Ideological Representation of the U.S. Presidential Candidates in the Editorial Positions
of the English Online Newspapers in Russia – A Critical Discourse Analysis
A thesis presented to
the faculty of
the Scripps College of Communication of Ohio University
and the Institute for Communication and Media Studies of Leipzig University
In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degrees
Master of Science in Journalism (Ohio University),
Master of Arts in Global Mass Communication (Leipzig University)
Swetlana Maschinez
May 2018
© 2018 Swetlana Maschinez. All Rights Reserved. This thesis titled
Ideological Representation of the U.S. Presidential Candidates in the Editorial Positions
of the English Online Newspapers in Russia – A Critical Discourse Analysis
by
SWETLANA MASCHINEZ
has been approved for
the E.W. Scripps School of Journalism,
the Scripps College of Communication,
and the Institute for Communication and Media Studies by
Bernhard S. Debatin
Professor of Journalism
Scott Titsworth
Dean, Scripps College of Communication, Ohio University
Christian Pieter Hoffmann
Executive Director, Institute for Communication and Media Studies, Leipzig University
ii Abstract
MASCHINEZ, SWETLANA, M.S., Journalism; M.A., Global Mass Communication
May 2018
3745809
Ideological Representation of the U.S. Presidential Candidates in the Editorial Positions of the English Online Newspapers in Russia – A Critical Discourse Analysis
Director of Thesis: Bernhard S. Debatin
Committee Members: Christian P. Hoffmann, Benjamin Bigl
This study examines the ideological representation of the U.S. Presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in the editorial sections of the three
English-language online newspapers in Russia: Sputnik International, Russia Beyond the
Headlines and The Moscow Times. Through Jäger’s framework (2015), van Leeuwen’s model of the social actors’ representation (2008), and van Dijk’s notion of ideological square (1995; 2006) as powerful tools of enquiry within Critical Discourse Analysis, several tactics could be identified that were applied by the online newspapers in order to influence public’s opinion about the candidates. The results of this study showed that state-owned Russian media outlets made increasingly favorable comments about Donald
Trump while consistently ridiculing and offering negative coverage of Hillary Clinton. In addition, the enemy image of America as the hostile scapegoat for Russia’s negative actions and the country’s negative development since the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as a Cold War image of the current Russian-U.S. relations were constructed within the discourse.
iii Table of Contents Page
Abstract ...... iii List of Tables ...... vi List of Figures ...... vii Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 Motivation and Purpose of the Study...... 2 Outline of the Study ...... 3 Chapter 2: Context – The Russian Media ...... 6 The Russian Media ...... 6 A short history of the Russian media...... 6 Censorship and the Internet...... 9 The Russian press model...... 11 Propaganda ...... 13 The Coverage of the Russian Press ...... 16 CDA studies of Russian media...... 16 Coverage of the 2016 U.S. Presidential candidates in the Russian press...... 19 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework ...... 23 Editorials and Op-Ed Columns ...... 23 Ideology and Language ...... 27 The ideology concept...... 27 Ideology and politics...... 30 The Critical Discourse Analysis ...... 32 General principles of CDA...... 33 History of Critical Discourse Analysis...... 35 CDA and ideology...... 37 Chapter 4: Methodology ...... 42 Siegfried Jäger’s Critical Discourse Analysis...... 42 The structure of discourses...... 42 A toolbox for discourse analysis...... 44 Social Actors Representation by van Leeuwen ...... 46 Van Dijk’s Ideological Square ...... 48
iv Chapter 5: Analysis ...... 54 Applying the Critical Discourse Analysis Framework ...... 54 The conception and planning phase...... 54 The material identification and the data collection phases...... 56 The analysis phase...... 63 Social Actors Representation According to van Leeuwen ...... 97 Ideological Groups and Ideological Square ...... 100 Chapter 6: Discussion ...... 106 Conclusion ...... 111 Limitations and Future Research ...... 113 References ...... 115 Appendix A: Social Actors’ Representation ...... 131 Appendix B: Articles for the Detailed Analysis ...... 138 Appendix C: Structural Analysis ...... 160
v List of Tables
Page
Table 1 Top 10 English Online Newspapers in Russia ...... 57 Table 2 Inclusion and Exclusion of Social Actors in Sputnik International ...... 131 Table 3 Exclusion of Social Actors in Sputnik International ...... 131 Table 4 Nomination of Social Actors in Sputnik International ...... 131 Table 5 Categorization of Social Actors in Sputnik International ...... 132 Table 6 Activation and Passivation of Social Actors in Sputnik International...... 132 Table 7 Passivation of Social Actors in Sputnik International ...... 132 Table 8 Individualization and Assimilation of Social Actors in Sputnik International .. 133 Table 9 Inclusion and Exclusion of Social Actors in RBTH ...... 133 Table 10 Exclusion of Social Actors in RBTH ...... 133 Table 11 Nomination of Social Actors in RBTH...... 134 Table 12 Categorization of Social Actors in RBTH ...... 134 Table 13 Activation and Passivation of Social Actors in RBTH ...... 134 Table 14 Passivation of Social Actors in RBTH ...... 135 Table 15 Individualization and Assimilation of Social Actors in RBTH ...... 135 Table 16 Inclusion and Exclusion of Social Actors in MT ...... 135 Table 17 Exclusion of Social Actors in MT ...... 136 Table 18 Nomination of Social Actors in MT ...... 136 Table 19 Categorization of Social Actors in MT ...... 136 Table 20 Activation and Passivation of Social Actors in MT ...... 137 Table 21 Passivation of Social Actors in MT ...... 137 Table 22 Individualization and Assimilation of Social Actors in MT ...... 137
vi
List of Figures
Page
Figure 1. Van Dijk’s notion of Ideological Square ...... 50 Figure 2. Cartoon of Donald Trump in RBTH1 ...... 80 Figure 3. Photomontage of Clinton and Trump in RBTH4 ...... 80 Figure 4. Photomontage of Putin and Trump in MT4 ...... 90 Figure 5. Photograph of Trump in MT1 ...... 90
vii Chapter 1: Introduction
On November 8th 2016, the citizens of the United States of America voted for their 45th President. Although both candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, generally represented the principles of the Democratic and Republican parties respectively, each candidate contributed a unique dimension to the campaign.
For example, the Democratic presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton, presented the potential of being the first female President, which would have been a milestone as significant as the election of the first black President. Her political and diplomatic experience as a Senator and as a Secretary of State generally qualified her for the position and set her apart from almost all other candidates. Her popularity, however, was negatively affected by the several scandals that she had been involved in. On the other side, the businessman, property magnate, reality TV host, and Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, presented himself as the ultimate political outsider. He had no experience of any kind in political office and presented himself as the “crude voice of the people,” giving voice to the fears and hopes of people who felt marginalized from modern American society, culture and politics.
Both candidates entertained, horrified, and polarized the USA and the world during their campaigns. In the end, of the 130 million citizens who voted, 47.8% supported Hillary Clinton whereas 47.3% voted for Donald Trump. However, due to the fact that the popular vote means little in the U.S. election system and the Electoral
College votes are organized on a “winner takes all” basis, Trump won 306 votes to
Clinton’s 232 and became the 45th President of the United States of America. The polarizing rhetoric of Donald Trump’s campaign and the tightness of the race immediately led to several national and international protests, and also signaled a great potential for conflict in the future.
Motivation and Purpose of the Study
Russia’s involvement in particular in the 58th quadrennial American presidential election can only be described as extraordinary. In fact, the election was overshadowed by fears that Russia was actively seeking to help Donald Trump win, as well as by the seemingly mutual respect and sympathy between Trump and the Russian president
Vladimir Putin. After the election, the question of whether Russian cyber and information operations launched during the campaign were a deciding factor in the outcome of this election still remains at the center of media attention. Due to the negative depiction of the
Russia’s role in Western media outlets’ election coverage, it is important to look at this issue from the Russian side. It is of great interest to see what position Russia takes in this scandal, and whether or not Russian media outlets attempted to influence the election through their coverage. Moreover, it is also interesting to look at the ideological positions that particular media outlets with different corporate connections represent and how both
U.S. Presidential candidates were ideologically depicted within election discourse of these media organizations.
For more than 200 years, Russia and the United States have shared a multi-faceted diplomatic relationship with several political challenges and mutual breakdowns. After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-Russian relationship took on a new dimension. However, according to several press voices,
2 Russian-American relations are currently struggling through their most difficult period since the end of the Сold War. With this background, it is also interesting to look at the current picture of America in the Russian press and whether or not the Russian media are constructing a concept of an American enemy.
Outline of the Study
This thesis aims to investigate how English online newspaper editorials in Russia generally expressed their political ideologies in the 58th quadrennial American presidential election. In order to address this overall aim, the study first looks at several tactics that were applied by the selected English-language online newspapers in Russia in order to ideologically represent both U.S. Presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton and
Donald Trump, during the final four months of their campaigns. In other words, the main aim of the study is to look at the ideological depiction of both candidates in the English media in Russia and the rhetorical techniques and strategies the writers applied in editorials and/or opinion columns in order to express their ideological ideas about the candidates. Although editorials usually encode the ideological position of their editors, they are not always explicit for all readers - thus, they need to be revealed and unmasked.
While qualitative content analysis1 in general emphasizes an integrated view of speech/texts with their specific contexts and thus mostly focuses on the manifest content of the data (Mayring, 2000), the main goal of the Critical Discourse Analysis is to reveal hidden relationships and causes between discourse and society that are not obvious to the
1 According to Mayring (2000), qualitative content analysis is “an approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models, without rash quantification” (p.2). 3 people involved in the discourse (Fairclough, 1992, p. 9). Consequently, since the aim of this study is to uncover and examine the ideologies underlying the texts, the researcher decided to apply the method of Critical Discourse Analysis. Moreover, this thesis looks at the notion of ideological group building within the discourse and the ideological positions that these groups represented.
Regarding all of the objectives mentioned above, the main research questions in this study are:
1. What tactics did the selected media outlets employ in order to influence the
readers’ opinion about the U.S. Presidential candidates?
2. How were the U.S. Presidential candidates ideologically portrayed in the
editorial positions of the three English language online newspapers in Russia?
3. What ideological groups are constructed in the discourse of the three selected
online newspapers?
3.1. What ideological position do these groups represent?
Generally, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the main analytical approach employed in this thesis. Three frameworks as powerful tools of enquiry within Critical
Discourse Analysis, proposed by three different CDA scholars, were employed in order to analyze various aspects specified in the research questions. The study addressed the first research question mainly with the CDA approach of Siegfried Jäger (2015). Since the second research question focuses on the depiction of both U.S. Presidential candidates, the framework of van Leeuwen (2008) which analyses the representation of social actors was also an important part of this thesis. In order to answer the last question,
4 the researcher identified, scrutinized, and compared the ideology carrying categories proposed by van Dijk (1995; 2006a). His notion of the so-called “ideological square” helped to identify ideological groups in the discourse and to understand the reasons for their existence.
5 Chapter 2: Context – The Russian Media
As the analysis of this paper is focused on the Russian media coverage, it is important to look at the basic principles of the Russian media model, since this might help to better understand the complex relationship between citizens, the government, and the media. This chapter presents a short overview of the Russian media landscape, its press model, history, censorship, and propaganda.
The Russian Media
As Oates (2007) notes, the Russian mass media system went through 70 years of strict state control, and several researchers argue that this “Soviet legacy” can still be observed in the modern Russian media.
A short history of the Russian media. The origins of the modern Russian media system were laid down with the birth of the first Russian newspaper Vedomosti, which was set up by Czar Peter the Great after his European trip in 1730 (Hartog, 2017). For centuries after, Vedomosti remained a tool for elite communication because of the hierarchical management of the Russian political system by the ruling bureaucracy, and the exclusion of the political parties from Russian power structures (Zassoursky & Esin,
2003). During the Soviet era, however, the relationship between the state and mass media became “vertical,” which means that the media was owned, financed and fully controlled by the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) (Poberezhskaya, 2013). In accordance with the first leader of the USSR, Vladimir Lenin’s understanding of the mass media’s role in achieving the revolution and building the new social order, the media were widely used as a propaganda tool in order to achieve the aims of the Party, to
6 strengthen the impact of the ruling communist ideology as well as to contribute to regime stability (Muižnieks, 2008; Coyne & Leeson, 2009; Strovskiy, 2011). Lenin's ideas were carried on by Stalin and Khrushchev, who used mass media in order to communicate
“official news, educate and instill ideology, and present an idealized view of Soviet life”
(Coyne & Leeson, 2009, p. 9). The situation changed significantly in the late 1980s with
Gorbatchev’s Glasnost and Perestroika which at the end largely contributed to the break- up of the Soviet Union in1991. As Becker (2004) argues, Glasnost was a political slogan for increased openness and transparency in government institutions and activities in the
Soviet Union. Consequently, this new policy played an important role in the mass media, and as a result, democratic media system began to emerge. The new regime of Gorbachev and the new role of the media in society demanded a new type of ownership structure, and it was necessary for the media to adjust to this new function according to market principles and at the same time to speak on behalf of the whole of society and to critically observe the government’s performance. This process continued under Russia’s first
President Boris Yeltsin (Becker, 2004). The new legislation regulating mass media that was proposed in 1990 and then changed again in 1991 allowed for non-governmental commercial organizations and private individuals to own mass media outlets. As
Poberezhskaya (2013) argues, as a consequence the majority of the Party media outlets were replaced by independent press created on the basis of journalist collectives. This was the turning point when the “vertically” regulated media, which had been functioning in the USSR for several decades, was replaced by a “horizontal structure” which was more appropriate for the democratic principles of the new state (Richter, 1995). Due to
7 economic pressures caused by a competitive market, media outlets faced several problems and were forced to find appropriate ways to exist and to make a profit in the free market system (Kuznetsov, 2003). According to Zasurskiy (2001), the media outlets then aimed to find financially stable and powerful actors who, in turn, quickly realized that mass media could be used as a source of profit and as a tool to realize their corporate and commercial interests. Consequently, “after the temptation of being the 'fourth power', the media lost its real independence and quite quickly became a convenient tool for elite power and structure” (Azhgikhina, 2007, p. 1248). Lipman and McFaul (2001) describe this as being especially notorious because of the emergence of oligarchs who were creating monopolies in the media market. After the election of Vladimir Putin as the
Russian president in March 2000, a series of events occurred that restricted press freedom and again centralized media ownership in the hands of the government (Zassoursky,
2004). Vartanova (2012) characterizes the Russian media system since the 2000s as
“Putin’s monocentric political regime,” where the state was again increasingly using the
Russian media as a tool to support the vertical power system by creating a unified national identity as well as by marginalizing and relegating oppositional voices. Many oligarchs who were not in favor with Putin had to give up their media outlets to other oligarchs or organizations that had close state connections (Orttung, 2006).
According to the former Russian Press Ministry, the number of fully independent media organizations was very limited (Poberezhskaya, 2013). As of 2003, around 10 percent of the press was relatively financially independent, mostly because of collective ownership by journalists, whereas the majority of media outlets belonged to the
8 government or private owners (Nenashev, 2010a). In fact, Mickiewicz (2008) argues that the independent outlets only exist due to their insignificance, restricted target audience or their limited territorial influence whereas the influential organizations were to a large extent controlled by the state or by clients of the government. For example, the major TV channels, which cover 99 percent of Russian territory, are all under government control
(Poberezhskaya, 2013). Moreover, politically oriented newspapers mostly lost their circulation and can only exist by relying on money from the supporting parties. At the same time, the so called “informative-commercial press” (which is very close in its format to the Western tabloids) have the biggest circulation and popularity due to their flexibility and dependence on the market (Grabel'nikov, 2001).
Censorship and the Internet. According to Markov (2010), censorship of books appeared in Russia before the press was even introduced – that is, during the time of
Alexis I (1644-1676). The press censorship, however, emerged at the end of the reign of
Catherine II (1762-1796) and under Paul I (1796-1801) it became formally institutionalized (Poberezhskaya, 2013; Esin & Zasurskiy, 2003). However, in the 20th century, the Soviet Union expanded press censorship to a new level. The Soviet media,
(not only the press and electronic media, but also all kinds of printed matter, advertising, theatre and cinema performances, etc.) were strictly supervised, regulated and controlled by the Communist Party (Choldin, 2011). In this regard, Choldin (2011) has even coined the term “omnicensorship” (usually translated into Russian as всецензура) in order to describe the state where censorship influences all levels of society, affecting each individual (p. 294). Only in the second half of the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev
9 proclaimed the policy of glasnost and, even more so, after the end of the Soviet Union, was there hope for independence of the Russian media and thus freedom of speech
(Mickiewicz, 1999). As Oates (2007) argues, “[i]f the system is consumer-driven, then it is much less vulnerable to manipulation, either by a powerful group of elites or by inchoate masses” (p. 1281). According to Voltmer (2000), the period of perestroika and the few years after 1989 can be called the “honeymoon” period of press freedom in
Russia (p. 472). In 1991, for the first time in Russian history, freedom of speech and expression were legally defined in the form of the state law on mass media which
“prohibited censorship and barred government from shutting down media outlets ... except by court order” (Coyne and Leeson, 2009, p. 10). However, several media scholars note that the freedom of the press declined noticeably after Vladimir Putin became President, with the Russian government increasingly interfering with media autonomy (Becker, 2004, p. 147). Although in general the current situation is considerably better than in the Soviet era and a certain extent of pluralism is tolerated in
Russia, there are limits. These limits include issues that are of central importance to the government, such as national security and elections (Seaton & Pimlot, 1980). In fact, many international scholars and professionals, as well as foreign journalists and press monitoring organizations, have voiced a “constant worry” regarding the current informational behavior in Russia (De Smaele, 2007, p. 1299). In 2017, Reporters without
Borders ranked Russia 148th out of 180 in the Press Freedom Index (Press Freedom
Index 2017). The main criticisms of the Russian media system are its lack of pluralism, as well as persecution of journalists and censorship (BBC, 2012).
10 Just a few years ago, several scholars (Vinogradov, 2006; Yushchenko, 2007) expressed high expectations of the Internet, describing it as a new form of communication in Russia. Their main arguments were its interactivity, lack of censorship and the possibilities it offered for open discussion. However, the current situation in
Russia shows that over the last few years the Internet could not break the pattern of state control. Although Internet access continues to grow and is widely affordable to the people (about 73% of Russians used the Internet in 2015, and more than half of internet users were able to reach the medium via smartphones), there is significant evidence that with a few exceptions the government censors the mainstream media through the so- called “Roskomnadzor” (Russia’s federal executive authority responsible for overseeing online and media content) and organizes online propaganda campaigns (Freedom House,
2016). Especially after the mass protests in 2012 about Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency, the Russian authorities have not accepted any kinds of criticism, labeling it as a threat to state security and public stability. The consequences were significant restrictions of online expression and invasive surveillance of online activity, and these restrictions were even stepped up after the revolution and subsequent Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014 (Maida, 2017).
In conclusion, scholars and practitioners point out the presence of censorship in
Russia and state that even the development of the relatively new way of communication –
(the Internet) - did not break this pattern.
The Russian press model. On the basis of Russian media history, Elena
Vartanova (2012) describes the contemporary Russian media model as a synergy of
11 different features that might be found in various national contexts. She identifies the synergy of Western and Asian elements in the Russian media system as a distinct
“Eurasian hybrid system” (Vartanova, 2012, p. 140). Vartanova generally defines the
Russian media model as “statist commercialized,” based on factors such as national history, pressures of the authoritarian traditions of Imperial and Soviet Russia, cultural practices, features inherited from Soviet journalism, the emergence of the market in the media industry, and trends in journalism (p. 142). However, she also states that the contemporary Russian media model differs significantly from the three models established by Hallin and Mancini (2004): the Liberal, Corporatist and Polarized media models. As Hannu Nieminen (2009) noted, on the basis of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) categorization, “the Russian media system has been classified as closer to the
Mediterranean media system that to other Western-type systems, although no systematic analysis of the Russian media systems has yet been conducted” (pp. 108-9). Additionally, it also has many of the features of the polarized pluralist model and some of the liberal model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). However, Vartanova sees a key difference in political and cultural pressures of the authoritarian traditions of Imperial Russia and the Soviet
Union, and thus a strong relationship between the state, media and journalists that is legitimized by the shared belief of Russians in the regulatory and decisive role of the state (Vartanova, 2012, p. 140). This unique character of Russian society and culture may be rooted in its “geopolitical position, the complexity of its historical heritage, and the multiethnic, multicultural, and multilinguistic nature of Russia” (Vartanova, 2012, p.
140).
12 Propaganda. As the research shows, the term “propaganda” has been widely used in connection to Russian media and politics. According to Karlsen (2016), propaganda is an integral part of Russia’s political culture, and the Russian propaganda apparatus consists of four means which are tied together in a coordinated manner: media, social media, political communication and diplomacy, and covert active measures. A most cited definition of propaganda is “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 7). In the case of Russia, there has been a range of (information) activities, e.g. the invasion of Ukraine that would be morally and legally unacceptable in the West. However, as Karlsen (2016) states,
Russia exploits its relative advantage as an authoritarian state and portrays itself as “the protector of conservative family values while promoting an anti-EU message,” as well as anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism (p. 183).
A number of scholars agree that the prime purpose of Russian information campaigns is to destabilize other societies through massive psychological influence and thus to undermine their opponents’ political, social and economic systems (Franke, 2015;
Person, 2014; Giles, 2015; Nye, 2004; Wilson, 2005). Pomerantsev and Weiss (2014) even argue that Russia is using the principles of liberal democracy against itself in what they call “the weaponization of information, culture and money” (p. 14). This information warfare is highly politicized and its aims are to confuse, demoralize, and subvert society in order to split the West and to ensure Russia’s own regime security.
According to Nimmo (2015), there are three main reasons for Russia’s propaganda use.
13 Firstly, propaganda is aimed directly at achieving or supporting political objectives.
Secondly, the goal of propaganda is to win the understanding and support of the audience. Finally, propaganda also aims to discredit the West and to use what is described as the “4D- approach” to defend Russia (Nimmo, 2015). The 4D – approach describes the effort to dismiss any negative reporting, to distort the facts, distract by launching accusations, and to spread dismay by warning that attacking Russia will have negative consequences.
In order to achieve these goals, there is “Kremlin’s weaponised information toolkit” that includes the international broadcaster RT (formerly known as Russia Today), the manipulation of social media, as well as directed disinformation of Western media
(Karlsen, 2016, p. 183). Additionally, techniques such as hostile messaging and intimidation, demonstrations of military strength, cyber-attacks, as well as economic tools such as trade, the use of money, bribes and energy benefits play an important role
(Nye, 2004). The Russian media also apply several rhetorical techniques in order to influence society. Two NATO studies (2014; 2015) take a closer look at some of the rhetorical techniques, although it is important to note that these are not academic, but political and military sources. In other words, they are purpose-driven, most likely biased, and politically motivated. However, they provide a first overview of rhetorical means applied by the Russian media in order to provide the first insight into the issue.
According to a NATO study (2015) on political rhetoric, content, and narrative of the crisis in Ukraine, there were 22 manipulative techniques that have been applied by the three Russian media outlets, RT, Sputnik and Pervij Kanal (the First Channel) in order to
14 influence Euro-Atlantic values. Among them were such common techniques as authority, repetition, victimization, labeling and simplification. The main finding of the study was that Russian media were being used to redefine the meaning of democracy, media freedom, freedom of speech, and human rights. In addition, another NATO study (2014) showed that the Russian media aims to divide Western society by making people question their foreign and security policies as well as the credibility of their political leader.
As mentioned above, RT is the main international media channel, broadcaster and website in Russia. It has been widely presented as an outstandingly successful channel, receiving awards for good journalism, informing up to 700 million people around the world, and having the world’s most viewed YouTube channel. However, according to
Karlsen (2016), these figures and achievements are deceptive, since RT’s reach is apparently only the theoretical number of people that could view the channel, and in reality the real viewership is marginal. Additionally, RT has been widely criticized as a
“Kremlin propaganda mouthpiece where the main editorial line is to discredit Western perspectives, and thus indirectly demonstrating that there is no moral difference between
Russian and Western world order” (Karlsen, 2016, p. 187).
RT is complemented by the Sputnik International radio station, various websites, news and video agencies, as well as by the Russia Beyond the Headlines news supplement. Together, these media outlets have their own operations on social media and make up a news conglomerate operating in almost 40 languages. As Karlsen (2016) shows, in order to influence political decisions and to undermine trust in the web, these
15 media outlets also have a wide network of troll farms, which use false identities to conduct complex and large-scale manipulation of events in social media networks.
In conclusion, the Russian mass media went through 70 years of state control and had been suppressed for decades by the government, depending on the regime or leader in power. Moreover, many scholars see propaganda as an integral part of Russia’s current political culture. A number of techniques were introduces in this section that follow the overall aim of the Russian state-controlled media to destabilize other societies and to undermine their opponents’ political, social and economic systems.
The Coverage of the Russian Press
Since the aim of this study is to examine the coverage of Hillary Clinton and
Donald Trump in English online newspapers in Russia through a lens of a Critical
Discourse Analysis, it is also important to look at similar studies and the general coverage of the both Presidential candidates. This section presents other CDA studies of the Russian media and also provides an overview of the general press coverage of the candidates.
CDA studies of Russian media. There are several CDA studies of Russian print and online media in the literature. While the CDA studies of the national print newspapers mainly look at such issues as climate change (Poberezhskaya, 2016) and migration topics (Davis and Sosnovskaya, 2009), the online media studies focus on the representation of topics such as the Ukrainian conflict (Klimava, 2016), the Russian foreign politics (Chernysh, 2010) and the Syrian civil war (Abdulmalik Ali and Omar,
2016).
16 For example, in their article “Representations of otherness in Russian newspapers: the theme of migration as a counterpoint to Russian national identity,” Davis and
Sosnovskaya (2009) examined the coverage of migration topics in four of the most popular print newspapers (Kommersant, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and Novaya Gazeta) in Russia. The main finding of the study was that migrants were represented in three main ways: with a benevolent attitude (especially to “sisters and brothers” from the former Soviet republics); with a predominantly aggressive stance towards people who do not want to assimilate and integrate themselves (for example people from China and the Baltic states); and finally, with an ambivalent response toward the interactions between Russian and non-Russian attitudes, values, etc., mainly in relation to stories of Russians abroad in Europe or North America. Another example of
CDA research on the topic of Russian media perception of migrants is the work of
Rybina (2014), “A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Representation of Migrants in
Russian Press.” The study examined 22 news articles in two Russian newspapers: the liberal and oppositional Novaya Gazeta and the conservative state-owned Rossiyskaya
Gazeta. The main finding was that both newspapers covered migrants similarly: as a voiceless group of people who do not have the same rights as local residents.
