THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF THE FlRST TEN YEARS
BY
Jesse Rutledge
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia September, 1998
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List of Tables v
Abstract vi
List of Abbreviations Used vii
viii
Chapter One: Introduction 1
Chapter Two: Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy 13
Chapter Three: Legislative History and Institutional Dynamics 44
Chapter Four: From Silent Partner to Audacious Advocate? 73
Chapter Five: ICHRDD's Relationship with CIDA and DFAIT 1O8
Chapter Six: Conclusion 127
Appendîx "A": International Centre for Human Rights and Dernocrutic Developrnent Act
Appendix "B": Members of the Board of Directors
Bibliography LIST OF TABLES
Breakdown of ICHRDD's Annual Expenditures By Category
Government of Canada ODA and Trade Figures ( 199 1- 1992) for ICHRDD's Initiai 13 Core Countries ABSTRACT
Ten years derits creation, and after almost eight full years of operation, the International Centre For Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) is an institution which has been largely ignored in the academic world. Drawing mainly upon interviews with staff at ICHRDD, and with officiais at CIDA and DFAIT as well as in the NGO comrnunity, this study begins to fil1 this gap in scholarship by examining the Centre in light of its mandate under the International Centrefor Human Rights and Democratic Development Act of 1988. The investigation that follows fin& that the Centre has had an impact greater than one would deduce from the very limited acadernic attention paid to the organization. From the outset, ICHRDD has been heralded for its unique design as an organization stabilized by govemment funding, yet, despite the potentially politically- sensitive nature of its work, at arms length from the govemment of Canada. Created in the nadir of the Cold War. the Centre has been largely displaced from its original raison d'être of funding front-line human rights NGOs in developing countries by its much wealthier sibling, CIDA. In response, ICHRDD's leadership has re-aiigned the organization to make it more of an "influencing" agency, advocating human rights at the national and supranational level. The Centre has also put more resources into educating the Canadian public, while continuing to fund organizations which lie beyond CIDA's grasp, such as Burma' s National Coalition Goverment. Through the Centre's own efforts, and through the multiplier effect it creates by funding other organizations, ICHRDD has pushed Canada to adopt a foreign policy which advances respect for univenal human rights. The Centre has also moved to occupy a niche as a 'bridge builder" between state and society in deveioping countries, in line with its own status as a quasi non-govemmentai organization (QUANGO). While a variety of organizational and institutional difficulties have impaired the development of a long-term strategic vision, this study argues that the Centre remains a valuable organization within Canadian society, and is worthy of continued support from the public purse. APEC - Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation BCNI - Business Council on National Issues CCIC - Canadian Council for International Cooperation CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency CLAIHR - Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights Cabie News Network Department of National Defence Federation internationale de droits de l'homme Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Human Development Index (of the United Nations) International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development ICTR - International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda IDRC - International Deveiopment Research Centre IFI - international Financial Institution iMF - International Monetary Fund INGO - InternationaI Non-Govermental Organization MP - Member of Parliament NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement NTHR - Network on International Human Rights NGO - Non-Govemrnental Organization OAS - Organization of American States ODA - Official Development Assistance OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Deveiopment PCO - Privy Council's Office PM0 - Prime Minister's Office PRC - People's Republic of China QUANGO - Quasi Non-Governmental Organization SBSI - Indonesian Welfare Union (in Indonesian) SLORC - State Law and Order Restoration Council (of Burrna) UDHR .. Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN - United Nations UNcm - United Nations Commission on Human Rights UNDP - United Nations Development Program WO - World Trade Organization
vii This study benefited greatly from the contributions of nearly 20 individuals who took part in interviews during May and June of 1998, mostly in person but some by telephone. If there is integrity to this project, much of it is because of the honesty and frankness of their offerings. 1 am grateful to all of them for making time for me, and sincerely hope al1 will find faithful representations of their views within these pages.
Any errors of fact or of interpretation are, of course, my own.
I am particularly thankful for the CO-operationof those at ICHRDD who ensured my research trip was productive. Patricia Poirier deserves special praise for facilitating my visit on short notice. Serge Rousseau provided me with unrestricted access to the documentation centre, where al1 of the intemal documents used in this study were found.
Pat Daigle was a most reliable correspondent on follow-up matters. The Centre proved a mode1 of public transparency worthy of replication by other govemment organizations.
At home, Don Rutiedge and &me Rutiedge ensured the manuscript was up to their exacting standards. In Halifax, Professor Moira McConnell of the Faculty of Law dedicated many hours and offered insightful feedback throughout the process, and
Politicai Science Professor Denis Stairs aided me in sharpening my focus. 1 owe my greatest debt to Dr. David Black of the Political Science department, who persuaded me that this project was feasible and worthy of pusuit. His perceptive cnticism and untiring encouragement will not be forgotten.
Finally, my dearest thanks to Vanessa, for sustenance of body, mind, and spirit. CELAPTIER ONE Introduction
This thesis is an institutional and political history of the International Centre for Human
Rights and Democratic Developrnent (ICHRDD). The Centre was established by an Act
of Parliament on September 30, 1988, and inaugurated in Montreai on October 19. 1990.'
According to the Centre's mission statement,
The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) is a Canadian institution with an international mandate. It is an independent organization which promotes, advocates and defends the democratic and human rights set out in the International Bill of Rights. In CO-operationwith civil society and govemments in Canada and abroad, the Centre initiates and supports programmes, to strengthen laws and democratic institutions, principally in developing countries. Although its mandate is global, the Centre focuses its work in a number of core c~untries.~
A creation of the Canadian govemment. ICHRDD was heraided for its unique design: an
organization at once stabilized by govemment funding, yet. despite the potentially
politically-sensitive nature of its work, at arms length from officiai Canada. The result,
an institution which spanned both government and non-govemment sectors, was without precedent and devoid of peen in the human rights community.
In the years since the passage of its statute, ICHRDD has pushed the Canadian govemment to adopt a foreign policy which advances respect for universai human nghts. both through the Centre's own efforts, and by funding other organizations to do the same.
The Centre has aiso moved to occupy a niche as a "bridge builder" between state and society in developing countries, in Line with its own status as a quasi non-govemmental
I ICHRDD Annual Report 1990- 199 1, 1. See also the Internatio~alCentre for Human Rights and Democratic Development Act, attached as Appendix "A". ' ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes. February 13 and 14, 1998.7. organization (QUANGO). In spite of a variety of organizational and institutional difficulties which have impaired the development of a longer-terni institutional vision, the Centre remains a valuable organization within Canadian society, and is worthy of continued support.
The study that follows examines ICHRDD1s first ten yean, in light of the mandate given the Centre in 1988 by the International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development Act. This introductory chapter bnefly reviews the literature on
ICHRDD, and argues that the Centre has managed to establish independence from
Canadian foreign policy. To help put the Centre into context. chapter two identifies some of the issues, actors and theories involved in the study of human rights and Canadian foreign policy, while contending that Canada has largely eschewed any consistent foreign policy on international human rights. Chapter three begins by outlining the ambiguous legislative and political origins which shaped ICHRDD, and examines how certain of the
Centre's actors and institutional dynamics have circumscribed the work it performs. The fourth chapter analyzes the Centre's programme, research and advocacy efforts, concluding that ICHRDD has found its niche as a link between state and society in developing countries. Yet the evidence also reveals an ad hoc approach to its undertakings. a result of frequent changes in strategic direction. Chapter five presents findings from an inquiry into the working relationship between ICHRDD and both the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), noting that the Centre has been forced to re- orient itself as CIDA increased funding for human rights prograrns, but that the collaborative relationship with Foreign Affairs has ken less subject to strains imposed by overlapping areas of responsibility. Finaily, the conclusion draws together the most saiient points of the thesis, and re-visits a number of the major questions raised throughout.
Information for this project has ken drawn from a variety of sources. First and forernost have been interviews and discussions with staff members of the Centre. past and present, both in penon and by telephone. Most respondents were frank and forthcorning, and this high degree of CO-operationwas integral to bringing this project to fruition.
Interviewees included al1 three of the Centre's Presidents to date, programme officiais. and communications and administration staff members. Intemal documents and Board of
Directon minutes also provided insights unavailable elsewhere. In order to ensure a balanced perspective, interviews were dso conducted with representatives of non- govemmental organizations (NGOs) and QUANGOs, as well as with officials in CIDA's
Policy Branch and DFAIT's Global and Human Issues Bureau. Views were also solicited from an independent consultant in Ottawa who has worked with the Centre, and from rite
Globe and Mail's columnist on rights issues, Paul Knox.
An approach which relies heavily upon interviews and primary source materiai
(e.g. strategy documents. minutes of the Board of Directors) provides insights not likely to be found in secondary sources such as books or journal articles. Research based largely around interviews and other pnrnary materials does have pitfalls. though.
Corroborating incongruent and at times conflicting evidence can be dificult. Care must be taken to ensure accurate representation of views put forward in interviews, and discretion must be used in cases where anonyrnity was either requested, or was deemed appropriate because of the cntical or sensitive nature of the cornments. A lack of secondary documentation also imposes limits on the conclusions one cm reach as to the
eflectiveness and influence of the organization.
Literature Review
Ten years after its creation, and after alrnost eight full years of operation, the
Centre remains an under-studied organization. Academics have not exarnined the Centre
in any great detail. Perhaps, the reasoning has been that the Centre's internationally
focussed, action-oriented activities place it beyond the realm of the foreign policy
process, where much of the political science literature is focussed. Further, ICHRDD's
quasi-governrnental status may have deterred scholars, who have been unsure of how to
properly frame it. A more critical perspective would suggest that ICHRDD's
marginalization within acadernic literature reflects the perception that it is an
organization with a trifling budget, which has suffered from intemal squabbling and
lurches in strategic direction so frequently it has rendered itself irrelevant. Evidence
supporting both of these perspectives can be found in this study. Regardless of which of these perspectives is doser to the truth, the Centre's unique placement at the cross-roads of government and non-govemment approaches to the promotion of rights and democracy makes such marginalizing inappropnate.
Most academic references to the Centre are made in passing. It is usually considered a smaii piece in the large and complex puzzle of human rights and Canadian foreign policy. Mainly, such efforts portray the Centre as little more than a minor arm of the Canadian foreign and development policy apparatus, and the Centre is referred to more often than not as helping to promote assorted peripheral "ends" of Canadian foreign policy. For exarnple, Andrew Cooper and Leslie Pal note that "the activities of this organization have been complernentary to those of the government".3 This relatively indifferent approach to ICHRDD is t~r~ical.~The two lengthy commentaries on
ICHRDD that exist date from either prior to the Centre's inauguration, or shortly after it began its operations. They are considered below.
Robert Miller argues in his 1989 article "The International Centre for Human
Rights and Democratic Development: Notes on its Mission" that the newly established
Centre must prioritize two goals: establishing a clear and compelling mission statement. and forging a link between civil and political rights, and economic. social and cultural ones.' He contends: "Rather than ignoring or trying to avoid the tensions between human rights and democratic development, the Centre should derive strength from directly confronting and seeking to resolve these tensions'? Recognizing ICHRDD as the comerstone of a new-found Canadian emphasis on human rights "development" (in contrat to the more traditional "defence" approach of imposing sanctions and suspending aid), Miller sees the Centre as "international in its orientation, inclusive in its mandate, and developmental in its approach.. .".' In Centrai America, Miller contends, the Centre
Andrew Cooper and Leslie Pal. 'Human Rights and Security Policy," in Doem, Pal and Tomlin. Border Crossines: The Internationalization of Canadian Public Policv (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 236. The authors go on to note that "on a wide range of other issues, the ICHRDD disagreed rnarkedly with official policy," though the authors do not assess the impact of this dissent. 4 For other brief discussions of ICHRDD along these lines, see David Gillies and Marie Cocking, 'The Centre for Human Rights: A Distinctive Vision?" International Perspectives 19:3 (March 1990), 36; Gerald J. Schmitz, "Human Rights, Democratization and International Conflict," in Hampson and Maule, eds., Canada Amone Nations 1992-1993 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 244-245: Andrew Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policv: Old Habits and New Directions (Scarborough. ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1997), 202,272; Kim R. Nossal. The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough. ON: Prentice-Hall, 1997). 279. For more inforrned and slightly more extensive discussions, see David Gillies, Between Princi~leand Practice (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996). 242-247; and Ann Gri ffiths, Creating Sustainubte bemocracy? CdimPolicy in the Visegraâ Counrries in the Posr-Cold War Era (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1997), unpublished PhD thesis, 288-293. Robert Miller. 'The International Centre for Human Rights and Dernocratic Development: Notes on its Mission," in Brecher. ed., Human Ri~hts.Develoument and Foreim Policy Canadian Perspectives (Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989). 377-389. ibid, 382. ' Ibid. 380. is perfectly placed to pmmote a "democracy and social justice" program to help support the fragile peace of the late 1980s' a direction in which the Centre set off in the early
1990s. Many of Miller's more specific suggestions were also reaiized in ICHRDD's earliest years: the need to ensure that work is based upon requests frorn southern NGOs
(and not "imposeci"), the transparency of its operations, the usefulness of establishing a newsletter, and the assuming of politically riskier operations than those to which the federal government was di~~osed.~
Whereas Miller sets up ICHRDD's definitional debate as one between civiVpolitica1 rights versus economic, cultural and social rights, Andres Perez is interested in what he perceives as the overly "legalistic view of democracy and politics in developing countries" which underlies the creation of the centremgPerez argues that because the Centre's founding documents evade defining democracy, we are left to assume that a Western understanding of liberal democracy is the irnplicit position. The consequences, he observes, do not aiways match the benign intentions: "Prornoting the use of elections and other forrnal democratic mechanisms of conflict resolution in sociaily fragmented and politicaily polarized societies is putting the cart before the rnule~".'~In arguing that ICHRDD rests on a Western concept of democracy, the author points to what he calls the "politicization" of the International Bill of Rights within the
Centre's statute. He refen to the particular rights singled out in the Act. three of four of which are civil-political rights. ' '
' Ibid, 38 1,382,388. 9 Andres Perez. 'The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development: A New Approach to Politics and Democracy in Developing Countries?" in Miller, ed. Aid as Peacernaker (Ottawa: Carleton University Ptess, 1992). 145-1 59. The same article appeared in the Canadian Journal of Development Studies 13:l (1992)- 91-102. 'O bid, 15 1. " International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Devetupment Act, section (4). Perez's interpretation, ironically, suffers from the same faults he attributes to the underlying assumptions of the Act: his is an overly formal reading, lacking an understanding of the political forces which shaped the Act. He does not acknowledge that the nghts emphasized in the Centre's statute appear only because of last-minute amendments made in the Senate. Certain senators expressed unease with a Canadian- funded organization promoting "international" values, which led them to pinpoint certain rights they considered particularly important. Ultimately however, the legislation was still worded to accord immense freedom to ICHRDD in establishing its mission statement. It was not restricted by the singling-out of these particular rights. a fact that
Perez ultimately concedes when he acknowledges the Centre to be already punuing the empowerment of grassroots organizations and civil societies, and linking human rights and democratic institutions, mission goals he finds la~dable.'~
These pieces appeared in 1989 and 1992 respectively, very early in the Centre's development. Subsequent to these articles, there has been virtual silence in the academic community on ICHRDD. Such lack of interest is unfortunate, because the Centre has made greater contributions, both within Canada and internationally, than this lack of attention wouId lead one to klieve.
ICHRDD's Independence - A Precarious Balance
Situated on the fault-line between govemment and non-govemment sectors, the rationale for ICHRDD's founding rests on both transparent and clandestine motives.
Overtly, the Centre was created to aid Canada in fulfilling its international obligations to further the promotion of universal rights nom, which are speiled out in the prearnble to
" Perez, 154, 156. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHRj. Sources close to the government
insist, though. that an ultenor motive was also at ~ork.'~They contend that the Centre
was also established to act as a quasi-intemal check on a bureaucracy patently
uninterested in rights issues. and similarly to push the govemment of Canada to better
incorporate human rights issues into foreign policy.lJ Having an independent institution
capable of performing politicaily-sensitive work was also a benefit to the government.
In these regards, the personal influence of Joe Clark, the Secretary of State for Extemal
Affairs at the time, appears to have been of great irnpon. Consider his words at
ICHRDD 's inauguration:
Central to success in what the Centre does will be its independence. something we sought to enshrïne hmthe outset, something which cannot be challenged. That independence gives the Centre a vital kdom. a crucial credibility.. .that means there will be occasions on which the views expressed by this institution will not match those of the overnment. But it would be odd - indeed perverse - if that were not the case. 1F
Clark's personal commiunent ensured the Centre's creation in the face of opposition fiom both Extemal Affairs and CIDA? A more cynical interpretation of the government's motivation is also possible: that by creating ICHRDD. the government was essentially removing rights concems fiom the mainstream of the policy process and rnarginalizing them in order to facilitate an exclusively economic-based foreign policy. The mixed motives for the Centre's founding are re-examined in the conclusion.
13 Telephone interviews with Gisèle Côté-Harper and Clovis Derners. June 1998. '' Though there is no encouragement of this in the Centre's founding smte. it appears political decisions were taken to encourage the Centre in this regard. See chapter three, 5 1. I5 External Affairs Statement 90/60."Notes for a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, on the occasion of the opening of the international Centre for Human Rights and Dernocratic Development ." l6 Telephone interviews with Gisèle CM-Harper and Ed Bmadbenr June 1998. See chapter three. 56-57. for more details on resistance from CIDA and Extemai Affairs. The govemment initially undertook measures to ensure that the Centre was accorded greater independence than was envisaged by those studying the creation of the institution. Two primary methods were built into the Centre's legislalion to ensure its distance hmofficial Ottawa Fit. hnds were initialiy guaranteed in a five year block through to March 1993. B y mandahg frinds over an extended period the govemment ensured that concems over self-preservation would not constrain ICHRDD hm diverging with officiai Canadian foreign poiicy. The effectiveness of the second means to ensure independence is les evidea~panicularly due to the complications surrounding hinding since 1993. In theory, however, the Centre does not report ru the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. but through the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Parliament. The fact that the Minister now ultimately conmls the annual budget of the Centre calls this second assurance of independence into doubt.
It would be erroneous to evaiuaie the Centre's success solely in te- of its wîilingness to cnticize the Canadian govemment. as this was of peripheral concem to
ICHRDD's leadership in its formative years. At its inau=ural Board meeting, a decision was taken not to operate as a critic of Canadian foreign policy:
TkBoard agrees that the Centre should not embark on a systematic critique of govemment policies and programmes. at least in the early stages of its activitïes; it should rather project the image of an institution which is beyond the government 17
The Centre's fmt President, Ed Bruadbent, noted that ICHRDD decided to criticize the
Canadian govemment only when the Centre found its position on a particular issue clashed with 0ttawa's.l8 In areas where the Centre was not working, it would not
- " ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes. Apnl 19 and 20. 1990.5. " Telephone inrPvKw wirh Ed Broadbent June 1 1.1998. critique Canadian policy. The rapid expansion of the Centre's operations, though. ensured that conflict was inevitable.
Conflict, when it has occurred, can usually be classified into one of three categorîes, from weakest to strongest: leading by example, policy advice, or condemation. Over the years the Centre has staked out a nurnber of positions which differ considerably from Canada's official stance. Two of the more notable of these have kenthe cases of Burma and Tibet. In Burma, ICHRDD has provided large-scale financial and technical assistance to the democratically-elected government-in-exile, which was prevented from assuming office by the current military junta. Yet officidly
Canada recognizes the junta as Burma's govemment. In September 1990, the Dalai
Lama, Tibet's spiritual leader. visited Canada. While he was not welcomed by high-level
Canadian government officiais, who feared a diplornatic rift with China, the Dalai Lama was welcomed by the Centre, where Broadbent met with him to discuss rights violations by the Chinese in Tibet.Ig
On some issues, the Centre has adopted a constntctive approach to criticizing
Canadian foreign policy. A popular tool employed to further this end has been the use of op-ed pieces in Canadian dailie~.'~Such articles are more often aimed at highlighting rights abuses in foreign countries than at specific Canadian dealings with those countries. and consequently are more of a contribution to policy debate than a forceful denunciation. Privately, the Centre has also pressed the govemment on a wide variety
19 Liberras I :1 (December 1990). 4. For example. see David Gillies, "A long way to go on Kenya's mad to democracy," Globe and Mail. May 10, 1992, A18. of issues. A letter fmm Broadbent to Internatioaal Trade Minister Roy MacLaren
provides an example. Broadbent ailudes to Canada in the World when he writes:
1 note in particular, the statement that 'we will make effective use of al1 the influence that our econornic, trading and development assistance relationships give us to promote respect for human rights (page 35)'. 1 would like to know precisely what this means with reference to 'WTO regulations. How will the Canadian Govemment use its trading relationships in this instance to advance human nghts?2'
This could be called the middle-of-the-road approach, as it employs both constructive
public advice with more critical private lobbying.
On other occasions, ICHRDD has brazenly condemned the policy of the Canadian
government. In the summer 1997 edition of Libertas, the Centre's quarterly newsletter,
President Warren Allmand wrote a lengthy article entitled "Canada's Mixed Record on
Human Rights," in which he takes Canada to task for withdrawing its support of a
resolution condemning Chinese rights abuses at the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights (UNCHR)." Centre efforts have also recently shifted to direct work in a
number of countries with key Canadian economic and security interests, including
Mexico and Indonesia. ICHRDD's adoption of a thematic carnpaign on globaiization and
workers' rights has opened up the possibility of much discord with official Ottawa. On
the eve of the 1997 Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation's (APEC) Vancouver summit, the Centre issued one of its most effective and critical publications, a 16-page glossy pamphlet en titled Human Rights: MEC'SMissing Agenda. It sharpl y cnticized
Canadian complicity with human rights violations in a number of APEC countrie~.~
'' Ed Broadben~'Utter to Roy MacLaren," February 17. 1995. Y Libertas 7: 1 (Summer 1997). 2-3. According to Diana Bronson, ICHRDD's Globalization Co-ordinator, this document "pissed the government off royally". Interviews at DFAIT and CIDA confirmed Bronson's view and confirmed the displeaswe of senior policy makers in the Chretien government with this sort of negative publicity. These examples represent only a smd number of the times ICHRDD has either adopted a different position from. made suggestions for, or directly criticized. Canadian foreign policy. The examples indicate that ICHRDD does not demure from diplomatically-sensitive matters, and substantiates its independence from government.
However, criticizing Canadian foreign policy comprises only a small part of the Centre's internationally-oriented activities. This thesis seeks a more comprehensive approach to evaluating the Centre's work than just examining this one (albeit particularly interesting and controversial) nexus. CHAPTERTWO Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Poücy: Issues, Actors and Theories
The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) is a creation of the Canadian govemment. The Centre occupies an important place in human rights debates in Canada, but it does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is only one actor among the many which focus upon international human rights issues. Consequentiy, this study of ICHRDD begins by outlining the setting within which it operates: the issues and significant actors that exist alongside the Centre, and the theories associated with human rights in Canadian foreign policy. To better understand the Centre, we must start by exarnining the broader problem of international human rights politics in Canada, past and present.
Thirty years ago, in 1968. human rights were at best a minimal foreign policy consideration. The Trudeau govemment's ambitious international agenda was concemed with transnational issues iïke the North-South divide, nuclear proliferation, and the global environment. On issues of human nghts abuses, though, Canada was largely silent. in the years since human rights considerations have increased in relevance drarnatically, at least in rem of a rhetorical cornmitment, if not a substantive one. For example, in 199 1
Prime Minister Mulroney announced at the Commonwealth and La Francophonie summits that Canada was "serious" about tying aid to human nghts, though this has never materialized. '
1 Kim R. Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Austrdian Foreign Policv (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). 52. While current Prime Minister Jean Chretien's approach to foreign policy may place vade at the top of the list of pnorities, the inter-weaving of human rights with trade and aid is part of the new hurnan security agenda.' We can therefore expect the debate, between those who advocate more emphasis on human rights activism and those who prefer a more traditionally "realist" foreign policy, to endure for some time. In spite of the present government's downplaying of rights issues, the currency of the matter is still recognized, and remains at least in tems of rhetonc, a dimension of our foreign policy.
At recent meetings of the Organization of American States (OAS), for example, Canada initially announced that no hemispheric free vade deal would be concluded without human rights provisos attached. Once the meeting was under way, though. it was business as usual.'
As this chapter will show, this example symbolizes a continuing pattern within
Canadian foreign plicy of king rhetoricdy forcefui, but neariy always prioritizing other interests and objectives ahead of human rights. The evidence also shows. however, that those who seek more human rights 'activism' in Canadian policy abroad have reason to be encouraged: as the international climate becomes (arguably) more conducive to nghts promotion, as govemment departrnents become better versed in the complex debate around this issue, and as public pressure and the influence of NGOs continues to increase, guarded opûrnism is justified.
This chapter examines the political forces which have ushered human rights ont0
' See Lloyd Axworthy. Tanada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership." internufional Jouml 52:2 (Spring 1997). 183- 196. See Heather Scofild, 'Trade talks to touch on rights." Globe Md Mail, Apd 16, 1998. Al ; and Heather Scoffield, "Summit maps path to free trade," Globe and Mail, April20, 1998, Al. the foreign policy agenda The goal is to briefly examine the roles of certain key actors upon this dimension of the foreign policy process between 1968 and the present. with an emphasis on more recent developrnents. To this end, the framework employed is a level- of-analysis overview." The levels considered are: extemal, or changes in the international system; state, comprising departments and offices of the Canadian govemment; and societal, which includes a variety of domestic pressures. The placement of actors at a particular level of analysis does have a certain subjective component. For example, in the analysis that follows Parliamen: is placed at the societal level, but could justifiably be placed at the state level. NGOs are considered briefly at the international level, and in greater detail at the societal level. Yet the placement of specific actors at certain levels is not of great import to the analysis. What is far more important is the disposition and influence of the actor in question.
Moreover, there are important interactions not only between actors at a particular level, but between actors at different levels. These linkages are both vertical and horizontal, and contribute to a Buid and dynamic process of interaction and influence, or
"pulling and hauling," as Graham Allison puts it in a different context? For example.
NGOs influence both Parliament, a horizontal linkage, and DFAIT, a vertical linkage.
No particular level is impervious to influence from other levels, though some influences are stronger than others, and the degree of influence changes over the. The advantage of this approach is that it helps us understand the changing dynamic of the human rights debate in recent years, and permits some general conclusions about the actors involved,
* See Ka1 J. Holsti. International Politics: A Framework For Andvsis, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995). Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Ex~lahin~the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). and their relative influence over time as either "pushen" towards, or "pullers'* away
from, a more proactive human rights policy for Canada.
Clearly this approach is holistic, and is concerned with how each actor's role and
influence has changed over the past quarter century or so rather than providing
explanations for particular policies, an undertaking well beyond the scope of this
overview. Before proceeding, some introductory remarks conceming both the generic
relationship between human rights and foreign policy, and observations about general
trends in the Canadian case, are necessary to provide some context for the analysis that
follows.
Much of this chapter discusses a "human rights foreign policy". What does this
mean? As an ideal-type, a human rights foreign poiicy is one that contributes to the
development of universal human nghts standards, as spelled out in international
agreements, and the application of those standards when violations occd Thus an
"activist" human rights foreign policy, another term which reappears frequently in this chapter. refen to an approach which priontizes this dimension of extemal relations.
Hurnane internationalism has long been one of the competing principles of
Canada's international affairs. "Canadians," wrote politicai scientists Peyton Lyon and
Brian Tornlin some years ago, "like to be liked".' Cranford Mt,one of the best-known advocates of an activist approach to international human rights, describes humane intemationalism in the following manner: "At its core [it] is an acceptance by the citizens of individual States that they have ethical obligations towards those beyond their bordea
6 Peter Baehr, The Role of Human Riehts in Foreign Policy, (New York: St. Martin's, 1994). 158. ' Peyton Lyon and Brian Tomlin. canada as an International Actor, (Toronto: Macmillan. 1979). 77. and that these in tum impose obligations upon their govemment".8 Humane intemationalism is characterized by a sense of cosmopolitan (i.e. universal) values. by the realization that this ethical obligation is fused with the long-terni self-interest of one's own state, and by the belief that action abroad is a reflection of social justice within one's own so~iet~.~
Humane internationalism, however, represents only one relatively marginal conception of Canadian foreign p01icy.'~ Its influence ebbs and flows over tirne, competing always with shorter-term Canadian interests driven by commercial and security imperatives. While there is not always a direct conflict between the defence and promotion of nghts, and economic or secunty interests, there are some situations in which the two clearly clash. As Emie Regehr notes concerning nuclear and rnilitary capability sales: "Pursuit of prosperity is not necessarily incompatible with promotion of rights, but some of the means by which it is pursued may be so inirnical to the promotion of human rights as to warrant their severe restriction or even prohibition".' '
As David Gillies and numerous other scholars have ably demonstrated, Canada's foreign policy with respect to countries in which human rights violations are gross and systematic continues to be dnven largely by self-interest. Gillies argues, more generally, that
Cranford Ptatt. "Humane Internationalism: Its Significance and Variants." in Idem ed.. Internationalism Under Strain, (Toronto: University of Toronto Ress. 1989). 13. 9 Ibid, 14. 15. 'O It should ais0 be noted that the promotion and/or defence of human rights is only one dimension of a hurnane internationalist foreign policy. A February 1997 public opinion survey gave precedence to other matters. such as sIowing the AlDS epidemic. See Public Opinion 1997: International Prioriries of CCUlllCjims, by GoIdfarb Consultants. 1 thank Augie van Biljouw at ICHRDD for making this survey available to me. " Emie Regehr. "Military Sales," in Pratt and Matthews. &S.. Human Riehts in Canadian Foreign Policv, (Montreai-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1988). 209. states will sustain an assertive human rights policy only when the costs are perceived to be low in terms of other national interests.. .in situations where 'gross and peaistent human rights violations*confront countervailing diplornatic or economic interests, states will be unassertive in their policy responses."
Canada's record supports his conclusion almost without exception.
