Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Non-Jewish Minorities and Their Access to Israeli Citizenship WP S Demographic Threat Perceptions and Ensuing State Strategies Lidia Averbukh

On Independence Day in May 2016, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics announced that the Israeli population had increased tenfold since the State’s establishment in 1948. Leading national newspapers rejoiced that the population has multiplied from an initial 800,000 to almost 8.5 million, a figure ascribable to the highest birth rate in the western world among other facts, such as Jewish immigration. This, in turn, can be attributed to the fact that the state seeks to preserve and promote the country’s Jewish majority. The downside of this policy is the discrimination of minorities living in Israel, which are deemed a demographic threat. This applies not only to Arab Israelis, but also to the growing number of foreign workers who replace labour forces from the Palestinian territories, and to African refugees whose legal integration within the Israeli citizenship system is not foreseen. Less exclusive access to citizenship and the secure legal status of non-Jewish population groups is likely only to be possible if they are no longer viewed as a threat.

The Basic Laws passed in the 1990s define adopted by members of the current govern- Israel as a state which is both Jewish and ment, such as the Zionist-nationalist party democratic. A similar concept is already Likud, as well as the party Yisrael Beiteinu, mentioned in the Declaration of Independ- with its base of secular, Russian-speaking ence of 1948. The mandate to reconcile Israelis. A Jewish majority constitutes an “Jewish” and “democratic” is often inter- expression of state Jewish identity also for preted as follows: as long as Israel demon- the rest of Jewish and Zionist parties, such strates a clearly Jewish majority, the two as the socially conservative coalition party state precepts do not conflict with one an- Kulanu, led by Finance Minister Kahlon other. In this understanding, the majority and the opposition parties Yesh Atid, by of Jewish votes guarantee democratic pro- Yair Lapid, the central left party Zionist cedures in a Jewish state, although this con- Union and the leftist Meretz. Both of the cept of democracy is lacking in substance. latter parties also make a greater emphasis This stance is in line with the position on the democratic values.

Lidia Averbukh is a researcher in the project “Israel and its regional and global conflicts: Domestic developments, SWP Comments 43 security issues and foreign affairs”. The project is conducted within the Middle East and Africa Division of SWP and September 2016 funded by the German Federal Foreign Office.

1 However, democracy is of little signifi- and directives can be used systematically cance to the religious coalition parties in order to prevent the long-term settlement which are exerting an ever stronger influ- of non-Jewish immigrants and to refuse ence on Israeli politics. They believe that legal rights. All parties who have provided the identity of the Jewish State is based on a Minister of the Interior to date have pur- Jewish religious law (halakha). This advo- sued the policy of expediting Jewish immi- cates high birth rates and prevents assimi- gration as far as possible, and minimising lation through marriages with non-Jews, the settlement and integration of non- which could sever the Jewish lineage. The Jewish groups. current coalition parties United Torah Judaism and Shas endorse a religious demo- graphic policy. The nationalist-religious Demographic background party The Jewish Home, led by Naftali A Jewish population majority arose in the Bennett, which also holds seats in the course of the establishment of the State Knesset, unites a Zionist-nationalist with of Israel and had to be preserved to secure a religious stance. the State’s future existence. The founding The collaboration of the Zionist and fathers consequently established a system religious camps within a government which which sought simultaneously to accelerate can be traced back to the era prior to the Jewish immigration and naturalisation State’s establishment proved a decisive and to restrict the access of Palestinians to factor in the increased population growth Israeli citizenship. within Jewish Israel, as the Zionist and During the almost 70 years of the State’s religious interests tally in questions of existence, the number of Jewish immigrants demographics. As a result, it is hardly sur- has plateaued at a constant, but low aver- prising that the legal instrument used to age of 20,000–25,000 each year, only slightly create and preserve the Jewish majority, exceeding the number of emigrants. As the namely Israeli citizenship, has been inter- pool of potential new immigrants is virtu- preted as the inclusion of Jews and the ally exhausted, non-Jewish groups in Israel exclusion of all other individuals since are regarded increasingly as a threat. This the State’s foundation. can be ascribed to a series of historical, Like other Israeli legislation, the immi- social and political factors. gration and naturalisation laws allow for The birth rates of Arab Israelis are deemed a broad range of interpretation, enabling a key threat to a Jewish majority. In the common ground to be found among all political world, this development is referred the political interest groups and ensuring to as a danger, which could eventually a relatively large margin of discretion as far make the Jewish nature of the Israeli State as implementation of the law is concerned. obsolete as a result of the preponderance It follows that the ideological persuasion of of Arabs. Today, 20.8 per cent of the Israeli the respective Minister of the Interior is of population is Arab. According to statistics decisive importance for the interpretation published in 2014, an average of 3.11 chil- and execution of the immigration and natu- dren are born to Jewish families, and 3.17 ralisation laws, i.e. whether he belongs to children to Arab families. the secular or religious camp. Although the birth rate among Arab Legal implementation practices within Israelis, which has been in decline since a legislative system can thus vary in such a 2002, indicates that the “demographic war” way that Arab citizens of Israel are treated waged within the country has been won, differently to Jewish citizens. If migrants namely in favour of Jewish Israelis, whose can be categorised neither as Jewish nor birth rate continues to rise rapidly, such Palestinian, such as foreign workers and facts are by no means sufficient reason for refugees, then the latitude in terms of laws Israeli politicians to refrain from employing

