Central Asia the Caucasus

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies

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Volume 17 Issue 1 2016

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Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council ISMAILOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 497 12 22; E-mail: elis@tdb.baku.az Murad ESENOV Editor-in-Chief Tel./fax: (46) 70 232 16 55; E-mail: [email protected] Vladimer PAPAVA Deputy Editor-in-Chief Tel./fax: (995 - 32) 24 35 55; E-mail: [email protected] Jannatkhan Deputy Editor-in-Chief EYVAZOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 596 11 73; E-mail: [email protected] Kalamkas represents the journal in Kazakhstan (Astana) YESSIMOVA Tel./fax: (7 - 701) 7408600; E-mail: [email protected] Ainura represents the journal in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek) ELEBAEVA Tel./fax: (996 - 312) 61 30 36; E-mail: [email protected] Saodat OLIMOVA represents the journal in Tajikistan (Dushanbe) Tel.: (992 372) 21 89 95; E-mail: [email protected] Farkhad represents the journal in Uzbekistan (Tashkent) TOLIPOV Tel.: (9987 - 1) 225 43 22; E-mail: [email protected] Ziya KENGERLI represents the journal in Azerbaijan (Baku) Tel.: (+994 - 50) 3006694; E-mail: [email protected] David represents the journal in Armenia (Erevan) PETROSYAN Tel.: (374 - 10) 56 88 10; E-mail: [email protected] Kakhaber ERADZE represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) Tel.: (+995 - 95) 45 82 88; E-mail: [email protected] Sun ZHUANGZHI represents the journal in China (Beijing) Tel.: (86) 10-64039088; E-mail: [email protected] Konrad SCHÄFFLER represents the journal in Germany (Munich) Tel.: (49 - 89) 3003132; E-mail: [email protected] Vladimir MESAMED represents the journal in the Middle East (Jerusalem) Tel.: (972 - 2) 5882332; E-mail: [email protected] Irina EGOROVA represents the journal in the Russian Federation (Moscow) Tel.: (7 - 495) 3163146; E-mail: [email protected] Robert represents the journal in the U.S. (Buffalo, NY) GUANG TIAN Tel: (716) 880-2104; E-mail: [email protected] Rustem represents the journal in Ukraine (Kiev) ZHANGUZHIN Tel.: (380 - 44) 524-79-13; E-mail: [email protected] 2 CENTRAL ASIA AND THEE CAUCASUSD I T O R I A L B O A R D Volume 17 Issue 1 2016

Akif ABDULLAEV Ph.D. (Economy), Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Bülent ARAS Doctor, Chair, Department of International Relations, Fatih University (Turkey) Mariam ARUNOVA Ph.D. (History), leading research associate, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Garnik ASATRIAN D.Sc. (Philology), Professor, Head of the Department of Iranian Studies, Erevan State University (Armenia) Mustafa AYDIN Rector of Kadir Has University (Turkey) Svante E. CORNELL Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) William FIERMAN D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor of Indiana University (U.S.A.) Paul GOBLE Senior Advisor, Voice of America (U.S.A.) Sergey GRETSKY Doctor, Chair of Central Asian Studies, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State (U.S.A.) Xing GUANGCHENG D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Deputy Director of the Institute for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China) Alexander IGNATENKO President, Institute of Religion and Politics, Doctor of Philosophy, specialist in Islamic studies, leading expert of the Institute of Social Systems, Moscow State University, member of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations under the Russian Federation President (Russia) Ashurboi IMOMOV Ph.D. (Law), Assistant Professor, Head of the Department of Constitutional Law, Tajik National University (Tajikistan) Stephen F. JONES Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) Lena JONSON Doctor, senior researcher, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Sweden) Klara KHAFIZOVA D.Sc. (History), Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Professor at the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department, Kainar University (Kazakhstan) Zaynidin KURMANOV D.Sc. (History), Professor, Head of the Chair of International Relations, the Kyrgyz-Russian University (Kyrgyzstan) Jacob M. LANDAU Professor of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel) S. Neil MACFARLANE Professor, Director, Center for International Studies, The University of Oxford (Great Britain) Alexei MALASHENKO D.Sc. (History), Professor, Scholar-in-Residence, Ethnicity and Nation-Building Program Co-Chair, The Carnegie Moscow Center (Russia) Abbas MALEKI Doctor, Director General, International Institute for Caspian Studies (Iran) Akira MATSUNAGA Doctor, History of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Japan) Roger N. McDERMOTT Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen (Denmark) Roin METREVELI D.Sc. (History), Professor, Academician of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences, President of the National Committee of Georgian Historians (Georgia) Nazim MUZAFFARLI D.Sc. (Economy), Professor, Director, Institute of Economy, Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences (Azerbaijan) Vitaly NAUMKIN D.Sc. (History), Professor, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies of RF (Russia) Yerengaip OMAROV Professor, Rector of Kainar University, President of the Academy of Natural Sciences, Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) Avtandil SILAGADZE D.Sc. (Economy), Professor, Tbilisi University of International Relations, Full Member of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) S. Frederick STARR Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.) James V. WERTSCH Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington University in St. Louis (U.S.A.) Alla YAZKOVA D.Sc. (History), Professor, head of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Center, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Stanislav ZHUKOV D.Sc. (Economy), Senior Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion

Editorial Office: CA&CC Press AB, Hubertusstigen 9. 97455 Luleå, SWEDEN WEB ADDRESS: http://www.ca-c.org © Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2016 © CA&CC Press®, 2016 3 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies

Volume 17 Issue 1 2016

IN THIS ISSUE:

NATION-BUILDING

Nikolay INSTITUTING THE PRESIDENCY Borisov. IN KAZAKHSTAN AND TAJIKISTAN: STABILITY VS. CONFLICTS...... 7

Sergey POLITICAL PROCESSES IN CENTRAL ASIA: Zhiltsov. PECULIARITIES, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS...... 21

Ali THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS: Salgiriev. TRIBAL-CLAN STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL ELITES AS A FACTOR OF POLITICAL TENSION...... 29

Sergey GEORGIA TODAY: MILITARY-BUILDING AND Minasyan. THE MILITARY-POLITICAL COURSE...... 35

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Ruslan CHINA’S CHANGING STRATEGY Izimov. IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION (Based on the Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative)...... 44

Larisa GEOPOLITICAL “U.S.-CHINA-RUSSIA” TRIANGLE: Garusova. THE ASIA PACIFIC CONTEXT...... 54 4 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

Vladimir Minakov, Armen Galstyan, Lyudmila Piterskaya, Maria Radchenko, Anastasia INNOVATIVE INVESTMENT TRENDS Shiyanova. IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS...... 61

Olga Kurilkina, Aleksey Ovchinnikov, Irina Samoylova, Irina Stetsenko, Svyatoslav LEGAL POLICY IN THE ECONOMY AND Fedorenko. THE SPECIFICS OF RUSSIAN ETHNIC CULTURE...... 70

RELIGION IN SOCIETY

Vakhit Akaev, Magomed ISLAM: LOCAL TRADITIONS AND Soltamuradov. INNOVATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIA...... 77

Irina Karabulatova, Bigaysha Akhmetova, Khabiba Shagbanova, Ekaterina Loskutova, Flera Sayfulina, Luiza Zamalieva, SHAPING POSITIVE IDENTITY Ilya Dyukov, IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHNOCULTURAL Margarita INFORMATION SECURITY AND THE STRUGGLE Vykhrystyuk. AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE...... 84

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FOR YOUR INFORMATION

The Special Feature section in the next three issues will discuss:

 Central Eurasia: Politics Today  Central Eurasia: Religion in the Sociopolitical Context  Central Eurasia: Integration Processes

Contributors please use the following guidelines: — begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords; — articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes; — footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author’s name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19; — quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English; — the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion; — the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

All articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The editorial board takes responsibility for translation of the articles.

6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016

NATION-BUILDING

INSTITUTING THE PRESIDENCY IN KAZAKHSTAN AND TAJIKISTAN: STABILITY VS. CONFLICTS

Nikolay BORISOV Ph.D. (Political Science), Assistant Professor, Head, Department of Theoretical and Applied Political Science, Department of History, Political Science and Law, Russian State University of the Humanities (Moscow, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

he author studies the circumstances ity/inability to become the president, the first in which the presidency was instituted presidential elections, and the positions of T in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and the the central actors regarding the State Com- consolidation of this new institution in 1991 mittee on the State of Emergency (GKChP) amid the structural and procedural changes. and the new Union Treaty. The historical version of neo-institutionalism In the absence of considerable dis- is used as the methodological foundation of agreements inside Kazakhstan’s elites, le- the analysis. This method is based on iden- gitimization of the First Secretary of the C.C. tifying the indices of the form of government Communist Party of Kazakhstan as Presi- and presidency competitiveness. The author dent of the Kazakh S.S.R. went smoothly. probes deep into the structural and proce- Amid the rising political rivalry and the emer- dural splits, provides a detailed description gence of the first nationalist movements, of the circumstances in which the decision to Nursultan Nazarbaev succeeded in becom- institute the presidency was prepared and ing the leader of the struggle for the repub- made, the role of the incumbent and his abil- lic’s sovereignty.

7 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In Tajikistan, the emergence of the na- Soviet’s involvement in cabinet- making and tional-democratic and, later, Islamic move- fairly wide presidential powers, and it was re- ment led to ethnic and religious splits. From alized through uncompetitive elections. This the very beginning, the intention to set up allowed President Nazarbaev to tighten his the post of president with wide powers in a grip on power and later expand his powers at split society looked like a hazardous enter- the expense of the parliament. The competi- prise and made all the political processes tive model with wide presidential powers im- very competitive. plemented in Tajikistan not only removed As a result, Kazakhstan acquired a non- presidents K. Makhkamov, K. Aslonov, and competitive presidency, while in Tajikistan R. Nabiev one after another, but also plunged the presidency was highly competitive. The the presidency and the republic’s political Tajik model of presidency envisaged wider system into a crisis that led to a civil war. In (compared with the Kazakhstan model) pres- these conditions, the presidency weakened idential powers, on the one hand, while it the political system—members of very differ- functioned in a much more competitive envi- ent political forces and regional clans claimed ronment, on the other. From the very begin- political power, while the struggle for the post ning, the Kazakhstan model proved to be of the president developed into struggle fairly sustainable: it envisaged the Supreme among ethnoregional groups.

KEYWORDS: the institution of presidency, form of government, competitiveness, elections, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, political stability, political conflict.

Introduction

The institution of presidency, established twenty-five years ago in the Soviet Union and the Union republics (independent states since December 1991), has changed considerably. A superficial observer might dismiss the importance of these changes as the mere desire to imitate the Union Cen- ter; a more attentive observer will discover local specifics, social constitutional formulas and, most important, different roads of development and transformation of the institution of presidency. This means that in each particular case the presidency developed under the impact of common and highly specific factors that later caused its divergence while the Soviet Union still existed and later in the newly independent states. Here I have posed myself the task of analyzing the factors and causes of this divergence. A comparative analysis of what happened in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan is interesting because in both states the first secretary of the C.C. Communist Party remained in power as president. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev consolidated his power and remained in power, while in Tajikistan the first and second presidencies were very short. The causes of the different fates of the presidencies, as well as their different models and impact on the institution’s later transformations deserve close scrutiny. The appearance of the institution of presidency should be discussed in the context of structural (state- and nation-forming, socioeconomic, cultural-axiological) and procedural factors.1 Anyone analyzing the structural factors should pay particular attention to social splits, while an analysis of the procedural factors should concentrate on the presence, degree, and nature of the splits inside the

1 See: A.Yu. Melvil, Demokraticheskie tranzity: teoretiko-metodologicheskie i priklandnye aspekty, Moscow, 1999.

8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 elites, which, to a certain extent, are the products of structural splits and largely determine the correlation of political forces at the early stage of transformation. I used the historical version of neo-institutionalism as the methodological foundation of my analysis. Douglass North pointed out that institutions push societies, so to speak, toward a certain road that is not easy to leave. Any society inevitably acquires a blend of efficient and inefficient -in stitutions, their correlation determining the trajectories of social development.2 This poses an interesting and important question about the degree to which the initial framework of the institution of presidency and presidential powers has determined the course of further transformations. The impact of the form of government, and the institution of presidency as its part, on the way political regimes change is one of the most controversial issues in political science. According to Klaus von Beyme, “since the time institutional engineering, during the crisis of democracy in certain West European countries, regained its position on the podium, the ‘religious war’ of the olden days over the advantages of either presidential or parliamentary system triumphantly celebrated its resurrection.”3 Juan Linz warned about “the perils of presidentialism”;4 Donald Horowitz, in turn, counseled about the instability of the parliamentary system,5 while Arend Lijphart cautioned against combining a proportional election system with the presidential form of governance.6 The general analytical scheme requires an analysis of structural and procedural splits, the circumstances in which decisions on presidency were prepared and made, the role of the incumbent and his ability/inability to become the president, the course of the first presidential elections, and the positions of main actors regarding the GKChP and the new Union Treaty. The Index of the Form of Government (IFG) and the Index of Presidency Competitiveness (IPC) based on the results of the first presidential elections are the key indicators. They are used to shape the model of presidency, which, in the future, might be either transformed or remain the same. By the index (system) of government, we mean the way in which the top power structures are formed (heads of state, government, and parliament) and the way their powers correlate. The IFG is calculated using the methods suggested by André Krouwel and specified by Oleg Zaznaev7 on a 10-point scale, in which pluses mean a presidential from of government, while the minuses indicate a parliamentary form; zero indicates that the system is well balanced. The IPC points to the degree of political polycentrism and is an aggregated index (from 0 to 1) calculated as an average of the following indicators: the ability of the incumbent to be elected as the first president; the methods selected for the first presidential election (parliamentary or general); the number of candidates at the first general election; the share of votes cast for the winner at a presidential election; and the difference between the share of votes cast for the winner and the closest rival. The scenario of the transfer of power predetermined by the correlation of forces of the political actors at the stage when the old regime falls apart and the new regime is created is of particular importance.8

2 See: D. North, Instituty, institutsionalnye izmeneniya i funktsionalnye ekonomiki, Moscow, 1997, p. 44 (Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990). 3 K. von Beyme, “Institutsionalnye predposylki konsolidatsii partyynoy sistemy,” in: Teoriya partiy i partiynykh system: khrestomatiya, Comp. by B.A. Isaev, Moscow, 2008, p. 309. 4 The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, ed. by J. Linz, A. Valenzuela, Vol. 1, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, London, 1994. 5 See: D.L. Horowitz, “Comparing Democratic Systems,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1990, pp. 73-79. 6 See: A. Lijphart, “Molodye demokratii i konstitutsionny vybor,” in: Demokratiya: Teoriya i praktika, Moscow, 1996, pp. 86-105. 7 See: O.I. Zaznaev, Poluprezidentskaya sistema: teoreticheskie i prikladnye aspekty, Kazan, 2006. 8 See: A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge, 1992.

9 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Kazakhstan: The Presidency is the Road to Stability

The following factors were mainly responsible for the specifics of the political process in Ka- zakhstan in the 1980s: insufficient pre-Soviet experience of statehood in the form of several khanates; emergence of an ethnopolitical split in the republic into Russian-speaking and Kazakh populations; intra-Kazakh ethnoregional splits (the zhuz phenomenon); the nomadic culture; and the fairly weak position of Islam. Due to the total Russification of Kazakhstan, transfer of part of the territory that belonged to the R.S.F.S.R. to Kazakhstan, and extensive development of virgin land in Soviet times, in 1970 Kazakhs comprised only 32.5% of the republic’s total population9; while in 1989, their share was 39.5%,10 and the Kazakh language had practically disappeared. The republic’s population increased by means of the Russian-speakers who moved to Kazakhstan from Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia to develop the virgin land of northern Kazakhstan. Within the nationwide territorial division of labor, the Kazakh S.S.R. was responsible for non- ferrous metallurgy and coal mining. In the last Soviet decades, the republic was developing oil production and oil refinery; it came third after the R.S.F.S.R. and Ukraine in terms of its GDP.11 The standard of living in Kazakhstan was the highest among the Central Asian republics, while average wages were second only to the wages paid in the R.S.F.S.R. (the Baltic republics are not included).12 Late in the 1980s, the conflict inside the republic’s elite and the December events of 1986 caused by the appointment of Gennady Kolbin, the next First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Kazakhstan, played an important role. Early in December 1986, First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Kazakhstan D. Kunaev since 1964 retired. Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that before his retirement he had spoken negatively about Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nursultan Nazarbaev (“he is a dangerous man and he should be stopped”) and offered his comment: “There are no suitable candidates to fill the post of first secretary, especially from among the local Kazakhs. In this far from simple situation a Russian should be appointed to the post of first secretary.”13 This was said deliberately to fan the conflict between Kunaev and Nazarbaev. According to Kazakhstan experts, a conflict was unfolding among the groups of N. Nazarbaev (the Senior zhuz), Secretary of the C.C. C.P.K. Z. Kamalidenov (the Junior zhuz), and First Secretary of the Alma-Ata Regional Committee of the C.P.K. S. Aukhadiev (the Middle zhuz).14 This means that the decision to elect Gennady Kolbin (first secretary of the Ulyanovsk Regional Party Commit- tee) as First Secretary of the C.C. C.P.K. passed in December 1986 was a compromise: Kolbin was a neutral figure who did not belong to any of the local elite groups. On 17-18 December, 1986, crowds of Kazakhs poured into the streets of Alma-Ata to protest against the Russian-appointed first secretary of their republic. This was the first of a series of rallies that demanded national resurrection; they were suppressed and human casualties could not be avoided. On 22 June, 1989, Nursultan Nazarbaev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kazakhstan, was elected First Secretary of the C.C. C.P.K.

9 See: “Kazakhskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika,” in: Bolshaya Sovetskaya entsiklopedia, Vol. 11, Moscow, 1973. 10 See: Naselenie SSSR: po dannym Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989, Moscow, 1990. 11 See: “Kazakhskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika.” 12 See: Narodnoe khozyastvo SSSR v 1990 g.: statistichesky ezhegodnik, Moscow, 1991, p. 38. 13 M.S. Gorbachev, Zhizn i reformy, Book 1, Moscow 1995, pp. 497-498. 14 See: N. Amrekulov, “Zhuzes and Kazakhstan’s Social and Political Development,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3, 2000.

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Speaking at the 28th Congress of the C.P.S.U. in July 1990, Nazarbaev, a convinced supporter of a Union state with wider rights of the republics, actively defended the Communist ideology and supported the Soviet Union and the C.P.S.U.: “The state of affairs in the ideological sphere cannot but cause concern. Lenin and Leninism are vilified; the ideological foundations of our party are shamelessly falsified… We want a new firm Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and a united C.P.S.U., this position is shared by the Communists and the majority of the working people of Kazakhstan.”15 It was at the same time that “informal independent alliances” appeared in the republic that, at first, pursued non-political aims—environmental protection, national resurrection, and the problems of the Kazakh language and literature—that promptly developed into the political foundation of the Kazakh opposition. In 1987-1988, a social-ecological association called Initsiativa (Initiative) appeared that served the basis for several “green” ecological groups (Zelenoe Spasenie and Zeleny Front). Later, the Social-Democratic Party, the Alma-Ata People’s Front, branches of the Demo- cratic Union, the Perestroika Club, Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, and others appeared. Many of them were driven by the Chernobyl disaster and its repercussions, as well as the nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk testing ground. The Union of Writers of the Kazakh S.S.R. and its first secretary Ol- zhas Suleymenov moved into the ranks of the political players. By the summer of 1990, there were over 100 independent and highly politicized groups in the republic; thirty of them operated in Alma- Ata, the republic’s capital. In 1990, Zheltoksan, Azat, and Alash, which had emerged as national movements, became political parties.16 After he came to power, Nazarbaev minimized the split inside the elites. In March 1990, the republic elected the Supreme Soviet, and the number of deputies was reduced from 510 to 360 in full accordance with the new election law. A total of 270 deputies were elected in majority constituencies, the rest (90 deputies) by the quotas of the republican public movements—the Communist Party and the trade unions had 17 seats each in the Supreme Soviet, the local Komsomol organization gained 10 seats, the Council of the Veterans of War and Labor 5 seats, etc. Labor collectives, public organizations, and meetings of neighbors and servicemen in their units acquired the right to nominate candidates who were confirmed by constituency meetings of voters.17 In this way, the ruling elite legalized the quota principle of electing one-fifth of the deputies and created a structure (constituency meetings) that weeded out undesirable candidates. In March 1990, 1,031 candidates in the constituencies ran for 250 seats; in 26 constituencies, there was no competition; in 78 constituencies, two candidates ran; in 165, three and more. Among the elected deputies, 94.4% were C.P.S.U. members, 66 of its members became full-time deputies.18 The legalized limitations reduced the number of opposition members in the new convocation of the Supreme Soviet to an absolute minimum. In the fall of 1990, the Democratic Kazakhstan deputy group that united 30 opposition members appeared. On 22 February, 1990, First Secretary of the C.C. C.P.K. Nazarbaev was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. On 12 April the draft Law on Insti- tuting the Post of President of the Kazakh S.S.R. and on Amendments and Addenda to the Constitu- tion (Fundamental Law) of the Kazakh S.S.R. was published.19 This was followed by several articles

15 XXVIII s’ezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 2-13 July, 1990: stenograficheskiy otchet, Vol. I. Moscow, 1991, p. 336. 16 See: E.K. Ertysbaev, Kazakhstan i Nazarbaev: logika peremen, Astana, 2001, p. 212. 17 See: The Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic on the Elections of People’s Deputies of the Kazakh S.S.R. adopted on 22 September, 1989, Alma-Ata, 1989. 18 See: “Vybory v Verkhovny Sovet Kazakhskoy S.S.R. XII sozyva 25 marta 1990 g.,” in: Informatsionny sbornik o vyborakh i respublikanskikh referendumakh, sostoyavshikhsya v Respublike Kazakhstan v period s 25 marta 1990 goda po 16 yanvarya 2012 goda, in 2 vols., Vol. I, Astana, 2012, pp. 197, 201. 19 See: Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 12 April, 1990, p. 2.

11 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS that explained why the republic needed a presidency.20 On 23 April, 1990, the plenary session of the C.C. C.P.K. passed a decision on amendments to the Constitution and on adopting the Law on Presi- dency.21 The decision was not unanimous. S. Sartaev, who spoke in favor of a presidency in the republic, stressed that “executive power will be strengthened within the framework of democratization of Soviet statehood in the conditions of an all-Union federation.”22 Very much like in other republics, nothing was said about the future president’s opposition to the decisions of the Union Center. It was far from easy to achieve an agreement on several points, including on the possibility of combining the posts of president and first secretary of the C.C. C.P.K. and on election methods. Some people insisted on general elections and on a referendum for instituting the presidency in the republic. On 24 April, 1990, the Law on Instituting the Post of President of the Kazakh S.S.R. and on Amendments and Addenda to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Kazakh S.S.R. was adopted.23 The same day, the Supreme Soviet elected Nazarbaev president of Kazakhstan. The Law amended the Constitution of the Kazakh S.S.R., which guaranteed freedom of political associations and lost the article on the leading role of the Communist Party. The institution of presidency was absolutely logical in this context: the president was the head of the republic, yet his functions did not include domestic and foreign policy, which belonged to the functions of the newly established Presidential Council of the Kazakh S.S.R., together with ensuring the republic’s security (Art 114.4). According to the newly adopted law, the president was elected by general voting for five years, with the exception of the first presidential term: the president was elected for six years by the Supreme Soviet. The President of the Kazakh S.S.R. had the right to nominate candidates to the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers and other top officials, as well as to appoint ministers, after discussing their candidatures with the prime minister, and submit their names for confirmation by the Su- preme Soviet; a presidential veto could be overcome by two-thirds of the votes of the delegates of the Supreme Soviet (Art 114.3). The legislative initiative of the president could be described as a nov- elty in the republic’s legal system (Art 101), as was the post of deputy president (Art 114.7); he was expected to perform certain functions on the instructions of the president and replace the president in his absence or inability to fulfill his functions. The deputy president was elected by the Supreme Soviet for a first term of six years. The index of the form of government was +2, that is, a presidentialized parliamentary-presidential republic. The Supreme Soviet elected the president on the same day; the candidates were nominated by public associations and groups of people’s deputies of no fewer than 90 people; the candidate with no less than 50% of the votes of the total number of people’s deputies was elected. Nazarbaev was the only candidate; he received the votes of 317 Supreme Soviet deputies out of 360 (88.1%); 18 deputies voted against. First Deputy of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Sergey Tereshchenko was elected deputy president.24 This post was probably intended for a Russian- speak- er to avoid accusations of ethnocracy.