In understanding Canada's human rights foreign policy, it is essential io take note of three general points which help us make sense of. to use Margaret Doxey's phrase, the
"rhetonc gap" - the difference between the ofi-pronounced humane intemationalism and the practised self-interest.I3 First, Canada has avoided stating which rights it considers paramount and worthy of defence in its foreign policy. This has led critics to charge that the govemment's failure to pnoritize "basic righü" doorns the prospect of any consistent response. 14 Since Canada is a party to a myriad of human rights treaties." it is literally impossible to adhere to al1 of its international obligations al1 of the tirne? Second, when aid programs have been terrninated. as in Uganda in 1973 or Carnbodia in 1977. the govemment has ken reluctant to publicly cite human rights violations as the direct cause of suspension.17 Third, the govemment has also repeatedly rejected the idea of creating a system to appraise the level of rights violations by its aid recipients. These three factors
" David Gillies. Between Principle and Practice. (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1996). 5. I3 Margaret Doxey. "Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy:' Behind the Headlines 37 ( 1979). 10. '" "Basic rights" are a distillation of the wide number of intemationally recognized human rights, into a set of usually four or five. They are aiso known as "core" or "primary*'rights. and tend to include freedorn from torture, freedom from extrajudicial kiliing, tieedorn from arbitrary arrest and detention. and the nght to subsistence. The benchmark work on basic nghts is Henry Shue. Basic Riehts. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 15 Canada is a party to 29 different muItilaterai human rights treaties. See Multilateral Treaties in the Area of Human Rights ro which Canada is Party (Ottawa: MulticuIturaiisrn and Citizenship Canada. 1993). 16 David Gillies, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy: We've Only Just Begun," Policy Options 1 1:2 (March 1990), 8. " T.A. Kennleyside. "Aiding Rights: Canada and the Advancement of Hurnan Dignity." in Pratt ed.. Canadian Develo~mentAssistance Policies: An A~~raisd,(Montreal-Kingston: McGiIl-Queen's University Press. 1994), 246-247. permit inconsistency and selective application of human rights critena. While activists decry this as an instititutionalization of double-standards, policy-maken argue that the rhetoric gap is both inevitable and necessary to Canadian interests. and that flexibility is imperative to diplomacy.
The tying of aid to respect for basic rights remains probably the rnost preferred instrument of advocates of a human nghts foreign policy. However, it is only one of a large number of possible tools at the disposal of govemment. As Peter Baehr writes in
The Role of Human Ri~htsin Foreim Policv, "the instruments that are available for the promotion of human rights do not differ fundarnentally from those serving other aspects of foreign policyT*.18Cranford Pratt and Robert Matthews argue that "except in the realrn of force, there are no legal constraints on what states can do. The only obstacles are practical and political. rather than legal".19 Legal obstacles, however, are on the horizon, as the corpus of international law (including vade and investment agreements) expands in the 1990s and beyond.
Gillies provides a very useful "hierarchy of human rights policy options" which may be used as leverage to encourage recalcitrant states to comply with international rights nom.'0 Such levers can be broken down into degrees of assertiveness - low. moderate, or high. At the low end are mesures such as quiet diplomacy. At the moderate level. there are both positive and negative signals; the type of signal one sends depends on whether the target state is improving or worsening in its human rights performance. In improving cases, positive signals could include increases in officiai
-- - '' Baehr, 46. l9Cranford Pratt and Robert Matthews. "Introduction," in Idem eds., Human Rights in Canadian Foreign PoIic~,15. " Gillies, Between Princi~leand Practice, 49. development assistance (ODA) or debt relief. In worsening cases, options may include
encouraging the tennination of lending programs at international financial institutions
(IFIs) or suspending cultural contact^.^' When violations are particularly egregious. and
a high fevel of assertiveness is called for, options include suspending FI credits, recailing
ambassadors, imposing trade and other sanctions, or in the most dire cases, intervening
militarily. The more assertive the critical state chooses to be, the more likely it is to be
subject to retaliation (and thus that there will be some cost to its own inierests, economic
or otherwise). For this reason States tend to shy away from the most assertive levers.
States also prefer multilateral to unilateral action, in part because it makes retribution less
likely, and because it underlines the legitimacy of the mesures adopted.
Canada has rarely used highly assertive policy options when dealing with human
nghts transgressas. In cases where it has chosen punitive action, there is often a chasm
between statements and enforcement. For example, following the 1989 Tiananmen
Square massacre, Canada enacted some potentially significant sanctions against china.''
As T.A. Keenleyside and Paul Gecelovsky have shown, these tumed out to be illusory.
Export development credits increased by 20% in the three years after Tiananmen venus the three years before, and in 1990 exports to China increased by 49% over the previous year." A sirnilar story concerning sanctions against Indonesia in 199 1 is told by Sharon scha.de."
2' Fis include organizations like the Word Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). as well as regionai development banks. Many of the world's worst rights violators are still dependent upon loans from such institutions to ensure macroeconomic heaith, making the use of Fi "leverage" a highly contentious arena of debate. Gillies. Between Princi~leand Practice, 147. a T.A. Keenleyside and Paul Gecelovsky. 'Canada's International Human Rights Policy in Practice: Tiananmen Square", International Jouml 50: 1 (1995). 583,586. Sharon Scharfe. Cornplicitv: Human Ri~huand Canadian Foreign Policy, (Montreal: Black Rose Books. 1996), passim. The evidence indicates that Canada has a two-track policy on human rights: ofien swift and vocal in rhetoricai condemnation, but rarely backed up by 'assertive' use of policy levers to punish transgresson. The subsequent section traces the relative impact of a variety of issues and actors in this policy area since 1970. As noted above, the acton and issues are put into one of three categories. ***
The exterual level
in the realist mode1 of international relations, developments in the international system dictate to a considerable degree state behaviour within that system? Yet in the
Canadian case. it is difficult to make direct Iinks between systemic developments and behaviour changes in human rights foreign policy. However, international changes clearly aber the political caiculus and the operating environment for foreign policy maken, and it is this "environmental" dimension which alten the parameters within which decision makers operate. There have been at least four major systernic developments which have impacted upon foreign policy since 1970: the end of the Cold
War, a decline in the force of the sovereignty pnnciple, global economic liberalization, and the growth in the numben and influence of international non-govemmental organizations (INGOs).
The Cold War was ente~ga pend of détente whcn the Trudeau govenunent completed its major foreign policy review. Foreign Policy For Canadians, in 1970. By the early 1980s, East-West tensions were beginning to re-heat, in part due to the election of Ronald Reagan to the American Presidency. The Canadian government aiigned itself
-> Eians Morgenthau. Politics Amow Nations, (New York: Knopf, 1948). closely to the U.S.in its Competitiveness and Security green paper in 1985. But by the end of the 1980s, the East-West conflict had dissolved, opening up a new era in global politics. The Cold War had a significant impact upon a number of dimensions of
Canadian foreign policy which made action on human rights problematic. With the end of the East-West conflict, many previous constraints were reduced in salience. if not eliminated altogether.
The Cold War prevented the development of a universal agreement on human rights, with the Eastern bloc emphasizing collective rights (by and large economic. culturd and social ones) and the Western nations individual rights (mainly political and civil ones). Kathleen Mahoney writes:
At the international level, progress in implementing human rights norms was made very difficult by these fundamental political and philosophical disagreements on the role, content, and importance of rights. Moreover, the cornrnunist view was not compatible with effective implementation of a universai system of human nghts because even though. in theory, communist States recognized the legitimacy of setting international norm, they argued the application of norms was a matter of exclusive national juri~diction.'~
In Competitiveness and Security, this schism was played up to reflect a significant obstacle to the development of effective policy formu~ation.~The end of the Cold War was to change al1 this. Not only did the world move closer to an understanding and acceptance of universal noms, but Western countries no longer had the same security concerns which had frequently led to the marginalization of human rights in their foreign policies.
Kathleen Mahoney, "Human Rights and Canada's Foreign Policy," Intenuitional Journal 47:3 (1992). 560-56 1. Competitiveness and Sccurity (Ottawa: External Affairs, 1985). 16. As the green paper noted: 'There is littie agreement between govemments of the West, the Comrnunist bloc, and the developing world on the definition of human nghts". The transformation hmtraditional "military" security to a broader "human" security was another result of the collapse of state socialism. As the Commission on
Global Govemance put it: "Global security must be broadened from its vaditional focus on the secunty of the state to include the secunty of people and the planet".28 Cooper and
Pd argue that 'the new concept of security.. .is in part the foundation for the insistence that govemments adhere to universal human rights nor~ns".~~Rights also became increasingly perceived as an essential piece of the development puzzle: sustainable development could not take place. it was argued, without democracy. and democracy was unattainable without respect for human nghts.
One hirther restriction on a hurnan rights foreign policy was removed with the cessation of East-West hostiiities. This was the decreased importance of Western alliance obligations. Kim Nossal has argued that Canadian disregard of Indonesian human rights abuses pnor to the 1990s can largely be attributed to the Canadian interest in conforming to Amcrican, and broader Western, policy priorities.30 Writing in 1988. he argues that "Ottawa tends to define tactics on rights violations so as to maxirnize its abiding interest in coalition mernber~hi~s".~'Canada has felt less obliged to adhere to the Amencan lead since ùiis comment was made.
Commission on GlobaI Governance. Our Global Neirihbourhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 78. 'P Cooper and Pal. 2 10. 30 Nossal. Rain Dancing, 49. 3' Kim Nossal, Tabin'd. Crib'd, Confin'd? Canada's Interest in Human Rights." in Matthews and Pran. eds. Human Riphts in Canadian Foreim Policv, (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 54. The second major extemal change since 1970 has ken a waning in respect offered for the principle of state sovereignty. and alongside it, the developrnent of a stronger international human rights regime.32 Notes Amyn Sajoo:
While article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter upholds the principle of non- intervention in respect of "matten which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," substantiai judicial as well as empirical evidence supports the view that fundamental human rights no longer constitute an 'essentially' national ~oncern.'~
Traditionally Canada has been a staunch supporter of the sovereignty of nations, as evidenced by Prime Minister Trudeau's frank "no-dice" response when asked if he would raise human rights issues on his first trip to China in the early 1970s. When pressed on whether Canada would support Biafran separatists in the Nigerian civil war. Trudeau's tongue in cheek response was: '*WhereTs ~iafra?"."
While Canada remains sensitive to how human rights concems impinge upon state sovereignty, it has increasingly supported a weaker application of the principle. A shifi was signalled. for exarnple, by this 1991 Canadian statement at the United Nations
(UN) General Assernbly:
We must not allow the principle of non-intervention to impede an effective international response. The concept of sovereignty is fundamental to statehood. to international discourse, and, of course, to the United Nations itself.. .@ut] the concept of sovereignty must respect higher principles, including the need to preserve human life from wanton destnicti~n.~~
" On the intemational human rights regime. see lack Donnelly. "international Human Rights: A Regime Analysis." Intemional Organization 40:3 (1986).599-642, I3 Amy n Sajoo, hternatiortul HumRights and Cadian Foreign Policy: Principles. Priorities and Practices in the Trudeau Era and Beyund (Montreal: McGill University, 1987). Unpublished PhD thesis. 8. Robert Boardman writes, dong the same Iines, that "'there is.. .some intriguing evidence of the erosion of the constraints that have traditionally protected States from outside scrutiny." See Robert Boardman. 'Wuman Rights in the Global Village: Reflections on the Canadian Case." Zeitschnfifur Kanada-Sludiien 14:l (1994), 106. Y In Mitchell Sharp. Which Rerninds Me: A Memoir, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1994). 207. '' Extemal Affairs statement 91/43. Reprinted in Mahoney. 59 1. This recognition that sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct is a significant contribution to.
and represents Canada's tacit recognition of, the growing strength of the international
human rights regime and the legitimacy of international law respecting univend rights.
The two significant extemal developments reviewed thus far, the end of the Cold
War and the erosion of state sovereignty, have both contributed to making an activist human rights foreign policy more possible. The third extemal development, however, has worked against it. This might be termed "global Darwinism", which has become the defining international ideology of globalization in the 1990s. Global Darwinism, a euphemism for widespread econornic liberalization. dictates meaner. leaner governments, reduced national regdatory functions, and a general emphasis on the provision by the state of "enabling environments", with all else lefi to the market. In recent years there has been a substantial devolution of economic authority from govenunents to markets and assorted non-state acton. A host of international agreements on trade, finance. and potentially, investment, may have the long-term effect of devolving power from national govemments to international standards, resulting in a reduced capacity for States to act against rights abuses.
This neo-liberal ideology inhibits an activist human rights foreign policy. For exarnple, developing nations cm daim they are using their comparative advantage in cheap labour to industrialize, and if Western nations intercede with human rights objections, the target country can claim that the sanctioning country is acting in violation not only of sovereignty but of market principles as well. This has corresponded with the
Canadian government's 'constnictive engagement' of illiberal societies such as China,
Indonesia, Mexico and Cuba. Proponents of constructive engagement argue that the best approach to reducing rights violations is through positive means like trade enhancement and cultural exchange, and not negative ones like sanctions, or the suspension of diplornatic relations. That
Canadian businesses have much at stake abroad is not new, but levels of foreign investment and trade have increased dramatically since the late 1970s. making business an even more influential player. The business perspective is expanded upon later in this chapter.
The fourth extemal factor tends to act as a counter to "global Darwinism".
INGOs have become increasingly important for their contributions in information gathering and dissemination, as well as consciousness raising. Organizations like
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have established links which bypass national frontiers, and use advanced communications technologies to channel information to national or local cells. which then become forceful domestic interest and advocacy groups. Denis Stairs calls such INGOs "public interest groups with a transnational twist" because of their focus largely on 'international* public goods.36
Globalization, then. cm be seen to act as both a push and a pull factor in making
Canadian foreign policy responsive to human rights questions. As a process it has been defined by an ideology which frowns upon state intervention. but at the same Ume it has also spurred the growth of numerous non-state actors who campaign for international human rights. Clearly, though, these are developments of recent years. Govemrnents of al1 stripes were subject to less pressure from either side through the '70s and '80s.
-.
56 Denis Stairs, 'The Policy Process and Dialogues with Demos: Liberal PIuralism with a Transnational Twist." Mimeo, 33. AIso forthcoming in Hampson, Made, Tomlin and Von Riekhoff, eds., Canada Among Nations 1998 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1998). The end of the Coid War and the waning of reverence for the principle of state sovereignty have created a more sympathetic international environment for human rights considerations in foreign policy. INGOs have seized upon the growing international human rights regime to push Canada and other states to punue more vigorous and consistent huma. rights policies abroad, and are there to critique states if and when they do not. They also, however, tend to run head-fint into a neo-liberal ideology which has pervaded both business and government, tending to pull govemment away from activism on human rights if econornic interests are at stake. Al1 of these factors show how the calculus surrounding a human rights foreign policy has been substantially altered in recent years. International factors represent only one part of the picture, however. In the remaining portion of the chapter, the focus tums to the domestic arena.
The state level
Many students of Canadian foreign policy argue that analysis at the state level is rnost salient for undentanding foreign policy behaviour." The "modified statist" mode1 contends that the Canadian state maintains "relative autonomy" from societal influence - that is, the bureaucracy is more than simply a mechanism for translating the popular will into policy, but rather impresses its own priorities on the direction of Canadian foreign policy. Pressures from society are seen merely as occasionaily circurnscribing policy options rather than directiy determining national behaviour, as a more pluralist interpretation of the foreign policy process would expect.
Kim R. Nossal. "Anal yzing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy." IntemationoI Joud 39: 1 (1983- 1984). 1-22. The number of govemment departments and offices which focus to some extent upon international human rights has expanded in recent years, and exemplifies what has been termed the "intemationalization" of Canadian public policy.38 This phenomenon recognizes that international relations no longer fa11 exclusively under the purview of one particular department, but that a series of previously domestically-focussed acton now play at least some role in Canada's international persona. A few representative examples should clarify how this has affected the human rights arena. The Department of Justice works with foreign govemments abroad in training judges and establishing legal frameworks. Elections Canada devotes funds to assist democratizing countries to develop their electoral systerns. and to monitor elections abroad. The Department of
National Defence (Dm)and RCMP have undertaken work in countries such as Haiti in training civilian police corps.
Yet the influence of these departments should not be over-stated, for any substantial and consistent human nghts foreign policy must be set by the decision makers with the most influence on the process. In Canada, the three major actors in this reaim are the political executive, DFAIT and CIDA. On balance. al1 three have historically downplayed human rights issues in foreign policy whenever countervailing interests are present. Recent changes would seem to indicate an increasing degree of responsiveness to pressures, from above and below. for a more integral human rights component in
Canada's international relations, though little substantial change has yet been observed in state behaviour.
38 See Bruce Doern, Leslie Pal, and Brian Tomlin, eds., Border Crossines: The Internationalization of Canadian Pubi ic Pot icv, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1996). The politicai executive is at the core of foreign policy making in Canada. It is here that final decisions are taken, agendas are set, and polic y direction is decided upon.
As one DFAIT officia1 says: 'The big decisions in foreign policy are usually made by a bunch of guys sitting around a table in the Langevin block (the Pnme Minister's
fic ce)".^^ Sajoo notes how the primacy of the executive impacts upon human rights questions:
With particular reference to human rights foreign policy making, the executive generally enjoys a vital role in at least three respects: 1) Formally, in affirming the state's support for relevant international instruments.. .2) as the ultirnate decision- maker on policy issues, in the implementation of human rights obligations through specific aspects of extemal relations; 3) in the capacity to launch initiatives at the national and transnational levels, focussing attention on rights issues as part of the political agenda4'
Up until about the mid- 1980s there was virtually no policy on human rights issues aside from public statements by Prime Ministers and senior Cabinet officiais - in essence, the executive was the policy. Today, the human rights agenda is no longer set exclusively by
Ministerial staternent. The role of the political executive has been transformed as societal interest in the issue has grown.
Given that the political executive is charged with ensuring the protection of
Canadian sovereignty and the promotion of Canada's economic interests, it shouid not corne as a surprise that the advancement of international human rights has not aiways been prioritized at the highest levels of govemment. However, in lieu of a more complete analysis of individual Canadian Prime Ministen and Foreign Ministers, it is imperative to note their periodic role in advancing rights in the foreign policy process. In
------'' In Charlotte Gray, "New Faces in Old Places: The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy ." in Hampson and Maule, eds., CcAmong(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 19921, 17. 40 Sajoo, 93. particular, Brian Mulroney, Joe Clark and Lloyd Axworthy have demonstrated eagemess to incorporate human rights into foreign policy, whereas Jean Chretien or Pierre Trudeau have n~t.~'However, as Pratt argues, there have ken impediments to the success of these individual-led forays: "When a strong lead is given politically for a more forceful human rights policy, there is a recurrent tendency for the bureaucracy to minimize its significance rather than to capitaiize upon it*'."
The dominant philosophical (and pragmatic) disposition in DFAIT is one that shies away from an activist human rights foreign policy. The bureaucracy's most influential members are largely adherents of the realist theory of international relations, which prescribes limited manoeuvrability for a middle power with relatively modest capabilities in the international ~~stern.~~This philosophy is also deferential to state sovereignty, which shows a linkage upward - to the constraints historically imposed by the international system. This pulls DFAIT away from seeing human nghts as a pnmary foreign policy objective. Berry and McChesney, writing in 1988, argue that DFAIT priotitizes three issue-areas: "growth as a trade-dependent capitalist country; membenhip in various Western military, political and economic alliances; successful management of the relationship with the United tat tes".^ They continue:
The three presuppositions are reflected in policies and administrative structures. They form an operating environment and perspective so deeply ingrained in training, procedures and evaluation processes that other possible objectives
'' On Mulroney. see Nossal. Rain Dancing, 9 1-1 IO; On Axworthy, see B. Michael Frolic. "Re-engaging China: Striking a Balance Between Trade and Human Rights," in Hampson, Molot and Rudner. eds.. Canada Amonp Nations 1997, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997). 324, and Stairs, "Liberal Pluralism with a Transnational Twisf" 7, and also footnote #6; Clark's personal roie in establishing ICHRDD is discussed in this thesis, chapters one and three, 8.56-57. '''Cranford Pratt, 'The Limited Place of Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy." in Brecher, ed., Human Riehts, Develo~mentand Foreign Policv: Canadian Perspectives, (Halifax: The Institute For Research on Public Policy, 1989), 173. 43 Nossal, "Cabin'd, Crib'd, Confin'd?', 57. 44 Berry and McChesney, 59. receive littie serious, sustained attention. This environment clearly constrains the consideration of human rights."
How, specifically, has ihis attitude inhibited action? As noted above, Nossal contends
that 'coalition politics,' (the desire to stay in step in with alliance partners, particularly
the U.S.), was the dominant factor in Canada's refusal to impose sanctions on Indonesia
following its 1975 annexation of East Timor. When sanctions were applied in 199 1 in
response to the Dili massacre, Nossd continues, it was because the Western alliance had
declined ir. importance in the post-Cold War era6 Whether Cold War alliance obligations wiU be replaced by the new imperatives of multilateral trade. finance and
investrnent agreements remains to be seen.
Yet despite the department's traditional opposition to the consideration of factors outside the realm of irnrnediate Canadian econornic and security interests, there is some evidence of recent refonn which rnay make the govemmental environment somewhat more favourably disposed to human nghts issues. For exarnple, in response to the recommendation of the 1986 Hockin-Simard repon Independence and Internationalism.
Canada established human nghts training courses for its foreign service oficer~.~'The subsequent foreign policy review in 1994 also urged the creation of a Global and Human
Issues Bureau. The govemment agreed, and one of the sections created was a Human
Rights Division. In spite of Pratt's recently noted apprehension that "the human rights and justice division of Global Issues does not as yet play a centrai policy role within
45 Ibid. 46 Nossal, Rai n Dancing, 49. Independence and Inteniarionalism. (Ottawa:Supply and Services. 1986), 101. The favourable response is in Canada's International Relations, (Ottawa: External Affairs, 1986). 72. DFAIT":~ such a division is nonetheless a step towards a greater humane internationalist
emphasis in Canadian foreign policy.
Established in 1968, for many years CIDA found human rights too political an
issue to be overtly concemed with. though its mandate - to focus on the economic and
social development of Southern countries - placed it undeniably at the heart of the debate.
Nonetheless, there was little significant concem within the Agency for human nghts
issues until the early 1990s, though CIDA financed modest human rights projects as eariy
as 1982." Yet as Gillies shows with reference to the case of a CIDA project in Sn Lanka
in the early 1980s. bureaucratie and commercial considerations ofien took precedence
over human rights concern~.~~CIDA seerns to have been dismissive of attempts to use
Canadian aid as a political lever over the years, fearing that it would politicize aid
projects which should be essentially non-political in nature.
In the early 1990s, CIDA established a human nghts unit, though for a time it consisted of a single individuaL5' However. with the changing international environment
requiring a greater emphasis on human security, human nghts have made remarkable
advances within the Agency, particularly considenng the cost-cutting which has reduced
CIDA'S budget drarnatically in recent years. The muchexpanded human rights, democratization and good governance unit now serves as a policy CO-ordinatorfor projects, which are still delivered through country desks. CIDA is also guided by a
November 1995 policy statement entitled Govemment of Canada Policy for CIDA on
a Cranford Pratt, "DFAIT's takeover bid of CIDA: The Institutional Future of the Canadian International Development Agency." C'imForeign Policy 5:2 ( 1998)- 10. 49 Gillies, Between Princi~teand Practice, 246. Ibid, 125. Gillies, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy: We've Only Just Begun." 8. Humun Rights, Democratization and Good Govemunce. Most importantly. however, the
arnount of funds king devoted to development projects with a rights or democratization
component has increased sub~tantiall~.'~
The state level thus reveals a series of actors which have histoncaily neglected
human nghts issues. The institutional frarnework is definitely changing however,
particularly within CIDA, and this has aiready yielded substantial dividends in terms of support for rights issues in developrnent projects. However. both the current political executive (with the possible exception of Lloyd Axworthy) and DFAIT appear less willing to stray from the promotion of Canadian trade and security interests. Given their preeminence in the foreign policy process, the changes reviewed at this level may be more cosmetic than structural.
The societal level
While state level acton have historically supported the marginalizing of rights issues in foreign policy, actors at the societai level have graduaily become more numerous, vocal. and important in advocating a human rights foreign policy. Parliament,
NGOs. and the media have al1 had an impact in this realm. Their interest in the issue was relatively minimal in the early Trudeau years, grew in the late '70s and early '80s. and peaked in the iate '80s and early '90s under the second Mulroney government. Since the return to power of the Liberals in 1993. the business lobby seems to have been the dominant actor at the societai level. pulling the govemment away from activism in situations where it is likely to work to the detriment of Canadian economic interests.
'* CIDA's human rights programme is elaborated upon in chapter five. 1 12- 1 14. paxticularly its impact upon ICHRDD. However, human rights NGOs remain vocal, and appear to have a sympathetic Minister of Foreign Affairs in Lloyd Axworthy.
One of the most ciramatic developments conceming human rights in the foreign policy process has been the increased interest of Parliament. The beginning of
Parliament's ascent on this issue can be traced to 1978. when Progressive Conservative
Member of Parliament (MP) David MacDonald introduced a private member's bill. the
Foreign Aid Prohibition Act, which would have denied ODA to countries which repressed hurnan nghts. This and many subsequent attempts to systematically link
Canadian aid to human rights performance have failed. but such failures do not imply complete Parliamentary irnpten~e.'~
That Parliament has become more important in this regard is surprising, given the nature of the Canadian political system. After dl, Parliament has little Say in the foreign policy process, due to the fusion of powers between it and the political execuiive. There are only rare instances where legislation is required to approve executive decisions concerning foreign policy. As Baehr notes about legislatures in generd, "parliarnentary control over foreign policy takes place afenvards, when the minister concemed must account for his policy. It is much more dificult for Parliament to give the minister specific instructions beforehand'."
In Parliamentary reports on Canada's international relations ( 1956) and official development assistance (1987)' a great deal of emphasis was placed on the importance of human rights. The authors of Independence and Intemtionalism noted: "the
'' Cathal I. Nolan. 'The Influence of Parliament on Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy." Hum Rights Quarrerly 7:3 (1985). 382. Y Baehr, 50. Emphasis in original. international promotion of human rights is a fundamentai and integral part of Canadian
foreign poli~y".S5The Winegard Report. For Whose Benefir?, followed this up by
recommending "that human rights criteria be developed coherently as part of overall
Canadian foreign policy. and that these be applîed in a univenal, consistent. and
transparent manner"? Such strong wording has not swayed DFAIT or the executive.
They continue to apply leverage selectively and sparingly, which serves to underscore
Parliament's subservient role in the foreign policy process.57
Like NGOs (considered below), Parliament's role can be termed "consciousness
raising". This has been facilitated by an expansion of the committee system in the 1980s.
including the development of a standing cornmittee on human rights with a mandate to
examine international as well as domestic matters. Additionally, individual
Parliamentarians have worked as publicists by travelling abroad and causing troubles for
governments, Canadian and foreign. alike. in 1992, for example. three Parliamentarians
were expelled fiom China for condemning human rights violations while travelling to
that country.58
Writing in 1985, foreshadowing Parliament's invigorated role of the late 1980s'
Cathal Nolan argues that
While there exist sizeable constraints on its decision-making abilities. Parliament exercises certain traditional prerogatives in the course of fulfilling its non- legislative functions, and.. .these privileges afford it influence on the agenda, parameters, and administration of Canada's human rights policy.s9
55 Independence anà Intemarionulism. 99. 56 For Whose Beneft? (Oîîawa: Supply and Services. 1987). 26. " Large portions of Canadian aid continued to be deliverd to senous human righrs violators. See Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights," 258. Frolic, 325. 59 Nolan. 389-390. Parliament remains potentially a weii-spring of activism, though recent sittings reveal
Parliamentarians (at least on the government side) who by and large prefer to con form to the Chretien govemment's emphasis on trade expansion. This is not entirely surprising, given the fiscally conservative climate and the govemment's emphasis on the link between continued Canadian prosperity and international trade.
Lest it be concluded that Parliamentarians are the altruistic conscience of an otherwise seif-absorbed nation, the reason for the increased Parliarnentary interest cm be partiy attributed to the growth in public interest concerning human rights, stimulated largely by increased media coverage. Concems over rights abuses have grown as communications technology has made "it possible for people in one part of the world not simply to hear about abuses.. .but actually to see them taking place".* Of course, media coverage is inconsistent, and as Robert Boardman notes, "public attention to international nghts issues.. .has tended to be ~elective".~'For example, the 1975 Indonesian take-over of East Timor went virtually unreported in the Canadian press.
The tough punitive line adopted by Canada against China following the
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, to provide another example, must be partly attributed to the fact that events were broadcast live on CNN. Despite the tough- sounding sanctions imposed at the tirne, the measures taken were principally symbolic and motivated more by a desire to avoid complicity with a tyrannical regime than by expectations of changing China's beha~iour.~~The rapid diminution in media coverage
(and hence public interest) pemiitted the Canadian government to quietly retum to
------60 Cooper and Pal, 2 13. 61 Boardman, 11 1. " Keenleyside and Gecelovsky. 564. business as usual with the People's Republic of China (PRC) leadership.63 Scharfe makes a sirnilar cornplaint about the media coverage of Indonesia's take-over of East
Timor in 1975, and the concomitant Iack of domestic interest in an annexation which breached international lawM In short, sustained media attention and resulting public interest may force the government into action if there is a strong lobby. or if the case is panicularly egregious and demands a response. as with the 199 1 Dili massacre in East
Timor which generated an uproar because of the presence of Western journa~ists.~~
A third societal level factor which has, in recent years, increasingly pushed
Canada towards stronger action on rights issues is the NGO lobby. A disparate group with a variety of interests, NGOs focussing on human rights have grown rapidly in number, and have increased in effectiveness also. Baehr sees NGOs as having four specific functions pertaining to human rights:
1- the collection and distribution of information 2. lending legal and moral support to victims 3. lobbying govemments 4. mobilizing public opiniod6
The last two functions are particularly applicable to the Canadian case.
