The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on Native Land Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand
The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on Native Land Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand Blake A. Watson† The landmark decision in the United States regarding Indian land rights is Johnson v. McIntosh, an 1823 decision authored by Chief Jus- tice John Marshall. The Supreme Court in Johnson unequivocally re- jected the most favorable view of indigenous land rights—that the native inhabitants own the land they occupy and are free to retain or sell their property.1 Yet the Court did not adopt the least favorable view of Indian land rights either—that the tribes of America are trespassers without ownership or possessory rights. Instead, Marshall endorsed an interme- diate position. On one hand, he declared the Indian nations “to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion . .”2 On the other hand, Marshall proclaimed that European discovery of America “gave exclusive title to those who made it,” and that such dis- covery “necessarily diminished” the power of Indian nations “to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased.”3 Johnson v. McIntosh sets forth a “limited possessor” conception of indigenous land rights. Eleven years after Johnson, the United States Supreme Court appeared to adopt a “limited owner” theory of native land rights in Worcester v. Georgia. In Worcester, Marshall wrote that In- dians do in fact own the lands they occupy but are not free to sell their lands to whomsoever they please because the discoverer holds a preemp- tive right to acquire their property rights.4 Michael Blumm describes the native right as a “fee simple [that is] subject to the government’s right of preemption” or, alternatively, as a “fee simple with a partial restraint on † Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law.
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