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2 the “demographic threat” in order to mobi- no civil marriages are recognised. Further- lise other swathes of the population. more, the citizenship system impedes Both Israeli and Palestinian parties prom- family reunions between non-Jewish part- ulgate a high birth rate as a type of patri- ners and the longer-term settlement of otic duty. In Israel, elections have always individuals who could challenge the Jewish been successfully won by instrumentalising character of the State of Israel. fears regarding Palestinians, both those living in the country itself and as far as potential Arab supremacy in the region is Citizenship of Jewish and concerned. The former Palestinian leader Arab Israelis Yasser Arafat also referred to “the womb of The Nationality Law of 1952 determines the Arab woman (as the) strongest weapon” who is, or may become, an Israeli citizen. against Israel. Simultaneously, references In the first instance, Jews from the diaspora to the ecological and economic dangers of making use of the Law of Return; in the Israel’s potential future overpopulation are second, individuals who were subjects of rare, particularly as regards Jewish Israelis. the former British Mandate at the time of The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics antici- the State’s establishment and who did not pates that the population will have swelled flee or were expelled in 1948, and, in the to between 15 and 20 million by 2059. third, children of an Israeli national. In The absence of social debate on this issue addition, non-Jewish individuals may be can be partially explained by the experience naturalised in certain circumstances. of the Holocaust, in the course of which The so-called Law of Return was adopted the Jewish people’s fears of extinction were in 1950 and extended in 1970. It permits all perceptibly substantiated. This fear triggered individuals able to trace their Jewish ances- individual and social traumas which con- try back to a Jewish grandparent to immi- tinue to have an impact today. The Holocaust grate to Israel, a regulation which includes casts its shadow on each crisis in which their spouses. The Law of Return constitutes Israel feels that its very existence is under the only form of statutory immigration to threat. This applies to the missile attacks Israel. It places no restrictions on immigra- from the Gaza strip just as much as to Iran’s tion in terms of age or qualifications. The negation of Israel’s right of existence. decisive criterion is an affiliation to the The social response to these perceived Jewish people. In its level of significance, threats is made manifest, inter alia, in in- the law is equated most closely to that of creasing birth rates. Nine months after the a Constitution, and remains unchallenged Israel—Gaza conflict in the summer of by any Jewish political party. The Israeli 2014, for instance, a baby boom within the government organises and expedites Jewish Jewish population was noted. The need to immigration to Israel with the aid of a broad compensate past losses with a high num- network of international offices operating ber of children, this at least symbolically, on behalf of relevant organisations, includ- and thus protect oneself against possible ing the Jewish Agency for Israel and Nefesh future losses, is reinforced by the Jewish B’Nefesh. religious precept of reproduction. More- The Law of Return continues to consti- over, the Israeli healthcare system offers a tute a form of reassurance for many Jews, variety of methods of artificial insemina- which can be “redeemed” as necessary. tion. Unsurprisingly, almost 50 per cent of the The religious ban on assimilation also latest Jewish immigrants, who entered be- finds expression in the Israeli legal system tween spring 2015 and spring 2016, came as far as demographic aspects are concerned. from crisis-ridden Ukraine and from France, Family law, which is wholly religiously in- where anti-Semitism and jihadi attacks are fluenced, allows for no intermarriages, as on the rise.