NGOs have evolved from king relatively modest in number and influence in the early 1970s, through a stage described by Pratt as the emergence of a 'counter consensus*
(because of their opposition to the dominant military security focus of Canadian foreign policy), to an active component part of the policy process t~da~.~'The growth in
63 Ibid, 586. 64 Scharfe, 1 12- 1 17. 65 Ibid. Baehr, 56. " On the idea of the "counterconsensus" see Cranford Pratt, "Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter Consensus," Inrertu~tionalJouml39: 1 ( 1983- 1984). 99-135. numbers is sharp: only 29 NGOs submitted briefs to the Standing Cornmittee on Extemal
Affairs and National Defence in 1970-197 1; similar hearings in 1994 attracted 277 NGO brief~.~*Critics charge that many of the groups which once cornprised the "counter consensus" have been CO-optedby the rnain~tream.~~Some of the more significant groups in the area of intemational human rights which operate in Canada include:
Amnesty International, the East Timor Alert Network. the Canadian Council for
International Co-operation. Oxfam, Human Rights intemet, and the Inter-Church
Cornmittee on Human Rights in Latin Amerka. Such groups CO-ordinateunder an umbrella organization called the Network on International Human Rights (NIHR),which in 1996 comprised 54 rnernber~.'~
These organizations play two distinct roles on human nghts issues in Canada.
First. they are cogs in the policy wheel. They appear before Parliamentary committees
(andor subrnit briefs). inform and advise goverment offkials and ministers directly using their international sources of information, and take part in a two-day consultation with DFAIT every February in preparation for the UNCHR annual meetings. William
Winegard has acknowledged the importance of NGOs in shaping For Whose Benefit?. the 1987 Parliamentary review of Canadian ODA which was highly critical of delivering aid to repressive regimes? He praises NGOs' "representations [as]. ..both well infonned and seriously c~nsidered.~'
68 Cooper and Pal, 223. See Mark Neufeld, "Democratization idof Canadian Foreign Policy: Critical Reflections on the Canadian Case." Mimeo, 1997. Cooper and Pal. 222. '' William Winegard, 'Winegard on the Winegard Report and on Parliarnentary Cornmittees." in Brecher. ed., Human Ri~hts.Develooment and Forei~n- Policv: Canadian Pers-pectives, (Halifax: The Institute For Research on Public Policy, 1989). 39 1-396. Ibid. 392. Second. NGOs are critics of govenunent inaction or delay, and mobilizen of public opinion. This requises capturing the attention of the media, the public, and most likely, Parliament as well. As Berry and McChesney note, "'NGO mobilization of support for a human rights issues.. .is unlikely to succeed unless it has aroused media attenti~n".'~
NGOs are arguably the most important factor in pushing the govemment towards action.
The role of the churches in pressuring the Canadian govemment to sanction South Africa in the 1980s is a particularly well known success ~tory.'~
NGOs, the media and Parliament cm generally be described as advocates of a more activist hurnan rights foreign policy, business interests are generally more cautious.
There tends to be a strong link between*business and govemment in Canada. One need not look far beyond the 'Team Canada" expeditions to China and the Asia Pacific for evidence of a bond between senior policy makers and corporate interests. Retuming from his 1994 voyage with 'Team Canada" to China, Canadian Chamber of Commerce
President Tim Reid remarked that there exists "a reai partnership between the private sector and government ministries and ~ficials".'~
Cranford Pratt has been one of the rnost outspoken cntics of the intimate relationship between business and govemment. He uses a Marxist-influenced "dominant class" theory to explain the congruence between senior policy maken and business interests. As he describes it, the theory's "most central proposition is that the capital- owning class in any capitalist state is the dominant class and the policies of the state
" Berry and McChesney. 72. 74 Renate Pratt, In Good Faith: Canadian Churches Against A~artheid,(Waterloo. ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997). 75 Quoted in Frolic. 326. reflect and perpetuate that d~minance".'~He describes the implications of the theory: "It would expect foreign policy to reflect the central preoccupation with stability and the preservation and advancement of capitalism which it identifies as the state's role in a capitalist society"."
The vast majority of Canada's trade has histoncally been with fellow members of the Organization for Economic Ceoperation and Development (OECD)- countries which. as mostly stable liberal democracies, are unlikely to be gross and systematic violators of human rights. However, the expanding connection to the Asia Pacific region has resulted in considerably more trade with many less rights-friendly regimes, including indonesia and China, two of the world's largest econornies. Commercial links with these countries were minimal through most of the 1970s and 1980s- but the nurnbers have increased exponentially in the 1990s. As Frolic notes conceming China "the 1995 trade figures showed that Canadian exports to the PRC had increased by 50 percent in one year. Two-way trade was at an dl-tirne high - C$7.8 billion, which was 2.6 Urnes greater than in 1990.'~ Recent investment figures with Indonesia reflect the mth of a comment made by Don Jarnieson, Canada's minister of industry, trade and commerce on a trip to
Jakarta in 1976, when Canadian-Indonesian links were in their nascent stages. He said that there was potential "to make a heii of a lot of money in Asia now if you're in business and you're h~n~ry".'~Exports to Indonesia were $2.9 million in 196gg0 Today.
Canadian business has more than $5 billion invested in ~ndonesia.~'
'' Pratt, '*Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy." 104. Ibid, 105. 78 Frolic, 327. 79 Quoted in Scharfe. 134. sa Nossal. Rain Dancinl41. " Scharfe, 188. See also chapter six of Scharfe's Com~licityfor more details on Canada's trading relations with Indonesia. Many in the business community argue that commercial and business links actually advance respect for hurnan rights abroad. Adherents of the constructive engagement approach contend that by increasing business links (in addition to culturd and political ones) countries which have poor human rights records are more likely to be open to liberal influences than if links were severed altogether. Thomas d'Aquino. the
President of the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), believes further that
"benefits are fiowing overall from the greatly expanded reach of trade, investment, capital and technology - benefits that have led to an important enhancement on a global basis of social progress, democratic development, and huma.rights".a2 This perspective places importance on the presence of foreign investment abroad, which not only provides econornic benefits, but also facilitates the flow of ideas, and therefore the promotion of international In turn, authoritarian regimes are expected to accommodate societal pressures for greater political representation, the predicted result of bettering economic fortunes.
The relationship between government and business in zones of rights abuses extends beyond the government 's frequent inaction on trade sanctions or abstention from other forms of punishment. In many cases Ottawa is a key facilitator of Canadian business interests abroad. Through state-led trade missions, the provision of export credits, the maintenance of trade officiais in Canadian embassies abroad, and federd licensing of rnilitary exports and aid-related contracts, the govemment is often a
" Quoted in Gerald Schmia and Comne MacDonald. "HumanRights. Global Markets: Some Issues and Challenges for Canadian Foreign Policy," Library of Parliament background paper BP-416E (1996). Space does not permit a full examination of this very interesting debate. On corporate responsibility. however, see Craig Forcese, Commerce With Conscience? Hurnan Rights and Comrate Codes of Conduct, (Montreal: ICHRDD, 1997). and Craig Forcese, Puttin? Conscience into Commerce: Strategies for Makine- Human Ri phts Business as Usual, (Montreal: ICHRDD, 1997). substantiai partner in business ventures abroad. In cases where Canadian business interests have been negligible, the government is clearly more willing to punish rights violators. Sceptics conceming the Mulroney govemment's sanctions on South Afnca pointed to the Iimited trading relationship between the two countries as proof that Ottawa only acts when Canadian business interests are not substantially at stake.
The Canadian govemment has an extensive history of favouring constructive engagement over the rival approach of using economic and political channels to punish and coerce nghts violaton in the hope of compelling more immediate changes in regime behaviour. Which of these approaches is more successful is a hotly contested debate. ihough al1 but the most extreme critics would agree that every case should be examined individually. Many opponents of constructive engagement. for example, would agree that for Canada to completely break ties with China would be counter-productive. +**
Peter Baehr correctly observes that "everybody is in favour of human rights".84
While this may be me, those with strongest influence on the levers of foreign policy have often refrained from exercising them to aid victims of rights abuses abroad. Instead,
Canada has histoncally engaged in a policy of outspoken vocal condemnation. occasionally accompanied by limited sanctions. Such sanctions are only likely io be sustained. however. if economic and secunty objectives are not likely to be damaged.
Canada has also frequently advocated constructive engagement with illiberal societies.
Notwithstanding, human rights have evolved from king an inconsequential consideration to the foreign policy process in the early 1970s. to king an irrefutable
-- " Baehr, 157. dimension, at least rhetorically, to almost every decision affecting Canada's foreign
relations with countries known to be serious violators of human nghts. As is discemible
from the analysis in the preceding section, much tension exists between the realist-
dominated DFAR and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), and the more ideaiist NGOs.
While the results of this tension remain unsatisfactory for those wishing to see a greater
humane internationalist element in Canadian foreign policy. developments in the
international environment and structural changes within the foreign policy bureaucracy
offer some hope for the future.
The tension inherent in the ongoing process of 'push" and "pull" has grown with
the passage of time. One of the products of this tension is ICHRDD. The Centre has
been omitted from the analytic focus of this chapter, which instead has attempted to
highlight the domestic context of human rights politics in Canada, and thus sorne of the
issue and actors the Centre has confronted and engaged within Canada. ICHRDD defies easy classification dong the schematic "levels of analysis" lines used throughout this chapter. Its design is unique, for it is at once a state institution by nature of its funding, and yet exists equally within the realm of the societal, and it perceives itself as an NGO.~~
It is thus classified as "quasi-govemmental." as it straddles the fine line between power from above - official Ottawa - and pressure from befow - at the grass-roots of societies. at home and abroad.
The Centre has had NGO consultative status with the UN since 1995. In the previous chapter. a levels-of-analysis approach was employed to trace the significant actors, issues, and theories surrounding the roie of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. The focus now shifts on to the Centre itself. The political forces which tumed the Centre from an idea into a reality are the subject of the first part of this chapter. Here the genesis of the Centre is traced from its mots as a recommendation of the 1986 foreign policy review, to the appointment of the fmt President and Board of
Directors in 1990. The Mulroney government*~attitude to the Centre was ambiguous: it made changes to both accord greater independence to ICHRDD, while contravening its own rapporteurs*advice in other respects. ensuring key controls remained in the hands of the foreign policy establishment-
Also significant to understanding how the Centre operates is an exploration and andysis of some key institutional dynarnics, which are discussed in the latter hdf of this chapter. The anaiysis reveals that there have existed, and continue to exist, some significant rifts between the Board, the upper management, and the staff, which affected the productivity of ICHRDD, revealing the extent to which organizations of dus small size cmbe subject to influence by individuals who have responsibility for leadership, management and strategy. Financial difficulties have also plagued the Centre since its initial multi-year funding expired in March 1993. ***
The origin of the idea for an institute dong the hes of ICHRDD is fmt found in the recommendations of the 1986 Special Joint Cornmittee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations. a sweeping forum which in responding to the Mulroney government's 1985 green paper, Competitiveness and Security. re-assessed
Canada's international relations. The ail-party committee was chaired by Tom Hockin and Maurice Simard, and produced a report entitled Interdependence and
Intemationalism, comrnonly referred to as the Hockin-Simard report. With a mandate that endured close to an entire year, the committee was able to hear from over 70 witnesses. ' As Andrew Cooper and Leslie Pal note,
In summarizing the priorities of Canadians that appeared before it. the cornmittee listed the promotion of human rights and development well behind peace, security, and the state of the economy, but it did note that many witnesses had cailed for a 'more significant human rights component in Canadian foreign policy' .2
Nonetheless, the report did dedicate an entire chapter to "prornoting human rights". including some strongly worded recommendations which reflected the changing conception of security in the nid-1 980s.'
In noting that Canada had been relatively mute on international human rights matten. the report argued that a variety of factors made it both feasible and desirable to be more proactive. It cited Canada's CO-operative,rather than coercive. approach to international issues, as well as the political gains to be derived from engaging other States on human rights iss~es.~In seeking to not just protect rights but to promore them. the report continued,
We recommend that the government consider establishing an International Institute of Human Rights and Democratic Development with caref'ully prepared guidelines for supporting activities by non-governmentd organizations. To
' Cooper and Pal. '*HumanRights and Security Policy." 2 17. ' Ibid, 2 18. See Independencc adInternntiomlism. chapter eight. ' Ibid, 105. ensure that the Institute is sensitive to the varying national perspectives on democratic development, particularly in the Third World, we recommend that its board of directors include international representation, on the mode1 of the International Development Research Centre. Funding for the hstitute should be provided as a smd fraction of officiai development assistance funds.'
The government's response to the Hockin-Simard report. Canada's International
Relations, gave the green tight to proceed with such an Institute:
The govemment welcomes and accepts the recornmendation for an institute which would have as its aim the development and strengthening of democratic institutions and human nghts in developing counuies. Design and establishment of the institute will require care to ensure that it is effective. The govemment therefore intends to establish a consultative mechanism to provide advice on how to proceed. Funding will be available from official development assistance allocations to support the institute which would focus on the Third ~orld.~
Support for the proposed Institute also extended to a number of other parliamentary cornmittees. For example, the 1987 review of foreign aid, For Whose Benefir?, was even more visionary in its support. It foresaw "an independent, free-standing body working closely with Canadian human rights groups and non-governmental ~r~anizations".'
In Ianuary of 1987 the government assigned two rapporteurs, John Courtney of the University of Saskatchewan and Gisèle Côté-Harper of Laval University, to study the potential establishment of such an Institute. Their report, entitled International Co- operation for the Development of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions, was based on meetings with more than 250 individuals and 70 written communications. Courtney and Côté-Harper's report was subrnitted to the govemment in June of that year, and made public on November 13, 1987, when the government endoned the report and announced
Ibid. CannAn's lnrematiortal Relations, 75. 7 For Whose Benefir?, 3 1. Two other cornmittees, the Parliarnentary Group on Haiti and the Special Cornmittee on the Peace Process in Central America, also approved the idea. the creation of a working group of CIDA and Extemal Affairs officiais to draft the organization's statute.' This report became the Centre's intellectual foundation, and thus rnerits close consideration.
The mandate given the rapporteurs was broad, yet not all-encompassing. They were asked to examine what was king done by the Government of Canada's various departments with respect to human rights, but also to study and consult with the NGO community and academic representatives, as well as a senes of international organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).the World
Bank. and the Ford Foundation. They were then to report back on the institute's
"proposed relationship with the Govenunent of Canada.. .together with the institution's proposed mandate, objectives. policies. program areas. organization, financing, location,
As Loretta Rose has remarked. the one seerningly obvious oversight in such a mandate was consultation with NGOs from developing countries. After dl, such organizations would presumably be the beneficiaries of (or at least major interlocutors with) any such In~titute.'~Unable to travel to meet with such groups. Côté-Harper noted that the rapporteurs instead tried to ensure minimal representation of such groups at the
Canadian NGO meetings.' '
The report invoked a conception of human rights, and particularly democratization, that was different from the prevailing state-led attitude of the time. In
Government of Canada news release I987/210. 9 This mandate is found in Appendix "A" of John Courtney and Giséie Côté-Harper, Intemational Co- operationfor the Developrnent of Human Rights and Democratic Instit~rtions,(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1987). 37-38. 'O Loretta Rose, Assessing Canada's Human Rights Foreign Policy, Unpubtished M.A. thesis (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1988)' 67. " Telephone interview with Giséie CôtC-Harper, June 1 1. 1998. particular, it contrasted with the Reagan administration's conception of election-centred democracy. Instead, it engendered the spirit of the UN'S 1986 resolution on "the right to development". The rapporteurs note near the outset that
a linkage exists between the promotion and development of human rights and the development of institutions. In our definition, such institutions embrace not only the formal institutions of a society but alm its policies, program and practices. It is clear thor rhe development of an institutional framework in itselfdoes not constitute a guarantee for the enjoyrnent of rights and freedurns by all!'
This rebuff of "façade" dernocratization was to foreshadow the overall thmst of the
Centre's orientation.13 The rapporteun even warned against the use of the term
"democracy" in the name of the Centre, noting that the term "has acquired an ideological, political and cultural meaning which differs profoundly from one region of the world to another" and nsked king interpreted as an attempt to impose Western standards upon non-Western nations. l4 This caution was ultimately disregarded, though the term
"democratic development". which was the temiinology eventually chosen for the
Centre's name, diffen in meaning from promotion of "democratic institutions", the govemmentTsoriginal s~gpstion.'~More will be said about the debate over an appropriate name shortly.
The general concem over the use of the word democracy in the title reflected a broader concern of the rapporteurs: ensuring that any such institution would not be
l2 Courtney and Côtk-Harper, 5. Emphasis added. l3 Taçade" democratization is a term used by critics who decry the lack of substantial change within democratizing counuies between elites and the traditionaily marginalized Such critics note that the emphasis on elections, political parties, and rule of law often gloss over the more substantial impediments to a veritable democracy (such as economic reforrn and social justice), leaving such countries as 'Yaçade" democracies. See William S. Robinson, Prornoting Polvarchv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). l4 Cour~reyand Côte-Harper, 24-25. l5 Cariada's lnternional Relations, 75. perceived as imposing Canadian values. To this end, the comentone recornmendation of
the report was for a Centre which would be based not upon Canadian domestic
institutions. but upon intemationaily-endoned values. Accordingly. the authors
envisaged a Centre which
will have as its mandate CO-operationbetween Canada and developing countries in the promotion, development and strengthening of institutions, programs and practices which serve to give effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the International Bill of Human IXightd6
This international document inciudes the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (and its Optionai Protocol). and the International Covenant on Economic.
Social and Cultural Rights.
The rapporteurs surveyed a wide number of existing institutions and foundations
across the developed world, and came to the conclusion that there did not exist anywhere
a mode1 upon which to base the entre." While there existed many QUANGOs within
this field, most were involved in the areas of research and education, not funding and
advocacy. Many govements provided small budgets through which they would directly
fund NGOs in the issue-area, as in Holland, but nowhere did there exist a state-supported
organization of this nature. The design for the Centre as a publicly-funded yet officiaily
independent bridge-builder between state and civil society was thus unique within the
developed world.
Courtney and Côté-Harper noted that the real impact of a Centre of this nature
would be in undertaking work which would not be feasible via traditional govemment channels. They noted that, among others. the Centre should undertake to support trade
l6 Courtney and Côté-Harpcr. 28. l7 Ibid, 1 1. unions, professionai associations, cornmunity co-operatives, and groups that defend
disadvantaged minorities. Such activities, the authors contended, "'are less likely to arise
frorn requests of govemments or in certain cases even to gain their support. On occasion,
they may even be perceived as a challenge to the established a~thority".'~This was to be the domain of the new Centre, while CIDA was to assume continued responsibility for the lion's share of govemment-to-govemment requests. l9 In undertaking this sort of work. the rapporteurs noted, the new Centre "wiii seek to promote and strengthen initiatives of a South-South nature"."
International Co-operation for the Development of Human Righfs and
Democratic Institutions formed the philosophical and inteiiectual basis of the centre, and many of the recommendations the authors proposed were translated directiy into legislation by the CIDA-Extemal Affairs working group. However, the legislation does
Vary from the rapporteurs' advice in a number of interesting areas. Many of the alterations appear to reflect a desire on the govemment's part to accord the Centre even greater independence than had been recomrnended. Paradoxicaily, though, there are other changes which seem to offset these by according the governrnent control in the areas of key appointments and funding.
There are three specific differences between the report and the initial legislation which are worth highlighting. FVst, the legislators did not adopt the suggestion of
Courtney and Côté-Harper to forrnalize links between the Centre, CIDA and the
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) by means of "working level
'' Ibid, 23. l9 Ibid, 27. Ibid. consultative c~mmittees".'~While the Centre has maintained close links with CIDA (see chapter five), this is an imperative of a working relationship, not one demanded by the
Centre's statute. Such an omission seerns clearly designed to minimize the Centre's official links with the Canadian government, and accord it more independence. Second. similarly, the legislators chose to disregard advice from the rapporteurs to designate mats on the Centre's Board of Directors on an ex oficio basis to the President of CIDA and the
Director of the Human Rights Research and Education Centre of the University of
~ttawa." While the President of CIDA sits on ICHRDD's Board again, this is not legislated and thus has ken a situation deemed acceptable to the Centre's goveming body.
Third, and most significant, is the omission in the legislation of the following recommendation from International Co-operationfor the Development of Human Rights and Dernocratic Institutions: ''The operations of the ICHRID [sic] shall be consistent with the broad Lines of Canadian foreign policy"." The decision to leave out this line is consequential. If there was any doubt about the arms-length character of the institution, the govemment's decision not to include this recommendation can be interpreted as an endorsement of the Centre's ability not oniy to stray beyond the parameten of Canadian foreign policy, but also to be openly critical of the Canadian govemment when deemed appropriate." In this way the Centre was designed to be capable of providing leadership on human rights issues, and positioned to influence senior policy-makers.
2' ibid, 33. * Ibid, 29. t3 Ibid, 28. Sources confirmeci this was the motivation for ensuring such wording did not appear in the legislation. Yet the govemment dso drafted the legislation so as to ensure there would be some constraints on the Centre's independence in ways which diverged from the rapporteurs' suggestions. Two significant divergences are evident. First, whereas
Courtney and Côté-Harper had suggested that the President of the Centre be chosen by the Board of Directors by means of an open and public competition, the govemment wrote a provision into the legislation which ensured the President was to be appointed by
Order in Council. This effectively guaranteed that the President's office was to be a political appointment. It also placed the onus of responsibility upon the government to ensure the Centre's character: were the office to become a patronage post. the Centre would lose significant credibility. However, the inaugural appointment of Ed Broadbent allayed initial concems in this regard?
The second deviation fiom the report which conceivably could challenge the
Centre's independence concems finances. The rapporteurs saw the need for the Centre's independence to be assured by means of multi-year funding. They contended that "in Our view it is essential that ICHRID (sic) be able to count on a given level of financing over a period of several years" and that there be "the strongest possible ongoing guarantee of forward funding for five year periods".26 The government chose to guarantee oniy one initial five year block of funding. Subsequently annual appropriations were to be made by ~arliament." Block funding for the Centre expired at the end of March 1993, and since then ICHRDD's budget has ken allocated on an mual bais. The impact that this has had on the Centre's independence is debatable, though the implications are clear
See Gillies, Between Princiole and Practice, 244. " Courtney and Côté-Harper,33. " Internarional Centre for Human Rights anâ Democratic Lkveloprnent Act. section 28 (f). enough; the diverging opinions on the effects of this consuaint are discussed in the latter section of this chapter.
in addition to these two potential challenges to the Centre's independence. officiais in the working group who were cirafting the legislation made one further change of significance that contravened the rapporteurs' advice. This was in the naming of the
Centre. Whereas Courtney and Côté-Harper had urged the adoption of "International
Centre for Human Rights and Institutional Development (ICHRID)". the governrnent settled on the "International Centre for Human Rights and Dernocrutic
Development (ICHRDD)". This change did not escape notice by the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. When questioned in the Senate on why the govemrnent had changed the name. Clovis Demers, a member of the CIDA-Extemal Affairs working group and later the first Vice-President of the Centre, pointed higher-up in the foreign policy chain- of-command: "Our minister (Joe Clark) felt that the name conveyed the Centre's purpose very clearly. It is a double purpose: to promote human rights and to promote democratic institutions" ."
The proposed name of the Centre raised hackles dunng debate over Bill C- 147
(An Act to Esrablirh the International Centre for Human Rights and Dernocrutic
Development), with differing opinions as to the validity of the use of the word
"democratic" in the Centre's name and what, exactiy, this term meant. The Minister for
International Co-operation, Monique Landry, explained before Senate hearings that the inclusion of the word "democratic" was not tied to a Canadian definition: "1 think that if we want the Centre to have a certain credibility, it would be a bad idea to define
Senate Standing Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs (33:8), September 20, 1988. democracy according to Our own perceptions. It would be better to have an international perception".29 Yet Liberal Senator Alla MacEachen spoke out in favour of an organization based on Canadian institutions: "h was somewhat disconcerting to me that the minister said.. .that it was certainly not the intention of the Centre to pmmote
Canadian-style democracy and human nghts. That provoked the thought in my rnind: whose democracy and human rights if not h ana da's?".^^
More numeroiis. though. were critics who chastised the govemment for its refusal to follow its own rapporteurs' advice. in the House, Roland de Corneille wondered whether
Third World nations. who see how the superpowen use these words to camouflage nationdistic intentions and the extensions of their empires, are going to be suspicious when they see the words "'democratic development". What do these words mean? This is not some sort of savant's concern or dilettante's comments. It was expressed by those asked by the Govemment to study this matter."
Warren Allmand, who would become President of ICHRDD in 1997. demanded bluntly:
"1 would like some assurance from the Govemment that we do not intend to impose our western concepts of democracy on al1 occasions"." The concems expressed at the tirne with regard to the vacuous definition of the term were understandable. though in retrospect the govemment's decision not to define "democracy" or "democratic development" was probably for the best. Debate over this matter would likely have killed the bill, as it was one of the final pieces of legislation passed prior to the dissolution of Parliament and the caliing of the 1988 ''fiee trade" general election.
29 Senate Standing Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs (34:34). September 27. 1988. 3o Quoted in Gillies. Between Princi~leand Practice. 244. " How of Commons debates. September 13. 1988. 19 178. " How of Commons debates. September 30. 1988. 19839. Following first reading of the bill on August 15, 1988, Bill C-147 undenuent only
modest alterations in the legislative pmcess. An amendment was introduced by the
opposition to ensure that appointrnents to the Board of Directon worild have to be
approved by the leaders of al1 recognized political parties in the House of Cornmons.
This ensured that the Board was not to be filled exclusively with loyalists to the
govemment of the day. A clause was added to permit the Centre to undertake extemal
fundraising, which would then permit the Centre to work in countries not classified as
"developing" according to the UN. This was necessary because the Centre's funding is
drawn from ODA funds, which may only be dispensed in "ODA-able" countries.
Accordingly, another amendment added a clause to the Centre's mandate, "to support
prograrns and activities for the benefit of countries other than developing co~ntries".~~A
global mandate was thus ensured, though if ICHRDD wanted to work in non-developing
countries it had to raise the funds itself.
The objectives of the centre also undenvent modification. Certain senators, not
content with the "intemationalized" definition of democracy adopted in the bill, insisted
on highlighting sorne of the politicaVcivi1 rights the Centre was to support? Such an
amendment was more cosmetic than structural though, as the statute referred explicitly to
the International Bill of Rights, in its entirety, as the Centre's theoretical grounding.
Finally, a clause was added which noted that "A major object of the Centre is to help reduce the wide gap that sometimes exists between the formal adherence of States to
33 International Centre for Human Righrs and Democraric Devtdoprnent Act, section 4 (3)(b). Y These are (a) the right to an adequate standard of Iiving; (b) the rights of penons not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (c) the rights of fieedom of opinion and expression; (d) the right to vote and be elected at periodic, genuine elections in pluralistic political systerns. These are found in section 4(1) of the act. international human rights agreements and the actual human rights practices of those states"." The act ihus underscored the role the Centre was to play as a lobbyist and advocate.
With these amendments. the act passed third reading and was given royal assent on September 30, 1988. The bill received all-party support, despite the gmrnbling of opposition members that ihere was insufficient time to properly debate the bill, and the displeasure voiced by other members about the Cenm being located in Montreal, rather than Ottawa as the rapporteurs had s~ggested.~~
On January 30, 1990, Ed Broadbent was named first President of ICHRDD." On
March 20, 1990, the government announced the fiat Canadian members of the Centre's
Board of Directors, choosing nine frorn more than 120 applications.38 Gisèle Côté-
Harper, co-author of the report which formed the basis for the design of the Centre, was named first Chair of the Board. The Centre was opened in a renovated warehouse, and former nunnery, in Old Montred on October 19, 1990.
The inauguration of the Centre was attended by External AffÛirs Minister Jw
Clark. Clark's personal role in ensuring the Centre's eventual creation was acknowledged by both Broadbent and Côté-Harper. Broadbent credits Clark with overcoming resistance from within Extemal Affairs, which feared the new Centre might create diplornatic strife for Canadian bilaterai relations.39 Côté-Harper confirmed the
--- -
35 International Centre for Humari Rights and Democratic Deveiopment Act* section 4(S). NDP member Lorne Nystrorn intoned: '4 suspect that the principal reason is that it is king created for pork-barrelling reasons. for political reasons. The Consemative party is in very, very senous trouble in the City of Montreal." House of Commons debates, September 30, 1988, 1984 1. 37 Another prominent figure considered for the post was Bernard Wood. According to testimony of Clovis Demen before the Senate Standing Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs (33:7), September 20. 1988. The Board is comprised of the President, nine Canadian members chosen by Order in Council, and three international members in tm chosen by the Canadian members. 39 Telephone interview with Ed Broadbent. June 1 1. 1998. Minister's role in assuaging fears within CIDA as well; officials there were apparently concemed about a possible "diffusion" of Canadian human rights initiatives."
Fortuitously, the 18-month era between the passage of the legislation and the opening of the Centre was perhaps the most tumultuous period of world politics since the
Second World War. ICHRDD was presented with a much more fluid and dynamic
international environment in which to work than its creators would likely have envisaged
when the legislation was fmt drafted. The opening of democratic 'space" in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union was paralleled by fragile transitions to popular rule in numerous countries of the Amencas and Afiica. The Centre's inauguration seemingly could not have been better timed.
The chronology of the Centre's life is picked up again in chapter four. which analyzes its programming, research and advocacy efforts since 1990. The balance of this chapter seeks to more clearly illuminate how the organizationd structure of the Centre has impacted upon the Centre's efforts to promote human rights and democratic development. The four areas to be examined are:
1. The Office of the President (and its three occupants to date) 2. The Board of Directors 3. The Secretariat 4. Finances
Each shapes the Centre's performance, influencing where it works, when it succeeds or fails, or why it selects one coune of action over another. These four shape the intemal politics of the Centre.
40 Telephone interview with Gisele Côté-Harper. June 1 1, 1998. and interview with CIDA's Jim Holmes in Hull, May 22, 1998. The meof the Redent. ICHRDD's President is appointed by Order in
Council. Unlike in most private enterprises, but akin to many other para-statai organizations, the President is not directly responsible to hislher Board of Directoa. ïhe
Board does not have the right to remove a Presideot; this is the prerogaiive solely of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs' office. As mentioned above. this is one of the govemment's key depamires hmthe CourtneyCÔté-Harper report. A Presidential term may not exceed five years, and a President may not sit for more than two consecutive terms. The saiary of the President is ais0 established by Oder in Council. A recent request by the
Privy Council Office (PCO)now ensures that the Chair of the Board undertakes an annual performance review of the ~resident."
