) Man-made changes are of a different order than evolutionary changes and have effects more comprehensive than is intended or is often foreseen.3

This summary first presents land as more than a simple, inert, instrument. Second, it establishes native biota as important because it is known to maintain the energy circuit.

Third, it enjoins that we be wary of intentional human changes due to their unforeseeable and long-ranging effects. Such a summary provides a foundation for Leopold‟s normative ethic.

Having described the land as something toward which we can act ethically,

Leopold provides a succinct yet powerful maxim to govern action. He writes: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.

It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold 1993: 108). The first sentence is of utmost importance in that it defines what positive action must promote. It is essential that when human beings act, they do so in a way that promotes ecological “integrity, stability, and

2 Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1993), 102-103. 3 Ibid., 105.

8 beauty.” The second sentence is also significant in that it pointedly defines what should not be done, that is, anything that does not tend toward the positive action described.

There is a strict dichotomy at work here: actions can either conserve the natural environment and are allowed or they don‟t and are impermissible. This brief yet encompassing maxim is followed by a longer discussion of the essential nature of ecological understanding and education.

The implication of the normative maxim presented in “The Land Ethic” is that followers will develop a land consciousness and shed the commitment to dominance over the land. Leopold writes that:

In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such.4

Since human beings must take into account the “integrity, stability, and beauty” of the land, they must submit to a more egalitarian role within the ecosystem. This changed role of Homo sapiens necessitates a particular approach to general education and scientific understanding. Specifically, “ecological training” is essential (Leopold, 1994: 146).

Ecological training focuses on understanding relationships amongst organisms and between organisms and the abiotic environment. Human beings must learn about the environment by virtue of its many convoluted relations so as to properly understand the land and thus be capable of following the principle maxim.

“The Land Ethic” is an essay that promotes a particular type of conceptualization of the land, delineates how human beings ought to act toward the land, and provides a method for supporting such action. The land pyramid is Leopold‟s model for how human beings should think of and relate to the land. This model enables ethical expansion to

4 Ibid., 97.

9 include natural systems, hence Leopold‟s central maxim. Finally, ecological training further promotes the concept of the land pyramid and ensures the ability to follow the central maxim. Though “The Land Ethic” includes considerably more topics than are summarized here, this summary provides those parts essential to the further discussion of

Leopold‟s land ethic.

1.2: Leopold’s Career as a Defense of the Land Ethic

Leopold‟s personal practices in the beginning of his career appear at odds with the beliefs for which he later became famous. When he worked in the United States Forest

Service (USFS), Leopold practiced predator extermination. Such a management strategy is at odds with the land ethic in that it disrupts the subtle flow of energy from the inanimate, to organism, and back to the inanimate. Such a contradiction between

Leopold‟s actions and beliefs would call into question the legitimacy of his land ethic; if an ethicist doesn‟t follow the system he or she earnestly promotes, why should anyone else? The seeming contradiction of Leopold‟s early career and his land ethic is explainable through an understanding of the chronology of his life and his personal development as a forester, ecologist, and naturalist.

Leopold‟s practice of predator extermination must be understood as the first step in his development as a naturalist. He entered the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale

University the same year Gifford Pinchot was named president of the new Yale School of

Forestry. His education was focused on efficient resource management use.5 When

Leopold entered the USFS in 1909 to work in the southwestern United States, he viewed the eradication of predators as an opportunity to increase the amount of fish and game

5 Frese, S. “Aldo Leopold: An American Prophet.” The History Teacher 37 (2003), 104.

10 available for human consumption. Further, he believed that such a practice was not harmful to the natural system, because careful human management of fish and game could replace the capture of wolves and mountain lions.6 However, by 1939 Leopold had come to realize that species interactions were more complicated than originally thought, for the changes brought about by their eradication “are seldom foreseen; they represent unpredicted and often untraceable readjustments in the structure” of natural systems.7

Ten years before the publication of A Sand County Almanac, Leopold‟s view concerning the interrelatedness of organisms and the ability for proper and concise management of natural systems by human beings had already changed drastically.

The meditations and observations encapsulated in A Sand County Almanac can be seen as the culmination of a lifetime dedicated to wildlife observation and contemplation, and they demonstrate a marked development from Leopold‟s USFS days. The Leopold who wrote “The Land Ethic” did not simultaneously annihilate predators; these endeavors were separated by decades. Further, Leopold‟s personal development mirrors the way in which he urged education about the interrelations within the land pyramid.

Though once he was guided by the optimistic belief in complete anthropogenic management of natural systems, later he came to recognize that these systems work in a complex series of relationships, as indicated by the land pyramid. Thus, in “The Land

Ethic” he encouraged a conceptualization of people within the biotic community as “plain citizens.” Such a change inspired Leopold to write and, as he proclaimed, enabled an expansion of ethical consideration to the land.

1.3: The Ethical Heritage of the Land Ethic

6 Norton, B. “The Constancy of Leopold‟s Ethic.” Conservation Biology 2 (1988), 99. 7 Ibid., 728.

11 Though he never expounded upon it, the heritage of Leopold‟s land ethic is important to its proper understanding. Leopold, while offering a guide for action with his land ethic, does not make clear its foundation or how it might change over time. Such omissions can be attributed to the nature of his writings in A Sand County Almanac.

They were not intended to be ivory tower exemplars of scientific observation or ethical proclamation. Rather, they were intended to be approachable to a wide variety of people, to spark interest in the natural world, to inspire a different conceptualization of nature, and to encourage ethical consideration of the land based on feelings of communion and appreciation. However, questions about ethical heritage remain: Was Leopold‟s ethic entirely original? If so, how, and if not, from where does it come? Leopold‟s land ethic can be traced to the work of David Hume, but it contains a significant amount of departure from the Humean system. Also, as an ethic that is founded upon continued understanding and development—an ethic subject to considerable evolution—Leopold‟s land ethic also derives from Charles Darwin‟s writing in The Descent of Man and

Selection in Relation to Sex. By acknowledging its ethical pedigree and documenting how Leopold‟s land ethic is similar to, yet different from, its predecessors, an understanding of what Leopold considers to be the basis of ethical action and the possibility of ethical evolution within the land ethic becomes apparent.

The land ethic as established by Leopold is, at least in part, a sentiment-based ethic of the Humean tradition. Throughout the Enquiry of the Principles of Morals,

Hume endeavors to show that reason alone cannot provide moral inspiration. In Hume‟s system:

though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions; it is not

12 alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and where the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means.8 . Reason, in the Humean system, enables the judgment of actions through analysis and comparison. When I notice an elderly man struggling to load his groceries into his car, it is through my reason that I determine what actions I could take in light of this situation: I might ignore the elderly man, I might help him, or I might run away with his shopping cart. Reason does not inspire any of these actions, but it brings them to light and compares them with each other. According to Hume:

It is requisite a sentiment should here display itself in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. This sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends, which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here, therefore, reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial.9

However, this sentiment is not identical within all human beings; people feel differently in different situations. Whereas I might determine it best to ignore the elderly man, feeling he enjoys his independence despite his struggle, another might determine it better to assist him with his groceries. Despite its unpredictable nature, sentiment is what determines value, and values dictate the ends of actions. “Concerning Moral Sentiment” in Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals provides the dichotomy that arises through moral sentiment:

The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains, that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action of quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary.10

8 Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. Beauchamp, T (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 158. 9 Ibid., 158. 10 Ibid., 159.