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3 The group of individuals living in the and little hope of enjoying an individual British Mandate for Palestine prior to future citizenship. the State’s establishment, and who were Israeli citizenship can also be trans- ineligible to avail themselves of the Law mitted in accordance with the principle of Return includes the relations of all Arab of birthright. Israelis abroad can pass on population groups and a small number their citizenship to the next generation, of religious and ethnic minorities. These although this right expires in the second individuals may only be naturalised if they generation. This marks a fundamental dif- have been living legally on Israeli territory ference between Jewish and non-Jewish since the State’s proclamation or entered Israelis, as the Law of Return permits Jewish Israel legally until this law’s enforcement emigrants to return to Israel for at least a in 1952. With this, the legal category of generation longer than their compatriots. the remaining “Arab Israelis” was created, By contrast, all non-Jewish Israeli emigrants and excluded Palestinians who fled or were lose Israeli citizenship and the right to expelled during the 1948 War of Independ- return in the second generation. ence. The status of Palestinians from East Two further laws, the “Entry into Israel Jerusalem is a special case. Although these Law” of 1952 and the “Prevention of Infil- individuals do not hold Israeli citizenship tration Law” of 1954, stipulate that the like Arab Israelis, they do have a permanent return of Palestinians and immigration Israeli residence permit, unlike Palestinians from enemy states is to be deemed “infiltra- living in the West Bank and on the Gaza tion” and that prosecution may occur as Strip. This is not automatically inherited, a result. Palestinian return is the ultimate and may be revoked in the event of a pro- disaster for Israel, and would ultimately longed stay abroad. lead to the end of the Jewish state. The Finally, the right to family reunions and restrictive naturalisation policies of the the naturalisation of non-Israeli partners is majority of neighbouring states, where enshrined in the Nationality Law. However, Palestinians settled since their flight and the “Entry into Israel Law” was extended in expulsion, prevent them from being 2003. Since then, spouses of Israeli citizens accepted into a new state collective body, have no longer been permitted to immigrate in which they could integrate themselves. to Israel and may not obtain Israeli citizen- As a result of their statelessness, their iden- ship if they come from Gaza or the West tity remains firmly tied to the historical Bank. Conceived as a temporary safeguard- territory of Palestine. ing measure, the extended version of the Palestinian refugees do not fall within law continues to apply today, and has far- the remit of the United Nations High Com- reaching consequences for Palestinian fami- missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but are, lies who are frequently connected across instead, the responsibility of the United borders. Since its modification, the law has Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales- been the focus of public criticism, chiefly tine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). from the left-wing parties, and numerous According to the Israeli interpretation, they human rights organisations. The imple- therefore fail to fall within the scope of the mentation of the legal provisions related internationally recognised definition of to naturalisation is also problematic. Al- refugees, and have no right to asylum in though they permit the de jure naturalisa- Israel in consequence. At the same time, tion of all immigrants if they fulfil criteria neighbouring states consolidate the Pales- including language skills and duration of tinian refugee problem as regards accusa- stay, the few individuals who have actually tions towards Israel. The refugees remain been naturalised in accordance with these in a legal vacuum – with no prospect of a regulations are predominantly spouses of naturalised status in the host countries, Jewish Israelis.