On the other side, the CDA studies of the Russian online press especially focused on the coverage of different topics by the RT- and RIA Novosti- news agencies (now known as Sputnik). For example, in her study “Russian Foreign Policy Discourse During and After the Georgian War: Representations of NATO,” Chernysh (2010) analyzed
Russian foreign policy discourse on NATO during and after the Georgian war in the
17 state-run RIA Novosti news agency. The main finding of the study was the fact that the discourse on NATO in the news articles of RIA Novosti mainly reflected the official
Russian government narrative. Moreover, Chenysh (2010) also showed the usage of a dichotomy of “us” and “them” in the coverage on NATO in order to establish political frontiers between “insiders” and “outsiders” in the discourse.
Another study that investigated the positive self-representation and the negative other- representation in the Russian media is “Discourse and Manipulation in the
Representation of the Russian Military Intervention in the Syrian Civil War” (Ali and
Omar, 2016). The aim of the study was to examine how the Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war was represented in the CNN and RT coverage of the event. The main finding was that the view on the Syrian conflict differed significantly between the two media outlets in regard to the language choices and underlying ideologies. As Ali and Omar (2016) stated, the conflicting ideologies of both CNN and RT were highlighted by the use of positive self-presentation and negative other- presentation in order to support the self’s ideological positions and distort the other’s political stances.
In her work “The Ukraine Crisis as Represented in the News: A Critical Discourse
Analysis” Klimava (2016) discussed the role of language in the construction of ideological stances in newspapers from different countries representing the Ukrainian political crisis in four different online news portals: the New York Times, Deutsche Welle, the Moscow Times, and RT. The main findings of the study were that the investigated news texts served as means of legitimization of political decisions and actions, and that language made a large contribution to a naturalization of particular ideological
18 perspectives on events that later became common sense ideas and beliefs. Moreover,
Klimava could also confirm the hypothesis that RT mainly represents viewpoints on events which were in accord with its editorial line and the stance of the Russian government on the events. In doing so, the discursive tactic was again the dichotomy of oppositional “us” vs. “them” representation by portraying and characterizing Ukraine negatively, while giving the voice to the rebels and empowering them with credibility.
On the other hand, the Moscow Times did not take a stance in the crisis, attempting to identify existing problems in viewpoints and actions both of the West and Russia. This point of view reflected the newspaper’s aim to provide an alternative Russian opinion on events.
Coverage of the 2016 U.S. Presidential candidates in the Russian press.
Russian media, as well as people all over Russia, have expressed a high interest in the outcome of the U.S. Presidential election. The reason for the constant monitoring of the election can be explained by the fact that the next President could dramatically influence the relationship between Russia and the United States. Consequently, many people in
Russia (including people who may never have had a great interest in politics) were reading and watching the news, discussing the campaign goals of the candidates, and making assumptions and forecasts.
As Malenova (2016) states, in the Russian media the election was often portrayed as a circus, where each candidate was a magician who always pulled a new rabbit out of his or her hat (p. 68). The Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova even metaphorically called the U.S. Presidential election “a tango of three” because each time
19 the candidates were talking about their campaign goals they always mentioned Russia and the Russian President Vladimir Putin.
According to Kluver (2016), the Russian media depicted Donald Trump during the campaign as a “reasonable” candidate and mainly focused on Trump’s “business acumen, his strong leadership skills, and his willingness to pull away from NATO” (p.
67). In contrast to Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton was tied to numerous conflicts over
Russian engagement in Syria and the Ukraine. As Malenova (2016) points out, the coverage of the two Presidential candidates in general as well as their metaphorical portrayals were extremely contradictory in the Russian media.
On the one hand, Hillary Clinton was depicted as a stylish and self-confident woman and as a role model for young and ambitious women. According to Malenova
(2016), Clinton was even compared with a “brood hen that takes care of her nation, especially children and women” (p. 68). On the other hand, her mainly negative attitude toward Russia and open criticism of Vladimir Putin strongly contributed to the formation of a negative metaphorical image in the Russian media. For example, Hillary Clinton was portrayed as “pig in a poke” and a “queen of chaos” (Malenova, 2016, p. 68). She was even compared to a Russian fairy-tale character, Baba-Yaga, an old witch who steals, cooks, and eats her victims, who are usually children.
In comparison to Hillary Clinton’s metaphorical depiction, the portrayal of
Donald Trump was much more diverse. As Malenova (2016) argues, Trump was called a narcissist who is afraid to “lose face.” Moreover, similar to Clinton, Trump was also compared to a famous Russian fairy-tale character, Koshei the Immortal, who is
20 extremely rich and spends all his time counting his treasures. Malenova (2016), however, also mentions that many negative metaphors connected with Trump were also used in a positive way. For example, he was pictured as a devil in a good way because he can convince anyone of anything. Finally, the Russian media mostly uses zoomorphic metaphors in order to describe Trump and his campaign. As Malenova (2016) states, he was often called a “notorious and stubborn bull, putting the heat on his campaign, a rooster, who is loud, provoking and battailous, a red stallion, who is ready to win the
American rodeo” (p. 68).
After the election, however, there was an obvious satisfaction with Trump’s election, with wide reports of the members of the Duma breaking into applause once
Trump’s victory was announced. Several articles from Western press outlets such as The
New York Times and the Independent were reprinted in the Russian newspapers, stating that Trump’s victory meant vindication for Russia (Kluver, 2016, p. 67). One such article published by Inopressa, which originated in The Daily Beast was titled “Now it is Putin’s world.”
In conclusion, this section of the study has shown that the CDA studies of the
Russian media mainly focused on the coverage of particular events in the Russian media.
The studies showed in particular that the RT coverage reflects the official government position. The main tactic identified in these studies is the “us” vs. “them” dichotomy in order to contrast the positive Russian side and the negative side of the opponents as well as to construct particular ideological perspectives on events. This short overview has also shown how persuasive and, in some ways manipulative, the election coverage in the
21 Russian press was. This is the reason why it is important to look at the ways both candidates were represented in the Russian media with the intent to sway public opinion and perhaps to bring about a change of attitude toward the candidates.
22 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework
After a brief overview of the Russian media in general and its representation of the Presidential candidates, it is important to look at the theoretical framework for this paper. Thus, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses editorials and opinion columns from a general point of view. The second part defines the general concept of ideology and examines its functions. The third part looks at the general principles of the CDA and its connections to concept of ideology.
Editorials and Op-Ed Columns
Due to the fact that newspapers largely provide the basis of our social and political knowledge, they are an important component of our daily lives. Their main role is to transmit news and they are often regarded as a source of ideological significance. As
Bell (1991) argues, a newspaper includes three major categories: news or news reports, opinion, and service information. The news or news reports category shares information about the latest news events and it is the predominant type of text in a newspaper. The service information category of a newspaper provides its readers with lists of such things as sports results, television programs, share prices, weather forecasts, etc. Finally, opinion columns, also called “editorials,” are texts aiming to present the newspaper’s own views on an issue. In other words, editorials are comments and evaluations on the news events of national concern that have already been reported in the newspaper. Such news items may be “political, economic, educational, religious or general socio-cultural issues that border on the welfare of the people” (Ashipu, 2013, p. 48).
23 Generally, editorial pages as opinion texts can be seen as a kind of “media discourse,” which belongs to a large class of opinion discourse (van Dijk, 1995; Farrokhi and Nazemi, 2015, p. 157). Fowler (1991) and Reah (2002) state that the main aim of an editorial is not only to arouse interest and curiosity in readers but also to influence the reader’s views and speak for the news organization’s point of view through analysis and comments on the news. Bhatia (1993, p. 170) and Ogunsiji (2001) also argue that an editorial offers the views and opinions of the newspaper, and is normally regarded as the newspaper’s analysis, discussion, opinion or verdict on the issues of the day. Due to their ideological role editorials are expected to be linguistically complex. According to van
Dijk (1995), opinion, as it is used in editorials, is a type of belief which has an evaluative dimension based on social and cultural grounds as well as norms and values.
Consequently, editorials are argumentative and persuasive in nature since they reflect the writing preferences of their background cultural context and language. In other words, it can be assumed that since newspapers are generally cultural artifacts, the way that editorials persuade their readers as well as the strategies the editors employ differ among different cultures and languages. As Reah (2002) discusses, every message in a newspaper must be transmitted through the medium of language, which necessarily encodes values into this message. Thus, language gathers its own emotional and cultural
“loading,” the type of which strongly depends on the nature of the culture in which the language exists (Reah, 2002, p. 55). However, Reah (2002) also points out that the beliefs, values and language of a culture change over time, and that language can keep people from critically evaluating their opinions and views.
24 According to van Dijk (1992), editorials have several interactional, cognitive, socio-cultural, and political functions. Firstly, due to their argumentative and persuasive function, editorials aim to persuade readers to change their opinions and attitudes about a certain topic, or to undertake a certain action (Farrokhi and Nazemi, 2015, p. 157). Thus, newspaper editors intend to influence the social cognitions of the readers. Secondly, the editors aim to reproduce their own attitudes and ideologies among the public.
Consequently, they usually use diverse styles and discursive strategies in order to express the voice of the news organization’s opinions and often the beliefs of the particular dominant group that the organization represents. Thirdly, editorials tend to address directly or indirectly influential news actors, the social and political elites, and also, but not primarily, the reading public as a whole. This assumption leads to the conclusion that the readers can be seen more as observers than addressees of this type of discourse of one of the power elites, e.g. politicians (van Dijk, 1992, p. 244). This is also the reason why editorials not only express opinions to the public, but also attack, defend, or give advice to the authorities. Fourthly, as van Dijk (1992) discusses, editorials are politically important for an implementation of power, since they can be described as “strategic moves in the legitimation of the dominance of a specific elite formation (e.g., the government, the conservative party) or in the maintenance of power balances between different elite groups in society” (p. 244). Finally, editorials also have a cultural function due to their normative and ideological nature. They formulate and reproduce acceptable norms and values by which news events may be evaluated.
25 Due to their persuasive nature, editorials cannot be considered to be examples of objective texts (Tabassum, Shah & Bilal, 2013). Rather, they are representatives of dominant newspaper ideologies and thus, they make up a relevant body of text for the examination of predominant ideological assumptions in a society (van Dijk, 1992).
According to Henry and Tator (2002), when analyzing the ideological role of news media it is essential to study editorials, because they are expressions of “the broader ideological stance of the newspaper’s owners and managers” (p. 93). Consequently, the emphasis on the difference “between ‘us’ and ‘them’” will highly depend “on the political orientation of the newspaper” (van Dijk, 1992, p. 245).
In contrast to a traditional editorial page, the term “op-ed” (short for “opposite the editorial page”) usually stands for “a page of special features usually opposite the editorial page of a newspaper” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2017). Op-eds tend to appear mostly in the written media (for example a newspaper) with a strong, informed, and focused opinion written by external editors with no institutional connection to the media outlet and thus, usually do not represent the views of anyone in the editorial division (Karam, 2014). As David Shipley (2004) from The New York Times explains, op-ed editors look for articles that “cover subjects and make arguments that have not been articulated elsewhere in the editorial space.” For example, if the editorial page has a particular, long-held view on a certain topic, the editorial division would be more inclined to publish an op-ed that disagrees with that view.
In conclusion, there is great difference between an editorial piece and an op-ed.
While editorials with their persuasive character represent the newspaper’s dominant
26 ideologies and their own views on a particular issue, op-eds are opinion texts written by external editors and thus mostly do not resemble the opinion of the editorial division.
Ideology and Language
The ideology concept. According to van Dijk (1998a), the concept of ideology is
“one of the most elusive notions in the social sciences” (p. 23). Consequently, summarizing the long theoretical debate about this notion would be impossible in this thesis.
Although the concept of ideology is vague, it is often used in the media and in the social sciences. As van Dijk (2006) states, the everyday usage of the term “ideology” is mostly negative, and typically refers to the “rigid, misguided, or partisan ideas of others: we have the truth, and they have ideologies” (p. 728). The reason for this negative meaning goes back to Marx and Engels, for whom ideologies were a form of “false consciousness” of the working class, who may have had misguided ideas about the conditions of their existence due to their indoctrination by the ruling class. However, originally, “ideology” did not have this negative meaning. The French philosopher
Antoine Destutt de Tracy first coined the term “ideology” in his book Eléments d’Idéologie (1801-15) in order to denote a new discipline that would study “ideas.”
Nowadays, especially in contemporary political science, this notion is used in a more neutral, descriptive sense, for example, to refer to political belief systems (Freeden,
1996).
The concept of ideology has been defined by various schools of thought and by a vast number of different scholars working on ideology, power relations, hegemonic
27 trends as well as discourse studies. Consequently, there are multifarious definitions, interpretations and connotations of the term ideology. For example, Marxists define ideology as the “production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness” and situated it within class struggle and domination, with its main function being to legitimize the hegemonic order (Marx and Engels, 1970; as cited in Kopytowska, 2012, p. 3). The representatives of the concepts of “false consciousness” (Engels, 1893), “ideological state apparatus” (Althusser, 1971), and the “manufacture of consent” (Gramsci, 1971), view ideology as an important component within the society-power construct, inevitably in the service of the ruling class (Kopytowska, 2012). Habermas (1987) then extended the notion of “false consciousness” to “fragmentation of consciousness” (Habermas, 1987, p.
355) and defined ideology as a form of systematically distorted communication which operates in line with the strategic interests of powerful communicators, and which is a constituting part of “internal colonisation” (Habermas, 1987, p. 332-373). In fact, the key role he attributed to language:
Language is also a medium of domination and social power. It serves to legitimate
relations of organized force. In so far as the legitimations do not articulate the
relations of force that they make possible, in so far as these relations are merely
expressed in the legitimations, language is also ideological. Here it is not a
question of deceptions within language, but of deception with language as such.
(Habermas, 1979, p. 130)
Contemporary theoretical approaches on ideology focus on its dialectic relationship with power in the context of dominant groups, political economy, gender and
28 culture (for more information see, among many other sources, Eagleton, 1991; Larrain,
1979; Thompson, 1984, 1991). Additionally, there is also a growing focus on ideology and its discursive representation. While Eagleton (1991) refers to ideology as “ideas and beliefs which help to legitimate the interest of a ruling group or class by distortion or dissimulation” (p. 30, as cited in Calzada Perez, 2003, p. 4), for Hall the concept encompasses “…the mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works” (Hall, 1996, p. 26).
While numerous theoretical definitions of ideology exist, for the purpose of this study, van Dijk’s (1988) definition is particularly well suited to study ideology through a critical discourse analysis approach. According to van Dijk (2006b), the definition of ideology is complex and multidisciplinary. For this reason he proposes several theses in order to clarify his notion of ideology. The first one is that ideologies are primarily some kind of “ideas,” i.e. belief systems. The second assumption implies that there are no private, personal ideologies. Thus, ideologies as belief systems are socially shared by the members of a collectivity of social actors. The third thesis assumes that ideologies are rather “fundamental” or “axiomatic,” than some kind of socially shared beliefs, such as sociocultural knowledge or social attitudes (van Dijk, 2006b). Consequently, they control and organize other socially shared beliefs of a rather general and abstract nature. Finally, van Dijk (2006b) argues that ideologies are gradually acquired and sometimes change
29 over a time period and thus, consequently need to be relatively stable. In order to acquire or change ideologies, usually many discourses and experiences are necessary.
Moreover, as van Dijk (2006b) discusses, ideologies have many cognitive and social functions. Firstly, as previously mentioned, ideologies organize and ground the social representations shared by the members of (ideological) groups. Secondly, they form the basis of the discourses and other social practices of the members of social groups as group members. Thirdly, ideologies allow members of social groups to organize and coordinate their actions and interactions in regard to the goals and interests of the group as a whole. Finally, van Dijk (2006b) argues that ideologies function as the part of the socio-cognitive interface between social structures of groups on the one hand, and their discourses and other social practices on the other hand. Consequently, some ideologies may function to legitimize domination as well as to articulate resistance in relationships of power (e.g. feminist or pacifist ideologies).
Although these are quite general assumptions used in order to describe the meaning of ideology and its functions, they still define ideology in a different way than several other approaches. To sum things up, ideologies are neither personal beliefs of individuals nor are they necessarily dominant or “negative.” Moreover, ideologies are not the same as discourses or other social practices that express, reproduce or enact them, and in addition they are not the same as any other socially shared beliefs or belief systems.
Ideology and politics. According to van Dijk (2006a), as soon as ideologies acquire political functions in the field of politics in addition to their general social functions, they become “political ideologies.” The concept of political ideology, or the
30 idea that political opinions and attitudes are connected and linked together in a coherent system, has been theorized as particularly important for a well-functioning democracy
(Carmines and D’Amico, 2015). In fact, it is widely recognized that the field of politics is highly ideological due to the fact that when there are different and opposed groups, power, struggles and interests are at stake. Consequently, in order to be able to compete, political groups must be ideologically conscious and organized, which means that political discourses and many phenomena in the political field such as elections, political campaigns, propaganda, etc. are potentially ideological (van Dijk, 2006b). A vast amount of literature on political discourse shows that it is largely through discourse that political ideologies are acquired, explicitly expressed and formulated, learned, propagated, and contested (Chilton, 1995, 2004; Chilton and Schäffner, 2002; Wilson, 1990, Wodak and
Menz, 1990). However, since such political situations do not simply cause political actors to speak in such ideological ways, van Dijk (2006a) proposed a mental model of the political situation, which defines how participants experience, interpret, and represent aspects of the political situation that are relevant for them. He calls such specific mental models that control all aspects of discourse production and comprehension “contexts.” In other words, “political discourse [thus] is not only defined in terms of political discourse structures but also in terms of political contexts” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 733). A detailed explanation of the question of how context models control political discourse and what cognitive processes are involved is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is firstly important to mention that pragmatic context models control the speech acts and other acts of the current situation. Consequently, particular statements can be interpreted
31 differently, depending on the power or relationships of the participants, their political position, and their intentions (van Dijk, 2006a). Secondly, pragmatic context models control the selection of information in the mental model that in turn defines what discourse participants talk about. Thirdly, context models generally control all levels of style of a political discourse, for example lexical choice, syntactic structure, and other grammatical choices. Finally, context models control the overall format or schema of political discourse, for example the overall organization of a party program, the layout of a political advertisement, the conversational structure of a political interview, etc. (van
Dijk, 2006a).
In conclusion, this section has shown that there are numerous definitions, interpretations and connotations of the term ideology. However, it is important to note that ideologies are neither personal beliefs of individuals nor are they necessarily dominant or “negative.” Since the field of politics is highly ideological, political groups must be ideologically conscious and organized. Moreover, as van Dijk (2006a) states, political discourse is defined in terms of political discourse structures as well as in terms of political contexts.
The Critical Discourse Analysis
There are a vast number of definitions of the term “discourse” in the literature, ranging from ongoing communication in a certain situation to a theoretical view of the study of language in general. Even one of the most influential figures in the field of discourse, French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926 – 1984), uses different definitions of discourse in his studies. As Iara Lessa (2006) states about Foucault’s work Archeology
32 of Knowledge (1972), the latter refers to discourses as “systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of actions, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (p. 285). In other words, he sees the role of discourses in wider social processes of legitimation and power. Despite different approaches to discourse analysis, contemporary theorists agree on the fact that language, which is the medium of interaction, creation and dissemination of discourses, plays an important role in the creation of regimes of truth (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999;
Wetherell et al., 2001; Lessa, 2006). In fact, scholars explicitly look at the ways in which discourses construct, realize and justify realities by applying the method of Discourse
Analysis (DA) (Pietikäinen, 2000). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), however, is an important branch of DA that studies how language represents the world from different points of view, and encodes ideological positions while highlighting “the traces of cultural and ideological meaning in spoken and written texts” (O’Halloran, 2005, p.
1946).
General principles of CDA. According to van Dijk (1998c), CDA is “a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (p. 352). Thus, researchers take an explicit position with regard to social inequality and aim to understand, expose, and resist it. Their main focus is to present various ways in which these inequalities are enacted by the privileged and resisted by the underprivileged. However, Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) perceived CDA as a multi-disciplinary approach which aims to analyze the relation between “discourse
33 and social and cultural developments in different social domains” (p. 60). In relation to this approach, Fairclough (1995) notes that the main aim of CDA is to “systematically explore the opaque relationship of causality and determine between a) discursive practices, events, and texts, and b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes” (p.132). Another discourse scholar, Janks (1997), sees CDA as a form of social practice which is tied to specific historical contexts. The social practice is thus the means by which existing social relations are reproduced or contested and different interests are served. However, Janks (1997) also relates discourse to relations of power which can be examined through language.
CDA is an approach that is generally interested in analyzing “social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-methodical approach” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 2). Consequently, CDA is characterized as an interdisciplinary multi-method approach with a broad spectrum of several approaches to analyzing discourse rather than being an isolated discipline or a homogenous theory on its own. It addresses different approaches that engage in the social analysis of discourse, and these approaches “differ in theory, methodology, and the type of research issues to which they tend to give prominence” (Wodak and Fairclough, 1997, p. 258).
The central principle of CDA is its critical approach. The approach is aimed specifically at the use of issues of power, hegemony and resistance in various fields of language. Consequently, it also refers to aim of CDA to reveal hidden relationships and causes between discourse and society that are not obvious to the people involved in the
34 discourse (Fairclough, 1992, p. 9). Thus, “critical” implies showing connections, relations and causes that are hidden.
History of Critical Discourse Analysis. There are four mainstream approaches to
CDA that played an important role for its development: Critical Linguistics (CL), the
Sociocultural approach, the Discourse-Historical approach, and the Socio-Cognitive approach (van Dijk, 2007).
The first and one of the most influential linguistically-oriented critical approaches to discourse analysis is the Critical Linguistics approach, which was developed by
Fowler, Kress, Hodge and Trew (1979). According to Fowler (1991), “critical linguistics simply means an enquiry into the relations between signs, meanings and the social and historical conditions which govern the semiotic structure of discourse, using a particular kind of linguistic analysis” (p. 90). Moreover, in his research, he is mainly concerned with media’s representation of events and the linguistic analysis of that representation, as well as the ideology encoded by it. Fowler’s (1991) focus lays on the “mystification” analysis of hard news texts that occurs with the use of certain grammatical structures which are thought to veil certain aspects of reality, thus encoding ideology.
The second approach was introduced by Norman Fairclough (1995). In his book
“Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language” (1995), Fairclough developed his Sociocultural analysis on the basis of social theories. He argues that language is closely linked to social realities, and that there is a linkage between discourse, ideology and power relations within society that must be examined (Fairclough, 1995).
Consequently, Fairclough (1995) critically examines the micro-structures of discourse
35 (linguistic features) and the macro-structure of society (societal structures and ideology) in specific situations where relations of power, dominance and inequality are present in discourse.
The third approach is the Discourse-Historical approach proposed by Wodak
(1996; 2001) and Wodak et al. (1999). Since the 1980s, this approach has focused on the impact of historical socio-political contextual factors. As Wodak (2000) states:
In investigating historical, organizational and political topics and texts, the
discourse-historical approach attempts to integrate much available knowledge
about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in
which discursive ‘events’ are embedded. Further, it analyzes the historical
dimension of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres
of discourse are subject to diachronic change (Wodak 1996). Lastly, and most
importantly, this is not only viewed as ‘information’: at this point we integrate
social theories to be able to explain the so-called context. (p. 187).
After CDA scholars recognized the importance of context to the meaning of the text, they began to examine non-verbal aspects of the text, the so-called “semiotic devices” (Wodak, 2000). Van Leeuwen (1996) was the first to propose a framework for examining how social actors can be represented with visual devices in the media.
The final approach to CDA is van Dijk’s (1985; 1998b; 2002) framework, which is based on the Socio-Cognitive approach. As previously mentioned, van Dijk (1998c) generally believes that texts are based on the ideological beliefs of individuals or groups, and therefore one of the main functions of CDA is to reveal the sources of dominance and
36 inequality in discourses. The Socio-Cognitive model proposes that cognition mediates between “society” and “discourse.” According to van Dijk (1985), individual memories and certain mental models shape our perception and comprehension of discursive practices, and at the same time they imply stereotypes and prejudices when these mental models become rigid and over-generalized. In his CDA studies, van Dijk (2000) used macro-level (language, discourse, verbal interaction) and micro-power as control
(inequality, dominance), access and discourse control, context control, the control of text and talk, as well as mind control as theoretical concepts.
CDA and ideology. Critical discourse studies can involve many dimensions. One important dimension focuses on ideologies framed and propagated in various discourses in social contexts. As Fairclough (1989) states, one of the main objectives of CDA is to deconstruct ideological assumptions that are hidden in written texts or oral speech in order to resist and overcome various forms of power. Deciphering ideologies is essential because "ideologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as pictures, photographs and movies" (van Dijk, 1995, p. 17). Henry and Tator (2002) also define
Critical Discourse Analysis as “a tool for deconstructing the ideologies of the mass media and other elite groups and for identifying and defining social, economic, and historical power relations between dominant and subordinate groups” (p. 72). In other words, CDA mainly focuses on how social relations, identity, knowledge, and power are constructed through written and spoken texts in communities, schools, the media, and the political arena (Luke, 2005). As Wodak (2002) argues, since ideology can be seen as an important
37 means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations, “CDA takes a particular interest in the ways in which language mediates ideology in a variety of social institutions” (p. 9). This is due to the fact that social institutions often use particular patterns of language in their discourse in order to mediate various ideologies.
Media studies scholars have widely used Critical Discourse Analysis in order to identify the underlying ideologies of mediated racist representations of minorities and immigrants (Hall, 2000; Henry and Tator, 2002; van Dijk, 1987, 1991, 1992, 1993b). Van
Dijk in particular has used a discourse analytical approach to the study of ideology in news discourse. For example, in his essay “Opinions and Ideologies in Editorials,” van
Dijk (1996), analyzed a newspaper editorial in order to identify how the mental representation of opinions and ideologies were eventually manifesting themselves in discourse of a specific genre. The main finding was that many opinions in editorials are not expressed explicitly and that the degree of explicitness largely depends on the nature of the opinions themselves, on the context (model), the role and political position of the newspaper and also its relation to the government. In his essay “Ideology and Discourse
Analysis: Ideology Symposium,” van Dijk (2004) analyzed several examples from a debate on asylum seekers in the British Parliament, and proved that there are a number of ways that ideologies may be expressed in newspapers. For example, van Dijk (2004) has identified the expressions of ideology in the use of the actor description, metaphors, comparisons, euphemisms, hyperboles, and so on. Finally, in his work Ideology and
Discourse Analysis (2006b) he analyzed an editorial from the Sunday Telegraph from
August 8, 2004 using a multidisciplinary theoretical framework, the so called “ideology
38 interface,” in order to study the discourse. Here, he applied different categories such as language use, interpretation of communication of beliefs or cognition, and actions and interactions in a social context.