20 See: V. Malinovsky, “Na puti k prezidenstvu,” Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 6 April, 1990, p. 2; S. Sartaev, “Prezidenstvo tselesoobrazno,” Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 13 April, 1990, p. 2; R. Alishanov, U. Aliev, “Mozhet li byt v Kazakhstane svoy prezident?” Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 18 April, 1990, p. 2; K. Kolpakov “Uchrezhdenie prezidenstva: ‘za’ i ‘protiv’,” Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 19 April, 1990, p. 3; U. Kudaybergenov, U. Udartsev, V. Shopin, “Sovershenstvovat narodovlastie v respublike,” Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 20 April, 1990, p. 2. 21 See: Pravda, 24 April, 1990, p. 2. 22 Pervaya sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta Kazakhskoy SSSR (dvenadtsaty sozyv), 24 April, 1990: stenografichesky otchet, Alma-Ata, 1990, p. 43. 23 [http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z900001000], 30 December, 2015. 24 See: “Vybory Prezidenta Kazakhskoy S.S.R.,” in: Informatsionny sbornik o vyborakh …, pp. 201-202.

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In 1991, Nursultan Nazarbaev had the following to say about the expediency of combining the post of first secretary of the C.C. C.P.K. and the president: “Until Soviet power, and democracy for that matter, have taken a firm stand, it is unwise to artificially expedite separation of powers between the Soviets and the Communist Party… If we had chosen this road there would have been dual power in many regions across the republic… Combining the two top posts allows us to make a more active contribution to restructuring of the Communist Party and its transformation into a political party in the true sense of the word.”25 Nazarbaev initiated a dialog between the Communist Party and the national movement; the decision of the C.C. Bureau of the C.P.K. of August 1990 formulated the aim of “developing a promising concept for a ‘democratic bloc’ of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan with certain independent movements.” By certain independent movements, the document meant the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, Party Clubs, the Social-Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, the workers’ movement of the republic’s industrial centers, and certain other movements.26 In September 1990, President Nazarbaev set up the Council of Civil Agreement, which united the greater part of the republic’s public movements. On 25 October, 1990, the Supreme Soviet passed the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Kazakh S.S.R. that said in part: “The Constitution and the laws of the Kazakh S.S.R. prevail in the territory of the Kazakh S.S.R.” and “the republic has the right to suspend in its territory all laws and other acts of the Union that violate the sovereign rights and the Constitution of the Republic.” Natu- ral and economic resources were transferred to the exclusive property of the Kazakh S.S.R.27 On 20 November, 1990, the republic acquired the Law on Perfecting the Structure of State Power and Governance in the Kazakh S.S.R. and on Amendments and Addenda to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Kazakh S.S.R., which expanded the powers of the President according to the earlier adopted Union law. According to this document, the President became head of the supreme executive and administrative power; the Council of Ministers was transformed into a Cabinet of Ministers; and the post of vice president was instituted to be elected by the Supreme Soviet as advised by the President.28 The Cabinet of Ministers was accountable to the President and the Supreme So- viet; the President acquired the right to remove the chairmen of the regional Soviets “if they failed to fulfill their obligations or disgraced themselves.” Under this law, the President was not the head of government; this function belonged to the prime minister. It should be said that Nursultan Nazarbaev was one of the most consistent supporters of a reformed Soviet Union and an active participant in the Novo-Ogarevo process. Mikhail Gorbachev saw him as potential vice president or chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. Late in July 1991, he agreed to take the post of prime minister of the U.S.S.R. once the new Union Treaty had been signed.29 He considered the events of 19-21 August, 1991 in Moscow to be a serious blow to the new Union project—the victory of the GKChP would have buried his career in the Union power structures. Members of the Politburo of the C.C. C.P.K. suggested that Nazarbaev wait rather than hasten to be judgmental.30 On 19 and 20 August, Nazarbaev spoke about the need to keep calm and

25 N.A. Nazarbaev, Bez pravykh i levykh: stranitsy avtobiografii, razmyshleniya, pozitsiya…: otvety na voprosy izdatelstva, Moscow, 1991, p. 102. 26 Archives of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, rec. gr. 708, inv. 319, f. 2329, sheet 92. 27 See: Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Kazakh S.S.R. adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh S.S.R. on 25 October, 1990, available at [http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/B900001700]. 28 See: Law of the Kazakh S.S.R. on Perfecting the Structure of State Power and Governance in the Kazakh S.S.R. and on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Kazakh S.S.R. of 20 November, 1990 No. 334- XII, Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Kazakhskoy S.S.R., No. 47, 1990, Art 431. 29 See, for example: M.S. Gorbachev, op. cit.; B.N. Yeltsin, Zapiski prezidenta, Moscow. 1995; S.S. Shushkevich, Moya zhizn, krushenie i voskreshenie SSSR, Moscow, 2012 and many other sources. 30 See: E.K. Ertysbaev, op. cit., p. 174.

13 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS demonstrate self-control; he confirmed his loyalty to the Constitution, rejected the documents issued by the GKChP as illegal, and said that the Union Treaty should be signed.31 At the same time, many regions set up workgroups to fulfill the documents of the GKChP of the U.S.S.R. Immediately after the coup failed, Nazarbaev said that “the disappearance of the Communist Party from the political arena was the logical end of its strongarm rule… Just as the system had made a bungling effort to run the show for over seven decades, so it bungled its effort to carry out a coup, thus issuing itself a death sentence.”32 On 22 August, the President published decrees that excluded organized structures of political parties from the state organs and banned the combination of state and party posts.33 On 28 August, 1991, Nazarbaev resigned from the post of First Secretary C.C. C.P.K. and withdrew from the Politburo of the C.C. C.P.S.U. “I think that the C.C. of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan should make the only correct decision—to announce the end of its activity. An organizing committee must be created to hold an extraordinary congress or a conference to discuss the future of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.”34 He never abandoned his efforts to preserve the “repaired” Soviet Union. When its death had become obvious, he persisted in his efforts and even organized a meeting of heads of Union republics in Alma-Ata to set up a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in which all the former Soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltic republics and Georgia, participated. On 7 September, 1991, the Communist Party of the Kazakh S.S.R. met for an extraordinary meeting to discuss its future. Nazarbaev suggested a new name—the Democratic Party of People’s Unity; however, the majority, which by that time had become very critical of the president, rejected this name35 and chose to call it the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan. Nazarbaev failed to transform the Communist Party into a new ideological structure, of which he could have become the leader. He went as far as saying that “the president should be free from all political biases, even though any movement is free to support him”36—probably an echo of the failure at the congress to transform the Communist Party into a presidential party and a dominant structure in the new political conditions. On 16 October, 1991, the Law on Election of the President of the Kazakh S.S.R. was adopted, under which the president was elected by general vote for five years. The first election according to the new law was scheduled for 1 December, 1991. On 16 October, 1991, the Supreme Soviet nominated Nursultan Nazarbaev as presidential candidate. Olzhas Suleymenov, whom some of the deputies wanted to see as president, refused to accept the nomination. Khasen Kozhakhmet could not gather the 100 thousand signatures needed for nomination. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Erik Asanbaev was appointed vice president. This means that at the first presidential election Nazarbaev had no rivals; he received 98.78% of the votes; 1.22% voted against.37 On 10 December, 1991, Nursultan Nazarbaev took office; the same day, the Kazakh S.S.R. became the Republic of Kazakhstan.

31 See: Ibidem. 32 Ekspress-K, 31 August, 1991. 33 See: Decree of the President of the Kazakh S.S.R. on the Discontinuation of Activities of the Organizational Structures of Political Parties, Other Public Associations and Mass Public Movements in the Structures of Public Prosecution, State Security, Internal Affairs, Justice, State Arbitration, Courts of Justice and Customs of the Kazakh S.S.R. of 22 August, 1991 No. 405, available at [http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U910000405], 30 December, 2015; Decree of the President of the Kazakh S.S.R. on the Inadmissibility of Combining Top-Level Posts in the Organs of State Power and Administration with Posts in Political Parties and Other Public and Political Structures of 28 August, 1991 No. 408, available at [http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/ docs/U910000408], 30 December, 2015. 34 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 29 August, 1991. 35 Stenografichesky otchet ocherednogo S’ezda Kompartii Kazakhstana 7 sentyabrya 1991g., Archives of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, rec. gr. 708, inv. 139, f. 3034, pp. 154-160. 36 Ekspress-K, 31 August, 1991. 37 “Vybory Prezidenta Kazakhskoy S.S.R.,” in: Informatsionny sbornik o vyborakh…, p. 205.

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The Law on State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan was passed on 16 December. Kazakhstan was the last of the Union republics to proclaim its independence from the Soviet Union; by that time, it had de facto ceased to exist, since the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements had already been ratified. Until the last day of the Soviet Union, Nazarbaev remained a consistent supporter of a united state and tried to find new forms of its further existence.

Tajikistan: From the Presidency to a Civil War

In the late Soviet period, the political process in Tajikistan unfolded under the pressure of highly possible ethnoregional splits and the Islamic movement that was rapidly gaining momentum. Tajikistan had no pre-Soviet experience of independence: at different times it belonged to different big states. In 1924, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was set up as part of the Uzbek S.S.R.; later, in 1929, it became the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. This was done to acceler- ate the formation of the Tajik ethnicity that spoke one of the Persian languages. The cities—ancient centers of culture and science—with a predominantly Tajik population (Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khujand) remained in Uzbekistan. Later Khujand was transferred to the Tajik S.S.R. At all times, the Tajiks saw themselves as belonging to different regional ethnicities rather than to the common Tajik ethnicity: there were the Kulob, Leninabad, Kurganteppa, and other identities. The populations of many areas (Gorno-Badakhshan in particular) never saw themselves as Tajiks. The peoples of the Pamir speak Iranian languages that form a separate group in the Indo-European family.38 There was a distinct and mounting irritation over the fact that the political elite consisted of members of the Leninabad clan: First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Tajikistan Ra- khmon Nabiev and Kakhar Makhkamov, who replaced him in 1985, both belonged to the Leninabad clan. Tajikistan was one of the poorest Soviet republics, which depended, to a great extent, on the Union Center. In the 1960s-1970s, the South Tajik Territorial Industrial Complex was set up in Ta- jikistan. Leninabad, Kulob, and Kurganteppa spread far and wide, new cities appeared, while two migration flows increased: people from other republics moved to Tajikistan, while villagers moved to the cities (this flow reaching its peak by the late 1970s).39 The specifics of the republic’s economic development caused serious disproportions in population density, economic development, and urbanization level in the Leninabad, Kulob, and Gharm regions and Gorno-Badakhshan. In the latter half of the 1970s, Tajikistan displayed a trend not evident anywhere in the Soviet Union, viz., the shrinking share of the urban population. The Tajiks are the only Central Asian peoples who speak in a Persian language, yet, unlike Iranians, they are mainly Sunnis. Gorno-Badakhshan is home to numerically small Pamir peoples, each with its own language; they are Shi‘a Ismailites. The important role of Islam in the republic during Soviet times made it one of the factors of political mobilization. The Union Center did a great deal to regulate interregional and interethnic relations inside the country; it had military means at its disposal to be used to restore stability, and it was the donor of the economically poorly developed republic.40

38 See: Grazhdanskie dvizheniya v Tadzhikistane, ed. by N.G. Chicherina, Moscow, 1990, p. 14. 39 See: Ibid., p. 15. 40 For more details, see: I.D. Zvyagelskaya, Stanovlenie gosudarstv Tsentralnoy Azii: politicheskie protsessy, Moscow, 2009, p. 157.

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In 1989-1991, the opposition movements and political clubs figured prominently on the republic’s political arena: Rastokhez, Ru ba Ru, Dirafshi Kovien, the Popular Front of the Supporters of Perestroi- ka Vakhdat, Oshkoro, Bakhtar, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, etc. Many of them were officially supported by the C.C. of the Komsomol of Tajikistan; some of them (the Ru ba Ru political club) were set up on the initiative of the local Komsomol. They were built on the clan-regional principle and never embraced the entire country. In fact, there was no republic-wide movement; this and clan and regional splits inside the party elite were among the key factors of everything that happened later. The first underground Islamist cells were set up in the republic’s south in the mid-1970s; by the end of the perestroika, they surfaced as a branch of the All-Union Islamic Revival Party with its center in Moscow.41 At the first stage, the leading role belonged to the People’s Movement Rastokhez. It had expected to win the 1990 coming elections to the Supreme Soviet by a vast majority. These hopes were buried by the mass riots in Dushanbe in February 1990 caused by the rumors that Armenian refugees from Baku would be permanently housed in the republic. The rioters demanded resignation of First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Tajikistan Kakhar Makhkamov. According to official information, 11 people were killed and 194 were wounded in the fracas.42 The Rastokhez leaders were accused of stirring up the riots; a state of emergency and curfew were introduced in the republic’s capital. The election campaign was ruined with disappointing results: Rastokhez did not get enough votes to be widely represented in the parliament. The election was held on 25 February, 1990; in April 1990, the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the Tajik S.S.R. 12th convocation was opened with fierce debates about the candidates for chairman. The delegated finally agreed on two candidates—First Secretary of the C.C. C.P.T. Kakhar Makhkamov and former Chairman of the Presidium of the Republican Supreme Soviet Gaibnazar Pallaev from the Pamir. On 12 April, 1990, Makhkamov won by 102 votes (162 against 60), or 71.5% of the votes; Kadreddin Aslonov from Gharm was elected his deputy.43 In August 1990, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan was formed and immediately attracted many of the most active Rastokhez members; on 27 September, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan held its constituent conference. In August 1990, the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Tajik S.S.R. was adopted,44 which proclaimed supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the Tajik S.S.R. in its territory, while “the power of the acts of the U.S.S.R that contradicted the sovereign rights of the Tajik S.S.R.” could be suspended by the Supreme Soviet. The Declaration confirmed Tajikistan’s exclusive right to owner- ship, use, and disposal of land, its subsurface, and other natural resources, which were proclaimed to be the exclusive property of the Tajik S.S.R. On 29 November, 1990, the Supreme Soviet set up the post of the President of the Tajik S.S.R. to legitimize Kakhar Makhkamov as the head of state. The law established that the President of the Tajik S.S.R. was head of the Tajik S.S.R.; any citizen of the republic from among the Tajiks could be elected president; the first president was elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik S.S.R.; and the right to nominate candidates belonged to the people’s deputies.45 The post of vice president was es-

41 See: P. Mullojanov, “Party Building in Tajikistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (32), 2005. 42 See: “Obstanovka ostaetsya slozhnoy”, Pravda, 14 February, 1990, p. 6; “Napryazhennost sokhranyaetsya”, Pravda, 15 February, 1990, p. 2. 43 See: Sessiyai yakumi Soveti Oli RCC Tojikiston Da’vati Duvozdakhum, 12-14 aprelya soli 1990; khisoboti stenoggrafy, Dushanbe, pp. 24-25 (in Tajik). 44 See: Declaration of Sovereignty of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic adopted on 24 August, 1990 by the second session of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik S.S.R. 12th convocation, Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 29 August, 1990, p. 1. 45 See: Law of the Tajik S.S.R. on Instituting the Post of the President of the Tajik S.S.R. and the Order of Election of 29 November, 1990, Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 1 December, 1990, p. 1.

16 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 tablished by the same law. On 1 December, the Supreme Soviet passed a law on Constitutional amendments.46 According to the amended Constitution, the President was the head of the republic and of the Cabinet of Ministers; that is, he concentrated the executive and administrative power in his hands. The vice president was expected “to head the Cabinet of Ministers and organize its functioning” on instructions from the president. The Supreme Soviet retained its right to approve the vice president suggested by the President and members of the Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the President. The President acquired the right of veto, which the Supreme Soviet could overrun by two- thirds of the votes. The amended Constitution did not contain the clause on a vote of no-confidence against the government, while the President had no right to disband the parliament. He could be removed from his post if he violated his oath or the Constitution by popular vote initiated by the Su- preme Soviet through a vote of no-confidence against the President adopted by two-thirds of the votes. The index of the form of government was +5 (presidentialized presidential-parliamentary republic). Tajikistan was the last of the republics to amend its Constitution (the other republics followed the example of the Union Center; they consolidated the powers of their presidents and established the post of vice president). From the very beginning, the President of the Tajik S.S.R. was an institution- ally strong figure. At the first election, there were several candidates: Makhkamov’s strongest rival was not a candidate nominated by the national-democratic opposition, but former First Secretary of the C.C. C.P.T. (1982-1985) Nabiev. On 30 November, 1990, at the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet 12th convocation, Makhkamov was elected president of the Tajik S.S.R. by 131 votes (57%) of the total number of deputies (90 voted against). Nabiev received 89 votes (132 voted against).47 On 5 Decem- ber, Chairman of the Council of Ministers I. Khayeev from Kulob became vice president; K. Aslonov was moved to the post of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Almost immediately after that, on 14 December, the Supreme Soviet passed a decision designed to curtail the activities of banned parties and public organizations, the Islamic Revival Party of Ta- jikistan in particular, and “similar organizations.”48 Kakhar Makhkamov was convinced that a new Union Treaty should be signed to save the So- viet Union. On the eve of the referendum of 17 March, 1991, he said in his public address to the nation: “We should be fully aware that we have reached the point beyond which lies disintegration of the great Soviet state and economic collapse with unpredictable catastrophic repercussions for the absolute majority of the country’s population.”49 The absolute majority (96.2%) supported the idea of a reformed Union. President Makhkamov preferred the wait-and-see policy in relation to the GKChP. On 21 Au- gust, 1991, in his address to the people of Tajikistan, he said: “We should pool our forces to become more organized and maintain order… We should remain calm and resolutely intercept everything that might provoke violations of law and order.”50 The Rastokhez movement tried to capitalize on the defeat of the GKChP to acquire wider support by demanding resignation of the leaders of the Com- munist Party and the republic.

46 See: Law of the Tajik S.S.R. on Improving the Structure of Executive and Administrative Power in the Tajik S.S.R. and Amendments and Addenda to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Tajik S.S.R. of 1 December, 1990, Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 8 December, 1990, pp. 1, 3. 47 See: Informatsionnoe soobshchenie, Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 1 December 1990, p. 1. 48 Decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik S.S.R. on Cutting Short the Activities of Parties and Public-Political Movements, Banned by the Laws of the Tajik S.S.R. of 14 December 1990, Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 19 December, 1990, p. 1. 49 Statement by President of the Tajik S.S.R. K.M. Makhkamov, Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 21 February, 1991, p. 1. 50 Address of the President of the Tajik S.S.R. to the People of Tajikistan, Kommunist Tajikistana, 22 August, 1991, p. 1.

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On 29 August, 1991, the Supreme Soviet met for an extraordinary session, while the opposition forces organized a rally on Lenin Square. Kh. Khamidov, one of the Rastokhez leaders, read an address to the Supreme Soviet; the crowd demanded resignation of the republican leaders and annul- ment of all laws and decisions that infringed on human rights, declaration of Tajikistan’s independence, and U.N. membership. The President tried to address the rally, but without much success.51 On 31 August, 1991, at a sitting of the Supreme Soviet, 124 deputies passed a vote of no-confidence against the President; as Acting President, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Kadreddin Aslonov issued a decree that banned the Communist Party of the Tajik S.S.R. and nationalized its property.52 On 9 September, 1991, at an extraordinary session, the deputies passed a Decision on State Independence of the Republic of Tajikistan; on 21 September, 1991, the Communist Party convened its 22nd extraordinary congress, at which it declared itself a parliamentary party under a new name— The Socialist Party. Under pressure from the Rastokhez rally and supporters of the Democratic Party and the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, Aslonov issued a decree that disbanded the Communist Party of Tajikistan and nationalized its property and the property of its legal successors.53 On 23 September, the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet responded by introducing a state of emergency and demanded Aslonov’s resignation. It denounced the decrees that banned the Communist Party and elected Rakhmon Nabiev, former head of the republic, as new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and Acting President.54 General elections of the president and vice president were scheduled to 24 November. The opposition demanded that Nabiev resign from his post of chairman of the parliament on the eve of the elections; he asked to be relieved of this post on 6 October to give all candidates an equal chance.55 A. Iskandarov from Pamir was appointed Chairman of the Parliament and Acting President. This meant that Nabiev could rely on the still vast resource of the former Communist Party, which the opposition did not and could not treat lightly. In post-Soviet conditions, his resignation looked unprecedented. On 24 November, 1991, for the first time in its history, Tajikistan elected its president at a general election. D. Khudonazarov from Pamir, People’s Deputy of the U.S.S.R., film director and Chair- man of the Union of Filmmakers of the U.S.S.R, was Nabiev’s main rival. Typically enough, the rivalry between the national-democratic opposition and the former Communist Party functionary acquired the form of a regional-clan rivalry between the Pamir and Leninabad clans. Khodonazarov had the larger part of the creative intelligentsia behind him, as well as the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Rastokhez Popular Movement, students, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, and the Muslim clergy. Nabiev won with 56.92% of the votes; Khudonazarov, who came second with 30.05%, made public statements about falsifications and demanded that the results be annulled.56 Later, “in view of the republic’s economic problems and acute political tension,” he decided to retreat and “withdrew his demand for a repeat election.”57 Nabiev was supported by his fellow countrymen in the Leninabad region, where 34% of the voters lived, as well as the national minorities.58 On 2 December, 1991, he was sworn into the office as president; however, the balance between the elites proved to be shaky. In the fall of 1992, Nabiev resigned amid the unfolding civil war. Since

51 See: D. Nazriev, I. Sattarov, Respublika Tadzhikistan: istoria nezavisimosti. God 1991-y, Dushanbe, 2002, p. 56. 52 See: Kommunist Tajikistana, 1 September, 1991, p. 1. 53 See: M. Daler, “Vsled za mitingom”, Pravda, 23 September, 1991, p. 2. 54 See: “Po strane”, Pravda, 24 September, 1991, p. 1. 55 See: “Puls dnya”, Pravda, 8 October, 1991, p. 1. 56 See: “Nabiev-Khudonazarov. 57:31: itogi vyborov Prezidenta Tadzhikistana”, Izvestia, 26 November, 1991, p. 1. 57 Izvestia, 28 November, 1991, p. 2. 58 See: E. Evtushik, “Byvshiy pervyy kommunist Tadzhikistana stal prezidentom,” Kommersant-vlast, No. 46, 1991.