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All morality is a result of a moral sense. This sense is what determines what we value, with whom and what actions we sympathize, and the aims of our actions; reason supplies the means to obtain those aims. Though this moral sense varies from person to person, Hume accounts for an “internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species.”11 Just as “good” smells and “good” tastes vary widely, many people acknowledge similar sensory preferences. This is analogous to the operation of the moral sense, for while it does vary some, it does not vary to a large degree. Hume bases his system upon the desire for human beings to individually avoid pain and to pursue pleasure and to collectively desire “the happiness of mankind” and feel “a resentment of their misery.”12 While I might decide to ask the elderly man if he needs help unloading his groceries, another might determine that the elderly man is a roguish individual who enjoys his independence and so would not offer assistance. In both scenarios, the action depends on the value or feeling of the actor, but both actions are aimed at providing for the happiness of the elderly man. Thus, virtue and vice—and morality itself—varies, because “the pleasing sentiment of approbation…and the contrary” vary from person to person.

Leopold‟s land ethic is similar to the Humean moral system in that it has moral sense at the root of ethical behavior, but it differs from Hume‟s system in that it extends moral consideration to the land and it provides the ability for knowledge to influence the moral sense. Leopold states: “No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and

11 Ibid., 75. 12 Ibid., 158

14 convictions.”13 This internal change hearkens directly to Hume‟s sentiment-based ethic: without a definitive moral feeling, no moral action is taken. In “The Land Ethic,”

Leopold encourages an altered ethical relation, one that is characterized by “love, respect, and admiration for land.”14 By encouraging a shift in the human relation to land, Leopold is promoting an ethical, paradigm shift by virtue of a sentiment-based ethical system.

However, Hume‟s system only takes into account morality amongst human beings. He considered the sympathy felt for one human being by another as the only impetus capable of generating feelings of approbation or disapprobation. Though the moral sense is the same in Hume‟s moral system and in Leopold‟s land ethic, the genesis of sentiments by the moral sense is different. In Hume‟s system, sentiments arise out of feelings of sympathy for the actions and characters of other human beings, while in Leopold‟s land ethic those same sentiments can also arise out of enhanced understanding.

Within “The Land Ethic,” readers are led to believe that ecological education will help propagate Leopold‟s land ethic; such promotion is at odds with a system of morality founded upon a purely sentiment-based ethic. Remember: in the Humean tradition reason provides the means while sentiments, the ends. Leopold states that we must feel positively toward the land before we can act ethically toward it, or anything else. He does not indicate that only this feeling dictates ethical consideration. It would seem, due to importance Leopold places on environmental and ecological education, that changing fact and judgment also play a part in exercising the land ethic. Though the land ethic takes into account the necessity of human sentiment in the consideration of ethical action, it also allows for objective influence of fact and judgment upon that sentiment. Although

13 Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic.” The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994), 141. 14 Ibid., 146.

15 ethical action is governed by the moral sense, Leopold changes the relationship, outlined by Hume, between the moral sense and reason. The change is that reason can influence the moral sense, itself. Thus, when someone is faced with the theory of evolution, and is shown the intricate and variable ways in which this theory explains the biosphere, it is likely—though not at all certain—that the same person will feel positively toward that biosphere. Of course, in this very example there is some controversy, but it was chosen purposely. Just as Hume allowed for a considerable amount of shared “feeling or sentiment,” so too does Leopold, but the mechanism for this shared feeling is different.

Hume believes the mechanism of shared sentiment to be based in shared, humanitarian feelings, while Leopold bases them in the ability for human beings to come to a similar, rational acceptance of a scientific finding that, in turn, alters the moral sense. It is important to note that this relationship between knowledge and sentiment, as provided by

Leopold, admits universal evolution of the land ethic as scientific understanding changes.

In this way, Leopold‟s land ethic is related to Darwinian thought.

Leopold‟s references to Darwinian thought are many within “The Land Ethic.”

One of the most obvious allusions occurs in the beginning of “The Ethical Sequence” subsection, where Leopold writes: “extension of ethics, so far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in ecological evolution. Its sequences may be described in ecological as well as in philosophical terms.”15 This theory of ethical evolution is directly influenced by The Descent of Man where Darwin theorized the beginning of ethical behavior to lie in parent-offspring relations.16 Parent-offspring

15 Ibid., 138. 16 Darwin, Charles. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (New York: J.A. Hill and Co., 1904), 98.

16 affections then, according to Darwin, extended to larger social networks due to the benefits in promoting biological fitness. Of this extension, Darwin writes:

As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him.17

Darwin‟s theory promotes concentric rings of social networks within a species; each ring adds more individuals though, perhaps, fewer responsibilities to those particular individuals. Since all individuals are capable of experiencing the parent-offspring relation, all individuals have within them a natural capacity for ethical understanding.

Further, by exercising “the simplest reason,” man began to include “members of the same nation.” Leopold‟s exhortation for human beings to conceptualize themselves as “plain citizens” of the biotic community fits, precisely, within Darwinian thought.

Darwin and Hume intersect at this point of universal human ability for ethical judgment, as it arises from natural sentiments. However, while Darwin ascribes the propensity for human beings to act ethically to natural law, Hume claims that “Supreme

Will…bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence.”18 Despite this verbal difference, Hume and Darwin embed human morality and ethics in society, relationships, and, ultimately, sentiments. In this way, they both contribute to Leopold‟s land ethic: it is an ethic of sentimentality and fact judgment and an ethic that evolves as human beings increase their understanding about the world in which they live.

1.4: Callicott’s Development

17 Ibid., 124. 18 Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. Beauchamp, T (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 163.

17 Since its publication, “The Land Ethic” has received a great deal of attention and criticism. As a result, it has been significantly modified by a number of authors.

Foremost among contemporary advocates of Leopold‟s land ethic is J. Baird Callicott, a professional philosopher who specializes in environmental ethics. Callicott‟s interpretation of “The Land Ethic” spans numerous articles. It examines normative provisions found within the essay and, through a process of examination, critique, and defense, suggests an important change to the Leopold‟s principle maxim and an addition of Second Order Principles in order to more effectively address action promoted by the land ethic.

Leopold‟s Land Ethic promotes the “integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community” and prohibits any action that does otherwise, a maxim based on an outdated sense of ecological wellness. Noting this, Callicott attempts to advance the land ethic by acknowledging this weakness and addressing it through a revised central maxim. During

Leopold‟s time, ecosystems were thought to strive toward a natural balance found within climax communities. These communities accounted for the balance and stability of the ecosystem and, thus, the beauty of the natural system.19 This belief presents a final cause within ecosystems. This portrayal of ecosystem growth resonates with teleological ethics. Aristotle explained that “nature is a cause, and in fact the sort of cause that is for something.”20 This “cause,” also known as telos, or the “final cause,” is the core of teleological ethics; all instrumental actions are aimed at fulfilling an end. The normative portion of teleological ethics is articulated by Callicott, who explains that “organic beings

19 Callicott, J. Baird. “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine the Leopold Land Ethic?” Beyond the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 118. 20 Aristotle. Trans. Irwin, T., Fine, G. Introductory Readings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996), 199b.