The President is responsible for the day-to-day management of the Centre, and for ensuring that the Board's strategic direction is implemented. In an organization such as
ICHRDD, in which ideas are an integral component of the operation, intellectual leadership must also be expected from the President. One member of the NGO community noted the prominence of this dimension:
As far as the Centre is concemed, inteilectual and philosophicai leadership is probably the most important. The Centre not only has to do things. it has to Say things. It has to make pronouncements, contribute to the policy debate, raise awareness of human rights issues in the world to general audiences and to policy audiences. It has to add something that wasn't there before. So you need inteilectual leadership and moral vision.4'
The President thus travels and speaks extensively, both in Canada and abroad, and communicates the Centre's positions to other organllations and govemment departments by means of press conferences and sound bytes.
'' ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes. October 3 1. 1997.22. " Interview in Ottawa, May 21. 1998. ICHRDD's fmt President, Ed Broadbent, was in many ways inseparable from the
Centre in its nascent years. The awkwardly-named ICHRDD soon became known simply as the "Broadbent Centre", a title which has only recently begun to give way, more than two years after the fmt President's departure. Broadbent's political career as leader of the federal NDP,noted his successor, Maureen O'Neil, lent the Centre "instant credibility and also instant publicity. He was someone joumalists liked to follow.. .if there had been some kind of earnest and dedicated human rights worker who no one had ever heard of
[appointed President] the Centre wouldn't have had the press it had."
Broadbent's strong suit was on the intellectual side. He wrote and spoke extensively on rights and democracy matters, publishing frequently on the op-ed page of
Canadian dailies. He aiso ensured that, at least initially, channelling fun& to partner
NGOs in the developing world would be prioritized. He deserves much of the credit for the establishment of an institute which is widely regarded as trustworthy, independent. and stafCed by bright and cornmitted people. His appointment was aiso critical in establishing the Centre's credibility with a previously reluctant international human rights community, which looked agreeably upon the appointment of a social democrat to the post. 44
Broadbent brought with him his own liabilities, though these are less evident to outside observers. Being an intellectual came with the associated cost of king perceived in both the media and govemment as "Ed the Professor". Nor was Broadbent a good manager or administrator. according to the authon of the Centre's Fit five year review.
The consultants noted, "intemal organization, intemal hannonization, and problem-
43 Interview with Maureen O'Neil, Ottawa. May 22, 1998. * Telephone interviews with Ed Broadbent and Gisèle Côte-Harper. lune 1 1. 1998. solving were totally neglected by managementm." In 1994, following the publication of this review, the Liberal govemment ordered Broadbent to hire "a competent administratof' to bring order to the centre?
Maureen O'Neil, the Centre's second Chair of the Board, was appointed interim
President of ICHRDD upon Broadbent's departure in the summer of 1996 while the govemment took its time in naming a new President. O'Neil launched a full-scaie review of the Centre's orientation during her brief tenure4' The govemment took over a year to appoint a new permanent hesident for ICHRDD,and the waiting period was clearly a traumatic one for the employees at the Centre. Rumours abounded that the next President would be a patronage appointee, as the Liberal government appeared to be meddling in the selection of a new President for the IDRC. As Paul Knox noted in The Globe and
Mail,
much of the concem has arisen because advertisements for the post last month.. .instnicted interested parties to send their applications to the Prime Minister's Office.. .the concem extends to another high profile federal appointment - the presidency of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic ~evelo~ment.'~
Rumours circulated that former Heritage Minister Michel Dupuy was destined for the
ICHRDD job, though Dupuy was apparently never seriously considered for the
The appointment of Warren Allmand in February of 1997 was welcomed by the
" "Five Year Review of the Organization and Activities of International Centre for Human Rights and Dernocratic Development," (Montreal: GESTED International, 1993). 4-4. Henceforth known as the "GESTED Review". 46 Robert Fife. "Liberais reduce Broadbent's role," Ottawa Sun, February 16, 1994.64. " This is elaborated upon in chapter four. 97-10. " Paul Knox, "Centre to safeguard search for president," Globe and Mail. January 18. 1997. A13. Ironicaily, the evennid appointee ro the DRC job tumed out to be none other than ICHRDD's interim President, Maueen O'Neil. 49 Intmiew with ICHRDD staff member. Montreal. May 1998. Centre, as he was considered an independent, often dissenting, voice in the Liberal caucus? Allmand also possessed a strong background in human rights and social justice issues, having served as the Chair of numerous Parliarnentary "friendship" cornmittees
(inciuding Friends of East Timor and Fnends of Tibet), and having been active in disarmament and peace groups since his election to the Commons in the mid 1960s. As
Soiicitor General in the Trudeau cabinet, he introduced the legislation to abolish capital punishment.s' In interviews, staff at the Centre and officiais in Ottawa expressed only limited concem that Allmand's affiliation with the govemment of the day jeopardises the
Centre's independence, or could render it a less fenrent cntic of Canadian foreign policy.
One media observer noted that, regardless, the govemment was solving a political problem by dispatching Allrnand to Montreal. He was after dl, a lefi-over Trudeau-era
Liberal not comfonable with the much more right-leaning Chretien govemment.s'
It remains unclear whether Allmand will be able to provide the same sort of intellectual and strategic leadership Broadbent did. or whether he will be a better manager of the Centre's staff. Concems have been expressed on both of these fronts by members of the NGO cornm~nit~.~~One noted that Ailmand's strength lies in his ability to cornmunicate:
He's very good at saying things prominently, sound bytes to the press, and may actually do much better in terms of raising issues with Canadian audiences through the media, because he doesn't have any intellectual pretensions, like Broadbent.. .who mbs some people the wrong way"
Interview with ICHRDD staff mernber. Montreal, May 1998. Interview with Warren Allmand. Monueal. May 20, 1998. * Tefephone interview with The Globe ond Mail's Paul Knox. July 7. 1998. " Interviews in Ottawa, May 1998. Y Interview in Ottawa, May 1998. Given the Centre's current drive to increase its role as an educator and information disseminator in Canada, this will clearfy be an asset. Comparing Allmand to Broadbent, one ICHRDD employee who has been close to both noted: "He's much less hands on.. .though he's given very clear political leadership".s5
The Board of Directors. During debate on Bill C- 147. the precursor to the htemational Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Deveiopment Act. Senator Allan
MacEachen argued that "If this body [the Centre] is to be significant, or to mean anything, it will depend on the quality of the Board and the complexion of Board member~".~~The Board is cornposed of 13 mernbers: the President of the Centre. nine
Canadian rnembers appointed "at pleasure" for up to three year terrns by Order in Council on the recommendation of current Board members, and three international members chosen by the Canadian members (but subject to approval from Ottawa) for three-year terms. The legislation stipulates that Board appointments should be staggered to assure continuity and histoncal memory on the Board. The Act also specifies that 'The Board must have knowledge of Canadian foreign policy and expenence in international development, the development of democratic institutions, the promotion of human rights internationally and international law relating to individual and collective rightsW."
Much like a federal cabinet. Canadian appointments to the Board are politically sensitive. Care has been taken to ensure that the Board is balanced with respect to party affiliation, gender, region, and minority representation. According to informed observers, this, dong with each prospective Board member having to receive approval
'' Interview in Montreal, May 1998. Senate Standing Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs (33:20), September 20. 1988. " International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Developrnent Act, section 13(3). frorn every party leader in the House of Cornons, slows the process of Board
appointments. The appointments, when they do corne, tend to be of exceptional quality.
Board members have included scholars like Gisèle Côté-Harper, David Matas, Inring
Brecher, and Irwin Cotler, as well as representatives from church, native, and women's
gr~u~s.~*The cmnt chair, the Very Reverend Lois Wilson, was recently appointed to
the Senate, where she sits as an independent.59 Unfortunately for the Centre. the
appointment means Wilson will soon be resigning her post as Chair, and ICHRDD will
have to choose its fourth Chair in two years.
The non-Canadian Directors add credibility to the Centre's "intemationalisrn".
The Centre has made an effort to ensure equal representation by continent. Of the three
international members, one each is chosen from Asia, Africa and Latin Arnerica. By
attracting well-respected international memben, like Oscar Arias Sanchez. former
President of Costa Rica and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, the Centre has sought to
establish its reputation as a 'partner" rather than as a "helper". The intemaiional
members add credibility to the Centre's daim that it is promoting universal values. rather
than Canadian ones. They corne ready-equipped with a significant network of contacts
within their native countries, are aware of what work is already being done, and act as a
reality-check on the Centre's programming innovations.
The Board of Directors plays the cntical role of strategist for ICHRDD, a role demanded by the legislation and affiied at their fmt rneetinga6O Minutes (and other
intemal documents) indicate the Directors have delegated a considerable portion of this
-- - See Appendix "B" for a list of Board members. Anne McIlroy. "Former church moderator is 'five feet of dynamite:' Globe and Mail. June 27. 1998. D3. ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes. April 19, 1990. role to the President, and appear willing to foîiow the direction she or he sets. Mandated to meet at least twice annually, in most years the Board has met three times, with each meeting lasting a minimum of two days. There is also an "executive cornmittee" comprised of a smaller number of Directors which meets more frequentiy. Meetings tend to operate on a consensual basis. A review of the Board minutes over the years clearly leaves the impression that certain Board members are more active and vocal than others.
The Board has worked in a collaborative fashion with the secretariat, particularly in the earliest years of operation. This is a cause for concem arnong certain outside observers. One Ottawa consultant who has worked as an evaluator on ICHRDD projects noted that the Board created a Publications Committee to assess the Centre's research projects. According to this consultant, this is an inappropriate incursion into work that should be done by the Centre's secretariat, and compromises the Board's role as a critic and strategist by making it too much of a "stake-holder" in the process.6' However.
Centre officiais daim this was necessary to oversee the extensive process involved in publication. for which ICHRDD does not have sufficient staff reso~rces.~~
Ensuring harmonious relations between the Board and the Centre's staff is the responsibility of the President and the Chair of the Board. Discussions at ICHRDD reveal that there is no uniform opinion on the quality and productiveness of the relationship, though the balance seems to tip toward the negative. At the heart of the conflict lies the Board's insistence on drarnatically expanding the areas of the Centre's work, while the Centre's resources, financial and human, shrink. As one of the survivors
" Interview in Ottawa, May 2 1. 1998. Telephone interview with Cisèle Côtd-Harper, June 1 1, 1998. The Publications Committee has since been disbanded. of the recent staff downsizing put it, 'They [Board rnembers] are not here everyday so they don? know what your workload Others. however, see an improving relationship:
There's a genuine sense that the Board wants io play a better role and they are working on a modus operandi to make sure that happens. In the next couple of months we will be seeing a much more organized process b which the Board can be supportive ...the spint of heaithy collaboration is there.J
For example, at one recent Board meeting, each Director selected one of the Centre's themes to follow closely and develop closer contact with the appropriate staff membed5
The relationship seerns to be stronger at the more senior levels of the Centre, where collaboration is imperative. Ultimately, the distance between the Board and the
Secretariat can corne down to personalities. "We al1 have our preferences for individual
Board mernbers," commented one ICHRDD employee.66
The Secretariat. ICHRDD's secretariat works out of its headquarters in Old
Montreal, and is responsible for the seiection of projects. the building of networks, and the &y-to-day operation of the Centre. It comprises a balance of management and staff, on a ratio of about 15, though this number has fluctuated over the years. The internai structure has been subject to frequent revision, as priorities have changed, staff have departed. or fun& have been added or withdrawn. There can be little doubt that this has been tirne-consuming and energy draining.
In recent years there has ken a great deal of disquiet among the staff members, the result of poor management practices. Some of these problerns included creating an
" Intewiew in Montruil. May 1998. 64 Interview in Montreal. May 1998. " ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes. Febniary 13 and 14, 1998.3. a interview in Montreal. May 1998. advocacy unit which was not under effective control of senior management, the President over-tuming decisions of the Vice-President on a regular basis. and more recently, an unpopular effort to reduce the budget for the women's rights programs (which has been one of the Centre's success st~ries).~'Fed up by what they perceived as autocratie strategizing and a lack of communication between management and staff on policy changes, non-management employees of the Centre formed a union in June 1996. When this failed to lead to improvements, and motivated by an oncoming down-sizing, employees went on what they termed an "alerte de grève" (strike waming) in November and December of 1997, during which they picketed outside of the office over the lunch hour. Remarked one employee regarding management's unwillingness to compromise:
"We felt that they weren't sitting down to negotiate ..A was their way or no way".68 A three year contract was finally signed in February 1998.
Shortly after assurning his new post, Warren Allmand re-structured the Centre to accommodate both budget cuts and a re-orientation of the Centre's strategic outlook. h the November 1997 overhaul. the Centre elirninated 17 positions, re-creating 12 of them, for a net loss of five. Dunng this period ten employees who had been with the Centre for five years or more resigned or lost their jobs. Others were required to recompete for the newly "created" positions. Perhaps importantly for ofice harmony, though, Allmand abolished the position of Vice-President. The Vice-President had previously been in charge of administrative matters, but had acted effectively, according to Allmand, as "the one ail-powerful gatekeeper" between the staff and the ~resident.~~The new staffmg
Interviews in Montreal and Ottawa, May 1998. 'Interview in Monmal. May 1998. * Interview with Warren Allmand, Montreal. May 20. 1998. structure implemented by Allmand has been designed to ensure that as the mandate
changes with time, the support structure will not require regular reconstruction.
Previously, nearly every change in strategic direction had resulted in a cataclysmic in-
house disaster, as the new imperatives demanded by such a change were not compatible
with the Centre's organizational structure. As Marie-France Cloutier, ICHRDD's
financial comptroller put it, "the new structure makes sense"."
The secretariat has ken in a period of disarray since the departure of Ed
Broadbent, though most are confident that the most draconian reforms are now pst.
Asked whether the constant changes have impeded capability, one employee replied:
"Definitely. It's harnpered the productivity in-house"." The constant tum-over of staff
has detrimental effects not only on the efficiency, but on the financial health of the Centre
too, which must pay out compensation packages to dismissed e~n~lo~ees.~'And because
the Act stipulates that the Centre's employees are not members of the Public Service, the
Centre is unable to take advantage of the early-retirement packages which have been available to many federal employees during the downsizing of the pst few years.73
Finances. ICHRDD has operated on meagre funding since its inception in 1990.
Unfortunately, as demands on its resources have expanded, its financial resources have
stagnated. Since the end of the 1992-1993 fiscal year, ICHRDD has not received five year block-funding, which was guaranteed during its fmt five years. Instead, allocation has becorne a Line-item in CTDA's annual estimates, which are ultimately subject to
70 Interview with Marie-France Cloutier. Montreal, May 14, 1998. " Interview in Montreal. May 1998. In 1997- 1998. ICHRDD paid out over 6175.OOO in termination benefits. ICHRDD 1997- 1998 Annual Report, 20. " Interview with Marie-France Cloutier, Montreal. May 14. 1998. approvd at the Ministerial level prior to king placed before Parliament. In both 1997-
1998 and 1998- 1999 the Centre has had its annual $5 million budget reduced by approximately $325,000 a year.74 The level of governrnent funding beyond 1998- 1999 is unknown.
According to those at the Centre, lirnited, non-guaranteed. financial support has a variety of impacts on ICHRDD. These include: an inability to place more staff abroad to help in programme CO-ordination;rejecting 80% of proposed projects; an overworked
Secretariat; insufficient means to dedicate to either an effective evaluation process. or to
"rnining" possible domains of future interest; a serious reduction in long-term planning potential and long-term contractual obligations; the need to always maintain funds in reserve, in case future funding is seriously reduced or terminated; and inefficiency in ierms of administration-to-project cost~.'~
More seriously, however, the lack of guaranteed financing presents a potential challenge to the Centre's independence, though few respondents were willing to acknowledge that this was a genuine concem. Allmand acknowledged that this "is a flaw in our independence". But he continued: "One might think we're now compromised or were under pressure in that our funding comes yearly. As far as 1 can see it hasn't changed our attitude"? While Ed Broadbent argued that multi-year funding was
'*crucial" to the Centre's independence, he concurred with Allmand's assessrnent of the
Centre's continued criticism of Canadian foreign policy. However, he noted that year-to-
'.'Ibid. '' This last point was emphasized Marie-France Cloutier. who argued that with a % 10 miilion annual budget (as opposed to the current $4.675 million), the Centre couId increase this ratio in favour of projects dramaticdiy, Interview in Montreal, May 14, 1998. 76 Interview with Warren Allmand, Montreal, May 20, 1998. year funding canot help but have a negative impact upon the ability of the Centre to work to its potential.77
While the Centre has had its budget moderately reduced. Minister of Foreign
Affairs Lloyd Axworthy noted in an October 9, 1997 letter to Warren Allmand that. in fact, the Centre has escaped relatively unscathed compared to other departments. He also seems to irnply that the funding reductions should not be interpreted as a challenge to the
Centre:
1 understand your concems regarding the reductions to the Centre's parliamentary appropriation. for both this fiscal year and next. However, I am confident that the budget reductions will not compromise the effectiveness of the Centre's programming.. .the Centre's budget has remained relatively prosected - facing its first reduction only in 1997-1998. CIDA, by cornparison, has seen its budget reduced by nearly 30 percent since 1993- 1994; other non-governmental organizations and institutions have also had to absorb significant redu~tions.'~
Allmand continues to lobby the government for a return to multi-year financing. The problem lies in the complex nature of the funding process. Allmand acknowledges that if the decision were exclusively Axworthy's. multi-year funding would probably be rest~red.'~However. the process is more cornplicated than that. Allmand has also appeared before the Finance Cornmittee to plead the Centre's case. To date he has been unsuccessful.
Critics of the Centre further note that the right to raise fun& of its own from extemai sources is written directly into the Centre's Act. This amendment to the original statute was initially intended to ensure that the Centre would be able to raise additional fûnds to work in non-ODA expendable counuies, such as those in Eastern Europe.
Telephone interview with Ed Broadbent, Iune I 1, 19%. Lloyd Axworthy. "Letter to Warren Allmand:' October 9. 1997. Emphasis added. 79 Interview with Warren Allmand, Montreal, May 20, 1998. Financial sources could be both private and public. The Centre need not fear For its
independence or credibility when taking fun& from extemal, private, and even corporate
sources: their statute ody dlows the Centre to accept outside monies provided no
conditions on their use are attached, "a protection against donor-dnven programming".80
Outside funding has been both a modest success and ICHRDD's Achilles' heel. Tt was
recognized as an imperative aimost immediately: after less han a year of operation, the
Board realized that "'the Centre's needs will outgrow its revenues; funds must be
Yet the Centre has had to be careful of incurring the wrath of smaller NGOs
(some of which are its partners) who feel that cornpetition for over-stretched private
fun& is already fierce enough without a comparatively well-funded govemment body
looking for a piece of the pie. Wiih this in mind, the Centre tned direct fund-raising from
the Canadian public. In 199 1, Broadbent launched a "penny per Canadian" ~arn~ai~n.~'
The Centre Iost in excess of $40,000 on this direct-mail effort. "Everyone knows you
lose money on your fmt direct-mail," noted Broadbent, who wanted to push on but met
opposition from a cash-conscious Board, which subsequently adopted a motion not to
pursue work in non-ODA receivable countries "unless it [ICHRDD] receives a special
govemrnent allocation or a significant private donation".83
When it cornes to direct funding for project initiatives, however. the Centre has
ken much more successful. On high-profile initiatives. ICHRDD has attracted money
- . -. . - . - " Bnef submitted to the 1994 Federal Program Review by ICHRDD. 9. ICWDBoard of Directors Minutes, June 6 and 7, 199 1, î5. " "Broadbent asks for money to fight for human rights in poor coun~ies." Montreal Gazette. November 16. 1991, B8. ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, November 5-6, 1993,32. from larger organizations such as the Royal Bank and Petro Canada, both of which provided $10,000 towards the Centre's remarkable 1993 Nobel Laureate campaign. which highlighted nghts abuses in Burma and called for the restoration of the democraticaily-elected government-inexile." in this particular case, however. funding was arranged largely through the personal networking of the Centre's President rather than by altniism on the part of the corporations.8s At present. large Amencan foundations are funding the Centre's observer at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in Aru~ha.*~
Allmand is in the process of devising a new fundraising strategy which will target pnvate organizations rather than individuals." The way forward for the Centre must involve raising extemal funds, as it remains uncertain whether the govemment will increase the Centre's annual stipend in the near future. Meanwhile, dernands on the
Centre's personnel continue to increase. If the Centre hopes to expand its work to crisis- prone regions of North Africa and the Middle East, and if the govemment refuses to raise its annuai contribution, ICHRDD7sbest (and perhaps only) hope lies in the private sector. ***
This chapter has addressed two major questions which aid in our understanding of where the Centre came from and how it operates. First, what politicai forces shaped its founding? Second, how do personnel issues and financial complexities influence work performed by the Centre? Answers provided to these questions in this chapter help
" ICHRDD Board of Directon Minutes, February 6-8. 1993. 26. This carnpaign is considered is greater detail in chapter four. 82-83. " Telephone interview with Ed Broadbent, lune 1 1. 1998. Broadbent also noted that Petro Canada's willingness to contribute to a good cause couId partially be attributed to its previous involvement in numerous development projets in countries with less-thamrespectablerights records. 86 InteMew with Marie-France Cloutier. Montreal, May 14. 1998. 87 Inte~ewwith Warren Allmand, Montreal, May 20, 1998. illuminate some of the political intricacies in both the shaping of the Centre's mandate and in how its institutional dynarnics influence its operation. With some of the historical and bureaucratic questions now properly framed. chapter four proceeds to analyze and assess the work that ICHRDD has done pursuant to its mandate. CHAPTER FOUR From Silent Pattner tu Audacious Advocate?
The Centre has cast a wide net for itself in strategies to promote human rights and democratic development, a consequence of its broad mandate under the International
Centrefor Human Rights and Democratic Development Act. Its u l timate goal is to pursue international CO-operationto advance respect for rights and aid in democratization.
It thus acts in concert with a wide variety of govemment, non-governrnent and multilateral partners. The Centre's work (both direct and indirect) cm be sorted into one of three broad categones. The majority of the Centre's operations have histoncally been in the first category, programme support by which is meant the provision of funds, or political or technical support, to groups operating abroad. The second, public education and advocacy, refers to lobbying, conference organizing, publicizing of noteworthy issues, and increasing the capacity of its partners to do the same. The third area is research and publication, and comprises democratic development studies, occasional
Papen, and an essay series. The three are inter-related, and the distinctions between them are not always meaningful, or for that matter, evident.' Table one breaks down annual expenditures using these categones. While they are conceptuaiiy distinct, over time the
Centre has worked to integrate the three and make them mutuaily reenforcing to a greater degree.
Since it began operations on October 19, 1990. there have been some significant changes in ICHRDD's direction. One was the implementation of a decision to select
' The distinctions. however. are ones the Centre itself makes in its financial reports to the Govemment of Canada, and have been employed by ICHRDD before the Standing Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. TABLE 1
BreaMowi of ICHRDD's Annual Expenditures by Category
90-91 9 1-92 92-93 93-94 Country 58% 7 1 %" 70% 65% Prog'ing Public Ed, & 1 1 % 10% 11% 13% Advocacv Dev'Research t & 1 O% Generd Admin.
Note: "- Does not include projects in Central and Eastern Europe. - Includes start-up costs. c - Does not include employee termination benefits.
Source: ICHRDD Amual Reports / 990-1998 "core" countries for programming work in June of 1993. Another noteworthy shift came with the resignation of the Centre's first president, Ed Broadbent, in September 1996. To help segment the Centre's eight years of work into more manageable units. a narrative loosely stnictured amund these phases is adopted in this chapter. The first era runs from
ICHRDD's inauguration, in the fa11 of 1990, to June of 1993. The second runs from June
1993 to September 1996. The third coven September 1996 to the present.
Making distinctions between types of work the Centre performs and periods of time in which they were performed allows for a nuanced analysis of the Centre's activities. Within each time period. al1 three areas of work shall be discussed, analysed and assessed. This narrative will highlight key decisions, illustrate relevant debates, and point out patterns and trends. Significant obstacles and challenges faced by the Centre will be discussed. Though it does not seek to evaluate the success or failure of projects funded abroad (this is well beyond the scope of this thesis), project and advocacy work in
Burma, Haiti and Rwanda is examined in some depth. In concluding, a critique of how the Centre evaluates its own work is presented. In this chapter, then. we seek to explain where the Centre has focussed its efforts. why, and with what results. By blending a chronological with a thematic approach, the analysis pedts detailed understanding of the activities undertaken. and yields explanations as to why the Centre has chosen to alter strategic direction on numerous ~ccasions.~
The evidence shows that over time the Centre has moved slowly away from an approach based around programming to one more evenly split between programming and advocacy. Research and publication received littie attention in the earliest yean, but has
'Given the vast scope of activities undertaken by the Centre during these eight years. the exarnples presented are representative sarnples of ICHRDD's work as a whoIe, become an integral part of the Centre's efforts of late. Moreover. ICHRDD has recently made strides in ensunng that al1 thRe areas of its mandate complement one another, a more logical use of iis scarce resources which was neglected until the mid- 1990s. It also becomes evident that the number of occasions on which the Centre has altered its strategic orientation represents a pattern of indecision on the part of the Centre's
leadership. This has ken damaging to continuity and constrained ICHRDD from obtaining any sense of iong-term strategic vision.
October 1990 to June 1993
At the Cenue's officiai opening on October 19,1990. ICHRDD announced the first 13 projects it intended to support. Wiih combined grants in excess of $600.000, the beneficiaries included the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Institute of
El Salvador, and the Nelson Mandela Fund in South ~frica.~The initial projects were the result of a hectic and confusing period of some nine months between the appointment of the President and Board (in January and March, respectively) and the opening of the doon in October that same year.
The scope of the Centre's mandate created vast opponunities for expansion, but at the same time presented challenges and difficulties in operationalizing an institution without comparable rnodels elsewhere in the world. The Centre's leadership was thnist into an immediate period of "trial and err~r".~ICHRDD faced numerous challenges, both pnor to its opening and during this fmt period of operation. Some of these challenges were: developing an immediate strategic vision; making NGOs, in Canada and
' Elizabeth Thompson. "Funding the fight for freedom," Montreal Gazette. October 20. 1990. A4. ' Telephone interview with Gisèle Côte-Harper. June 1 1. 1998. abroad, aware of the Centre's mandate and purpose; getting on with the work of human rights and democratic development; and devising criteria for the selection of gant applications. According to the Centre's first Chair. it was very much a process of leaming on the go?
A series of key decisions conceming the Centre's strategic vision were passed at the August 1990 Board of Directors meeting. Many of the decisions were to remain cornerstones for months and years to corne. The Board Hmed:
- the Centre must devote the major part of its budget to projects in the field and "front-line activities" - the Centre must give the sarne importance to al1 human rights and not favour one right over another - projects which are given pnonty by the Centre should be conceived and carried out by the people of the country concerned - the importance of making decisions on project proposais within the shortest time possible6
The direct funding of organizations abroad, in a participatory and expedient manner, was thus given pnmary ernphasis in the earliest years of the Centre's operations, while advocacy and education, and research and development, were accorded much less importance. Broadbent temed ICHRDD's disposition a "knowledge-based, action- oriented" approach, which satisfied activists but not acadernics who had envisioned the
Centre as a think-tank.'
At the very fint meeting of ICHRDD's Board, the Centre confmed what the rapporteurs had foreseen: the organization would pnontize supporting NGOs, though this was not to preclude some work with governments.8 Yet the initial reaction within the
-- ' bid. ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, August 1 and 2, 1990.9-10, Interview with Iris Almeida, Montreal, May 19. 1998. ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, April 19 and 20. 1990.4. Canadian NGO community was "rnixed and very guarded".9 NGOs were sceptical of yet another federaily-fbnded institution in this area, fearïng intrusion into their work from
Ottawa "officiald~rn".'~Such resistance was not encountered in initial meetings with
NGOs from southem counties. where, according to Ed Broadbent, the Centre's Canadian mots were a major advantage. ICHRDD was able to capitalize on Canada's excellent reputation abroad in establishing links with these groups, and southern NGOs were reportedly delighted at the entry the Centre gave these organizations to Canadian embassies and delegations abroad." It noneiheless took some tirne to make clear both the Centre's independence from government, and its raison d'être. As the Centre's debut
Annual Repon notes, "the first few months.. .were marked by some confusion on the part of those requesting project support. Some thought the Centre had the same role as
Amnesty international with the additional function of providing grants-in-aid." Such confusion was airnost unavoidable, given the Centre's novelty.
Within Canada, Broadbent's initial appeals to NGOs were made through contacts provided by acquaintances within the academic community and by Board membea, and through meetings arranged b y the Canadian Council for International Co-operation
(ccIc).'~Intemationally, the Centre's partnen were established through sirnilar means. as Broadbent alone visited 17 countries in his first year as president, and the staff many rnore.14 Rather than beginning with a mass mailing, the Centre only responded to direct
9 Telephone interview with Clovis Demers, June 25. 1998. 'O Ibid. Broedbent argued that this hesitancy was largely overcome when the tint Board appointments were made, establishing the Centre's credibility and independence from government. TeIephone interview. June II, 1998. " Telephone interview with Ed Broadbent, June 1 1.1998. " ICHRDD Annuul Rcpon 1990- 199 1.9. l3 Intewiew with Iris Almeida, Montreal. May 19, 1998. '" ICHRDD Annual Repon 1990- 199 1.6. inquiries, in order "not to unduly raise expectations with regard to the Centre's capacity, financial and other, to accept projects".'5 Nevertheless, the number of gant applications soon began to outweigh the Centre's ability to support them, with the Centre refusing about 80% of funding applications by 1994?
In addition to these logistical matters, the Centre's governing body was also faced with the irnmediate challenge of getting involved in the dynamic international environment of the early 1990s. Clovis Demers, the Centre's first Vice-President, noted candidly that "we didn't know where the pnorities were"." The Board and the President decided to begin with an incrementai program, based upon their combined persond knowledge and contacts, which led to a strong initial programming emphasis in the
Arnericas, where talks of hemispheric integration had begun, and where a number of counuies were engaged in tentative first steps toward democracy. Following a 16-day, five-country visit to Africa in early 199 1 by Broadbent, further contacts on that continent led to greater funding of African organizations in the second year.18 An experîenced and wekomected staff was hired to oversee and direct operations, which, as Iris Almeida noted, was integral to the Centre's initial development: 'The Centre could not have moved quickly had it not had that Board and staff combination, both being very proactive in their approaches". Ig
While the Centre pronounced ail human rights as indivisible and worthy of equal attention, the overwhelming share of initial programming funds went to organizations
-. '' ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, October 4 and 5, 199 1, 36. l6 ''Presentation on the Activities and Plans of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development to the Standing Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade," April 12. 1994, Ottawa. 12. " Telephone interview with Clovis Demers. June 25. 1998. I8 Libertus 1 :3 (June 1991), 1-5. I9 InteMew with iris Almeida, Monmal. May 19. 1998. involved in the defence of civil and politicai rights. Nancy Thede explained this as an unavoidable reality:
in generai there tends to be quite a gap between human rights organizations and development NGOs. with development NGOs focussing on economic and social rights and the human rights NGOs focussing on civiVpolitica1 rights. We tended to reproduce that because we were working with human rights ~r~anizations."