18 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 no new presidential election was possible, the clause about presidency was excluded from the Con- stitution.

Conclusion

In the post-Soviet period, the republican elites imitated the Union elite: they consolidated their legitimacy through the post of president, which amalgamated top party and state power. In Kazakh- stan and Tajikistan, the party leaders managed to remain at the helm as presidents, however the repercussions proved to be very different. In Kazakhstan, the splits inside the elite, caused by the national and ethnoregional splits between the Kazakhs and the non-Kazakh population in particular, were the most important factors of the political process unfolding in the republic. The non-Kazakhs constituted nearly half of the republic’s population; therefore, the Kazakh nationalists oriented toward monoethnic statehood could hardly hope to come to power. In post-Soviet Tajikistan, the constellation of ethnoregional, social, and political splits in society and the political elite, as well as the great role of the Islamic organizations capable of rallying the masses, were the most important political factors determining the political process. The split inside the Tajik nation (which had not yet taken shape) along region-clan lines—Leninabad, Kulob, and Pamir—played an important role. Tajikistan was much poorer than Kazakhstan and had a much lower urbanization level. On the one hand, because of the splits, the elections during perestroika were alternative and the rivalry was active. On the other hand, the rivalry reflected not so much a political, but a regional-clan struggle and an increase in traditionalist orientations. The national-democratic opposition had no choice but to join forces with the Islamic movement, which spoke about protection and revival of traditional pre-modernist values. The events of 1986 in Kazakhstan and 1990 in Tajikistan strongly affected the political process. In the former case, they encouraged national self-awareness and the election in 1989 of ethnic Kazakh Nazarbaev as First Secretary of the C.C. C.P.K.; in the latter, they undermined the power of the Com- munist Party of Tajikistan and made a state of emergency inevitable. The national movement in Kazakhstan was based on support of the Kazakh language and culture, as well as environmental movements; in Tajikistan these trends were combined with problems generated by the unfair distribution of resources and unequal access to power for representatives of different regions. The democratic movement itself was not national: it was based on the republic’s ethnoregional division. The elections to the Supreme Soviets of the last Soviet convocation in both republics were su- pervised by the communist parties. In Kazakhstan, one-fifth of the parliament represented public organizations; in Tajikistan, the elections were carried out amid a state of emergency, which limited oppositional activities. The composition of the newly elected Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan was different from its predecessor, mainly in terms of the regional affiliation of the deputies rather than their political convictions. In February 1990, the opposition was discredited to the extent that the newly elected Supreme Soviet was totally controlled by the Communist Party elites, while its leader, Kakhar Makhkamov, was elected chairman. The absence of a more or less considerable split inside the elites in Kazakhstan, as well as in the other Central Asian republics with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, simplified the process of legitimizing First Secretary of the C.C. C.P.K. as President of the Kazakh S.S.R. However, he was not endowed with the status of “supreme official” (as in some other republics), but as head of the republic, albeit without the right to have a strong influence on the state’s foreign and domestic policy. Acting amid mounting political rivalry and emerging national movements, Nursultan Nazarbaev succeeded in 19 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS become the leader of the struggle for the republic’s sovereignty, which he understood as economic independence, revival of the Kazakh language and culture, and preservation of the Union Center as a source of money and guaranteed security. He set up and institutionalized a platform on which the ruling elites could speak to the national-cultural, environmental, and labor movements and guaranteed the rights of the Russian-speaking population, a challenging task in the context of the unfolding nationalist movements. This explains the support of the absolute majority of the republic’s population at the 1990-1991 elections. The opposition, which had no comparable figures and no ideas that could have united all people, withdrew from the race. Many of its ideas, however, were realized by the incumbent. The First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Tajikistan, on the other hand, who followed the legitimization pattern tested in the republics, failed to correctly assess the specifics of his republic, hence his very short presidency. The emergence of the national-democratic and, later, Islamic movement exacerbated the ethnoregional discord. In late August 1991, Kakhar Makhkamov responded to the demands of the opposition to condemn the GKChP and proclaim independence with his de facto support of the at- tempted coup d’état, thus making his resignation inevitable. It turned out that a presidency with a wide set of powers created great risks in the split state in which Tajik society found itself. Tajikistan could not accept the high stakes in the presidential struggle with a “winner takes all” outcome. The institution of presidency was restored in 1994 along with restored stability and continues to survive as long as the political regime is non-competitive. Acting in Kazakhstan’s multiparty context, Nazarbaev failed to transform the Communist Par- ty into a dominant administrative party; the majority of its members were in opposition to the president. In Tajikistan, the Communist Party was transformed into the Socialist Party; by that time, First Secretary Makhkamov had already left his post as President of the Tajik S.S.R. and could not guarantee the party a prominent place in the political system. Kazakhstan acquired a non-competitive presidentialized model of the institution of presidency with an IPC of 0.05 and IFG of +2; Tajikistan acquired a competitive presidentialized model with an IPC of 0.8 and IFG of +5. The Tajik model of presidency presupposed much wider (compared with Kazakhstan) presidential powers, on the one hand, while on the other, it was established in a much more competitive environment. It turned out that the Kazakh model demonstrated sustain- ability from the very beginning: the Supreme Soviet was involved in appointing the ministers, while the president enjoyed fairly wide powers after a non-competitive election. This consolidated the president’s position and later extended his powers by weakening the parliament. In Tajikistan, the competitive presidentialized model, in which the president had wide powers, defeated three presidents in a row (Makhkamov, Aslonov, and Nabiev) and sent the institution of presidency and the republic’s political system into a crisis and a civil war. So the institution of presidency in Tajikistan did not become a way to solve problems and consolidate the president’s power (as it did in Kazakh- stan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), or a way the national movement fought an alternative power center represented by the C.C. Communist Party (as in Kyrgyzstan), but a factor enfeebling the political system due to claims to power by the representatives of various political forces and regional clans. The struggle for the post of president of Tajikistan inevitably turned into a struggle among ethnoregional communities. In Tajikistan, the split in the political elite and the national movement structured on the regional-clan principle created numerous conflicts and developed into a civil war. The institution of presidency, expected to settle conflicts, was abolished. It comes as no surprise that the institution of the President of Tajikistan was restored on different principles of the presidentialized non-competitive model, which presupposed that the president’s powers would be gradually widened. In December 2015, the process came to its logical end: the President acquired the title of Pillar of Peace and Na-

20 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 tional Unity—Leader of the Nation.59 The same law removed the restriction on the number of con- secutive terms in power for Emomali Rakhmon. Earlier, Kazakhstan, likewise, adopted the Law on the First President (in the 2010 version) that conferred the title of Leader of the Nation (Elbasy) on President Nazarbaev and removed the limit on the number of his presidential terms.60 In this way, the Kazakhstan and Tajik models of presidency, very different at the first stage, moved closer to become practically identical.

59 See: The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on the Pillar of Peace and National Unity—Leader of the Nation, 25 December, 2015 No. 1259, The Ozogadon Information Agency, available at [http://catoday.org/centrasia/24504-tekst-zakona- tadzhikistana-o-lidere-nacii.html] 1 February, 2016. 60 The Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan—Leader of the Nation of 20 July, 2000 No. 83-II (in the version of the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 14 June, 2010 No. 289-IV), Yurist: compleks pravovoy informatsii Respubliki Kazakhstan, available at[http://online.zakon.kz/ Document/?doc_id=1019103], 1 February, 2016.

POLITICAL PROCESSES IN CENTRAL ASIA: PECULIARITIES, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS

Sergey ZHILTSOV D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor at the Department of Political Science, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (Moscow, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

he political processes in the Central sector in the economy. The republics be- Asian countries have similar features came acquainted with contemporary man- T determined by the history of their de- agement techniques and state-building took velopment and the social relations that have immense strides. At the same time, a par- emerged. Their history as part of the Soviet ticular management technique formed, in Union has had a great impact on the political which the traditional (regional-clan) princi- development of the Central Asian republics. ples characteristic of the Central Asian re- Their formation as Union republics did not publics existed alongside the generally ac- come to fruition until the 1920s-1930s. cepted party-state approaches. While pay- Being part of the Soviet Union made it ing lip service to the communist ideology, possible for the Central Asian republics to the leaders of the Central Asian republics form state structures and achieve an eco- carried out their policy keeping the inter-clan nomic breakthrough by creating an industrial balance of power in mind.

21 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, phasize the geopolitical and geographic- five new independent states emerged in political unity of the regional countries, Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ta- showed the increase in the region’s role in jikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. international relations in the post-Soviet ex- Their state-building and the establishment of panse. However, not one of the regional in- their political systems emerged amid dra- tegration projects was ever implemented. matic changes in the geopolitical situation, The Central Asian countries were equal- increasing economic problems, and aggra- ly unprepared to form political systems in vation of the political struggle among the compliance with Western standards. During elites of the Central Asian republics. Soviet times, state administration in Central Regional division, which has a long his- Asia combined party-state approaches with tory, had a great effect on the political pro- regional-clan pursuits. After the collapse of cesses in the Central Asian countries—divi- the Soviet Union, the Central Asian coun- sion into zhuzes in Kazakhstan, into north and tries strove to meet the demands of demo- south in Kyrgyzstan, and into regional clans in cratic states by holding parliamentary and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. presidential elections, introducing pluralism, The political processes in the Central and complying with the principles of separation of powers. In practice, the political elites Asian countries were subjugated to the geo- of the region’s countries were oriented to- political competition that became wide- ward traditional administration methods, spread in the region after the disintegration whereby compromise was attained among of the Soviet Union. Spurred on by their geo- the unofficial influence groups. political and economic interests, Russia, the In recent years, the political processes in U.S., the EU, and China began paying the Central Asian countries have been contra- greater attention to the region. These inter- dictory. Power institutions are being formed, a ests were mainly realized by boosting politi- party system developed, and the role and cal and diplomatic cooperation and render- place of the opposition parties defined in a ing financial assistance. China used eco- situation where tribal and regional-clan inter- nomic levers to achieve a gradual increase ests predominate. The existence of strong in its presence in Central Asia. traditional self-administration structures in the After the collapse of the Soviet Union, local communities in the form of regional, trib- the Central Asian countries took steps to es- al, kinship, clan, and other traditional commu- tablish political and economic relations, nal relations impacts on the conditions in keeping the new conditions in mind. Intro- which domestic and foreign policy is formed.1 duction of the term “Tsentral’naia Azia” (“Central Asia”) in 1993 (in Soviet times, the 1 See: A.D. Bogaturov, A.S. Dundich, V.G. Korgun, region was called "Sredniaia Azia" [Middle et al., Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentralnoi Azii: Asia] in Russian), which was meant to em- sobytiia i dokumenty, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2011, p. 19.

KEYWORDS: Central Asia, political processes, parliament, president.

Introduction

The political processes in the Central Asian countries began picking up momentum before the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the end of the 1980s, national movements in favor of carrying out political and economic reforms and raising independence within the framework of the Soviet Union

22 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 emerged in the Central Asian republics. The rapidly changing situation, in turn, forced the leaders of the republics to adapt and maneuver in order to retain their power. The weaker influence of the Union authorities and their striving to retain power led to the formation of a tactical alliance between the party-bureaucratic system and the representatives of nationalist movements. The authorities viewed radical forces as a way to exert pressure on Moscow and establish control over republic property. At the same time, inter-clan opposition in the Central Asian republics, prompted by the struggle for power, lurked behind the slogans calling for democratization and the need to carry out economic and political reforms. The failure of the Union authorities to have a viable impact on the situation in the republics raised the question of redistributing powers within the power system that existed in the Soviet Union. They introduced the office of president in order to procure an advantage in their relations with the Union center and augment their own power in the Central Asian republics. In several republics, presidential elections were held by the Supreme Soviets while the Soviet Union still existed. This is the path Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan took. These decisions expressed the unofficial agreements among the main political forces. Other republics, Turkmenistan for instance, held direct national presidential elections as early as Soviet times. However, in both cases, the presidents often stopped at nothing in their struggle against the opposition from the very start. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan upheld a hard line, whereby the opposition parties were essentially removed from the political arena. The Central Asian elites relied primarily on traditions and historically developed power techniques, reviving informal agreements in full. This was promoted by the regional-clan division in the former republics, which the Soviet system failed to eradicate. However, in Soviet times, inter-clan contradictions were kept under wraps, since the policy of the central authorities was aimed at maintaining a balance of power among the competing clans, while all attempts at independence were strictly repressed.

Establishment of Political Systems

The domestic political situation drastically changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the republican elites found themselves at the head of independent states. From the very first days of independence in Central Asia, the power struggle gained new momentum, accelerating the redistribution of powers between the parliament and president. The supreme soviets, elected back in Soviet times, began yielding to the institution of president in the new political conditions. This positioned the president as the key figure who determined the vectors of foreign policy and had a decisive influence on the domestic political processes. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the president strove to preserve political pluralism and did not have any direct influence on the legislative branch. In Turk- menistan and Uzbekistan, the activity of the parliament was limited from the very first months of independence. So in Uzbekistan in 1992, the Supreme Council made amendments to the law on the status of deputy, according to which a parliamentary deputy could be deprived of his mandate for anti-constitutional actions and destabilization of the sociopolitical situation. Presidential rule was enforced in the Constitution of Turkmenistan. The president was not only the head of state, but also headed the executive power branch. Concentration of power in the hands of the president in the Central Asian countries had an effect on later relations between the authorities and the opposition. The “legal” opposition did not have any noticeable impact on the political processes. Introduction of democratic standards did not change the way the political elites implemented domestic policy, since democratic institutions and procedures were combined with methods that largely expressed the mentality and development of the Central Asian countries. In the end, the political struggle shifted from the public sphere to non-public agree-

23 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ments. Resignation of the government and early elections to parliament were subordinated to solving tasks aimed at strengthening the position of the president. Referendum was one of the ways used to solve domestic political tasks aimed at consolidating the elite and forming a strictly centralized state. For instance, during the referendum held in August 1995 in Kazakhstan, the question of creating a parliamentary republic was removed from the agenda.2 The position of head of state in the Central Asian countries was strengthened by holding presidential elections. The high level of support by the population was explained by the special features of historical development. Consolidation of power in the hands of the president and the tendency toward severe restriction of the opposition changed the attitude toward representatives of the nationalist movements, which, under the momentum of the 1980s, demanded political and economic reforms. These strivings contradicted the interests of the elites in power. In the end, during the transition of the Central Asian countries to the clan-hierarchical principle of political system-formation, the upper echelons of power had no use for the national movements. The leaders of many public organizations were forced either to withdraw from the political struggle and leave politics, or adapt to the new rules set by the presidents. As a result, the clan principle of power retained in the Soviet period gained momentum, thus determining the approaches to the formation of the political system for the following decades. This mechanism of executing power manifested the special features of development of the Central Asian countries and was based on a long history. In turn, the introduction of Western democratic standards—the post of president, holding elections, development of the party system—did not correspond to the traditional Asian societies.3 A distinguishing feature of the return to the clan structure of society was the close intertwining of the political and economic elites. A competitive struggle took place within the regional elites, for which political power meant gaining control over the economy. The historical-cultural heritage of the regional countries became a key factor influencing the establishment of the political systems. The ideological vacuum that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union was filled by turning to history and historical heroes, the mythologization of whom was evident in all of the post-Soviet countries.4 After rejecting communist ideology, the authorities of the regional countries turned to national state-building. The new political elites had to substantiate this move by making their actions legiti- mate. Correspondingly, history was used to make people think the statehood of their country was older than it was and to raise national grandeur.5

Redistribution of Power

Redistribution of powers in favor of the president became a characteristic feature of the regional development, expressing the specifics of the political systems. The constitutions adopted by the regional countries in the first half of 1990s endowed the presidents with wide powers. The parliament essentially occupied a subordinate position to the president, while the president became a key figure.

2 See: M. Karsakov, “Osobennosti transformatsii politicheskoi sistemy Kazakhstana v kontse 80-x-seredine 90-x godov,” Tsentralnaia Aziia, No. 14, 1998. 3 See: E. Luzanova, “Mezhdunarodny seminar ‘Politicheskoe razvitie Tsentralnoi Azii i Tsentralnoi Evropy: skhodstvo, razlichiia, puti sotrudnichestva’,” Tsentralnaia Aziia, No. 10, 1997. 4 See: M.A. Neimark, “Kultura kak resurs natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossii,” in: Sovremennyy mir i geopolitika, Kanon+, Moscow, 2015, pp. 158-175. 5 See: R. Agaev, “TsAR: problemy evoliutsii politicheskikh system,” in: Tsentralnaia Aziia: geopolitika i ekonomika regiona, Krasnaya zvezda, Moscow, 2010, p. 15.

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The president’s powers were extended to ensure the possibility of implementing a unified state policy and decreasing political rivalry among the branches of power. Victory over the parliament made it possible for the Central Asian countries to adopt new constitutions that endowed the presidents with maximum powers and severely restrict the powers of the other branches.6 The presidents of the Central Asian countries took steps toward reducing the influence of the opposition forces, regarding their activity as a threat to their power. The differences that existed in some countries did not affect government-opposition relations. Whereas in Kazakhstan, the opposition and government coexisted peacefully until the mid-1990s, in Uzbekistan, decisive measures were taken to reduce the opposition’s influence. This situation led to an increase in authoritative trends in the Central Asian countries. Given the economic difficulties the regional countries encountered, consolidation of power in one set of hands made it possible to resolve problems more effectively and maintain political stability. The system of checks and balances widely represented in Western states did not become popular in the Central Asian states where authoritative regimes formed. At the same time, the Central Asian countries strove to demonstrate their adherence to democratic standards by holding parliamentary and presidential elections and developing a party system that was largely conditional. This was related both to the inadequacy of the population that supported the authorities and to the elites’ lack of need to structure the political space. Archaism of the political system moved tribal and regional- clan groups to the forefront, the interests of which were maintained through agreements and the inner- clan struggle. Political parties were created to demonstrate the country’s adherence to democratic and political reforms. However, any real achievements in reaching agreements and resolving issues occurred in the non-public sphere. Furthermore, political parties were formed according to the regional principle. Correspondingly, the political struggle assumed specific features and was determined by the interests of different clans rather than by ideological differences. Endowment of the president in the Central Asian countries with wide powers reflected historical traditions. The people saw the head of state as the nation’s leader enjoying unlimited power. These trends in the regional countries showed the special features of the Central Asian societies’ development. They only differed in the amount of power bestowed on the legislative power branch. In Kyr- gyzstan and Kazakhstan, the parliaments formally played an independent role, but in the other Central Asian countries, the president’s powers were essentially unrestricted. A special feature of Kyrgyzstan’s development was the establishment of a parliamentary form of rule. The 1993 Constitution defined the country as a parliamentary republic and enforced separation of powers. The president, who was endowed with wide powers, was the guarantor of the country’s unity. After his national election, the president concentrated governance of the country in his hands and de- creased the influence of the Supreme Council. The striving to follow Western democracies meant bringing the parliamentary form of rule into harmony with the traditions existing in the country. Division of the country into clan-community and kinship groups and introduction of the parliamentary form of rule put Kyrgyzstan to a real test. This was confirmed by the two state coups that occurred in the country after it acquired its independence. These coups were struggles between the representatives of certain regions of Kyrgyzstan that fought for political and economic power. In the end, after another change in power in 2010, a poorly functioning parliamentary-presidential form of power was established in Kyrgyzstan that promoted further regression of the state.7

6 See: D.E. Furman, “Evoliutsiia politicheskikh system stran SNG,” in: Sredizemnomore-Chernomore-Kaspii: mezhdu Bolshoi Evropoi i Bolshim Blizhnim Vostokom, ed. by N.P. Shemyov, V.A. Huseinov, A.D. Iazkova, Granitsa, Moscow, 2006, p. 136. 7 See: D.A. Alexandrov, I.V. Ippolitov, S.D. Popov, “’Miagkaia sila’ kak instrument amerikanskoi politiki v Tsentralnoi Azii,” in: Tsentralnaia Azii: problemy i perspektivy (vzgliad iz Rossii i Kitaia), RISI, Moscow, 2013, p. 28.

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The steps taken by the presidents of the Central Asian countries to extend their terms as head of state confirmed that these states were not ready to develop according to Western recommendations. Essentially all the Central Asian countries went this route, either by extending the term of the president’s powers, or allowing him to be reelected an unlimited number of times. The unchanging rule of the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (since 1990) and Tajikistan (since the mid-1990s) played a positive role in the transition period when the Central Asian countries were faced with internal and external challenges. However, the absence of a time-tested regime change mechanism in these countries made political destabilization all the more probable, while questions of succession acquired particular significance. As a result, rapid degradation of the legal mechanisms led to rein- forcement of archaic forms of mobilization and political engagement.8 Several Central Asian countries interested in increasing cooperation with the Western countries and attracting investments strove to show their willingness to introduce democratic standards. For instance, in Kazakhstan the president initiated changes aimed at raising the role of the parliament and developing pluralism. The amendments to the Kazakhstan Constitution in 2007 led to an increase in the role and importance of the legislative power branch, on the one hand, while they strengthened the presidential vertical of power, on the other.9 On the whole, conventional adherence to democratic reforms did not bring the country any closer to the standards of Western democracy. The changes were cosmetic and did not have any serious impact on the situation or change the nature of presidential power. Clannishness became ingrained in the regional countries during their independent development, making it possible to achieve relative political stability and regulate the political processes. The president is still the key figure in the political system and has a dominating influence on the balance of power within the country. Furthermore, the president relies on the support of the population and political elites, who see the head of state as a guarantor of stability. Finally, the political regimes in the Central Asian countries rely on a powerful security apparatus that makes it possible to maintain relative stability.10

Political Processes Impacted by the External Factor

In recent years, the economic situation has been having a significant impact on the political processes in the Central Asian countries. While searching for ways to resolve the problems and retain their power, the regional elites have had to cooperate more with their partners throughout the post- Soviet region. This factor is largely explained by the active participation of the Central Asian countries in establishing the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Kazakhstan is an active participant in this integration union, viewing the EAEU as an alternative to the Western vector of foreign policy. As- tana’s turn toward the countries of the post-Soviet region, primarily toward Russia, is related to its lack of success in developing hydrocarbon resources. So the president of Kazakhstan is faced with preserving social stability and maintaining the domestic political balance of powers. Kyrgyzstan, which joined the EAEU after long domestic political discussions, hoping in this way to resolve its acute internal and economic development problems, has had to solve similar tasks. Analogous processes are going on in Tajikistan, which is a potential participant in the integration union. Tajikistan

8 See: Tsentralnaia Aziia segodnia: vyzovy i ugrozy, ed. by K.L. Syroezhkin, KISI, Almaty, 2011, p. 21. 9 See: Tsentralnaia Aziia: 1991-2009 gg.: monografiia,ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISI, Almaty, 2010, p. 69. 10 See: A.M. Vasiliev, “Rossia i Tsentralnaia Azia,” in: Postsovetskaia tsentralnaia Aziia. Poteri i obreteniia, Izdatelskaia firma “Vostochnaia literatura,” RAS, Moscow, 1998, p. 7.

