Plato and Christian Belief
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Plato's "Euthyphro"
24.231 Ethics – Handout 1 Plato, “The Euthyphro” I. Plato’s Dialogue Plato’s Question: What is it to be pious? - He is not looking for a list of things that are pious - He is not looking for a property that (even all) pious things have. Euthyphro’s (best?) answer: To be pious is to be loved by all the gods. Plato’s Argument against Euthyphro’s answer: Perhaps all and only those things/actions that are loved by the gods are pious. But why is that? Are pious things loved by the gods because they are pious, or are they pious because they are loved by the gods? Socrates and Euthyphro agree that they must be loved by the gods because they are pious. But, says Socrates, in that case, being pious cannot be the same thing as being god-beloved. Because something that is god-beloved is so because it is loved by the gods. But something that is pious isn’t so because it is loved by the gods; rather, it is loved by the gods because it is pious. Being loved by the gods causes god-belovedness, but being loved by the gods does not cause piety. So god-belovedness and piety cannot be the same thing. (This kind of argument will be relevant again in the selection from Moore that we’re reading for Wednesday.) II. The “Euthyphro Problem” Socrates’ question about whether what’s loved by the gods is pious because it is loved by them, or loved by them because it is pious, forms the lynchpin of an important contemporary debate about what moral philosophers call “Divine Command Theory.” According to DCT, morally good actions are good because they are commanded by God. -
The Highest Good for Plato Goodness Is an Abstract Concept That Is Very
The Highest Good for Plato Goodness is an abstract concept that is very difficult to define, and saying what counts as the highest good is perhaps even more so. In Republic, Plato attempts to say something about what makes things good, but his answer is very vague in the end. Still, we can get some clarity on what he would have answered if asked what the highest good is, from what he says in this text. What counts as the highest good for Plato can be said to be knowledge of the Form of the Good, because it is necessary for knowing and using the other Forms well. The nature of the Forms is not clear in Republic; Plato writes about them as if his audience already knows what they are. Still, we can get some sense of what forms are like from the text. In several places he says that when two or more things share the same name, then they share a form. For example, in Book IV Socrates and Glaucon talk about the form of justice: “…are things called by the same name, whether they are bigger or smaller than one another, like or unlike with respect to that to which the name applies? Alike. Then a just man won’t differ at all from a just city in respect to the form of justice; rather he’ll be like the city” (435 a-b). But what is a Form, exactly? We can start to get a sense of what Plato means by a Form by looking back at Euthyphro. -
Agorapicbk-17.Pdf
Excavations of the Athenian Agora Picture Book No. 17 Prepared by Mabel L. Lang Dedicated to Eugene Vanderpool o American School of Classical Studies at Athens ISBN 87661-617-1 Produced by the Meriden Gravure Company Meriden, Connecticut COVER: Bone figure of Socrates TITLE PAGE: Hemlock SOCRATES IN THE AGORA AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES AT ATHENS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 1978 ‘Everything combines to make our knowledge of Socrates himself a subject of Socratic irony. The only thing we know definitely about him is that we know nothing.’ -L. Brunschvicg As FAR AS we know Socrates himselfwrote nothing, yet not only were his life and words given dramatic attention in his own time in the Clouds of Ar- istophanes, but they have also become the subject of many others’ writing in the centuries since his death. Fourth-century B.C. writers who had first-hand knowledge of him composed either dialogues in which he was the dominant figure (Plato and Aeschines) or memories of his teaching and activities (Xe- nophon). Later authors down even to the present day have written numerous biographies based on these early sources and considering this most protean of philosophers from every possible point of view except perhaps the topograph- ical one which is attempted here. Instead of putting Socrates in the context of 5th-century B.C. philosophy, politics, ethics or rhetoric, we shall look to find him in the material world and physical surroundings of his favorite stamping- grounds, the Athenian Agora. Just as ‘agora’ in its original sense meant ‘gathering place’ but came in time to mean ‘market place’, so the agora itself was originally a gathering place I. -
Plato the ALLEGORY of the CAVE Republic, VII 514 A, 2 to 517 A, 7