Several researchers have integrated van Dijk’s concept of the ideological square
(1995; 1998a; 2006a) in their research. According to van Dijk, this is a strategy of a positive “ingroup” description and a negative “outgroup” description (1998a, p. 44). In other words, it is a theoretical concept of a binary opposition of two groups which is realized through a double strategy. For example, the study “Editorials and Ideologies,” which was conducted by Ahmadi and Safaei Asl (2013), investigated the way in which
English newspaper editorials in Iran expressed their political ideologies in the ninth presidential election. Here the authors mainly focused on some of van Dijk’s ideology carrying categories, such as metaphors, comparisons, euphemisms, hyperbole, etc. In their study “A Discourse Analysis of Elite American Newspaper Editorials – the Case of
Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Izadi and Saghaye-Biria (2007) applied van Dijk’s concept of the ideological square in order to analyze the editorial coverage of Iran’s nuclear program by three elite American newspapers. In a similar manner, Ahmadian and Farahani (2014) examined how the power of language influences and formulates public opinion in terms of the ideological portrayal of Iran’s nuclear program. Through the application of van
Dijk’s framework of the ideological square (especially lexicalization, presupposition, etc.), the study showed how the editorials of The Los Angeles Times and Teheran Times represented the same issue differently.
39 Poorebrahim and Zarei (2012) looked at the relationship between language and ideology by examining the representation of Islam and Muslims in the media outlets The
Independent, The New York Times, The Herald Tribune, and The Times. The analysis demonstrated that Islam was frequently stereotyped with a negative representation of
Muslims. Similarly, in his study “A Critical Discourse Analysis of Religious Othering of
Muslims in the Washington Post”, Tahir (2013) also analyzed ideological representation of Muslims in one of the articles published in The Washington Post which covered protests carried out by Muslims against the publications of the blasphemous cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Through the application of van Dijk’s notion of the ideological square, Tahir was able to explore the underlying beliefs of the in-group and out-group presentations. The main finding was that the article described Muslims and their actions negatively by treating them as “others.” Another example of the applicability of the ideological square is the study “Investigating language and ideology - A presentation of the ideological square and transitivity in the editorials of three Kenyan newspapers” by
Matu and Lubbe (2007), which uses van Dijk’s notion of the ideological square in order to illustrate how different newspaper editorials portrayed various political groups in the run up to the general elections in 1997 in Kenya. The main goal of the study was to show the role of newspaper editorials in articulating conflicting ideological positions in the election reporting.
In conclusion, this section has shown that CDA is primarily concerned with language use as a socially constructed practice – i.e. in particular social, political and/ or cultural contexts. Consequently, it can be assumed that the main goal of the CDA is to
40 explain the complex relationships between the structure of texts and their social functions when they are used to create and maintain power relations and structures. In addition, four mainstream approaches to CDA (Critical Linguistics, the Sociocultural approach, the
Discourse-Historical approach, and the Socio-Cognitive approach) were introduced and briefly explained. Finally, this section introduced a number of studies that have widely used Critical Discourse Analysis in order to identify the underlying ideologies in terms of immigration, racism, and religion.
41 Chapter 4: Methodology
The following chapter introduces the main method of CDA and within that, three different analytical CDA frameworks that have been applied in this paper in order to analyze various aspects addressed in the research questions. The first paragraph of this chapter generally defines and explains the CDA approach by Siegfried Jäger (2015). The second paragraph presents the social actors’ representation framework by van Leeuwen
(2008). The final paragraph of this chapter elaborates on van Dijk’s notion of the ideological square (1995; 2006a).
Siegfried Jäger’s Critical Discourse Analysis
The German discourse researcher Siegfried Jäger (2015) was the first to publish a
German - language book about the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis using
Michal Foucault’s discourse theory. In his book, Jäger also integrated the discourse analytic work of Jürgen Link (1982). This section first defines the main terms used when describing the structure of discourses and then presents a toolbox defining the most important tools.
The structure of discourses. Before starting a Critical Discourse Analysis there are several fundamental issues to address and some key terms to define. First of all, every discourse consists of the so-called “discourse strands” which are “flows of discourse that center on a common topic (Jäger and Maier, 2014). Each discourse strand comprises several sub-topics, which can be summarized into groups of sub-topics. Moreover, each strand consists of a multitude of elements that Jäger calls “discourse fragments” (Jäger,
2001, p. 47). In other words, a discourse fragment generally refers to a text or part of a
42 text that deals with a particular topic. Moreover, a text contains fragments from various discourse strands that are usually entangled with each other to a “discursive entanglement” (Jäger, 2015, pp. 47-48). Consequently, an entanglement of discourse strands can take the “form of one text addressing various topics to equal degrees, or of one text addressing mainly one topic and referring to other topics only in passing” (Jäger and Maier, 2014). A statement where several discourses are entangled is called a
“discursive knot” (Jäger, 2001, p. 48).
Central to Jäger’s CDA approach is the use of collective symbols that are known to all members of a society. These are “cultural stereotypes,” also called “topoi,” which are handed down and used collectively (Jäger, 2001, p. 35). According to Jäger and Maier
(2014), collective symbols provide the “repertoire of images from which we construct a picture of reality for ourselves.” Through these symbols, recipients interpret reality and have reality interpreted for them, especially by the media. Another category that is fundamental for a critical discourse analysis is normalism (Jäger, 2015, p. 53). In his book, Jäger (2015) focuses on the Jügen Link’s theory of normalism. According to Link
(2012), “[n]ormalism is to be understood as the entity of discoursive and practically- intervening procedures, dispositives, instances and institution by which “normalities” are being produced within modern societies”2 (p. 138). In other words, it is a category that regularly produces sectoral and common normalities.
2 Definition translated from German: „Unter Normalismus sei die Gesamtheit aller sowohl diskursiven wie praktisch-intervenierenden Verfahren, Dispositive, Instanzen und Institutionen verstanden, durch die in modernen Gesellschaften „Normalitäten“ produziert und reproduziert werden“ (Link, 2012, p. 138) 43 Since different discourse strands operate on different “discourse planes” (also
“societal locations”) that influence each other (e.g. politics, the mass media, education, etc.), they can be characterized as “social locations from which speaking takes place”
(Jäger and Maier, 2014). Additionally, discourse planes consist of various sectors, for example TV, newspapers and the Internet, which are different sectors of mass media
(Jäger, 2001, p. 49). Another important key word is the “discourse position,” which describes the “ideological position from which subjects, including individuals, groups and institutions, participate in and evaluate discourse” (Jäger and Maier, 2014). For this study, it is important to note that media also can take up discourse positions that can be seen in the media’s reporting. However, individuals develop a discourse position because they are exposed to various discourses and thus form them into a specific ideological position or worldview in the course of their life.
Finally, since all events are rooted in discourse, it is important to look at so-called
“discursive events” (Jäger, 2001, p. 48). These are events that appear on the “discourse plane of politics and the mass media intensively, extensively and for a prolonged period of time” (Jäger and Maier, 2014). Consequently, they are important because they influence the future development of a discourse.
A toolbox for discourse analysis. In this section, a brief summary of Jäger’s process of Critical Discourse Analysis is presented. Within the scope of this thesis, it is impossible to provide detailed methodological justifications for each of the CDA phases, but these can be found in Jäger’s book “Kritische Diskursanalyse” (2015).
44 According to Jäger (2015), the first step in a Critical Discourse Analysis is the conception and planning phase. Here, the researcher must choose and explain his or her general subject and discourse plane. A theoretical concept, several research questions and the general purpose of the study should be described and explained extensively. The second phase is the material identification phase. The concrete corpus for analysis must be identified, delineated, and all specifications must be justified. In the subsequent collection phase, a general characterization of date sources must be provided. For example, such bibliographical information could be general descriptions of the media outlets, their readers, their political orientation, etc. The next step is the analysis. This is divided into two parts: the structural analysis and the detailed analysis. A structural analysis should roughly capture the characteristics of articles on particular aspects of interest, such as illustrations, layout, the use of collective symbols, the vocabulary, and so on, and identify which forms are typical for the newspaper (Jäger, 2015, pp. 95-97). This step is important since it helps to identify typical articles for the detailed analysis of typical discourse fragments. The identification of main topics, subtopics, and discursive entanglements is the center of attention. After all these phases, a characterization of the newspaper’s discourse position begins to emerge. The next step is a detailed analysis of typical discourse fragments (Jäger, 2015, pp. 98-108). For this purpose, discourse fragments that are typical for the particular newspaper are selected on the basis of the structural analysis. A detailed analysis should cover the following aspects of the typical discourse fragments: the context, surface of the text, rhetorical means, content and ideological statements, as well as the discourse position and the overall message of the
45 article. At the end of the detailed analysis, the interpretations of single aspects are combined into a total interpretation of the article. Finally, the last step proposed by Jäger
(2015, pp. 108-111) is the synoptic analysis. Here, a final assessment of the newspaper’s discourse position is made. The findings from the structural analysis and the detailed analysis are interpreted in relation and in comparison to each other.
In conclusion, this section defined all fundamental key terms of Jäger’s CDA approach and in detail described the general structure of a discourse. Moreover, every step in the procedure of the CDA analysis was identified and summarized in a brief toolbox for CDA.
Social Actors Representation by van Leeuwen
In his study on the representation of social actors, van Leeuwen (2008) introduces
“a sociosemantic inventory of the ways in which social actors can be represented” (p. 32).
His model allows the critical enquirer to “bring to light […] systematic omissions and distortions in representations” (van Leeuwen, 1993, p. 194). To this end, several morpho- syntactic categories of his inventory were used in this study to look at the ways Hillary
Clinton and Donald Trump were represented in the editorial positions. The selected categories will be briefly explained below.
First, van Leeuwen (2008) discusses the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion.
According to him, exclusion is an important aspect of Critical Discourse Analysis which is divided into radical and less radical exclusion (van Leeuwen, 2008). The radical exclusion “leave[s] no traces in the representation, excluding both the social actors and their activities” (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 29). However, partial exclusion falls into two
46 subclasses: suppression, in which “there is no reference to the social actor(s) in question anywhere in the text,” and backgrounding, in which the excluded social actor in a specific activity shows up later in another part of the clause, sentence or text in general (van
Leeuwen, 2008, p. 29). According to van Leeuwen (2008), suppression can be realized in different ways, for example through agentless passive voice, non-finite clauses, nominalizations, etc.
Furthermore, van Leeuwen (2008) discusses the inclusion of social actors through activation and passivation (p. 33). He states that social actors can be activated, or represented as the active, dynamic forces in an activity, or passivated by being represented as undergoing the activity, or as being the recipient of a particular action.
Passivated social actors can be also subjected (treated as objects in the representation) or beneficialised (positively or negatively, benefitting from the action). Another category is individualization and assimilation (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 37). Within the text, social actors can be referred to as individuals (individualization) or as groups (assimilation).
The category of indetermination addresses the way in which social actors are represented as unspecified, anonymous individuals or groups (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 39). Moreover, social actors can be represented either in terms of their unique identity (nomination), or in terms of identities and functions they share with others (categorization). Nomination is typically realized by the use of a proper noun, which can be formalization (surname only, with or without honorifics), semi-formalization (given name and surname), or informalization (given name only) (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 41). The category of categorization is divided into functionalization, identification and appraisement (pp. 42).
47 Functionalization occurs when social actors are referred to in terms of an activity, or in terms of something they do. The subcategory of identification defines social actors in terms of what they, more or less permanently, are. Finally, appraisement occurs when social actors are referred to in terms that evaluate them as being good or bad, loved or hated, admired or pitied.
In conclusion, parts of Theo van Leeuwen’s framework of the representation of social actors, as one powerful tool of enquiry within Critical Discourse Analysis, was adopted and adapted in this thesis. In this regard, CDA is the impact of power structures on the production and/or reproduction of knowledge and its effect on identity and subjectivity of the members of the community. Thus, social actors are seen as a discourse analytical category and as a textual exemplification of models of the self and others
(individual and collective).
Van Dijk’s Ideological Square
Despite the great variety of literature on ideology, there are very few studies that explore the details of the relations between discourse and ideology. However, according to van Dijk (2004), there are numerous books in Critical Linguistics and Critical
Discourse Analysis that have dealt with at least some aspects of this relationship: for example, Fairclough (1989), Fowler et al. (1979), Fowler (1991), Hodge and Kress
(1993), van Dijk (1998b), Wodak (1989), Wodak and Menz (1990), Wodak and Meyer
(2001), etc.
In fact, most authors agree that the relation between ideologies and discourse is complex and often quite indirect. Moreover, discourse is not always ideologically
48 transparent, and discourse analysis does not always reveal the editor’s real ideological beliefs (van Dijk, 2004), which is why van Dijk’s concept of ideology is non- deterministic, since it always depends on the definition of the communicative situation by the participants, i.e. it depends on context. According to van Dijk (2006b), a number of ideologies are relevant in situations of competition, conflict, domination, and resistance between groups, and thus are a part of a social struggle. This fact explains why many of the mental structures of ideologies and ideological practices are polarized on the basis of the “in-group/out-group differentiation,” typically “Us” and “Them” (van Dijk, 2006a, p.
730). In this regard, van Dijk (1998a) offers a systematic approach to the study of discourse which entails the study of discursive structures, i.e. at the semantic, lexical, and rhetorical levels. Moreover, he also contributes a theoretical concept he calls the
“ideological square,” which concentrates on the strategies of a positive “in-group” description and a negative “out-group” description (van Dijk, 1998a). The double strategy of this binary opposition comprises the semantic macro strategies developed by van Dijk which provides the features for positive self- presentation and negative other- presentation (Figure 1).
49
Figure 1: Van Dijk’s notion of Ideological Square. Own depiction, 2017.
As van Dijk (1998a) observes, the ideological square acts as a kind of justification for the presence of inequality in the society by polarizing “in-groups” and “out-groups” through the process of emphasizing “Our” good properties/actions and “Their” bad ones as well as mitigating “Our” negative properties/actions and “Their” positive ones (van
Dijk, 1998a, p. 35). In other words, the discourse tends to be in “Our” favor, in “Our” interest, or in any other way positively and persuasively contribute to “Our” self- presentation and impression management. However, conversely, the discourse also tends to support the negative presentation of “Them,” who are mostly our enemies, opponents, or the “Others” in general. In conclusion, the term “Us” always refers to positive saying and beliefs in a social context while the term “Them” refers to negativity, condemnation and other negative stances.
There are numerous discursive structures and strategies that aim to help to acquire, express, enact and reproduce ideologies in a discourse (van Dijk, 2004). It is important, however, to point out that ideologies may only influence the contextually variable structures of a discourse, since general grammatical structures cannot be 50 ideologically marked. They are the same for all speakers of the language and thus virtually ideologically neutral, although there is a debate in the literature on whether some general grammatical rules are really ideologically “innocent” (van Dijk, 2004).
There are systematic means to examine discourse at various levels when looking for ways that ideologies are expressed or enacted (or not) in a discourse.
The following summary of van Dijk’s ideology-carrying categories, however, cannot uniquely express and communicate a single ideological meaning; all presented structures may also be used for other reasons and functions. The first important ideology- carrying category proposed by van Dijk is the surface structure (van Dijk, 1998a, p. 45).
As van Dijk (1995, p. 23) argues, ideological surface structures of discourse primarily signal special meanings or model structures. These encompass phonological and graphical features that are usually only the conventional manifestations of underlying meanings. The second ideology-carrying category that this thesis focuses on is the syntax
(van Dijk, 1995, p. 24). There is a solid research basis for the ideological implications of syntactic sentence structures. At least in English, ideological opinions on positive or negative acts may be differentially expressed using various syntactic forms and manipulation techniques, such as word order or transactional structures of sentences. The third ideology-carrying category proposed by van Dijk (1995) is the lexicon. According to the author, “lexicalization is a major and well-known domain of ideological expression and persuasion as the well-known “‘terrorist’ versus ‘freedom fighter’ pair suggests” (van
Dijk, 1995, p. 25). In order to refer to the same persons, groups, social relations or social issues, the editors usually choose in their texts special words, depending on the discourse
51 genre, personal context, social context and sociocultural context. Furthermore, as
Nordlund (2003) states, the most obvious lexico-semantic manipulation is the use of words with emotional or cultural loading. In this context, Andersson and Furberg (1996) differentiate between the “plus words” (positively loaded words) and “minus words”
(negatively loaded words) (p. 128). The fourth ideology-carrying category is the local semantics (van Dijk, 1995, p. 26). This category mainly focuses on the management of meaning in a text. Here, van Dijk (1995) especially mentions the implicitness in the discourse as a technique. For example, the information that is unfavorable for the in- group in a discourse may tend to remain implicit whereas the information that is damaging to the out-group will be made explicit and vice versa. The fifth ideology- carrying category is global semantics, especially the topics of a discourse (van Dijk,
1995, p. 27). Due to the fact that topics of a discourse generally tend to subjectively define the information in a discourse that the editor considers being the most relevant or important, the “topicalization” may carry underlying ideological meanings. The last ideology-carrying category that plays an important role in this thesis is rhetoric and the rhetorical structures of discourse (van Dijk, 1995, p. 29). Van Dijk (1995) especially points out the surface structure repetition (e.g. rhyme, alliterations) and semantic figures such as metaphors that may carry underlying ideologies and support the ideological square.
Furthermore, in his paper “Politics, Ideology, and Discourse” (2006a), van Dijk elaborates on 27 ideological strategies, among which the fundamental dichotomy of “self positive- representation” and “other negative- representation” stand out. The selected key
52 terms of the framework are the following: Actor Description; Categorization; Disclaimer;
Evidentially; Hyperbole; Implication; Irony; Lexicalization; National Self Glorification;
Number Game; Polarization; Presupposition; and Vagueness (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 735).
In conclusion, this section closely looked at van Dijk’s notion of ideological square and thus construction of a dichotomy of “Us” vs. “Them” within the discourse. A number of ideology-carrying categories were identified and explained for the further analysis.
53 Chapter 5: Analysis
This chapter presents the Critical Discourse Analysis of the three selected English media outlets in Russia. The researcher applied in this thesis three different CDA frameworks proposed by Jäger (2015), van Leeuwen (2008), and van Dijk (1995; 2006a) that were introduced earlier in the chapter IV. The following paragraphs describe and explain every phase in the analysis process in detail.
Applying the Critical Discourse Analysis Framework
The conception and planning phase. The main topic of this study is the ideological representation of U.S. Presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald
Trump in the editorial sections of three English online newspapers in Russia: Sputnik
International, Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH) and The Moscow Times (MT). The thesis looks closely at the depiction of both candidates as social actors in the selected
Russian media outlets by identifying particular rhetorical and lexical techniques and strategies that the editors apply in order to express their own, but mostly the papers’, corporate and ideological views. Moreover, the study investigates the notion of ideological group building within the discourse and describes ideological positions that these groups represent.
In order to address the main research question of how both U.S. Presidential candidates were ideologically depicted, this thesis focuses on mass media and politics as discourse planes in the sector of newspapers; more specifically, English online newspapers in Russia. In addition, it looks at discourse fragments in editorial sections that have been chosen on the basis of their relation to the coverage of the 2016-17
54 American election campaigns. The editorials of different newspapers are quite diverse in their styles and textual strategies, such as in the selection of lexical items, syntactic structures, and modes of argumentation, which suggests an individual voice for each newspaper. Thus, the main reason for concentrating on the editorials and opinion columns lies in the fact that editorials usually have a hidden social and philosophical commitment to the ideology of the editor and to the interest of the readership (Rafael,
1995). This commitment therefore makes them more argumentative and persuasive than other newspaper categories. Moreover, understanding ideology is of special significance since it can help to educate readers in coping with the realities of the twenty-first century, increasing their awareness and enhancing their critical thinking.
The discourse strands that are especially interesting for this study are the U.S.
Presidential candidates’ views on Russia and their campaign statements on their future
Russia policies. Both of these discourse strands directly affect the discourse strand of
Russia-U.S. relations, as well as the question of which candidate would contribute more to an improvement in these relations. The reason for looking at the above-mentioned discourse strands is the study’s focus on Russian media outlets and the fact that this analysis may reveal the newspapers’ corporate ideological views on America. It is very likely that in the cases of Sputnik International and Russia Beyond the Headlines, this ideological view resembles the Russian government’s official view on the United States, since both outlets are government controlled.
55 The material identification and the data collection phases.
Material identification. A synchronous analysis has been conducted in this study, which focused on a specific period of time within a discourse or a discursive event (Jäger,
2004, p. 171). The paper examines the editorial pieces in the last four months before the
58th quadrennial American presidential election, (July to November 8th 2016). On July
26th 2016, Hillary Clinton was nominated as Presidential candidate at the 2016
Democratic National Convention and thus became the official opponent of Republican nominee Donald Trump. It was of interest to look at how her nomination, her rivalry with
Donald Trump, and her attitude toward Russia were depicted in the discourse of the
Russian online media outlets.
There are a number of English online newspapers in Russia that mainly target an international English-speaking audience, internationally-oriented residents of Russia, and
Russian citizens abroad. Table 1 presents the top 10 English online newspapers in Russia sorted by their global Alexa traffic rank, Facebook fans, and their Twitter followers.
56
Last updated on November 8th, 2017
There were a number of criteria for the selection of the news portals for this analysis. Firstly, language played an important role. All of the selected media outlets broadcast their news and editorials in English, as well as other foreign languages.
Secondly, a focus on global politics and international orientation of the media outlets was important in order to look at the elections in America. Thirdly, the presence of an editorial section and/or an opinion column was crucial for this study. For example,
Meduza is a popular and independent media outlet in Russia. However, it was excluded from the analysis because it only focuses on issues of domestic politics and does not have an editorial section. Finally, the scale of the outlets was also a relevant criterion. The
57 media outlets needed to be popular and well-known among social media and internet users in general. Although RT is the most widespread Russian broadcaster that is also watched and read internationally (Alexa global ranking 340), the media outlet was excluded from this research. The reason for this decision was RT’s focus on an op-ed section that contains special features that are in opposition to the editorial page of the outlet. However, although RT also features an editorial blog with a range of opinions prepared by a team of in-house authors, only one editorial piece could be identified that fulfilled all of the selection criteria of this study, which was not enough for a constructive analysis.
After reviewing the most important and popular English online newspapers in
Russia and taking all the selection criteria into consideration, three media outlets were chosen for a closer analysis: Sputnik International, Russia Beyond the Headlines and The
Moscow Times. The first two media outlets are most likely to represent the “official” governmental view. The Moscow Times’ angle of reporting was considered worthy of investigation as an alternative, non-governmental Russian opinion on events.
Sputnik International. The Sputnik International is a modern news agency located in Moscow, whose offerings include newsfeeds, websites, social networks, mobile apps, radio broadcasts and multimedia press centers. The agency covers global political and economic news with the mission of spreading Russian politics and its worldview abroad, and has several regional offices located in key regions and countries around the world.
The editorial staff of Sputnik consists of more than 1,000 employees and operating in 35
58 languages, including English, Spanish, French, German, Arabic, Chinese, etc. (Sputnik
International, 2017).
Sputnik International’s predecessors were the state-run news agency RIA Novosti and the Voice of Russia radio service, which were disbanded in 2013. The Sputnik brand was launched on November 10, 2014 and has rapidly expanded since. With its slogan
“Sputnik tells the untold,” Sputnik produces international as well as some national news, although most of its content appears to be shared across their various sites.
The Alexa traffic ranking gives an indication of its reach, ranking the website
Sputniknews.com as the number 897 most popular site globally, number 177 in Germany, and number 4,784 in the United States (Alexa, 2017a). In addition, relative to the general internet population, male graduates are greatly overrepresented at this site. Additionally, the media outlet has been repeatedly accused of bias as well as the spreading of disinformation and “fake news” (MacFarquhar, 2016; Dearden, 2017). Moreover, the
Center for European Policy Analysis described Sputnik International as a Russian propaganda outlet that does not provide a balanced coverage of international events, but instead a “one-sided hostility to the mainstream” (Nimmo, 2016, p. 5).
Russia Beyond the Headlines. The internet-based outlet Russia Beyond the
Headlines (RBTH) has an international print supplement that has been published since
2007 by the government-owned Rossiyskaya Gazeta in partners’ newspapers in 14 countries of the world. RBTH has more than 40 partners worldwide which include such media outlets as The Daily Telegraph (UK), The Guardian (UK), Handelsblatt (GER),
Big News Network (USA), Foreign Policy (USA), etc. Moreover, its website is available
59 in 17 languages. RBTH offers news, opinion, analysis and comments on far-ranging issues such as politics, culture, business, science and public life in Russia in order to contribute to a better understanding of Russia in the world. According to its website,
RBTH’s target audience is a “wide range of educated, socially active and wealthy people who read major international newspapers” (Russia Beyond the Headlines, 2017). Indeed, relative to the general internet population, people who attended graduate school are overrepresented on this site (Alexa, 2017b). RBTH’s global Alexa ranking is 18,762, whereas it is ranked 9,731 in Japan and 33,171 in the United States. However, various
Western media outlets see in RBTH yet another venue to reach globally influential audiences with the Russian government line. For example, The Guardian has criticized its competitor, The Daily Telegraph, for continuing to publish the “Russian propaganda supplement” (Greenslade, 2014).
The Moscow Times. The Moscow Times (MT) is the only English-language weekly newspaper published in Russia. It was founded in 1992 and its website moscowtimes.com was launched in 2009. Until 2005, MT was owned by Independent
Media and in 2006 it began its alliance with the International Herald Tribune. In 2015, the Finnish media company Sanoma sold its one-third stake in Vedomosti and its ownership of The Moscow Times to Demyan Kudryavtsev, a veteran Russian media manager and a former director of Kommersant (Roth, 2015). In July 2017, the ownership changed to a foundation based in the Netherlands (Brizgalova, 2017).