In its own view, ICHRDD did have better success at expanding its relationship with partner NGOs away from a strïctly donor-recipient one, to one of longer term networkng and information sharing, which was another one of its earliest strategic goals.21
By early 1993, the Centre had formally codified its guidelines and regulations for the provision of hinding in a pamphlet entitled Guidelines and Criteria of the Grants in
Aid Programme. Above dl, the Centre was to hind projects which would lead to concrete action. "Data collections that will sit on shelves, conferences without an orientation to action, follow-up research without popular dissemination or practical applicability. and advocacy without representation are not eligible for funding assistance"." Priority initiatives, it noted. are those "which strengthen the linkage between human rights and democratic dzve~o~rnent*'.~This linkage becarne the Centre's core intellectual underpinning. From the outset it has emphasized the building of civil society as the primary means of democratic development. The foreword to the criteria noted that
according to the Centre's orientation. democracy is not only a political system and a form of govemment, but also a kind of society. A fully democratic society is one in which al1 human rights are respected.. .this approach sees human nghts and democracy as two sides of the sarne coin. Struggling for human rights implies
" Interview with Nancy Thede. Montreal. May 20, 1998. *' ICHRDD Annual Repon 1992- 1993. 9. Guidelines adCriteria of the Grants in Aid Programme (Monmal: ICHRDD. 1 993). 4. " Ibid, 1. workin for democracy. Building dernocracy is in turn implementing human rights. 8
The theoretical link between the two is fmitful in that it facilitates the operationalization of strategies towards democratic development, a notoriously nebulous term; practically. it can help detennine which areas of civil society to target. This conception of a rights- democracy interdependence remains pivotal to the Centre's approach even today. and is the foundation for its democratic development frame~ork.~
As noted earlier, in this fmt period the Centre's emphasis was placed first and foremost upon funding front-line activities. The other two areas of ICHRDD's work. advocacy and publications. were accorded dramatically fewer financial resources, especially in the first two fiscal years. Nonetheless. the Centre did take these other elements of iis work seriously. particularly its advocacy work, which was recognized immediately as integral to the Centre's mandate? Such work, when it takes the form of speeches and articles (as it often did in the Centre's early years). cm be inexpensive.
Thus the Centre's expenditures, which indicate roughly 108 of outlays going to advocacy and education in the fmt three years, do not offer an enùreiy accurate account of the extent of such efforts."
Advocacy and education initiatives in the first penod took a variety of forms. The
Centre's President was a vocal supporter of linking human rights records to ODA allocations, making more than 20 speeches on this topic in the fmt year al~ne.'~As
" Ibid, foreword. See below, 93-95. 26 "President*~Remspective" in ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes. June 7 and 8. 1996.20. See table one, 74. " ICHRDD Annual Report 1990- 199 1.6-7. See Ed Broadbent, 'Tell the tyrants the future has arrived." Globe and Mail, November 25, 1991, A15; Louise Crosby, "Canada urged to tie idto Cuba's human rights," Ottawa Citizen, May 29, 1992, A 1 1. rnentioned in chapter two. in late 1991 then Prime Minister Mulroney made such a promise, though the Centre's role in this development should not be over-stated. Canada has not adhered to such a policy on a systematic basis, nor, in any event, is there evidence to suggest Broadbent's efforts were any more important than the Prime Minister's own expressed personal contempt for rights violators.
Broadbent also involved himself in issues as diverse as the Oka cri~is.'~the
Middle East Peace talles," and most controvenially. the hurnan rights record of Mexico as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) began to be negotiated.3' In addition to speaking out on a variety of political issues at home and internationdly,
ICHRDD also funded a number of conferences and serninars both within Canada and abroad. For exarnple, the Centre invested some $200,000 over three years towards the two major meetings for "Indigenous 500 (Amerindia '92)," which explored the cultural contributions of Native peoples in the Americas over the last five centuries?
By far the most audacious piece of advocacy work undertaken by the Centre during its first 30 months of work was on Burma The Centre made this country a priority from the outset, funding the democraticdly-elected governrnent which had been forced into exile by the military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC). Programrning money was provided to "publicize human rights violations in
Burma, obtain increased diplornatic support and Iead the rnilitary junta to transfer power
l9 "B roadbent seeks native probe," Globe and Mail, April 17. 199 1. AS. Ed Broadbent, 'The big threat to Mideast peace talks: Israeli settlements." Globe and Mail. Febniary 24. 1992, A13. '' Ed Broadbent, %et's drop the tariff on humanity." Globe Md Mail. June 13. 199 1, A 17. '' ICHRDD Annual Report 1%O- 199 1.29. to elected civilians"." This initiative highlights the sensitive work ICHRDD is capable
of doing, and its willingness to do so. An even more arnbitious endeavour was the
gathering of ten Nobel Peace Prize wimers, arnong them Desmond Tutu and the Dalai
Lama, and promoting their trip to the Burmese-Thai border to demand the release of
political prisonen, notably the democratically-elected President of Burma, Aung San Suu
Kyi, winner of the 199 1 Peace Prize. Subsequently, the Laureates travelled to Geneva to
make a presentation of their findings to the UNCHR. ICHRDD deemed this project a
resounding success at raising the profile of rights abuses in Burma in te mat ion al^^,^^
thought the Centre criticized the Canadian media for king "slow" to cover the voyage.35
Pursuant to its mandate to educate the Canadian public on rights matters,
ICHRDD also provided substantial financial backing to aid Human Rights Intemet's
relocation from Harvard University to the University of ~ttawa.~~ICHRDD itself
established a documentation centre within its headquarters to provide information to both
the human nghts comrnunity, and to the public at large. It also established its quarterly
newsletter, Liberias, to document the Centre's efforts, and created an annual "freedorn
award" narned after John Humphrey, the Canadian who CO-authoredthe üNTsUniversal
Declaration of Human Rights. The award is given out annually on International Human
33 ICHRDD Annual Repon 199 1 - 1992.3 1. In 199 1 - 1992. $lM).ûûû was given to the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma- Over the subsequent two years another $200,000 was provided. and support has continued since. y The attention of the world's media was definitely captured. See "A Nobel act: Myanmar." The Econornisî, Febniaty 20. 1993,36; Philip Shenon, "'Nobel winners urge release of Burrnese dissident" The New York Times,Febniary 18, 1993, A12; James Pringle. "Nobelwinners cal1 for Suu Kyi releltse." The Times (London),Feb- 18, 1993,9. '' Diana Al yward, "Activist says media dores while Burma abuses rights." Thunder Bay Times News, Mach 16, 1993, 1. Clovis Demers noted that DFAIT was not pleased by the Centre's aggressive approach to the Burma issue. Telephone interview. June 25, 1998. " Liberras 1 :1 (December I WO), 4. Rights Day in early December, and, in terms of media coverage. has been one of the
Centre's most successfbl efforts at raising public awareness of rights issues."
Ttie period under study also culminated with the publication of the fint five year
Parliamentary review. Such reports are mandated under section 3 1(2) of the Centre's
statute as part of its accountability to the Canadian people.38 The review, undertaken by
the Montreal-based GESTED International consulting firm, was on the whole quite
positive concerning the Centre's work, and particularly laudatory of its transparency and
non-bureaucratie style.39 It concluded that "the Centre has been effective in carrying out
its mission and mandate" and "has succeeded in recruiting a core of competent, devoted
and hard working professionals".q
The consultants, however, criticized the Centre for its "low efficiency", the result
of "the scattering of activities, the number of staff and the salary conditions"."
According to a staff member with ICHRDD at the tirne of the review. these cnticisms
were "traumatic" for a group of acûvists who felt they were "world beaters"." The
report's release stimulated much criticism of the Centre, particularly from the Reform
Party, which demanded the Centre be shut down. 'This entire project," said Reformer
Diane Ablonczy, "appears to be an expensive retirement plan for the former leader of the
NDP, complete with a $150,000 year sala~y"." Reform continues its rigorous opposition
to the Centre as a waste of taxpayers' money."
Telephone interview with The Globe und Mail's Paul Knox. Jul y 25, 1998. 38 The second five year review of the Centre's activities is due to be tabled in the faIl of 1998. 39 GESTED Review, 8-2. 40 Ibid. 9- 1. 4' Ibid. " Inte~ewin Montreal. May 1998. " Robert Fife. "Reform rips Ed's agency," Toronto Sun, February 15. 1994.8. An even more recent critique cm be found in "Have title. will travel: despite 247 'rights' tours. Broadbent has achieved precious iittle," Western Report. June 3, 1996.8-9. In the fa11 of 1992, Broadbent prepared a long-tenn strategy document for the future direction of ICHRDD. Beyond 1992: A Strategy. whkh was presented at the
February 1993 Board meeting, called for a refining of the Centre's work. Most notably, it called for geographic concentration on "six or seven countnes per continent*'." The reasoning was expressed by Broadbent as foilows:
By reducing the nurnber of countries and by designating reasonably precisely a range of rights and institutions most pertinent to democratic development in a given country, the Centre would be in a position to concentrate its energies and thus have greater impact on that country and be able to propose possible courses of action most pertinent to re-enforcing the country's democratic development.... the Centre's prime objective in its next phase of activity is to show concentrated, informed leadership in helping to build democratic civil societics. It now has the experienced staff at home and established partners abroad to make this feasible?
The reasoning was sound, as ICHRDD was at work in over 40 countries, with only four people CO-ordinatingwork on three continent^.^' Beyond 1992: A Strategy also suggested increased emphasis on thematic issues, continued work in its role as a state-society bridge-builder, and using dernocratic society indicaton to undertake specific country studies.
The first two-and-a-haif years of the Centre's operations were experimental.
Early emphasis was placed on the desirability of providing funds directly to organizations involved in human nghts promotion and protection, though the efforts on the Burma campaign showed ICHRDD to be capable of excellent advocacy and education work.
However, there was little attempt to integrate the three areas of the Centre's work. By mid- 1993, an initially ad hoc process of project selection had been somewhat
" Ed Broadbent, Beyond 1992: A Strategy, Intemal ICHRDD Strategy Document, 8. 46 Ibid, 7.9. " 1997 and Beyond, ICHRDD Intemal Strategy Document, 1 1. systematized, and thematic priorities in each region had also ken established. On March
3 1, 1993. the Centre's guaranteed five year funding expired, though the govemment
renewed the Centre's mandate with another $5 million for the subsequent fiscal year.
June 1993 - September 1996
The February 1993 Board meeting endorsed the President's strategy to select core
countries for programming. At the June 1993 meeting, the countries themselves were
chosen. There was, however, no formal set of criteria developed for the selection of such
countries. In fact, the choice not to set criteria was an explicit decision. Some Board
membea argued that establishing any particular set of criteria "could make it too easy to
set aside proposals which othenvise would deserve to be considered or s~~~orted".~~
Ultimately, the decisions were to be made by the Centre's programming staff. Countries were chosen based upon where the Centre had the strongest contacts, where it could
make the biggest impact, or for unique or compelling reasons. The recommendations were then subject to Board approvai. The initiai 13 countries chosen were:
Afnca - Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo Americas - El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Haiti, Pen Asia - Burma, Pakistan, ha il and^^
Nancy Thede noted: "to a certain extent implicitly our choice of core countries has to do with where we think there is a more acute strategic need for promotion of nghts and derno~rac~".~~
4g ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, June 4 and 5, 1993,33. 49 Ibid. In addition. Zaire. Honduras. Colombia and Nepal were also considered. but not chosen. 5" Interview with Nancy Thede, Montreal, May 20, 1998. According to staff members, the choice of countries in no way reflected a desire to avoid countries in which Canada had important commercial or strategic interests, lest its activities provoke the ire of foreign policy maken. Table two provides Government of Canada ODA and trade figures for the fmt 13 core countries from 199 1- 1992. The statistics support the contention that little consideration was given to the nature of
Canada's officiai relations with these countries, as they reveal no pattern whatsoever: countries with next to no cornmerciai relationship with Canada (Togo. for exarnple) were selected alongside countries with immense significance, such as Thailand and Mexico. The latter was explicitly chosen because of its inclusion in N~A.''
In late 1993 the Centre also made its initial foray into publishing, with the fmt three contribution to its "Essays on Human Rights and Democratic Development" series?* The goal of these publications, according to Board Chair Gisèle Côté-Harper. was to stimulate discussion within the human rights NGO corn~nunit~.~~The Centre's extemal evaiuator provided a largely favourable review of the effectiveness of the series within the NGO comrnunity, although mistakes, like not including the Centre's mailing address or phone number for re-orders or cornrnents, and sending embassy-bound copies via general delivery (instead of via Extemal Affairs pouches in Ottawa), were also underscored?
Interview with Diana Bronson. Montreal. May 15. 1998: and ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes. June 4 and 5. 1993,35. '*The first three were: Tom Farer, Collectivelv de fend in^ Democracy; David Gillies, Human Rights, mocracv and 'Good Govemance': Stretchine the World Bank's Policv Frontiers; and Laurie Wiseberg. Defendinn Human Rights Defenders (Montreai: ICHRDD, 1993). " ~ele~honeinte~ew with Gisèle Côte-Harper, June 1 1. 1998. Y Virginia Thomas. "Report of Extemal Consultant on Impact Assessrnent of ICHRDD Essay Series." Mimeo, 1994.9. Goventment of Canada ODA and Trade Figures for ICHRDD 's 13 initial cure countries
:DA (C$thousands) Trade (C$ thousands)
Rwanda Tanzania
1 El Salvador iAsia Burma Pakistan
Note: Aidfigures are total bilateral (govemrnent-to-govemment) transfers Tradefigures indicated are for two-way trade (imports and exports) " - The Canadian govenunent suspended ODA to Bunna in 1988.
Sou mes: CIDA Annual Report 199 1 - 1992, (Ottawa: SuppIy and Services, 1992) Trade of Canada, Summury of Extemal Trade 199 1, (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1992) The selection of core countries meant that the Centre began to devote most of its efforts to the promotion of rights and democracy within a narrower range, though it did not automaticaily eschew work outside of this initial basket of countries. By also embracing ad hoc work on thematic issues such as women's rights, and trade and hurnan rights, and by encouraging links with NGOs in Canada as well as abroad, the Centre continued to raise its profile intemationally. John Foster, the national secretary of
OXFAM, noted that "the Centre has built a platform and won a certain audience. Its role in supporting and CO-operating with NGOs is extremely important. They haven't always got the rnix right, but the balance is positive".ss The Centre was particularly active in two countries where rights abuses made headlines in the rnid-L990s, so-called "basket cases" of the international community: Haiti and Rwanda These cases provide some contrast in prograrnming approach in that with the former ICHRDD collaborated with govemment, while in the latter it worked primarily with NGOs.
Jean Bertrand-Aristide, who was democratically elected President of Haiti in
1990, was forced into exile by a military coup in 199 1. On December 9". 199 1, Aristide visited ICHRDD's headquarters in Montreal and met with Ed ~roadbent.'~Thus began a collaborative effort to retum the Haitian President to power. Given the size of the Haitian community in Quebec (especially Montreai), a strong local constituency supported the
Centre's efforts, and provided it with a series of pamen with which to work. in the fall of 1994, the Centre collaborated with many of these partners in organizing a "Popular
International Tribunal on Rights in Haiti," held in Montreal. Tribunal memben, who listened to testirnonies of rights abuses by the military junta, included Isaac Nguéma, the
I5 Quoted in Mark Abley, 'Trying to make a difference." Montreai Guzerte. February 18, 1995. 82. Libertas 2: 1 (December 199 1), 2. President of the Afrîcan Commission on Human and People's Rights, and Michael
Manley, former Prime Minister of Jamaica Amongst other recommendations, the tribunal echoed Aristide's cal1 for an independent Truth ~ommission."
The Haitian case provides an example of the Centre's policy of prioritizing human iights above state sovereignty. ICHRDD cded for military intervention to restore the elected President when years of econornic sanctions proved ineffective. "Working with other Latin American middle powers such as Chile, Argentina. and Venezuela,"
Broadbent argued, "Canada should press for OAS (and United Nations) resolutions warranting collective rnilitary action with clear, limited and achievable objective^".^^
Following the U.S. intervention and the period of UN supervision, Broadbent was present in Port-au-Prince to accompany Aristide upon his retum to power on October 15. 1994.
ICHRDD was given the mandate by Aristide to design the Tmth Commission he had called for, and its proposal was accepted almost without alteration by the Haitian government.59
The Centre's decision in 1993 to make Rwanda a country of concentration foretold the disaster of the summer of 1994 in the tiny African state. It is inconceivable that the Centre could have single-handedly prevented the genocide. However, ICHRDD did attempt to bnng human rights violations in Rwanda to the attention of the international cornrnunity pnor to the devastation that was unleashed beginning in April
1994. It fell on deaf ears, though. because of the political paralysis of the UN at the time.
In 1993, the Centre, in collaboration with the Federation internationale de droits de l'homme (FIDH) and Human Rights Watch - Afnca, undertook a fact-finding
Liberzus 4:4 (Novernber 1994). 3-5. Ed Broadbent, 'Time has corne for action in Haiti: Broadbent," Montreal Gazerre, JuIy 16, 1994, B5. International Commission of Inquiry to Rwanda. After meeting with officiais from both
state and society, the report which emerged warned of the dangers to corne. The report
was so cntical of the Rwandan leadership that the President. Juvénal Habyarimana, filed
a iibel suit against the three organizations in a Paris The Centre undertook
extensive public and private lobbying with both the Canadian govemment and with
multilateral bodies, prior to and concurrent with the eruption of hostilities in ~wanda?
Canadian officiais were apparently "very unhappy" with the report. as they were not
prepared COoffer the kind of response demanded by the ~~0s.~~
During the early days of the genocide, the Centre also acted to ensure the safety of
endangered human rights activist Monique Mujawarnariya. Her pursuit by govemment
death squads was foiled when the Centre co-ordinated her escape fkom Rwanda by means
of diplornatic protection and an international relief flight." Once in Canada, ICHRDD
funded her advocacy work. Since the end of the 1994 genocide, ICHRDD has been
actively engaged with both the new government and actors within civil society to
prosecute war criminals, to re-establish the judicial system and to work toward democratic de~elo~rnent.~~With its partners, the Centre has established the position of
Monitor on Gender-Related Crimes at the ICTR.~~
Late in 1994 the Centre made another significant change in strategic direction. At the November meeting of the Board of Directors, a decision was taken to "becorne even
------
59 See "Haiti to Establish Truth Commission," ICHRDD Press Release. November 1. 1994. ICHRDD Board of Directon Minutes. February 25 and 26, 1994.32. The death of the Resident in an airplane crash on Apn17. 1994, would effectiveiy end the libel suit; it would also prompt the largest enocide since the Holocaust. " IdnBlock, ''Rights group calls on UN to intervene." Montreal Garerte, April 14. 1994. A13. " Interview with Iris Almeida, Montreal. May 19. 1998. 63 Anne McIlroy, 'Escapeci rights leader gets to Canada" Ottawa Citizen, April 19, 1994, AS. 64 ICHRDD Board of Dkctors Minutes, June 10 and 1 1, 1994,39-40; ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, March 3 1 and April 1, 1995,33. more of an 'influencing organization' emphasizing its public education and advocacy role with key players at the national, regional and multilateral le~els".~~This was a clear departure from the Centre's fm cornmitment to pnontizing the funding of front-line nghts organizations, and figures since 1995-1996 reflect this shift. This change is attributable to two dominant influences. Fit. the Centre's relatively low profile within
Canada demanded an increased presence on the domestic scene. This was especially true during an era of govemment budget cuts. when a low profile could ofien result in the ciramatic downsizing, if not elirnination, of an organization's funding. Second. it was becoming increasingly apparent that CIDA's increased direct funding of human rights organizations was making the Centre appear trifling and disposable, and lacking a raison d 2t1-e.~'
Linked to the Centre's move towards advocacy and education was an increased emphasis on thematic programming at the regional level. while reducing the number of direct gants to organizations at the country level. As the Centre noted in an intemal document, "the themes provide us with a valuable vantage point for involvement in major problematic areas which transcend the context of individual core co~ntries".~~Women's rights have ken a priority area of interest for the Centre from the outset, and particularly in the wake of the victories achieved for wornen's rights at the Vienna Conference in
Iune 1993. One such victory was the appointment by the mCHR of a Special
Rapporteur on violence against women; in July 1994 ICHRDD organized an "NGO
-
65 ICHRDD Annual Report 1997-1998.8. 66 ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, November 4.5. and 6, 1994.34. CIDA's influence on ICHRDD is described in greater detail later in this chapter. and in chapter five. f 997 and Beyond, 17. expert meeting" in Montreal to discuss the mandate and recommend strategies and priorities.69
Trade and human rights, particularly the necessity of a social clause in the World
Trade Organization (WTO), was another thematic topic on which the Centre focussed its efforts." Along similar lines, in February 1996 the Centre. in collaboration with the
BCNI. organized an unprecedented day-long seminar in which CEOs mingled with rights activists, academics. the media and representatives from DFAIT. To no one's surprise. the conference failed to produce any breakthroughs, though the exchange of viewpoints was welcomed by conference delegates."
Offïcials from both govemment and non-govemment sectors have noted that perhaps the most useful activity the Centre perfom are the democratic development studies it undertakes of its core c~untries.'~These studies are undertaken by two researchers, using a set of rights indicators developed by the Centre as an analytic framework." This theoretical framework rests on the key assumption that democratic development can only be ensured in the long term by a vibrant civil society. The
Centre's framework lists three important characteristics of a democratic civil society:
"civil associations are politically independent of the state; a culture of tolerance and dialogue prevails; al1 adult men and women have equal political rights, arnong them, the
69 Jan Bauer. Reoort of the NGO Exmrt me et in^ on the Mandate of the Special Raoprteur on Violence Against Women. its Causes and Conseauences (Montreal: ICHRDD. 1994). 'O Ed Broadbent. 'Why to keep China out of the WTO:' Globe ond Mail. December 30, 1994. A 17. 71 Summary Report on Globalization. Trade and Human Rights: The Canadian Business Perspective (Montreal: ICHRDD. 1996). Interviews in Ottawa. May 1998. See also chapter five, 1 1 1. for information on how CIDA makes use of these studies. " The most recent formulation is by Nancy Thede. et al.. The Democratic Development Eirercise: Temof Reference and Analytic Framework, (Monireal: ICHRDD, 1996). right to choose and reject their governors*'.74 The framework continues to adhere to the
Centre's earlier established premise, that "fuil respect for the entire body of human rights is a necessary [but not sufficient] condition of a fully functioning dernocra~~".~~
Nancy Thede noted that it is fairly easy to programme around human rights but much more difficult to programme around democratic development. While the Centre has an interesting conceptual grasp on the idea of what democratic development is, the challenge lies in designing concrete initiative^.^^ As the Centre's 1994- 1995 Annual
Report notes, the study produced by the researchers is only a departure point.
The resulting report is a tool for the Centre's own activities and provides the basis for a two-day workshop in the country in question. Government officiais, opposition parties, key NGOs, academics, media and international donon are invited to the workshop which is usuaily CO-sponsoredby the Centre and one or two local organizations. The main objective of the workshop is to hold discussions to assess and complement the results and recommendations of the report and determine key priorities for supporting democratic devel~~rnent.~~
To date, such studies have been completed on Kenya, El Salvador. Thailand. Guatemala.
Tanzania Peru and ~akistan.'~
Both intellectually and practically, the democratic development studies have much to commend them. Intellectually, in cornparison to another common barorneter of development, the UN'S Human Development Index (HDI). the Centre's methodology is not concemed with ranking or numbering societies, which gives the studies a higher degree of cultural sensitivity. Further, the HDI tends to try to de-politicize its rankings - to eliminate the question of how power is distnbuted within a particular country.
74 ibid, 5. '' Ibid, 6. '' Interview with Nancy Thede, Montreal. May 20. 1998. ICHRDD Annuni Repon 1994- 1995, 15. '' I~CHRDDAnnuai Repon 1997- 1998.3. ICHRDD's studies, noted Thede, "attempt to address that [power] as a fundamental
aspect of the dynarnic of rights and derno~rac~".'~Practically, the studies benefit the
Centre in that they serve to underscore its unique role as a bridge-builder between state and society. They have also served to create linkages within the Centre's mandate, by drawing together the programming, advocac y and publication dimensions in the Centre's work, making the themutually re-enforcing and complernentary and reducing stress on the Centre's resources.
The increased emphasis on thematic work and country studies led to a much greater volume of publications between June 1993 and September 1996, though as a percentage of expenditures publishing remained relatively modest. Publishing moved from being an effort of its own, with little extemal momentum, to a natural output of the thinking, criticism and advocacy of the Centre's day-to-day activities. Unlike the fmt three pieces in the essay series, the subsequent three al1 drew from one or another of the
Centre's themes: women's rights, trade and nghts, and indigenous people's rights.80
Further, the Centre began a new occasionai papen series, which were put out as mimeographs to reduce costs, and began two additional newsietters, one on women in conflict situations and one on impunity.
In June of 1996 the Centre established a site on the World Wide Web, which is maintained by the staff of ICHRDD's documentation centre." What the site lacks in style, it makes up for in easily accessible. easily downloadable substance in both official
79 Interview with Nancy Thede, Montreal, May 20, 1998. ao These are: Christine Elwell, Human Ri~hts.Labour Standards and the New World Trade Oryanization: O~oortunitiesfor a Linkaee, (Montreal: ICHRDD, 1995); Jan Bauer, Onlv Silence Will Protect You: Women. Freedom of Ex~ressionand the Laneua~eof Human Riahts, (Montreal: ICHRDD,1996); B. Denis Marantz and Maivan Clech, Peo~leor Peo~les:Eaualitv. Autonomv and Self-Detemination: The Issues at Stake of the International Decade of the World's Indbenous Peo~le,(Montreal: ICHRDD, 1996). The URL is cwww.ichrdd.ca.> languages. The site contains Links to press releases of recent months, to sumrnaries of
new Centre publications, and provides information on current advocacy initiatives.
Electronic access to Centre information is clearly one matu be prioritized in yean
ahead, particularly if ICHRDD continues to emphasize education and advocacy as vital
parts of its work.
The period of June 1993-September 1996 was a busy and productive one for the
Centre. It was also a period of transformation, as strategy was redefined on severai
separate occasions. The Centre shifted away from a near-exclusive focus on country
funding, emphasizing its education and advocacy roles to a greater degree. Of course, direct support to rights organizations in its core countries was still important. as were its highly-regarded democratic development studies. However, advocacy lent itself more to work around themes than around specific countries, and created a fusion in ICHRDD's work. By mid-1996 a transition at the Centre was signalled with the expiration of the term of Chair of the Board Gisèle Côté-Harper, and the resignation of Broadbent, to that point the only President, who left to take up an academic position at Oxford.
September 1996 - present
Despite Broadbent giving numerous months' notice of his departure from the
Presidency, the govemment was not prepared to appoint a new President in mid-
September. The new Chair, Maureen O'Neil, was appointed by the Board as interim
President for 90 days effective September 15", and a subsequent Order in Council extended her appointment for an unspecified period. O'Neii almost immediately launched a thorough review of the Centre's mandate, which she termed a "stock taking". The idea was to utilise the interim period between permanent Presidents to reflect on the
Centre's mandate and orientation, and to examine environmental changes since the
Centre's founding in order to help it re-shape its priorities and strategic objectives.
Thus over the 1st few months of 1996 and in to early 1997, ICHRDD underwent
a thorough diagnosis. both intemaily and with the aid of extemai evaluators. The 1996-
1997 Annual Report acknowledges that this resulted in a siowing of activities:
During a series of about 25 meetings the entire staff reflected on what we had done in the past and how we could set priorities for the many competing demands on our limited resources. We cancelled trips, postponed events, deïayed publications and declined to participate in many events in which we normally would have been involved."
The resulting strategy document, 1997 and Beyond, provided a synthesis of what had
corne out of these sessions. It was then subject to critique by outside experts in a series
of round-tables chaired by an extemal eval~ator.~~
According to O'Neil, the biggest challenge facing the Centre was the greatly
increased CIDA funding of human rights and democratic deveiopment projects, a concem shared by the Centre's staff in an interna1 document:
Given the quantity of the resources devoted by CIDA and numerous other players to the support of rights and democratization, and their willingness to get invoked where six years ago they would not have dared to venture, it is imperative that the International Centre carefuiiy position its resources where they will have the greatest impact?
The Centre was in need of a new niche if it was to flourish. For O'Neil, the logical step was to move away fkom areas CIDA had rnoved into.'' This was to mean a deparhm from country-based programrning to programming based largely around themes. In tum.
------ICHRDD Amui Repon 1W6- 1997.4. " Paul A. Turcot, 'Synthesis Repon of the December 1996 Roundtables on the IODDocument 1997 and Beyond*," Mimeo, January 1997. " 1997 anti Beyond*4. this would result an increased emphasis on research and publication. Interviews with staff members revealed uncertainty as to whether this would have meant abandoning country prograrnrning altogether. O'Neil insisted it would not, though the thematic orientation would determine work at the country-leveLa6 In a report to the Board of
Directon, O'Neil argued her case by drawing upon recommendations from extemal consultants:
A clear conclusion from the extemal consultations and iess clear from Our interna1 discussions was that the focus of our work should be thematic and we should abandon the concept of working in partnership with such a large number of countries. It is not possible to attempt to do so many country-based programs with a budget and staff the size of ours."