18 have built-in teloi. Therefore each is a conative end-in-itself. Therefore, each has intrinsic value. That fact generates duties.”21 If an entity has a telos, then it has intrinsic value, and thus it must be ethically considered. Aristotle does not extend his teleological ethic to natural systems. However, in “The Land Ethic,” Leopold does so by indicating that ecosystems grow toward a stable community and so contain a final end: the climax community. Given this teleological understanding of ecosystems, they require ethical consideration. More recent ecological understanding has, however, undermined the concepts of stability and integrity and thus the concept of natural system telos. On ecosystem stability, Kristin Shrader-Frechette writes:

there is no precise, confirmed sense in which one can claim that natural ecosystems proceed toward homeostasis, stability, or some „balance‟ . . . Ecosystems regularly change and they regularly eliminate species. How could one use an ethic based on some balance of nature to argue that humans ought not to modify ecosystems or even wipe out species?22

The existence of climax communities does not signify ecosystem telos; rather, they have simply existed longer than re-growth communities. A natural disturbance could eliminate a climax community at any point and this would be part of a natural process. Also, climax communities can change, as they have over millions of years, in response to glacial movement, climate change, or the movement of plate tectonics. Since ecosystems are dynamic, the land ethic, an ethic focused on the same ecological systems/wholes that ecology studies, must be dynamic as well. Hence, Callicott‟s revision of Leopold‟s maxim: “A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic

21 Callicott, J. Baird. “Rolston on Intrinsic Value” Beyond the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 227. 22 Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. “Ecology.” A Companion to Environmental Philosophy (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2001), 307.

19 community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”23

The revised maxim does not require a conception of ecosystem stability and the resultant belief in ecosystem telos. However, this new conceptualization is still subject to the daunting problem of ecofascism, or the effacement of human beings in the face of environmental problems. Since the revised maxim promotes actions that “disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales,” if human beings must be transported or eliminated in the name of “normal” disturbance, Callicott‟s revised ethic would promote such action. To address this morally deplorable implication, Callicott provides Second Order Principles.

Callicott seeks to remedy the problem of ecofascism by providing a deeper understanding of the Land Ethic as an accretion of other expanded, relational ethics. As

Callicott describes it, “the land ethic is an accretion—that is, an addition—to our several accumulated social ethics, not something that is supposed to replace them.”24 Thus, there still exist responsibilities to direct family members, and even to strangers within the human community. This accretion principle asserts a multiplicity of ethical obligations, and so an ordering principle to determine correct action in a given situation is necessary.

Callicott provides two principles for ordering obligations:

The first second-order principle (SOP-1) is that obligations generated by membership in more venerable and intimate communities take precedence over those generated in more recently emerged and impersonal communities…The second, second-order principle (SOP-2) is that stronger interests…generate duties that take precedence over duties generated by weaker interests.25

23 Callicott, J. Baird. “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine the Leopold Land Ethic?” Beyond the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 138. 24 Callicott, J. Baird. “Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofascism.” Beyond the Land Ethic. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 71. 25 Ibid., 73.

20

These principles indicate that stronger relationships (typically those between human beings) require the greatest amount of obligation, unless there is a stronger “interest.”

For instance, the chiru, antelope that live on the Tibetan Plateau, are prized for their wool. In the 1990s, these animals saw a population decrease from one million to as low as seventy five thousand members.26 If a chiru poacher was killing antelope to provide for his family, he would be operating under SOP-1. However, once the chiru population dwindled dangerously, SOP-2 would indicate that chiru interest in life, and species prolongation, is stronger than the hunter‟s claim to chiru harvest. By the land ethic, then, the hunter must cease killing chiru. As an accretion of previous relational ethics, the land ethic does not obviously promote ecofascism. As members of Homo sapiens we can value our species and interpersonal relationships while simultaneously recognizing we should not regard ourselves as in a dominant position over ecological communities.

Though SOP-1 indicates stronger relationship to and more responsibility to immediate relationships, this species centrism is transferable to all species, and the SOPs, when taken together, take into account the wellbeing of the entire ecological community.

Through the combination of Callicott‟s revised principle maxim and his provision of SOP, Callicott seeks to reconcile the land ethic with new developments within ecology and to avoid ecofascism. These are two essential and fundamental changes that help to advance the land ethic. However, a multitude of questions arise concerning this ethic.

The next chapter seeks to identify and address these problems through a continued defense of the land ethic.

26 “Inside Geographic.” National Geographic. 210 (2006), 166.

21 Chapter Two: Critique and Defense of the Land Ethic

2.1: Subjectivism and the Land Ethic

In “The Land Ethic,” Leopold encourages an extension of ethical consideration to environmental communities. He writes that “a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members and also respect for the community.”27 Human beings must not dominate environmental communities, but include them in their scope of ethical concern through “love, respect, and admiration for land.”28 However, an ethical system built upon the impetus of human sentiment might seem to lack the ability to provide consistent normative guidance; such a system, if it promoted inconsistent solutions, would be arbitrary and a poor normative system. Though the land ethic is specifically rooted in sentiments of moral approbation, it does not promote contradictory solutions and so remains acceptable and useful.

Some subjectivity is inherent within the land ethic, as it is a type of sentiment- based ethic. Since human beings do not have identical sentiments, their actions will not be identical in each situation. Though people might have a common aim—say, to promote environmental awareness—they can go about pursuing that aim in completely different ways. One proponent might climb a Redwood tree to live among its branches for months, encourage friends and family to recycle, pursue a career in forestry, or lecture about environmental ethics at a university. The possibilities are many, though the aim is similar. The land ethic is similarly subjective. A general maxim provides an overarching

27 Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic.” The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994), 139. 28 Ibid., 146.

22 ethical guide: “A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”29

However, the land ethic promotes no particular guidance. Acting in accordance with Callicott‟s revised maxim might necessitate public demonstration or enlightened hermitage; it could encourage a career in forestry or one in environmental ethics; it may inspire someone to inquire into the land ethic or start encouraging friends and family to recycle. In this way, the land ethic is founded upon a maxim that can be correctly followed in an assortment of ways.

Though the land ethic allows for an array of possible actions, it does not permit all actions. This might seems counterintuitive at first: if the land ethic is a sentiment-based ethic, and one is acting under the auspices of the revised maxim in a way he/she feels is right, then it would seem that no incorrect action is possible. This interpretation indicates that, given its sentiment-based nature, if one tries to follow the land ethic earnestly, one succeeds regardless of what actions he/she performs. This line of reasoning is incorrect, however, for it lacks the connection of responsible inquiry into, and use of, information.