26 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 is interested in the EAEU as a tool for resolving key problems. In addition to economic development issues, the matter also concerns the hydropower industry.11 Despite procuring the help of international organizations, experts, and politicians in resolving this problem, it has not been possible to reach a compromise solution regarding the use of Central Asia’s water resources. Nevertheless, Ta- jikistan is taking a wait-and-see position, limiting itself to discussing the country’s accession at the expert level. Arguments against accession include the loss of income from customs, as well as from the re-export of Chinese and Turkish goods.12 External forces, which imply the U.S.-led Western countries, are having an immense impact on the development of the political processes in the Central Asian countries.13 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington exerted efforts to bring about defragmentation in the post-Soviet region by objecting to all integration projects with Russia’s participation and supporting alternative projects created as a counterbalance to Russian policy. The EU is against the idea of an integration union controlled by Russia. Brussels’ position is determined by its long-term interests in Central Asia. The EU considers political interaction and raw hydrocarbon deliveries to be its priority tasks.14 The U.S. and the EU see the further development of the EAEU as an obstacle to realizing their long-term interests. It is no accident that in November 2015, U.S. State Secretary John Kerry made a tour of all five Central Asian countries, emphasizing the American administration’s ongoing high interest in the hydrocarbon-rich region. In addition to political and trade and economic communication, the problem of the Central Asian countries’ attitude toward the opposition was discussed. In particular, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom criticized Tajikistan’s authorities for their tight control over religious activity and repression of the opposition.15 In contrast to the EU and U.S., which largely use political levers of pressure on the Central Asian countries, China is consistently augmenting its economic presence in the region by expanding trade and economic cooperation and participating in the implementation of energy and infrastructural projects. In particular, Beijing is actively allotting funds to building transport infrastructure and pipelines. China’s position is defined not only by its interest in tethering the Central Asian countries by economic means, but is also striving to exert political influence on the region’s countries. In this context, China sees the creation of a Eurasian Economic Union and reorientation of the elites of several Central Asian countries toward Russia as a serious challenge on a par with that posed by the former Soviet Union.16 Correspondingly, Beijing is negative about the plans of the EAEU member countries to expand trade and economic cooperation17 and has been activating its contacts with the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan. For example, in March 2015, during Kazakhstan Prime Minister Karim Masimov’s visit to China, a memorandum was signed on mutual understanding between the Kazakhstan Ministry of the National Economy and the State Committee on Development and Reforms of China regarding joint efforts to create the Silk Road Economic Belt. Earlier, China had significantly fortified its position in the fuel and energy sector of Kazakhstan’s economy. This

11 See: S.S. Zhiltsov, I.S. Zonn, “Borba za vodu,” Indeks bezopasnosti, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2008, pp. 49-62. 12 See: Z.A. Dadabaeva, “Tadzhikistan—Tamozhennyy soiuz: vozmozhnosti i perspektivy vzaimodeistviia,” Problemy postsovetskogo prostranstva, No. 1, 2015, pp. 36-57. 13 See: V. Shucun, V. Qingsong, “Perspektivy evraziiskogo integratsionnogo proekta i ego posledstviia dlia Kitaia,” Problemy natsionalnoi strategii, No. 3, 2013, p. 91. 14 See: S.S. Zhiltsov, “Truboprovodnaia igra v Kaspiiskom regione,” Problemy postsovetskogo prostranstva, No. 1 (3), 2015, pp. 96-116. 15 [http://www.news.tj/ru/node/217247], 4 November, 2015. 16 See: K.L. Syroezhkin, “Evraziyskoe prostranstvo i kitaiskiy factor,” in: Integratsionnye protsessy v evraziyskom prostranstve i sovremennyy mir: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii (Almaty, 14 November, 2012), Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2013, p. 156. 17 See: K. Syroezhkin, “Bolshaia kitaiskaia Evraziia?” in: Yu.I. Kirinitsiianov, Evraziiskoe partnerstvo. Idei, Mneniia. Predlozheniia, KISS under the RK President, Almaty, 2014, pp. 59-76.

27 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS trend was related to the increase in energy consumption by the Chinese economy, as well as to the solution of long-term tasks aimed at creating conditions that would ensure stable production and transportation of resources from Kazakhstan.18 As the president of Kazakhstan noted in September 2015 during his visit to China, contracts for $70 billion have been signed between the two countries in the last few years alone. Beijing has also been issuing large amounts of money to Turkmenistan, which has become a key supplier of natural gas from Central Asia.19

Conclusion

The Central Asian countries will celebrate 25 years of independence in 2016. This makes it possible to draw certain conclusions regarding their political development. First, the absence of legislatively regulated mechanisms of interaction among the power branches and the predomination of informal agreements based on the interests of certain clans is making the political systems weak in the face of external and internal challenges. The power structures are not self-sufficient and represent forums in which sub-government pressure groups are competing among themselves in order to ensure their security and establish their influence over the state.20 Several countries of the region, primarily Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are faced with resolving the succession of power. However, the task is complicated for Kazakhstan by the fact that the successor must suit all three zhuzes, whereby serious contradictions periodically break out in the zhuzes themselves and among them. A similar situation is seen in Uzbekistan, where the successor must suit the leading Samarkand, Tashkent, Kamangan, Ferghana, Khorezm, Bukhara, and Karakalpak clans.21 The economic situation is having an increasingly strong impact on the development of the political processes in the Central Asian countries, thus aggravating the competition between the elites for the limited resources, the inability to resolve the acute regional problems, the deterioration of social conditions, and the increase in unemployment. These factors are influencing the approaches of the Central Asian elites to preserving their own power and ensuring stability. A similar situation is seen in Turkmenistan, where the opposition was very active despite the authoritative regime. Turk- men society still has a clan structure, and a new generation of clan leaders is emerging who have already begun or will soon begin struggling for power.22 The presidents of all the Central Asian countries must look for a balance between the separate groups and clans, without permitting any of them to occupy a dominating position and pose a threat to the ruling elite. The limited opportunities of the political elites of the Central Asian countries to have an impact on the domestic political processes have become a trend over the past twenty years. Institu- tionalization of relations and the development of formal mechanisms of power continue to go hand in hand with informal relations. A graphic example is Kyrgyzstan, where under the parliamentary-presidential form of rule the head of state determines the direction of domestic and foreign policy. Most of the Central Asian countries do not have an opposition that is seen as a threat to the existing regime. The role of parliament is still weak and does not have an impact on the elaboration and implementation of domestic and foreign policy.

18 See: I.S. Zonn, “Velikiy Shelkovyy put stanovitsia Velikim neftegazovym putem,” Problemy postsovetskogo prostranstva, No. 2 (4), 2015, pp. 34-44. 19 See: S.S. Zhiltsov, “V pogone za uglevodorodami Tsentralnoi Azii,” NG-Energiia, 10 October, 2015, p. 13. 20 See: Tsentralnaia Azia i Kaspiiskii region: riski, vysovy, urgozy: kollektivnaia monografiia, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISS, Almaty, 2012, p. 79. 21 See: “Smena tsentralnoaziatskikh elit: revoliutsii ne budet?” available at [http://eadaily.com/news/2015/08/31/smena- centralnoaziatskih-elit-revolyucionnyh-izmeneniy-v-regione-ne-vyzovet], 8 November, 2015. 22 See: Iu. Fedorov, “Turkmeniia: vremia peremen?” Indeks bezopasnosti, Nos. 3-4, 2009, pp. 91-114.

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The parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2015 in the Central Asian countries did not change the power formation principles. Parliamentary elections were held in Tajikistan and Kyrgyz- stan, while presidential elections took place in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, in which the parliament enjoys relative independence, the trend continues in the other Central Asian countries toward concentrating power in the president’s hands.

THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS: TRIBAL-CLAN STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL ELITES AS A FACTOR OF POLITICAL TENSION

Ali SALGIRIEV Ph.D. (Political Science), Leading Research Associate, Sector of Philosophy and Sociology, Institute of Humanitarian Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Chechen Republic (Grozny, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

he Northern Caucasus is home to nism of their formation, as well as axiological over 100 peoples who belong to nu- attitudes and aims should be carefully stud- T merous tribes, teips, tukums, families, ied. Indeed, one cannot but wonder about clans, pressure groups, etc. It is a polyethnic those who belong to the group of the chosen and polyconfessional region, in which the ones and the way they replenish their ranks. interests of the federal administrative, and The article analyzes the opinion that the cur- local political elites are closely intertwined. rent quality and structure of the elites is Life has taught us that in this context eth- fraught with regional conflicts and tension. nopolitical clashes and contradictions can To identify the elites, the author selects hardly be avoided. a reputational approach and has correlated Here I analyze the political elites as the it with the altimetric and decisional ap- key actor in the regional political process that proaches. I describe the ethnopolitical elite is gradually gaining weight at the federal as a privileged and politically dominating level. Any analysis of the threats and risks in group of people that occupies the leading the Caucasus pays particular attention to the position in public institutions and directly af- ethnopolitical elites and their stratification as fects decision-making. one of the important factors. This suggests The expert community has still not ar- that the structure and place of the political rived at a concerted opinion about the role of elites in the Northern Caucasus, the mecha- ethnic elites in the political processes in the

29 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS region.1 Some experts are convinced that litical process. I side with the latter: the eth- the local elites play a positive role in defus- nopolitical elites of the Northern Caucasus ing national tension, containing local con- are biased; they function on an informal pa- flicts, promoting civilian dialog, etc. Others tron-client basis instead of listening to the tend to think that the ethnopolitical elites opinions of the people and following them.2 pursue their own interests, haggle with the This article gives recommendations on federal elite over subsidies and interest how to defuse ethnopolitical tension in the zones, and play a destructive role in the po- Northern Caucasus.

1 See: A. Shichanin, O. Grivkov, “O roli elity v 2 sovremennoy Rossii,” Rossia i musulmansky mir, No. 4, See: A.R. Salgiriev, “Mekhanizmy uregulirovaniya 2008, pp. 213-217; L.V. Kozhevnikova, “Transformatsia roli mezhnatsionalnykh konfliktov i profilaktika politicheskogo elit v usloviyakh globalizatsii,” Vestnik Universiteta ekstremizma v deyatelnosti etnopoliticheskhikh elit na (Gosudarstvenny universitet upravlenia), No. 16, 2013, pp. Severnom Kavkaze,” in: Nauka i obrazovanie v Chechenskoy 303-305; V. Akaev, “Religious and Political Elites in the respublike: sostoyanie i perspektivy razvitiya. Materialy Northern Caucasus: Formation, Ideological Contradictions, Vserossiyskoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, and Practical Opposition,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, posvyashchennoy 10-letiyu so dnya osnovaniya KNII RAN, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 77-89. Grozny, 2011, pp. 462-463.

KEYWORDS: Russia, the Northern Caucasus, elites, political elites, ethnopolitical elites, ethnoelites, federal elites, bureaucrats, tension, conflicts, interests, corruption, clans, power, political process.

Introduction

Russian sociologists, philosophers, and political scientists pay particular attention to the structure of the elites and all aspects of their activities. The works dealing with the role played by the Russian ethnopolitical elites at the regional level are especially interesting. M. Astvatsaturova, M. Afanasyev, O. Gaman-Golutvina, A. Glukhova, A. Duga, A. Vartumyan, V. Ignatov, O. Novikova, A. Ponedelkov, A. Starostin, A. Chirikova, and others offer a comprehensive analysis of the formation, structure, and institutionalization of the ethnopolitical elites in the region.3 The role of the actors in political processes largely depends on their ability to mobilize all sorts of resources, to accumulate and integrate them, and to transform their economic and social impacts into tighter grip on political power.

3 See: O.V. Gaman-Golutvina, “Regionalnye elity Rossii: personalny sostav i tendentsii evolyutsii,” Politicheskie issledovaniya, No. 3, 2004, p. 22; G.K. Ashin, E.D. Lozanskiy, S.A. Kravchenko, Sotsiologiya politiki. Sravnitelny analiz rossiyskikh i amerikanskikh politicheskikh realiy, Moscow, 2001; G.K. Ashin, “Nauka ob elitakh i elitnom,” Vlast, No. 1, 2004, pp. 45-46; M.N. Afanasyev, Pravyashchie elity i gosudarstvennost posttotalitarnoy Rossii, Voronezh, 1996; I. Diksin, “Elity kak sub’ekty rossiiskikh reform,” Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Series 12. Political Sciences, No. 1, 1996; N.Yu. Lapina, A.S. Chirikova, “Politicheskoe samoopredelenie regionalnykh elit,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, No. 6, 2000, pp. 98-107; M.K. Gorshkov, Regionalnaya konfliktologiya. Kontsepty i rossiiskaya praktika, Moscow, 2008; O.V. Gaman-Golutvina, Politicheskie elity Rossii: vekhi istoricheskoy evolyutsii, Moscow, 2006; V.P. Mokhov, Regionalnaya politicheskaya elita Rossii (1945-1991), Perm, 2003; V.G. Ignatov, A.B. Ponedelkov, A.M. Starostin, et al., Vzaimodeystvie elit v sotsialno- politicheskom protsesse sovremennoy Rossii, Rostov on Don, 2001; M.N. Afanasyev, Klientizm i rossiiskaya gosudarstvennost, 2nd enlarged ed., Moscow, 2000.

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We should take into account that domination of one of the strategies in real politics defies simple and straightforward definition. According to Max Weber, the politeias can be identified either as “value” (traditional) or “rational” (innovational). The Northern Caucasus is a special case with a fairly involved combination of both, in which the former predominates.4 A political strategy in this context is understood as an imposition of the “only correct” power, institutions, distribution of resources, and ideology in the interests of the strongest group inside the elite. A different, that is, compromise strategy speaks of the more or less equal resource potentials of different groups (Daghestan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria being pertinent examples).5

Structure of the Elites and the Mechanism of Their Formation

Let’s analyze the quality of the elites, their structures, and circulation specifics. In the Northern Caucasus, a polyethnic and polyconfessional region, the elites are closed groups, they prefer to remain in the shadows, are highly traditional, and replenish their ties through ethnization, authoritarian- ism, and kindred ties. The region’s political elites consist of informal units—clans, pressure groups, teips, tukums, families, tribes, etc. The teip is a “brotherhood, an association of kindred and not kindred (social) groups united by common social and economic interests and mythological kinship.”6 Tukums are military-political (economic) associations or unions of teips joined by non-kinship ties. Tribes (from Lat. tribus) are interpreted as informal groups organized on the principles of cliquishness, archaic nature, and functioning on the basis of their exclusiveness, which brings to mind ethnocracy. In the Northern Caucasus, elites are formed on the basis of personal loyalty, common origins, etc., that is, vague and traditionalist criteria based on personal loyalty to the clan’s leader. This makes the fairly contradictory and conflict-prone regional context even more contradictory. Nor- mally, the closest members of the “team” move to new posts along with the “patron”— the examples are numerous. At the same time, counter-elites are also gaining strength in the Northern Caucasus; their impact on the clans inside ethnicities, territorial pressure groups, and the clergy is rising. An autonomous elite segment has taken shape within civil and democratic institutions. Ethnic representation in the structures of state power has not lost its importance—it has probably become even more firmly rooted. Corruption of the regional elites strongly affects their functioning and stirs up conflicts. In the Northern Caucasus, corruption is present at all levels of state power and creates fertile soil for extrem- ism7 and an outflow of young men to the Islamic State; the people are dissatisfied with a government that causes social deprivation and anomie. Young men remain unemployed since jobs are sold and bought, while the arbitrariness of the administrative structures stirs up discontent and protest sentiments. According to sociological studies, in North Ossetia-Alania the majority of the respondents

4 See: V.O. Bobrovnikov, Musulmane Severnogo Kavkaza: obychay, pravo, nasilie (Ocherki po istorii i etnografii prava Nagornogo Dagestana), Moscow, 2002; B.B. Nanaeva, Politicheskie traditsii v sotsiokulturnom nasledii chechentsev, Rostov- on-Don, 2009. 5 See: Zh.T. Toshchenko, Etnokratia: istoria i sovremennost. Sotsiologicheskie ocherki, Moscow, 2003, pp. 120-135, 267-281. 6 S.A. Nataev, Chechensky teip: sushchnost, stuktura i sotsialnaya dinamika, Author’s abstract of a Ph.D. Thesis, Makhachkala, 2010, p. 11. 7 See: I. Dobaev, “The Northern Caucasus: Spread of Jihad,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (55), 2009, pp. 49-56.

31 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

(over 60%) pointed to corruption in the corridors of power as the main problem. The United Russia Party and the anti-corruption committees are associated with individual officials, the bureaucracy, and those who represent the interests of the local “nobility.”8 The public prosecution structures are also corrupt; over 50% of the respondents were convinced that public prosecution was steeped in bribe- taking and corruption.9 The corruption scandal around the family of Prosecutor General of Russia Yury Chayka10 that flared up on the strength of the findings of the Anti-Corruption Foundation shows that the problem is acute and widespread. Indeed, the fact that the sons of the main corruption fighter in Russia, who are barely 30, have already earned billions of dollars cannot but raise many questions and undermine public confidence in the government as a whole. Corrupt regimes based on clans that gradually emerge around the local elite have taught the Caucasian peoples not to trust either the regional or even the central political-administrative elite. Elites are based not on professional skills, but on personal loyalty, origin, belonging to a family, teip, etc. It should be said that the political elites of the Northern Caucasus are products of the radical reform, “revolutions,” and political earthquakes of the early 1990s. The so-called wave of sovereignties brought to power separatists, “national-patriots,” corrupt officials, and even members of criminal structures and groups. At the current stage of the political process, they are trying to adjust themselves to the new reality, while keeping their ties with the groups close to criminal circles intact.

Points of Ethnopolitical Tension in the Northern Caucasus

As could be expected, stronger ethnocentrism and weaker impacts of the federal administrative- political elite, as well as the countrywide economic problems stirred up conflicts in the region. The second war in Chechnia was provoked by leader of the Daghestani Wahhabis B. Kebedov, Arab Hat- tab, and Shamil Basaev, who attacked the mountainous part of Daghestan, moving from Chechnia with a clear-cut goal—an Islamic state in Daghestan. This provocation organized by political and religious radicals had nothing in common with the interests of the Chechens, who needed peace, political stability, and economic development. The road to peace in Chechnia was far from easy because of active opposition from political and religious extremists. A small group of likeminded people who demonstrated determination and political perspicacity in the struggle against international terrorists stabilized the situation and localized in the Northern Caucasus the main risks and threats to Russia’s sustainable development. They avert- ed the widespread catastrophe Russia’s geopolitical rivals had in store for it.11 Another point of tension was created in the 1990s by Cossack atamans who demanded that the Naurskiy and Shelkovskoy districts be transferred to the Stavropol Territory. In April 1991, five Cos-

8 U.V. Usova, “Korruptsionnaya sostavlyayushchaya regionalnykh elit: sotsiologichesky apekt,” Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i yuridicheskie nauki, kulturologia i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki, No. 8 (46), 2014, pp. 181-183. 9 See: Kh.V. Dzutsev, Korruptsiya v organakh ispolnitelnoy vlasti Respubliki Severnaya Osetia-Alania Severo- Kavkazskogo federalnogo okruga Rossiiskoy Federatsii, Moscow, 2011, p. 18. 10 [https://fbk.info/], 7 December, 2015. 11 See: M.M. Yusupov, “Chechenskie i yaponskie tsennosti v kontekste globalizatsii,” Voprosy kulturologii, No. 1, 2016, pp. 55-60; Idem, “Tsennostnaya determinastiya sotsialnogo samochustviya,” Izvestia vysshikh uchebnykh zavedeniy. Severo-Kavkazskiy region, Social Sciences Series, No. 6 (172), 2012, pp. 40-44.

32 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 sacks (the ataman of the Sunzhenskiy District among them) and three Ingush were killed in armed clashes between the nationalists and Cossacks. The events of mid-October 199212 and the Osset-Ingush conflict are still fresh in our minds. Groups of extremists, armed with machineguns and grenade launchers and supported by armored vehicles, tried to capture part of the Prigorodny District. To resolve the conflict, Moscow supported one of the sides; this caused numerous casualties, an outflow of Ingush from the disputed district, and another smoldering seat of disagreements. The ethnopolitical situation in Daghestan was no less complicated; the national movements of the Kumyks (Tenglik), Lezghians (Sadval), Nogays (Birlik), Balkars (Tere) and Karachais (Jamagat) demanded republics of their own in the Northern Caucasus. In September 1991, the Third Congress of the Lezghians set up the Republic of Lezghistan. This brought Daghestan dangerously close to losing its territorial integrity; the conflicts could have spread far and wide to inundate the rest of the country.13 Unfortunately, in 1994 in Chechnia, the ethnopolitical elite failed to prevent a disastrous conflict with the Federal Center and allowed it to escalate in the late 1990s. In Daghestan, the local elites managed to suppress the rising ethnopolitical tension, which could have developed into a much cru- eler conflict. Today, the ethnopolitical confrontation between the leaders of Chechnia and Ingushetia over the Sunzhensky District of Ingushetia is causing much concern. The Federal Center had no choice but to take into account the interests of the ethnic elites and act with caution and tact. To my mind this has put all decision-making on hold. Recently, we have become aware of the mounting disagreements between the religious elites of the two republics ignited by political provocateurs and irresponsible people. This new ethnoreligious conflict has complicated the far from simple relations among the local political elites, despite the fact that the political leaders of both republics are moving toward cooperation and common points from which the current conflict among the clergy can be resolved. The regional ethnopolitical elites are expected to defend the rights of the local people at the federal level, harmonize the positions of the ethnicities and territories in the Federation Council, at- tract investments to their republics, create favorable social and political conditions, etc. Today, the elites have moved too far from what is expected from them: they pursue their own interests, while the relations between them and the political-administrative elite in Moscow are developing on the “transfers for loyalty” basis. This means de facto freedom of action, which the elites are abusing in their personnel policy: they make their own people heads of regional branches of federal departments and ministries and reduce the chances of success of Moscow appointees to naught. They control practically all economic assets of their territories: the government is becoming decentralized and the regional elites are tightening their grip, on the one hand; while it is leading to a shift in the political vertical and the principle of supremacy of federal power is being violated, on the other. The religious elites are another important factor. At all times the clergy in the Northern Cauca- sus has been the most respected social institution; religious leaders mediated extreme conflicts and their decisions were never challenged. Today, the Islamic clergy has moved close to the state structures and special services; their ideas and assessments strangely coincide with those of the administrative elites. In fact, this bias and the fact that the clergy depends on the government is fanning separatist sentiments and religious extremism in the region. The cadis and mullahs have de facto become part of the state machine and preach loyalty to the state. They are paid by the official structures, while their far from modest lifestyle—bodyguards, expensive cars, etc.—causes a lot of disenchantment with the

12 See: R.M. Tatiev, Territorialnye etnopoliticheskie konflikty: politiko-pravovye osnovy uregulirovaniya (na primere osetino-ingushskogo conflikta, Ph.D. Thesis, Moscow, 2010; L.A. Chibirov, “K predistorii osetino-ingushskogo konflikta oseni 1992 goda,” Vestnik IMCIT, No. 1-2 (57-58), 2014, pp. 20-24. 13 [http://www.darial-online.ru/2005_4/dzidzoev.shtml], 18 September, 2015.