The Board resolution in January of 1997 endorsed OTNeilTsproposais, and "agreed that the Centre would re-orient its prograrnming to focus on themes as opposed to core
The interim President's decision to move away from core countries divided the staff at the Centre, who thought of themselves as activists fint and intellectuals second.89
Many were not pleased by the prospect of this hierarchy being reversed, which would have been the inevitable outcome of focussing exclusively on broad issues and not on country-specific problems. The fate of the democratic development studies on core counuies, with which the Centre was becorning increasingly associated, was also a con~em.~Internai discord was further fuelled by the ongoing rift in staff-management
85 Interview with Maureen O'NeiI, Ottawa, May 22, 1998. 86 Interviews in Montreal and Ottawa, May 1998. AIso O'Neil's "Report from the President", tabled at the January 1997 Board meeting. " O'Neil, "'Report from the Resident.," 2. ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, January 24 and 25, 1997, 1 1 . 89 Interviews in Montreal, May 1998. l997and Beyond, 21. relations, and by the announcement of an impending 8% reduction in the Centre's
operating grant for 1997- 2 998.
However, O'Neil's change in direction was put on hold with the appointment of
new President Warren Allmand. He assumed off~ceon February 15, 1997. In March
1997 Ailmand requested and received permission from the Board to review O'Neil's
changes, which were already in the process of king implemented at the working level.
At the fa11 session of the Board "it was agreed that the Centre would continue with existing core countries and themes.. .rr9 1 In AUmand's view, it is unwise for the Centre to pursue themes exclusively, which are more abstract than state entities: "My feeling was that human rights issues aise in certain countries.. .when you are dealing with a country, you can hold Idi Amin or Pol Pot or Kabila responsible.. .you deal with the totality of the human rights violations with the system in the ~ountry".~'He did agree with O'Neil that thematic work deserved more prominence. and thus decided to work around the agreed- upon themes within core countries. This was reflected in the new staff structure designed under his leadership.93
The dramatic shifi envisaged by O'Neil was thus beaten back, with a paradoxical effect. as emphasized by this staff member:
The good side of the new approach is that everybody's happy. The problematic side is that the reason that Maureen [O'Neill undertook that to start with was because al1 of us realized we were too thidy spread. that something had to give.. .and now we're back in a situation where we're doing everythmg.. .with fewer
'' ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, March 21 and 22, 1997, 15. and October 3 1 and November 1. l997.2l. Interview with Warren Ailmand. Montd, May 20. 1998. * ibid. Interview in Montreal, May 1998. The drarnatic 12 months between the fa11 of 1996 and the fa11 of 1997 thus provided many
distractions hmthe work at hand. One employee noted that throughout the review
period in the fall of 1996. "we were practically at a stand-still because of al1 the intemal
bi~kenn~".~'Another employee noted of the process: "It was very problematic to go
through a re-thinking of Our mandate when we didn't know who the Leader was going to
be, and that is the government's fault. They took a year to name a new person, and that's
In spite of the probiems the Centre faced during this period, 1997 proved a
remarkably effective year for ICHRDD. Its hallmark was an ongoing campaign on
human nghts in the APEC region, which culminatecl in the Centre's involvement in the
"people's summit," which coincided with the APEC heads of govemment meeting in
Vancouver in ~overnber." Alongside the APEC effort came two very original
publications in the sarne issue area written by Craig Forcese of the Canadian Lawyers
Association for International Human Rights (CLAIHR). Commerce with Conscience?
examines the idea of corporate codes of conduct, and Putting Conscience into Commerce:
Strateeries for Makine Human Riehts Business As Usual suggests strategies and policy
options. Emphasizing the growing currency of the issue. Forcese notes that
the systematic violation of fundamental human rights, and in particular the rights of worken, presents a severe threat to the long-term viability of the global market place and to peaceful and democratic societies where people share in the weaith that is generated by the much-touted globalization process.98
The broad readership for such publications, which includes NGOs, rights
'' Inte~ewin MonW. May 1998. % Interview in Montreai. May 1998. P7 ICHRDD Annuul Reporr 1997- 1998.6-7. 98 Forcese, Commerce With Conscience?, 8. activists, university students. consumers, acadernics and CEOs, should help in promoting not only the praiseworthy goals of the publications, but the profile of the Centre toaW
Together. they represent work which puts the Centre on the leading edge of both research and advocacy. l"
Re-establishing some semblance of civil society in Rwanda (and more broadly, the Great Lakes Region of Afnca) has also been a prominent focus of ICHRDDTsefforts since mid- 1996. In January of 1997 the Centre CO-ordinateda "Conference in Support of
Democratic Opportunities in the Afncan Great Lakes Region" in Montreal, which was attended by African NGOs and three UN special rapporteurs on human rights in the Great
Lakes region.l0' In 1998, the Centre tumed its advocacy efforts on rights violations in the former Zaire, calling for an independent inve~tigation.'~~
Such efforts complemented the Centre's work on the thematic issue of impunity
(particularly within Africa). In addition to campaigning for an Independent Criminal
Court (ICC) with teeth, the Centre added an impressive seventh edition to its essay series.
Entitled Carnpaign Against Impunitv: Portrait and Plan of Action, contributions to this thick volume corne from a breadth of geographic and thematic areas. The volume comprises an appropriate balance between the "portrait" and the "plan of action". in one essay, a Rwandan judge, Francois-Xavier Nsanzuwera, outlines the means employed by the Rwandan state in facilitating a culture of impunity. He quotes from an international inquiry which found that
99 Paul Knox, "Publicize ethical firms, report recommends," Globe and Mail, Decernber 16, 1997, A 13. 100 Interview with NGO officiai, Ottawa May 1998. 'O1 ICHRDD Annual Report 1996-1997.2 1. 102 ICHRDD Press Releases, "Actsof Genocide Committed in Congo-Kinshasha" (June 19, 1998) and "Acts of Genocide in Congo-Kinshasha: Investigation Urgently Needed" (July 16, 1998).
He also details his own personal experiences of king subject to control by administrative officers appointed by the executive. and how they interfered in the ability of officiais to conduct investigations (refusing to execute arrest warrants, for e~arn~le).'~~The Centre's work on the impunity issue has been irnpressive. in large part because ICHRDD has been at the forefront of the debate. using ail three elements of programming. advocacy and education. and publications to press the issue. It is an excellent example of how advocacy work can multipiy.
In early 1998 ICHRDD re-assessed its countries of concentration. It dropped
Eritrea and El Salvador. and in their places added Nigeria and Ind~nesia.'~'The new choices certainly indicate a willingness to become further involved in areas undergoing politically-sensitive change and perhaps signal a disposition towards focusing on countries of particular political and econornic salience to Canada. When asked whether the new choices indicated such a tendency, one programme co-ordinator replied, "It hasn't systernatically ken the case that countries have kenchosen on that basis, but that may become an explicit cnteria in the near futurevr .106 The Centre aiso formalized its four themes: women's rights, indigenous rights, globalization and human rights, and
'* Francois-Xavier Nsanzuwera. "Rwanda and the Culture of Impunity: A Penonal Account:' in Camriai~nA~ainst Im~unitv: Portrait and Plan of Action, (Montreal: ICHRDD, 1997)- 155. 'O4 1bid.- '" Libertas 7:3 (Apnl 1998). 7. 'O6 Interview in Montreal. May 1998. democratic development and justice. 'O7 Thematic work, w hich had previousl y corne from advocacy initiatives, was thus elevated ont0 equai footing with COR country programming, and themes and core countries are now interconnected to a considerable degree.
The Centre has also revised the process for its democratic development studies. to make the framework more participatory hstead of two researchers writing a report, followed by a workshop to discuss its findings, the process will begin with two facilitators hosting key NGO partners within a seminar context. They will then generate a report together. A new country study, on Mexico. is due to begin later in 1998.
The 50" annivenary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights presented
ICHRDD with a challenge: how to use the occasion to Merits mandate to educate the
Canadian public. ICHRDD has chosen a campaign in collaboration with the Canadian
Council For Refugees, centred around what it cails human rights "ambassadon": victims of rights abuses abroad who now live in Canada Initidy it proposed having 12 ambassadors in cities across Canada who would tour and speak at cornmunity events ihat would not nomaUy hear about rights abuses.'08 Budgetary constraints have reduced the number of ambassadors to six, and hinding for a publication to accompany the campaign has been eliminated? The success of this campaign is hard to judge yet, though the
Cenue could claùn a srnail victory with a prominent Globe and Mail story in early
March. ' '
-- - lm Liberrps 7:3 (Apnl 1998). 7. 108 T'r~posalfor the Board of Directors: A Popular Education Programme on the 50° Anniversary of the UDHR". 1-D intemal sû-ategy document, 1. '" ICHRDD Board of Directon Minutes. Ftb- 13 and 14. 1998.6. ''O Monique Dull. "A living lesson in human righu." Globe ruid Mail. March 4. 1998. A2. Internal planning for 1998-1999 indicates that ICHRDD is well aware of where it is successful, as well as where it has ken criticized in past - for financial ineptitude, poor internai CO-ordination,and overlap with CIDA. The strategic objectives for the coming year, address these problems directly. ' ' ' The Centre's work since September 1996 demonstrates an awareness of the need for integration and efficiency. It further provides reason to believe that ICHRDD, after eight years of operation, is beginning to hit its stride as an organization which is most effective when working to close gaps between state and society, and when using its thematic and advocacy initiatives to drive its agenda. In effect the international "market" for human rights work has proven more efficient at dictating priorities than when the Centre chose countries and attempted to programme the rest of its initiatives around them.
ICARDD9sEvaluating System: Room For Improvement
While ICHRDD has made noteworthy progress in fulfilling and refining its mandate, it does not have, nor has it ever had, a systematic means of evaluating projects it performs. Ironically, the Centre has invested large sums of money in its evaluation procedures. Approaches to self-evaluation have been random, Bawed, and more often than not of little long-term benefit to any son of institutional leaming process. This problem is exacerbated by two factors. First, it is labour and time consuming to engage in productive institutional leming. This is especiaily true in organizations such as
ICHRDD which are already over-stretched, both financidly and in terms of staff work- load. Il2 Second, and partiy a consequence of king over-worked, staff are far more
"' XHRDD Programme Plan 1998- 1999". Internal strategy document 1-2. '12 Interview in Monmal. May 1998. interested in projects in the pipe-line than in those which have already corne and gone.
This is accentuated in a Iine of work in which priorities. and politicai 'hot spots,' cm
change extremely quickly."3 The result has been an expensive, ineffective and random
evaluation process in which lessons are too often not "learned", but "spumed rr .114
Evaluation procedures were scant in the early years of operation. Given that
ICHRDD was sponsoring work in a large number of countries, limited in-depth
evaluation was possible, because of the cost of such endeavoun. They consisted of little
more than short, two-page assessments of individual projects submitted by the
organizations abroad which had received Centre funds to undertake projects, which were
simply put on file.
In an effort to improve its evaiuation procedures, ICHRDD retained a consultant,
Sterken Consulting Services. The consulting fim was hired not on a project-by-project
basis as required. but for a series of evaluations at a time. ' lS Jack S terken's experience as
the in-house "extemal" evaluator points to the paradox evident in the phraseology: on one
hand, a truly extemal evaluator would have a difficult time understanding the culture of
the institution, which would have to be taken into account in the evaluation procedures; on the other hand, Sterken's ties to the Centre did not afTord enough distance to conduct tmIy impartial evaiuations. ' l6
The Centre has undertaken evaluations of its publications in addition to its programmes. One consultant reviewed the fmt three contributions to the ongoing essay
Il3Interview with NGO official. Ottawa, May 1998. '14 Interview in Montreal, May 1998. '15 ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes. November 5 and 6, 1993.35. The Board also created a sub- committee on evaluations, to act as a link between the Board and the evaluation process. Il6 InteMews in Monmal and Ottawa, May 1998. series in November 1993.Il7 Another undertook an evaluation of the subsequent the
essays in the fa11 of 1996, at the cost of no less than $22,500.'18 One consultant
interviewed regarded the Centre's approach to evaluating itself as scattered, defensive
and reactive, and lacking in clear follow-up procedures."9 However, staff members were
not entirely impressed by the work of the extemal evaluatoa either. One noted the
evaluations tended to be inconsistent: "In cases where they missed the boat, it was
because there wasn't a participatory enough process with the staff. It could have gone
much farther.. .had it gone farther it would have actually helped us integrate the lessons
from the evaluations7, .120
The prospects for a revised, systematized and fonvard-looking evaluation process
did not improve with the decision to elirninate the extemal evaluator as part of the budget
cuts in 1997. At present, the budget ailocates only $40,000, a modest amount compared
to what had previously ken spent on evaluations. Such a budget will allow for evaluation of only one medium-sized project, where previously three or four had been
assessed annually. 12' The task of devising an efficient and cost-effective evaluation
system is the responsibility of the Board of Directors. As the Centre continues to move
in the direction of thematic work, advocacy, and more initiatives on the "knowledge"
(rather than the "action") front, designing such a system must be prioritized.
Conclusion
Il7 See Thomas. "Rcpon of External Consultant on Impact Assessrnent of ICHRDD Essay Series." Il8 ICHRDD Evduation Cornmittee Minutes. Iune 3. 1996.2. Il9 Interview in Ottawa, May 1998. Interview in Montreai, May 1998. 12' Interview in Montreal, May 1998. Mereight years of supporting human rights and democratic development in developing countries, the Centre cm point to many successes, such as the value of its democratic development country studies, the impact of some of its advocacy work, and its unique ability to bring together actors from both govemment and NGOs. This role, as a "bridge-builder," represents the Centre's niche within the field. The research findings presented in this chapter suggest that ICHRDD has also made more of a sustained effort in recent years at ensuring the three of aspects of its work (programming, advocacy and publication ) correlate, when and where possible.
Nonetheless, frequent changes in strategic direction have impaired ICHRDD's ability to develop a long-term institutional vision. Such changes represent a pattern of inadequate decision-making and leadership on behalf of the Centre's Presidents and
Board. As has ken argued in this chapter and in chapter three, ICHRDD's leadership must also assume responsibility for problerns in evaluation procedures, external fundraising and interna1 management. The Centre's recent decision to elevate themes dongside country-prograrnrning renders resources more thinly spread than ever before, at a tirne when any ciramatic raise in the level of ICHRDD's financing is unlikely. CHAPTER m ICRRDD's Re~onsh$with DFAIT and CIDA
"A major object of the Centre is to help reduce the wide gap that sometimes exists between the formal adherence of states to international hurnan rights agreements and the actual human rights practices of those states."
- International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development Act. section 4(2)
As was estabIished in chapter two, ICHRDD is located on the fault-line between government and non-govemment sectors of the human rights debate. This precarious position has some advantages. An exarnple is the high degree of access the Centre has to the Canadian government. This exists particularly at the personal level between the
President of ICHRDD and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, where Ed Broadbent and
Warren Allmand have had far easier access to the foreign policy leadership than have
Canadian NGOs.' There is also a link between the programme staff of the Centre and officiais in two of the major internationally onented departments of the government.
CiDA and DFAIT.
The Centre's creation in the fail of 1988 was apparently cause for concem arnong senior members of the Department of Extemal Main, who felt that an arms-length institution could have the potential to inflict significant ham on Canada's bilateral relations.' According to Ed Broadbent, the Centre "wouldn't have come into being if Joe
Clark hadn't gone against the advice of some people in ~xtemal".~However, the Centre
I Officiais from Foreign Affairs noted that the President of ICHRDD has toplevel security clearance and therefore is privy to the highest levels of information available from DFAIT. 'Gillies. Between Pnnci~leand Practice, 243. and telephone interview with Ed Broadbent. June 1 1. 1998. ' Quoted in Gillies. ~etweenPrinciple and Practice, 243. went hmking perceived as a liability to a definite asset with the rernarkable changes in the international system in the early 1990s. As Canada moved to embrace a broader human security agenda following the collapse of the East-West conflict, the Centre came to be perceived as a useful tool, panicularly by DFAK The Centre was seen as well placed to do politicaily-sensitive work that diplornats or regular aid channels could not.
ICHRDD. however, has not wanted to be relegated to the status of a tool of DFAIT or
CIDA; it has repeatediy and forcefully reminded the govemment of its independence through ongoing foreign policy critiques. In interviews, differences in the perception of
ICHRDD became apparent. Those in government see the Centre as an extension of the bureauctacy, while those at the Centre view themselves as an NGO.
In this chapter ICHRDD's relationship to CIDA and DFAIT is examined. The evidence reveals a clearly syrnbiotic and primarily positive working relationship between the Centre and each of these organizations. It appears that the institutional relationship between DFAIT (in particular, the Global and Human Issues Bureau) and ICHRDD is better established and less subject to strain than that with CIDA. Tensions with CIDA can be attributed to the narrowing gap between the two organizations' areas of responsibility. As CIDA has shifted its aid program to prioritize human rights, democratic development and good govemance, ICHRDD has been faced with a direct challenge to its raison d'être. Such changes have been the major impetus to ICHRDD re- onenting its mandate away from NGO funding and towards advocacy. ICFIRDD9srelationship with CIDA
The President of CIDA has dways ken a member of the Centre's Board of
Directors, in spite of the fact that the drafters of ICHRDDTsstatute chose to ignore a suggestion from the rapporteurs to make the CIDA President an ex oficio member.
While some have interpreted this as a rneans for the govemment to keep a check on the
Centre, officiais at CIDA disagree. Instead. one CTDA official contends, this further highlights the Centre's independence from Ottawa: when the Centre cnticizes the
Canadian govemment, the CLDA president may not agree with the Centre's position. but he or she does not act to stifle itS4 It also provides a conduit through which IODis able to influence the top decision-makers in Hull. For example, Broadbent contended that Marcel Massé, on the ICHRDD Board from 1990-1993 while CIDA President, had his views changed as a result of his involvement with the Centre: he came to recognize the validity of incorporating human rights into the mainstrearn of ODA projects in order to make development efforts more sustainab~e.~
The arrangement should theoreticall y help the two organizations ensure minimal duplication of ser~ices.~CIDA's current President, Huguette Labelle, defended
ICHRDD when it came under criticism on this front from the Standing Cornmittee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 1994.' This seems to confirm the validity of the opinion of one ICHRDD employee, when questioned about the propnety of having the CIDA president sitting on a body designed to develop policy and strategy for the
4 Interview with Jirn Holmes, Hull, May 22, 1998. 'Telephone interview with Ed Broadbent. June 1 1, 1998. Interesthg1 y. both Broadbent and Allmand expressed reservations about maintaining what appears to be an ex ofici0 seat for CIDA's President Broadbent said his original idea was to have CIDA and Foreign Affairs representatives alternate terms, though this has not happened. interview with Jim Holmes, Hull. May 22, 1998. ' See Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 301 (footnote 107). Centre. who remarked: "It's a good dly to have".' At ICHRDD Board meetings, Labelle has been sensitive to the danger of an overly intimate connection between ICHRDD and
CIDA jeopardizing the Centre's indepnden~e.~
There is considerable interfacing between ICHRDD and CIDA. primarily at a working level, between programming staff at the Centre and desk officers in CIDA. The relationship tends to focus on the Centre's core countries or regions, though this is not exclusively the case. CLDA makes extensive use of the dernocratic development studies undertaken by ICHRDD." These studies use a democratic development framework developed by the Centre to assess a particular country, and suggest strategies for action and recommend roies for particular actors. The studies are useful for CIDA in that, while the framework is developed by ICHRDD, the actuai studies and reports tend to be produced by field researchee, at least one of whom is closely tied to the local NGO or academic community of the country in question. This increases the credibility of the studies. Officiais at CIDA. DFAïï and in the NGO community confinned the originaiity, quality, and usefulness of these studies to their research and programming efforts. The consensus is that they are among the most innovative and constructive work the Centre does, and illustrate very nicely the niche of bridge-builder between state and society ICHRDD seeks to occupy. ' '
At the time the Centre began operations in 1990, CTDA was Iittle concerned with human nghts and democratization issues, though it had funded human rights projects as
' Inte~ewin Montreai. May 1998. 9 ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, Febmary 25 and 26, 1994.47. 'O Interview with Jim HoImes, Hull. May 22, 1998. " Interviews in Ottawa and Montreal. May 1998. far back as 1982.'~At the tum of the decade, the Centre's annual $5 million operating
budget represented a considerable percentage of dl Canadian ODA dollars emarked
specifically for human nghts initiatives. This situation changed dramatically as CIDA
began to increase its efforts on human rights initiatives later in the decade. This had a
considerable impact on ICHRDD.
Understanding changes at ICHRDD in recent years requires an understanding of
how CIDA's focus on human rights have expanded within the sarne time period. The
most significant changes include: an increase in funding for human rights activities, the
creation of a Human Rights unit within CIDA's policy branch, and the adoption of a
statement of policy entitled Govemment of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights,
Democratizotion and Good Govemance released in November of 1995. Changes such as these have made CIDA "much more legitimate in the eyes of the development community intemationally," argues ICHRDD's Nancy Thede. l3
The most recent numbers available from CIDA indicate that, on human rights and democratization initiatives, "as many bilaterai projects were approved in 1995/ 1996 as during the previous two years, and more than in the ten years prior to that 91. 14 b' In
199511996, ClDA disbursed $47.1 million on project initiatives that directly addressed human rights and dem~crac~*'.'~This. however, is only part of the picture; realistically. close to twice this amount is now disbursed ann~all~.'~It should be noted that this
Gillies, Between Pnnci~leand Practice, 246. Interview with Nancy Thede, MontreaI. May 20, 1998. CiDA S Support for Human Rights and Democratiration f995196 (Hull: CIDA, 1 997). ii, 1 am indebted Jim HoImes at CIDA for rnaking this information available. ibid. 16 The official numbers are comparatively modest because they do not inchde projects aimed at economic, social or cultural rights, nor do they include projects in which rights or democratization are secondary objectives. funding is increasingly concentrated on civil society organizations, which had been the
initial beneficiaries of ICHRDD funding." The major cuts in CIDA's overall budget
during these years make the growth in hinding for human rights and democratization
projects dl the more remarkable.
To help coordinate funding initiatives, CIDA added a Human Rights division to
its Policy Branch. The idea was to increase coherence, though projects still remain
funded directiy through country desks. In essence. the division acts as an umbrella to
help coordinate and oversee CIDA's new emphasis. Also underpinning this increasing
emphasis on human nghts projects was the govemment's 1995 policy statement,
Govemrnent of Canada Policy for CIDA on Hwnan Rights, Democrutization and Good
Govemance. It sought to integrate CIDA'S aid program into the three objectives of
Canadian foreign policy, as outlined in Canada in the World. These are the promotion of
prospenty, protection of secunty within a stable global frarnework, and democracy and
the mle of law.I8 The CIDA-directed document calls for an increased emphasis on policy coherence, "working with provincial govemments and other agencies in the public sector,
including the International Centre for Human Rights and Dernocratic Development.. .9, .19
With CIDA's new-found emphasis on human nghts, democratization and good govemance, ICHRDD is eligible to apply for CIDA funds for specific projects.
However, this has raised concems within the Centre concerning its proper role. There
has ken unease over becorning an executing (or delivering) agency for CIDA projects.
17 The sarne report puts the level of CIDA funding for civil society organizations at 67%-compared to only 23 % for govemment institutions and 10% for inter-governmental organizations. 18 Canada in the Worid (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1995)- 1. l9Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights. Democratizarion and Good Governance (Hull: CIDA, 1995). 6. As Marie-France Cloutier, ICHRDDTsfinanciai comptroller put it,
we could bid for that money. Except when you take that money you are a delivering agency, and we donTtwant to be a delivenng agency for CIDA, that's not Our role. We donTtmind taking money from CIDA, but it has to be what we decide to do. not what they tell us to do."
This has not, however, resulted in the Centre's cornpiete abstention from using CIDA funds. For example, ICHRDD and CIDA are currently collaborating on a project in support of the Guatemala peace accords. where ICHRDD has used money from CIDA to help with the integration of indigenous peoples into the mainstream of Guatemalan society. The Centre's most ment Annual Report also reveals that ICHRDD received
CIDA fùnds to help fùnd opposition to the Abacha regime in ~i~eria."As these examples illustrates, the Centre is still willing to accept CIDA funds, provided the project falls within the Centre's normal purview.
As CIDA's focus changed, the Centre faced an existential crisis: unable to compte with its much better-funded sibling rival in Hull, its vulnerability as an organization without a clear niche was particularly apparent in a domestic climate of fiscal restraint. This reorientation of CIDA efforts brought ICHRDD under fire from critics who pointed out that, with these changes at CIDA, ICHRDD seemed somewhat superfluous. As pointed out in chapter four, intenm ICHRDD President Maureen OTNeil
(September 1996-Febniary 1997) responded to these developments by launching a wholesale review of KHRDD's mandate during her brief stint as the Centre's head.
OTNeilattempted to re-orient the Centre by bringing it up to speed with the changes occumng at CIDA, and by rnoving away from an emphasis on country prograrnming to
Inte~ewwith Marie-France Cloutier. Montreal. May 14, 1998. ICHRDD Annual Repon 1997- 1998.22. one based on thematic programming. Now President of the IDRC in Ottawa. O'Neil explained her reasoning as follows:
From my perspective, when the Canadian govemment goes from allocating a very tiny amount of money in its regular development prograrn to human rights to the considerable arnount now, the agency that was originaiiy created to do that kind of thing has to look at what it's doing. It's not logical just to assume that it can continue doing whatever it does in isolation fiorn CIDA?
The wholesale changes O'Neil iniroduced were partially rescinded under Allmand in
mid-1997, however. who decided to maintain programming on a regional basis while still according greater attention to themes.
While CIDA has displaced ICHRDD to a considerable extent in king the major
Canadian funder of NGOs in developing countries, there rernain three fundamental ciifferences in what the two institutions can do. These justify ICHRDD continuing its funding of Southem NGOs. They also [end credence to the oft-heard argument that the two agencies cm be collaborative rather than cornpetitive?
First, CIDA is restricted to working where they are permitted to do so by the host country, a stncture which ICHRDD-funded NGOs do not face. Second, in general it is government policy for CIDA to work with the govemment of the day, regardless of how repressive the regime may be (though, of course, the Canadian government has the option of terminahg bilateral aid to the most repressive of regimes, as it has with ~urma);'~
ICHRDD, however, is under no such obligation, and has funded numerous political opposition groups, including Burma's democraticallyelected govemment-in-exile.
* Interview with Maureen O'Neil, Ottawa, May 22, 1998. A familiar refrain with officials at both KHRDD and at CIDA. Interviews. May 1998. " Government of Cana& Policy for CIDA on Humun Rights, Dernmocratirarion and Go& Covernunce, 8. Finaily, recipients of CIDA fun& abroad are not permitted to use those fun& to engage in advocacy (i.e. governent lobbying). Again, ICHRDD's funds come with no such restraint. Clearly, these differences stem hmthe Centre's independence fkom government, and indicate that ICHRDD retains certain "comparative advantages" over
CIDA even today. Though the new international environment allows CIDA to engage in projects they once never would drearned of. there is stiil a need for an organization such as ICHRDD to work on the most poiitically-sensitive cases.
These thRe distinctions highlight the point that there remain differences in the operational goals of CIDA and ICHRDD, and that overlap does not occur to the extent critics charge. As CIDA official Jim Holmes argued,
We like to think there's not so much overlap as complementarïty. We dl operate under a general mandate, but each organization has a specific niche. And they do things that we don? do. The sum of those increases the impact of what we're doing?
Differing approaches to rights work in Peru illustrate how divergent the approaches of the two organizations can be. CIDA has worked on children's rïghts - a relatively uncontroversial field. ICHRDD, however, has funded organizations which are very critical of the Fujimori regime, and NGOs which aid victirns of state violence.26
In defending against charges of overlap and duplication, though, the Centre may eventuaily be forced to hrther reduce, or abandon altogether, direct funding, which could have unfoxtunate consequences for sectors and groups which fa11 beyond CJDA's ambit.
How important a lobbyist the Centre was in pushing the Canadian govemment to incorporate human nghts into CIDA'S mainstream remains an open question.
Interview with Jim Holmes. Hull, May 22. 1998. intmiew with Nancy Thede. Monmal. May 20,1998. Establishing a direct causal link between the Centre's lobbying and the Canadian
govemment's increased emphasis on human nghts and democratization in its aid program
is nearly impossible. in interviews, the consensus opinion was that ICHRDD's role was
marginal; that ultimately on its lirnited budget it has not prioritized lobbying of the
Canadian government, and probably is no more effective a lobbyist than any other
Canadian NGO. Instead, interlocutors concurred that broader trends at work in the
international system are more likely responsible for the change in government policy.
CTDA's Holmes, however, adds: "1 think the Centre has played a signifm.int role in
helping keep the issues front and centre. I don? think they would have the same
prominence if not for the Centre's efforts"."
ICBRDD's relationship with DFAIT
From the outset of the Centre's creation, the Canadian government was aware that an independent institution with a mandate to focus on work that falls beyond the niche of the diplornatic corps could create problerns for the govemment. This was a calculated risk.
The perceived benefit was that the Centre could operate in areas beyond the pale of what was officially sanctioned. As one government official put it, "having the Centre there as an arrns-length organization gives Canada an ability to address issues, perhaps have a greater impact, than addressing those issues at a more officia1 level".'*
In its fint year of operation, ICHRDD retained an Ottawa liaison, who coordinated and facilitated exchanges between DFAIT, CIDA and the Centre. The position was recognized as superfluous within a year, as it soon becarne apparent that it
Interview with Jim Holmes. Hull. May 22. 1998. " Interview in Ottawa May 1998. made more sense to have the relevant parties communicate directly with one another, rather han through a third ICHRDD's programme coordinators now directiy consult their counterparts at DFAIT country desks on issues of mutuai interest or concem.