According to its website, MT is an independent newspaper that “tells the truth and makes a difference” (The Moscow Times, 2017). Its target group is foreign citizens
60 residing in Moscow and internationally oriented Russians. Indeed, in comparison to its global Alexa ranking (54,569), MT is a popular site in Russia (33,759) and in the United
States (30,523) (Alexa, 2017c). In relation to the general internet population, male graduates are overrepresented on this site.
MT is known for publishing both pro-Russian statements and critical statements about the Russia government. In the light of the Ukrainian Crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, MT was criticized for its anti-Putin spirit. In relation to these accusations, the website has allegedly been repeatedly hacked (Luhn, 2015).
The data collection phase. The analysis was made from a total of 27 articles publicly available on the online websites of Sputnik International, RBTH, and MT. For
Sputnik International and RBTH the keywords “election,” “Donald Trump,” and “Hillary
Clinton” were used in the search field of the archive to identify relevant articles. Two filters were set in the field of “advanced search options:” the time period from July to
November 2016 and the section of opinion. As a result, 118 articles in Sputnik
International and 37 articles in RBTH could be found. Due to the extensive amount of material and the parameters of this study, it became necessary to limit the search. This was achieved through the exclusion of op-eds (articles with a remark at the end that the views in the article were personal), interview pieces, comments on YouTube videos of the candidates, analysis of the presidential debates, and finally, articles where the focus was not on the candidates. In the end, 16 articles in Sputnik International, and six articles in RBTH could be identified for this analysis.
61 In the case of MT, only manual search via scrolling within the defined period of time was efficient. Nine articles could be identified in the period of July – 8th November
2016. After the exclusion of op-eds, interview articles and explanations of prominent media Russian expressions regarding the election, four articles could be identified. Due to the fact that these articles were not suitable for an extensive analysis, a decision was made to extend the time period and to also look at the time period of January to June
2016. Within this time period, four additional articles could be identified. However, due to the above mentioned selection criteria, only one article could be taken into consideration. In the end, five articles were selected for the analysis.
In fact, it is important to note that contingent on a synchronous analysis, a restriction or, as in the case of MT, the extension of time, may lead to new discourse strands that may affect other discourse strands. Moreover, it is also important to address the question of why there is such a wide gap between the numbers of editorial pieces among the selected media outlets. Firstly, the number of opinion pieces is highly dependent on the ownership structure and thus the size of the media outlet. It is likely that
Sputnik International and RBTH take advantage of being state-funded and are thus financially secure, whereas MT cannot benefit from its size and growth-possibilities due to financial pressures. Secondly, the number of opinion pieces is also dependent on the focus and the corporate line of the media outlet. Consequently, since MT mostly covers domestic issues, it is highly unlikely that a large number of editorial pieces would cover the American election.
62 The analysis phase. This paragraph presents a structural, detailed, and synoptic analysis of the editorial positions of Sputnik International, RBTH, and The Moscow
Times. Each step is described and explained in detail.
The first step in the analysis phase is the structural analysis. A tabularization of all articles in order to identify their typical features was conducted. This list includes bibliographical information, notes about the topics covered in the articles, and any special characteristics that were important for the analysis (Jäger, 2015). These characteristics are not arbitrary and thus are explained in detail.
The structural analysis was divided into three parts. The first part included all the general, bibliographical information of the articles, such as the headline, date, categorization, summary, visual signs as well as collective symbolism and normalism.
The headline is the first orientation for the reader and is designed to attract the readers’ attention. The publication date is important for the analysis in order to highlight the effects of particular discourse events. In other words, in the case of a notable accumulation of articles in a special period of time, it can be implied that they are related to a particular discursive event. The graphics in the articles, such as the use of photographs, drawings, videos, and Tweets, and also the choice of font and the font size of the text and the headlines, structured and defined the text and left room for interpretation regarding the author's intention. In addition, a short summary of the articles and the identification of the main topic as well as subtopics within various discourse strands are important because they reflect the views and textual understanding of the potential readers, especially since an author’s intended effect of an article may not always
63 resemble its actual effects on the recipients. However, due to the fact that every recipient reads articles from the background of his or her ideological views and knowledge, there is a high possibility of subjective reactions to an article. Thus, a summary may help to reflect these subjective means and identify the actual intention of the editor. Additionally, the identification of the main topic and subtopics of the text are important since they help to identify the discourse fragments that are appropriate for the following analysis. Finally, the identification of collective symbolism and normalism was also conducted since both categories were fundamental for a discourse analysis, as mentioned in the Chapter IV.
The second part of the structural analysis contained parts of van Leeuwen’s
(2008) framework of social actors representation. The following categories of the social actors’ representation were gathered: exclusion with backgrounding or suppressing; inclusion with its associated subcategories of activation or passivation, individualization or assimilation, and nomination or categorization of social actors.
Finally, in the third part of the structural analysis, the notion of the ideological square was at the center of attention. The identification of the main ideological groups within the discourse, the rhetorical and lexical features, and a comment column for the researcher’s remarks were the main categories in this regard.
After the structural analysis, a detailed analysis of the selected articles was conducted. Here, the paper covered follows aspects of the selected discourse fragments: context, surface of the text, rhetorical means, content and ideological statements, as well as the discourse position and overall message of the article. Finally, a synoptic analysis, a final assessment of the newspapers’ discourse position was made. For this purpose, the
64 findings from the structural analysis and details were interpreted in relation and in comparison to each other.
Sputnik International.
Structural Analysis. After reviewing all the material and conducting a structural analysis, several important discourse strands and discourse fragments could be identified.
Firstly, Russia and its attitude to the elections as well as the Russian-U.S. relations in general were the focal points of Sputnik International’s discourse. The main discourse strands were Clinton’s anti-Russian election campaign, the candidates’ connections to Russia, and Russian opinion on which candidate would contribute more to an improvement in Russian-U.S. relations.
The discourse strand of Clinton’s anti-Russian election campaign was tightly entangled with the discourse strand of the candidates’ business or personal connections to
Russia. The discursive knot here is Clinton’s several statements on Trump’s alleged connections to Russia, which, according to the editors, was the tactic she used in order to distract attention from her own situation: “The Democratic nominee doubled down on the disturbing tactic of drumming up anti-Russia hysteria in a bid to smear Donald Trump and to label any reports not favorable to her candidacy as akin to treason.” (S2)
“By playing the “Russian card” against Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton is trying to divert the public opinion from a series of scandals, haunting the former Secretary of State.” (S1)
Moreover, the discourse strand of the candidates’ connections to Russia could be divided into two parts. The first stated that Trump does not have any ties to Russia, or that at least there is no proof of such connections: “Despite all the media investigations
65 and even more accusations, no substantiated evidence has been presented demonstrating that Trump has any significant business or personal interests in Russia which would create a conflict of interest” (S9).
On the other hand, the editors of Sputnik attributed Clinton's allegedly provable connections to Russia (S1) as well as Saudi Arabia, thus having ties to Islamic extremism
(S9): “While Trump’s links to Russia appear to be nothing more than hot air, there is clear evidence of Clinton playing a role in a deal that provided control of one of
America’s largest uranium mines to Moscow,” (S1) and “[H]er [Clinton’s] Foundation has taken in tens of millions of dollars from the Saudis, and [that] her top advisor seems to have been a supporter of hardcore Islamist ideology” (S9).
The final discourse strand addressed the question of which candidate would be best for Russia. The main tendency of the discourse was that both candidates are not perfect for a good and stable Russian-U.S. relationship in the future. However, as indicated in Sputnik 3, when choosing “the lesser of the evils,” “the predictable foe”
Clinton is slightly more favorable than an “unpredictable friend” Trump.
The discourse strand of Clinton’s anti-Russian election campaign was also tightly entangled to the discourse strands of Clinton’s e-mail scandal and the role of Russia in it, as well as the Russian alt-right movement.
Within the discourse strand of WikiLeaks and the hacking attack on the DNC, the editors established a normalism of the fact that Russia was an innocent player in the middle of an international scandal. According to Sputnik 7, the involvement of Russia in the WikiLeaks dump of 20,000 Democratic Committee emails was absurd, since such a
66 “conspiracy theory one would expect from a wrinkly ten-year-old James Patterson novel cast aside for its absurdity even in the realm of fiction” (S7). The editors either stated that there is no evidence of Russia’s involvement in the hacks, or they implied that Russia was innocent by creating an axiom: “Let’s be real. No proof of Russian involvement in the hacks has yet been presented” (S5).
Another discursive entanglement was the alt-right movement in Russia in connection with the discourse strand of Clinton’s anti-Russian policies. Two main discourse positions deserved closer attention. Firstly, the editors discussed Clinton’s statement on Putin being the “godfather of extreme nationalism” (S2) that had established a connection to Trump’s campaign tactics. According to Sputnik 14, Clinton was baited by Trump into concocting “one of the most bizarre narratives in modern political thoughts that Putin is the “‘grand godfather’ of the alt-right movement” (S14). In other words, Trump deliberately manipulated Clinton in order to benefit from her anti-Russian policies. Secondly, the editors discussed the question whether or not Trump is a racist.
The consensus of the discourse was that Trump is not a racist and being an inspiration for the radical hate groups was not his intention (S12).
Other discourse strands were the foreign policies of the candidates, especially their Middle East policies, as well as the candidates’ campaigns and polls. The main statement on the Middle East policies of the candidates was that no matter who became the next U.S. president, Washington’s Middle East policies were likely to become more confrontational than under the Obama presidency. In the discourse strand of candidates’
67 campaigns and polls, the main attention lay on the supporters of the candidates and their position in the polls.
Nine articles out of 16 selected for this analysis were published in August 2016.
Their main focus was on Russia, the candidates’ connections to Russia, and U.S.-Russian relations. The editorials published in October and the beginning of November discussed the questions of which of the two candidates would contribute more to an improvement of the U.S.-Russian relations as well as whether there was a possibility for Clinton’s impeachment due to her email scandal.
Detailed Analysis. In this section the study focuses on the analysis of two articles:
“Cold War 2.0: Hillary Claims a Putin-Led “‘Alt-Right’ - Conspiracy is Against Her”
(S2) and “Next US Leader Through Russia’s Eyes: Predictable Foe or Unpredictable
Friend?” (S3). These articles were selected for a detailed analysis due to the fact that in sum they represent the main discourse strands of Sputnik International and exhibit the media outlet’s typical features, such as visual signs, rhetoric, etc. Sputnik 2 was published in August 2016, shortly after Clinton called Putin the “grand godfather of this global brand of extreme nationalism” at a campaign event in Nevada, and several days after Clinton’s campaign manager Robby Mook accused Trump’s adviser Michael Flynn of being on the payroll of “Russia Times, a Kremlin propaganda outfit.” Sputnik 3, on the other hand, was published in November 2016, four days before the election. Both articles appeared in the opinion section of the news agency and no authors’ names were mentioned, which is typical of the editorial section of Sputnik.
68 The main topic of Sputnik 2 was Hillary Clinton’s anti-Russian campaign, especially her statement on Putin being the “godfather of extreme nationalism.”
Additionally, the discourse strands of the WikiLeaks email dump and Russia’s role in it, as well as Russian media and the “alt-right” movement were at the center of attention.
Sputnik 3 closely looked at both Presidential candidates from the Russian point of view and compared them in terms of their views on the anti-Russian sanctions related to the annexing the Crimea, as well as their future Syria and Russia policies. In addition, such discourse strands as Russia’s role in the WikiLeaks release of emails, Trump’s connections to Russia, and Russian-U.S. relations were touched on in the editorial piece.
As for the surface of the text, both articles included photographs (S2, S3), a YouTube video (S2) and two Tweets (S2). The photographs in each article referred to the editorial piece and built a connection to the text. Consequently, since Clinton’s anti-Russian campaign and her allegations against Putin in Sputnik 2 were at the center of attention, a photograph of them both, talking to each other and smiling, was the header of the article.
Also included in the article were a YouTube video titled “Godfather of extreme nationalism,” where Clinton blames Putin for the rising popularity of right-wing leaders, as well as two Tweets by journalist Michael Tracey, who questioned Clinton’s word choice. On the other hand, since Sputnik 3 generally looked at both candidates from
Russia’s point of view, the photograph in this editorial piece was relatively neutral. The picture showed the seal of the President of the United States of America. Furthermore, eight pull quotes/callouts could be identified, highlighted through bold font and a yellow lateral bar. These were quotes from individuals who Sputnik considers to be experts on
69 Russian-U.S. relations. While Sputnik 2 did not have any subheadings, the Sputnik 3 text was divided into four parts through subheadings: “Hawkish Clinton,” “Unpredictable
Trump,” “Man is Known by Company He Keeps,” and “Choosing the lesser of Evils.”
The passage “Hawkish Clinton” described the politics of Clinton and the passage
“Unpredictable Trump” looked at Trump’s campaign. The last two passages “Man is
Known by Company He Keeps” and “Choosing the lesser of Evils” compared both candidates and decided which of them gave Russia hope for a “relief of tensions with
Washington” (S3).
As for the rhetorical means of Sputnik 2, author’s word choice was increasingly colloquial (i.e. double down on the disturbing tactic, drumming up, etc.). Several minus words were used in connection to Hillary Clinton, especially in the lead of the editorial piece: disturbing tactic, anti-Russia hysteria, to smear Donald Trump, treason, and so on.
These minus words were combined with collective symbols of the circus and/or fighting rhetoric. For example, Clinton’s campaign manager Robby Mook “ reached into his bag of tricks and pulled out the Russia card” and “That once defense damage control shield has since been converted into a sword” (S2). The “Russian card” metaphor is widely used in Sputnik’s discourse. First, the “Russia card” was used by Mook in order to blame the country’s intelligence services for the document leak, and thus with the help of “Hillary camp,” the DNC and the corporate media to create “false narratives” about Bernie
Sanders to propel Clinton to the nomination. Consequently, Russia played an important role in the American election long before Clinton’s nomination, and the “Russian card” was used as a “defense damage control shield” in order to protect the Democrats’
70 reputation. Secondly, the “Russian card” as “shield” has been converted into a “sword,” since Mook again used it to “slander the reputations” of U.S. three-star general and
Trump adviser Michael Flynn by accusing him of being “on the payroll of the Russia
Times, a Kremlin propaganda outfit,” and to “defame opposition media outlets into oblivion” (S2). In other words, the “Russian card” tactic first used by Democrats to protect themselves was then used to attack their opponents. The Sputnik 2 author, however, corrected Mook by clarifying that by “Russia Times” he probably meant RT and refuted his accusations by implying, without providing any proof, that Flynn was not on the payroll of RT, and claiming that neither RT nor Sputnik (although not mentioned in the discussion) were government controlled. Furthermore, through the repetition and thus normalization of the indication that neither RT nor Sputnik were government controlled, the author builds a discourse knot to Clinton’s statement that Putin was the “grand godfather of this global brand of extreme nationalism,” which includes individuals such as Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, as well as “treasonous” and “racist” media outlets such as Breitbart, RT and Sputnik. However, the author justified his statement by again implying that the coverage of these outlets was highly critical of Trump’s support by various “white supremacist groups” and that RT has recently received yet another nomination for an Emmy for their reporting. Moreover, the article defined the term of
“alt-right” as “news read by non-establishment conservatives” and made the criticism that the term was now linked to “bigotry and racism – positions no doubt held by a small percentage of that particular cohort” (S2). Another important aspect is that the term “Cold
War 2.0” was used in the headline of the article. The term was probably adopted from
71 journalist Michael Tracey, who three days before the article was published used this term in his Tweet in connection to Clinton’s statements on Putin. His Tweets were included in the article, although the author only referred to them in the last paragraph of the article.
In conclusion, the ideological view of the editorial piece Sputnik 2 is generally that the Russian media outlets RT and Sputnik were not government controlled, that
Russia had nothing to do with the WikiLeaks email dump, that Putin and the Russian media were not racist, and that only a small percentage of the alt-right movement was bigoted and racist. The discourse position of the article can be summarized as follows:
Clinton’s anti-Russian campaign and her latest statements about Putin and the Russian media do not have a solid ground.
As for the rhetorical means of Sputnik 3, the author’s choice of words was clearly ideological. For example, the editor referred to Clinton more negatively as a “predictable foe” and “hawkish Clinton,” and described Trump as an “unpredictable friend,” “a successful businessman,” and an “experienced businessman but inexperienced politician”
(S3). Several metaphors were used within the text, but the most prominent one was the subheading “Choosing the Lesser of Evils.” According to Sputnik 3, the Russian-U.S. relations had reached the lowest level since the Cold War by the end of President Barack
Obama presidency. Thus, this metaphor conveyed perfectly the overall discourse position of the article that both candidates were not perfect for an improvement of these relations and that when faced with selecting from two immoral options, the one which is least immoral should be chosen. In order to support this statement, the author used a special argumentation structure by contrasting both candidates. First, the author gave a very
72 detailed described of Clinton’s anti-Russia campaign and her negative attitude toward
Russia, substantiating it by particular examples such as her views on Syria policies and the U.S. missile system in Eastern Europe; this widely contradicted the Russian views.
She provoked Russia by supporting the strengthening of ties between NATO and
Ukraine, and she “cripple(d) economies” of several EU states by insisting on anti-Russian sanctions over Ukraine. Moreover, Clinton accused Russia of cyberattacks and of being behind the WikiLeaks release of emails in order to influence the American election. The author’s comment on this was the fact that Russian top officials have denied the allegations. However, neither any particular names of these “top officials” nor some other proof and/or explanations in this regard were made. By the end of the argumentation, one short positive statement about Clinton was made in the form of a quote from an expert, who stated that Clinton had at least tried to improve ties with Russia when she was the
Secretary of State. Secondly, the author showed in great detail all positive aspects about
Trump, such as his sympathy for Vladimir Putin, his likely willingness to (at least partially) lift the sanctions, his doubts on NATO’s relevance, and his Russia-friendly
Syria policies. Moreover, Trump denied Clinton’s accusations of having any ties with the
Kremlin and rejected the idea of any interference from Moscow. According to the editorial piece, “FBI initiated a case against some of his advisers, but has not found any evidence, according to local media reports” (S3). However, this is a prominent example of an indetermination in the text, where the author did not specify the social actors and depicted them as anonymous individuals. Neither the group of “his advisers,” nor the
“local media reports” were specified. At the end of the argumentation, the author offered
73 a brief criticism of Trump by stating that his “extravagant” manner makes some analysts doubt his trustworthiness. It is important to note that the author used a specific visual tactic in order to emphasize Trump’s positive aspects. Through some callouts within the article, the author set the focus on Trump-positive quotes from pro-Trump experts such as
John Mearsheimer and on Clinton-negative quotes from anti-Clinton experts such as
Richard Sakwa. The quotes from experts who criticized Trump as well as experts who praised Clinton, however, were not highlighted through a callout. In addition, a partial direct quote of Trump was highlighted, where he criticized Obama’s politics on Syria and
Clinton for her anti-Russian attitude.
In conclusion, although both candidates had diametrically opposed views on
Russia, neither of the candidates gave Russians a real hope of a relief in tensions with
Washington. Consequently, since there was no prospect for improvement, it would be important to maintain the status-quo. In a callout, the expert Nikolai Zlobin concluded that predictability in foreign policy is always better than unpredictability, which unsubtly means that “predictable foe” Clinton was better than “unpredictable friend” Trump.
Synoptic Analysis. After a detailed analysis, several tactics applied by Sputnik
International in order to influence the public opinion could be identified. The first and most obvious tactic is Sputnik’s application of visual signs, especially the callouts and/or pull quotes. These are usually short pieces of text set in larger type than the rest of the page and intended to attract attention. In the case of Sputnik, quotes from experts, government officials, social actors, Western media outlets, and the editors’
74 statements/conclusions could be identified. They were especially used in order to highlight experts’ positive opinions on Trump or experts’ negative opinions on Clinton.
The second tactic applied by Sputnik International was the spreading of misinformation, the withholding of some important facts on particular issues, or implying information without providing any evidence. For example, the media outlet stated that neither RT nor Sputnik were state-run media outlets, although there was evidence that they were both operated by companies funded by the Russian government (Intelligence
Community Assessment, 2017). Moreover, Sputnik established a normalism of the assumption that Russia had nothing to do with the hacks on the Democratic National
Committee in 2016. However, according to a declassified report (Intelligence Community
Assessment, 2017), Vladimir Putin ordered the hacks of the DNC in order to improve
Trump’s election chances. Another example of misinformation and withholding of information was the downplaying of the meaning of the term “alt-right,” as well as stating that Trump is not racist (S12). The author deliberately omitted to mention
Trump’s racist and sexist comments on women and his ties to the racist scene.
The third tactic was the victimization of Trump and Russia (S1, S5, S6, S10).
Sputnik International consistently cast Trump as the target of Clinton’s accusations and unfair coverage from traditional US media outlets that, according to Sputnik, were subservient to a corrupt political establishment: “The press celebrates Clinton as a brave heroine, while repeatedly pointing out that Trump is a baseless coward who manipulates fear” (S10). This tactic was intensified through an assimilation of Hillary Clinton and other Trump’s opponents into groups while individualizing Donald Trump within the
75 discourse. Consequently, the “Clinton camp,” “Clinton team,” “Hillary’s team,” Clinton’s campaigners,” “Clinton supporters,” “team Clinton” (S1, S6, S7, S14, S16) as well as
Trump’s undesirable supporters “radical hate groups,” “white supremacists,” and “racist hate groups” (S12) are against one individual Donald Trump. In other words, Trump’s opponents operated in groups while he appeared to operate alone against them all. This created an impression of unfairness and contributed to the intention of the outlet to depict
Trump as a victim. However, additional victimization of Russia through Clinton’s accusations regarding the WikiLeaks email dump and sanctions over Ukraine portrayed
Russia as Trump’s partner in crime, although Sputnik paradoxically denied any connections between them.
Finally, the word choice as well as the rhetoric of the discourse in terms of
Clinton’s anti-Russia campaign revealed several interesting facts about Sputnik’s tactic.
Such expressions as “anti-Russian hysteria” (S2, S5, S13), using the “Russian card” (S1,
S2), “conspiracy theory” (S2, S7, S13, S14), the “Cold War” (S2, S3, S7),
“McCarthyism” (S6, S7, S8), and choosing the “lesser of two evils” (S3, S13) were very prominent within Sputnik’s discourse. “McCarthyism” is a term used to describe the practice of making accusations of subversion without any regard for evidence (S6). The term refers to U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy and was used in Sputnik International’s discourse in terms of Clinton’s accusations of Russia being involved in the WikiLeaks affair. As already mentioned, the metaphor “Russian card” also stood for Russia’s involvement in the American election and was often used in combination with Clinton’s accusations of Russia being responsible for the WikiLeaks file dump. However, the
76 editorial pieces either denied the accusations referring to the fact that there was no evidence or just constructed an axiom of Russia’s innocence. This was achieved by the use of tactics such as anonymous indeterminations, exaggerations, ironical remarks, and generalizations in order to cause ambiguity and thus an ability to not give rise to precise truth conditions.
Russia Beyond the Headlines.
Structural analysis. Within the RBTH’s discourse, two main topics could be identified: Russia’s view on the American election and the electoral campaigns of the
Presidential candidates. The three main discourse strands were the anti-Russian campaign of Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump’s popularity in Russia and Russia’s favorite candidate.
The discourse strand of the anti-Russian campaign of Clinton was tightly entangled with
Clinton’s statements on Trump’s connections to Russia. The editors saw in her attempts to attack Trump and to demonstrate his lack of professional ability as well as to distract from her own mistakes the main reasons for her anti-Russian campaign: “Clinton’s campaign tactic is fully rational: increase the scale of foreign threats in order to demonstrate the Republican candidate’s lack of professional ability” (RBTH2); and:
By the way, the deeper the discussion is led into the jungle of ‘existential threats’
to American democracy, the fewer questions will be asked about the contributions
to the Clinton Foundation or about Hillary’s success as secretary of state, which
raises doubts. (RBTH2)
The second discourse strand was the discussion of Trump’s popularity in Russia.
Although there was no evidence of Trump’s links to Russia, there was an “invisible
77 bond” (RBTH3). However, his popularity in Russia was a result of a favorable coverage of his person in the press, the existence of several Russian politicians with a similar mentality, and Russia’s general dislike of Hillary Clinton (RBTH4). Consequently,
Trump was seen as the best candidate to win the election when looking at the Russian-
U.S. relations. Since Trump and Putin did not have a history together, it would be easier for them to get along, despite the differences in their upbringings and life experiences
(RBTH5). On the other hand, Clinton and Putin had a negative history together from her times as Secretary of State, which might have been a problem for the future Russian-U.S. relations.
Clinton’s anti-Russian campaign discourse strand was also closely entangled with the WikiLeaks email dump (RBTH1, RBTH6). Here, the editors stated that it is not proven that Russia had anything to do with the DNC hack, but they did not eliminate the possibility of this scenario: “The theory is being examined by the FBI and important members of the Obama administration” (RBTH1).
The editorial articles were distributed over the selected period of time in a relatively balanced way. In the period from July to September, the main topics concerned
Russia in connection to the candidates, whereas in October and November the analysis of both candidates from the Russian perspective took place.
Detailed Analysis. In this section, this study focuses on the analysis of two articles: “U.S. elections: How Trump became ‘Putin’s agent’” (RBTH1) and “Who would
Russians vote for in the U.S. Presidential election” (RBTH4). These articles were selected for a detailed analysis due to the fact that in sum they represented all the main
78 discourse strands of Russia Beyond the Headlines and exhibit the media outlet’s typical features, such as visual signs, rhetoric, etc.
The main topic of RBTH1 was the role of Russia in the WikiLeaks scandal and its consequences. The discourse strands of Russia’s role in the American election and the consequences of the anti-Russian campaign of Democrats were also at the center of attention. RBTH4 mainly focused on Russia’s favorite candidate in the U.S. election, as well as on Trump’s popularity in Russia as a subtopic. RBTH1 was written by Georgy
Bovt, Russia's famous journalist, political scientist, and co-chairman of the “Right
Cause” Party in July 2016 – only a few days after the WikiLeaks DNC email leak.
RBTH4 was written only a week before the U.S. election by the Russian journalist and writer Alexander Bratersky.
As for the surface of the editorial piece, RBTH1 included a cartoon of Donald
Trump as its header (Figure 2), whereas RBTH4 worked with a photomontage of Clinton and Trump (Figure 3). The cartoon in RBTH1 showed Trump standing in front of the
American flag, waving to the crowd and having a parachute with the Russian flag on it on his back. The photomontage in RBTH4 showed both Presidential candidates - Clinton on the left, Trump on the right - talking and pointing at each other (Figure 3).