33 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ideals of Islam these people are supposed to preach among the younger generation. The professional level of the local fighters against the ideas of Salafism and Wahhabism leaves much to be desired: when it comes to knowledge of the holy texts, the Wahhabis and extremists leave them far behind. It is becoming increasingly clear that traditional Islam cannot compete with fundamentalism—the fact that the local elites prefer to ignore. The way the local ethnopolitical elites respond to religious de- viations is highly reactionary; they rely on repression, while education and explanations would have been much more efficient. They should develop democratic institutions and enter into an equal dialog with the local people. To restore the lost confidence of the people, the religious leaders should abandon their protectionism and one-sidedness; they should become more independent in the public discourse and try harder to prevent extremism and social tension. Today, the state structures in the region are growing increasingly Islamic, which creates an eclectic context: many of the leaders of ethnic elites want “to sit on three chairs,” that is, rely on the adats, the Islamic norms, and secular institutions, which, as we know, are contradictory and mutually exclusive elements. The current policy of encouraging religious feelings and, in particular, Islamization of the population of the Caucasian republics expected to draw them closer together is fraught with conflicts. The Russian government believes that traditional Islam may become a factor of integration of the polyethnic North Caucasian regions.14 Propaganda and agitation of recruiters from the Middle East are not the only source of the popularity of extremist sentiments, religious fanaticism, and an outflow of young people to the Is- lamic State. People do not trust the local government; they are irritated with bureaucratic arbitrariness, total corruption, social inequality, unemployment, the fact that the clergy is hand in glove with the government, that the elites believe that “everything goes”, etc. None of the factors that fan religious fanaticism among the young people and increase the outflow of people from the North Caucasian republics to the Islamic State and armed underground have disappeared. Young men see no future at home; this explains why, according to different sources, about one thousand people from Daghestan fight on the side of the IS; on the whole, there are at least seven thousand fighters from Russia. The geopolitical conflicts and problems caused by unification with Crimea, the war in Syria, the economic sanctions, etc. provoked social transformations inside the country. The political elites are trying to adjust to the economic problems, the devalued ruble, and the mounting unemployment that hit the Northern Caucasus harder than any other region because of its mind-boggling social inequality and the income gap. Sociological studies reveal that the people in the Northern Caucasus are more concerned about unemployment and social inequality than terrorism.15 In this situation, the local elites prefer to rely on traditional methods of self-preservation—propaganda, control and struggle with pluralism, repressions, etc.—instead of seeking more understanding with the people through more democratic methods of recruiting elites, a more resolute anti-corruption struggle, and more tolerant attitude toward criticism. The federal elites should revise their relations with the North Caucasian ethnoelites and abandon the “money for loyalty” model. The federal administrative-political elites should promptly respond to the changing public sentiments. According to sociological polls, 60% of the polled believe that the government in Russia is not accountable to the people. This means that we are unlikely to acquire developed democratic institutions.16

14 See: A.R. Salgiriev, Politicheskie elity v sovremennoy Rossii kak sub’ekt upravleniya politicheskimi protsessami (na materialakh respublik Severnogo Kavkaza), Ph.D. Thesis, Krasnodar, 2012, p. 134. 15 [http://www.levada.ru/old/28-01-2013/sotsiologi-zhiteli-severnogo-kavkaza-opasayutsya-bezrabotitsy-i-posledstvii- sotsialnogo-r], 18 November, 2015. 16 [http://www.levada.ru/sites/default/files/report_fin.pdf], 1 October, 2015.

34 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 Conclusion

The Northern Caucasus demonstrates consistent authoritarian trends in the system of state governance and a high degree of personified power; there is no real dialog with the opposition or civil activists. The Kremlin has been relying on the use of force when dealing with the “Caucasian problem,” while talking about softer approaches designed to improve the social and economic situation in particular. The federal administrative-political elites must reach agreements and harmonize their decisions with the ethnocratic circles, which are the real political and, according to experts, military force. This situation will survive as long as ethnocratic circles remain the only source of power. In these conditions, personal loyalty comes to the fore: decisions will be carried out, albeit by auto- cratic methods, and the Kremlin is prepared to pay. To defuse ethnopolitical tension in the region, the government must resolve the social problems: unemployment, poverty, and corruption; the tribal-clan principle of personnel policy must be abandoned; human rights organizations and the media must be encouraged, while the current “witch hunt- ing” must become a thing of the past, etc. Not infrequently, federal programs remain on paper for lack of money, or because money is stolen by important and not so important officials. The region needs a new elite aware of its political status and the need to address and resolve the far from simple economic and political problems. The national elites should harmonize the national interests of their peoples with Moscow on the basis of democracy, equality of all peoples, and exclusion of discrimination.

GEORGIA TODAY: MILITARY-BUILDING AND THE MILITARY-POLITICAL COURSE

Sergey MINASYAN Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Director, Institute of the Caucasus (Erevan, Armenia)

ABSTRACT

ost-Soviet Georgia pays particular at- gust 2008 with Russia, awakened the politi- tention to its armed forces and de- cal elite and the Georgian public to the prob- P fense and security policy as crucially lems of military security and stirred up a lot important elements of its state-building. Its of interest in them. Moreover, for a long pe- involvement in the armed ethnopolitical con- riod in its post-Soviet history, Georgia was flicts of the 1990s in Abkhazia and South stubbornly pursuing NATO membership as Ossetia, as well as the Five-Day War of Au- one of the key aims of its foreign and de-

35 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS fense policy. The Georgian political elite ex- of its armed forces (AF) after the change in pected it to guarantee an adequate response power in 2012, the current state of affairs, to national security threats, Russia being and the prospects for further development of perceived as the main source of such Georgia’s armed forces. Sergey Minasyan threats. also discusses certain key military-political The author analyzes the dynamics of aspects related in particular to the nature of military-building in Georgia after the Five- Georgia-NATO relations and Georgia’s Day War, the specifics of the development chances of NATO membership.

KEYWORDS: Georgia, NATO, the Five-Day War, Abkhazia, South Ossetia.

Postwar Restoration (2009-2012)

The Five-Day War is better described as a catastrophe for Georgia’s armed forces. The Geor- gian people and Georgian elite were badly disappointed: it became clear that the conflicts in Abkha- zia and South Ossetia defied a military solution, while the army lost much of its earlier popularity. In 2009, Georgia’s military budget began gradually shrinking from about 1.625 billion lari (slightly over $1 billion, including the money spent on the Five-Day War) in 2008 to 1.090 billion lari ($665 million) in 2009.1 In 2009-2010, the armed forces of Georgia acquired new (the 2nd artillery brigade, an anti-tank battalion, etc.) and liquidated some of the old units and subunits (a separate tank battalion in Gori was one of them) within the program to optimize the organizational structure of Georgia’s AF. The Navy, which lost most of its ships in the Five-Day War, was disbanded; in 2009, the Coast Guard was made a subunit of the Border Guard of Georgia, while at essentially the same time the land borders became the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Air Force was made part of the land forces as the Army Air Section.2 The lessons of the Five-Day War suggested that the country should concentrate on structural changes in the army, better equipment for the air-defense units and antitank defenses, and reforms in the system of training reservists, the shortcomings of which had surfaced in the course of the war. The country continued buying armaments and military equipment, albeit in smaller quantities, to restore the artillery and tank units to their former capacities. The land forces acquired new types of antitank weapons and air defenses. The system of battle training and operational strategic planning of the Georgian army was also changed. Before the August 2008 war, the Georgian army was geared toward using force to return breakaway and de facto independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia. It was expected that the enemy would be defeated in the shortest time possible, while Russia’s involvement in the conflict was not contemplated. This was registered in the main official military-political documents—the Na-

1 Estimated in constant (2008) US$ according to the methodology used by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (for more details, see [http://milexdata.sipri.org]). 2 See: S. Minasyan, “Problemy regionalnoy bezopasnosti na Yuzhnom Kavkaze v 2009 g.: Perekhodny god s neopredelennymi rezultatami,” Kavkaz-2009, Yearbook of the Institute of the Caucasus, Erevan, 2011, pp. 115-117.

36 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 tional Security Strategy, the Military Strategy, and the National Threat Assessment. As a result Geor- gia lost the war. It did not expect its neighbor’s army, which was superior, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to the Georgian armed forces, to be involved. In early 2009, the Georgian army began gradually adapting itself to the new conditions, viz., local conflicts waged according to the latest standards, including by means of electronic warfare and a UAS (unmanned aircraft system). Since that time, the Russian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the North Caucasian Military District of the armed forces of Russia, rather than the armies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are seen as the main threat. On 23 December, 2011, the Parliament of Georgia approved a new National Security Concept of Georgia that pointed to Russia as the main threat and the main challenge to Georgia’s national security.3 In the postwar period, the Georgian army had at its disposal about 170 tanks (mainly T-72 and a certain number of T-55), about 210 units of field artillery, mortars, and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) of over 100 mm caliber, and 310 armored vehicles (ITV-1/2, APC-70/80, Turkish APC Ejder and Cobra). Military aviation included 14 attack aircraft Su-25 (as well as Su-25K Mimino modernized with the assistance of Israeli experts), 8 Aero L-39 Albatros jet trainer aircraft, and about 40 helicopters (Mi-24, Mi-8, Mi-14, UH-1H). The total numerical strength of the Georgian AF was 37 thousand; 23.5 thousand of them belonged to the land forces.4 In late 2010, much was done to create battle-worthy reserves. It was expected that the system of military reserves in Georgia would be divided into two types: the Army Reserve (former military men who would be conscripted to military service in reserve) and the Territorial Defense Forces based on voluntary basis by territories to support the local powers in case of armed actions and for disaster management.5 At that time, the former Georgian authorities tried to demonstrate that Georgia’s military industry was absolutely adequate. Tbilisi was forced to develop its own military-industrial complex under the pressure of an informal embargo the EU, Israel, the U.S., and even Turkey established after the Five- Day War: these countries preferred not to worsen their far from good relations with Moscow. The new people in power in Kiev, one of the main weapon exporters to Georgia before the 2008 war, stopped the flow of armaments. Once the contracts concluded with Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and Turkey before the Five-Day War had been fulfilled, no more armaments and weapons arrived in Georgia.6 In 2010, Georgia set up a scientific-production corporation Delta under the aegis of the Defense Ministry of Georgia that included Tbilaviasheni (TAM); the 142nd tank plant (one of the enterprises inherited from the Soviet Union), the Kutaisi machine-building plant, and several scientific-research institutes. In 2011, the Georgian military industrial complex demonstrated its first products. On 26 May, 2011, Independence Day, Georgia presented for the first time 30 Georgian-made Didgori armored personnel carriers constructed in two baseline versions. Experts could not miss the fact that the armored hull of the personnel carrier looked very much like Turkish APC Cobra (which had been used by the Georgian army); the Didgori armored vehicle was assembled on and around the chassis of U.S. Ford F-Series pickup trucks.7 In February 2012, Georgia demonstrated IFV Lazika

3 [http://nsc.gov.ge/files/files/National%20Security%20Concept.pdf]. 4 See: A. Vetrov, “Vooruzhennye sily i sistema ikh podgotovki,” Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 3, 2012, pp. 17-18. 5 See: “Kavkazskiy perekrestok: k kakim voynam gotovyatsya na Kavkaze?,” available at [http://rus.azatutyun.am/ content/article/24557255.html], 23 April, 2012. 6 In particular, in 2009-2012, Georgia received twelve D-30122mm howitzers and twelve D-20 152mm howitzers from Bulgaria, twelve 122mm RM-70 MLRS from the Czech Republic, and seventy APC Ejder from Turkey (for more details, see: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database [http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php]). 7 See: M. Barabanov, “Saakashvili—piar manager gruzinskogo OPK: voenno-promyshlennye ambitsii zakavkazskogo gosudarstva,” Voenno-promyshlenny kur’er, No. 17 (434), 2-8 May, 2012.

37 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS developed by Georgian experts on the basis of the well-known IFV-1/2 of Soviet/Russian manufacture, with a short-wheelbase chassis and a ring-mounted 23mm autocannon. In the same way, the new Georgian armored 122mm MLRS based on the KRAZ-63221 automobile designated as GG-122 turned out to be an upgraded version of the widely known Soviet BM-21Grad that used modernized Turkish Rocketsan rockets, another version of its Soviet predecessor.8 Finally, the UAS allegedly developed by the Georgian military industrial complex turned out to be the product of Estonian Eli Military Simulations in 2006, which the Estonians had abandoned after the tests.9

Military-Building after the Regime Change (2012-2014)

After winning the parliamentary elections on 1 October, 2012, the Georgian Dream opposition bloc set up a new government headed by Bidzina Ivanishvili; on 25 October, Irakli Alasania was appointed defense minister. The new people in power needed much closer control over the Defense Ministry to prevent any unfriendly steps by Mikhail Saakashvili, who remained President of Georgia until November 2013. This created a far from favorable situation for the newly elected parliament.10 In mid-2013, the new people in power started moving toward further reforms of the armed forces and the country’s security system. The new defense minister formulated new concepts and revised some of the old approaches to arrive at the Strategic Defense Review (2013-2016), which “represents the guideline document for the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, which identifies the main directions for the development of the Ministry of Defense and Georgia’s armed forces and aims to enhance the capabilities of Georgia’s armed forces and NATO interoperability.” Its spirit and logic were in tune with the key official documents—the National Security Con- cept of Georgia and the Georgian National Military Strategy—based on the national threat-based approach for 2010-2013.11 The SDR 2013-2016 was harmonized, within the system of official documents of the Georgian Defense Ministry, with such documents as the Minister’s Vision 2013-2014 and the conceptual approach offered in another document, the Modern Armed Forces, published in the fall of 2012. The new Strategic Defense Review-2013 contained revised general parameters of the security environment, new assessments of the threats and challenges, and new approaches to the structure and organization of Georgia’s armed forces and Defense Ministry and their reforms. It was based on a new methodology for elaborating and implementing the new document, in which the main attention was shifted from the capabilities-based to the threat-based approach.

8 See: “Georgia Upgrades Rocket Launcher,” available at [http://www.janes.com/article/37455/georgia-upgrades- rocket-launcher], 6 May, 2014. 9 See: M. Barabanov, op. cit. 10 For more details, see: S. Minasyan, “Problemy regionalnoy bezopasnosti na Yuzhnom Kavkaze v 2012 g.: ‘Sery’ god?” in: Kavkaz-2013, Yearbook of the Institute of the Caucasus, Erevan, 2014. 11 The previous Strategic Defense Review was adopted by a presidential decree for the year 2007; its implementation was cut short by the August 2008 War that forced the Georgian authorities to revise all the military-political documents. The new government began to revise it in 2009 with the active consultative and expert assistance of the military structures and defense ministries of NATO members and adopted the new version in 2013. It was based on a new methodology and stressed that military-building should be analyzed on the new threat-based approach, rather than on the previously used capabilities- based approach (for more details, see: Strategic Defense Review, 2013-2016, pp. 4-5, available at [http://mod.gov. ge/?pages=mimoxilvis-dokumenti]).

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The Document envisaged the restructuring of the General Staff and redistribution of its units’ responsibilities (in late 2012, the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces was renamed the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces), as well as the establishment of maritime Defense Department. Serious structural and organizational changes in the armed forces became inevitable. The Command of the Georgian Land Forces was replaced with two territorial commands—East Operational Command and West Operational Command—under the General Staff responsible for operational planning and command within their geographical responsibility zones and the way the mobilization resources and sup- plies were used. East Operational Command included the 4th mechanized infantry brigade, the 1st and 5th infantry brigades, and the 1st field artillery brigade. West Operational Command included 2nd and 3rd infantry brigades and the 3rd field artillery brigade. The newly established Air Operations and Air-Defense Command incorporated an Air-Defense Brigade (6 missile systems Buk-1M, 8 missile systems Osa-AK, and 10 missile systems Osa-AKM); mixed aviation brigade and mixed-transport aviation base equipped with 7 upgraded Su-25K Mimino and 3 standard Su-25, 6 attack helicopters Mi-24, 17 utility Mi-8T helicopters, and 12 UH-1H Iroquois).12 It was planned to set up separate intelligence and medical battalions to support both Operational Commands; together with logistics support capabilities, they were subordinated directly to the General Staff.13 The reserve system was based on certain new approaches; the old principles disappeared from the new conceptual documents. Today, very much as before, the National Guard, commanded by the Chief of the National Guard Department of the General Staff of Georgia, remained the cornerstone of the reserve system of the Georgian AF. The National Guard consists of two professional reserve brigades—the 10th brigade located in Senaki and the 20th brigade located in Telavi, as well as territorial reserve units and supply and command units. The Army Reserve is a professional reserve force for replenishing the ranks of regular formations; the Territorial Defense Forces were established for immediate readiness of the population in crisis events, such as a state of emergency or natural disasters; in wartime they should be ready for partisan warfare, etc.14 It should be said, however, that formally Alasania did not offer any fundamentally new approaches. The reforms of the armed forces were no longer aimed at defense against wide-scale foreign aggression or restored control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the use of force. It became much more important to improve capabilities to participate in international peacekeeping operations in order to enhance NATO interoperability and, in this way, move closer to NATO membership for Geor- gia.15 The new defense minister confirmed that Georgia’s AF would remain involved in ISAF (the largest non-NATO contributor to the mission in Afghanistan). At some point, the numerical strength of Georgia’s involvement in the peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan (starting in 2009) was over 1,600 military (two reinforced light infantry battalions and other separate units, including artillery, engineering, intelligence, communications, etc.). On the other hand, the military-political leaders of Georgia remain convinced that the shortest route toward integration with NATO (if the NATO Membership Action Plan remains outside Geor- gia’s reach) lies through its more active involvement in the Alliance’s peacekeeping operations. Under Saakashvili, peacekeeping was one of the main trends in military-building in Georgia (along with building up the armed forces to be strong enough to restore Tbilisi’s jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force and, to a certain extent, oppose Russia’s involvement). Starting in 2013, peacekeeping essentially became the central trend for the new people in power.

12 See: I. Petrov, “Voennaya aviatsia Respubliki Gruzia,” Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 3, 2015, pp. 61-62. 13 See: Strategic Defense Review, 2013-2016, pp. 24-27. 14 See: A. Yavorskiy, “Rezervny component Vooruzhennykh sil Gruzii,” Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 10, 2013, pp. 27-31. 15 See: Strategic Defence Review, 2013-2016, pp. 16-17.

39 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In line with this logic, Georgia is gradually moving away from the Soviet/Russian systems to NATO standard armaments and concentrating on buying mobile systems.16 Late in 2013, the Defense Ministry of Georgia announced that it had replaced “Mi-24 and Mi-25 attack helicopters and Mi-8 utility helicopters of Soviet origin” with Western helicopters.17 It likewise announced that it would gradually replace its T-55 and T-72 tanks with Western antitank systems.18 In 2013, the new military- political leaders abandoned the idea of setting up a new system of total reserve of the Georgian AF, one of Saakashvili’s central points. In 2013, the European Union did not exclude that Georgian units might be included in the Eu- ropean Union Force (rapid reaction force). With this aim in view, Georgia is concentrating on light mobile forces best suited for peacekeeping operations and peacekeeping forces. On 12 May, 2014, within the framework of President Hollande’s visit to the three Caucasian states, Tbilisi showed him the units of the Georgian AF (150 military) that would be dispatched to the Central African Republic (CAR) as part of the French peacekeeping contingent within the EU peacekeeping operation in this faraway African country.19 It was in mid-July 2014 that a unit of the Georgian Armed Forces, a light infantry company which belonged to the separate Batumi light infantry battalion, first participated in peacekeeping operations. Early in November 2014, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, acting within the logic of Geor- gia’s domestic policy, replaced Minister of Defense Irakli Alasania with Mindia Janelidze, Secretary of Council of State Security and Crisis Management.

New Trends in Military-Building (2014-2015)

Early in May 2015, the country acquired a new cabinet of ministers and a new defense minister, a woman, for the first time in Georgian history. Tinatin Khidasheli, wife of Parliament Speak- er David Usupashvili, is one of the most active pro-Western politicians of the Republican Party of Georgia. The change did not affect the pace and priorities of military-building, even though the new minister became more visible in the public and information field, partly because of her political past and partly because of the more active contacts with NATO and the key Western countries. The Ukrai- nian developments forced the Georgian military leaders to revive their external contacts in the military-political sphere, talks about NATO membership and integration with other Western structures, contacts in the military sphere, and discussions of the reform of Georgia’s AF. After analyzing the experience of the Five-Day War and the Ukrainian crisis, the Georgian military-political leadership concluded that the country should cut down the share of heavy tank and motorized infantry units and fighting aviation. It was decided to increase the numerical strength of the light infantry, special forces, and helicopter units to be used in air assault operations. The armed

16 For example, in 2013, Georgia bought 5 used tanks T-72M1 in Bulgaria (for more details, see: [http://armstrade.sipri. org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php]). 17 See: “Georgia: We Will Replace All Russian Helicopters with Western Aircraft,” available at [http://www.eurasianet. org/node/67906], 31 December, 2013. 18 See: M. Vignanskiy, “Gruzia khochet prodat sovetskie tanki i vertolety,” Izvesta, 9 December, 2013, available at [http://izvestia.ru/news/562149]. 19 See: G. Dvali, “Prezident Frantsii predskazal Gruzii evropeyskoe budushchee,” Kommersant, 15 May, 2014.

40 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 forces will be trained for hybrid and irregular armed operations, while the country’s territorial defense system will be reformed accordingly. The country will be divided into Defense Zones, each supplied with an Infantry Battle Group (IBG) in case of war, consisting of regular troops and 3 to 4 regiments of the Territorial Army manned by reservists.20 It is not yet clear whether the infatuation with the fashionable concept of irregular “hybrid” war will strengthen Georgia’s defense capability if a new hypothetical conflict with Russia develops into a normal, not “hybrid,” war. We should bear in mind that fighting in Georgian territory—the Five- Day War with Russia—was not an irregular hybrid war, but a “classical” invasion of regular troops of a neighboring state armed with a huge quantity of tanks and artillery and actively supported by aviation and the Navy. Ukraine left the weapons market of the post-Soviet region—this can be described as one of the specific military-political results of the Ukrainian crisis. During the entire post-Soviet period, Ukraine has been the main weapons supplier for the South Caucasian countries (Azerbaijan and Georgia in particular). In the past, Kiev has sold Tbilisi scores of tanks, IFVs, APCs, artillery systems, and air defenses (including the actively used Buk missile systems), L-39 jet trainer aircraft, and huge amounts of small arms and ammunition. In fact, for twenty-five years, Ukraine has been selling weapons and armaments (which could have been used in its own southeast) in quantities that transformed the export of armaments into an economic branch and a factor of Ukrainian internal policy.21 In the summer of 2014, it was rumored that Georgia was ready to sell six Su-25 jet aircraft that belonged to its air force; it could surmised that Ukraine was ready to buy them.22 As long as the opposition between the West and Russia within the continued Ukrainian crisis deepens, it cannot be excluded that Georgia’s armed forces will have to return to the “classical” defense methods. This is explained mainly by the increasing awareness among the Georgian political elite and people of the threats presented by their northern neighbor, while the area and scope of the Ukrainian crisis are spreading far and wide. In the new conditions, however, with the increasing tension across the post-Soviet space that stops short of another Cold War, the aims and tasks of Georgia’s AF will be revised and read- justed to the new conditions. In any case, the political elite of Georgia is growing increasingly concerned about a direct military threat to the country. Sooner or later, this concern will be trans- lated into revised aims, tasks, and structures of the armed forces adjusted to the geopolitical reality. In the summer of 2015, Georgia signed an agreement with France on a state-of-the-art missile system (probably SAMP/T) and a long-range radar station.23 This looks like a sign of the current concerns. In 2014, the military budget of Georgia amounted to $394 million (685 million lari). A year earlier, it was about $409 million (679 million lari), a drop from the previous years: in 2012, Georgia spent $492 million (822 million lari) on its defense and in 2011, $469 million (791 million lari).24

20 Project 1704: A U.S. Army War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe, an Appropriate U.S. Response, and the Implications for U.S. Landpower, ed. by Douglas Mastriano, Derek O’Malley, The U.S. War College, 26 March, 2015, pp. 48-49. 21 For more details, see: V. Badrak, S. Zgurets, and S. Maksimov, Kult: oruzheyny biznes po-ukrainsky, Kiev, 2004. 22 These six Su-25 aircraft had not been ungraded, together with six Georgian aircraft, at the Tbilisi Aviation Plant with the help of Israeli experts, even though this would not have been too expensive. It can be surmised that this information was spread for a different reason: it was reported that during the summer 2014 campaign, Ukraine had lost many of its Su-25 aircraft (for more details, see: I. Oragvelidze, “Gruzia khochet prodat polovinu svoikh Su-25,” available at [http://www.ekhokavkaza. com/content/article/25429760.html], 20 June, 2014). 23 See: “Nazvana sistema PVO, kotoruyu Gruzia khochet kupit u Frantsii,” available at [http://vz.ru/news/2015/4/9/738999. html], 9 April, 2015. 24 Estimated in constant (2014) US$ (see: [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database]).