As in its relationship with CIDA, ICHRDD occasionally receives additionai funding from DFAIT to conduct specific projects. One of the earfiest examples of this was the $200,732 the Centre received between 1990- 1992 to coordinate projects for the newly democratizing countries of Eastern ~uro&' The projects undertaken included raising awareness of discrimination against Gypsies in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a project in Poland on municipal dernocrati~ation.~'However, the high degree of coordination required between the Centre and External Aff'rsquickly created tension. and the Centre declined to take on future projects of this nature. As one ICHRDD official put it, "they [Extemal Affain] were too hands on".32
Collaborative failures in Eastern Europe did not stop the Centre from trying to persuade Foreign Affain to adopt ICHRDD's evaluative framework for democratic development. This did not met with success, either. Diana Bronson. ICHRDD's
Globalization Coordinator, explained the effort:
The original idea behind the democratic development frarnework was to have CIDA, IDRC, and Foreign Af'fairs ail adopt Our democratic development framework which identifies pnonties for funding democracy.. .but donor organizations are very temtorial about adopting someone else's framework, no matter how good it is.33
" Interview with Diana Bronson, Montreai. May 15. 1998. " Because its funding cornes directly from ODA funds. the Centre is only pennitted to use its regular budget to undenake projects in developing countries. In order to work in other countries, such as those in Eastern Europe, the Centre must raise funds fiom other sources. 3 1 Libertas 1:2 (March 1991). 3. '' Interview in Montreal. May 1998. 33 Interview with Diana Bronson. Montreal. May 15. 1998. It was probably naïve of KHRDD to think that they could get al! these organizations, with their diverse concems and interests, onto the same page. let alone one the Centre defined unilaterally. The govemment has repeatedly rejected recomrnendations from its own parliarnentary cornmittees to systematize and institutionalize human rights evaluations, and there was little reason to believe something sirnilar could be achieved with a democratic development framework, for much the same reasons the govemment frequently cites: potentiai injuries to bilateral relations, and a lack of flexibility for policy makers. Adèle Dion. head of the Human Rights Division at the Global and Human Issues
Bureau of DFAIT, expressed just such a sentiment in explaining Foreign Affairs' rejection of the bework:
From Our perspective, the cnteria were simply too narrow. They might work well for the Centre which is a smail organization with a fairly narrow mandate, but they were not transferable to broader foreig. policy developments. There were .. .critical factors.. .that were not taken into consideration by the criteria.
These setbacks do not, however, negate what officiais at both ICHRDD and DFAIT confm as a positive day-to-day working relationship. both at the Pearson building and at
Canadian embassies and missions abroad.
As with the ICHRDD-CIDA relationship, the extent to which there is contact between programming staff at the Centre and desk officers at DFAIT depends upon a series of contingencies: the personnel involved, the nature of the file, and the distance between the two organizations with respect to their positions on the issue. Again akin to
CIDA, one of the most effective areas of the Centre's work is with consultative groups, in
Interview with Adèle Dion. Ottawa, May 2 1, 1998. which DFAIT officiais usually participate. The Centre organizes these 'policy dialogue'
groups, which are comprised of key govemment and non-govemment players, and which
meet three or four times a year to discuss strategies to advance rights and
democratization. Maureen O'Neil rernarked that "in those areas where there have been
special mechanisms set-up [i-e., consultative groups] .. . there are very close relations"
between ICHRDD and DFAIT? Geographical areas of close co-operation have included
the Americas, paaicularly Guatemala, and the Great Lakes region of Afnca (Rwanda,
Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire). Thematically, there are also close and effective links between
ICHRDD and Foreign Affairs on Women's Rights issues.
The latter is an issue-area on which ICHRDD and the Canadian governrnent take sirnilar positions. Both are working toward the dual goals of integrating women's rights into the UN system, and elirninating violence against women. The women's rights issue area is recognized as being perhaps the most mutually beneficial working relationship that exists between Foreign Affairs and the Centre. Kinten Mlacak, DFAlT's
International Women's Rights coordinator in the Human Rights Division. was adamant in her recognition of ICHRDD as "absolutely indispensable". Mlacak cited the two very different constituencies to which the organizations orient themselves. and the ability to bring them together to talk constructively, as the pnmary benefit of the relationship:
1 simply do not have that [NGO] network, nor do 1 have the time to maintain it. It's also extremely important for me to know.. .what we rnight be proposing has feasibility from an officia1 perspective, but will also have credibility in the non- official perspective.. .the fact thai 1cm share ideas through an NGO intedocutor and get a sense of whether those.. .reflect the kinds of priorities that are being developed in that group of stakeholders is extremely important for me to develop credible strategies.j6
35 Interview with Maureen O'Neil. Ottawa, May 22, 1998. Interview with Kirsten Mlacak, Ottawa, May 2 1, 1998. She dso cited the cornfort and confidence between herself and ICHRDDTswomen's
nghts coordinator, Ariane Brunet, as integral to the smooth functioning of the
institutional dialogue. ICHRDD's unique ability to bring together the official and the
non-official sectors clearly plays to the organization's strength - perhaps nowhere more
than on this issue is it in evidence.
The positive nature of the inter-organizational relationship is also evident in the
high level of CO-ordinationand CO-operationbetween ICHRDD and Canadian representatives abroad. Interviews at ICHRDD revealed an appreciation for the respect offered the Centre by Canadian embassies, including the high calibre of treatment the
Centre receives while abroad. In an era in which the Canadian govemment has strongly pushed trade and commerce and accorded relaiively less importance to international human rights, this may seem somewhat surprising. ICHRDD's Diana Bronson described the relationship as "a collaborative link. I'd say we probably get treatment that is sirnilar to a Canadian invest~r".~~
The ties between the Centre and Canadian representatives abroad are multi- faceted. Al1 ernbassies receive copies of the Centre's quarterly newsletter, Libertas, as well as its Annual Report. The Centre maintains high-level contacts with most embassies abroad. but not with al1 due to constraints on resour~es.~~It is not unusual for embassies to approach the Centre requesting contacts in the NGO orbit. As uis Almeida .
ICHRDDTsDirector of Programmes, notes, "we have bi-annual briefings with the heads of missions when they are in Ottawa. We tell them the new things. ..the key democracy
37 Interview with Diana Bronson, Monireai. May 15, 1998. 38 Interview with fris Almeida, MonW, May 19, 1998. challenges.. .the human rights challenges.. .what we would expect in terms of our collaboration and dialogue". 39
Staff of the Centre take fiequent trips abroad to examine first-hand projects they fund from Montreai, or to participate in conferences and seminars. The Canadian embassy is usually the first stop. Upon arrivai. staff are provided with an oral briefing from the embassy's politicai officers on the current political situation in the partÏcular country, which complements the briefings provided by DFAïï prior to departure. The embassy also undertakes much of the logistical work: providing cars. arranging hotels. hosting receptions, and sometimes even arranging meetings with govemment officiais, though the Centre always makes its own arrangements for non-govemment actors with whom they wish to meet. In order to ailay confusion, Broadbent was often accompanied
(at his request) by the Canadian ambassador on trips to meet with govemment officials.
The ambassador would ensure there was no confusion as to who represented the
Canadian governrnent, and who represented an independent rights ~r~anization.~
Almeida further notes that "in certain cases the access to the govemment leaders is also limited for the embassy. And sometimes occasions of our visits there opens doon for them. So it has ken mutually benefi~ial".~'
There have been cases in which ICHRDD has lobbied successfully to induce
Foreign Affairs to take steps they probably would not otherwise have taken. The most recent of these concemed the Indonesian trade unionist Muchtar Pakpahan. Pakpahan. head of the Indonesian Welfare Union (SBSI in Indonesian), had been jailed for "inciting
39 Ibid. "Telephone interview with Clovis Demers. Iune 25. 1998. 4' Interview with Iris Almeida, Montreal, May 19. 1998. nots," though his detention actually stemmed from his outspoken cnticisms of the
Indonesian regime. The Centre had ken waging a campaign for his nlease, which included a pst-card campaign directed towards both Lloyd Axworthy and Indonesian
President Suharto. At the 1997 Vancouver APEC surnmit, the Centre succeeded in getting agreement from Foreign Affairs to send two Canadian doctors to attend to
Pakpahan, whose condition had been deteriorating and required specidized medical attention unavailable in Indonesia. The Canadian embassy also agreed to recommence their financing of the SBSI, which had been done through the Canada ~und.42and to send two observers to Pakpahan's ICHRDD's campaign to fiee Pakpahan ultimately met with success: he was released on May 25, 1998, following the resignation of Suharto.
This achievement and other modest accompiishments, however, have been kept in proportion by the Centre's staff, who expressed a tempered optimism regarding their ability to act as an intemal lobby on DFAIT. Almeida. for one. noted: "1 think we're doing a very modest job. We cannot pretend to be over-excited. It's a very tough battle"? She noted the difficulty in mobilizing political will for preventative action, and pointed to the Canadian government's inaction (general displeasure, in kt)when Centre personnel retumed from a 1993 trip to Rwanda and presented a report observing acts of genocide. Others at the Centre were even more skeptical: "1 donTtsee any direct evidence of our approach having significantly influenced the Policy Unit at CIDA or the
Global Issues Bureau at DFAIT?
The Centre's international orientation dominates its mandate, and in the early
" The Canada Fund is a small envelope of funds available to be dispersed by Canadian ernbassies abroad. " Interview with Diana Bmnson. Montreal. May 15. 1998. a Interview with Iris Almeida, Montreal, May 19, 1998. " Interview in Montreal. May 1998. years aimost dl effort was expended on funding NGOs in developing countries. Now,
however, as its efforts shift towards advocacy, the Centre is likely to channel more of its
energies toward the lobbying of governments, Canada's in particular. One of the
strengths of an organization like ICHRDD is that it can fund other NGOs, creating a
multiplier effect by making them more effective lobbyists and publicists. Some Ottawa
NGO insiders are even of the opinion that there is a sense of hstration within the Human
Rights Division in the Pearson building at ICHRDD's inability to lobby Foreign Affairs
more effectively, though officiais within the Division deny this. ICHRDD's
ineffectiveness may be a result partiaily of the down-playing of this part of its mandate,
and partially of organizational and structurai problems within the Centre. One well-
placed NGO officiai noted: "1 think there's a bit of disappointment.. .This is an area
[human nghts] where the Canadian government wants to see progress".u
Conclusion
There is working link between ICHRDD and both CIDA and DFAIT. Changes at
CIDA in recent yean have presented the Centre with a strong challenge to its raison d'être, and the Centre has respoaded by shifting its niche away from âirect funding to advocacy. Officiais at both CIDA and ICHRDD maintain that they are working together to ensure a minimum of duplication, and Aiimand and Labelle have been asked by the
Board to prepare a position paper on the nature of the relationship between the two
~r~anizations.~~On certain projects, ICHRDD still accepts direct funding from CIDA. as with its recent work in Guatemala and Nigeria Both Foreign Affairs and CIDA give the
* Interview in Ottawa May 1998. " ICHRDD Board of Directors Minutes, February 13 and 14. 1998.9. Centre its highest marks for its role as a bridge-builder between the government and non-
govemment secton, achieved through ICHRDD-led consultative groups and democratic
development forums.
Despite sorne early problems in their initial relationship over projects in Eastern
Europe. the relationship between DFAIT and ICHRDD is aiso a productive and mutually
enlightening one. There is a high degree of information shared at the practical level; as
has ken demonstrated. the link is strongest on issues pertaining to women's rights,
where DFAIT and ICHRDD see almost eye-to-eye. The Centre also makes effective and
consistent use of Canadian embassies abroad. While officiais at the Global and Human
Issues Branch of DFAIT insist ICHRDD is an effective lobbyist, other Ottawa insiders
contend that the Centre has not pressed Foreign Affain to the degree it could.
If there is one significant fissure between ICHRDD and its government partners,
it lies in their differing perception of the Centre's independence. On the one hand staff
at ICHRDD place themselves in the NGO category, and see links with CIDA and DFAIT
as purely functional. The architects of the Centre probably would not have foreseen such
a vociferous feeling of independence in an organization designed to do work diplomats
could not. On the other hand, officiais in Ottawa and Hull perceive the Centre as littie
more than an off-shoot of the Canadian government whose actions ultimately serve
foreign policy or development assistance goals.48 This is even affied in CIDA's policy
statement, where ICHRDD is referred to as a partner in the "public se~tor.'"'~Staff
members at ICHRDD are understandably sensitive to what they perceive as a potentiaily
48 The Centre's mention on the "Canadian values" page (34) of Canada in the World is an exarnple of this perceived linkage with the government. It should be recailed that, in fact, ICHRDD's mandate is defined b universal rather than specificaily 'Canadian' values. 4'Governmenr of Cm& Policy for CIDA on Human Righrs. Demoeratùation anà Good Governiutce. 6. serious misunderstanding, and combat it when and where possible. They also noie that the independence issue is better undentwd at the Ministerial level than within the bureaucracies, where ultirnately it matters rno~t.'~ln any event. the difficulty of establishing any one bbcorrect"label for the Centre is not surprising, given its Janus-faced nature. What's more, it seems both sides are sufficiently content to let the other's
"misperception" nst, notwithstanding ICHRDD' s protests. For the nebulous nature of the organization appears to more often than not serve the interests of al1 concemed.
Interviews in Montreal. May 1998. CHAPTER SIX Conclusion
This institutional and political history of the International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development is the fmt major academic review of the organization since its
inception, and seeks to help fil1 this gap in the academic literature on human rights in
Canadian foreign policy. The research findings presented support the contention that
ICHRDD9smarginalization within the academic community is not appropriate, given the
nature of its strategic orientation internationdly. and the character of its relationship to
DFAIT. CIDA and the govenunent of the day. ICHRDD remains a unique QUANGO.
A surnrnary of research findings conclude this thesis, dong with some suggestions for future strategies the Centre might emplcy. and some final thoughts on the institution and
its place within the human rights policy debate.
Smgths
The Centre has fulfilled its role as a facilitator of international cooperation in the promotion of hurnan rights and democratic development. Most successfully, the Centre has acted as a bridge between govermnent and non-govement organùations, at home and abroad. This "capacity to convene" is the Centre's unique niche. In its convening role, it has employed consultative groups (as with Guatemala, Pem. and the Great Lakes
Region of Afi-ica). democratic development study workshops (as with Thailand.
Tanzania. and others), and a series of ad hoc initiatives. based around one of its core countnes (the Haiti tribunal) or themes (the expert meeting on violence against women). uicreased advocacy efforts have also met with success. This is another area in which the Centre makes efficient use of its limited resources. By not only undertaking advocacy of its own. but also by strengthening the capacity of its partnen to do the same.
ICHRDD's efforts in this area are multiplied. The success of NGOs is crucial to increasing public awareness of rights issues, which. as has been argued in chapter two. appears often to motivate action by the Canadian govemment.
The development of a strong and credible voice. independent of the Canadian govemment's foreign and development policy. has been another achievement of note in the fmt decade. Using a variety of means, from leadership to oped pieces to vocal condemnation, the Centre has not shied away from emphasizing its differences of opinion with Ottawa. One of the most effective carnpaigns to date has ken to publicize human rights violations in the MEC region, which culrninated in a significant mle in opposing the Chretien government's emphasis on trade over human rights at the 1997 APEC Heads of Govemment meeting in vancouver.'
The 1986 parliarnentary report on Canadian foreign policy advocated the creation of an organization to further the promotion (as opposed to the protection) of human rights.' Such a disposition dernands a constructive approach to supporting democratic development, and in this respect the Centre's democratic deveiopment studies of some of its core countries have registered applause with both government and non-government sectors. These studies put the Centre in the vanguard of developing solutions in aiding the construction of healthy and durable civil societies.
' Paul Knox. "Rights no concem of APEC." Globe and Mail. November 19. 1997. A14. 'Independence ond Intrmatio~li~rn.103- 104. Impedïntenis tu Effectiveness
Frequent changes in strategic orientation have slowed the Centre's ability to set
pnorities and follow through on them. While ICHRDD deserves credit for its ability to
transform itself, as it clearly bas done in response to challenges over the years, this
process has also resulted in a lack of long-term vision. The rationale for choosing core
countries on which to concentrate was to narrow the Centre's focus; the addition of
thematic work has inflated the range of possible areas of interest beyond a sustainable capacity. The Centre's leadership must realize an mual budget of about $5 million
imposes limitations on capaci t y.
It is aiso clear that the Centre has been negatively affected by a poor institutional
structure. and by management-staff and staff-staff discord. This was partially recognized
in the internai strategy document 1997 and Beyond:
Problems at the management Ievel and the administration as a whole as to the ability to make strategic choices, apply hem, follow-up or support them as well as the poorly adapted structure have resulted in a relatively inappropriate allocation of human and material resources (work overload, unwise expenditures, etc.).3
It appears such problems may be ironed out for now, as a structure which is supposedly capable of enduring change is now in place. Whether it will stand the test of time remains to be seen, especially considenng how thinly resources are now spread.
The govemment's reluctance to restore multi-year funding remains a serious problem for ICHRDD. Whether it seriously affects the ability to plan for the long term, as many at the Centre contend, is debatable. There is much evidence in this thesis to support the contention that it has been intemal difficulties and frequent strategic changes which have hampered longer-terni programming, rather than simply a Iack of guaranteed
funding. Year-to-year fûnding is a reaiity for many goveniment sponsored bodies, most
of which still manage to ttuive.
A more serious reason for the Centre to pursue block funding is because it is
crucial to the continued perception of the Centre's independence, particularly
intemationally. Moreover. irrespective of the protests of the Centre's leadership that
annual appropriations have not slowed criticism of Canadian foreign policy. an
organization which has the potential to seriously embarrass its own life-line needs the
arms length assurance of multi-year funding. Now is the time to step-up lobbying efforts,
as many other institutions whose rnulti-year funding was suspended in the early 1990s
have recently had it restored (e.g. the IDRC, the North-South Institute).
Tied also to the Centre's financial woes is the enduring problem of extemal
hindraising. Effons during the Broadbent years were failures, and iittle serious attention has ken paid to this problern, though a new fundraising strategy is purportedly under construction. Failure to successfully fundraise has resulted in the complete neglect of part of the Centre's mandate under its statute: little work has been done for the benefit of countries other than developing ones (for example, in the democratizing countries of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union).
The Centre's procedures for evduation of its own work have also been less than successfu1. In 1993, the first five year review noted that "it seerns that the evaluation process has not had a big impact.. .it should be continued and improved".' However, as demonstrated in chapter four, problems persist in the arbitrariness of the evaluating
GESTED Review. 5-4. system. A systematic process must be devised and rnonitored carefully. Primary focus should be on integrating lessons into future work by making the evaluation system more participatory. This should be more feasible as fewer of the Centre's initiatives are now carried out exclusively overseas than in the early 1990s.
Strategies for the Future
Numerous respondents interviewed for this thesis argued that the Centre was most effective when it was "out Front" acting as the "catalyst," pushing (dong with its partners) issues ont0 the agenda not only of the human rights cornmunity, but to the national and supranational levels as well. Work on women's rights. globalization, and more recently impunity shows ICHRDD to be capable of this. However, the Centre must sharpen its efforts to remain at the forefront, both in terms of advocacy, and research and publication. A small percentage of annual resources should be set aside with a two-fold purpose. First, such funds could provide a better ability to respond to what the Centre calls "urgent action" requests.' Second, some of those fun& should be used to "mine" fields of potential interest to the Centre in corning years.
The Centre's own reflections, in late 1996, concluded that "relations between the
Centre and Parliament remain fleeting and occasional . There is a great need for renewal of its [the Centre's] ties with the Canadian public".6 This assessrnent is accurate.
Chapter two demonstrated that Parliament has ken, in past, if not a 'hotbed of activism', at least an institution with significant credibility, cornprised of at least some rnembers with a strong interest in international human rights. The Centre should seek to establish
' For example. the Centre has been conspicuously silent on the Sudanese famine this summer. 1997 and Beyond, 6. closer ties with individual members, irrespective of pariy affiliation, who express an interest in human rights issues. in addition to potentially raising the profile of the Centre within Canada, this may lead to positive deveiopments on the political front. or at minimum, aid in the publicity of notable causes. ICHRDD should also continue its CO- operative relationship with DFAlT and CIDA. The Centre may be able to help re-enforce structural changes within these bureaucracies, which could result in officiais more amicable to human rights concems in foreign policy.
The Centre is already well aware of the extent to which its international Board members make significant contributions. As the Centre increases its capacity for research and publication, it may be useful to engage in international exchanges of both academics and intems. In this regard ICHRDD may wish to host "visiting" experts from abroad to work at its headquarters on specific themes or country-related matters. Further. while
ICHRDD is already engaged in sending young Canadian intems abroad to work with its partners. it may wish to establish a greater degree of reciprocity from organizations which could send low-cost help to Montreal. These visiting scholars and intems would [end even more credibility to the "international" dimension of the Centre.
As the Internet's reach expands into ever more distant points, and as political action increasingly necessitates use of electronic communication^,^ ICHRDD must ensure that its Web site keeps Pace with the growing demand. It would only require a small augmentation of resources to enhance the Centre's capacity to distribute information electronically. The establishment of an electronic newsletter - disseminated penodically
7 Think for example of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico, which depended Iargely upon the Internet to publicize its grievances. (say, bi-weekly or rnonthly) by e-mail - is a low-cost, instantaneous means of keeping
interested parties up to date on what the Centre and its partners are doing.
Finally, to aid intemal cohesion, ICHRDD should consider establishing an annuai
campaign on a thematic issue. For a staff which often seems "boxed off' from one
mother, a constant unifier could provide a pater degree of common purpose.
According to most respondents, the 1997 carnpaign on APEC was very successful in this
regard. Unfortunately. the idea of a carnpaign was dropped when the themes were
elevated in status to full-blown programmes, alongside country-specific work, in 1997.
An annual, formal carnpaign should work towards a culminating event, which would
provide both a sense of growing momentum and definitive closure - though follow-up
work should also be an integral part of every campaign.
Final Thoughts
In the introduction, a series of motives for the creation of this institution were
proposed, some complementary, some competing. One clear reason was to aid Canadian-
based efforts in the promotion of human rights abroad. The Centre has established an
impressive reputation on this front. Its independence from govemment, and its
promotion of rights ensh~edin the International Bill, have aided the Centre's credibility
as a culturally-sensitive organization. The Centre has been able to work in poiitically
sensitive areas beyond the reach of DFAïï or CIDA, a second reason the govemment created this para-statai institution. In hiture years, programming should focus on the
rnost highly politically sensitive of these realms, for it is in areas such as Bma, Tibet
and East Timor that CIDA still has extremely limited manoeuvrability. As an intemal lobby on the govemment and the bureaucracies, one of the veiled reasons the Mulroney government established the Centre, success has been more modest.
This may stem from the complementary vision shared between the bureaucracies and the government of the day since the election of the Chretien Liberais in 1993. Both emphasize trade links as the ultimate source of Canadian prospenty. While the govemment will on occasion take a stand on major rights violations abroad, it is still unlikely to do so when commercial interests would have to be traded-off.
Research for this thesis reveaied little evidence for a more cynical, competing hypothesis: that ICHRDD was created to marginalize human rights from the foreign policy mainstream. To the contrary, it seems ICHRDD has had at least lirnited success in pushing (in collaboration with the numerous other members of NIHR)rights issues ont0 the agenda of the Canadian govemment. Ultimately. had the Mulroney govenunent desired to marginaiize rights issues in foreign policy, it could have created a similar institution. but within CIDA, which would have assured complete government control.
Ten years have passed since Pariiarnent adopted the International Centre for
Human Rights and Dernocrutic Devehpment Act, and the Centre has been active in the promotion of human nghts and democratic development since October of 1990, approaching eight years now. Within this time frame, the Centre has had an impact greater than one would deduce from the very limited acadernic attention paid the organization. Even the Canadian govemment has seen fit to publicly endorse the work of the Centre. It did so in its in its 1995 foreign policy white paper, Canada in the World, noting that "the Government applauds the excellent work around the world of Canada's International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic De~elo~rnent".~While CIDA and other large organizations have assumed control over ICHRDD's original niche, ongoing challenges on the international human rights front merit retaining the organization's funding from the public purse. Domesticaily, the Centre's value-added is in aiding NGOs to exert pressure on the Canadian government, and in educating the
Canadian public and mobilizing public opinion, key ingredients to spumng govemment action. In these ways. the Centre can be considered both a reflection of. and contributor to. humane internationalism in our foreign policy.
Later this year, the Centre wiU be faced with two significant events. One is the completion and release of its second Parliamentary review. The other is notification of its funding level for 1999-2000. The latter will likely be tied to the former. but the issue is more cornplex. Here the Centre is faced with a dilernrna. In order to flourish, the
Centre must focus on two goals which are anything but mutually reinforcing: securing multi-year funding, and increasing its domestic presence through advocacy. lobbying. and cnticism of Canadian foreign policy. How, or if, the Centre will resolve this dilemma will dictate whether ICHRDD will prosper in the years to come. Canada, and the international human rights comrnunity in general. would benefit from the role the
Centre could potentially play in the years to come: at home. by working to raise the profile of international human rights, and bringing such issues onto the foreign policy agenda; and abroad, in continuing to find constructive ways to facilitate international co- operation to promote human rights and democratic developmeot.
* Canada in the World. 34. 35-36-37 ELIZABETH II 35-36-37 ELIZABETH II
CHAPITRE 64
An Act to estabbh the Internritioaal Centte Loi constituant le Centre international da for Humln Rights and Democratic droits de h pcnonne a du dhdoppe- Deniopment ment d&l~tiquc
Hcr Majesty, by and with the advicc and Sa Majesté, sur ravis et avec le ~~nscnte- consent of the Seaate and.Horwe of Com- ment du Sénat et de la Chambre des commu- mons of Ca&, enacts as foIIows: nsdo Canada, édicte :
SHORT TITLE
1. This Act may be cited as the Inîerrrrr- 1. toi sw le Centre intematio~l da tionol Ccnire fw Hunrcin Rights and Derno- droits de la pcrsottnê et du dhrcloppement crotic hlopment Ad. df mouarique.
2. (1) In this Act, 2. (1) Les dérinitions qui suivent s'appü- "Board" means the Bogtd of Directors of the quent la présente loi. Ccatre; administrateur, Tout membre du conseil. "Centre" means the International Centre for Human Rights and Dernomtic Devclop .Centres Le Centre international des droits ment cstablishcd by do33; de la personne et du divcloppemcnt dérno- "Chairman" means the Chairman of the matique constitd par l'article 3. bd; cconseib Le amseil d'administration du "director" means a iiitmber of the Board, Centre. dnistrcm Le membrt du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada chargC par le gou- "Minister" means 'such mcmber of the verneur en conseii de I'appbcation de k Queen's Pnvy Councii for Canada as may présente loi. bc designatal by the Oomnor in Councii .président du Cena0 :bprésident du as the MùrWtct for tht purposcs of thU Centre. Act; "Residentw means the Raident of the =président du sonse& Le président du Centre.. CVIWCil. I C 64 hter~tionalCentre/or Humun Rïghts and Drmocratic DeveIopment 35-36-37 ELIZ II
1-- (2) For the purpase of this Act. the Inrcr- (2) Pour I'appücation de la présente loi. la MoJHm ?-- m national Bill of Human Rights means Churte internatio~ledes droits de l'ho- kr Mo (a) the U,versal Dcclaration of Human désigne : r- Riglits, a) la Mciiuation universelfe dm droits de (6) the International Covenant on Chil l'hommr, and PoliticaI Righrs; b) le Pacte intemtionial relatif aux droits (c) the Optio~lProtocof to the Intema- civils et pofitiqucs' fional Covemwt on Civil ad Political C) le Protocole f~ltatifserapportant au Rights, and Pacte internatibnal relatif aux droits (d) the Intemational Gwentant on Eco- civil$ et politiqws, mm*c,Socid and Cultural Rights. d) le Pacte intemationai refatif aux droits 4conomiques. soctOCtawcet culturels.
CENTRE ESfABLlSHED CONSïïTUiïON DU CENTRE ~am 3. There is hereby established a corpora- 3. Est constitub It Centre international *- tion, to k calleci the Iiitcrnstionai Centre for des droits de la personne et du développe- Human Rights and Dtmocratic Dcvclop ment dtmocratiquc. dot6 de la personnalité ment. morale.