Plato THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE Republic, VII 514 a, 2 to 517 a, 7 Translation by Thomas Sheehan THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE SOCRATES: Next, said I [= Socrates], compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. PART ONE: SETTING THE SCENE: THE CAVE AND THE FIRE The cave SOCRATES: Imagine this: People live under the earth in a cavelike dwelling. Stretching a long way up toward the daylight is its entrance, toward which the entire cave is gathered. The people have been in this dwelling since childhood, shackled by the legs and neck..Thus they stay in the same place so that there is only one thing for them to look that: whatever they encounter in front of their faces. But because they are shackled, they are unable to turn their heads around. A fire is behind them, and there is a wall between the fire and the prisoners SOCRATES: Some light, of course, is allowed them, namely from a fire that casts its glow toward them from behind them, being above and at some distance. Between the fire and those who are shackled [i.e., behind their backs] there runs a walkway at a certain height. Imagine that a low wall has been built the length of the walkway, like the low curtain that puppeteers put up, over which they show their puppets. The images carried before the fire SOCRATES: So now imagine that all along this low wall people are carrying all sorts of things that reach up higher than the wall: statues and other carvings made of stone or wood and many other artifacts that people have made. -
BMC 13 - Georg Philipp Telemann (1681-1767): Orchestral Music
BMC 13 - Georg Philipp Telemann (1681-1767): Orchestral Music Born in Magdeburg in 1681, Telemann belonged to a family that had long been connected with the Lutheran Church. His father was a clergyman, his mother the daughter of a clergyman, and his elder brother also took orders, a path that he too might have followed had it not been for his exceptional musical ability. As a child he showed considerable musical talent, mastering the violin, flute, zither and keyboard by the age of ten and composing an opera (Sigismundus) two years later to the consternation of his family (particularly his mother's side), who disapproved of music. However, such resistance only reinforced his determination to persevere in his studies through transcription, and modeling his works on those of such composers as Steffani, Rosenmüller, Corelli and Antonio Caldara. After preparatory studies at the Hildesheim Gymnasium, he matriculated in Law (at his mother's insistence) at Leipzig University in 1701. That he had little intention of putting aside his interest in music is evident from his stop at Halle, en route to Leipzig, in order to make the acquaintance of the young Handel, with whom he was to maintain a lifelong friendship. It was while he was a student at Leipzig University that a career in music became inevitable. At first it was intended that he should study language and science, but he was already so capable a musician that within a year of his arrival he founded the student Collegium Musicum with which he gave public concerts (and which Bach was later to direct), wrote operatic works for the Leipzig Theater; in 1703 he became musical director of the Leipzig Opera, and was appointed Organist at the Neue Kirche in 1704. -
Plato's Hypothetical Inquiry in the Meno Naoya Iwata
Plato’s Hypothetical Inquiry in the Meno Naoya Iwata At Meno 86e2–4 Socrates proposes to Meno that they should consider the question whether virtue is teachable on a hypothesis. Partly because its concrete procedure is illustrated by a baffling geometrical example, there has still been wide disagreement among scholars as to how he actually carries out this hypothetical inquiry into virtue. The basic structure of the argument at 87b2–89a5 appears very simple: Socrates converts the original question whether virtue is teachable to the question whether it is knowledge, and then examines the latter on the basis of his agreement with Meno that virtue is good. Apart however from that agreement being, as it is explicitly called, a ‘hypothesis’, opinion is divided on what other hypothesis Socrates posited. Some think of it as the conditional ‘if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable’ or as ‘knowledge is teachable’ (Bedu-Addo 1984, 7–9; Wolfsdorf 2008, 44–6 and 58–60),1 and others as the bi-conditional ‘if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable, but if not, not’ or as ‘knowledge alone is teachable’ (Grgić 1999, 34–6; Weiss 2001, 131; Zyskind and Sternfeld 1976, 132). 2 But most scholars, in contrast, identify it with the simple proposition ‘virtue is knowledge’ (Bedu-Addo 1984, 7–9; Benson 2003, 107–25; Bluck 1961, 17–19 and 85–91; Bostock 1986, 165–6; Canto-Sperber 1991, 98–102; Cherniss 1947, 140; Hackforth 1955, 140–1; Kahn 1996, 310; Robinson 1953, 116–18; Rose 1970, 3–7; Sayre 1969, 29 n. 40; Scott 2006, 137–40 and 221–4; Sharples 1985, 167).3 It is also suggested that Socrates’ new philosophical tool does not involve any process of positing a hypothesis but only aims to establish the equivalence between teachability and knowledge (Ebrey 2013, 76 and 83–4). -
The Form of the Good in Plato's Timaeus