41 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Military-Political Priorities and Integration with NATO

The new people who came to power in Georgia late in 2012 did not change much in the country’s foreign policy and military-political priorities, as well as the expectations and preferences of the Georgian public. Very much as before, people are still looking forward to EU and NATO membership and closer strategic relations with the United States. According to the sociological polls carried out in June 2013, 79% of Georgians want to see their country in the European Union, while 73% would like it to join NATO.25 There is a clear understanding, however, among at least part of the political elite and the public that the August War of 2008 and Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia created serious or even insurmountable obstacles on Georgia’s road to NATO. Before the Ukrainian crisis, the North Atlantic Alliance had not been seeking exacerbation of its relations with Russia, but this is highly likely if Georgia joins NATO. Prior to the Russian operation in Crimea and the fighting in the east of Ukraine, Georgia, which had not settled the problem of its territorial integrity and had not quenched the still smoldering ethnopolitical conflicts, could hardly hope to join NATO. This would have created new obligations for NATO and contradicted its enlargement standards.26 Georgian and some Western experts point to a way out of the current dead end regarding Geor- gia’s accession to NATO. Tbilisi should leave the trodden path and sacrifice the idea of returning Abkhazia and South Ossetia for the sake of its NATO membership. “One option, for example, could be to constitutionally reclassify one or both regions as confederal (or some other autonomous con- figuration) subjects—perhaps even unilaterally—which would legally grant the regions in question deep autonomy without surrendering Tbilisi’s territorial claims or ethnic cleansed Georgians the right of return.”27 This means that this could have created conditions conducive to MAP, since in this case there will be no need for NATO to protect Georgia’s territorial integrity and, therefore, confront Rus- sia, which has recognized the breakaway republics as independent states. The greater part of the Georgian expert community is convinced of the opposite: Russia will never accept Georgia’s membership in NATO even if it abandons Abkhazia and South Ossetia to their fates. They are saying in chorus: “At the end of the day, the Georgian public has not forgotten that Russia’s war aims were not about controlling the breakaway regions, but about punishing Georgia due to its move toward NATO integration and exercising Russia’s hard power in its self-declared ‘near abroad’.”28 The rapidly worsening relations between Russia and the West, and NATO as its part, might theoretically have affected the prospects for Georgia’s membership in NATO. In any case, these feelings surfaced after Russia’s Crimea campaign in February-March 2014. Late in March 2014, Presi- dent Obama stated that Ukraine is not on the way to joining the North Atlantic Alliance. This sent shockwaves across Georgian society. The leaders of the key NATO members said more or less the same thing in 2014, 2015, and later. The West was obviously aware that Moscow would interpret the possibility of Georgia’s NATO membership as crossing the “red line,” an unwelcome feeling against

25 See: K. Kakachia, “NATO-Georgia Relations: Will 2014 Bring Anything New?” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, September 2013, No. 291. 26 “States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance” (K. Kakachia, op. cit.). 27 M.H. Cecire, “Security and Symbolism: Georgia’s NATO Aspirations in Perspective,” in: Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Security, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Tbilisi, 2013, p. 77. 28 K. Kakachia, op. cit.

42 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 the background of the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine unfolding since the summer of 2014. The Georgian public hoped that the Ukrainian developments and the worsened relations between Russia and the West had created a situation in which MAP for Georgia would be a logical step at the NATO September 2014 summit in the U.K. The summit, however, was another disappointment. In these conditions, Georgia and the Alliance are drawing closer together: Georgia has become even more involved in the peacekeeping operations of NATO and the EU in different corners of the world, a factor of military-strategic importance. This can be interpreted as an attempt to address the problem at a lower, technical level of interoperability of Georgia’s AF with NATO forces, since it cannot be addressed and resolved at the higher, military-strategic level amid the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. To a certain extent, Georgia’s efforts can be compared with the involvement of military contingents of Greece and Turkey in the Korean war of 1950-1953 as part of the U.N. contingent. We all know that this was one of the main factors, at least at the public level, of their involvement in the so-called first enlargement of NATO in February 1952. It remains to be seen whether Georgia will follow in their footsteps: this depends on the dynamics of the geopolitical processes across the post-Soviet region in the near future. So far, the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center at the Krtsanisi Military Facil- ity, in fact a modest joint training center, opened in August 2015, and the publicly announced intention to include a Georgian contingent in NATO’s Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) and its possible use for peacekeeping operations look like the only steps toward Georgia’s NATO membership. Time will show whether these steps will remain signs of intention or of Georgia’s real incorporation into the Alliance.

Conclusion

In the last few years, military-building in Georgia and the reforms in Georgia’s AF have been consistently adapting the country to Western standards. In its defense and security policy, Georgia has been creating conditions conducive to MAP and, later, full NATO membership. So far, the unfa- vorable geopolitical conditions have been interfering with these efforts. Tbilisi and Brussels are looking for other ways and means to further synchronize their intentions and achieve interoperability of Georgia’s AF with the Alliance’s forces. On the other hand, Georgia is spending less money on weapons and military equipment bought abroad than it was immediately after the Five-Day War. Today, Tbilisi is working on internal and organizational-structural reforms; it is developing its own military-industrial complex and organizing the manufacture, repair, and upgrading of certain types of its weapons and military equipment. It seems that the state-of-the-art air-defense systems Georgia bought in France in 2015 will remain the only expensive deal with a foreign state, which is indispensable in view of the rising threat the Geor- gian military-political leaders perceive from the Russian Federation.

43 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

CHINA’S CHANGING STRATEGY IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION (Based on the Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative)

Ruslan IZIMOV Leading Expert, International Turkic Academy (Astana, Kazakhstan)

ABSTRACT

his article presents an analysis of Chi- through the prism of China’s new foreign poli- na’s Central Asian strategy after the cy strategy, which is being implemented within T new leadership headed by Xi Jinping the Silk Road Economic Belt concept. Under- and his “fifth generation” team came to power. standing the long-term nature of this project, The author takes an in-depth look at the new the author attempts to analyze the prerequi- approaches of Xi Jinping’s team in China’s do- sites of its emergence, the main thrust of the mestic and foreign policy. In so doing, China’s project, and the prospects for the Chinese changing policy in Central Asia is examined leadership’s new foreign political initiative.

KEYWORDS: China, Silk Road Economic Belt, Central Asian strategy, geopolitics, Chinese project.

Introduction

“The 21st century belongs to China.” This phrase is frequently repeated. It has been coined by many scientists, specialists, and statesmen of different countries of the world. In the 2000s in par-

44 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 ticular, most experts openly predicted that the Celestial Kingdom would assume a leading position in the world with respect to economic development. After 2008, when China’s double-digit growth rates became a thing of the past, many experts had to amend their forecasts and expectations regarding the Chinese economy. And today, the Chinese economy, despite its continued growth trends, leaves much to be desired. Under the impact of both internal and external factors, the system and form of economic development itself in China are undergoing changes. However, despite these changes, the Chinese economy remains one of the main driving forces behind the world economy. Along with the economic transformations, China’s foreign political positioning, as well as the approach of the Chinese authorities to key international issues, is also changing. Judging from a whole series of foreign political initiatives, a conceptually new trend in China’s foreign policy is currently emerging. And although it is still too early to talk about a cardinal change in this vector, the country is already taking more active part in world affairs, which is shown by the Chinese authorities’ proposals to raise economic cooperation to a new level, primarily with neighboring states and regions. The Silk Road Economic Belt concept was one of Beijing’s first major foreign economic (foreign political) initiatives after the current leaders came to power. The new course in international cooperation proposed by PRC Chairman Xi Jinping gave rise to lively discussions in the expert community. Whereas at the initial stage only Russia and the Central Asian countries were discussing the Chinese initiative, today experts from practically all countries, including Japan and the U.S., are focusing their attention on the Silk Road Economic Belt project. At the same time, when examining this topic, it must be understood that in the absence of any specific legal document, program, or concept, all discussions on the topic of the Chinese initiative will be short-term. And many issues on the agenda might become less urgent with the emergence of such a concept. This article will most likely not be relevant for very long either. Nevertheless, there are several factors that make it worth analyzing China’s Silk Road Economic Belt project.  First. The Silk Road Economic Belt is a grandiose geopolitical project proposed by the PRC leadership, in which a central role goes to the Central Asian countries, and Kazakhstan in particular. Judging from the statements of PRC Chairman Xi Jinping himself about the project, it can be confidently said, based on the measures being carried out today, the funds allotted for this project, and many other aspects, that the project will have a long-term effect. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that this particular initiative could well become the fulcrum or main thrust of the PRC’s new foreign policy strategy in Eurasia, or at least in Central Asia.  Second. The role of China itself and its place in the system of world political relations is becoming increasingly important. In these conditions, any statements, projects, and concepts of the second largest economy in the world deserve closer study and analysis.  Third. Despite the lively discussions, particularly in Russia and in several Central Asian states, and despite the public support by the heads of the indicated countries of the Chinese initiative, there are still extremely few serious studies of the prospects for the Silk Road Economic Belt. Keeping in mind all the above-mentioned factors, this article will make an attempt to give a preliminary evaluation of the Chinese initiative. It will try, based on the available data and expert opinions, to understand the following: — what goals the project is pursuing; — what opportunities and hidden risks it contains for the Central Asian states; — and how feasible this project is in the current geopolitical situation in Eurasia.

45 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Prerequisites

It is no secret that for more than 14-15 years now, the Chinese authorities have been making skillful use of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) format to ensure the efficient resolution of their issues with the Central Asian countries. In so doing, by interacting with each of the CA countries both within the SCO and in a bilateral format, Beijing has almost always had to look over its shoulder at Russia. Up to a certain point, this state of affairs essentially suited China. And until 2009- 2010, China preferred to progressively develop the energy sector of the CA economies without any intention of forming the current system of economic relations. However, as the Central Asian countries became steadily more dependent on the Eastern giant, the fears of their neighbors, especially Russia, rapidly grew. This was when the idea emerged of providing better protection of their own businessmen and the market itself from Chinese domination. As a result, the Customs Union of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus began officially functioning as early as 2010. And this was not where the matter ended. As all integration processes are wont to do, Eurasian integration began attracting an increasingly large number of states. And as of today, Kyr- gyzstan and Armenia have also acceded to the EAEU. It is more than likely that Tajikistan will join the Eurasian integration process in the near future. It stands to reason that the Chinese authorities are concerned about all of these processes. This required more active steps on the part of the PRC authorities, and the response was not long in coming. As expected, in contrast to the previous Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping’s team almost immediately began proposing new initiatives and concepts of the country’s further development. At the beginning of March 2013, Xi Jinping came forward with the idea of building a “Chinese Dream,” which addressed the most urgent problems of the ordinary people and, first of all, gives“ the hope of a higher standard of living, prosperity of Chinese society, China’s development, and invigoration of the Com- munist Party.”1 While substantiating the need to consolidate the Chinese people around elevated values, the new PRC leaders did not forget about reforms. It stands to reason that Xi Jinping will not carry out major political reforms. Here he will nevertheless adhere to Deng Xiaoping’s well-known phrase about “crossing the stream by feeling the stones,” in so doing putting the stakes on moderate political reforms. However, the economy is a different matter. Here the Chinese leaders cannot afford take their time. And consequently, it was economic reforms that became the driving force behind the new transformations in China’s foreign economic strategy. It was the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative that became one of the innovative vectors in the country’s foreign economic policy. Speaking in Astana in September 2013, the PRC Chairman suggested that the regional countries form a Silk Road Eco- nomic Belt together. This step, according to the Chinese side, was based on the following factors:  First, at this stage, a competitive struggle is seen in Central Asia between the regional and world powers. Each of the large international entities is offering the regional countries their way of resolving regional problems, in so doing prompting them to make a so-called final geopolitical choice. On the one hand, this will turn the region into a target of unilateral external influence of one of the global power centers, and on the other, will lead to a slow, but dangerous increase in conflict potential caused by rivalry over the region between the Western countries and Russia, as well as the large states of the Muslim region;  Second, certain contradictions have been identified among the Central Asian countries themselves regarding the choice of different integration vectors. For example, whereas

1 “Secretary General Xi Jinping Explains the ‘Chinese Dream’” (习近平总书记阐释 “中国梦”), 8 May, 2013, Xinhua Agency, available at [http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2013-05/08/c_124669102.htm], 25 August, 2015.

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Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are choosing close cooperation within the Eurasian Union, Tajikistan has not yet made a final decision on what to do, while Tashkent has taken a wait- and-see stance. Furthermore, experts are worried about official Tashkent establishing closer relations with Washington at the diplomatic level and in the military-political share. It stands to reason that this is putting the Chinese leadership on guard, particularly in light of the probable transfer of armed forces to Uzbekistan;  Third, according to several Chinese researchers, the integration unions proposed by Russia and the U.S. are aimed to a certain extent at limiting the Chinese presence in Central Asia. In particular, in an article entitled “The New Silk Road and Opposition to China: An Amer- ican Strategy for the South and Central Asian Countries,” the authors note that the aim of the American project is to unite Central Asia with Afghanistan in order to politically re- strain China’s strivings in this region. While the Russian initiative in the form of the Cus- toms Union, Single Economic Space, and Eurasian Economic Union is supposed to oppose China’s economic penetration.2 In addition to these factors, there are also geo-economic prerequisites for China creating such a grandiose project. In particular, given the constant increase in tension between China and the U.S, particularly in the APR, China is taking an increasingly closer look at land corridors as a future alternative for delivering its commodities to Europe. Keeping in mind the current circumstances, the Chinese authorities have apparently decided to offer their own version of macro regional integration with a Chinese dominance. In do doing, at the first stage, the Chinese authorities are counting on including economically weak neighboring countries in the project that have still not made their final decision regarding their prioritycenter of power.

The Thrust of the Chinese Initiative

The new initiative proposed by the Chinese leadership was, on the whole, expected in Kazakh- stan and the other republics of the region, since during the 20-odd years of cooperation with the Central Asian countries, China had not offered any specific documents determining its foreign political or economic strategy regarding the region. In this respect, Beijing was to designate its goals and tasks in the region in conceptual form and Xi Jinping’s initiative was probably an attempt to adopt this kind of strategy. As for the proposals of the Chinese leader themselves, they give a rather vague impression. An analysis of the many publications by leading Chinese experts on the Silk Road project makes it possible to gain only a general idea. For example, the scientific collection Rivalry among the Central Asian Strategies of China, the U.S., and Russia presents the opinions of the most authoritative Chi- nese researchers, who identify the following strong aspects of the Chinese project: — advantage of the development concept. Compared with Russia’s Eurasian Union and Amer- ica’s New Silk Road plan, China’s Silk Road Economic Belt is a comprehensive project that extends to the East, West, North, and South. If it is developed, it will benefit approximately 3 billion people. A Eurasian economic zone could be created within China’s idea of an economic belt that would include China, Central Asia, and Europe. The SCO and EurAsEC

2 See: “The New Silk Road and Opposition to China: An American Strategy for the South and Central Asian Countries” (美国在中南亚的“新丝绸之路”攻势与中国的应对), available at [http://www.xzbu.com/3/view-3611181.htm], 28 August, 2015.

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could cooperate with each other within the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt. Furthermore, China’s new idea envisages uniting member countries, observers, and partners in keeping with the SCO dialog based on the Silk Road.3 — significant financial resources. Today China is truly the leading creditor and investor of the Central Asian economies. Graphic evidence of this is the amount China invests in the Central Asian countries and Russia. — convenient geographic position. China borders on three Central Asian countries. Moreover, the Chinese integration project envisages the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus, that is, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. — advantage of traditions. According to Russian analysts, keeping in mind the deep historical roots of the Silk Road, China has the capacity to rejoin all of its ancient links, only this time with the help of modern transportation and infrastructural networks.4 On the whole, as can been seen from Xi Jinping’s speech in Astana (September 2013), the primary task of the Chinese initiative is to gradually lower and then remove altogether the trade and investment barriers between the participants in the project. According to the Chinese side, this measure is necessary in order to open up the trade and investment potential of the participating countries. Moreover, the project primarily envisages strengthening multilateral cooperation in the financial sphere, ensuring continuous monetary circulation, and harmonizing the currency systems of the participating countries. A network of regional financial development organizations is to be created and the movement of financial flows optimized in order to solve this task. When talking at the Nazarbaev University, Xi Jinping first noted the achievements of the deep mutually beneficial relations between the CA countries and China. The Chinese leader went on to note in the understated manner inherent in Chinese philosophers the deep significance of the unique thread that binds our countries from time immemorial. Emphasizing the importance of preserving and enhancing the ties that have existed between the peoples of China and Central Asia for thousands of years now, Xi offered five principles on which the belt along the ancient Silk Road should be built. In particular, these five principles applied to the following:  First—constantly exchanging opinions on different economic development strategy issues to elaborate economic integration measures and programs. The main task is to give the green light at the political and legal levels to the merging of the regional economies.  Second—building a single transport infrastructure from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea.  Third—expanding trade ties and eliminating the various bureaucratic and legal barriers interfering with them, accelerating delivery of commodities, and creating a corresponding logistics system.  Fourth—strengthening currency flows.  Fifth—reinforcing ties between the peoples.5 It is important to understand that the most obvious and key purpose for creating the Economic Belt is primarily aimed at developing the western regions of China, particularly Xinjiang. As the economic branch of the XUAR becomes modernized, the Chinese side intends to expand its ties with Europe and the Middle East countries through Central Asia.

3 See: “Rivalry among the Central Asian Strategies of China, the U.S., and Russia” (中美俄的中亚战略大竞争), 25 Sep- tember, 2013, available at [http://ihl.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2013/0925/277405.shtml], 11 October, 2015. 4 Ibidem. 5 See: “Three Principles for Creating the Silk Road Economic Belt” (构建“丝绸之路经济带 ”的三大原则), 24 Septem- ber, 2013, available at [http://www.cet.com.cn/plpd/cmpl/980682.shtml], 24 November, 2015.

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On the whole, although more than two years have passed since Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping voiced his initiative in Kazakhstan to build the Silk Road, no official documents, concepts, or programs have yet appeared. The only exception is the Road Map strategy “One Belt, One Road” presented in March 2015 at the Boao Forum. But despite its name, this document does not contain anything specific and does not provide answers to the main questions—how and with the help of what mechanisms will the Chinese initiative be implemented? It is also interesting how different sources and experts translate the name of the Chinese initiative itself. 丝绸之路经济带 (Sichou zhilu jingjidai) translates literally as the Silk Road Economic Belt. For some reason, it is this not entirely correct translation that Russian-speaking experts of various countries use most. But there are many translations, and the one that most precisely expresses the meaning of the Chinese proposal, in my opinion, is Economic Belt on the Silk Road. Another rendi- tion is Economic Belt along the Silk Road. In order to prevent any confusion with the words “belt” and “road,” only one noun could be used: Economic Silk Belt or Economic Silk Road. Whatever the case, by offering this formulation, the Chinese side is most likely placing the main emphasis on the following: On the one hand, the Chinese project is a unique response to America’s New Silk Road strategy, which, in the opinion of several Chinese analysts, is excessively politicized. On the other hand, by proposing the name Silk Road Economic Belt, Beijing is deliberately placing the main emphasis on the fact that the Chinese vision is based exclusively on economic values—building infrastructure, increasing goods turnover, raising the quality of logistics, etc. In 2014-2015, different kinds and levels of scientific-practical conferences, round tables, and seminars were held regularly in China to discuss the prospects for the Chinese initiative. Specialists from Russia and the Central Asian states are also focusing primary attention on Beijing’s project in their research studies. However, there are still no comprehensive works, mono- graphs, or collections on the Chinese initiative. Furthermore, all of these discussions on the opinion of the leading experts on China from Central Asia and Russia differ somewhat in their tone and emphasis. In particular, the general discourse of Chinese analysts concentrates on a more positive and optimistic assessment of the Silk Road project. K. Syroezhkin, a leading expert on China from Kazakhstan, writes in his articles about the contours of the Chinese initiative to revive the Silk Road. In his paper entitled “Concept for Forming the Economic Belt on the Silk Road: Problems and Prospects,” he gives important clarifications regarding the goals and tasks the Chinese authorities intend to bring to fruition within the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt project.6 It is worth noting that the Chinese idea is also quite actively discussed in European and Ame- rican journals. As an analysis carried out shows, from the end of 2013 to the beginning of 2015, The New York Times and The Financial Times alone printed more than 20 articles on the Chinese concept of the Silk Road Economic Belt. In an article entitled “China Looks West: What Is at Stake in Beijing’s ‘New Silk Road’ Project,” the authors of the weekly The World Financial Review write that in the two-and-a-half years he has been in power, Xi Jinping has made significant adjustments to the country’s foreign policy course. The publication believes that following the PRC’s more aggressive rhetoric in upholding its interests in the South China Sea, the establishment of close relations with Russia, and its inclusion in the global leadership for a place in the sun, China intends to participate in grandiose infrastructural mega projects in Eurasia, which was why it initiated the Silk Road Belt.7

6 See: K.L. Syroezhkin, “Kontseptsiia formirovaniia ‘Ekonomicheskogo poiasa na Shelkovom puti’: problemy i perspektivy,” Kazakhstan v globalnykh protsessakh, No. 1, 2014, pp. 54-64. 7 See: “China Looks West: What Is at Stake in Beijing’s ‘New Silk Road’ Project,” The World Financial Review, 25 January, 2015, available at [http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=3388], 11 October, 2015.

49 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS The Advantages of China’s Strategy

As soon as the Chinese side announced the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative, Kazakhstan was in the center of all the discussions. As we know, it all began with the speech by PRC Chairman Xi Jinping at the Nazarbaev University in September 2013. Immediately following this, lively discussions of this topic began both in China and in the Central Asian republics and Russia. Three provi- sional stages in the advance by the Chinese authorities of their initiative can be singled out:  First. Announcement of the Initiative. Statement on the general principles and interests of implementing the Chinese project. The main emphasis is placed on what response the Chi- nese project will arouse and how the key participants, as well as the regional and global powers, will perceive it.  Second. Announcement that all internal projects in China linking the eastern and western regions of the country are the beginning of the Silk Road Economic Belt. Preparing an internal component of the project in order to announce full readiness to carry out its ideas abroad too.  Third. From Word to Deed. At this stage, the Chinese authorities are beginning to take very real steps to implement their own initiative. In particular, it was at this time, that is, since the end of 2014, that Beijing announced the creation of such financial structures as the Silk Road Foundation and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which are called upon to ensure the funding of the Silk Road Economic Belt and other projects within the framework of the One Belt, One Road strategy. At the beginning of March 2014, three scientific-research institutes were created in China, the activity of which is to be directed toward drawing up a specific action plan within the framework of this project. In particular, the Institute of Central Asia, the Institute for Study of the Silk Road at Northwest University, and the Institute of Central Asia at Xian International Studies University were established. Along with them, in compliance with Xi Jinping’s instructions, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps will take direct part, beginning in 2014, in practical implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt project. As the PRC Chairman noted, the Corps has unique organizing potential, geographic advantages, financial resources, and a long-term development strategy.8 To be fair, it should be noted that the Chinese initiative has many positive aspects. For example, from the viewpoint of the economic component and the possibilities of developing transportation and logistic cooperation, the Chinese initiative is definitely of immense interest to Kazakhstan. It is important to note that Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev has repeatedly spoken in favor of reviving the Great Silk Road. Another just as attractive aspect of the Chinese project lies in the possibility of expanding cultural and humanitarian cooperation with China. It would be expedient for the Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan, to promote greater recognition and proper understanding by the Kazakhs of strategic partnership relations with their Eastern neighbor. From this viewpoint, the Silk Road project makes it possible to intensify mutual exchanges of specialists in the humanitarian sciences and in culture.