OWECIS, PO- AND CAPACllY OF CENTRE obj~a~a 4. The objects of the Centre are to hi- 4. Le Centre a pour mission d'amorcer, ~i caurc tiate, encourage and support coopcratioa bc- d'encourager et d'appuyer la coopération twtcn Canada and other countries in the entre le Canada et les pays étrangers en cc promotion, dtvtlopment and strengthtning of qui touche la promotion, le développement et dernocratic and human rights institutions le renforcement des institutions ct program- and program that give effect to the rights mes d6mocratiques ou se rapportant aux and frecdoms enshrinai in the Intemutional droits de la personne qui donnent effet aux Bill of Human Rights, including, arnong droits et libertés consacrés par la Chute th- rights, the right to an adquate stand- internationale des droits de l'homme, ces ard of living, the rights of petsons not to be droits comprenant notamment le droit à un subjectcd to torture or ta cruel, inhuman or niveau de vie sufkant, le droit de n'être degrading treatmcnt or punishrncnt, the soumis ni à la torture, ni à un traitement ou rights of frdom of opinion and expression une punition cruels, inhumains ou digra- and the right to vote and be clccttd at pcri- dants, le droit à la Ebert6 d'opinion et d'ex- odic, gcnuine elections in pluralistic political pression et te droit de voter et de se faire élire systcms. A major objtct dl bt to help dans des &ctions périodiques authentiques rcduce the wide gap that sometimcs exists dans les systtmes politiques pluralistes. L'un betwecn the formal adherence of states to de ses objets principaux est d'aider à la international human rights agreements and réduction de l'écart consid6rable qui existe the actual human rights practices of States. parfois entre l'adhésion officielie da États In carrying out its objccts, the Centre will aux accords internationaux concernant les (a) support dcvelopmental programs and droits de la personne et les pratiques des activities for the bcnefit of dcveloping &tau en ce qui conarne ces droits. II lui countries; incombe, pour I'accomplisscment de sa (b)support programs and activities for the mission : knefit of counuies other thaa dnreloping a) d'appuyer les programmes et les activi- countries; and tés de dévtlopptmcnt en faveur des pays en voie de développcnient; Centre inîernationaf àes droits âe fa pcn~lll~ct du dhrcloppemnt dhmuuatique ch 61
(c) to fater and suppott rcscarch and 6) d'appuyer lu programma a Iaam- education, discoune, the exchange of th en faveur des pays autres que les pays information and collaboration among en voie de développement; people and institutions in Canada and c) de stimuler et appuyer la recherche et other countries. I'çducation, le dialogue, l'&changed'dot- mation et la coüaboration entre les citoyens et les institutions, tant au Canada qu'a t'étranger. S. (1) in canyiag out its objects, the 5. (1) Le Centre a, pour i'accompb Centre has the capacity and, subjcct to this ment de sa mission et mus rtgtrVc des autres Act, the rights, powers and privücgcs of a dispositions de la présente loi, h capacitt natural pcmn and in particuiar, but without d'une personne physique; a titre, il pcut limiting the gcnerality of the foregoing, the notamment : Centre may a) -er et appuyer !es pmpamma (a) sponsor aad support technical assist- de formation et lu services de consuftation ance, training programs and advisory ser- et d'assistance technique, et fournir les vices and provide finaacial rcsourccs as ressources fmci8rcs demandées, directe- rcquirtd in rcspoase to rcqutsts emerging ment ou non, par les gouvcmements, par diiy or hdktly from gavements, des organismes, orgmisations ou institu- public or private organita tions, institutions tions publics ou p+& ou par du @a- or agencies as weü as individuals in de- lien dans, notamment, les pays tn voie de vcloping countrics and elsewhttc; développement; (b) cstablish, maintain and support infor- b) constituer, exploiter et appuyer des mation and data centres and facilitics for centrés ou étabLUsernents d'information et research and other activities relevant to its de doan& en vue de recherches et d'au- objectil; trcs a&tb liées à sa mission; (c) fater and bdrcscarch; c) stimuler et SU~VC~~~OMC~Ia recherche; (4 sponsor and support seminan, work- 6) appuyer ou prendre en charge la tenue show and 0thmeethm de colïoqu~d'atelim ou d'autres réu- (e) carry out its activities through existiag nions; organizations, institutions and agencies; e) exercer ses activités par I'inttrmédiakc and des organismes, organisations ou institu- (f) acquire by gift, bcquest or otherwise tions existants; any real or pcrsonai propcrty and hold, f) dans Ics conditions prévues par sts expend, invcst, administer or dis- of r8glernents administratifs, acqudrir, par any such propcrty, in accordancc with the don, legs ou autre mode de libéralités, da by-laws of the Centre. biens immeubles ou ptnonneIs ou !es déte- nir, employer, investir, gérer ou aliéner. (2) The Centre may not acquue, otherwist (2) Le Centre ne pcut exercer Ie pouvou than from a gomment or 0th public énoncé A l'alinéa (1 V), dans le cas d'un bien body, by gift, bequest or otherwise any ml dont la destination est assortie de des or pcrsonai propcrty subjwt to any condition conditions par la personne qui l'aliène, que regardmg the pu- for which the proptrty s'il acquiert a bien du gouvcmcrnent ou d'un is to be usai, disposed of or expendcd that is organisme public. imposcd by the person disposhg of the PropcrtY* 6. (1) The Centre may cary on its activi- 6. (1) Le Centre pcut exercer ses activités tics throughout Canada. en tout lieu du Canada. C64 Internatiorutl Centre for Human Rights and Dcmocratic DNclopment 35-3637 ELU II
Qm (2) la dwrkrr The Centre bas the capacity to cany (2) Le Centre a capacitC d'exercer ses on its activities, conduct its affairs and excr- activités et ses pouvoirs à l'&ranger dans les ckits pwcn in any jurisdiction outside iimitcs des lois du lieu. Canada to the extent that the laws of that jurisdiction pcrmit. Rilbtr (3) No act of the Centre, induding any (3) Les actes du Centre, y compris la - ~ll~ferof propcrty to or by the Centrc is transferts de biens, ne sont pas nuis du seul rd- invalid by reason only tbat the act or transfer fait qu'ils sont conmires à ses règlements is contrary to this Act or the by-taws of the administratifs ou B la présente loi. Centre.
ORGANIZATf ON ORGANISATION 7. ( 1) There shall k a Board of Directors 7. ( 1) Est eoastitu6 k coascii d'adminis- y - of the Centre consisting of a Cbairman of the tration du Centre. composé de treize admi- rioi- Board, a Resident of the Centre and elevcn nistrateurs, dont le président du conseil et le other directors to be appointcd as providcd in président du Centre, nommés conformément sections 8 to 10. aux articles 8 B IO. (2) Al1 appointments pursuant to this sec- (2) Les nominations prévues au présent ww tion shall k made after consultation by the article sont effectuées B la suite de la consul- Ministcr with the Leader of the Oppsition tation, par lc ministre, du chef de l'opposition and the leader of every other rtcognhi et du chef de chacun des autres partis r-n- party in the Houe of Commons. nus 5 la Chambre des communes.
d 8. (1) The Càainnan sbU k appointcd 8. (1) Le gouverneur en CO& nomme le ~~~ by the Governor in Council to hold office président du conseil, B titre amovible, pour -t& during plcasure for a term not cxcecding un mandat maximal de trois ans. - thrce ycarr. caadutk (2) &fore a Chairman. other than the (2) Le ministre consulte le conseil pour la -h fust CbaVman, is appointai, the Ministcr nomination dcs présidents du conseil autres shall consult the Board with respect 10 the que Ie premier. appointment. Appaia-f d 9. (1) The Frcsidtnt shail k appointcd by 9. ( I ) Le gouverneur ta amseil nomme le N-bh Rerideat pbideot do the Governor in Council to hold office dwing président du Centre, titre amovible, pour ha pltasure for a term not excteding five ycan. un mandat maximal de cinq ans. rmmkit#a (2) Bcfore a President, other than the fint (2) Le ministre consulte le oonstii pour la ~~ Prcsidcnt, is appointed, the Ministtr shall nomination des présidents du Centre autres consuit the Board with respect to the que le premier. appointment. A~poin- d 10. (1) Eight of the directors, other than 10. (1) À l'exception du pr&ident du con- the Chairman and the Prcsideat, rhall k seil et du président du Centre. le gouverneur zd tcum appointed by tbe Govemor in Council to hold en conseil-nomme A titre amovibk huit des office during plcasure for such term, not autres addnistratcurs pour des mandats res- excding tbrœ years, as will ensure, as far pectifs de trois ans au maximum, ces man- as passible, the expiration in any one year of dats &tant,dans la mesure du possible, éche- the terms of office of not more than four of lonnés de maniére que leur expiration au those cight directors. cours d'une mhe annk touche au plus quatre de ces huit administrateurs. Centre intentotiomI des droits de ka personne et du divcloppemen~di~ocrarique CL 64
(2) Three of the directon, other rhan the (2) te conseil nomme les trois autres Cbairman and the Resident. shall be administrateurs selon Ics mtmts modalités, appointad by the Board to hold office during leun mandats étant, dans la mesure du pcwsi- plcasuse for such te- not cxding thtee blc, échelonnés de mani6re que leur expira- yeats, as will CMIUC. as far as possible, the tion au aws d'une mbe année touche au expiration in any one year of the tmno of plus deux de ces trois administrateurs. offia of not more tban two of those thra directm. (3) If the oEfia of a director, other than (3) En cas de vacance, en cours de tht Chairman and the Prcsident, becornes mandat, d'un poste d'administrateur autre vacant during the term of the director que celui du prbident du conscil ou du prési- appointed thcreto, anothcr pcnon may be dent du Centre, il peut 8tre nommé un rem- appointed, in the manner in which that direc- plaçant, seion les modalités de nomination tor was appointai. to tbat ocfia for the applicaMes au podte devenu vacant, pour la remaindcr of that tenn or for a new terme durée restant à courir ou pour un nouveau mandat* II. (1) The Cbailaian, the fiesident and Il. (1) Le mandat du président du constif any ohditador is cligible for reappoint- et des autres administrateurs. à I'txaption ment to the Board in the same or another- du président du Centre, ne peut être tean- capacity, but no penon may bc appointad to duit qu'une fois, à dcs fonctions identiques hold aay such office, other than the office of OU non. President, for more than two consecutive ttrnu. (2) A director who wishes to riisign that (2) L'administrziteur qui souhaite démis- offia shait notify the Board in writing to sionner notifie au conseil son intention par that effcct, and the rcsignation becornes écrit; sa démission prend effet à la date de effective at the time the Board rtceives the rkption de la notification ou à la date qui y notice or the time spccified in the notice, ut précisée, si celle-ci est postérieure. whichever is the later. 12. The Board shail elcct one of the dira- 12. Le conseil choisit son vice-président tors to bc Via-Chairman of the Board. parmi ses administrateurs. 13. (1) The Chairman, the Vicechair- 13. (1 ) Neuf administrateurs, dont le pri- man, the President and su other directon sidcnt et le vice-président du conseil et le must bc Canadian citizens or permanent rai- praident du Centre. doivent être des citoyens dents as defined in the fmrnigration Act, canadiens ou des résidents permanents au 1976. sens de la Lor' sur I'imïnïgration de 1976. (2) 'The directors appointed pursuant to (2) Les administrateurs nommés confor- sutsection lO(2) must bc nationals of de- nim ment au paragraphe 10(2) doivent être veloping countries. des ressortissants de pays en voie de dévtloppcmcnt. (3) The Board mut have Itnowlcdge of (3) Le conseil doit être au fait de la politi- Canadian foreign policy and cxperienct in que canadienne étrangère et avoir de l'txpé- international dcvelopment, the devclopment riena dans le domaine du développement of democratic institutions, the promotion of international et du divcloppemcnt des insti- hurnan rights internationally and interna- tutions démocratiques, de la promotion à tional law rctating to individual and mkc- l'échelle mondiale des droits de la ptrsoane tive rights. et du droit international relatif aux droits individuels et collectifs. CM International Ccnircfor Human Rights und i?emcxtaticDrvefoprnent 35-36-37 Errz II
14. (1) The Chairman shali prcside at 14. (1) Le président du conseil dirige les meetings of the Board and shali ptrform rhnions de cclui4, dispose da ponvoin et sucb othn dutiu or functions as are remplit les fonctions qui lui sont attribués imposai, or exetcise such powers as are am- par dglement administratif du Centre ou par ferreci, on the Chairman by or undct the résolution du conseil. by-laws of the Centre or by rcsolution of the Board* (2) If the Chairman is absent or unable to (2) En cas d'absence ou d'tmpëchement act or if the offrot of the Chairman is vacant, du président du conseil ou de vacana de son the Vice-Chairman bas and may exercise and poste, la prbidcna est assumée par le via- petform aii the powets, dutics and functions président du constil. of the Chiman. 15. (1) The Ptesident is the chief extcu- 15. (1) Le président du Centre en est le tive officer of the Centre and has suptrvision premier dirigeant et, A a titre, il assure la ovtt and direction of the work and staff of direct-ion et contrôle h gestion de son person- the Centre and shaii perform such duties or nel. A cet effet, il dispose du pouvoirs et fiinctions as arc imposed, or txercise such remplit les fonctions qui lui sont attribués powen as are confard, on the President by par rtglernent adminiruatif du Centre ou par or under the by-la- of the Centre or by résolution du cod. resolution of the Board. (2) if the '~esidcntis absent or unable to (2) En cas d'absena ou d'empêchement act or if the offre of the Prtsident is vacant, du président du Centre ou de vacance de son the Boarû may designate a diuector or an poste, le conseil peut charger un autre admi- oficer of the Centre to act as President for nistrateur ou un dirigeant du Centre d'assu- the time bting, but no person so designated ter I'intkrim pendant un maximum de qua- shall act as Prcsidcnt for more than ninety tre-vingt-dix jows, sauf prorogation days without the apprdof the Govemor in approuvée par le gouverneur en conseil. Council. 16. (1) IIne President shall bc paid by the 16. (1) Lt traitement du président du Centre such salary or othtr remuneration as Centre ainsi que toute autre rémunération à the Governor in Couacil rnay fm. lui verser sont fipar le gouverneur en conseil. (2) The Chairman and other directors, (2) Le Centre verse au président du conseil other than the Prcsidcnt, shali bt paid by the et aux autres administrateurs, à l'exception Centre such ftcs or other remuneration as du président du Centre, les indemnités ou the Governor in Council may fu. autre forme de rémmiration que fuc le gou- verneur en conseil. (3) A director shaii bc paid by the Centre (3) Le Centre défraie les administrateurs rasonable travel and living expenses des dtpcnses de diplaamtnt et de séjour incurred by the director while absent from entrainies par l'accomplissement, hors du the director's ordinary place of residençc in lieu de kur résidence habituelle, dc lcun the course of dutics as a director. fonctions ès qualités. 17. (1) Thtre shall be an executive corn- 17. (1) Est anstitué le comité de direc- mittee of the Board consisting of the Chair- tion du conseil, composé du président du man, the President and at least thrœ other conseil, du président du Ccntre et d'au moins directors electai annually by the Board. trois autres administrateurs choisis annuelle- ment par le conseil. Centre inter~tionaldes dniirs de ta psowet du divcrlopptment ditmerotique ch 64
(2) A majority of the memkn of the (2) La majoritt des membres du comité de executive committee must be Canadian citi- direction doivent être des citoyens canadiens zens or prxnancnt residents as dcfmcd in the OU des résidents permanents au sens de la Loi Immigration Act, 1976. sut i'i~tv)u~grtztimde 1976. (3) The extcutivt committœ shdl pcrfonn (3) Le cornit6 de direction exerce les fonc- such of the fmctions of the Centre as the tions du Centre que le conseil peut lui dtté- Bord may by by-law assign to it and rhd guer par rtglcment administratif et dépose Q submit at each meeting of the Board minutes chaque réunion du a& le prods-verbal of iîs prWingr rince the lert prcccding dts dtlibérations qu'il a tenues depuis h meeting of the Board. dernière rtunion de celui-ci. (4) The Board shail elcct ont of the mcm- (4) Le conscii choisit b président du bers of the executive committee to k the comitb de direction panni les membres de chairman of the executive cornmittee. celui-ci. (5) The exocutive cornmitta shall mect at (5) Le comitt de direction tient un mini- Icast four timu a y-. mum de quatre réunions par an. (6) Tbrw rnembers of the exccutivc am- (6) Le quo- pur les réunions du mittee, a majority of whom arc Canadian comité, est de trois membres, dont au moins cihmor prmancnt raidents as dcfmed in deux sont des citoyens canadieru ou des rési- the Imigration Act. 1976, constitutc a dents permanents au sens de Ia Loi sw lrm- quorum at any meeting of the cornmittee. migration de 1976. la The Board may appoint advisory, ia Le coareii pcut constituer des comités audit or othcr ammittees under such terms consultatifs, de vérification ou autre selon les and conditions as the Board may by by-law modalités qu'il peut prévoir par r&gIement prdk. administratif. 19. The head office of the Centre SMbe 19, Le sitge du Centre est Tué dans la in the Montreal Urban Community. CommunautC urbaine de Montrial. 20. (1) The Board shaii mcet at least 20. (1) Le conseil tient un minimum de twicc each ycar and at such other times as deux réunions par an; il pcut en outre se the Chairman dccms ntcÉssary. réunir aux &tes que le président du conseil estime indiquées. (2) Stvtn directors, at least five of whom (2) Le quorum, pour les réunions du con- are Canadian citizcns or permanent rcsidents seil, ut de sept administrateurs. dont au as defincd in the Imntigrotion Act. 1976, moins cinq sont des citoyens canadiens ou constitutc a quorum at any mecting of the des résidents permanents au sens de la Loi Board. sur l'immigration de 2 976. 21. The Board may make by-iaws respect- 21, Le conseil pcut, par règlement admi- hg nistratif, prévoir : (a) the assignment of aay functiolls of the a) la dtlégation de fonctions du Centre au Centre to the exccutive cornmittee of the comité de direction et son mode d'excrcicc; Board and the ma~crin whicb those b) les modalités de constitution des comi- functions shail bc exercised; tés visés & l'article 18 ainsi que le traite- (b) the constitution of advisory, audit or ment et les indemnités pouvant être versés other cornmittee appointai pursuant to aux membres de ceux-ci., section 18, and the remuneration and c) Ics pouvoirs et fondons du président expcnses, if any, ta bc paid to the mcmbcn du conseil. du président du Centre, des of such cornmittees; 1
C. 64 International Cen#m/or Humcm mghts and Drmocratie Drvclopment 35-36-37 Etrz. II
(c) the pwers, dutics and functions of the administrateurs, du personnel et des man- Chairman, President, directors, offmn, dataires du Centre; ernployees and agents of the Centre; d) les conditions d'emploi, l'engagement (d) the employrnent, engagement and et la rémuntration du penonnel et des remuneration of ofkrs, employcs and mandataires du Centre; agents of the Centre; e) la conduite de scs travaux; (e) the procedute in all business at f) l'acquisition, la détention, l'emploi, I'in- meetings; vcstissemcnt, la gestion ou Saliénation de the acquisition, holding, expenditure, biens; invcstment, administration or disposition g) de façon générale, l'exercice des activi- of propcrty; and tés du Centre. (g) generally the conduct and manage- ment of the affain of the Centre. 22. Tbe Centre is not an agent of Her 2Z Le Centre n'est pas mandataire de Sa Majesty. Majatk.
PERSONNEL
23. (1) The Centre may employ or engage 23. (1) Le Ccntre put s'assurer les SCM- such officcn, cmployces and agents as it as du personnel et des mandataires qu'il considen ntccssary for the proper conduct of estime nécessaires B l'exercice de ses the work of the Centre. activitês. (2) Exccpt as providcù in substaions (3) (2) Le président du conscil, 1e président du to (5)' the Chairman, Rsident, directors, Centre, les autres administrateurs, le person- officers, employets and agents of the Centre nel et les mandataires du Centre ne font pas are not part of the public service of Canada. partie de l'administration publique fédérale. Sw--ti- (3) The Resident, offictn and cmployccs (3) te président du Centre et son person- of the Centre sball k dumed to be nel sont réputés être employb dans la fonc- employed in the Public Stmcc for the pur- tion publique pour l'application de la Loi w poses of the Public Service Superamuation la pension de la Fonction publiquc; le Centre Act and the Centre shall bc deemed to bc a est réputé être un organisme de la fonction Public Service corporation for the purposes publique pour l'application de l'article 25 de of section 25 of that Act. cette loi. rdan (4) The Public Semce Superamtrotion (4) Sauf instruction coatrairc du gouver- Act docs not apply to the Chairman or the neur en conseil, la Loi sw la pension de la other directors, other than the Prcsident, Fottction publique ne s'applique pas au prési- unltss in the case of any of them the Govcr- dent du conseil ni, exaption faite du prési- nor in Council otherwise directs. dent du Centre, aux autres administra teun.
C-pcnuk (5) The Prcsident, omars and ernployees (5) Le président du Centre et le personnel of the Centre shaîi be decmed to bt du Centre sont riputés être employés dans employed in the public service of Canada for l'administration publique fédérale pour Sap the purposes of the Government Employecc plication de la Loi concernant iïnde-sa- ampenrotidn Act and any rcgulations made rion des employés de lDi?tatet darègiernents pursuant to section 7.7 of the Aeronautics pris en vertu de l'article 7.7 de la Loi sw Act. i D&~~utique.
û~tydair 24. (1) Evcry director and every officer of 24. (1) Lu admùiistrateurs et la diri- the Centre in exercising powtrs and pcrform- geants du Centre doivent, dans l'exercice des Centre intemutional des droits de Io persom et du dévcloppemenr démocratique ch. 64 ing duties and functions under this Act shall pouvoirs et fonctions qui leur sont attribués (a) act honestly and in good faith witb a sous le régime de la présente loi : view to the bcst intercsts of the Centre; a) agir avec intégrité et de bonne foi au (6) exercise the care, diligence and ski11 mieux des intérêts du Cenue; that a reasonably prudent person would b) agir avec le soin, la diligence et la exercise in comparable circumstancts; and compétence d'une personne prudente et (c) comply with tbis Act and the by-laws avisée; of the Centre. C) observer la présente loi et les rtgle- ments administratifs du Centre. (2) A director or offictr is not liable for a (2) Ne contrevient pas aux obligations que breach of duty under substction (1) if the Iui impose le paragraphe ( 1) l'administrateur director or officer relies in good faith on ou le dirigeant qui s'appuie de bonne foi sur : (a) financial statements of the Centrc a) des états financiers du Centre présen- reprtsentod to the dircctor or officer by an tant sindrement la situation de cetui-ci, oficer of the Centre or in a written report selon I'un de ses dirigeants ou d'après le of the auditor of the Centre fairly to rapport écrit du vérificateur: reflcct the financial condition of the b) les rapports de personnes dont la pro- Centre; or fession ou la situation permet d'accorder (b) a report of a lawyer, accountant, en@- foi à leurs déclarations, notamment les mer, appraiscr or other penon whosc posi- avocats, les comptables, les ingénieurs ou tion or profession lends crcdibility to a les estimateun. statement made by that person. 25. ( 1 ) A director or officcr who 25. (1) Est tenu de communiquer au (a) is a party to a material contract or Centre la nature et l'étendue de ses intérêts proposed mattrial contract with the l'administrateur ou le dirigeant qui, selon le Centre, or cas: (6) is a director or offxer of, or has a a) est partie à un contrat important ou à matcrial interest in, any pcfson who is a un projet de contrat important avec le party to a matcrial contract or proposed Centre; material contract with the Centre, b) est également administrateur ou diri- shail disclose to the Centre the nature and geant auprès d'une personne partie à un tel exttnt of the interest of the director or contrat ou projet de contrat ou détient un officer. intérêt important auprès de cellelci. (2) The Board shail make by-laws (2) Le conseil fixe, par règlement adminis- rcspecting tratif : (a) the time when and the form and a) la date, la forme et le mode de la manner in whicb the disclosurt required communication visée au paragraphe (1); by subsection (1 ) shall be made; and b) les restrictions à la participation de (b) the limitation on the participation of a l'administrateur ou du dirigeant en cause director or officer who bas made a disdo- aux opérations relatives à un contrat ayant sure as required by subsection (1) in any fait I'objct de la communication visée au proceedings respecting the contract that is paragraphe (1). the subjm of the discloswe.
26. (1) The Centre may indemdy a 26. (1) Le Centre peut indemniser ceux de prescnt or former dircctor or officer of the ses administrateurs ou dirigeants ou leurs Ccntre or a person who acts or acted at the préâicesseurs, ou les personnes qui, A sa Centre's request as a director or offier of demande, agissent ou ont agi en cette qualité another corporation of which the Centre is or pour une autre personne morale dont il est ou CI 64 Internatio~lCenîre for Humn Rights adDemocratic Dcyelopment 35-36-37 ELIZ II was a shareholder or creditor, and bis hein était actionnaire ou criancier, ainsi que leurs and legal reprcsentatives, against al1 costs, héritiers et mandataires, de tous les frais et charges and expenses, including an arnount dépens, y compris les sommes venies pour paid to settle an action or satisfy a judgmcnt, transiger ou pour exécuter un jugement, reasonably incuncd by him in respect of any entraînés lors de procédures civiles, pénales civil, criminal or administrative action or ou administratives auxquelles ils étaient par- procetding to which he is a pany by reason ties en cette qualit&,si les conditions suivan- of king or having ken such a director or tu sont réunies : officer, if a) 5 ont agi avec intégrité et de bonne foi (a) he acted honestly and in good faith au mieux des intérêts du Centre ou de witb a view to the best intercsts of the l'autre personne morale; Centre or other corporation; and 6) dans le cas de proddures finales au (b) in the case of any criminal or sdminis- administratives abautissant au paiement trative action or prding that is d'une peine ptcuniairc, ils avaient des enforced by a monetary penalty, he had motifs raisonnables de croire à la régula- reasonable grounds for believing that his rité de leur conduite. conduct was lawful. (2) The Centre may purcbase and rnain- (2) Le Centre peut souscrire au profit de tain insurance for the btnefit of a director or ses administrateurs et dirigeants, ainsi que de officcr, and his hein and legal reprcscnta- leurs héritiers et mandataires, une assurance tives, against any liability, cos& charge and couvrant toute responsabilité ou tous frais et expense incuned by him as describai in sub dépens découlant des situations prévues au section (1). paragraphe (1).
FINANCIAL PROVISIONS DWOSITIONS FINANCIERES 27. The Centre shall be detmcd, for the 27. Pour l'application de la Loi de l'impôt purps of the ?ncome Tax Act, to be a sut le revenu, le Centre est rCputi être un registered charity within the meaning of that organisme de charité enregistré au sens de expression for the purposes of that Act. cette expression. B. (1) fhere shall be paid to the Centre B. ( 1) Les sommes suivantes sont versées out of the Consolidatd Revenue Fund for au Centre sur le Fonds du revenu consolidé the purpose of supporting developmental pro- pour appuyer la programmes et la activités grams and activitits for the btncfit of dt- de diveloppcment en faveur des pays en voie veloping çoun tries, de développement : (a) the amount of one million dollars in a) un million de dollars au coun de l'exer- the fiscal year commcncing on April 1, cice commençant le 1' avril 1988; 1988; b) deux millions de dollars au coun de (6) the amount of two million dollars in I'exercict cummençant le 1' avril 1989; the fiscal year commencing on ApriI 1, c) trois miliions de dollars au coun de 1989; l'exercice commençant le 1" avril 1990; (c) the arnount of three million dollars in d) quatre millions de doilan au coun de the fiscal year commenting on April 1, l'exercice commençant le 1" avril 199 1; 1990; e) cinq millions de dollars au coun de (4the amount of four million dollars in l'exercice commençant le 1 avril 1992; the f-l year commencing on April 1, fi au cours de chaque exercice ultérieur. 1991; les crédits votés par le Parlement. 1988 Centre internurional des droits de la personne et du développement démocratique ch. 64
(e) the amount of five million dollars in the fiscal ycar commcncing on April 1, 1992; and V) in each fifiscal year thercafter. such amount as may be appropriattd by Parliament. (2) For the purpose of supporting pro- (2) Le Centre peut. pour appuyer la pre mms and activities for the bcncfit of coun- grammes et les activitis en faveur des pays "z I tria other than developing awintrics. the autres que lapays en voie de développement Centre may. in addition to such moneys as recevoir et utiliser, en plus des crédits votés may k appropriated by Parüament for that par le Parlement uttc fin. de l'argent lui purpose, ro~iveand use moneys providcd to venant de sources autres que le gouverne- it ?rom sources othcr than the Governmeat of ment du Canada. Canada,
Fdycu 29. The financial year of the Centre is the 29. L'exercice du Centre commence le 1' EX- pcriod beginning on April 1 in one year and avril et se termine le 31 man de l'année ending on March 3 1 in the foilowing year. suivante.
A~LOI 30. The accounts and financial transac- 30. Le vérificateur général du Canada VWi- tions of the Centre shall bc audited annually examine chaque année les comptes et opéra- by the Auditor General of Canada and a tions financières du Centre et lui en fait report of the audit shall bc made to the rapport de même qu'au ministre. Centre and to the Minister.
REPORT TO PARLIAMEM RAPPORT AU PARLEMENT 31. (1) The Chainnan shall. within four 31. (1 ) Dans les quatre premiers mois de bpgatrnnucl months afttr the end of each fiscal ycar, chaque exercice, le président du conseil pri- transmit to the Minister a report of the sente au ministre le rapport d'activité du activities of the Centre for that f-1 year, Centre pour I'exercice précédent, y compris including the financial statements of the ses états financiers et le rapport du virifica- Centre and the Auditor General's report teur général y afférent. thereon.
(2) ~itbinone ycar after the founh anni- (2) La cinquième année suivant I'entrét venary of the coming into force of this Act, en vigueur de la présente loi - et cc ensuite and every five yars thercafter, the Minister tous les cinq ans -, Ic ministre fait procéder shall cause a revicw and report to bc made of à l'examen des activités et de I'organisation the Centre's activities and organization. du Centre et à l'établissement d'un rapport a cet iaard.
Tabliq in (3) The Minister shall cause a copy of (3) Le ministre fait déposer une copie de Puiumcllt cach report under this section to be laid chaque rapport en vertu du présent article Z*zt kfore each Hause of Pariiarncnt on any of devant chaque chambre du Parkment dans the fint fdteen days on which tbat House is les quinze premiers jours de séance de cel- sitting afttr the day on which the Minista le-ci suivant sa réception. ratives the rewrt. C 64 Insernationoi Cenîrefw Human Righrs and Drniocratic Developmenr 35-36-37 ELIZ II
Rdaril co (4) Each report under this section shall be (4) Les comités du Sénat, de la Chambre Rb &tlot rcviewai by such cornmitta of the House of des communes ou mixtes chargés d'étudier cmliil Comrnons. of the Senatc or of both Housu les rapports visés au présent artide procident of Parliament as may bc designated or estab- à leur examen détaillé. lishtd for the purpose of considering such reports.
CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENT MODiFlCATION CORR&IAT~VE
RS, C. P-36 Public Service Superannuarion Act Loi sur la pemion de la Fonction publique s+R-=~b-P-36 32. Part 1 of Schtdule A to the Public 32. La partie 1 de l'annexe A de la Loi sur Semice Supe~amuurionAct is amendcd by la pension de la Fonction publique est modi- adding thcreto, in alphabctical order, the fiée par adjonction de cc qui suit : following: .Centre international des droits de la "International Centre for Human personne et du développement dimo- Rights and Dcrnoctatic Development" cra tique..
QUEENS PRINTER FOR CANADA Q IMPRIMEUR DE LA RUNE POUR LE CAN-A OTTAWA. 1988 Warren Aiirnand ( 1997-Present) Del Anaquod ( 1990- 1995) Irving Brecher ( 1990- 1994) Ed Broadbent ( 1990- 19%) Iona Compagnola ( 1995-Present) Gisele Côté-Harper (Chair, 1990- 1996) hinCoder ( 1997-Present) Kenneth David Crawford ( 1996-Present ) Julie Davis ( 1990- 1996) Raymonde Folco ( 19%) Ron Gtiitter ( 1990- 1996) Huguette Labelle ( 1993--nt) Gregory MacKinnon ( 1992- 1995) Marcel Massé ( 1990- 1993) David Matas ( 1997-Present ) Kay Naodall( 1990- 1996) Maureen O'Neil (Chair, 1996- 1997) Thérèse Paquet-Sevigny ( 1995-Present) NomWalmsiey (1990-1996) Lois Wilson (Chair, 1 997-Present ) Stanley Wood ( 1995- 1997)
International membels:
Oscar Anas Sanchez (Costa Rica, 1990- 1 996) Karnal Hossein (Bangladesh, 1995-Present) Asma Jahangir (Pakistan, 1990- 1994) Akua Kuenyehia (Ghana. 199 1 - 1997) Cecilia Medina (Chile, 1997-Present) Wiliy Munyoki Munninga (Kenya, 1998-Resent)
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------. The Relntionship Between Traàe and Righrs in the Conrext of Foreign Policy. Montreal: ICHRDD, 1996.
+------. "Tell the tyrants the future has arrived." Globe and Mail. November 25, 199 1, A 15.
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