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The Role of the Volhynian Massacres in the Building of Narratives About Ukrainians on the Polish Internet

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The Role of the Volhynian Massacres in the Building of Narratives About Ukrainians on the Polish Internet Zoon Politikon Special Issue 2018 DOI: 10.4467/2543408XZOP.18.004.10060 http://www.ejournals.eu/Zoon-Politikon/ THE ROLE OF THE VOLHYNIAN MASSACRES IN THE BUILDING OF NARRATIVES ABOUT UKRAINIANS ON THE POLISH INTERNET Katarzyna Krakowska* Abstract This work is an analysis of historical motives – with special consideration for the problematic nature of the Volhynian Massacres – in the discourse regarding Ukrainians and Ukrainian immigrants in Polish social media. It was realized using CAQDAS tools on the basis of the materials collected in autumn 2016. Keywords: Ukraine, Ukrainians, history, Volhynia, discourse, critical discourse analysis, internet Creating the English-language version of the journal “Zoon Politikon” is financed under contract No. 724/PDUN/2018 from the funds allocated by the Minister of Science and Higher Education for dissemination of science. * Katarzyna Krakowska, M.A., Collegium Civitas, Warsaw, Poland, e-mail: [email protected] ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2558-202X 67 Katarzyna Krakowska Introduction “Ukraine’s relationship with Poland is difficult and contradictory. For 500 years they shared a common history, first under the Polish kings, then under the Russian tsars. But like rival siblings they define them- selves more by their differences than they similarities – Poland glamor- ous and self-dramatising; Ukraine inarticulate and put-upon. Ukraine resents Poland for hogging the limelight; Poland resents Ukraine for steling its lines. Ukrainians, like the Irish, rebelled against their Polish landlords at every opportunity; Poles, like the English, responded with a curious mixture of affection, scorn and fear” – this is how Anna Reid describes the Polish-Ukrainian relationship in her book Borderline (Reid 1997, p. 25) This picture, although full of inaccuracies and depicted in a journalistic, slightly provocative manner, is immensely inspiring, because it shows the importance of historical context in Polish-Ukrainian relations. In light of the current social-political and economic situation in Ukraine, it should be taken into account that the already considerable number of immigrants from this country in Poland is likely to continue growing even larger. Statistics measuring migrations can be strongly underestimated. But even the official data regarding the increment in number of workers in Poland and the quota of Ukrainians in this num- ber show a huge quantitative change since the year 2014. This turning point in time was not coincidental. It is the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity, that took place in Ukraine from November 2013 until Feb- ruary 2014 (Shveda, Ho Park 2016). According to the data of the Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Pol- icy, 103,200 Ukrainians were granted work permits in 2016 (annual in- crease of 115,0%), and this number made up 81% of all work permits granted that year (the previous year it was 73%). Declarations of inten- 68 The Role of the Volhynian Massacres in the Building of Narratives about Ukrainians on the Polish Internet tion to entrust work to Ukrainians were submitted 1,3 million times (in- crease of 65,5%) and this number made up 96% of all submissions, which is a quota analogical to the year 2015 (Department of Statistics, National Bank of Poland 2018). Observing the attitude of Polish people towards the incomers from the East is important, especially in regard to a certain leniency dis- played by a considerable part of the Polish political class for increas- ingly radical nationalistic and xenophobic sentiment in the country. The object of this article is to analyze the motif of the Volhynian Mas- sacres in the discourse about Ukrainians on the Polish internet and their significance in building an image of the modern Ukrainian (in- cluding Ukrainian immigrants in Poland). Historical strands, especially the topic of the Volhynian Massacres of the 1940’s, proved to be the most crucial and emotionally provocative element in the discourse about Ukrainians in Polish social media, analysis of which was under- taken by Marek Troszyński (2018). The groundwork for the analysis were materials from Polish social media, collected using the commercial platform sentione.com during the initial stage of the project Ukraine and Ukrainians In Polish Inter- net Discourse. Qualitative-quantitative Analysis Of Texts Published In Social Media, realized as part of Collegium Civitas research projects by Marek Troszyński with a grant from the Stefan Batory Foundation. The analyzed source material initially consisted of about 23,000 logs imported from the internet and randomly chosen for this purpose from about 100,000 logs of this type, that appeared on social media in Sep- tember 2016. Out of all these logs almost 10,000 were chosen and as- signed special codes, which were helpful for analysis. The code sheet consisted of three parts. The first one contained codes which served to define the