8 See: “Role of the Production and Construction Corps in Implementing the Silk Road Economic Belt Strategy” (兵团在“丝绸之路经济带”战略中应大有作为), 16 January, 2014, available at [http://www.xjbt.gov.cn/zjbt/shjj/sczlxj/249664. htm], 5 July, 2015.

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And finally, the very existence of such a long-term Chinese strategy in our region makes it possible for Central Asia to retain and even raise the world powers’ interest in it. It is particularly important that this concept is based precisely on economic interaction. Furthermore, it must be objectively understood that the Chinese project, like any other development concept of a foreign country, has certain weak aspects, as well as certain challenges.

Risks and Challenges

Based on the goals and tasks of the Silk Road project, it is clear that it will strive to open the borders for free movement of commodities and people between China and Central Asia. This is where the risks come in, since Central Asia may find itself in the midst of the all-out economic trade and migration expansion of its Eastern neighbor. In this context, the Silk Road initiative is closely related to another Chinese project called Free Trade Zones in the Framework of the SCO. As we know, Moscow blocked this proposal by Beijing, after which the Chinese authorities may have changed their tactics, relying primarily on bilateral cooperation with each of the Central Asian republics. It is known that the Chinese authorities announced their interest again at the summit of SCO heads of state in Beijing at the end of 2015 in creating free trade zones within the framework of the SCO. Despite the official statements by the Chinese authorities that the PRC is not claiming world supremacy, Beijing, judging by everything, has very serious intentions of forming a world order alternative to the current one. Financially speaking, China is making the effort to create an analogue to the IMF in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which has a total capital of $800 billion. Furthermore, Beijing has already pushed through the idea of a free trade zone with the APEC countries and established a Silk Road Foundation with a capital of $40 billion. The geopolitical aspect of a China-centered world is based on the long-term strategy of two roads—land and sea. It is this nuance, that is, counting on a long-term political advantage, that will determine the replication of the economic advantage for China. Based on the above, at the first stage, which is assumed will last for 5-7 years, the projects within the framework of the One Belt, One Road strategy will be exclusively advantageous for its participants from the viewpoint of economic dividends and real profit. (In particular, the Chinese projects within the framework of the mentioned strategy are much more attractive than the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP] or Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership [RCEP].) However, in the longer term, these projects will promote greater dependence on China (investments, commodities), on the one hand, and distancing from the Western political and economic structures, on the other. Having said that, the Chinese strategy will most likely encounter serious opposition, whereby not so much from its participants themselves, although this is entirely to be expected (particularly in the southeasterly direction), as from the U.S. and its allies. Noting the risks of the Chinese strategy, Secretary General of the Boao Asian Forum Zhou Wenzhong, an authoritative Chinese specialist, said that the following two challenges must be faced: the geopolitical challenge and the risk in the sphere of international finances. In other words, the Chinese expert was hinting that in the mid-term, China would encounter what the U.S. encountered when carrying out its policy in other regions of the world. In particular, sooner or later, the question would arise of ensuring stability in those countries in which large investments are made, whereas the One Belt, One Road strategy envisages making multi-billion investments in countries that are not very stable in the political and financial respect (countries of Southeast, Central, and Southern Asia, Africa, and the Middle East). In so doing, the message is being heard that the Chinese leadership must be ready to adopt forceful methods outside the country, as well as be ready for criticism from the world community.

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There is also something else that intensifies the fears about the Chinese project. It is still not clear what role and place the Chinese authorities are assigning Russia in the One Belt, One Road strategy. Despite the official statements by the authorities, as well as the designated plans (an express Beijing-Moscow railroad, highway, etc.), China is essentially allotting Russia an insignificant place in its strategy. Furthermore, by offering Moscow participation in the above-mentioned road-building projects, Beijing, judging by everything, is hoping to distract Russia’s attention from its own plans in Central Asia. It is entirely clear that Russian-Sino relations are currently characterized by mutual concessions. To solve its own tasks each of the sides is interested in the other, while less attention is focused on their competitive views. However, in the long-term geopolitical respect, China and Russia remain rivals, while keeping in mind China’s ambitions plans to form a China-centered world order, these nations will most likely become irreconcilable rivals again. This means that sooner or later, the model of cooperation offered by China will contradict to some extent the integration projects in which Moscow acts as moderator. This in turn means that the conflict of interests between China and Russia in Central Asia will only grow, and it is very predict- able that the political elites of the regional states will be faced with a geopolitical choice. Editorial articles in China’s official and unofficial printed organs published at the end of last year have become graphic confirmation of this thesis. In particular, the official printed organ of the Chinese Communist Party Renmin ribao published two articles at the same time on its site giving a comparative analysis of the Eurasian Union and Silk Road Economic Belt projects: “What Differ- ences Are There in the Strategies of China, the U.S., and Russia in Central Asia?” and “The Silk Road Economic Belt: What Competitive Advantages Does China Have in Central Asia.”9 In these articles, Chinese experts openly ask Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to join the Silk Road Economic Belt instead of the Customs Union. For example, when talking at a round table in Bishkek, Vice President of the China Institute of International Studies Ruan Zongze asked Kyrgyzstan to reject its accession to the CU in favor of joining the Chinese Silk Road initiative. In his opinion, “The Cus- toms Union consists of only three countries and it is unclear who else will decide to join it.” The likelihood of a shift in accents in the choice of priority route for transporting hydrocarbons from Central Asia to China, as well as with respect to the development of the network of infrastructural systems, can also be identified as a potential threat to Kazakhstan. For example, the Chinese authorities have been actively advancing the project to build a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad for quite some time now. This project is already moving into the practical stage today.10 During Kyr- gyzstan Prime Minister Temir Sariev’s visit to China in December 2015, the sides announced that a final agreement on the project had been reached. Furthermore, judging by everything, Kyrgyzstan agreed to build the railroad in keeping with Chinese standards.11 Moreover, the Chinese leadership proposed extending the fourth line of the Turkmenistan- China gas pipeline through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the direction of China. In so doing, Kazakhstan loses its place in this chain. Here an essentially new phenomenon is emerging— China’s striving to take on responsibility for moderating relations among the regional countries. At this stage, it is difficult to determine whether this is good or bad. But one thing is clear, China will invest even more actively in the economies of the Central Asian countries and, correspondingly, augment its potential in the political sphere with the aim of protecting its investments.

9 “What Differences Are There in the Strategies of China, the U.S., and Russia in Central Asia?” available in Russian at [http://russian.people.com.cn/95181/8420655.html], 15 September, 2015. 10 See: “Central Asian Strategy and the Economic Belt along the Silk Road” (中亚战略和新丝绸之路经济带), 30 No- vember, 2013, available at [http://finance.eastmoney.com/news/135020131130342017622.html], 13 May, 2015. 11 See: “Building the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railroad Will Turn the Republic into a Transit Country,” available in Russian at [http://www.gov.kg/?p=68650&lang=ru], 2 January, 2016.

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When listing the potential risks of the Chinese project, it should be noted that in the current situation, Beijing’s geopolitical influence on the regional countries is dramatically rising. This is related to the fact that given the increasing geopolitical opposition between the U.S. and Russia, particularly against the background of the Ukrainian crisis, these nations risk missing important opportunities in Central Asia. By taking advantage of this situation, the Chinese side might take specific steps in the near future to implement the Economic Belt along the Silk Road concept. At the same time, separate mention should be made of the fact that it is traditionally acceptable to keep in mind only external conditions when examining China’s Economic Belt along the Silk Road project, that is, the situation in Central Asia, the willingness of these states to support Russia’s incli- nations and position, and so on. But I feel we should not forget about China’s internal readiness and, most important, the potential of the Chinese economy itself to cope with such a grandiose project. Today China has found the necessary finances and has initiated the establishment of two major financial institutions—the Silk Road Foundation and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank—for the Economic Belt along the Silk Road project in particular and the One Belt, One Road strategy, on the whole. At the same time, it is important, in my opinion, not to forget that the Chinese economy is now entering a dangerous period of its development, and this is precisely when the economic miracle of the Celestial Kingdom might end. According to specialists, in the first half of 2015, the Chinese economy showed a record high state debt, while the situation in the stock market and real estate market as a whole confirms that the Chinese economy has fundamental problems. That said, it is also worth taking into account such internal factors as the interparty struggle and the approaching date for a change in power in China. Will Xi Jinping’s team succeed in making pre- cise plans to ensure the practical implementation of the long-term strategy in the time that remains? Will the new leaders of the Chinese Communist Party continue the undertakings of Xi and his entou- rage? And can ambitious Xi Jinping introduce major changes into the power transfer system from generation to generation? All of these questions directly influence the success and stability of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt project.

Conclusion

China is determined to gradually change the form of its presence in Central Asia. Whereas before, beginning in the 1990s until today, China preferred to act as an observer and in so doing gradually enter the energy sector of the regional economies, now China is ready to pose a challenge to other international players by offering its own ideological standards and ideas. After weighing up the new trends toward a more intensive competitive struggle between the world and regional powers in Central Asia, official Beijing has decided to take more active part in this process. For this purpose, the Economic Belt along the Silk Road program was adopted. An analysis of the project gives reason to believe that this is a long-term strategy calculated for the decades ahead and aimed at forming China’s relations with its neighboring countries in the conceptual sense. Like any other project, the Chinese initiative has its advantages, as well as its risks and challenges. Kazakhstan’s primary task when examining the possibility of participating in the Chinese project is to make as effective use as possible of the advantages of the Chinese initiative, on the one hand, and minimize the risks of the project, on the other. Nevertheless, despite the noted challenges and risks inherent in the One Belt, One Road strategy, it must be objectively understood that, on the whole, the Chinese initiative opens up vast prospects for its participants, which it would be foolish to ignore or reject. In particular, internal discus-

53 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS sions among Chinese experts show several promising vectors for Kazakhstan’s fundamental inclusion in China’s Economic Belt along the Silk Road project with maximum advantages and minimum risks. On the whole, when examining the alternatives for participating in the Chinese project, it is important for Kazakhstan not to fully repeat the Russian interpretation of Beijing’s strategy, but not overestimate its possibilities either. In conclusion, it is important to understand that today we are not only witnesses, but also direct participants in the gradual reformatting of the world system. Our Eastern neighbor is one of the key driving forces behind these transformations today. This entails challenges, as well as enormous opportunities to acquire the most advantageous place for ourselves in the new world order.

GEOPOLITICAL “U.S.-CHINA-RUSSIA” TRIANGLE: THE ASIA PACIFIC CONTEXT

Larisa GARUSOVA D.Sc. (Hist.), Professor, Department of Theory and History of Russian and Foreign law, Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service (Vladivostok, Primorsky Territory, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

he basic interests and resources of only depend on Russian-Chinese coopera- the three great Pacific powers—the tion, but also on the development of Sino- T United States, China, and Russia— U.S. relations. This is compelling Washing- are currently concentrated in the Asia Pacific ton to look for new partners and allies, in- Region. Against the backdrop of the deterio- cluding in the Asia Pacific Region, one of rating relations between Russia and the Unit- which could be Russia. However, the deteri- ed States (because of the events in Ukraine), oration in U.S.-Russian relations against the China has become a key partner and the background of the increasing “Eastern,” or main foreign policy priority of both countries. rather “Chinese” vector of Russian foreign With the help of Russia, China has the po- policy leaves little opportunity for such sce- tential to enhance its regional and interna- narios to emerge. The confrontation between tional status and become, along with the Russia and the United States is counterpro- United States, one of the poles in the bipolar ductive since not one of the parties, with the world order that is emerging. The United exception of China, can objectively benefit States does not yet perceive Russia as a Pa- from it. Prior to the crisis in Ukraine (2014- cific power. Russia’s opportunities and pros- 2015), the American elite and society had pects in the Asia Pacific Region today not little interest in Russia. Russian foreign poli-

54 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 cy must now focus on making its relations lateral format—“U.S.-China-Russia.” Russia with China and the U.S. constructive and must make its relations with China and the mutually complementary, including in the tri- U.S. more productive for its own benefit.

KEYWORDS: Russia, U.S., China, Asia Pacific, security.

Introduction

Transformation of the Asia Pacific Region (APR) into a center of the world economy and politics has now become an axiom. In this context, the very fact that a particular country is geographi- cally located in the region is seen as its geopolitical and geo-economic asset. The interests and resources of two key Pacific powers—the United States and China—are concentrated in the Asia Pa- cific Region. Russia is positioning itself as a country that wants to find its well-earned place among the advanced Asian economies. However, Russia’s future in the Asia Pacific Region not only depends on cooperation with the Asian countries (especially China), but also on relations with another Pacific power—the United States. Thus, a virtual “U.S.-China-Russia” triangle has developed in the Asia Pacific Region today, the members of which have both common and divergent interests, objectives, and priorities. The question is whether the common interests of the great powers can mitigate or neutralize their differences and mutual misunderstanding. The Obama administration has proclaimed the APR to be the U.S.’s main strategic goal in the 21st century. However, in recent years, along with its interests in the Pacific, America has been actively dealing with the key international problems that affect its international leadership and prestige. This applies to the situation around Ukraine and the Middle East, especially in Syria. The policy papers and speeches of well-known American political scientists Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger in the Senate Committee in late January 2015 placed top priority on these topics, as well as on relations in the “U.S.-China-Russia” triangle.1

Review of the Literature and Research Methods

The active interest of researchers in the Asia Pacific Region, as well as in the regional policy of the world powers can be traced back to the beginning of the 1990s when a number of Asian countries underwent significant economic recovery. At the same time, attempts were made to define the concept “Asia Pacific,” and describe its structure and boundaries. The difficulties associated with resolving these problems led some authors to question the reality of the existence of the APR.2 Researchers have traditionally considered the United States, Russia, and China to be the key APR “players,” however,

1 See: Zb. Brzezinski, Global Challenges and U.S. National Security Strategy. Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CSIS. 216 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., 21 January, 2015, p. 3; H.A. Kissinger,Global Challenges and U.S. National Security Strategy. Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CSIS. G-50 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., 29 January, 2015, p. 5. 2 See: O.A. Arin, А. Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskii region, Moscow, 1997, p. 435.

55 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the role of each of them varied at different historical times. In the 1990s, the United States strengthened its regional influence, announcing the creation of a unipolar world,3 while in the 2000s, China fortified its position. Renowned American historian V. Mote analyzed Russia’s prospects in the Asia Pacific Region and surmised that the Russian Far East could only develop in close cooperation with the APR countries, including the U.S. and China. The Asia Pacific Region, according to him, would be able to manage without the resources of the Russian Far East and Siberia, but Russia would “wither” without the APR.4 In the first decades of the 21st century, interest in the problems of the Asia Pacific Region, -in cluding regional U.S.-Chinese-Russian relations, only intensified. Comprehensive study of Russian- American cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region in the context of the impact of the “China factor” is most fully represented in the works of L.N. Garusova.5 In a number of her speeches and policy papers, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton formulated the task of “returning” the United States to the Asia Pacific Region as the main official priority of U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century.6 When analyzing the economic and political rise of China as a threat to international dominance of the United States, Brzezinski, a well-known American political scientist, believes that China’s leadership is not in the interests of most countries, including Russia.7 This creates potential for Russian-American cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region with “anti-China” overtones. The main trends of Russian policy in the Asia Pacific Region are set forth in the state development programs for Siberia and the Far East, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2013), etc. Similar documents of the State Department, as well as official statements and expert reports of the U.S. Congress, give an idea of current U.S. foreign policy.8 This work is based on a geopolitical conceptual approach and aims to investigate the system of international relations at the global and regional levels. The geopolitical laws of the foreign policy of the key Asia Pacific countries—the U.S., China, and Russia—can easily be seen in the mainstream of contemporary geopolitical theories of the post-bipolar world order. The geographic, economic, and political opportunities throughout the Asia Pacific Region as a whole and the Russian Far East in particular are analyzed in the context of the geopolitical theory “of the coastal space” (rimland) as an area of dynamic development.

Results

The Pacific vector of U.S. foreign policy is traditional, historically significant, and even officially substantiated by the famous Monroe Doctrine (1823). As early as the 19th century, the Ameri- cans were firmly convinced they belonged in the Pacific and would remain there in the 21st century. In 2010, the administration of President Barack Obama officially announced the “return” of the United States to its “Pacific Home” after many decades of active Atlantic and Middle Eastern policy.

3 See: A.D. Bogaturov, Velikie derzhavy na Tikhom okeane. Istoria i teoria mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii v Vostochnoi Azii posle Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (1945—1995), Moscow, 1997, p. 352. 4 See: V.L. Mote, Siberia. World Apart, Westview Press, U.S., 1998, p. 239. 5 See: L.N. Garusova, Rossia i SShA: tikhookeanskoe vzaimodeistvie na rubezhe vekov (1991-2003), Vladivostok, 2005, p. 272; Idem, “Tikhookeanskaia Rossia v kontekste sovremennoi vneshnei politiki SShA,” Vestnik Dalnevostochnogo otdeleniia Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, No. 6 (178), 2014, pp. 5-14. 6 See: H.R. Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, available at [http://www. foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century]. 7 See: Zb. Brzezinski, “After America,” Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 2012, available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2012/01/03/after_America]. 8 See: Zb. Brzezinski, Global Challenges and U.S. National Security Strategy, p. 3; H.A. Kissinger, op. cit.

56 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016

According to President Obama, the United States stands ready to continue playing a leadership role in the Asia Pacific Region. The U.S. administration believes that “one of the most important tasks of the American government for the next decade is to dramatically increase diplomatic, economic, strategic, and other investments in the Asia Pacific Region.”9 Currently, the United States has four priorities in East Asia: — Maintaining the current relations in the region, primarily a strong alliance with Japan and the Republic of Korea; — Strengthening cooperation with the “new” powers in Asia and expanding economic and other relations with China; — Strengthening cooperation on a multilateral basis, including within the framework of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); — Continuing multilateral cooperation to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Barack Obama made his first visits to Asia Pacific countries—Thailand, Myanmar, and Cam- bodia—and took part in the East Asia Summit after his re-election to a second term in November 2012. In February 2013, the State Department confirmed the United States’ willingness to “restore strategic balance” (rebalance) in Asia Pacific. It was announced that the scope of U.S. strategic interests in the Asia Pacific Region should be expanded to South Asia, especially India. The United States sees itself as the main trading partner of the Pacific Rim countries, as well as a source of innovation that benefits workers and businesses on both sides of the Pacific. Universities and colleges in the United States receive $350 thousand every year. Six of America’s ten largest trade partners are in the Asia Pacific Region, including Canada, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Hong Kong. APEC countries annually import 60% of U.S. commodity exports and about 40% of U.S. exports of private services, while maintaining about 6 million jobs in the United States. China is a top priority of U.S. foreign policy, on cooperation with which the regional and global future of the United States depends. The U.S. State Department also outlined the main areas of cooperation with China in regional security. The APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014 confirmed the mutual interest in constructive China-U.S. economic and political cooperation. The leaders of the states—Barack Obama and Xi Jinping—agreed to sign two agreements forestalling the possibility of military conflict between their countries. U.S. relations with China are based on real strategic partnership, accompanied by an increase in their interdependence. Despite its strategic partnership with China, the United States is not going to give up regional leadership in the Asia Pacific Region. It is determined to maintain its military and political dominance in light of China’s growing might. Current U.S. military strategy envisages deploying 60% of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific Ocean this decade. Potential conflict in Sino-U.S. relations will increase not only the strategic value of the U.S.’s traditional allies (Japan and the Republic of Korea), but also of other countries in Northeast Asia. American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski has said that without U.S. leadership the international community can expect chaos. “For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor — not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes.”10 Brzez-

9 H.R. Clinton, op. cit. 10 Zb. Brzezinski, “After America.”

57 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS inski makes it clear that China is not yet ready for the role of world leader. Moreover, its rapid rise might unite other countries against it, including Russia and the United States. He did not rule out that at some point, “more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China’s international interests, because none of China’s key neighbors — India, Japan, and Russia — is ready to acknowl- edge China’s entitlement to America’s place on the global totem pole.”11 Unlike China, Russia is not a priority for American foreign policy in the Asia Pacific Region. America perceives Russia today more as an Eastern European, rather than a Pacific power. After the Russian Far East opened up to the outside world in the early 1990s, the United States (along with China, South Korea, and Japan) was its very strong counterparty for the next ten years. This was a period of active U.S. economic, political, and humanitarian cooperation in Pacific Russia. In 1998, it formulated the “U.S. government strategy for the Russian Far East.” It explained that the U.S. has been implementing a Far East assistance program since 1992 and includes the task of creating basic market economy institutions, forming basic management skills, providing small businesses access to credit, enhancing American trade and investment in the region, and promoting non-governmental organizations, independent media, and civil society.12 A number of reasons drew U.S. attention to Pacific Russia in the 1990s, which are still pertinent today: — first, America’s national and regional security interests, which the American government felt could be ensured by turning post-Soviet Russia into a democratic market country along the lines of Western democracies. Russia’s Far East is particularly important for U.S. nuclear security, since this territory, which is adjacent to the U.S. west coast, has a powerful military segment in the form of the country’s Pacific fleet, which boasts a nuclear arsenal. U.S. -na tional security interests now see the Far East through the prism of the “Chinese factor”: stronger Chinese pressure on the APR is just as dangerous for Pacific Russia as it is for the U.S.; — second, the American side has an economic (raw material resource) interest in cooperating with the Far East Region, the importance of which should not be overestimated. Pacific Rus- sia also has a certain amount of transit and transportation potential; for example, the transportation corridor from the American port of Tacoma to Brest, which both countries tried to create in 1999 as an East-West project; — third, interstate and intergovernmental relations between the two countries in themselves are an important stimulus of American interest and cooperation in the Far East. They developed very successfully in the 1990s with the U.S. and Russian Federation showing each other their loyalty and affinity at all levels and in all vectors of cooperation. At the turn of the 2000s, America’s business and humanitarian activity in Pacific Russia began winding down. Russia stopped working with numerous American non-profit and non-governmental organizations in the Far East. In October 2012, USAID representative agencies were closed across the country, one of which, in the Far East, had funded 30 programs in small business support, environmental management, health, democratic initiatives, etc. Today, the U.S. Consulate General in Vladivostok has only a visa office, department of education and culture, and press office of the Min- istry of Agriculture. The fact that the Russian Far East is no longer a significant economic partner of the United States is shown by the 2-2.5% share of U.S. trade in its foreign trade turnover. For comparison, in 1995 it reached 16%.13

11 Zb. Brzezinski, “After America.” 12 See: L.N. Garusova, Rossia i SShA: tikhookeanskoe vzaimodeistvie na rubezhe vekov (1991-2003), p. 272. 13 See: L.N. Garusova, “Tikhookeanskaia Rossia v kontekste sovremennoi vneshnei politiki SShA,” pp. 5-14.