The land ethic, as a type of sentiment-based ethical system, inherits some objectivity through the relation between fact, sentiment, and action. On this subject,

Callicott writes:

ethical ideals rest upon and are justified by suppositions of fact and supposed relations among supposed facts…[O]ur ideas about who we are, what sort of world we live in, and our relationship to the natural environment change rapidly and not at all arbitrarily or blindly. They change in response to scientific discovery and to intra- and intercultural critical reflection and debate.30

29 Callicott, J. Baird. “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine the Leopold Land Ethic?” Beyond the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 138. 30 Callicott, J. Baird. “Can a Theory of Moral Sentiments Support a Normative Environmental Ethic?” Beyond the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 114.

23

Our sentiments guide our actions in a way that is reproachable or laudable, depending on the extent to which those sentiments are affected by “suppositions of fact.”

If a chemical company acts in line with current environmental restrictions and earnestly strives to limit and control harmful waste, it is acting in line with the land ethic; however, if that same company attempts to reduce impact on the environment through questionable and untested methods—shallow and uncontained burial, or perhaps launching it into space—such actions are irresponsible and illustrate an action condemned by the land ethic. Thus, to act in accord with the land ethic, one must consider “scientific discovery and…intra- and intercultural critical reflection and debate” before taking action.

A problem persists in this progression from information gathering to sentiment formation, to action; if there is a fact/sentiment dichotomy, the land ethic remains wholly subjective. Any ability to form an objective opinion about the correctness of an action in regard to the land ethic depends on the ability for knowledge to influence sentiment. The difference between the sentiment-based ethic found within “The Land Ethic” and that supplied by Hume helps to inform this problem. Hume‟s sentiment-based morality depicts reason as only a means to an end determined by desire. This valuation is determined by the moral sense, what people feel is right, good, or virtuous. In “The Land

Ethic,” Leopold implies that ecological education can alter the way in which people feel toward the environment. That is to say, the acceptance of a scientific finding into one‟s worldview can affect what an individual values by increasing his/her propensity for appreciation of, communion with, or interest in the natural world. If someone reads about or witnesses the unique interrelationship between ants and acacia trees, how these two organisms coexist through an intricate mutualism, they will be more likely to

24 appreciate these two organisms, to respect their relationship, and to consider them ethically, than if they simply witnessed “bugs crawling on branches.” Thus, where Hume does not allow for knowledge to influence sentiment, Leopold does. With Leopold‟s alteration of the sentiment-based ethic in mind, it is imperative that as a culture we promote a common propensity toward open-mindedness, innovation, and free dialogue.

In any specific application of the land ethic, the bulk of information that comprises contemporary understanding must be considered to determine facts—the truth value of statements—and act accordingly. When more information is discovered, sentiments can likewise change and values may shift. Remember the example in Chapter

One of changing ecological knowledge: when Leopold wrote “The Land Ethic,” ecologists determined that ecosystems could be judged healthy or unhealthy based on the composition of their biotic community. If the biotic community was thought to be the stable climax community, then the ecosystem was healthy; if not, it was considered unhealthy. As ecology advanced, and the knowledge of natural history provided insight to the constant flux of natural systems, this theory of ecosystem stasis and health was scrapped. Using knowledge garnered by the reasonable conduits of scientific discovery and cultural dialogue, sentiment can be affected. This is observable through the switch from geo- to heliocentricity, to the view of modern science which determines the sun to be one among many stars in the universe. Also, the gradual (and continued) displacement of fundamentalist creationism with evolution reveals a change in sentiment as influenced by a novel and explicative scientific finding. Though sentiment ultimately determines the ends we seek, and so influences the way in which individuals pursue the land ethic, it is

25 essential that scientific discovery and cultural dialogue be considered fully, so as to— hopefully, though not necessarily—best influence sentiment.

Given the Leopold sentiment-based ethical system, knowledge can influence sentiment, and though it might be a tentative and long process, the land ethic retains normative power. Specifically subjective, the land ethic generally denies the disturbance of natural systems at abnormal spatial and temporal scales though it allows a myriad of actions which are in line with this sole denial. The actions that might violate this maxim may be evaluated on the basis of current scientific discovery and cultural dialogue. The legitimacy that can be accorded to these evaluative processes is the focus of the next subsection.

2.2: Ecology and the Land Ethic

The land ethic is built upon ecological understanding. For this to be unproblematic, for the land ethic to emerge a strong and useable system, two conditions seem necessary. First, science and its findings must be wholly objective in order to provide a universally practical ethic. Second, ecology must inform the land ethic with definitions and facts that influence human sympathies in order to inspire ethical practice.

In this subsection, I reject the legitimacy of the first requirement and represent scientific finding as culturally contextual, though still legitimate as an ethical foundation. I maintain the second requirement in a modified manner: ecology informs the land ethic by providing a dual definition for “land” and promoting the specific application of more general theories. The land ethic thus emerges as a legitimate, sentiment-based system that is able to adapt as (or, less optimistically, if) scientific findings change.

26 Scientific findings, as inductive processes, are culturally contextual. I use

“scientific finding” to refer to discoveries made through hypothesis, experimentation/observation, and hypothesis support. Kristin Shrader-Frechette articulates the culturally contextual nature of sciences when she states that they

depend on methodological value judgments—about whether certain data are sufficient, about whether a given model fits the data, about whether nontestable predictions are reliable, and so on. Because such value judgments render strict deduction impossible, falsification and confirmation of hypotheses are always questionable, at least to some degree.31

This claim demonstrates the way in which scientific finding admits of some subjectivity through its method of inductive reasoning. How many samples are required, what type of model or statistical analysis should be used, or what statistical value corresponds to a supported hypothesis depends on the resources and knowledge available to a particular scientist and on the commonly accepted rules at a given time. Whereas a deductive conclusion must follow, inductive conclusions can only be supported as likely, and the measure of likelihood is subject to change as other scientific findings are discovered.

The reliance upon cultural context within the scientific method has several implications.

First, scientific finding is subject to change. Second, scientific finding becomes part of a human discourse, among cultural beliefs, history, and societal norms.

Scientific finding provides a legitimate foundation for an ethical system precisely because it is rooted in cultural context, subject to development, and predisposed to be adapted. That scientific finding is modifiable is unsurprising and desirable; theories of the indivisibility of subatomic particles, a flat earth, and a geocentric universe have been altered or discarded over the past several centuries as alternative scientific findings have

31 Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. “Practical Ecology and the Foundation for Environmental Ethics.” The Journal of Philosophy 92, (1995), 624.

27 revealed these theories of antiquity dubious. However, an ethical system subject to modification might seem undesirable. If an ethical system is based upon scientific finding, it might promote alternative—and possibly inconsistent—solutions as scientific finding changes. Therefore, the legitimacy of an ethical system based on scientific finding is discoverable through the extent to which scientific finding depicts reality and adheres to overarching cultural sympathy. J. Baird Callicott writes:

A culture‟s values and ethical ideals rest upon and are justified by suppositions of fact and supposed relations among supposed facts…[O]ur ideas about who we are, what sort of world we live in, and our relationship to the natural environment change rapidly and not at all arbitrarily or blindly. They change in response to scientific discovery and to intra- and intercultural critical reflection and debate.32

Cultures react to certain scientific findings, and through them individuals determine important beliefs concerning themselves and the surrounding world.33 These findings are then subject to “critical reflection and debate,” and so, may change over time. The scientific finding that provides the best explanations and predictions will be the most effective in enabling individuals to conceptualize themselves and others in the world.