sentiment behind the statement. According to the hypothesis, every statement was going to have a certain level (or lack thereof) of 69 Katarzyna Krakowska negativity, or positivity, although only 2,760 of the 9,906 logs had a de- fined sentiment. Moreover, significant differences in understanding of levels of negativity were observed – 1 and 21. The second part contained codes indicating subject areas. The third part contained the code “other” – “additional categories were treated as binary variables (does con- tain/does not contain), that made it possible to code additional infor- mation about the specific parts of the statement” (Troszyński 2018, p. 113)2. The significance of the Volhynian Massacres in Polish-Ukrainian history Participants in the discussion of relations between the two nations, especially regarding the historical context of these relations, would be expected to have good knowledge of their history. The volume of knowledge that would have to be learned for this purpose is rather in- timidating3 . However, especially after the film Volhynia by Wojciech Smarzowski4 entered the theaters, the historical image of the Ukrainian nation and Polish-Ukrainian relations became subject of fervent discus- sions on the Polish internet. Although the internet users discussing subjects they don’t know much about is not a new phenomenon, the range of this discussion, as well as its language and possibility to become an element of wider dis- course about the Ukrainians, is from a sociological point of view, inter- esting and important. 1 The analyzed materials were collected in the initial stage of the research project, hence certain inadequacies in using the tool. 2 Detailed explanation of the code key, the process of coding and quantitative as well as qualitative analysis of the whole body of the logs can in found in: Troszyński 2018. 3 Especially regarding the multitude of historians’ opinions regarding almost every era in Ukrainian history and proto- Ukrainian state organisms. 4 The movie by Wojciech Smarzowski is a war drama awarded in many international festivals, about the Volhynian Massacres of 1943. The plot is based on short stories by Stanisław Srokowski and the memories of witnesses. In the autumn of 2016 about 1,5 million people watched it in the theatres. 70 The Role of the Volhynian Massacres in the Building of Narratives about Ukrainians on the Polish Internet The Volhynian Massacres of 1943 were actions planned and con- ducted by an emerging Ukrainian nationalist movement (the leaders of OUN-B, but also UPA members), assisted by Ukrainian peasants, tar- geted towards Polish civilians living in the Volhyn area. They were par- ticularly bloody and brutal ethnic cleansings which, according to Grze- gorz Motyka (2011, pp. 852-853), resulted in about 100,000 victims. Although the Ukrainian government has never officially admitted this, these events are commonly regarded as a crime of genocide5. Although today nobody doubts the reality of the events of 1943, the opinions regarding their reasons, character and source of inspiration are strongly divided. Two radical approaches dominate the discourse: The first idea is that this crime was a display of the murderous nature of the Ukrainian nation, which in the right circumstances carried out its downright demonic desire to kill (Motyka 2016, p. 9). The narration on the opposite end, however, depicts these same events as a righteous re- bellion of the Ukrainian peasants, in reaction to oppression and terribly bad treatment, in which their Polish neighbors were held responsible for repressions of the 2nd Republic of Poland and previous displays of Polish domination (Ibidem, p. 37). “In a story told this way, it is the Polish victims who should explain themselves for what happened. Mer- ciless conduct of the »Polish lords« resulted in an »asymmetric« social reaction. The perpetrators didn’t actually have a choice, other than op- posing the »catholic dehumanization« with force and cruelty. Although the Polish guilt is individual, the perpetrators are just a tiny wheel in an alleged historic necessity machine, only a mindless water drop in a pow- erful social tsunami, therefore their actions in fact remain beyond the scope of good and the evil”, comments Grzegorz Motyka (Ibidem, p. 17). 5 On the of 22nd July 2016 the Polish Parliament – regarding the 73rd anniversary of the Volhynian Massacres – passed the resolution, which for the first time called these events a crime of genocide – Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from 22nd July 2016 in respect to pay tribute to the victims of the genocide committed by the Ukrainian nationalists on the citizens of the 2nd Republic of Poland during the years 1943-1945. In previous years it was called, at the most, “an ethnic cleansing with marks of a genocide” – Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from 12th July 2013 in respect to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the Volhynian Crimes and pay tribute to its victims. 71 Katarzyna Krakowska However, the author of Volhyn ’43 is not in agreement with the first point of view, with its claims about the criminal nature of the Ukraini- ans or demonic character of this crime.
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