79
Figure 2: Cartoon of Donald Trump in RBTH1. Adapted from “U.S. elections: How Trump became ‘Putin’s agent’”, In: Russia Beyond the Headlines, by Georgy Bovt, from https://www.rbth.com/elections_in_usa/2016/07/28/us-elections-how-trump-became- putins-agent_615955. Copyright 2016 by Iorsh.
Figure 3: Photomontage of Clinton and Trump in RBTH4. Adapted from “Who would Russians vote for in the U.S. Presidential election,” In: Russia Beyond the Headlines, by Alexander Bratersky, from https://www.rbth.com/international/2016/10/31/who-would- russians-vote-for-in-the-us-presidential-election_643825. Copyright 2016 by Getty Images.
80 Moreover, the article also presented a YouTube music video from the singer Emin
Agalarov starring Donald Trump from the year 2013. Each photograph or cartoon had a quote from the text or from a candidate as description beneath it. Finally, three subheadings divided the article into four parts: “Starring role in pop video,” “Anti- establishment figure,” and “Fear and loathing” (RBTH4). The paragraph “Starring role in pop video” described the fact that Trump was little known in Russia before the presidential election, but his friends from Russian show business persuaded him to star in a music video in 2013. In the paragraph “Anti-establishment figure” the author stated that
Trump was an anti-establishment figure and this plays well with the Russians. Finally, the paragraph “Fear and loathing” looked at the candidacy of Clinton and her unpopularity in Russia. As for RBTH1, only two subheadings could be identified: “Hints and denials” and “Unintended consequences.” The paragraph with the first subheading closely described all the accusations of Russia being involved in the American election and even mentioned Edward Snowden in connection with the WikiLeaks email affair.
The paragraph “Unintended consequences,” however, discussed all of the consequences that the Democrats might have to face due to their anti-Russia campaign.
As for the rhetorical and stylistic means of RBTH1, the author used several metaphors, ideologically loaded words, irony, and comparisons. In the lead of the editorial piece the author already summarized the initial situation of the U.S. media’s extensive coverage of the assumption that the Kremlin was supporting Donald Trump in the election campaign. According to him, the aim of this extensive coverage was to obscure some “uncomfortable truths” about the primaries. Although there had already
81 been suspicions, the WikiLeaks scandal was “fairly clear evidence” that the party apparatus favored Clinton over Sanders. Here, the author compared the Russian patriots, who, according to him, always blame everything on the omnipresent U.S. State
Department, and the American Democrats who tried to turn their internal problems into an electoral advantage by making Russia responsible for the hacking attack. A prominent anonymous indetermination was used by stating that the theory was currently being examined by the FBI and important members of the Obama administration. However, neither specific information on the issue, nor the names of these “important members of the Obama administration” were mentioned in the discourse. Moreover, the author mentioned Obama’s official accusations against Moscow that Russia could have influenced the American elections in order to make people vote for Trump, and explained his behavior by the apparent illogical purpose of the U.S. electoral campaign to elect a
U.S. president that Putin would not like. By using irony, the author made a mockery of
Obama’s apparent logic and consequently downplayed the Russian role in the American election by stating: “As if America does not have more important problems” (RBTH1).
The author used such metaphors as a “strange weapon” and “one’s own dirty laundry” in order to define this “shameless” anti-Russian tactic of the Democrats. The phrase “dirty laundry” is usually used to describe someone’s secrets that they wish to keep hidden.
Consequently, it sounds paradoxical that the Democrats used their own secrets and debacles within the party for a negative campaign against Trump which, according to the author, could have led to unexpected consequences for them, for example Trump’s leadership in the polls. Another comparison was applied within the discourse of RBTH1
82 as the author agreed with a statement made by the conservative Republican ideologist
Patrick Buchanan, who compared the possible Russian involvement in the WikiLeaks email dump with The New York Times’ publication of secret documents from the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations concerning preparations for the Vietnam War in
1970s. The conclusion was that since The New York Times was awarded the Pulitzer
Prize in 1971 for revealing “dirty methods” and provocations, Putin also deserved a prize for revealing the “dishonest methods” of Democrats. The article ended with an illogical statement from the author, who argued that the WikiLeaks email dump revealed that
Clinton did not win the primaries in an honest way, and that neither Trump nor Putin had anything to do with it. This statement is confusing since earlier in the discourse the author stated that the theory was being examined and did not provide any opinion or evidence on this issue. In conclusion, the overall discourse position of RBTH1 was that Russia had nothing to do with the WikiLeaks email affair, and that the Democrats were using this tactic in order to attack Trump, which might backfire.
As for the rhetorical and stylistic means of RBTH4, the author used several specifications, indeterminations and quotes from experts, “ordinary people,” and show business figures in Russia. The editorial piece began with a specification where an anonymous “grey-haired” sales assistant in a Moscow pharmacy stated that he would vote for Trump because he “loves Russia.” This was a sign that not only elite Russian politicians prefer Trump, but also the “ordinary” people respect Trump due to his positive attitude toward Russia and his “warm words” about Putin. This assumption was backed
83 up by quoting a poll and stating that only in Russia, Trump would beat Clinton by 23 percentage points.
The rest of the editorial piece looked closely at the reasons why Trump is popular in Russia. As the first reason, the author mentioned the fact that Trump had several friends in Russian show business and even appeared in a humorous music video about his
Miss World pageant. A quote from a Russian superstar Philipp Kirkorov who “prays” for
Trump’s presidency would have supported Trump’s popularity among Russian show business figures. A prominent indetermination of “some experts” that was prominent in the whole RBTH discourse was also applied in RBTH4. These “some experts” argued that
Trump’s “flamboyant” style, and the impression he gives of telling things straight, are appreciated by the Russians. Moreover, Trump is an “anti-establishment figure” and
Russians hate the “American establishment.” According to the logic of the author, Hillary
Clinton was then a figure of the establishment and consequently hated by the Russians.
However, there were several factors that contributed to Trump’s popularity in Russia.
Firstly, the Russian state TV gave Trump favorable coverage while openly ridiculing
Clinton, which is a critic on the election coverage of the Russian press. Secondly, there were several politicians in Russia whose popularity was based on a Trump-style populist agenda. For example, the author cited a blogger who stated that Trump was a “second- rate version” of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the right-wing leader of Russian national party
LDPR, who is known for his outrageous statements. Moreover, the author also compared
Trump to the populist pharmaceutical tycoon Vladimir Bryntsalov. Here, the author constructed a discourse knot to Trump’s racist and sexist statements about women
84 mentioned in the lead of the editorial piece by stating that both Bryntsalov and
Zhirinovsky are known for their disrespect toward women. However, Bryntsalov and
Zhirinovsky’s comments on women were not seen as scandalous in Russia, which might be the reason why Trump’s comments about women failed to tarnish his reputation.
Thirdly, the author of the editorial piece stated that many Russians favor Trump because they dislike Clinton and see her as a “divisive character.” However, no reasons were mentioned why the Russians do not like Clinton. Instead, several anti-Clinton quotes that partly included disclaimers were cited. For example, Natalya Karpovich, a former deputy head of the Duma family relations committee noted: “I don’t want this woman to be
President of the United States, even though I usually support and cheer on women in power” (RBTH4). The main reason for this dislike was Clinton’s apparent focus on wars.
Another expert concluded that it would be easier for Russia if Trump were elected, since
Trump and Putin do not have a history of having a relationship and thus can start their relationship “from scratch.” On the other hand, Clinton does have a negative history with
Putin from her time as Secretary of State, which would make it difficult to improve the
Russia-U.S. relationship. In sum, the overall discourse position of RBTH4 was that there were several reasons for Trump’s popularity in Russia and that Trump’s presidency would be better for Russia than Clinton’s presidency.
Synoptic Analysis. Through the structural and detailed analysis, several tactics applied by Russia Beyond the Headlines in order to influence the public opinion could be identified. An important tactic that could be identified was the application of the visuals in the RBTH discourse. The cartoons were used for editorial pieces that focused on the
85 anti-Russian campaign of Clinton and her accusations against Trump for his apparent connections to Russia. Within the discourse, these two aspects were either rhetorically ridiculed or ironically refuted, which was intensified through the use of cartoons as headers of the editorial pieces.
Another tactic was the partial assimilation of Hillary Clinton to the “U.S.
Democratic Party,” “American Democrats,” and “Democrats,” especially when talking about Russia’s role in the American election and Clinton’s accusations. In line with this, a partial victimization of Russia could be identified. Within the RBTH discourse, Russia as an actor was depicted as a victim misused by Clinton and her campaigners in order to attack Trump (RBTH1, RBTH2, RBTH3).
Finally, several rhetorical and stylistic tactics were applied in order to influence the readers’ opinion about the candidates. The most prominent tactic was the use of ideologically loaded words, metaphors, and ironic remarks. For example, the metaphor of the “Russian card,” “demonization of Russia,” “evil,” “devil,” “diabolic cunning and willy plot,” and “Cold War,” especially in RBTH2, were used in connection with Clinton and Russia. This word choice intensified the impression of Russia’s victimization.
Another important tactic was to include only anti-Clinton quotes from the experts, use indeterminations in order to achieve vagueness, and misinforming the readers by implying statements without supporting the argumentation with proven facts.
The Moscow Times.
Structural analysis. Russia was the only main discourse topic that could be identified within The Moscow Times discourse. Here, three discourse strands deserved
86 closer attention: Trump’s connections to Russia, the alt-right movement, and Russian-
U.S. relations.
Within the discourse strand of Trump’s connections to Russia the editors made a detailed summary of Clinton’s accusations of Trump’s personal links to Russia.
However, they did not provide their personal opinions on this issue and through several
Western media examples that widely labeled him as a “Putin’s Puppet,” only listed all agitations against Trump and his sympathy for Russia (MT4).
The discourse strand of Trump’s connections to Russia was closely entangled with the question of which candidate would be better for Russia. According to the editors, although Trump promised to get along with Moscow, he may prove too disruptive “even by Russian standards” (MT4). Although Putin showed “little interest in Trump” and
Clinton had been a “subject of the Kremlin’s passion and anger” (MT4), a Clinton presidency would be better for the Moscow-Washington relationship than a Trump
Presidency (MT5). The main reason for this discourse position was the fact that the
Russian-U.S. relations would need a “steady hand” which Clinton could provide despite her very negative attitude toward Russia and their starkly different world views (MT5).
Russian-U.S. relations also played an important role as a discourse strand. Here, the editors’ position toward the United States and its presidential candidates was in general negative, as well as the view on Russia itself. However, although Russia was “an unpredictable and recalcitrant” player, the United States should change its course and reconsider its anti-Russian politics: “American establishment and its candidate are equally unwilling to contemplate compromise; they are exasperated and angry, anxious to
87 punish Russia rather than negotiate solutions” (MT3). Moreover, according to Moscow’s political creed “everyone is just like us, everything else is pretense;” the main consensus of the MT editors was that the West, and especially the USA, is no better than Russia.
Russian politicians “love seeing others get caught in what one might call a ‘Russian trap’: when others are caught doing the very thing they accuse Moscow of doing” (MT4). In other words, when looking at Russia, the West has always been looking at its “darker self in reflection” (MT1). In this regard, a discursive knot to the alt-right and racism discourse strands could be established here. The editors stated that the alt-right movement developed in Russia long before it emerged in Europe or in the West in general: “Putin and ideologists have been riding the alt-right surf long before the European far-right. And now they are looking at the rise of the alt-right in the West with understandable schadenfreude and opportunistic glee” (MT1).
The editorial articles were distributed in a relatively balanced way across the selected period of time. From July to September, the discourse was focused on Trump’s connections to Russia. In the period from October to November, the editors looked closely at Russia-U.S. relations.
Detailed Analysis. In this section, this study focuses on the analysis of two articles: “On Russia, Trump and the Picture of Dorian Grey” (MT1) and “U.S. Politics
Caught in a ‘Russian Trap’” (MT4). These articles were selected for a detailed analysis due to the fact that in sum they represented all of the main discourse strands of The
Moscow Times and exhibited the media outlet’s typical features, such as visual signs, rhetoric, etc.
88 MT1 was published in the opinion section of The Moscow Times by journalist and writer Leonid Ragozin in late September 2016. Its main topics were the Western views on Russia and Russia’s view on Western development. The editorial piece looked closely at Trump’s connections with Russia, Clinton’s campaign tactics, the ideological history of Russia and its alt-right development. MT4, on the other hand, mainly discussed the possibility of U.S. politics being caught in a “Russian trap,” and addressed such subtopics as Trump’s sympathy for Putin, his connections to Russia, the Russian media, and the
WikiLeaks email dump. The editorial piece was published at the end of July 2016 by
Maxim Trudolyubov, who is a Senior Fellow at the Kennan Institute and former editorial page editor of Vedomosti, an independent Russian daily. As for the surface of the article,
MT4 included a photomontage as the header, where Putin and Trump were directly looking at each other in profile. No subheadings, callouts or pull quotes could be identified. On the other hand, MT1 included a photograph of Donald Trump looking grumpily into the camera with clasped hands on a completely black background (Figure
5). Moreover, in the middle of the article there was a pull quote as a short summary of the main statement of the article was written in a larger font than the rest of the text.
89
Figure 4: Photomontage of Putin and Trump in MT4. Adapted from “U.S. Politics Caught in a ‘Russian Trap’,” In: The Moscow Times, by Maxim Trudolyubov, from https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/american-politics-caught-in-a-russian-trap-54759. Copyright 2016 by Gage Skidmore / modified by MT.
Figure 5: Photograph of Trump in MT1. Adapted from “On Russia, Trump and the Picture of Dorian Grey,” In: The Moscow Times, by Leonid Ragozin, from https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/on-russia-trump-and-the-picture-of-dorian-grey- 55544. Copyright 2016 by Associated Press. 90 As for the rhetorical and stylistic means of MT1, the author worked with several metaphors, comparisons, and the collective symbolism of water/waves and change. The editorial piece begins with Clinton’s comment on Vladimir Putin being “the grand godfather” of the alt-right movement. With this statement Clinton unsubtly made another link, since if Putin is the godfather, the Trump is merely his “stooge” who obeys all orders from the Kremlin. However, according to the author this was Clinton’s electoral propaganda, which was supported by the fact that Putin is a president of a country that for
45 years was America’s Cold War adversary and is again showing open hostility.
Consequently, Clinton tried to depict Putin and Russia as an “exterior threat,” which was supposed to mobilize voters. This tactic was also extensively used by Trump. Here, the author used a metaphor that a constructed Cold War image of Russia as a “hostile alien civilization” makes it easy “to paint every traffic jam as a conspiracy plotted by the
Kremlin” (MT1). In other words, after establishing a negative image of a country that threatens another country’s security, people are more susceptible to propaganda against this country. In the case of Trump, according to the author his popularity among the voters was a direct result of a “deep moral and cultural crisis” the Republican Party, much of American society, as well as the rest of the developed world have suffered from for a long time. This crisis manifests as the emergence of alt-right populists in many parts of the EU and America. The author then compared Trump with a “comic Russian oligarch” or with the twin brother of LDPR party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. However, another comparison and, at the same time, a metaphor that is the core of the whole editorial piece was made when the author compared Russia to the West’s Dorian Gray
91 canvas which is “a realistic depiction of its darker sides usually hidden in the attic”
(MT1). The metaphor refers to a philosophical novel “The Picture of Dorian Gray” by
Oscar Wilde that was first published in 1890. The main character is a wealthy and young
Dorian Gray who has a picture which ages for him and when he commits terrible acts, the picture reflects his cruelty. Although he stays young and beautiful, the picture gets older and records the traces of his sins. Applying this to the author’s Russian/West comparison, it would mean that Russia is a fixture of the Western political and cultural realm and basically a reflection of the West. However, the immoral actions of the West have affected Russia negatively and while the West has stayed the same on the surface, Russia has changed in a negative direction. As the metaphor implies, this negative development has been long suppressed or “hidden in the attic” by the West. However, this “double life” of the West could not be maintained due to the fact that Donald Trump gained support from the broad population shifts. The “phenomenon Donald Trump” and his popularity among the people was the trigger for the West to see its real image, and its real political and cultural realm: “the portrait and the model of its darker self are looking strikingly similar again” (MT1). Consequently, the West is now becoming as nationalist as Russia. The main difference is that Russia accepted it long time ago, while the West has tried to deny and hide it. Moreover, the West is one of the reasons why Russia is now as nationalist and illiberal as it is. In the early 1990s, Russia was anything but nationalist and the neglect of Russia by the West pushed it and other East European countries into the Putin-style authoritarianism after the collapse of the Soviet Union: “Putin’s regime grew out of a cultural and political vacuum, in a thoroughly exhausted society” (MT1).
92 Putin grew in popularity just at the moment when the West closed its eyes to the difficult situation in Russia at the time, and promoted “blood and soil” nationalism as a way of creating broad coalitions to topple pro-Soviet regimes instead.
The editorial piece ended with a conclusion that Putin and “his ideologists” (other
Russian politicians) have a much longer experience with the alt-right movement than
Europe, where the self-inflicted destruction of Western unity was now beginning to occur. These ideologists are now looking at the rise of the alt-right movement in the West with “understandable schadenfreude and opportunistic glee” (MT1). This
“understandable schadenfreude” can and will be explained by the metaphor the “Russian
Trap” in MT4 later in this paragraph. The collective symbolism of water supported the aim of the editorial piece to describe a staggered change/development in the world. For example, such words and phrases were used that could be connected to the water rhetoric and especially metaphors: “That same crisis has now engulfed the rest of the developed world,” “when any illusions about the West opening its arms to Russians finally evaporated,” “leaving pro-democracy Russians in limbo,” “the dissolution of the Soviet
Union,” “would naturally slide,” “streamlined,” “Putin and his ideologists have been riding the alt-right surf,” etc. (MT1). Moreover, the photograph of the article resembled the metaphor of the canvas hidden in the attic, since Trump was depicted sitting in the dark and far away from the camera (Figure 5). In sum, the overall discourse position of
MT1 was that with the “Trump phenomenon,” it is now time for big changes for the
West. These changes have already happened in Russia but they have always been criticized by the Western society.
93 As for the rhetorical and stylistic means of MT4, the author of the editorial piece extensively used indeterminations, comparisons, ideologically loaded minus words, metaphors, and disclaimers. Moreover, the author generally avoided expressing his own opinion on such topics as Trump’s connections to Russia and Russian involvement in the
DNC hack attack. Instead, he cited some experts from Western media outlets and left their opinions uncommented.
The argumentation of the article began with an argument that according to some
“well-informed” friends of the author, a positive campaign about Russia would be impossible in America since there were many constituencies that do not want it and that
Russia becoming an issue on any major US politician’s agenda would be highly unlikely.
Already two indeterminations of the social actors were used here, as the author did not specify who these “well-informed” friends of his were, or who these people were by who he was “told many times” that Russia is unlikely to become an issue in the American election. According to the author, the main reason for this was the low overall trade turnover between the U.S. and Russia. However, all these anonymous social actors were mistaken, since Russia obviously played an important role in the American election as a
“feared puppet master” behind Trump and as an alleged perpetrator of the DNC computer network hack. The alleged connection between Trump and Russia was a “conspiracy- toned discussion” that already had become “mainstream” (MT4). Although using these ideologically loaded minus words, the author did not provide any of his own opinion on this issue or this alleged “conspiracy-toned discussion.” Instead, he listed and cited several negative statements about Trump’s alleged connections to Russia from the
94 Western media outlets such as The New York Times, The Atlantic, etc. Since Russia has a long history of media manipulation, this negative coverage “sounds endlessly ironic to a
Russian.” Here, the author supported this statement by a comparison of the Russian habit of blaming America for its alleged interference in Russia’s politics to American society that sees connections to Russia everywhere. For example, the Russian state-run media had often “demonized” Russian opposition as “U.S. stooges,” labelled any Russian NGO using foreign funding as a “foreign agent,” and described Putin’s opponents, independent politicians, and even provocative artists, as the “puppets of some hostile external force”
(MT4). The author also did not express his own opinion on the topic of the DNC hack attack. Instead, in the same manner he quoted some anonymous commentators who stated that even if Russia actually was behind the attack and actually did help leak the emails, it was to get back at Clinton rather than to help Trump directly. The author explained this behavior with Russia’s, Putin’s, and even the Russian political elite’s general disinterest in Trump, but the desire to sabotage Clinton since she has been a subject of Kremlin’s passion and anger. This lack of interest in Trump was rooted in his “disruptive” style that might lead to regional conflicts and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is not in
Russia’s national interest. However, through a tactic of an “indirect intervention”
Moscow made everybody believe that Putin supports Trump which alone has proved sufficient to “sow the dragon’s teeth of suspicion and distrust” in the American political field. Consequently, the author subtly implied that the American political field is fragile and susceptible to external influence. In addition, in this regard the author established the most prominent metaphor of this editorial piece – the “Russian Trap.” The metaphor
95 stands for the case when other countries are caught doing the very thing they accuse
Moscow of doing. For example, when other countries, especially the USA, accuse
Moscow of calling its opponents “foreign agents,” but at the same time do the same to their own political opponents by calling them “Russian agents.” At this point, a discourse knot to MT1 can be established where the author mentioned the “understandable schadenfreude” by the Russians in terms of the latest development in America. The schadenfreude is deeply connected to the Moscow’s political creed that states that everyone is just like us, everything else is pretense. However, Russia and the West are the same with the difference that Russia accepts it while the USA tries to deny any similarities. Consequently, a schadenfreude emerges for the Russians when America fails to hide these similarities.
Synoptic Analysis. Through the structural and detailed analysis, several tactics applied by The Moscow Times in order to influence public opinion could be identified.
Firstly, the visual signs are applied by the editors in order to support the content of the editorial pieces. These visual signs were mostly photographs or photomontages connected to the text. For example, the photograph of Trump in MT1 visually resembled the metaphor of Dorian Gray that was established in the text.
Secondly, the authors of the editorial pieces were reluctant to clearly express their discourse positions. They most likely relied on quotes from Western media outlets on such topics as Trump’s connections to Russia and Russia’s role in the WikiLeaks email dump. However, the discourse strand of WikiLeaks was not prominent within the MT discourse and the email affair was only mentioned once (MT4).
96 Thirdly, the authors mostly individualized both candidates within the discourse, although a few times they assimilated Trump to an “anti-establishment constituency”
(MT3). Hillary Clinton on the other hand was once assimilated to a “Hillary Clinton administration” (MT5). This shows that in comparison to the other media outlets analyzed in this paper, MT did not victimize Trump and constructed groups that supported him instead of opposing him.
Finally, the authors widely used ideologically loaded words and metaphors in their discourse. The most prominent metaphors and minus words were: the “Cold war”
(MT1, MT4), “conspiracy” (MT1, MT4), the “Russian trap” (MT4), and the “Trump card” (MT5).
The overall picture of Russia and the West that was established in The Moscow
Times’s discourse was predominantly negative. Russia was depicted as being the same as the West, although Western society refuses to acknowledge it. This is the reason why
Russia subtly mocks and indirectly sabotages America until it admits the similarities.
Social Actors Representation According to van Leeuwen
This section looks closely at the representation of both presidential candidates in
Sputnik International, Russia Beyond the Headlines and The Moscow Times. To analyze the data, the frequency of the words, phrases, clauses, and sentences, which introduced the social actors in terms of inclusion, exclusion, nomination, categorization, activation, passivation, individualization, and assimilation were calculated.
Within the editorial pieces of Sputnik International, Hillary Clinton with 51 percent was slightly more included into the discourse than Donald Trump with 49 percent
97 (Table 2). However, she was also more excluded (65% vs. 35%) and more backgrounded
(80% vs. 20%) than Trump (Table 3). As for the means of nomination and categorization,
Clinton was often addressed by her first name (18%) whereas Trump was more likely addressed only by his surname (72%). Moreover, the editors of Sputnik strongly referred to Trump in terms of his occupation and emphasized his role of the Republican nominee, a successful businessman, and a “bombastic” millionaire (Table 4). Within the discourse,
Clinton was less passivated (47% vs. 53%) and thus more activated than Trump (52% vs.
48%) (Table 6). However, Trump was more subjectified and beneficialized than Clinton
(Table 7). Finally, while the editors individualized Trump more than Clinton (71% vs.
29%), they also most likely assimilated Clinton to a “Clinton camp” or a “Clinton team”
(96% vs. 4%).
After the analysis, the researcher identified that the editorial pieces of Sputnik
International mainly focused on Hillary Clinton, her email scandal, as well as on her accusations of Trump and Russia. Clinton as individual was activated within the discourse in terms of her accusations by objectifying and labelling Trump as the “Russian agent” (S6, S7, S8, S9), a “Kremlin stooge” (S6), a “Kremlin tool” (S6), a “Russian tool”
(S1), an “unwitting agent” of Vladimir Putin (S8), a “Moscow’s man” (9), and a “puppet to the Russians, the Kremlin and to Vladimir Putin” (S9). As a reaction to these accusations, Trump was passivated and later activated in order to defend himself or deny the allegations. Moreover, a prominent individualization of Trump as well as an enhanced assimilation of Clinton intensified the effect of victimization of the Republican candidate within the discourse (Table 8).
98 Within the editorial pieces of Russia Beyond the Headlines, Donald Trump with
62 percent was more included into the discourse than Hillary Clinton with 38% (Table 9).
Additionally, Clinton was more excluded (90% vs. 10%) and backgrounded (90% vs.
10%) than Trump (Table 10). Trump was also almost twice as much nominated (67% vs.
33%), formalized (77% vs. 23%), categorized (67% vs. 33%), and appraised (83% vs.
17%) as Clinton (Tables 11 & 12). The authors labelled him as “an eccentric billionaire”
(RBTH1, RBTH2, RBTH3), a “simpleton from Queens” (RBTH2), the “Republican enfant terrible” (RBTH3), the “flamboyant Republican presidential candidate” (RBTH4), a “witty provocateur” (RBTH5) and in contrast, referred to Clinton as a “meticulous intellectual” (RBTH5). In addition, Trump was also more activated than Clinton (76% vs.
24%) (Table 13). In terms of the category individualization and assimilation, Clinton was most likely assimilated to the “U.S. Democratic Party” or “Democrats” (91%) while
Trump was mostly depicted as an individual (71%) (Table 15).
After this analysis, it could be identified that the discourse of RBTH mainly focused on Donald Trump as a candidate and described him with several appraisements in order to evaluate him. Trump was more included into the discourse and more activated whereas Clinton as an individual was more passivated in terms of the WikiLeaks affair and her accusations of Trump for being a “Kremlin puppet” (MT3) and “Putin’s pal”
(MT5).