Thus, the adaptation of scientific finding influences sentiments in a more accurate manner, due to the changed and more enlightened knowledge about the world.

The dynamic nature of scientific finding is dependent upon an unhindered scientific community; if the scientific community is unduly influenced, the findings it supports may not be the most accurate representations. In this instance, a sentiment- based ethic like the land ethic would suffer. It is essential that, to the best of their ability, scientists are able to work through the scientific method. The land ethic depends on

32 Callicott, J. Baird. “Can a Theory of Moral Sentiments Support a Normative Environmental Ethic?” Beyond the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 114. 33 Callicott‟s use of “fact” is more akin to my use of “scientific finding” than it is to an objective truth (Callicott 83).

28 adherence to the scientific method, its ability to produce findings, and its liability to be changed.

Scientific finding provides a legitimate basis for a sentiment-based ethic in that, it provides for the development of increasingly accurate ethical systems. An ethical system based on immutable scientific finding would be superior to an adaptive ethical system as it would be universal and unchanging for all generations and cultures. However, such scientific fact, by the very nature of the inductive method, is impossible. Scientific finding provides a legitimate basis for a sentiment-based because it is dynamic enough to allow for adaptation based on the best available depiction of reality. In this manner, the best sentiment-based ethic can be selected by the legitimacy of its scientific foundation.

Since scientific finding provides for a best available sentiment-based ethic, I must reject the statement that “science must be wholly objective in order to provide a universally practicable ethic.” Scientific findings, though culturally contextual, provide the best available knowledge to affect and help shape the sentiments of ethical action.

Ecology is inextricably linked to the land ethic and is an especially culturally and geographically contextual scientific field. Writing about ecology as a culturally contextual science, Shrader-Frechette notes:

Because of the empirical and theoretical underdetermination exhibited by ecological theories…and because of the resultant methodological value judgments necessary to interpret and apply it in specific cases, ecology does not appear to be fully amenable to hypothesis deduction.34

Much of ecology depends on the specific case in which it is being applied or studied. This accounts for the “underdetermination” of the field—it is underdetermined without a reference. Hence, ecology is a field of specific entities and particular

34 Ibid., 626.

29 relationships. “Organisms” do not exist the same way wolves and pronghorn or ants and acacia trees exist. Ecology necessitates a point of reference for study and only through this point of reference can it be determined. Hypothesis deduction cannot be universally employed, because ecology makes use of inductive methods specific to a given region.

That is not to rule out the existence of general, ecological rules. These rules may exist, but for ecology to become determined, these rules must be applied to specific organisms or organism-environment relationships.

A proper understanding of the conception “land” within the land ethic is found through a similar application of a general definition to a specific environment. In “The

Land Ethic,” Leopold writes that “the extension of ethics to [the land] is, if I read the evidence correctly…an ecological necessity.”35 The study of ecology focuses on the way in which organisms react with one another and the abiotic environment. Without land, there would be no organisms (as we know them) and thus, no ecology. However simple this recognition might be, it tends to take for granted what is meant by “land.” This definition, an obviously integral concept to the land ethic, is of a dual nature: a general rule that needs specific instantiation. Leopold‟s land pyramid is similar to the concept of an ecosystem in that they both provide a general framework for specific definition. The concept of an ecosystem and Leopold‟s model of the land pyramid both refer to a complex assortment of relationships between the abiotic environment and biotic organisms. More specific definition of the land pyramid of an ecosystem is only possible through particular application, since “ecosystems are context-specific

35 Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic.” The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994), 139.

30 entities…they cannot be delineated without a science of policy concern.”36 There must be a human agenda—scientific finding or ethical consideration—in place to determine the specific spatial dimension of an ecosystem or land pyramid. The specific definition of land, a definition that incorporates a spatial element, corresponds to the particular land forms, climate conditions, soil types, and biotic organisms that compose the “context- specific” ecosystem or land pyramid. The concept of “land,” as a land pyramid of an ecosystem, can be instantiated in various, specific ways. For example, outside my frost- plated window, a beech tree is growing in a Miami Valley, sand-loam soil that is host to a variety of organisms; a robin surreptitiously bobs its head as it scavenges at the base of the beech. Though it might be small, this scene represents a specific instantiation of land, as it establishes actual organisms and abiota for the purpose of providing an example.

Hence, the dual definition of land within the land ethic, as provided by ecology is as follows:

1. Land is a general concept that refers to the complex interrelations amongst biotic organisms and their interaction with the abiotic environment. 2. Land refers to specific areas that are defined by an agenda or purpose and are comprised of particular species, soil types, and landforms.

Both definitions are essential to one another. The first enables specific definitions, and the second provides observable examples to which, as human beings, we can relate. The very definition of “land” within the land ethic is subject to change, depending on whether it is intended to convey a general definition of the land, or a particular area. Just as the definition is variable and subject to change, so too are the applications of ecological findings.

36 Lackey, Robert T. “Values, Policy, and Ecosystem Health.” Bioscience 51 (2001), 439.

31 The land ethic depends on scientific finding in the form of ecological knowledge to substantiate its normative power. In order to ensure that natural systems are not annihilated, as Callicott‟s revised maxim demands, we must discover what practices or protections to enact through ecological study. Since ecological knowledge is dependent on specific application, it must be applied to a particular situation in order to be effective.

Shrader-Frechette writes:

If ecology turns out to be a science of case studies, practical applications, and human-directed environmental management, it is not obvious that this is a defect. Ecology may not be flawed because it must sacrifice universality for utility and practicality, or because it must sacrifice generality for the precision gained in case-studies.37

The application of the land ethic must occur on a local scale, as its normative provisions are based in the science of ecology. Ecological definitions and theories, without a temporal and spatial context, are too vague to inform human sentiment or to provide for a reasonable course of action. Acting ethically toward “the land” is a more difficult task than acting ethically toward an intricate system that cycles energy and forms the basis for life. Further, acting ethically toward such a “circuitous system” is less meaningful than acting in a way that benefits the idyllic, natural system that pulses in the early, winter light outside my window: the robin ruffles its feathers, scratches the surface of the soil, and alights to perch on a swaying branch of the beech tree. This necessary application within ecology is neither a curse of the land ethic, nor even a tolerable evil; it is the way in which ecology and human sentiment functions and so, it is the impetus and foundation for the land ethic.

37 Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. “Practical Ecology and the Foundation for Environmental Ethics.” The Journal of Philosophy 92, (1995), 635.

32 Ecology is a science of a culturally, temporally, and spatially contextualized nature and the land ethic, as it is founded upon ecology, benefits as an ethical system capable of adaptation and in need of specific application. Since the land ethic has a foundation of ecological finding, our perceptions and values may change as our ecological understanding increases. The better human beings become at understanding the intricate interrelationships of organisms, and the relationship between organisms and the abiotic environment, the more nuanced and informed our ethical actions can become via the land ethic. Through critical reflection and discourse, refinement of the land ethic is possible. The land ethic is as dynamic as the ecosystems it includes within the circle of ethical consideration and it is this dynamic nature that can carry the land ethic forward as a powerful and perpetually relevant sentiment-based ethical system.

