European Journal for Philosophy of Science manuscript No. (will be inserted by the editor) Stabilization of Phenomenon and Meaning On the London & London episode as a historical case in philosophy of science Jan Potters Received: date / Accepted: date Abstract In recent years, the use of historical cases in philosophy of science has become a proper topic of reflection. In this article I will contribute to his research by means of a discussion of one very famous example of case-based philosophy of science, namely the debate on the London & London model of superconductivity between Cartwright, Su´arezand Shomar on the one hand, and French, Ladyman, Bueno and Da Costa on the other. This debate has been going on for years, without any satisfactory resolution. I will argue here that this is because both sides impose on the historical case a particular philosophical conception of scientific representation that does not do justice to the historical facts. Both sides assume, more specifically, that the case concerns the discovery of a representational connection between a given experimental insight { the Meissner effect { and the diamagnetic meaning of London and London's new equations of superconductivity. I will show, however, that at the time of the Londons' publication, neither the experimental insight nor the meaning of the new equations was established: both were open The author would like to acknowledge the Research Foundation { Flanders (FWO) as funding institution. Center for Philosophical Psychology, Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Grote Kauwenberg 18, 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium E-mail:
[email protected] 2 Jan Potters for discussion and they were stabilized only later.