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4 Deep-seated fears of external “infiltra- data published by the Israel Central Bureau tion” and the rise of the Arab population of Statistics, around 91,000 registered and within the country constitute chief motives approximately 101,000 illegal migrant work- for the restrictive immigration and natu- ers were living in Israel in 2014. ralisation policies towards Palestinians. Some illegal migrants have now been The legally constructed pair of opposites of living in Israel for over two decades, and “Jewish Israelis/Arab Israelis” pervades the many of these have children born in the entire citizenship system. One could even country. As they are ineligible for any state describe it as two discrete nationalities social security benefits as a result of their within a single legal framework. illegal residence, local network structures have been created which secure a minimum social standard. The government categori- Other forms of immigration cally declares that all migrant workers are The Israeli citizenship system does not only residing in Israel on a short-term basis. provide for the systematic settlement of As a result, no state-run programmes exist, non-Jewish immigrants. As a result, no with the aid of which this group of individ- organised procedure regulating how these uals could be integrated into society and individuals can obtain a controlled, per- receive a permanent legal status. With this, manent status within Israeli society exists. Israel has created for itself a catch-22 situa- A few years ago, the relatively new phenom- tion, similar to other countries which rely enon of a high influx of non-Jewish immi- on labour migration: on the one hand, an grants and those wishing to settle triggered economic necessity exists which requires a public debate on ways in which the citi- foreign workers to enter the country, yet, zenship system could be reformed. To date, on the other, the political willingness to however, its legal shortcomings and contra- grant such individuals a share in both state dictions have not been resolved. Instead, and society is lacking. it has been used systematically in order to Furthermore, migrant workers live sepa- ensure that non-Jewish minorities within rated from the Jewish population, which the State are kept to a minimum, and to pre- prevents even the slightest degree of inte- vent legal claims from such groups gaining gration or assimilation. This separation is ground. As far as the stance on the situa- induced, among other things, by legal grey tion of non-Jewish minorities is concerned, areas. No coherent regulations exist, for in- two camps can be identified. On the one stance, on whether conversions to Judaism hand, there is the party Meretz, individual performed within Israel are recognised by party members of the Zionist Union and the Law of Return and can, in consequence, countless human rights organisations and be used in order to obtain Israeli citizen- NGOs, and, on the other, the religious and ship. In practice, attempts to become natu- Zionist-nationalist parties which currently ralised in this manner have been prevented make up the government. either by the Supreme Court (2005) or by religious stakeholders. The religiously-moti- vated refusal to grant these non-Jewish im- Migrant workers migrants full rights is also corroborated by Israel has been home to a large minority common parlance. The official Hebrew des- of non-Jewish migrant workers since the ignation for foreign work (“avoda zara”) cor- 1990s. These are illegal immigrants who responds to the religious term for “idolatry”. enter Israel on tourist visas and look for It is conceivable that the problems stem- work, foreign workers hired in the Far ming from this legal situation will inten- East who hold temporary work visas, and, sify as a result of the fact that the need for finally, those who remain illegally in Israel migrant workers is likely to increase. In after their work visas expire. According to addition, many Palestinians from the West

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5 Bank who once worked in Israel have had lar. This is because Israel is the only country their entry and work permits revoked since in relative proximity theoretically obliged the commencement of knife attacks – the to guarantee them minimal legal standards. so called lone-wolf-Intifada – on Israelis. As These refugees are the poorest of the poor, was the case during previous escalations who lack both the networks and funds re- of the conflict, an increased recruitment of quired to risk the journey to Europe. workers from the Far East could ensue. Yet In order to satisfy the very general de- in contrast to the Palestinian workers who mands of the Geneva Convention relating return to the West Bank each evening, many to the Status of Refugees and, simultane- of the new migrant workers are likely to ously, to apply the law of asylum restric- attempt to stay on a long-term basis. tively in the national interest, the Israeli A correlation between the Israeli-Pales- government performs a legal balancing act. tinian conflict and labour migration can Although the UNHCR monitors the overall be determined in consequence. For Pales- refugee situation and provides assistance tinians, the conflict has resulted in their with asylum applications, the final decision access to Israel becoming increasingly on each application has been made by the restricted, thus endangering their econom- Israeli Ministry of Interior since 2009. Be- ic livelihoods. In Israel, however, labour tween 2013 and 2015, Israel granted asylum migration and the subsequent constant to just 45 applicants. This can be explained presence of non-Jews are viewed as a threat by the fact that numerous refugees have to the State’s Jewish nature. This dynamic been denied refugee status and, with this, is aggravating the situation of Palestinian the right to apply for asylum. workers, and simultaneously subverting Sudanese refugees, for instance, are un- Israel’s sense of identity. able to apply for asylum as a rule, as they are deemed to come from an enemy state in accordance with the latest version of the Refugees “Prevention of Infiltration Law” of 2012. As far as the treatment of refugees is con- This law also holds that refugees who enter cerned, it should also be noted that the the country on foot via the Egyptian-Israeli rethoric of the current government system- border fall into the category of “infiltra- atically questions the legitimacy of their tors”. However, deporting these individuals residence, and strives to stigmatise them back to Egypt is considered politically in- as “economic migrants” and “infiltrators”. defensible since the revolution, and would According to this logic, the State’s Jewish result in protests by the opposition and identity, which is linked to a Jewish major- countless human rights organisations. As ity, conflicts with the right to asylum. a result, these refugees are interned indis- Israel signed the Geneva Convention criminately in a series of detention camps relating to the Status of Refugees, and thus set up near the border. committed itself to accepting international standards related to refugees and granting these individuals the right to asylum. Like Conclusions and recommendations many other countries, however, Israel con- An analysis of the Israeli citizenship sys- siders itself confronted by a disproportionate tem reveals how access to citizenship is number of refugees, and believes it is ob- determined not individually, but rather in liged to bear an overly heavy load in this accordance with group affiliation within respect. Yet the 45,000 refugees constitute legal framework. a mere 0.5 per cent of the country’s total The existence of a Jewish majority less- population of 8.5 million. Since 2006, Israel ens the Jewish people’s fears of extinction has become the destination of choice for and legitimises Israel’s self-identification refugees from Sudan and Eritrea, in particu- as a Jewish State. The resulting demo-

