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Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Three years later, the GSPC’s Algerian full-fledged “crusade” in North Africa Maghreb: A Case Study in hierarchy remains forcefully in charge and threatened to strike back at the of AQIM. Non-Algerian activists have European “oppressors.”7 Al-Qa`ida the Opportunism of Global not been promoted to the top layer of second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri Jihad the group. In Morocco3 and Tunisia, the echoed those threats when he welcomed jihadist militants who might have been the GSPC into al-Qa`ida.8 The anti-U.S. By Jean-Pierre Filiu tempted to join AQIM chose to keep jihad in Iraq had triggered in 2003- their independence, while some Libyan 2006 a triangular dynamic between al-qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) members Europe-based activists,9 al-Qa`ida (AQIM) is not only one of the latest decided to join the FATA-based al- operatives in the Middle East, and the offshoots of Usama bin Ladin’s terrorist Qa`ida central instead, turning their GSPC as a regional hub for potential network, but it is the branch of the back on the “Islamic Maghreb.” Non- “volunteers.” As a result, al-Qa`ida’s global jihad that has most clearly failed Algerians were admitted into AQIM on top leadership bet on AQIM to use to follow its founding guidelines.1 an individual basis, with the exception this Iraqi trend to launch a new wave Launched as a jihadist platform to unify of a Libyan cell that rose outside of the of terrorism on European soil. Yet the North African militant groups, it has LIFG and was smuggled into eastern crisis and decline of al-Qa`ida in Iraq not succeeded in attracting Moroccan .4 Moreover, this Libyan cell was since 2007 jeopardized this triangular and Tunisian cells, and it remains an reined in by AQIM, which did not dare momentum, and the nascent AQIM could Algerian-run organization. Hailed as expand its violence into the neighboring no longer rely on the clarion call for jihad al-Qa`ida’s spearhead against Europe, Jamahiriyya (Libya), probably out of in Iraq to recruit and plot in Europe. it has proved unable to strike France fear of outstretching its already loose or Spain. It has had to rely mainly on chain of command, but also so as not to In his July 2008 interview to the New the internet to recruit north of the repeat in Libya the fiasco of the jihadist York Times, Droukdel pledged to “liberate Mediterranean Sea. cell crushed in the suburbs of Tunis in the Islamic Maghreb from the sons of December 2006.5 France and Spain and from all symbols Conceived as a vanguard to push of treason and employment for the global jihad north into “the land of the Therefore, the only North African outsiders, and protect it from the foreign infidels,” it instead placed increasing country where AQIM kept a high profile greed and the Crusaders’ hegemony.”10 emphasis on its Saharan component to outside of Algeria became Mauritania. This was a defiant way to admit that the point that it is now involved in Yet Algerian jihadists already had the focus of anti-Western terror would and Niger. This failure makes AQIM a long record of involvement in be in the Maghreb itself, and not in a fascinating case to reflect upon the Mauritania, where the Algerian Mokhtar Europe, contrary to what al-Qa`ida tactical opportunism and the operational Belmokhtar and his brigade (katiba) had central had initially hoped. Therefore, reassessment of the global jihad. provoked the local security forces as AQIM started to strike “global” targets early as 2005.6 The “Islamic Maghreb” in its local environment, murdering four The Delusion of the “Islamic Maghreb” that al-Qa`ida central envisioned while French tourists in eastern Mauritania in Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching endorsing the GSPC was certainly not December 2007, then a French engineer and Combat (GSPC) emerged in 1998 limited to Algeria and Mauritania. As a in central Algeria in June 2008.11 Later, after splintering from the Armed Islamic result, the North African grand design when al-Zawahiri warned on August 5, Group (GIA). Although deeply rooted in collapsed primarily under the enduring 2009 that “France will pay for all her the complex history of the “black decade” weight of Algerian chauvinism, still crimes,” AQIM reacted by a suicide of the 1990s, the GSPC tried since 2004 vibrant