Within the editorial pieces of The Moscow Times, Donald Trump with 54 percent was slightly more included into the discourse of the online newspaper than Hillary
Clinton with 46 percent (Table 16). In contrast to Trump, Clinton was backgrounded
99 twice and was addressed more semi-formalized than Trump (70% vs. 30%) (Table 17).
On the other side, the authors categorized (58% vs. 42%), and especially functionalized
(67% vs. 33%) Trump more than Clinton (Table 19). Clinton was referred to as “a candidate of the establishment” (MT3), and “Democratic nominee” (MT5) whereas
Trump was described as the “Republican Presidential candidate” (MT1, MT4),
“doubtlessly talented Donald Trump” (MT5), and “The Donald” (MT5). In comparison to
Trump, Clinton was more activated (64% vs. 36%) and much less passivated (32% vs.
68%) (Table 20). Trump was more often treated as a subject in comparison to Clinton
(67% vs. 33%) and slightly more individualized (Table 22).
Since the focus of The Moscow Times clearly lay on the Russian-U.S. relations, both candidates were sometimes not in the focus of the attention. However, both candidates were treated similarly within the discourse, although Clinton was more activated which could be explained with her active role in the accusations of Trump for being a “Putin’s stooge” (MT1) or “Putin’s Puppet” (MT4).
Ideological Groups and Ideological Square
This section looks closely at the ideological groups that were built within the discourse of Sputnik International, Russia Beyond the Headlines, and The Moscow Times and at their ideological position.
Within the discourse of Sputnik International, three major ideological groups could be identified: Russia, the Clinton camp and the United States. The most prominent ideological square was established between the group of Russia/Kremlin/Moscow as
“Us” and the Clinton camp/Clinton campaigners/Hillary’s team as “Them.” The second
100 constellation was Russia/Kremlin/Moscow as “Us” and the White House/America/the
United States as “Them.” As for the discourse of Russia Beyond the Headlines, also three main ideological groups were identified: the U.S. Democratic party, the Clinton camp, and Russia. The ideological square was established between the U.S. Democratic
Party/American Democrats/Democrats as “Them” and Russia/Kremlin as “Us.” In addition, the Clinton camp was represented as the opponent of Russia (“Them”), separately from the overall foe - the U.S. Democratic Party. On the other side, five ideological groups could be identified within the discourse of The Moscow Times: Russia, the West, the United States, the U.S. political establishment, and the Trump supporters.
The most prominent ideological square was established between Russia/Moscow/Kremlin
(“Us”) and the West (“Them”) as well as between America/Americans/the White House
(“Them”) and Russia/Moscow/Kremlin/Russian political elite (“Us”).
As can be seen, different enemy images and out-groups among the analyzed media outlets could be identified. While Sputnik explicitly focused on the Clinton camp and the U.S. government in general as the enemy image, the RBTH differentiated between the Democratic Party as a whole and the Clinton camp as a part of the
Democratic Party. Within the discourse strand of the Russian-U.S. relations, the editors depicted the Democrats as the out-group whereas within the discourse strand of the
WikiLeaks email dump their focus lay on the Clinton camp as a part of the Democratic
Party. The depiction of the out-groups in MT, however, was more global than in the previous two media outlets. The main out-groups were the West, USA, the U.S. political establishment (which is basically the Democratic Party), and the Trump supporters,
101 although the focus mostly lay on the West and the USA. The U.S. political establishment was the rival of the Trump supporters or the “anti-establishment constituency” and of the
Russian government.
Several tactics were used in order to emphasize the own positive and the opponents’ negative sides, as well as to de-emphasize the own negative and the opponent’s positive sides.
As for the discourse level “general” proposed by van Dijk, positive self- representation of Russia and negative others-representation of the Democrats could be especially observed within the discourse of Sputnik and RBTH. In case of MT, Russia as
“Us” as well as the West and the Americans as “Them” were represented neutrally or negatively. Interestingly, the West and America were largely made responsible for
Russia’s recent immoral actions such as the annexation of Crimea and its negative development over the past years:
Putin’s regime grew out of a cultural and political vacuum, in a thoroughly
exhausted society. He grew in popularity just at the moment when any illusions
about the West opening its arms to Russians finally evaporated. The prospect of
Euro-atlantic democratic integration offered to former satellites was explicitly
denied to Russia, leaving pro-democracy Russians in limbo and the mercy of
predatory capitalist elites. (MT1)
However, although Russia is “an unpredictable and recalcitrant” player, it is the United
States that should change its course (MT3). The American establishment is unwilling to contemplate compromise and is anxious to punish Russia rather than negotiate solutions.
102 As for the discourse level of form, several tactics to establish an ideological square could be identified. First, Sputnik International in particular used surface structures in order to create a positive Russia image. Through callouts and pull quotes, the editors highlighted positive experts’ quotes about Russia and its achievements. For example: “Agriculture has found itself in a favorable climate, seeing double-digit growth rates every year. This year, Russia became the world’s top grain exporter after it surpassed the US and Canada for the first time in years” (S4). In terms of the syntax of the discourse, Russia as an actor was always activated when it had to deny any accusations or defend itself from allegedly unfair accusations in general. This tactic ensured a direct focus on the actor, although this actor did not provide some evidence or did not support his or her arguments by objective facts. However, Russia as a social actor has also been passivated in order to focus the readers’ attention on the actor affected by the involuntary action: “Russia has been routinely dragged into election debates” (S4).
As for the rhetorical means of the discourse, all analyzed media outlets used alliterations in order to drag readers’ attention on a particular section of the text, to create rhythm and mood. The most prominent alliteration that should support the out-group building was Clinton camp/Clinton campaigners. In addition, several semantic figures/operations such as metaphors, irony, hyperboles, and repetitions were used in order to draw readers’ attention on the social actors. Especially RBTH applied the tactic of irony to depict the in-group – out-group relations. The editors mostly used ironical remarks to ridicule America in general or the Clinton camp: “As if America does not have more important problems,” (RBTH1) “the willy plot that even the Soviet KGB
103 couldn’t dream of” (RBTH2), “but now the scale of evil that Russia embodies is growing before our eyes” (RBTH2). Moreover, the authors often used hyperboles to exaggerate
Clinton camp’s negative actions and to put them into the ridiculously wrong light: “The media have accused Moscow of every sin imaginable” (S9). Finally, especially Sputnik
International used the technique of repetition within its discourse to emphasize Russia’s and the Russian media innocence in America’s accusations.
In terms of van Dijk’s discourse level of meaning, several strategies are important to note. In the discourse structure of the lexicon, particular lexical choices as exaggeratedly negative addressing of Russia from the Clinton camp as well as the usage of the minus words and phrases could be identified. For example, the Clinton camp addressed Russia as “Big bad russkies” (S5), the “dark side” (S6), a “feared puppet master behind Trump” and “alleged perpetrator of the DNC computer network hack”
(MT4). Moreover, it used such minus words and ideologically loaded words as
“demonization of Russia” (RBTH2), “evil” (RBTH2), “devil” (RBTH2), “diabolic cunning and a willy plot” (RBTH2), “anti-Russian hysteria” (S5), “conspiracy-toned discussion” (MT4), etc. in connection to Russia. Especially in terms of the WikiLeaks conflict, the authors used the tactic of implicitness/presuppositions and evidentiality in order to de-emphasize Russia’s negative actions or to deny them. For example, in Sputnik
7 and Sputnik 8, the authors of the editorial pieces implied that Russia had nothing to do with the email leak without providing any evidence or explanation on this issue. This tactic followed the principle of “we have the truth, they are misguided” without supporting this “truth” with objective facts. Additionally, another tactics such as
104 disclaimers and ignoring important issues were used in terms of the WikiLeaks affair.
However, the most important tactic was the victimization of Russia in connection with generalizations and specifications, especially within the discourses of Sputnik and RBTH.
The media outlets extensively described all the things the Democrats accused Russia of and generalized Russia’s actual role in the conflict in order to avoid explicit statements on this sensitive topic. Moreover, the authors of the editorial pieces very detailed depicted the situation with the primaries before the WikiLeaks scandal and thus emphasized the assumption that the leak was used by the Democrats in order to blame the country’s intelligence services for the document leak. Their aim was to create false narratives about Bernie Sanders and thus propel Clinton to the nomination. Consequently, the negative actions of the Clinton camp were highlighted through specifications, while the negative role of Russia was played down by generalizations. A number of indeterminations could be identified in terms of the WikiLeaks scandal that were used in order to de-emphasize Russia’s role in it and to distract the reader from this sensitive topic: “the voices have instantly emerged claiming that the leak was organized by the
Russians” (S6).
105 Chapter 6: Discussion
This present study examined the ideological representation of U.S. Presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in the editorial sections of the three
English-language online newspapers in Russia: Sputnik International, Russia Beyond the
Headlines and The Moscow Times. After the CDA analysis on the basis of Jäger (2015), van Leeuwen (2008), and van Dijk (1995; 2006a), several findings were presented below.
In order to answer the first research question of what tactics the selected media outlets applied in order to influence the readers’ opinion, on the basis of Jäger’s CDA framework (2015), this study has identified several strategies that were frequently used by the media outlets as effective devices in persuasion and justification. The most prominent tactics were the application of the visual signs, ideologically loaded word choice and lexicalization, rhetorical figures, hyperboles, implicitness, evidentiality, spreading of misinformation, victimization, polarizations, disclaimers, and comparisons.
Although all analyzed media outlets used visual signs in order to influence their readership, the main difference between them was the way of their application within the discourse. While Sputnik International mainly focused on the anti-Clinton and pro-
Trump callouts and pull quotes from the experts, Russia Beyond the Headlines and The
Moscow Times used photomontages and caricatures that supported ideological messages in the editorial pieces. These messages were also supported by the editors’ ideologically loaded word choice as well as rhetorical figures, such as metaphors, and literary devices, such as irony and hyperbole. Especially in the discourse of Sputnik and RBTH ideologically loaded words and phrases, such as the Cold War, the Russian agent, and the
106 Kremlin stooge, were used by editors in connection to Trump and Russia. All three media outlets extensively employed metaphors, such as the “Russian trap” and the “Russia card.” In addition, spreading of misinformation, the withholding of some important facts on particular issues, implying information without providing any evidence, and using indeterminations in order to achieve vagueness were especially prominent tactics within the discourse of Sputnik and RBTH. Finally, a consistent depiction of Trump and Russia as the target of Clinton’s accusations and an allegedly unfair coverage from the traditional US media outlets showed especially Sputnik’s and RBTH’s aim to victimize both social actors. Similarly to Trump, Russia as an actor within the Sputnik, RBTH, and
MT discourse was depicted as a victim that has been misused by Clinton and her campaigners as a medium in order to attack Trump.
In line with these findings, the researcher addressed the second research question of how both candidates were depicted as social actors within the discourse on the basis of the framework proposed by van Leeuwen (2008). Although Clinton was slightly more included into the discourse of Sputnik than Trump, RBTH and MT included her into their discourse less often as an individual. In general, she was more excluded from the discourse and more often backgrounded than Trump. Moreover, especially in the case of
Sputnik, Clinton was often referred to by her first name whereas Trump was addressed by his surname. There are several explanations of why Sputnik widely used Clinton’s first name in its discourse. Firstly, addressing the former First Lady Hillary Clinton by her first name may intend to avoid confusion with her husband and former President of the
United States Bill Clinton. Since the name Clinton risks confusion, it would also risk
107 bringing some of Bill Clinton’s negatives into her campaign. Secondly, addressing an individual by his or her first name is in many cases regarded as rude and often aims to demean or disrespect this person in terms of his or her accomplishments. However, using just a first name for a Presidential candidate is not always seen as necessarily disrespectful.3 In fact, Clinton’s campaign has embraced it by using such campaign slogans as “I’m With Hillary.” This shows that to some degree she herself has welcomed this informality. Within the discourse, Clinton was also often activated in terms of her accusations of Trump having ties to Russia and Russia’s role in the American election and the WikiLeaks scandal. Trump, however, was mostly passivated when receiving the accusations and later activated in order to defend himself or deny the allegations. In line with this aspect, the already mentioned victimization tactic applied by Sputnik and RBTH was supported by an assimilation of Hillary Clinton into a group (i.e. the Clinton camp) and at the same time individualization of Donald Trump. The individualization of Trump depicted him as a more independent individual in comparison to Clinton and supported the impression of victimization since Trump’s opponents operated in groups while he appeared to operate alone. In contrast to Sputnik and RBTH, MT more likely individualized and treated both candidates similarly without victimizing Trump. These differences could be explained with different orientations, corporate lines, and financial structures of the media outlets. The state-funded outlets like Sputnik and RBTH mainly focused in their coverage of Clinton’s email scandals, her anti-Russian attitude, and the
3 In the history of American elections, the Army General Dwight Eisenhower effectively used his career nickname “Ike” for the famous slogan “I like Ike” in the 1952 Presidential campaign against Adlai Stevenson. The slogan is still regarded as the most memorable political advertising campaigns in the U.S. history (Suddath, n.d.). 108 role of WikiLeaks in the election campaign as well as at Trump as a “controversial” candidate and at his sympathy for Russia. On the other side, the focus of the independent media outlet MT was more global and its focus mostly lay on the Russian-U.S. relations.
The overall picture of Russia and the West that was established in the MT’s discourse was predominantly negative. Russia was depicted as being the same as the West, although Western society refuses to acknowledge the similarity. This is the reason why
Russia subtly mocks and indirectly sabotages America until it admits the similarities.
Furthermore, the last two research questions of what ideological groups were constructed in the discourse and what ideological positions did these represent, were addressed. The analysis also allowed this researcher to identify different enemy images/out-groups as well as in-groups among the analyzed media outlets. While Sputnik explicitly focused on the Clinton camp and the U.S. government in general as the enemy image, the RBTH differentiated between the Democratic Party as a whole and the Clinton camp as a part of the Democratic Party. Within the discourse strand of the Russian-U.S. relations, the editors depicted the Democrats as the out-group whereas within the discourse strand of the WikiLeaks email dump their focus lay on the Clinton camp as a part of the Democratic Party. The depiction of the out-groups in MT, however, was more global than in the previous two media outlets. The main out-groups were the West, USA, the U.S. political establishment (which is basically the Democratic Party), and the Trump supporters, although the focus mostly lay on the West and the USA. Furthermore, the researcher applied the concept of the ideological square to the analysis of the discourse.
Prominent positive self-representations of Russia and negative others-representations of
109 the Democrats could be observed within the discourse of Sputnik and RBTH. Especially
RBTH focused on semantic figures such as metaphors, hyperboles, repetitions, and irony in order to emphasize and/or ridicule America’s or the Democrats’ negative actions. In case of MT, Russia as “Us” as well as the West and the Americans as “Them” were represented either neutrally or most likely negatively. Moreover, the West and America were widely made responsible for Russia’s recent immoral actions and its negative development over the past years. Especially Sputnik used surface structures in order to create a positive image of Russia through callouts and pro-Russian pull quotes from experts. On the level of syntax, Russia as an actor was always activated when it had to deny any accusations and passivated in order to focus the readers’ attention on the actor affected by the involuntary action such as being dragged into American election debates.
In terms of the WikiLeaks conflict, authors used the tactic of implicitness/presuppositions and evidentiality in order to de-emphasize Russia’s negative actions, that is, its actual and provable role in the conflict. Moreover, as already mentioned, the tactic of victimization was widely used especially by RBTH and Sputnik. In this regard, victimization was realized in connection with generalizations and specifications. The media outlets extensively described in detail all the things the Democrats accused Russia of and generalized Russia’s actual role in the conflict in order to avoid explicit statements on this sensitive topic. In other words, the negative actions of the Clinton camp were highlighted through specifications, while the negative role of Russia was played down by generalizations.
110 Conclusion
On the basis of Siegfried Jäger’s CDA approach, this study identified several tactics that were used by the three examined Russian media outlets in order to depict
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump during their election campaigns. Among them were such strategies as application of the visual signs, ideologically loaded word choice and lexicalization, rhetorical figures, hyperboles, implicitness, evidentiality, spreading of misinformation, victimization, polarizations, disclaimers, and comparisons. Furthermore, this thesis showed that two of the three media outlets favored Clinton as the next
American President with regard to the future Russian-U.S. relations. According to the discourses of Sputnik International and The Moscow Times, although both candidates are not perfect for a prosperous Moscow-Washington relationship, Hillary Clinton would be the better President due to her stability and predictability in terms of her predominantly negative attitude toward Russia. However, Russia Beyond the Headlines progressively emphasized Clinton’s negative attitude toward Russia and prominently endorsed Trump as a favorable candidate on the basis of his sympathy for Russia and Vladimir Putin.
In general, both Presidential candidates were widely criticized within the discourse of the analyzed editorial pieces, although especially the state-owned Russian media outlets Sputnik and RBTH made several favorable comments toward Trump while often ridiculing Clinton. The main reasons for this increasingly negative coverage of
Clinton were her accusations of Russia for being involved in the WikiLeaks email scandal and Moscow’s alleged interference in the U.S. election. In addition, this thesis found some attempts to undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process through
111 victimization and allegedly unfair coverage of Trump from traditional U.S. media outlets as well as Clinton’s and the Democrats’ “dishonest methods” in light of the WikiLeaks email dump. On the basis of van Leeuwen’s framework of the social actor representation, the researcher identified the prominent strategy of Clinton’s assimilation to a “Clinton camp” while individualizing Trump in order to support the notion of victimization. At least in the coverage of Sputnik and RBTH, Trump was depicted as an outsider victimized by a corrupt political establishment and defective democratic process that aimed to prevent his presidency due to his sympathy for Russia. According to the media outlets,
Trump’s sympathy for Russia was misused by the Clinton team in order to attack him and
Russia at the same time. In line with these findings, on the basis of van Dijk’s in- group/out-group dynamics, this study also showed that all three examined media outlets took a defensive pro-Russia position. An enemy image of America as the hostile scapegoat for Russia’s negative actions and the country’s negative development since the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as a Cold War image of the current Russian-U.S. relations were constructed within the discourse. Consequently, this enemy image of
America, Clinton’s accusations and her apparent misuse of Trump in order to attack
Russia and vice versa, might have led to this defensive pro-Russia position and a medial solidarity with Trump which was expressed through a less critical coverage in the analyzed editorial pieces.
Siegfried Jäger’s CDA approach proved to be a good framework for analyzing the collected data in terms of the discourse strategies. The structural analysis provided a broad overview over the different discourse strands while the detailed analysis allowed a
112 closer look at particular strategies. Finally, the synoptic analysis provided important and comprised insights into the overall discourse trends of the newspapers. Van Leeuwen’s model of the social actors’ representation complemented the CDA by providing additional insights into the subject. Van Dijk’s framework of the ideological square also proved to be an appropriate design, as it pays attention to many of the techniques by which media outlets try to control and penetrate into the mind of their audience to reach their goal. In sum, the results of this study demonstrated that CDA provides a great opportunity to discover the realities, which according to Fairclough (1995) have been distorted and naturalized as “non-ideological common sense” (p. 27).
Limitations and Future Research
Any research has its own sets of problems and limitations. This thesis would have been more comprehensive, if the amount of articles had been greater and the differences in the number of articles per newspaper had been smaller. Moreover, the choice of newspapers was not perfect as the researcher had to choose from online newspapers that were most readily available at the time of the beginning of the study. In addition, it was difficult to find online newspapers that fulfilled all the requirements and offered an independent view on the research subject. Additional newspapers with polar opposite political stands would have contributed to more contrast within the discourse and to a more independent perspective on the research subject.
Similar studies can be conducted in the future research. For example, additional quantitative demonstration could be conducted in order to establish that the identified strategies indeed apply. Furthermore, as this research focused on a part of van Leeuwen’s
113 framework of social actors’ representation (2008), the remaining categories from his framework could also be taken into consideration. While this study has successfully shown how Critical Discourse Analysis can be applied productively to the qualitative analysis of political discourse in newspapers, future research might also attempt to analyze other media types and genres.
On the basis of this thesis, other studies may then apply similar framework to the analysis of the Western media, such as US media or German media, in order to find similar or different dynamics among the discourses. In other words, it would be interesting to compare the Western media outlets’ image of Russia and the West, especially the United States, to the images established within the discourse of the Russian media outlets examined in this study. Moreover, further studies may closely look at the reception and effects of the strategies that were applied by the Russian media outlets examined in this thesis in order to depict both U.S. Presidential candidates. This might contribute to the overall understanding of the Russian audience’s view on the coverage of the American election in the Russian media and the civil image of the United States in general. Additionally, since there are few studies on the practices, ethical principles and personal views of journalists in Russia, further studies might conduct quantitative surveys or qualitative interviews in order to address these issues. This might provide insights into the Russian media outlets’ general corporate guidelines on the coverage of particular topics for journalists and give an overview of their personal views on the American election.
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Cold War 2.0: Hillary Claims a Putin-Led ‘Alt-Right’ conspiracy is Against Her (S2)
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141 Next US Leader Through Russia’s Eyes: Predictable Foe or Unpredictable Friend? (S3)
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147 U.S. elections: How Trump became ‘Putin’s agent’ (RBTH1)
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149 Who would Russians vote for in the U.S. Presidential election (RBTH4)
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152 On Russia, Trump and the Picture of Dorian Grey (MT1)
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156 U.S. Politics Caught in a ‘Russian Trap’
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Sputnik International
Topic Subtopic Articles Russia Clinton’s Hillary Clinton’s Anti-Russian Campaign May Backfire anti-Russian (Sputnik1) campaign Cold War 2.0: Hillary Claims a Putin-Led ‘Alt-Right’ Conspiracy is Against Her* (Sputnik2) Hillary Releases Creepy Propaganda Ad Insinuating Trump is a Russian Agent* (Sputnik7) Which Next US Leader Through Russia’s Eyes: Predictable candidate is Foe or Unpredictable Friend? (Sputnik3) best for Russian Economy Unlikely to Experience More Russia? Pressure After US Election (Sputnik4) Trump’s and Trump’s Doubt of US Intel’s Groundless Claims of Clinton’s Russian Hack ‘Defines Logic’ (Sputnik5) connections Voting for Anyone But Clinton Means You’re to Russia Obviously a ‘Russian Agent’ (Sputnik6) Hillary Releases Creepy Propaganda Ad Insinuating Trump is a Russian Agent (Sputnik7) Hillary Ally Accuses Green Party’s Jill Stein of Being Trump-like Russian Agent* (Sputnik8) If Trump is ‘Russia’s Candidate,’ Does That Make Clinton the Saudis’ Pick?* (Sputnik 9) Foreign Middle East Most Pro-Palestinian Candidate Ever? Trump Stays Politics of Politics ‘Neutral’ in Middle East (Sputnik 10) the If Trump is ‘Russia’s Candidate,’ Does That Make Candidates Clinton the Saudis’ Pick?* (Sputnik 9) Victory Over Daesh in Mosul to Benefit Hillary Clinton’s Campaign (Sputnik11) Campaigns Supporter of Trump Endorsed by American Nazi Party Leader - Is and Polls the The Republican Nominee Racist?* (Sputnik12) campaigns Hillary Ally Accuses Green Party’s Jill Stein of Being Trump-like Russian Agent* (Sputnik8) Racism Cold War 2.0: Hillary Claims a Putin-Led ‘Alt-Right’ Conspiracy is Against Her* (Sputnik2) Trump Endorsed by American Nazi Party Leader - Is The Republican Nominee Racist?* (Sputnik12) Polls Poll Truther Movement: Is Trump Secretly Winning Behind Wave of Silent Support? (Sputnik13) More Polls Show Massive Trump Surge: Is Hillary the New ‘Low Energy’ Jeb Bush? (Sputnik14) Other Impeachment Distant Possibility of Impeachment Looms for Clinton If 160 Elected President (Sputnik15) Emails affair What to Expect After FBI’s Renewal of Clinton Probe Ahead of US Election (Sputnik16) * Doubles
Label Sputnik1 Headline Hillary Clinton’s Anti-Russian Campaign May Backfire Date 08.25.2016 Section Politics Author Noname Categorization Russia/ Clinton’s anti-Russian campaign Summary Assumption that Clinton has certain links to Moscow and this is the reason why she should not accuse Trump of "cozying up" with Russia. There is evidence that Clinton has connections to Russia. There is no evidence that Trump has connections to Russia. Topics/Subtopics Main topic: Hillary Clinton’s and Donald Trump’s connections to Russia Subtopics: WikiLeaks’ release of emails, Russia’s connection to the leaks, Russia’s possible interference into the US presidential elections Visual signs Photograph of Hillary Clinton talking, arms wide open, looking to the left The lead in bold font 3 extra highlighters: a fact about Trump’s financial ties to Russia according to an expert; a quote by Assange about released emails; a statement that denies Trump’s connections to Russia and notes that “there is clear evidence” of Clinton’s ties to Russia Collective symbolism Trump is “cozying up” with Russia/“cozying up” with the Kremlin; “links” to Moscow, “having a hand in,” “ties” Using words that signify a connection to sth. Unleash, backfire, hot air Normalizations Clinton experiences a series of scandals and tries to divert the public opinion from her by playing the “Russian card” Social Actors Representation Exclusion 161 Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Activation of Hillary Clinton in the first paragraph, then Assimilation to “the Clinton Camp” Individualization/ Assimilation Assimilation of Hillary Clinton to “the Clinton & camp” (Refer to Clinton as “the Clinton Camp,” later Association/ Dissociation in the article as “the Clinton campaigners”) Individualization of Donald Trump Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump Categorization: Functionalization as Democratic presidential nominee (Clinton), the former Secretary of State (Clinton); Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump Ideological Square Main groups Russia (meaning: government), Clinton Camp/Clinton Campaigners Rhetoric Alliteration: Clinton Camp, Clinton Campaigners Metaphors: “shoot herself in the foot;” “cozying up” with Russia; “links” to Moscow; “Russian Card;” “Russian Tool;” “cozying up” with the Kremlin; Trump’s links to Russia appear to be nothing more than “hot air;” “Russia is having a hand in the leak” Lexicon Minus words (Clinton as actor): shoot, accuse, trying to divert, tried to stigmatize Donald Trump, unleashed, branding not only Trump, Focusing on Clinton’s accusation of Trump, but focus on the denial of Clinton’s arguments and detailed description of Clinton’s apparent connections to Russia (by bringing in authorities like Alexander Antoshin and Julian Assange) generalization of Trump’s actions/connections to Russia (at some degree victimization), and specification of Clinton’s connections to Russia
Label Sputnik2 Headline Cold War 2.0: Hillary Claims a Putin-Led ‘Alt- Right’ Conspiracy is Against Her* Date 08.28.2016 Section Opinion Author Noname Categorization Russia/ Clinton’s anti-Russian campaign & Campaigns and Polls/Racism Summary Describing the meaning of the term ‘Alt-Right’ and analyzing Clinton’s attempts to blame Putin for rising popularity of right-wing leaders by calling him 162 the “Godfather of extreme nationalism” Clinton follows her anti-Russian campaign and labels Putin as well as Russian media as racist Topics/Subtopics Topic: Clinton’s anti-Russian campaign, especially her statement of Russia and Putin being nationalist/racist Subtopics: WikiLeaks’ email leak, Russia’s role in the email leak, Russian media, “Alt-Right” Visual signs 1. Photograph of Hillary Clinton and Vladimir Putin, he is smiling, she is friendly talking, direct eye contact 2. 2 Tweets of Michael Tracey 3. YouTube Video: “Godfather of extreme nationalism” Clinton blames Putin for rising popularity of right-wing leaders Collective symbolism Double down, drumming up, smear, etc. Reaching into bag of tricks and pull out sth., convert into a sword, etc. (theatric, circus rhetoric) Normalizations RT and Sputnik are not propaganda media outlets and they are not government controlled; Russia is not involved into the WikiLeaks’ leak of Clinton’s mails. Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding US-R relations are affected not directly by Hillary Clinton, but by her campaign backgrounding Clinton, but later in text including her through direct quotes (semiotic action, not behavioralized) Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Activation later in the text (Active in the headline: Hillary claims) Individualization/ Assimilation & Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Hillary, Clinton, “tinfoil Hillary” Categorization: The Democratic nominee (functionalization), Secretary Clinton Ideological Square Main groups Hillary camp, the DNC, the corporate media, Russia/Kremlin Rhetoric Alliteration: double down on the disturbing tactic Metaphors: drumming up anti-Russia hysteria, Russia card, converted into a sword, alt-Right, 163 reaching into a bag of tricks Repetition: “neither RT nor Sputnik are government controlled” & “RT which is not government controlled” Exaggeration/Hyperbole: “Secretary Clinton looks to label media outlets as not only treasonous but also racist” Lexicon Colloquial word choice (doubled down, drumming up, etc.) Minus words (Clinton): disturbing, hysteria, smear Donald Trump, to label, treason Focus on Hillary Clinton and her accusation of Putin and the Russian outlets of being “propaganda outlets.” Emphasis/Repetition of the fact that neither RT nor Sputnik are government controlled (although there is evidence that this is a lie) and that the coverage of these outlets also criticizes Trump’s support from various “White Supermacist groups” (although no links to articles; but comparison to the coverage of the Green Party’s Jill Stein, Bernie Sanders, or the UK Labour Party’s Jeremy Corbyn other racist actors). Cold war- term.