2.3: Is the Land Ethic Inconsistent?

According to the land ethic, as adapted by Callicott‟s revised maxim: “A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”38 Two specifications are required to clarify this maxim. First, the concept of “disturbance…at normal spatial and temporal scales” is in need of elucidation. Normalcy, as a qualifier, needs to be specific and must be determined through the best available knowledge of ecology. Second, the final sentence of the revised maxim prohibits all actions that disturb the biotic community at abnormal spatial and temporal scales. However, such a prohibition is sweeping and goes beyond the scope of possibility. To remedy these problems, I recommend two minor alterations of Callicott‟s revised maxim.

38 Callicott, J. Baird. “Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine the Leopold Land Ethic?” Beyond the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 138.

33 The establishment of normal spatial and temporal disturbances must be done on a case-by-case basis due to the necessary instantiation of the “land” concept. As it was defined in sub-section 2.1, the land is both a general concept and a concept that allows for specific instantiation; it can refer to the general interrelations of the biosphere and its dealings with the abiotic environment, or it may refer to a particular set of organisms and the specific geographic location where they are found. Determining the normal spatial and temporal disturbances for a biotic community must be done specifically and locally, because certain locations are affected by disturbance differently. This can be observed with the unintentional release of exotic species. The accidental introduction of the brown tree snake to the island of Guam resulted in the extirpation of nine species of endemic avifauna between 1960 and 1996.39 As the brown tree snake and its prey have coevolved in its native range—Indonesia and New Guinea—the snake‟s affects on these islands have not caused an increased disturbance. What is an abnormal spatial and temporal disturbance in one biotic community is not necessarily so in another. Further, action that does not permit normal spatial and temporal disturbance within a biotic community should be considered detrimental, just as those actions that increase disturbance.

Disturbance regimes are normal occurrences and can vary by ecoregion. For example, the fire management practices in Yellowstone National Park from 1972-1987 focused on fire suppression so as to “maintain „biotic associations‟ that were found in the park area.”40 When the vast wildfires of 1988 swept across the Greater Yellowstone Area

(GYA), approximately 560,000 hectares of the ecosystem were affected.41 The result was a major aesthetic alteration of the GYA that had surprisingly little effect on the

39 Fritts, T.H., Rodda, G.H. “The Disappearance of Guam‟s Wildlife.” Bioscience 47 (1997), 567. 40 Schullery, P. “Fire Impact on Yellowstone.” BioScience 39 (1989), 686. 41 Ibid., 687.

34 aforementioned biotic associations. Though many individuals were affected, the GYA

“forests appeared to alternate between short periods…of very large fires and long intervals…of relatively small fires.”42 The sixteen years spent on fire suppression in the park did nothing but hold back a process that was bound to occur, due to the aging of the combustible flora found in the GYA. While fire suppression for the preservation of human life and well-being is laudable, fire suppression for the maintenance of the biotic community often interferes with natural disturbance regimes. Of course, suppression may be necessary for those fires that begin due to human ignition. Deciding between the prescription of a burn or its suppression must come from the best knowledge available.

It would be impossible for human beings to practice the land ethic as Callicott‟s revised maxim reads. The last sentence, “[a thing] is wrong when it tends otherwise” refers to anything that unduly alters an environment which is not, necessarily, a human action. Therefore, by the revised maxim followers of the land ethic would be required to attempt to stop natural disasters before they could destroy specific biotic communities.

This, of course, is impossible. We are unable to prevent hurricanes and tornados; earthquakes and tsunamis are barely predictable, much less stoppable, and I pity the loyal adherent who attempts to block a volcanic eruption. Though it may seem like trifling semantics, it is important to alter the language of the revised maxim so that it doesn‟t prescribe normative action that cannot be followed.

Two simple corrections will provide Callicott‟s revised maxim with further clarification. I suggest that “the biotic community” be replaced with “a specific biotic community,” and that “[a] thing is right” be replaced with “a human action is right.” The alteration addresses the need to instantiate a particular biotic community when applying

42 Ibid., 688.

35 the land ethic. Since biotic communities differ in regard to normal spatial and temporal disturbance, specific application is required. The second alteration ensures that the land ethic only endorses and prohibits those actions over which human beings have control.

Thus, the newly revised maxim would read: A human action is right when it tends to disturb a specific biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.

36 Chapter Three: Application and Conclusion

3.1: The Land Ethic Applied

Application of the land ethic must occur specifically and on a case-by-case basis.

It is an ethic that applies to a wide variety of scenarios, not only those that pertain to specific land use. Further, as was discussed previously, the land ethic may promote alternative normative action in one situation. With all of these caveats in mind, I intend to use the land ethic to think through the use of a parcel of forested land in the Oxford

Community Park; this application will provide an example of how the land ethic can be used, and it will illustrate the way in which the different components of the ethic interact to promote action.

The Oxford Community Park is a one hundred and thirteen acre tract located on

6801 Fairfield Road. There are multiple athletic fields, a playground complex, basketball courts, and a natural area within the park. The natural area is approximately ten acres and is accessible by trails and bridges that were constructed by Kyle J. Biggs Eagle Scout

Troop 999 in 2005. It is adjacent to athletic fields, a playground, and a housing development (with a house under construction by Doug Ward Construction, Inc.) that is currently unoccupied. The land ethic will be applied to this parcel of natural land within the Oxford Community Park and will demonstrate whether it should be preserved, conserved, or completely harvested for natural resources.

While the natural land within the Oxford Community Park provides a small, accessible, and convenient example, its predetermination as a park might seem to beg the question of how it should be used. That is to say, because the Oxford City Council has already determined this land valuable enough to protect, isn‟t the question of preservation

37 predetermined? Wouldn‟t, then, land ethic application be unnecessary and redundant?

Though this objection is salient enough to require response, it is not so powerful as to render the example irrelevant. True, the Oxford City Council has set aside this area for protection, but such a determination does not necessarily mean this parcel of land is best suited for protection; perhaps it ought to be selectively logged, or maybe it would be better suited for agricultural use. Additionally, the practical power of this exercise— whether the action supported by the land ethic is realized—is superfluous to the nature of the example. I aim to show how the land ethic can be applied in a stepwise fashion to reach a result. Though it would be ideal for the resultant conclusion to be enacted, the point of this exercise is to reach a substantiated conclusion using the land ethic regardless of whether or not it is realized.

To begin to apply the land ethic to the natural area within the Oxford Community

Park, it is important to recall the two fundamental tenets of the land ethic: the revised maxim and the second order principles. The revised maxim reads that: A human action is right when it tends to disturb a specified biotic community at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. The revised maxim will provide guidance for any normative action considered, throughout the course of the application.