under its jihadist discourse, attack against the French Embassy in to distance itself from the heavy legacy and potentially repulsive for Moroccan Nouakchott three days later.12 of the and, under the and Tunisian activists. leadership of Abdelmalek Droukdel (also known as Abu Mus`ab `Abd al- The Mediterranean Wall Wadud), worked hard to join the global Even before transforming his GSPC 7 Le Monde, June 26, 2005; Le Monde, September 29, arena. The GSPC’s 2007 merger into al- into AQIM, Droukdel repeatedly 2005. Qa`ida was meant to crown this process accused France and Spain of waging a 8 Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Local and Global Jihad: Al-Qa’ida by assigning to the former GSPC a new in the Islamic Maghrib,” Middle East Journal 63:2 (2009): horizon, the “Islamic Maghreb.” This p. 223. marked a dramatic challenge to the 3 Carlos Echeverria Jesus, “The Current State of the 9 For the case of Spain, see Javier Jordan, “Anatomy North African regimes that have failed Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group,” CTC Sentinel 2:3 of Spain’s 28 Disrupted Networks,” CTC Sentinel 1:11 to push forward the “Arab Maghreb” for (2009). (2008). 2 the past 20 years. 4 For instance, in August 2007 four Libyan fighters 10 “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal,” New were killed by the security forces south of Tebessa. For York Times, July 1, 2008. details, see Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb (Pre- 11 For details on these incidents, see “Travel Warning,” 1 AQIM was established in January 2007, and it was the toria: Institute of Security Studies, 2008), p. 49. U.S. Department of State, December 2, 2009; “Deadly result of a merger between the GSPC and al-Qa`ida. 5 Ridha Kéfi, “Le Maghreb face à la pieuvre jihadiste,” Bombings Hit Algerian Town,” BBC, August 20, 2008. 2 The Union for the Arab Maghreb (Union du Maghreb Afkar/Idées n°14, summer 2007, pp. 50-53. 12 For the English transcript of this August 5, 2009 al- Arabe) was established in 1989 among Algeria, Morocco, 6 This brigade switched from the GIA to the GSPC in Zawahiri speech, see www.nefafoundation.org/miscella- Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya. 2000. neous/FeaturedDocs/nefa_zawahiri0809.pdf.

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The inability to strike European targets Hamidu Abu Zeid,15 whose neighboring of the hostages, a British tourist, in on European soil is deeply frustrating katiba kidnapped two Austrian tourists in May 2009, and even in that case AQIM for Droukdel and his followers, who southern Tunisia in February 2008 and did not give the killing Zarqawi-like invested significantly in the internet two Canadian UN diplomats in northern publicity.19 AQIM prefers to trade its to get their message across the Niger in December 2008.16 While captives for undisclosed ransoms or the Mediterranean. Cyber-jihad, enhanced Belmokhtar’s focus on Mauritania meant release of jailed operatives. Now that by the global exposure the integration Mali had to be preserved as a safe haven, kidnapping has become the most visible into al-Qa`ida granted to the former Abu Zeid spoiled his rival’s position by sign of jihadist activity in the Sahara, GSPC, remains the trump card for AQIM moving aggressively into northern Mali.17 AQIM is striving to maximize its local to regain a foothold in Europe. Thus The violent clashes in the beginning of July benefits even at the cost of clashing with far, however, international cooperation al-Qa`ida central’s global agenda. and enhanced security awareness have managed to thwart this move. In “The crisis and decline Conclusion December 2008, for example, a Paris of al-Qa`ida in Iraq since In the course of its first three years of court sentenced Kamel Bouchentouf—a existence, AQIM has turned away from longtime resident of the French city 2007 jeopardized this al-Qa`ida central’s main expectations of Nancy—to six years in jail after he triangular momentum, and of the group. AQIM has failed to admitted corresponding with Salah integrate non-Algerian factions into a Gasmi, the AQIM’s propaganda leader, the nascent AQIM could no truly Maghrebi organization and it has via e-mail.13 Yet the internet, regardless of longer rely on the clarion contained its terror to the southern how nefarious it can become in the hands shore of the Mediterranean. Al-Qa`ida of jihadist recruiters, is a poor substitute call for jihad in Iraq to as a whole is working hard to live up to to physical infiltration and individual recruit and plot in Europe.” its “global” commitment to fight the “far radicalization on European soil. As a enemy,” but its violence mostly targets result, instead of projecting its terror fellow Muslims killed on Muslim lands. northward, AQIM resigned to direct its Furthermore, AQIM, unable to regain the violence more and more southward. 