THANASSIS GKATZARAS | 71 One of the many philosophical problems The Form of the Good in that we face in the Timaeus is raised by the Plato’s Timaeus claim that the God who created the world (from now on we shall call him ‘Demiurge’)1 is good (Tim. 29d7-30a2). A satisfying explanation of Demiurge’s goodness is far from easy, and dif- ferent approaches have been proposed. How- ever, in this paper I’ll try to show that a clear, sufficient and relatively simple interpretation is possible, if we are based on the hypothesis that Timaeus follows the theory of causation in the Phaedo (including the distinction between ‘safe’ and ‘elegant’ cause) and the concept of the Thanassis Gkatzaras Form of the Good in the Republic.2 University of Ioannina [email protected] To be more specific, I’ll try to show that the Form of the Good of the Republic is also presupposed in the Timaeus and it plays the same role, and we should consider it as a first principle of platonic cosmology, independ- ent from the existence of Demiurge or even the Divine Paradigm (i.e. the model accord- ing to which the Demiurge creates the world). On first impression, this interpretation looks barely possible, since there is no direct refer- ence in the text to this particular Form, with the possible exception of what is said at Tim. 46c7-d1.3 In my opinion, this absence has to do ABSTRACT with specific purposes Timaeus serves, and not with the abandonment of the Good as a cause. -
1 Foreigners As Liberators: Education and Cultural Diversity in Plato's
1 Foreigners as Liberators: Education and Cultural Diversity in Plato’s Menexenus Rebecca LeMoine Assistant Professor of Political Science Florida Atlantic University NOTE: Use of this document is for private research and study only; the document may not be distributed further. The final manuscript has been accepted for publication and will appear in a revised form in The American Political Science Review 111.3 (August 2017). It is available for a FirstView online here: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000016 Abstract: Though recent scholarship challenges the traditional interpretation of Plato as anti- democratic, his antipathy to cultural diversity is still generally assumed. The Menexenus appears to offer some of the most striking evidence of Platonic xenophobia, as it features Socrates delivering a mock funeral oration that glorifies Athens’ exclusion of foreigners. Yet when readers play along with Socrates’ exhortation to imagine the oration through the voice of its alleged author Aspasia, Pericles’ foreign mistress, the oration becomes ironic or dissonant. Through this, Plato shows that foreigners can act as gadflies, liberating citizens from the intellectual hubris that occasions democracy’s fall into tyranny. In reminding readers of Socrates’ death, the dialogue warns, however, that fear of education may prevent democratic citizens from appreciating the role of cultural diversity in cultivating the virtue of Socratic wisdom. Keywords: Menexenus; Aspasia; cultural diversity; Socratic wisdom; Platonic irony Acknowledgments: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2012 annual meeting of the Association for Political Theory, where it benefitted greatly from Susan Bickford’s insightful commentary. Thanks to Ethan Alexander-Davey, Andreas Avgousti, Richard Avramenko, Brendan Irons, Daniel Kapust, Michelle Schwarze, the APSR editorial team (both present and former), and four anonymous referees for their invaluable feedback on earlier drafts. -
Socrates on the Definition of Piety: Euthyphro 10A- 11 B
Socrates on the Definition of Piety: Euthyphro 10A- 11 B S. MARC COHEN PLATO'S Et~rt~reHRo is a clear example of a Socratic definitional dialogue. The concept to be defined is that of holiness or piety (z6 r the need for a defini- tion is presented in a manner characteristic of the early dialogues. Euthyphro is about to prosecute his father on a charge of murder, Socrates expresses surprise at Euthyphro's action, and Euthyphro defends himself by saying that to prosecute his father is pious, whereas not to prosecute him would be impious. Socrates then wonders whether Euthyphro's knowledge of piety and impiety is sufficient to guarantee that he is not acting impiously in prosecuting his father. The trap has been set; Euthyphro's vanity is stung, and the search for a definition begins. The outcome of the search is also familiar; all of Euthyphro's efforts miscarry. The dialogue ends with no satisfactory definition of piety either produced or in the offing. The central argument in the dialogue is the one Socrates advances (10a-lib) against Euthyphro's definition of piety as "what all the gods love." The argument is interesting on several counts. First, the argument is sufficiently unclear as to warrant discussion of what its structure is. Second, it is at least open to question whether there is any interpretation or reconstruction of the argument according to which it is valid and non-fallacious. Third, there are a number of points of con- temporary philosophical interest that inevitably arise in any adequate discussion of the argument. -
"Mixed Taste," Cosmopolitanism, and Intertextuality in Georg Philipp