The second order principles read that:

The first second-order principle (SOP-1) is that obligations generated by membership in more venerable and intimate communities take precedence over those generated in more recently emerged and impersonal communities…The second, second-order principle (SOP-2) is that stronger interests…generate duties that take precedence over duties generated by weaker interests.43

43 Callicott, J. Baird. “Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofascism.” Beyond the Land Ethic. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 73.

38 These second order principles enable evaluation of specific land use. Though the revised maxim must guide any action, these second order principles govern for whom and the way in which the land in question should be used, that is, they govern what action is taken that disturbs the specified biotic community at normal spatial and temporal scales.

Keeping in mind the ubiquity of the revised maxim when performing any action in regard to the land ethic, I will consider the second order principles in order to determine the proper use of the natural area within the Oxford Community Park. As the second order principles state, an obligation to the most intimate community (SOP-1) with the strongest interest (SOP-2) takes precedent. Such a situation, for me, would require that my family or closest friends depend on the natural area within the Oxford

Community Park for survival. Thankfully, this is not the case. Thus, I move onto a less intimate community, and a weaker interest. The Oxford community isn‟t dependent on this natural land for survival—food and shelter can be obtained more efficiently in other areas and by other means—but it might benefit from this natural area as an educational, recreational, or spiritual resource. In this way, SOP-1 would address the Oxford community, and SOP-2 would refer to the interest in the natural land as a resource for personal enjoyment. If there was someone in the Oxford community who depended on the natural land in question the same way a destitute subsistence farmer depends on his/her land, then the second order principles would carry much more weight and dictate a much different use of the land. However, due to the location of the natural land, and the relative affluence of the Oxford community to destitute subsistence farmers, the second order principles seem to offer protection of the land for personal enjoyment as its most significant use. My task is made considerably easier for this decision, for protection

39 of the park is already taking place and, as a rule, protection promotes the integrity of the biotic community. If more agricultural land was needed to support the Oxford community, this application would be significantly longer, as the agricultural practices would have to mesh with the revised maxim. However, it is important to go back to the revised maxim even in this case to ensure that, though the natural land is being protected, it is not being disturbed at abnormal spatial and temporal scales.

Though the natural land is located within a park, and is being protected for the enjoyment of the Oxford community, there are several different human disturbances.

These disturbances include: removal of an invasive plant species, the Amur honeysuckle

(Lonicera maackii), the adjacent housing development, and the use of the park by the

Oxford community. These three disturbances will be reviewed in light of the revised maxim, to determine whether or not they are permissible via the land ethic.

Removal of the Amur honeysuckle must be considered in conjunction with a previous human disturbance. As an invasive species, Amur honeysuckle often out- competes native flora by blooming early in spring and losing its leaves late in the fall.

Karin DeLue, a concerned citizen, has taken it upon herself to remove Amur honeysuckle from this natural area for the benefit of native species. Her efforts have an affect on the biotic community. The picture, below, demonstrates the marked affect DeLue‟s efforts have had.

40

Notice the contrast between foreground and background. The foreground is an area where all Amur honeysuckle has been removed, while the background is still dominated by the species. This picture was taken in late September, 2007 and so the honeysuckle had been crowding out other understory species for, almost, an entire growing season. The lack of green vegetation where the honeysuckle was removed is obvious. In light of the revised maxim, this contrast might seem indefensible. It is clear that the biotic community is being altered at an abnormal spatial and temporal scale through the honeysuckle removal. However, it must be noted that the Amur honeysuckle, as an invasive species, altered the native landscape in an abnormal way long ago. Due to this original disturbance, the honeysuckle removal may be defended, as it promotes a state prior to the first disturbance prohibited by the revised maxim. By altering the landscape through the removal of an exotic species, native re-growth is promoted, and, with diligence and luck, the future succession of the natural area will come to resemble a time when Amur honeysuckle had not out-competed native species.

41 The housing development adjacent to the natural area, though it might affect those species located on the border of the natural area, should not compromise or change the natural area as a whole. Gail Brahier, the Parks and Recreation Commissioner, has noted that those people currently inhabiting houses close to the natural area have been very respectful of the park, and that the housing developers have been very observant of the parkland borders. Further, construction processes have in no way altered the natural area.

It is important to continue inspection of the housing development and natural area border to ensure that there is no abnormal disturbance. However, at this point the housing development poses no problem.

The hiking trails in the natural area, in theory, restrict public access to the path and, in so doing, limit the disturbance of the natural area. The trails do not dominate the landscape and, even though their construction required cutting down trees and removing shrubs and understory species, it was not on a scale so large as to unduly affect the biotic community by changing species composition or eliminating interspecies relations.

However, it is important to note that public access should be restricted to these trails. It is possible for the public to abnormally disturb the biotic community by wandering off the trails and treading upon the understory flora. Though this is a very hypothetical disturbance, it is important to consider, for prevention of abnormal disturbance is at the root of the revised maxim. In this vein, Brahier anticipates the placement of signs that encourage the protection of the natural area and the leashing of pets to be installed soon.

Though the hiking trails and public have and will continue to alter the landscape slightly, their effects are not so significant as to warrant cessation by the land ethic.

42 The application of the land ethic to the natural area within the Oxford Community

Park did not lead to any corrections or alterations to the current management of the park.

It recommended that the natural area continue to be protected as a resource for personal enjoyment by the people of the Oxford community and that the honeysuckle removal be continued, the affect of the adjacent housing development be monitored, and that public access be restricted to the hiking trails. The use of the land ethic, in this particular case, validated current practices. Such a validation, though it doesn‟t encourage a change in behavior, does provide greater insight into the legitimacy of current practices. Such insight anchors the contemporary protection of the natural area in a justifiable line of ethical reasoning, and promotes consciousness of the land.

3.2: A Hopeful Conclusion

The land ethic, throughout its existence, and even throughout this text, has been defined and redefined, described and applied, elucidated and reformulated. Though it is an ethic unto itself, it must exist as an aggregate of other duties and obligations. This facet is most easily observed in the second order principles. Though following the land ethic is important, so too are those obligations of intimate relationships. In certain extreme cases, these relational obligations can take precedence over the land ethic. It is the need to balance and weigh the revised maxim with other obligations that reveals the land ethic as a specific type of virtue ethic and, further, that reveals consideration of the land ethic a worthwhile task.

The land ethic can be considered a virtue ethic because of the way in which it depends on moral sentiments, informed by scientific knowledge, to guide action. The distinguishing factor of a virtue ethic is that it promotes action on the basis of virtue, or

43 moral character traits, as opposed to demanding that a moral rule be followed

(deontology), or that the consequences should solely determine what action to take

(utilitarianism). As Leopold wrote, more than half a century ago, “we can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in”44

Environmental responsibility and consideration depend on these basic human virtues expanded to include the land. Ethical guideposts for action do exist within the land ethic.

Examples include Leopold‟s maxim, Callicott‟s maxim and second order principles, and the revised maxim provided here. However, to establish these guides as deontological obligations is too strong an interpretation, and it does not acknowledge the land ethic as an expanded, or aggregate, component of ethical consideration. Callicott‟s second order principles explicitly indicate that the more intimate relationship a person has with another organism or entity, the more considerable ethical responsibilities are for that organism or entity. The contemplation, weighing, and selection of action in light of the land ethic requires the cultivation of virtues. The land ethic promotes a maxim of environmental responsibility, but this promotion is not at the expense of other ethical responsibilities. It is in addition to them.