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6 graphic policy, meanwhile, consolidates the voters, and to renounce the allusions to a exclusively Jewish claim to the territory demographic threat by the birth rates of and excludes Palestinians and Arab Israelis Arab Israelis. On the other, demographic by depriving them of rights or refusing to prognoses confined to the Israeli heartland concede them said rights initially. are of limited informational value in the The inadequate official regulation of face of the ongoing occupation of the West non-Jewish groups such as migrant workers Bank. The continuation of this unsatisfactory and refugees carries the risk of social ten- status quo and the scenario of a one-state sion. In the light of the increasing levels solution which could develop both increase of xenophobia within the population, the insecurity in the region. In the absence of a need for political discourse on this subject clear definition of the future national popu- is becoming ever more urgent. The longer lation, a proper debate on the subject of an the country fails to deal with these immi- alleged demographic threat is just as unlike- grants, depriving them of a secure legal ly as a reform of Israel’s citizenship laws. status within the citizenship system, the As a result, the two-state solution prob- greater the probable sense within the Israeli ably remains the most realistic way of sta- population of being left to deal with the bilising Israel’s identity as a Jewish, demo- problem of an undesirable minority. cratic state and securing it in the long term. The fact that xenophobic populism in However, which stakeholders in Israel’s Israel is falling on fertile soil is borne out by current party landscape would, generally the growing number of citizens’ initiatives speaking, be in a position to shatter the and regular demonstrations against non- status quo and, simultaneously, make suit- Jewish immigrants. In this respect, the social able partners for Europe and Germany? response to government immigration and At first glance, collaborations by Euro- naturalisation policies in Israel bears a re- pean governments with the current oppo- semblance to similar reactions in numerous sition parties the Zionist Union and Meretz European countries. The inadequate inte- appear most plausible. Located on the left gration of migrant workers and the piece- of the Israeli political spectrum, these par- meal legal status of refugees are issues ties believe that there is more to the “demo- which have long been a thorn in the side cratic” principle of state than a mere right of Europe. to vote. As a result, they correspond most However, the Israeli government chooses closely to the European idea of Israel as the not to curb or check the xenophobic tenden- sole democracy in the Middle East. They cies. On the contrary, the current govern- endeavour to secure the rights of non- ment is not immune to populism, with the Jewish inhabitants, who represent around result that there is no appreciable differ- 20 per cent of the total population. In a ence between its treatment of Palestinians country in which religion is steadily gain- and non-Jewish migrants and the stance ing ground, they are unable to command taken by the population. Yet, above all, majority backing, and are unable to offer the Israeli government remains resolutely even their core voters a convincingly liberal, silent as it regards the fact that the prob- secular concept of “Jewishness”. lems described above are, not least, a result Simultaneously, European cooperation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. with the left-wing political spectrum is eyed The Jewish-Israeli insecurity as far as the with suspicion in Israel, and criticised as a future demographic constellation is con- biased attempt to influence domestic policy cerned is derived from several sources. On processes. As a result, it meanwhile seems the one hand, the governing parties lack reasonable to consolidate the constructive the political will to explicitly emphasise dialogue with the Israeli parties capable of the reality of a largely predominant Jewish winning a majority, which, although located majority within the heartland to their own right of centre according to European and

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7 German standards, are deemed “Centre- right Parties” within Israel itself. Here, we are referring to the coalition parties Kulanu, Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu, and, in the lat- ter case, predominantly its pragmatic wing. In contrast to religious right-wing parties, these groups are committed to democracy, and the majority of their members con- tinue to adhere to the idea of a two-state solution, even if the border demarcation may not necessarily conform to the inter- nationally recognised “Green Line” (armi- stice line of 1949). However, these parties are the only ones which could count on the

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und support of the populace in the event of a Politik, 2016 rapprochement with the Palestinians and All rights reserved reforms in the field of demographic policy. These Comments reflect Furthermore, within the present govern- the author’s views. ment, they constitute those stakeholders SWP most suited to furthering the peace process Stiftung Wissenschaft und and altering the legal status of minorities Politik German Institute for in the process. International and Security Affairs

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(Elaborated version, based on SWP-Aktuell 58/2016, written by Lidia Averbukh and Dani Kranz)

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