2009 opened a new period of turmoil in initiative against the Algerian security the central Sahara and eventually spilled forces, was forced to enhance its profile in The Mirages of the Sahara into Niger. The competition between the the open spaces of the Sahara. The southern faction of AQIM was two katiba also involved their partners in initially a sideshow in the overall criminal activities; Belmokhtar and Abu The sad irony, however, is that AQIM’s planning of the organization, but it Zeid reportedly asked their respective frustrating move southward is opening steadily gained weight and visibility contacts to deliver them Western for al-Qa`ida new opportunities that due to a multi-fold set of inter- hostages, which led in a few weeks in late were not taken into consideration when related factors: the steady decline of 2009 to the abduction of three Spaniards, the GSPC joined the global jihad. The jihadist violence in Algeria and the two Italians and one French national.18 competition between the two AQIM containment of the bulk of AQIM field commanders in the Sahara has led activity in its stronghold of Kabylie, Despite these turf wars, Droukdel still to the recent recruiting of new members east of Algiers;14 the pressing needs of manages to maintain authority over originating from countries such as Mali, AQIM’s leadership, who suffered the AQIM, and he was greatly seconded in Niger, Burkina Faso and even Nigeria. shrinking of their extortion outreach that regard by his deputy in southern The numbers are too limited to speak and demanded a growing contribution Algeria, Yahya Djouadi, who oversees about a significant breakthrough, but from their Saharan affiliates; and the Belmokhtar as well as Abu Zeid. Yet the al-Qa`ida central could ultimately deepening cooperation between those contradiction is now open between al- benefit from this development that none affiliates and the various smuggling Qa`ida central and AQIM on the issue of of its leaders foresaw when deciding to networks, involved in drugs, weapons kidnapping Western nationals. In only launch AQIM. This would then be a or illegal immigration. one instance, al-Qa`ida central managed puzzling demonstration of the successful to pressure AQIM into executing one opportunism of the global jihad. This cumulating process played in the hands of Belmokhtar, especially when 15 Hamidu (Abdel Hamid) Abu Zeid, born in 1965, is Dr. Jean-Pierre Filiu is professor at Paris the abduction of Western nationals slightly older than Droukdel and Belmokhtar, but he was Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po), in the Sahara—and the subsequent only a junior commander until 2004 when he replaced and has been visiting professor at Georgetown ransoms paid for their release—became “al-Para” as the GSPC’s leader for southeastern Algeria. University. He authored several books at crucial to financing the whole AQIM 16 “Al-Qaeda Claims Austrian Hostages,” BBC, March Fayard, in Paris, including Mitterrand and apparatus. Droukdel sought to balance 10, 2008; Steven Edwards and Glen McGregor, “Cana- Palestine (2005) and The Boundaries of Belmokhtar’s rising power by promoting dian Diplomats Missing, Feared Kidnapped in Niger,” Jihad (2006). The French History Convention Canwest News Service, December 15, 2008. awarded its 2008 main prize to his Apocalypse 13 Isabelle Mandraud, “Frère Abou Zhara, apprenti ji- 17 On June 11, 2009, some of Abu Zeid’s followers killed in Islam. His most recent book is called The hadiste ou infiltré de la DST,” Le Monde, December 19, a senior intelligence officer in Timbuktu. Nine Lives of Al-Qaeda. 2008. 18 The French national was released in February 2010, 14 Hanna Rogan, “Violent Trends in Algeria Since 9/11,” and shortly after one of the Spanish detainees was re- 19 Ignacio Cembrero, “Cautivos de Al-Qaeda,” El Pais, CTC Sentinel 1:12 (2008). leased. The Italian couple was recently set free in April. January 10, 2010.

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