The land ethic must take its place among other, and possibly competing, values.

For this to occur properly, consistent personal reevaluation and consideration are required. Understanding the land ethic thus becomes a process, not an intuitive grasp, or a discrete, academic achievement. This process of understanding, of true comprehension of the land ethic, also necessitates embodiment. Only if one strives to follow the land ethic, to incorporate love, respect, and care for the environment into their life, can the

44 Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1993), 103.

44 process of consideration and contemplation actually begin. This concept of virtue formation and embodiment can be observed in Plato‟s “Meno” and extrapolated to the development of environmental responsibility, through the consideration of the land ethic.

“Meno” is a dialogue primarily between Socrates, and his interlocutor, Meno.

The dialogue centers on the question: What is virtue? Meno begins the dialogue as assertive, vain, and aggressive. He seems uninterested in anything except personal gain, and seeks to discover what virtue is from Socrates to benefit himself. However, by simply entering into a conversation about the nature of virtue, Meno has already begun to formulate some intellectual virtues. Inquisitiveness and curiosity, though not virtuous in an ethical sense, certainly mark a character trait necessary for intellectual achievement.

Meno‟s character, at this early stage in the dialogue, is similar to a person who is unconcerned about the environment, but ventures to pick up “The Land Ethic,” a text by

Callicott, or this paper. Such a person might consider the environment valuable, but only of instrumental worth. However, by reading a text aimed at consideration of the land ethic, this person has already shown a propensity toward understanding. This want of understanding might be tempered with a desire to deny environmental responsibility or moral standing, but it exists nonetheless. Just as with Meno, seeds are sown through initial action—beginning a dialogue about the nature of virtue, starting to read a text about the land ethic—that have the possibility to grow into ethical virtues.

The first intensional definition Meno provides in the dialogue is comparable to the conqueror‟s role condemned by Leopold in “The Land Ethic.” After realizing virtue cannot accurately be defined, separately, for different genders of age groups, Meno states

45 that it is “to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them.”45 This definition of virtue as power is very similar to a naïve understanding of the relationship between human beings and the land. It is not difficult to imagine someone without respect for the land describing the human relation to the land as: to desire and have the power to use it. To debunk his definition, Socrates shows Meno that all people desire good things, so that, by Meno‟s definition, “if one man is better than another, he must be better at securing” those goods all people desire.46 However, acquisition can occur through wicked means, and so Meno admits that it must be accompanied by justice, moderation, or piety.47 So it is with the land. All people use the land because we depend on it for survival. So then, following the method Socrates employed, it would seem that the power to use the land would indicate whether a relationship was good or not. On this point, Leopold writes:

In human history, we have learned (I hope) that the conqueror role is eventually self-defeating. Why? Because it is implicit in such a role that the conqueror knows, ex cathedra, just what makes the community clock tick, and just what and who is valuable, and what and who is worthless, in community life. It always turns out he knows neither, and this is why his conquests eventually defeat themselves.48

The role of the conqueror is ineffective because such a dominant position requires immutable and superlative knowledge of the dominated. Such knowledge is not possible.

The power to use the land must be tempered with caution, respect, understanding, and love to be effective and good. Since human knowledge and fact are not infallible and immutable, the conqueror role should be avoided in all situations. Just as virtue is not

45 Plato. “Meno.” Trans Grube, G. Plato, Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), 77c. 46 Ibid., 78b. 47 Ibid., 78e. 48 Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic.” The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994), 139.

46 simple acquisition, a proper relationship with the land is not accomplished by brute power.

Meno‟s paradox is featured next in the dialogue, and it reveals the necessity to strive toward ethical understanding. Meno, befuddled and frustrated, exclaims: “How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all?” and establishes the Meno paradox; the completely unknown cannot be sought.49 This paradox retains its poignancy, today. For the purposes of this text, and to frame a question of the environmental skeptic, Meno‟s paradox can be reformulated as: How can we behave ethically toward the land when such behavior cannot be precisely defined? Though

Socrates rejoins Meno through an illustration that attempts to prove the immortality of the soul, this portion of his rejoinder is still relevant to consideration of the land ethic.

Socrates states:

we will be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know and that we must not look for it.50

The act of questioning and contemplating the nature of virtue is a significant step in obtaining virtue. It is more virtuous to pursue the nature of virtue, rather than to lazily give up on the pursuit. In the same way, though the land ethic might not be strictly deontological, and though an algorithm for acting ethically toward the land might not be provided, “we will be better people” if we strive for heightened understanding about the human/environmental relationship, rather than dismiss it.

49 Plato. “Meno.” Trans Grube, G. Plato, Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), 80e. 50 Ibid., 86b.

47 “Meno” ends after several more attempts to define virtue. We need not concern ourselves, here, with these definitions, but with the final character of Meno. Throughout the dialogue, he becomes less demanding and more interested in the attempt to define virtue. Meno begins by confidently and incorrectly defining virtue. When these definitions are found to be lacking, Meno gets somewhat defensive and demanding.

Early in the dialogue, Socrates who claims that Meno is “forever giving orders in a discussion, as spoiled people do, who behave like tyrants.”51 This brash character is different than the Meno at the end of the dialogue who enthusiastically answers Socrates‟ questions and participates in the dialectic enthusiastically, not begrudgingly. A character transformation has occurred within Meno. The quest to define virtue has, it seems, left him more respectful, patient, interested, and humble, i.e., more virtuous. Perhaps a similar transformation could occur through the reading of a text about the land ethic. By examining the nature of the land ethic, attempting to understand it and its functioning, a greater appreciation for the land could be fostered. The moral sentiments, as Hume called them, could be affected to begin to consider the environment as an entity worth ethical consideration.

It might be that pursuit of the land ethic promotes environmental responsibility, just as participating in a conversation about the nature of virtue witnessed increased virtuous behavior by Meno. Through consideration of the land ethic, a deeper understanding concerning the relationship between human beings and the environment can be achieved. In gauging the efficacy of environmental philosophy as environmental activism, Callicott writes:

51 Ibid., 77b.

48 In thinking, talking, and writing about environmental ethics, environmental philosophers already have their shoulders to the wheel, helping to reconfigure the prevailing cultural worldview and thus helping to push general practice in the direction of environmental responsibility.52 (Callicott “Environmental Philosophy is Environmental Activism” 43).

By promoting thought, catalyzing conversation, and demanding criticism, consideration of environmental ethics—specifically the land ethic—may reinforce just what it attempts to inspire: environmental responsibility. Problems may persist in the ethical system itself, but pointing to these issues affords other examiners the opportunity to more fully assess the ethic, or it provides the reader with insight for his or her own ethical rumination. Contemplation of the relationship between human beings and the land is a necessary step for inspiring environmental responsibility.

52 Callicott, J. Baird. “Environmental Philosophy is Environmental Activism” Beyond the Land Ethic (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 43.

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