Label Sputnik3 Headline Next US Leader Through Russia’s Eyes: Predictable Foe or Unpredictable Friend? Date 11.04.2016 Section Opinion Author Noname Categorization Russia/ Which candidate is best for Russia? Summary Trump and Clinton are analyzed in order to show which candidate is the best one for Russia Both candidates are not perfect for a good and stable relationship with the USA, so choosing “the lesser of evils” is a good solution (tendency to Clinton) Topics/Subtopics Topic: Pros and cons of candidates in regard to Russia Subtopics: anti-Russian sanctions over Ukraine (Clinton’s position), Syria politics (Clinton’s position), Russia’s role in WikiLeaks’ releases of emails, anti-Russian sanctions over Ukraine (Trump’s vision), NATO, Syria politics (Trump’s vision), Trump’s connections to Russia, US-Russian relations 164 Visual signs Close up of two hands holding a sign “Seal of the President of the United States” 8 highlighters: 1. Quote of an expert on comparison of Clinton to Obama in terms of their attitude toward Russia; 2. Quote of an expert regarding negative attitude of Clinton toward Putin; 3. Direct quotes of Trump on topic Putin vs. Obama in Syria and criticizing Clinton for her negative attitude toward Putin; 4. Direct quote of an expert on US-Russian relations in case Trump gets elected; 5. Quote of an expert saying Trump would not be such a better option for Russia because he is unpredictable; 6. Quote of an expert on Trump being in an environment which is hostile to Russia; 7. Quote of an expert on Syria and Ukraine politics; 8. Quote of an expert who is stating that Clinton would be a “bad” decision for Russia, but still better than “unpredictable” Trump Collective symbolism / Normalizations No obvious normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Both actors (Trump and Clinton) activated through active voice Individualization/ Assimilation Both actors individualized & Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nominations for Hillary Clinton: Hillary Clinton, Clinton, the candidate Nominations for Donald Trump: Donald Trump, Trump Categorizations for Hillary Clinton: US Democratic nominee, the Democratic nominee, Hawkish Clinton Categorizations for Donald Trump: Republican candidate, the GOP candidate, the Republican nominee, Unpredictable Trump Ideological Square Main groups Russia(cyberattacks) /Moscow (Middle East politics)/Kremlin (connections), USA/Russia (under Clinton), USA/Russia (under Trump) Rhetoric Metaphors: Choosing the Lesser of Evils Lexicon Word choice: Clinton as “predictable foe,” Trump as 165 “unpredictable friend,” “hawkish Clinton,” “unpredictable Trump,” Trump as “a successful businessman,” and as “beginner in politics,” he is an “experienced businessman but inexperienced politician” Direct quotes by Trump, only one by Clinton; attributes to Clinton only “hawkish” whereas a lot of expressions about Donald Trump; the author does not mention anything about Trump’s view on Russia’s cyberattacks on Clinton.
Label Sputnik4 Headline Russian Economy Unlikely to Experience More Pressure After US Election Date 10.27.2016 Section Opinion Author Noname Categorization Russia/ Which candidate is best for Russia? Summary Focus on Clinton and the consequences for Russian economy when she wins the election It does not really matter for Russian economy whether Clinton or Trump get elected; US sanctions have limited impact on Russia because it has begun diversifying away from the West by engaging economically in the East; USA under Clinton still would not be able to isolate Russia economically. Topics/Subtopics Topic: Russian economy development scenarios in case of Trump or Clinton winning the election Subtopics: future of sanctions against Russia, economy relationships between US and Russia, Fed’s rates and ruble/currency, diversification of Russian economy toward East Visual signs Photograph of Trump and Clinton from the 3rd debates. Trump is facing Clinton and talking, Clinton looking at Trump and listening. 2 highlighters: 1. A quote from an expert on Clinton’s and Trump’s extreme opposite attitudes toward Russia during their campaigning time, stating that it may change and become less offensive and polarized after the election; 2. A quote from an expert on sanctions against Russia stating that they surprisingly benefited Russian agriculture. Collective symbolism
166 Normalizations Sanctions are unfair Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Russia as an actor activated, Trump and Clinton passivated, USA as actor passivated and even backgrounded Individualization/ Assimilation Associations and Dissociations: West, East, BRICS & and Brazil, India, China, South Africa Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Clinton, Trump Categorization: Republican nominee, Democratic nominee, Republican rival, Ideological Square Main groups Russia, the White House, the United States Rhetoric Metaphors: Russia has been routinely dragged into election debates Lexicon Word choice: Russia has been routinely dragged into election debates, WikiLeaks dumped, a gap has opened, Generalization: sanctions (only mentioning “after a row over Ukraine in summer 2016) hiding own negative actions, implicitness Topicalizations and examples A good article for examining the ideological square because focus on Russia as an actor and describing its relations to USA (and what to expect for Russian economy in case Clinton gets elected). Main statement: the USA as actor under Obama and USA as actor under Clinton will still hold into sanctions against Russia. However, Russia has already learned how to deal with it and is already looking for alternatives such as “going East.”
Label Sputnik5 Headline Trump’s Doubt of US Intel’s Groundless Claims of Russian Hack ‘Defines Logic’ Date 10.17.2016 Section Opinion Author Noname Categorization Russia/ Trump’s and Clinton’s connections to Russia Summary The opinion piece is justifying Trump’s doubts on Russian breaking in/hack into DNC 167 There are no proof of Russian involvement in the hacks and thus, it is legitimate if Trump expresses doubts in this regard; unlike previous candidates, Trump is critical toward government and shows doubts on their statements/advices Topics/Subtopics Topic: Trump’s doubts on Russia’s involvement in the hacks and they are legitimate Subtopics: No proofs of Russia’s involvement in the hacks, hurling accusations at Putin has become a norm of good behavior in America Visual signs Photograph of Donald Trump at a lectern, in background American flags, Trump is holding a microphone with both hands, is smiling and looking to the left 4 highlighters: 1. Quote from “several former intelligence officials” on Trump, accusing him of having a “blind spot” for Russia; 2. Quote from an former official on Trump about ignoring intelligence officials advice; 3. Quote of a former official about both candidates preparing their arguments; 4. Quote from an official who states that it is unlikely for a candidate doubting information from an intelligence briefing Collective symbolism Normalizations Russia had nothing to do with the hacks on Democratic National Committee and Trump has not openly admitted that he has sympathies to Russia Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Trump as actor activated, later backgrounded Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Trump as actor activated at the beginning (active voice, e.g. he dared, he said), later passivated (passive voice, e.g. he has a bind spot for Russia, he should be burned) Individualization/ Assimilation “several former intelligence officials” – no names of & the officials, but representing/summarizing them in a Association/ Dissociation group Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Trump Categorization: GOP presidential candidate, Republican presidential candidate Ideological Square Main groups Current and former US security officials, 168 Russia/Moscow Rhetoric Alliteration: Big bad (russkies) Metaphors: Trump is having a “blind spot” for Russia Irony: Trump has “dared” to doubt sth. officials say; “he should be burned on a pyre as a heretic and blasphemer” (exaggeration). Lexicon Word choice: “big bad russkies,” “anti-Russian hysteria” Rhetorical questions: Sound absurd? Word choice like: Let’s be real; Sorry, guys, but that’s just not good enough for everyone; according to basic principles of logic…; finger-pointing; Well, gentlemen, believe it or not, this candidate does, etc. An article which is written in a colloquial style, building a picture of US which is negative toward Russia and this negativity projects onto Trump. Victimization of Trump.
Label Sputnik6 Headline Voting for Anyone But Clinton Means You’re Obviously a ‘Russian Agent’ Date 08.10.2016 Section Politics Author Noname Categorization Russia/ Trump’s and Clinton’s connections to Russia & Campaigns and Polls/ Supporter of the campaigns Summary The opinion piece is blaming Clinton to declare everyone to be the "Russian Agent" if not willing to vote for her Clinton exaggerates when labelling every opponent of being a Russian sympathizer (some of her accusations are even silly and unrealistic) Topics/Subtopics Topic: Whoever is against Clinton, gets quickly branded as a sympathizer of Russia (a “Russian Agent”) Subtopics: Trump’s ties to Russia (because he is against Clinton), WikiLeaks’ release of emails, Bernie Sanders’ connections to Russia, Jill Stein’ connections to Russia, Clintons’ connections to Russia, Obama’s sympathy for Russia Visual signs Photograph of Clinton; mouth wide open, both hands in the air, eyes wide open (effect: silly, ironic) Photograph of Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton; 169 both arms crossed, Clinton smiling and looking to the right, Sanders looking serious and to the left Photograph of Clinton and Putin; Clinton is explaining sth., gesticulating and looking directly at Putin to the left; Putin is standing, looking at Clinton and smiling 1 Twitter post from Glenn Greenwald about Jill Stein and Russia 7 highlighters: 1. A direct quote from an expert on Trump “entering a political kill zone”; 2. A quote from an expert on Clinton and her “smear tactic” against Trump; 3. Quote from an expert on Sanders’ connections to Russia; 4. A statement by the author of the article about Clinton’s camp accusing Stein of being “agent of the Kremlin” very quickly; 5. Quote from an expert on Clinton labelling everyone who is against her of being “agents of Russia” 6. Quote from the NYT about Mr. Clinton’s links to Russia; 7. Quote from an expert on Clinton and “many more sordid stories to be reported on” her Collective symbolism Beating the war drums about, convert, stooge, eerie Normalizations The article is not explicitly saying that Russia is not trying to influence the US election or that the WikiLeaks release of emails were organized by Russia, the article only says that there is no proof of it (or the Democrats failed to provide proof) no denial or explanation that Russia is innocent Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Clinton is backgrounded in the article the reference is “the Clinton camp,” “Hillary Clinton’s campaigners,” or only “Democrats” Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Trump passivated, Clinton backgrounded, Clinton camp activated (camp is following, camp does not bother, Democrats went further, camp cares etc.) Individualization/ Assimilation Assimilation of Clinton to “the Clinton camp,” & “Hillary Clinton’s campaigners,” “Clinton Association/ Dissociation supporters” or just “Democrats,” no actions of Hillary Clinton as individual whereas Trump is individualized in the article Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Clinton, Donald Trump, Trump Categorization: Trump – Hillary Clinton’s major 170 competitor in the 2016 US Presidential race Ideological Square Main groups The Clinton camp/Clinton campaigners/supporters/Democrats; Russia/Kremlin/The Ruskies/the Russians Rhetoric Alliteration: Clinton camp, Clinton campaigners Metaphors: Democrats turned a deaf ear to the US intelligence community; dark connections to Russia; Kremlin weapons; beating the war drums; McCarthyism (a term used to describe the practice of making accusations of subversion without any regard of evidence; McCarthy-styled new ad, Joseph McCarthy’s footsteps) Exaggeration: “literally overnight you could find yourself converted into a Kremlin stooge” Lexicon Word choice (Russia): Kremlin stooge, Russian agent, smear tactic, Kremlin weapons, dark connections to Russia, Kremlin tool, joined the dark side, Russian propaganda tool Generalizations: Democrat’s attempts to label other actors negative connections to Russia described at more specific level, with many details Very ideological, negative attitude toward Russia and the Clinton camp, developing a new term “McCarthyism,” victimization of Trump
Label Sputnik7 Headline Hillary Releases Creepy Propaganda Ad Insinuating Trump is a Russian Agent* Date 08.07.2016 Section Opinion Author Noname Categorization Russia/ Clinton’s anti-Russian campaign & Russia/ Trump’s and Clinton’s connections to Russia Summary Discussion about Clinton’s ad which insinuates Trump as a “Russian Agent” The ad is smearing Trump’s character; it is meant to be an agitation against Trump Topics/Subtopics Topic: Clinton’s ad claiming Trump were a “Russian agent” Subtopics: WikiLeaks/emails, Joseph McCarthy and Joseph J. Welch Visual signs Photograph of Trump; smiling with closed mouth, 171 both hands raised like “I don’t know”; facing the right side 2 videos: 1. What is Donald Trump's connection to Vladimir Putin? | The Briefing; 2. Not available, but implying from the text it should be the ad described in the text Collective symbolism Hallmark, bedrock, caught steam Normalizations Russia had nothing to do with the WikiLeaks’ email affair Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Clinton backgrounded as an individual, but activated as Clinton’s campaign, or Clinton’s team Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Activation of Clinton’s campaign/ad, Clinton’s team; activated/individualized in the headline (Hillary releases) Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of Trump, and assimilation of & Association/ Dissociation Clinton to Clinton’s campaign, Clinton’s team, or Hillary’s team Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Clinton, Trump Categorization: the former Secretary of State, her political adversary Generalization/ Abstractions Ideological Square Main groups Hillary’s team Rhetoric Alliteration: Hillary Clinton’s campaign Metaphor: caught steam; final shoe drop, McCarthyism Exaggeration: Clinton coronation Lexicon Minus words (emotional, polarized meaning): brazen, monger, fear, Cold war, treason, hallmark of third-world authoritarians, aspersion, eerily, tyranny, etc. Similar rhetoric and lexicon to Sputnik6 article. Cold war. State that Russian intervention in the WikiLeaks email affair is absurd (this conspiracy theory one would expect from a wrinkly ten-year old James Patterson novel cast aside for its absurdity even in the realm of fiction), but providing no proof for this. The editor implies that the reader already knows and is certain that Russia has nothing to do with it (implicitness). Similar to Sputnik6, also McCarthyism term.
172 Label Sputnik8 Headline Hillary Ally Accuses Green Party’s Jill Stein of Being Trump-like Russian Agent Date 08/08/2016 Section Opinion Author Noname Categorization Russia/ Trump’s and Clinton’s connections to Russia & Campaigns and Polls/ Supporter of the campaigns Summary Discussion about Clinton’s ally Aravosis and Jill Stein and their relations to Russia Topics/Subtopics Topic: John Aravosis (Clinton’s supporter) attacked Jill Stein by stating that she has ties to Russia Subtopics: WikiLeaks Visual signs Photograph of a woman talking in a crowd, looking to the right A Twitter message from Glenn Greenwald about Aravosis’s comments on Stein’s relationship to Russia 2 highlighters: 1. a quote from an actor mentioned in the text about Stein’s trip to Moscow; 2. A statement from the editor and a quote from an actor. Collective symbolism Normalizations Russia has nothing to do with the WikiLeaks dump on DNC files Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Passivated in the text, activated at the end (Hillary Clinton opened, claimed, obfuscated, subverted, took it one step further) Passivated in the headline (Hillary ally…) Individualization/ Assimilation Clinton and Trump individualized & Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump Categorization: / Ideological Square Main groups No groups, individuals Rhetoric Metaphors: rush into the comforting arms of McCarthyism; sth. has now gone completely off the rails; Hillary Clinton opened Pandora’s Box Lexicon Trump as “unwitting agent” of Vladimir Putin Here again, Hillary Clinton “opened Pandora’s Box falsely claiming that Russia was 173 behind the WikiLeaks dump of DNC files” implicitness that Russia is innocent, without providing any proof or explanation.
Label Sputnik9 Headline If Trump is ‘Russia’s Candidate,’ Does That Make Clinton the Saudis’ Pick? Date 08/22/2016 Section Opinion Author Noname Categorization Russia/ Trump’s and Clinton’s connections to Russia & Foreign Politics of the Candidates/ Middle East Politics Summary Categorization/Polarization of Trump and Clinton Trump is not a "Russian Candidate" and that Clinton provably has connections to Saudis Topics/Subtopics Topic: Trump’s ties to Russia and Clinton’s connections to Saudi Arabia Subtopics: Clinton’s Foundation, Clinton’s supporter Huma Abedin Visual signs Photograph of Clinton with a Sheik; both in background, looking to the ground, Clinton is smiling Photograph of Clinton and her supporter Huma Abedin at a campaign event; Clinton with a wide open mouth looking to the right, Abedin looking and pointing in the same direction 3 highlighters: 1. Paraphrasing a piece from the Times on Clinton’s Foundation: accusation from the editor of accepting money from countries that the US State Department has repeatedly criticized for human rights abuses (mainly countries Saudi Arabia, Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, etc.); 2. Paraphrasing “conservative US and British media” that revealed that Clinton’s long term supporter had worked as an assistant editor for a radical Islamic Saudi journal; 3. Comparing two sides: Trump’s “false accusations” and Clinton’s proved ties to Saudis; rhetorical question. Collective symbolism Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding 174 Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Trump is activated, Clinton passivated Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of both candidates & Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Trump, Clinton, Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Mr. , Mrs. Clinton Categorization: Republican presidential candidate, candidate, the businessman, the Kremlin Agent Trump, Kremlin Agent, Moscow’s man Ideological Square Main groups Moscow/Russia/The Kremlin; Middle Eastern sheikdoms (only in the lead)/Saudis Rhetoric Exaggerations: The media have accused Moscow of every sin imaginable; exaggeration within the highlighters (supporter of hardcore Islamist ideology) Metaphors: slamming him; slipped through the cracks, before blowing up on national television Lexicon Lexical choices: Kremlin agent (Trump); Moscow’s man; Russian agent; puppet to the Russians, the Kremlin and to Vladimir Putin Generalizations: generalizing Trump by stating there is no evidence of Trump having any significant business or personal interests in Russia which could create a conflict of interest. Specifications: specificating Clinton’s ties to Saudis through The Times article and through “conservative US and British media” (which exactly not mentioned); very detailed descriptions of her alleged connections The headline of the article asks whether Clinton is the Saudi’s pick. However, in the article the author does not state at the end whether Clinton is the Saudi’s pick or not. The article just lists the two reasons why she could be associated with the Middle Eastern sheikdoms. Trump as the most “Russia friendly” presidential candidate the US has seen since 1945.”
Label Sputnik10 Headline Most Pro-Palestinian Candidate Ever? Trump Stays ‘Neutral’ in Middle East Date 08/17/2016 Section Opinion Author Noname 175 Categorization Foreign Politics of the Candidates/ Middle East Politics Summary Describing of Trump’s neutral attitude toward the Middle East and the opposite of Clinton Clinton does not really care about the minority that suffering of isolation and Trump, although in the press negatively depicted, neutral or at least cares about Israel Topics/Subtopics Topic: Trump’s and Clinton’s view on Israel Subtopics: press who is celebrating Clinton and blaming/criticizing Trump Visual signs Photograph of Trump, a close-up of his face, smiling, looking to the right Video called “Israel I Donald J. Trump for President” Collective symbolism Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Both candidates activated, direct quotes from both included in the text (Trump activated in the headline) Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of both candidates, &Association/ Dissociation assimilation/aggregation of Muslims living in the US Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Trump, Clinton Categorization: Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump, candidate, bombastic millionaire, opponent Hillary Clinton Ideological Square Main groups Islamic community, Muslims Rhetoric Metaphors: shot from the hip, political suicide Lexicon Statement that press “celebrates Clinton as a brave heroine, while repeatedly pointing out that Trump is a baseless coward who manipulates fear.” victimization of Trump (press is unfair toward him and too positive toward Clinton)
Label Sputnik11 Headline Victory Over Daesh in Mosul to Benefit Hillary Clinton’s Campaign Date 10/20/2016 Section Opinion Author Noname 176 Categorization Foreign Politics of the Candidates/ Middle East Politics Summary Discussing the plans of both candidates regarding Mosul and Middle East in general No matter who becomes the next US president, Washington’s Middle East policy is likely to become more confrontational than under the Obama rule Topics/Subtopics Topic: the future of the Washington’s Middle East policy Subtopics: Clinton’s Middle East plans, Trump’s Middle East plans Visual signs Photograph of Hillary Clinton, talking, mouth opened, raising one hand and looking to the left 7 highlighters: 1. Expert quote on Clinton and liberation of her plans on Middle East politics; 2. Expert quote and a summary of it from the editor on Obama’s politics on Daesh; 3. Expert quote on US and Mosul; 4. Trump’s direct quote on Mosul; 5. Rephrasing Trump/direct quotes from Trump on the Aleppo issue; 6. Expert quote on Trump and his foreign politics; 7. Expert quote on Trump and his future Middle East politics. Collective symbolism Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Clinton only activated in the second part of the article when writing about her foreign policy plans, in the first half passivated; Trump activated through the article (in the headline, Clinton also passivated) Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of both actors &Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Trump, Clinton Categorization: US presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton, Democrats’ nominee Clinton, the Republican candidate Donald Trump, then-Secretary of State Clinton, her rival Ideological Square Main groups No active groups Rhetoric Metaphors: going neck-and-neck in a tight race 177 Lexicon Relative neutral lexicon Direct quotes from Trump in the highlighters, Clinton’s only quote in the regular text. Word choice: “hawkish Middle East advisers”
Label Sputnik12 Headline Trump Endorsed by American Nazi Party Leader - Is The Republican Nominee Racist? Date 08/07/2016 Section Opinion Author No name Categorization Campaigns and Polls/ Supporter of the campaigns & Campaigns and Polls/ Racism Summary Describing Trump’s supporter the American Nazi Party Leader Rocky Suhayda Just because Trump’s electorate is based on economic imperatives that happen to be primarily impoverished male white voters does not mean that the candidate is espousing or deserves to be connected to the praise of white supremacists (the racist hate groups are wrongly inspired by Trump’s candidacy) Topics/Subtopics Topic: American Nazi Party leader Rocky Suhayda supports Trump Subtopics: radical hate groups in America, Trump’s target audience, radical hate groups inspired by Trump’s campaign Visual signs Photograph of Trump (the same as in Sputnik7) 2 highlighters: 1. Quote from an actor in the text stating that he believes that Trump is going to win the election; 2. Quote from the same actor but from his website, some words are written in capital letters. Collective symbolism Normalizations Donald Trump is not a racist and the radical hate groups are wrongly inspired by his campaign. Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Trump passive, the “supporter” of his campaign activated (In the headline passive, referred to as “Trump” and “The Republican Nominee”) Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of Trump, Assimilation of his &Association/ Dissociation supporters to a “radical hate group”/ “white 178 supremacists”/”racist hate groups” Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Trump, Donald Trump Categorization: the Republican nominee Ideological Square Main groups “radical hate group”/ “white supremacists”/”racist hate groups” Rhetoric Metaphors: death knell Lexicon Trump as not a “conventional” candidate. The normalization that he is innocent/not racist, etc. without providing any proof (implicitness). Letting out his racist comments and his eventual ties/connections to the racist scene.