“MIXED TASTE,” COSMOPOLITANISM, AND INTERTEXTUALITY IN GEORG PHILIPP TELEMANN’S OPERA ORPHEUS Robert A. Rue A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF MUSIC May 2017 Committee: Arne Spohr, Advisor Mary Natvig Gregory Decker © 2017 Robert A. Rue All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Arne Spohr, Advisor Musicologists have been debating the concept of European national music styles in the Baroque period for nearly 300 years. But what precisely constitutes these so-called French, Italian, and German “tastes”? Furthermore, how do contemporary sources confront this issue and how do they delineate these musical constructs? In his Music for a Mixed Taste (2008), Steven Zohn achieves success in identifying musical tastes in some of Georg Phillip Telemann’s instrumental music. However, instrumental music comprises only a portion of Telemann’s musical output. My thesis follows Zohn’s work by identifying these same national styles in opera: namely, Telemann’s Orpheus (Hamburg, 1726), in which the composer sets French, Italian, and German texts to music. I argue that though identifying the interrelation between elements of musical style and the use of specific languages, we will have a better understanding of what Telemann and his contemporaries thought of as national tastes. I will begin my examination by identifying some of the issues surrounding a selection of contemporary treatises, in order explicate the problems and benefits of their use. These sources include Johann Joachim Quantz’s Versuch einer Anweisung die Flöte zu spielen (1752), two of Telemann’s autobiographies (1718 and 1740), and Johann Adolf Scheibe’s Critischer Musikus (1737). -
Reading Plato Through the Menexenus I Begin with the Current Critical Agreement That Plato Did Indeed Write the Menexenus
Reading Plato Through the Menexenus I begin with the current critical agreement that Plato did indeed write the Menexenus. There was not always such agreement; but it was not the style of the dialogue that called it into question, nor ancient aspersions on its authenticity. This dialogue just did not seem (to many) the sort of thing Plato, our Plato, would write. It is so wildly anachronistic, so full of obvious historical distortion, and so lacking in philosophical meat. Never mind that Aristotle twice refers to it as one of Plato’s works. We are largely past those doubtful days, and there has even arisen something of a communis opinio about a general interpretation of the dialogue (while important details remain critically unsettled): Plato gives us in the Menexenus a parody of contemporary rhetoric, revealing it as facile, shallow, and destructive of the sort of political excellence it aims to celebrate, and even create in its listeners. That parody points, by contrast, the superiority of what Plato/Socrates has to offer over rhetoric: philosophy, dialectic, the truth, etc. – even though this dialogue does not give us much of that superior mode. From that consensus this paper moves forward. Does recognition of the Menexenus as a legitimate entry in Plato’s oeuvre require that we somehow change our view of what Plato does? If we agree that Plato can write a dialogue like this, do we have to reassess what Plato does elsewhere? That question is too large for full treatment in this paper, but I will approach it by refashioning it into a slightly more manageable one: are there aspects of the Platonic corpus that become clear(er) to us when we see them writ large in the Menexenus? I answer in the affirmative, and proceed to examples, hoping to set us on a path toward new ways we might read Plato through the Menexenus. -
SOCRATES in LOVE Passages from Ancient Texts for Consideration
SOCRATES IN LOVE passages from ancient texts for consideration 1) Plato Symposium 201d: (speech of Socrates) And now I shall let you alone, and proceed with the discourse upon Love which I heard one day from a Mantinean woman named Diotima: in this subject she was skilled, and in many others too; for once, by bidding the Athenians offer sacrifices ten years before the plague, she procured them so much delay in the advent of the sickness. Well, I also had my lesson from her in love-matters; so now I will try and follow up the points on which Agathon and I have just agreed by narrating to you all on my own account, as well as I am able, the speech she delivered to me. 2) Plato Symposium 219e f. (speech of Alcibiades) Now all this, you know, had already happened to me when we later went on a campaign together to Potidaea; and there we were messmates. Well, first of all, he surpassed not me only but every one else in bearing hardships; whenever we were cut off in some place a nd were compelled, as often in campaigns, to go without food, the rest of us were nowhere in point of endurance. Then again, when we had plenty of good cheer, he alone could enjoy it to the full, and though unwilling to drink, when once overruled he used to beat us all; and, most surprising of all, no man has ever yet seen Socrates drunk. Of this power I expect we shall have a good test in a moment.