Label Sputnik13 Headline Poll Truther Movement: Is Trump Secretly Winning Behind Wave of Silent Support? Date 08/27/2016 Section Opinion Author No name Categorization Campaigns and Polls/Polls Summary Comment on the poll situation and describing how it can be affected; describing the electorat of both candidates and refuting the assumption of Trump having a “wave of silent support” due to the Bradley effect Clinton’s base is less enthusiastic and thus, she may struggle to mobilize it on Election Day whereas Trump’s supporters will turn out in full. This is the reason why Trump may be doing better than polls suggest. Topics/Subtopics Topic: Trump is doing better than polls suggested Subtopics: Criticism of the methodology of the polls, the Bradley effect, the “neither” option in the polls, Clinton’s general election base and its demographics, Trump’s general election base Visual signs Photograph of Donald Trump on a rally, speaking into a microphone and gesticulating; facing the right; mouth wide open (as if is screaming or arguing) A Tweet from Michael McFaul about the Reuters/Ipsos poll 2 highlighters: 1. Editor’s comment on the LA Times poll situation and an expert’s thoughts about the possibility of people lying about who they really 179 supported; 2. Rephrasing Trump’s campaign manager and stating that she is not right about the “undercover” Trump supporters. Collective symbolism Normalizations There is no “wave of silent support” behind Trump Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Clinton a few times activated, Trump passivated. In sum, the article is more about polls and social actors are not playing a primary role Individualization/ Assimilation &Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Trump, Clinton, Hillary Very prominent the nomination of “Hillary” and of “Trump” Ideological Square Main groups No groups Rhetoric Lexicon Relative objective article without victimization of Trump or blaming Clinton for sth. The metaphor of “I learned never to wrestle with a pig. You get dirty, and besides, the pig likes it.” It seems that is a lesson yet unlearned by the Hillary campaign” shows a slight sympathy toward Clinton. Not a typical article for Sputnik. Nomination of “Hillary” very prominent (personalized). Bradley Effect not explained well enough. “Lesser of two evils” thought prominent with a slight sympathy for Clinton. Mentioning Russia: “… besides the hysterical conspiracy theory that Vladimir Putin is somehow behind an elaborate scheme to undermine Hillary Clinton…”
Label Sputnik14 Headline More Polls Show Massive Trump Surge: Is Hillary the New “Low Energy” Jeb Bush? Date 09/04/2016 Section Opinion Author No name Categorization Campaigns and Polls/Polls Summary Description of campaign strategies of both candidates Trump “is baiting” Clinton into a trap (by leading her to describe Putin as the “grand 180 godfather” of the alt-right movement) and Clinton fails with her campaign by lacking charisma and doing nothing controversial to disrupt the massive ten point lead that she had earlier Topics/Subtopics Topic: Trump is very active in his campaign while Clinton is ignoring campaign rallies Subtopics: Trump’s lead in the latest LA Times poll, Trump’s rallies, Clinton’s “big-dollar donors in closed meetings,” Trump and his Clinton-trap with Russia Visual signs Photograph of Clinton and Trump (2 in 1), from different locations/meetings; Clinton left, looking into camera and talking; Trump on the right, looking above the camera, talking, on a press conference 2 highlighters: 1. Comment of the editor on the poll situation and the statement that Clinton’s strategy of “doing nothing controversial” might backfire; 2. Comment/assumption of the editor that Trump “baited” Clinton into a trap by letting her say that Putin was the driving force of extreme nationalism Collective symbolism Baited, trap, maneuver, choke, field, airwaves, crisscrossing, floating/float around, flood of weapons and money Normalizations Russia conspiracy theory Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Activation of Trump and the Clinton team, Clinton as individual mostly passivated Individualization/ Assimilation Assimilation of Clinton as individual to the “team &Association/ Dissociation Clinton,” “the Clinton team,” “Hillary’s team” Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Hillary, Clinton, Trump Categorization: the Republican, “Low Energy” Hillary (in connection to Jeb Bush) Ideological Square Main groups Team Clinton/the Clinton team/Hillary’s team Rhetoric Metaphors: new “low energy” Jeb Bush, wait out the clock Hyperbole/exaggeration: Clinton as Jeb Bush Lexicon Word choice: Clinton’s team faces problems, failed, blasted, etc. Trump is leading, baited Clinton, visited, 181 crisscrossing, going to, speaking, meeting, etc. Clinton: parallelism/comparison to “low energy” Jeb Bush (comparison); Reference to Clinton as “Hillary,” and to Trump as “Trump;” Clinton’s “Russia and Putin did it” conspiracy theory; Clinton was baited by Trump into concocting “one of the most bizarre narratives in modern political thoughts that Putin is the ‘grand godfather’ of the alt-right movement.
Label Sputnik15 Headline Distant Possibility of Impeachment Looms for Clinton If Elected President Date 11/06/2016 Section Opinion Author Noname Categorization Other/ Impeachment Summary Reasons why Clinton might face impeachment if elected the president of the US There is a possibility of her impeachment, but it is unlikely Topics/Subtopics Topic: Impeachment of Clinton if elected president Subtopics: FBI and emails right before election, pros and cons of an impeachment Visual signs Photograph of Clinton standing in the shadow, looking to the right, no face seen 4 highlighters: 1. Expert quote: no impeachment for sth. the candidate did before election; 2. Expert quote: Republicans cannot begin impeachment without an investigation; 3. Quote from Clinton’s rival who is afraid of her becoming the president; 4. Expert quote: no impeachment on president Collective symbolism Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Clinton is the main actor, but passivated Individualization/ Assimilation &Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Clinton, Trump, Donald Trump Categorization: Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, 182 Ideological Square Main groups Rhetoric Lexicon The opinions of experts play the main role, both candidates are indirect topic. No actions of both candidates, no ideological groups.
Label Sputnik16 Headline What to Expect After FBI’s Renewal of Clinton Probe Ahead of US Election Date 11/06/2016 Section Opinion Author Noname Categorization Other/ Emails affair Summary Clinton’s email affair, how it could affect the election and what role played FBI The role of FBI is not certain Topics/Subtopics Topic: Clinton’s email affair Subtopics: FBI and Comey, Clinton’s reaction to FBI’s revelation, Obama about Comey, FBI bias, Trump about email affair Visual signs Photograph of Comey in foreground, American flags in background, Comey is talking 5 highlighters: 1. Direct quote Clinton on email situation; 2. Expert’s quote on the email situation; 3. Expert’s quote on active investigation; 4. Expert’s quote on how emails affair might affect the election; 5. Obama’s quote on Comey Collective symbolism Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Clinton as individual as well as Clinton and her supporters are activated; at the end of the article Trump as actor, activated. Individualization/ Assimilation Partly assimilation (?) of Clinton to “Clinton and her & Association/ Dissociation supporters”; Individualization of Trump and Clinton (mostly) Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Clinton, Trump Categorization: Democratic candidate Hillary 183 Clinton, Democratic party’s candidate Ideological Square Main groups Clinton and her supporters (1x) Rhetoric Metaphors: cards on the table, Trumpland Lexicon Some direct quotes of Clinton in the text and in the highlighters, Trump’s direct quote in the text. Not prominent ideologically loaded article.
Russia Beyond the Headlines
Topic Subtopic Articles Russia Anti- U.S. elections: How Trump became “Putin’s agent” Russian (RBTH1) campaign The Russian card: How Clinton is using Moscow to attack Trump (RBTH2)
Trump’s Fading Trump’s words are music to Moscow’s ears – but is popularity it in vain? * (RBTH3) in Russia Who would Russians vote for in the U.S. presidential election* (RBTH4)
Russia’s Who would Russians vote for in the U.S. presidential choice election*(RBTH4)
Clinton and Trump: A psychological profile through a Russian lens (RBTH5)
Why is it impossible to rig elections in the United States?* (RBTH6)
Campaign Trump’s Fading Trump’s words are music to Moscow’s ears – but is & Polls campaign it in vain? * (RBTH3) strategies
American Why is it impossible to rig elections in the United States?* electoral (RBTH6) system
Label RBTH1
184 Headline U.S. elections: How Trump became “Putin’s agent”*
Date 07/28/2016
Section Opinion
Author Georgy Bovt
Categorization Russia/ Anti-Russian campaign
Summary The role of Russia in the WikiLeaks scandal and its consequences Consequences are: 1. Negative consequences for Democrats, i.e. Trump is now leading in the polls; 2. America first started to interfere in other countries; 3. If Russia has something to do with the affair, they deserve a Prize for revealing dishonest methods of Democrats Topics/Subtopics Main topic: The accusations of Russia having something to do with the WikiLeaks affair Subtopics: Edward Snowden, consequences for Democrats since their accusations might backfire
Visual signs A caricature of Donald Trump standing in front of the American flag, having a parachute with the Russian flag on his back
Collective symbolism
Normalizations It is not proven that Russia had anything to do with the affair
Social Actors Representation
Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding
Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Passivation of Clinton, Trump is mostly activated
Individualization/ Assimilation Partly assimilation of Clinton to the “U.S. & Association/ Dissociation Democratic Party”/party apparatus/American Democrats/Democrats (when talking about accusations); individualization of Clinton when
185 talking about the election in general
Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Trump, Hillary Clinton, Clinton Categorization: Republican candidate, an eccentric billionaire, former U.S. Secretary of State
Ideological Square Main groups the “U.S. Democratic Party”/party apparatus/American Democrats/Democrats (THEM) vs. Russia/Putin (US)
Rhetoric Metaphors: one’s own dirty laundry; He who is painted as the devil by his opponents will soon or later start winning points; stopped one step short Irony: As is America does not have more important problems
Lexicon Comparison/Example to the New York Times/Pulitzer Prize and “just like the Russian patriots” US and THEM are similar
It is unknown whether Russia has had anything to do with the affair, “The theory is being examined by the FBI and important members of the Obama administration.” Ideological square relative prominent. Clinton’s tactic: to distract from own mistakes by attacking Russia and Trump
Label RBTH2
Headline The Russian card: How Clinton is using Moscow to attack Trump
Date 09/12/2016
Section Opinion
Author Fyodor Lukyanov
Categorization Russia/ Anti-Russian campaign
Summary Clinton is using Moscow to attack Trump which might backfire and damage her poll- situation
186 The reason for her tactic is to increase the scale of foreign threats in order to demonstrate the Republican candidate’s lack of professional ability; but aggressive Anti- Russian politics is pointless, because the polls are “not very worrisome” Topics/Subtopics Main topic: Clinton is using Moscow to attack Trump Subtopics: polls, reasons for Clinton’s Anti-Russian campaign
Visual signs Caricature of Trump and Clinton fighting in a ring
Collective symbolism
Normalizations Clinton is most likely to win the election
Social Actors Representation
Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding
Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Both candidates mostly passivated; Clinton party activated when she accuses/attacks Trump; Trump partly activated when talking about polls. Clinton is activated in the headline
Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of both candidates; assimilation & Association/ Dissociation only in the lead, when talking about the Democrats
Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Clinton. Trump, Hillary Categorization: U.S. presidential candidate, billionaire, Republican candidate, a simpleton from Queens
Ideological Square Main groups Kremlin/Russia (US) vs. Democrats (only in the lead) (THEM)
Rhetoric Metaphors: the Russian card, but now the scale of evil that Russia embodies is growing before our eyes, 187 the secret to why Russia has exploded…, devil-may- care recipes, man-to-man, throw sth. into the ring Irony/exaggeration: the willy plot that even the Soviet KGB couldn’t dream of.
Lexicon Word choice: demonization of Russia, evil (Russia), accusation against the Kremlin is considered an axiom, Russian card, primitive schemes (Trump), devil, diabolic cunning and a willy plot Implicitness: knowing all (?) that we know about Hillary Clinton’s views…
Ideological square is not very prominent (no great differentiation of groups); partly direct quotes from Clinton, citing the Washington Post which admits that it does not have any evidence of Russia’s plans (the jungle of “existential threats” to American democracy from Russia) but explaining it with another fact that also has not been proved yet. Victimization of Kremlin by Clinton playing the Russian card. Why is she playing the Russian card/demonize Russia? In order to demonstrate Trump’s lack of professional ability. Trump uses “very primitive schemes,” Trump does not possess any skills in international affairs. Clinton just wants to distract from her actions that might raise doubts; her campaign tactic is fully rational; however, knowing all that we know about Hillary Clinton’s views can only lead us to suppose that something personal will also be thrown into the ring. Both candidates are criticized.
Label RBTH3
Headline Fading Trump’s words are music to Moscow’s ears – but is it in vain? *
Date 09/08/2016
Section Opinion
Author Vladimir Mikheev
Categorization Russia/ Trump’s popularity in Russia & Campaign & Polls/ Trump’s campaign strategies
Summary Describing Trump’s campaign tactics and his
188 relations to Russia. Although many media analysts argue that Trump is losing his leadership in the election, the author states that he still has a chance to win. Moreover, there are several challenges and opportunities in Trump’s presidency Topics/Subtopics Main topic: Trump, his campaign and Russia Subtopics: Trump’s changing tactics; Russia and its sympathy for Trump; Trump’s views on economic issues; challenges and opportunities for Russia in case Trump becomes the President
Visual signs Photograph of Donald Trump at a rally; talking, gesticulating
Collective symbolism
Normalizations there is no evidence of Trump’s links to Russia, but there is an invisible bond
Social Actors Representation
Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding
Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Trump activated
Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of Trump, Assimilation of Clinton & Association/ Dissociation to the Clinton camp (activated), Clinton as individual passivated
Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Trump Categorization: “The Donald,” arch-opponent Hillary Clinton, the Republican enfant terrible, eccentric billionaire
Ideological Square Main groups Clinton camp (used once, activated), Kremlin /Russians/Moscow, America the Doer vs. America the Banker; Americans
189 Rhetoric Metaphors: Trump’s words are music to Moscow’s ears, Kremlin, to scrub off the label of a “racist,” fatally wounded, Kremlin puppet, a weak spot, invisible bond, put the house back in order, Russia may sound like Tchaikovsky’s “Waltz of the Flowers” Alliteration: Clinton camp
Lexicon Lexical choices: see metaphors, polarizing/strong word choice, many minus words
Cold war rhetoric. Contrasting and building groups by America the Doer vs. America the Banker; direct quotes of Trump; positive tendency to Clinton, although it is possible that Trump wins; there is no evidence of Trump’s links to Russia, but there is an invisible bond
Label RBTH4
Headline Who would Russians vote for in the U.S. presidential election*
Date 10/31/2016
Section Opinion
Author Alexander Bratersky
Categorization Russia/ Trump’s popularity in Russia & Russia/Russia’s choice
Summary Why Trump is popular in Russia because of Favorable coverage in the press (Clinton is often ridiculed in the press); several similar Russian politicians/similar mentality; Russia’s dislike of Clinton Trump and Putin do not have a history together; it would be easier for them. Clinton does have a history with Putin, but her husband Bill might be able to smooth relations between them Topics/Subtopics Main topic: Russia’s favorite in the U.S. election
190 Subtopics: Trump is a common topic in Russia, Trump’s popularity in Russia.
Visual signs 2 in 1 photograph of Clinton and Trump; Clinton is on the left, facing to the right, talking into a microphone, pointing with her arm to the right; Trump on the right, facing to the left, not talking, pointing his right hand to the left. YouTube music video of Emin Agalarov starringTrump where he is a star (2013)
Collective symbolism
Normalizations
Social Actors Representation
Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding
Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Trump activated, Clinton passivated
Individualization/ Assimilation Both individualized &Association/ Dissociation
Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Trump, Hillary Clinton, Clinton Categorization: the flamboyant Republican presidential candidate, the Republican nominee, the former Secretary of State
Ideological Square Main groups No group building
Rhetoric
Lexicon
In the lead: Trump’s sexual comments about women, later in the text comparisons to Russian politicians who are similar to Trump (also their comments on women). Quotes from Russian show business figures in favor of Trump, but also from an assistant in a pharmacy.
191 Label RBTH5
Headline Clinton and Trump: A psychological profile through a Russian lens
Date 11/08/2016
Section Opinion
Author Nikolai Shevchenko
Categorization Russia/Russia’s choice
Summary The psychological profile of both candidates Trump is better for Russia because Putin would better get along with Trump than Clinton Topics/Subtopics Main topic: The characters of Trump and Clinton Subtopics: the psychological analysis, Putin and Trump
Visual signs Photograph of Donald Trump and Clinton from the first debate
Collective symbolism
Normalizations No tendency to one or other candidate
Social Actors Representation
Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding
Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Both passivated
Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of both candidates, but Clinton &Association/ Dissociation once assimilated to the Clinton camp when talking about her campaign and concentrating on an “image of a politically correct woman” instead of imposing her own vision for the US.
Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Trump, Clinton
192 Categorization:
Ideological Square Main groups Clinton camp (1x)
Rhetoric
Lexicon
Trump as “witty provocateur” and “Putin’s pal,” Clinton as “meticulous intellectual.” No rival groups, just two rival individuals
Label RBTH6
Headline Why is it impossible to rig elections in the United States?*
Date 11/08/2016
Section Opinion
Author Gregory Bovt
Categorization Campaign& Polls/American electoral system
Summary The author explains why Russians who claim the U.S. elections are undemocratic and open to abuse are mistaken, and analyzes the role of the Electoral College’s political integrity and Trump’s challenge to the establishment.
Topics/Subtopics Main topic: American electoral system and the WikiLeaks scandal Subtopics: American media against Trump, American electoral system, politicians keeping promises, forecast
Visual signs Photograph of Clay Smith
Collective symbolism
Normalizations
193 Social Actors Representation
Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding
Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Both candidates are not the main topic of the article
Individualization/ Assimilation &Association/ Dissociation
Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Trump, Donald Trump, Clinton Categorization: the former secretary of state
Ideological Square Main groups
Rhetoric Repetitions, minus words, number games
Lexicon
An article about the electoral system in America. Mentions the biased media that favors Clinton, states that the “campaign seems dirtier than ever” & “the elections are still considered to be dirty” & “the dirt of democracy;” stating that all politicians lie and doing a number game.
The Moscow Times
Topic Subtopic Articles Russia Trump’s On Russia, Trump and the Picture of Dorian Grey* (MT1) connections U.S. Politics Caught in a “Russian Trap”* (MT4) to Russia Alt- On Russia, Trump and the Picture of Dorian Grey* (MT1) right/racism Russia-U.S. Hitting Rock Bottom: U.S.-Russian Relations Plunge Again relations (MT2) Why the Victory of “Sane” Candidate Clinton Is Nothing to Look Forward To (MT3) U.S. Politics Caught in a “Russian Trap”* (MT4) Russia Loses Its Trump Card (MT5)
194 Label MT1 Headline On Russia, Trump and the Picture of Dorian Grey* Date 09/29/2016 Section Opinion Author Leonid Ragozin Categorization Russia/ Trump’s connections to Russia & Russia/Alt- right, racism Summary When looking at Russia, the West has always been looking at its darker self in reflection; Russia is now looking at the rise of the alt-right in the West with understandable schadenfreude and opportunistic glee, because its own alt-right development started much earlier than in the West Topics/Subtopics Main topic: the Western views on Russia and Russia’s view on the Western’s development Subtopics: Trump’s connections to Russia, Clinton’s camp tactics, ideological history of Russia and its alt- right development Visual signs Photograph of Trump, looking grumpy, clasped hands, grumpy direct look into the camera, background completely black Collective symbolism Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Although Trump is the main social actor, he is passivated, Clinton is activated once Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of both candidates &Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Clinton, Trump Categorization: U.S. presidential candidate, the republican presidential candidate Ideological Square Main groups Moscow/the Kremlin/Russia vs. Western political analysts/the West Rhetoric Metaphors: own weapon, … makes it easy to paint every traffic jam as conspiracy plotted by the Kremlin, Russia is the West’s Dorian Grey canvas – a realistic depiction of its darker sides usually hidden in the attic, ..with Trump at the gates of Washington…, the West opening its arms 195 Lexicon Lexical choices: ideological word choice, the West is against Russia Cold-War rhetoric, Cold War image of Russia; Trump depicted from Clinton as being Putin’s stooge, obeying all orders from Moscow; Clinton uses propaganda; Trump’s popularity is a direct result of a deep moral and cultural crisis that has dogged the Republican Party as much of American society for almost a decade; conspiracy plotted by the Kremlin; Trump is every bit a comic Russian oligarch, or the twin brother of LDPR party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Bur he is also living proof that Russia is a fixture of the Western political and cultural realm; Dorian Grey as metaphor. Putin and ideologists have been riding the alt-right surf long before the European far-right. And now they are looking at the rise of the alt-right in the West with understandable schadenfreude and opportunistic glee.
Label MT2 Headline Hitting Rock Bottom: U.S.-Russian Relations Plunge Again Date 10/12/2016 Section Opinion Author Alexander Baunov Categorization Russia/ Russia-U.S. relations Summary The focus are the tense U.S. – Russian relations Russia decided to break with the U.S. due to a number of reasons, among of them is the election 2016 Topics/Subtopics Main topic: U.S. – Russian relations Subtopics: Syria, election Visual signs Photograph of John Kerry and Sergei Lavrov Collective symbolism Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Focus on the U.S.-Russian relations suppression of Trump Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Clinton passivated (mentioned once) Individualization/ Assimilation &Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton Ideological Square Main groups America/the Americans/the United States vs. Russia/Moscow Rhetoric 196 Lexicon Building 2 ideological groups, elections are a marginal topic; Clinton “more than likely victory”
Label MT3 Headline Why the Victory of “Sane” Candidate Clinton Is Nothing to Look Forward To Date 11/01/2016 Section Opinion Author Maria Lipman Categorization Russia/Russia-U.S. relations Summary Despite the fact that Donald Trump is not the perfect candidate to be a President, Clinton is not a better solution for the U.S. Topics/Subtopics Main topic: Clinton and her campaign Subtopics: Clinton’s political career, Trump’s supporters, Russian-American relations Visual signs Caricature of Trump and Clinton, arguing, Putin looking at them in the background Collective symbolism Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Clinton as main actor is passivated, once activated, no active actions, Trump once activated Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of Clinton, Trump is mostly &Association/ Dissociation individualized, but sometimes assimilated to “the broad anti-Trump camp,” and “ “Trump supporters” Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Clinton, Trump Categorization: Clinton’s rival Ideological Square Main groups Broad anti-Trump camp, Trump supporters, “the anti-establishment constituency,” Putin’s Russia, the United States/the American establishment and its candidate, the West Rhetoric Metaphors: across the pond, fall on fertile ground, the heath of confrontation Hyperboles Lexicon Lexical choices: Trump as Clinton’s rival, Clinton is today “reduced to a candidate of the establishment” 197 Confrontation between the “establishment and its detractors,” in case Clinton wins, “it will be a victory of conventional politics and political machines, over a preposterous challenger defying political and cultural conventions,” plus if Clinton wins, “this would demonstrate the United States’ superiority over its former metropolis across the pond, which only a few months earlier failed to suppress its own anti-establishment revolt and voted for Brexit,” however, Clinton’s victory would not “quell an ongoing anti- elite revolt in the American society,” and Trump’s supporters (the so called “anti- establishment constituency” will remain a huge challenge for Clinton even if they accept her victory. Putin’s Russia is (as Trump too), “an unpredictable and recalcitrant” player (criticism on Russia camouflaged in compliment or the other way around?) USA should change its course, not Russia. Plus, “the American establishment and its candidate are equally unwilling to contemplate compromise; they are exasperated and angry, anxious to punish Russia rather than negotiate solutions.”
Label MT4 Headline U.S. Politics Caught in a “Russian Trap”* Date 07/28/2016 Section Opinion Author Maxim Trudilyubov Categorization Russia/ Trump’s connections to Russia & Russia/Russia & U.S-relations Summary Russia made everybody believe that Putin supports Trump, and Russian politicians love seeing others get caught in what one might call a “Russian trap”: when others are caught doing the very thing they accuse Moscow of doing. Topics/Subtopics Main topic: U.S. politics caught in a “Russian Trap” Subtopics: Trump’s sympathy for Putin and his connections to Russia, Russian media, DNC servers attack, the “Russian Trap” Visual signs Photograph of Trump and Putin, montage of 2 photographs into one: both looking at each other (having an eye contact), Putin slightly smiling, Trump serious Collective symbolism Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Both candidates included, both once activated Individualization/ Assimilation Individualization of both candidates 198 &Association/ Dissociation Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Trump, Hillary Clinton, Clinton Categorization: The Republican candidate Ideological Square Main groups Russia/Moscow/the Kremlin, Russia’s center of power/Russian political elite vs. U.S./the White House Rhetoric Alliteration: Putin’s Puppet Metaphors: to put a cap on foreign ownership, layer of irony, to stir the pot, to sow the dragon’s teeth of suspicion, a Russian trap Lexicon Word choices: - negative, ideological minus words - Russian leader, get along with Moscow, Russia as “feared puppet master behind Trump” and as an “alleged perpetrator of the DNC computer network hack,” the Russian opposition has long been demonized as “U.S. stooges,” trap, suspicion and distrust, conspiracy-toned discussion Disclaimers: for example, “I don’t know whether the Kremlin even has a favorite in the U.S. elections, but I do know what Russia’s ruling politicians love to watch” Trump promised to get along with Moscow and heaping praise on Russian president. However, he may prove too disruptive even by Russian standards: his policies, if applied as advertised, may lead to regional conflicts and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is not in Russia’s interest. Russia looms increasingly large in this year’s presidential campaign not just as a foreign policy theme but as a feared puppet master behind Trump and as an alleged perpetrator of the DNC computer network hack and other attempts to meddle with the American political process. Comparing the American situation with the Russian situations, i.e. of media covering of the Russian opposition. However, Moscow has already made everybody believe that Putin supports Trump. The Russian politicians “love seeing others get caught in what one might call a “Russian trap”: when others are caught doing the very thing they accuse Moscow of doing.” They enjoy watching those who accuse Moscow of calling its opponents “foreign agents” do the same to their own political opponents. This proves Moscow’s political creed beautifully: everyone is just like us, everything else is pretense. The author shows the agitations against Trump by the media through many Western media examples of Trump’s connections to Russia that are calling him a “Putin’s Puppet.” Putin showed little interest in Trump, but Clinton has been a subject of the Kremlin’s passion and anger.
199 Label MT5 Headline Russia Loses Its Trump Card Date 02/04/2016 Section Opinion Author Vladimir Frolov Categorization Russia/ Russia-U.S. relations Summary The Clinton Presidency would be better for Moscow- Washington relationship than a Trump Presidency Topics/Subtopics Main topic: Russia-U.S. relationships and what candidate would be a better one Subtopics: Iowa’s polls, Senator Marco Rubio, Trump’s campaign message, Clinton’s politics on Russia Visual signs A drawing of both candidates, arguing. An American flag in background, Trump on the left, Clinton on the right, facing each other and arguing Collective symbolism Pierce a hole, march, to crater Normalizations Social Actors Representation Exclusion Suppression/ Backgrounding Inclusion Activation/ Passivation Trump activated and passivated, Clinton passivated Individualization/ Assimilation Clinton at first individualized, then assimilated to a &Association/ Dissociation “Hillary Clinton administration”/”Clinton administrations” Nomination/ Categorization Nomination: Donald Trump, Trump, Hillary Clinton, Clinton Categorization: “doubtlessly talented” Donald Trump, The Donald, the Democratic nominee, President Clinton, President Trump Ideological Square Main groups Russia/Kremlin vs. the U.S. political establishment Rhetoric Metaphors: Trump card, pierced a hole in The Donald’s balloon of inevitability, Trump’s train may have left the station, but it is not heading toward the White House, a steady hand Irony Lexicon Word choice: Trump is trolling the U.S. political establishment Not prominent ideological square (no obvious division into groups). Trump’s unmistakably Berlusconi style of leadership, his age and his aura of unrestrained masculinity is something that Putin finds appealing in other foreign leaders. Although Clinton has a pretty negative attitude toward Russia and their world 200 views are starkly different, the Russia-U.S. relations would need a “steady hand” which Clinton has.
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