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Today, the business relations between Russia and the U.S. in the region are maintained in three sectors of the Russian American Pacific Partnership (RAPP): — transport and trade; — energy, energy saving, and high technologies (Microsoft’s participation in creating a e-government in the Far East); — environment protection and tourism. These sectors represent the economic ties that have survived since the 1990s between the two countries in the Far East and U.S. interest in these areas of the Far Eastern economy. This primarily applies to the major Sakhalin-1 project with the participation of the Exxon Mobil Corporation and its $10 billion investments. At present, China is the main foreign policy and economic priority not only of the U.S., but also of Russia in the APR. The East Asian vector of Russian foreign policy has essentially turned into a Chinese vector. China and Russia enjoy mutual understanding in many international issues. Russia is becoming a significant factor of China’s growing might and so is a threat to the United States. Several years ago, cooperation between Russia and China became known in the West as “an axis of convenience.” Over time, the relations between the two countries became only “convenient” for both of them. Moscow and Beijing have settled—at least temporarily—their territorial disputes and are now collaborating on a strategic level, including with respect to “squeezing” the United States out of Asia. The aggravated confrontation between Moscow and the West over Ukraine has only strengthened the Chinese vector of Russian foreign policy. In terms of geopolitics, the establishment of a Sino-Russian alliance could lead to the consolidation of the emerging bipolar structure in East Asia, one of the poles of which will be headed by China (including Russia), and the second by the United States (and its allies Japan and South Korea). The greatest fear of the U.S. and its Asian allies is aroused by the following areas of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, including in the Asia Pacific Region: — export of arms and military technology from Russia to China; — Russia’s support of China in its so-called “maritime dispute” with U.S. allies over East Asian maritime resources (natural, transport-communication, navigational, strategic, etc.); — primary orientation of Russian hydrocarbon exports toward Chinese markets. However, as with the U.S., China’s relations with Russia are asymmetric in nature. At present, Russia ranks only 10th among China’s trading partners, giving primacy to the EU, U.S., Japan, and other countries, while China has become its principal (along with the EU) trade partner. Trade between China and Russia has not reached the “target figure” of $100 billion, planned by the Chinese and Russian heads of state as early as 2012. Russia is counting in its “East Asian” policy on bonuses from energy exports. Hydrocarbon reserves are turning Siberia and the Far East into the central link in the current and future international energy projects in the Asia Pacific Region. Its huge reserves of energy resources make it possible for Russia to put economic and political pressure on the countries of the Asia Pacific Region. It is understood that as China’s economic and political position strengthens political and economic interest in Russia in the East Asia will drop. There are fears that China’s successful integration into the world economy and politics will put Russia further away from the West—Europe and the United States—than China. If Russia focuses only on its relations with China, it will reduce its competitive advantages and weaken its political position in East Asia: it will remain on the periphery of the interests of the East Asian community. Therefore, the most desirable option for Russia is to di- versify its relations with the APR countries.

59 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Conclusion

The main challenge now facing America is preserving its global and regional leadership and forming an international environment that will prompt China to accept the existing global order. This is compelling Washington to look for new partners and allies, including in the Asia Pacific Region, one of which (until recently) could have been Russia. However, the deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations against the background of the increasing “Eastern,” or rather “Chinese” vector of Russian foreign policy leaves little opportunity for such scenarios to emerge. In turn, China has the potential to help Russia strengthen its regional and international status. Russia’s prospects in the Asia Pacific Region today not only depend on Russian-Chinese cooperation, but also on the development of Sino- U.S. relations. The irreconcilable positions of Russia and the United States in relation to each other are counterproductive. So far China, as a strategic partner of both of them, is the only country gaining from the confrontation between the United States and Russia.

60 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

INNOVATIVE INVESTMENT TRENDS IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS

Vladimir MINAKOV D.Sc. (Tech.), Professor, Saint Petersburg State University of Economics (St. Petersburg, Russian Federation)

Armen GALSTYAN Ph.D. (Econ.), Associate Professor, North Caucasus Federal University (Stavropol, Russian Federation)

Lyudmila PITERSKAYA D.Sc. (Econ.), Professor, Kuban State Agrarian University (Krasnodar, Russian Federation)

Maria RADCHENKO Ph.D. (Econ.), Associate Professor, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Krasnodar Branch (Krasnodar, Russian Federation)

Anastasia SHIYANOVA Ph.D. (Econ.), Assistant at the Department of Global Information Resources and E-Business, North Caucasus Federal University (Stavropol, Russian Federation)

61 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

ABSTRACT

his article analyzes the efficiency of segment, a decisive role is played by online investment in various sectors of the taxi booking services Yandex.taxi, GetTaxi T economy of Russia’s Northern Cau- (Gett), and others. They have provided in- casus. It has been established that the larg- novative technological solutions using mo- est cash flow from investments is generated bile gadgets and applications, which signifi- by enterprises engaged in agricultural pro- cantly increase the market penetration of duction and processing, as well as high-tech innovative forms of services. In agricultural enterprises. A survey of the most efficient production in the Northern Caucasus, a new agricultural enterprises shows that the most driver of revenue growth is workflow auto- competitive and profitable ones are those mation based on innovative smart firmware that have been restructured based on inno- devices. They enable rational situational de- vative forms of organization and manage- cision making based on real-time measurement and innovative technologies in basic ment and analysis of production processes. production processes. In the structure of in- Such management leads to a significant innovative development, the authors identify crease in crop yields with a simultaneous re- innovations that use information and com- duction in costs. In our view, the intellectual munication technologies (ICT). It is shown skills of personnel who service innovative that these technologies provide the basis for equipment are of fundamental importance in the ongoing convergence of modern innova- this context. The formation of human capital tions in the economy of the Northern Cauca- with a higher intellectual level requires the sus. This is particularly characteristic of ser- development of the education system and in- vices provided to the public. For example, vestment in institutions for advance training the tourism industry has been developing of personnel and the development of new with positive revenue growth due to the competencies. This helps to create a system emergence of online aggregators presented with positive feedback, self-regulation and in the Web services market by companies development. The stability of system relation- engaged in integrating travel services. First, ships in the economy of the Northern Cauca- they promote the services of tour operators, sus has stood the test of the crises of 2008- and second, they perform the function of lo- 2009 and 2014-2015. Consequently, the es- gistic integration. As logistics hubs, they ini- tablished innovative development trend tiate flows of financial and other resources should also be seen as fundamental for gov- through systems of online orders and pay- ernment agencies responsible for the devel- ments. Significant progress has been made opment strategy of the Northern Caucasus in road transport services. In this market and investment in its infrastructure.

KEYWORDS: innovations, regional economy, efficiency, cash flow from investments, information and communication technologies (ICT), convergence.

Introduction

The economic cycles of the last decade caused significant volatility in world and regional markets and thus created the conditions for the instability of many real sector companies and financial

62 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 institutions.1 In the territorial structure of the economy of the Russian Federation, the regions had to cope with the effects of disturbing factors under unequal conditions. Russia’s regions also differ in the structure of their economy and, accordingly, in the opportunities for implementing stabilization measures, as well as in their effectiveness. The Northern Caucasus is of special geopolitical importance for the economy of the Russian Federation. Due to migration processes in the region itself and in adjacent areas, its economic position has a number of specific features. A significant role is played by natural climatic conditions,2 which determine the opportunities and trends for the development of recreational tourist areas, the high share of agricultural production, and the constraints on the formation of sectoral clusters. A study of current trends in the development of the economy of the North Caucasus region of Russia and maintenance of its stability is highly relevant in this context. The purpose of our study is to identify and validate the opportunities for providing investment support and resetting the economy of the Northern Caucasus based on the replacement of loss-making enterprises with innovative high-tech ones as a top priority.

Current Economic Trends in the North Caucasus Federal District

In the system of Russia’s administrative-territorial division, the North Caucasus Federal District (FD) includes the republics of Daghestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay- Cherkessia and Chechnia, and Stavropol Krai (Territory). An analysis of the size of the population living in the territory of the North Caucasus FD,3 as presented in Table 1, shows that it is one of the two least populous territorial entities. The size of its economically active population is proportion- ally lower. Its area is no more than 170.4 thousand square kilometers. It is important to note, however, that demographic processes4 lead to an increase in the size of the population, which enhances the region’s labor potential. At the same time, the structure of the rural and urban population is biased toward the former, which amounts to 50.9% of the total (as of 1 January, 2015). This is the highest figure of all federal districts of Russia. Moreover, rural population growth is negative in all federal districts except the Southern and North Caucasus FDs. Compared to the Southern FD, the North Caucasus FD has shown the largest increase in rural population (by 70,000 over two years, or 1.42%). Thus, we can conclude that, despite the crisis, agriculture in the region is attractive to its population.

1 See: S.V. Ryazantsev, M.F. Tkachenko, Mirovoi rynok truda i mezhdunarodnaia migratsia, Ekonomika, Moscow, 2010, p. 32. 2 See: A.S. Lukyanets, S.V. Ryazantsev, T.K. Nguen, V.S. Tikunov, H.H. Pham, “Influence of Climatic Changes on Population Migration in Vietnam,” Geography and Natural Resources, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2015, pp. 313-317. 3 See: S.V. Ryazantsev, I.S. Karabulatova, A.A. Ter-Akopov, V.V. Bozhenko, E.E. Pismennaya, “The Specificity of the Differential Regulation of Economic Integration in the Context of Contemporary Labor Migration,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2015, pp. 96-102. 4 See: V.F. Minakov, T.E. Minakova, A.Sh. Galstyan, A.A. Shiyanova, “Time Constant of Innovation Effects Doubling,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2015, pp. 310-312; V.A. Korolyov, “Strategia innovatsionnogo tsentra,” Intellektualnaya sobstvennost. Promyshlennaya sobstvennost, No. 8, 2002, pp. 4-17; V.I. Kiyaev, R.V. Gerasimov, “Intellektualny CRM na baze multiagentnogo podkhoda,” Stokhasticheskaya optimizatsiya v informatike, Vol. 8, No. 1-1, 2012, pp. 50-94; K.S. Amelin, O.N. Granichin, V.I. Kiyaev, Introduction to the Development of Applications on the Intel Atom Platform for Netbooks and Tablets, SPb SU-VVM, St. Petersburg, 2012, p. 164; S.A. Dyatlov, “Innovatsionnao-investitsionnaia kontseptsia razvitiia,” Innovatsii, No. 4 (198), 2015, pp. 15-20.

63 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Table 1

Population of Federal Districts of Russia (thousands)

Years RF, District 2013 2014 2015

Russian Federation 143,347 143,667 146,267

Central FD 38,679 38,820 38,951

Northwestern FD 13,717 13,801 13,844

Southern FD 13,910 13,964 14,004

North Caucasus FD 9,541 9,590 9,659

Volga FD 29,772 29,739 29,715

Ural FD 12,198 12,234 12,276

Siberian FD 19,278 19,292 19,312

Far Eastern FD 6,252 6,227 6,211

Crimean FD 2,295

S o u r c e: S.V. Ryazantsev, M.F. Tkachenko, op. cit., p. 32.

An important point to note here is that overall business activity across all industries in the region is among the lowest. For example, in terms of the number of enterprises (137,127 as of 31 December, 2014) it ranks behind all other regions. Hence the conclusion that agricultural production is a factor of economic stability for the population of the Northern Caucasus.5 Evidently, import substitution has played a significant role. In fact, the share of agricultural production in the structure of consumption in the Russian market has increased most significantly. But one should also note a new factor stimulating the development of the agro-industrial complex in the Northern Caucasus: innovative technologies, equipment and organizational methods. The increase in the revenues and profits of agricultural enterprises in the Northern Caucasus is due, in our opinion, to the automation of workflows based on innovative firmware. This applies, in the first place, to on-board computers and microcontrollers embedded in agricultural machinery. Their use has led to a significant increase in crop yields in the region. The gains in labor productivity at agricultural enterprises are equally important. The market penetration of automated equipment in the agricultural processing industry has increased. As a result, the quality of food products supplied to retailers has improved significantly. Demand and enterprise revenues have increased.6 The organization of production at agricultural enterprises has assumed innovative forms based on active implementation of enterprise resource planning (ERP) business management software. An important role has been played by the software products of 1C Company, which are well adapted to the specific features of domestic production, with an established system of personnel training and re- training to implement and support such information resources. The company’s ERP-class 1C:Enterprise

5 See: V.I. Kiyaev, R.V. Gerasimov, op. cit. 6 See: V.M. Vasiltsova, S.A. Dyatlov, V.S. Vasiltsov, T.L. Bezrukova, B.A. Bezrukov, “Methodology of Management Innovation Hypercompetition,” Asian Social Science, Vol. 11, No. 20, 2015, pp. 165-169; L.V. Putkina, “The Concept of Process Approach to Management,” V mire nauchnykh otkryti, No. 9.1 (57), 2014, pp. 469-476; Website of the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation [http://www. gks.ru], 5 February, 2016.

64 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 systems were successfully integrated with the information resources of related organizations and institutions, primarily with bank information systems. The use of smart devices takes on a special importance. Their algorithms support rational situational decision making based on the results of objective measurements and analysis of workflows in real time. As a result, the management of economic processes guarantees the best (optimal) solutions regarding, for example, resource inputs and accordingly costs. The tourism segment of the North Caucasus economy deserves special attention. It is well known that in the last two decades even domestic tourism compared poorly with foreign proposals in service standards. The level of services provided by tourism companies in the Northern Caucasus began to improve with an upgrade of information and telecommunication services available to cus- tomers in choosing tour operators and travel services. It is precisely in response to customer requirements during online selection of a company that have compelled tour operators to improve the quality of their services. This has had a direct effect on their competitiveness. If we add to this the current situation in the foreign exchange market and the advantages gained by domestic tour operators from the depreciation of the ruble, it becomes obvious that the trend toward an increase in demand for travel services and their sales is only natural. However, mobilization of consumers, on the one hand, and providers of services, on the other, is beginning to play a major role in the system for the provision of modern services. And this is where innovative solutions based on ICT have been effective. First, there are mobile systems and applications for selecting services. Second, there are mobile payment systems using bank accounts, digital cash accounts, virtual accounts, and mobile phone services. And third, the logistics mobilization factor enables the population of the Northern Caucasus to take advantage of the opportunities for moving to other locations where they can apply their skills, as is customary in the region. Information and telecommunication services help to increase labor mobility within the region. This factor contributes to an increase in business activity and employment in the Northern Caucasus, considering that tradi-

Table 2

Number of R&D Organizations in the Russian Federation and Federal Districts

Years RF, District 2012 2013 2014

Russian Federation 3,566 3,605 3,604

Central FD 1,318 1,327 1,313

Northwestern FD 487 464 466

Southern FD 222 234 236

North Caucasus FD 99 116 117

Volga FD 609 633 619

Ural FD 236 229 239

Siberian FD 424 428 424

Far Eastern FD 171 174 170

Crimean FD 20

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Table 3

Number of R&D Organizations in the North Caucasus Federal District

Years District, Region 2012 2013 2014

North Caucasus FD 99 116 117

Of which:

1. Republic of Ingushetia 4 4 4

2. Karachay-Cherkess Republic 5 7 8

3. Chechen Republic 9 9 8

4. Kabardino-Balkar Republic 14 14 14

5. Republic of North Ossetia-Alania 16 17 18

6. Stavropol Krai 23 35 35

7. Republic of Daghestan 28 30 30 tional non-mobile methods of service provision led to migration of people to other regions. Recently, the European countries have felt the effects of migration to more developed regions. For the local population, these effects have been mixed. In this context, it is extremely important to increase demands on employees. Labor resources are thus transformed into highly intellectual human capital, as required by the operation and support of innovative equipment. At the same time, employees are interested in acquiring information competencies because the salaries of such employees are significantly higher than those of personnel who are incompetent in dealing with modern innovative technologies and solutions. Efforts are being made to stimulate the creation of a research and innovation infrastructure in the Northern Caucasus. As is evident from Table 2, this task is particularly relevant to the North

Table 4

RF Budget Spending on Research (millions of rubles)

2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

RF budget spending 17,396.4 76,909.3 237,644 313,899.3 355,920.1 425,301.7 437,273.3 on science, total

Of which:

fundamental research 8,219.3 32,025.1 82,172 91,684.5 86,623.2 112,230.9 121,599.5

applied research 9,177.1 44,884.2 155,472 222,214.8 269,296.9 313,070.8 315,673.8

As % of:

federal budget 1.69 2.19 2.35 2.87 2.76 3.19 2.95 spending

RF GDP 0.24 0.36 0.51 0.56 0.57 0.64 0.61

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Caucasus region. Obviously, its accomplishment will make it possible to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises in the region. The distribution of R&D organizations by subject (constituent entity) of the North Caucasus region is presented in Table 3. To solve this problem, it is necessary to invest in research, development, design and innovation activities. Table 4 shows that the amount of funds for such activities is increasing. However, it is still significantly below the level of the developed countries. An analysis of dynamic processes in the sphere of innovation shows that the region is attractive to its population. Figure 1 presents the dynamics of involvement of the economically active population in research and innovation activities.

Figure 1

Dynamics of Economically Active Intellectual Resources

Persons 3,500

3,000 Stavropol Krai

2,500

2,000 Republic of Daghestan 1,500 Republic of North Ossetia-Alania Chechen Republic 1,000 Kabardino-Balkar Republic

500 Karachay-Cherkess Republic Republic of Ingushetia 0 2012 2013 2014 Years

A comparison with changes in employment in other areas of activity shows that employment dynamics in research and innovation is sufficiently stable. This is a stabilizing factor for the economy of the Northern Caucasus. Thus, innovative segments in the economic structure had a stabilizing effect on the economy of the Northern Caucasus during the crises of 2008-2009 and 2014-2015. This is well illustrated by data reflecting the dynamics of the gross regional product, as presented in Table 5. A comparison of GRP dynamics in the Northern Caucasus with the gross domestic product of Russia allows us to conclude that the rate of development in the region is above the national average. Indeed, whereas the GDP indices for 2005, 2010 and 2013 compared to 2000 were 295.8%, 633.87% and 906.01%, respectively, the GRP indices for the Northern Caucasus were 334.7%, 847.9% and 1,292.35%. Overall, GRP growth in the region was 1.426 times faster than the growth of the gross domestic product (1,292.35% / 906.01%). Per capita indices for the Russian Federation and the Northern Caucasus calculated for the same period were 925.5% and 1,292.35%, which means 1.396 times faster per capita growth in the region.

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Table 5

Gross Regional Product (GRP)

Total, millions of rubles/Per capita, rubles

2000 2005 2010 2013

RF Gross Domestic Product 7,305,646 / 21,609,766 / 46,308,541 / 66,190,120 / (at market prices) 49,835 150,571 324,177 461,233

Of which, GRP of RF subjects:

Central FD 1,841,499 / 6,278,360 / 13,444,440 / 18,975,900 / 48,205 164,888 350,204 489,708

Northwestern FD 578,505 / 1,799,780 / 3,943,054 / 5,586,594 / 40,565 130,846 289,611 406,026

Southern FD 329,696 / 936,057 / 2,337,937 / 3,528,190 / 23,418 67,566 168,773 253,152

North Caucasus FD 105,178 / 352,069 / 891,834 / 1,359,273 / 13,803 39,051 94,915 142,103

Volga FD 1,036,787 / 2,799,036 / 5,709,469 / 8,571,225 / 32,792 91,574 190,720 288,055

Ural FD 866,133 / 3,091,363 / 5,118,918 / 7,648,600 / 69,327 254,078 423,495 626,119

Siberian FD 687,072 / 1,951,300 / 4,131,396 / 5,535,449 / 33,682 99,628 214,402 287,027

Far Eastern FD 308,802 / 826,420 / 2,110,720 / 2,808,368 / 44,932 127,161 334,910 450,126

The results obtained for such major economic indicators allow us to state the following facts. First, the potential of the North Caucasus region has not been exhausted, and its potential for growth at a rate above the national average is quite significant. Second, the orientation toward a regional economic structure with agriculture and food production as the dominant sectors is justified, and its effectiveness has been confirmed in practice. And third, innovative equipment, technologies and forms of organization of production have ensured the region’s faster development compared to the Russian Federation as a whole. Hence, the potential for the development of its economy in this direction can be calculated by the methods and models used for innovation processes. They are based on the logistic function or its modification in the form of the Bass model, which show that the stage of innovation dynamics at which the rate accelerates is characterized by a level that does not exceed 50% of the maximum (saturation) level. Consequently, the potential for the gross regional product of the Northern Caucasus is at least 2,719 billion rubles. The potential for GRP per capita is at least 284,206 rubles. The achievement of this potential will make it possible to close the gap in living standards between the North Caucasus Federal District and other regions. With an above-average rate of GRP growth, opportunities for investment using regional revenue from innovative projects are just as important. This particularly applies to agriculture, the food industry and tourism; the regional energy industry has not exhausted its potential either. The latter has a surplus of energy resources. However, it will be possible to exploit the potential of this sector only after a change in the trend in oil, gas and electricity prices, which is inevitable from a fundamental

68 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 perspective. After all, the drop in global oil prices from $147 to $27.5 per barrel is an anomaly. Hence, investments in the energy industry of the Northern Caucasus are strategically important and will help to achieve the region’s long-term development objectives. Breakthrough innovative projects are equally important to the region. A prominent company in this field is Monocrystal, which develops and manufactures competitive synthetic sapphire and sapphire wafers. The enterprise has become a portfolio company of Rusnano. For the Russian economy, developments and products of the sixth technological order are not only a factor of competitiveness, but also a valuable experience in increasing the share of value added in production. Consequently, the economy of the region can be restructured through the replacement of uncompetitive enterprises with modern innovative ones manufacturing competitive products. The phaseout of extractive enterprises and those producing goods with a low degree of processing and low value added but with high material requirements thus paves the way for improving enterprise efficiency and, accordingly, for economic growth in the region and higher living standards for its population.

Conclusion

An analysis of the efficiency of investment in the natural resource sector of the economy of Russia’s Northern Caucasus and industries requiring large material inputs shows that since the region is a peripheral one such investment has a negative return. Many enterprises of this kind have gone bankrupt. At the same time, enterprises in agricultural production and processing, as well as high-tech enterprises generate a stable and growing cash flow from nvestments. Enterprises that have been restructured based on innovative forms of organization and management, especially in agriculture and the food industry, are the most competitive and profitable ones. Innovative technologies in basic production result in a significant increase in revenues and profits. In the structure of innovative -de velopment, innovations that use information and communication technologies are particularly important. They provide the basis for the ongoing convergence of modern innovations in the economy of the Northern Caucasus. Innovation processes are underway in the consumer services sector, ensuring positive revenue growth due to the emergence of online aggregators presented in the Web services market by companies engaged in integrating travel services. First, they promote the services of tour operators, and second, they perform the function of logistic integration. Logistics hubs go online, performing their functions in computer networks. They also organize online orders and payments, initiating flows of financial and other resources. Innovative solutions using mobile gadgets and -ap plications, which significantly increase the market penetration of innovative forms of services, are in high demand in the Northern Caucasus and are a tool that helps to phase out traditional forms of migration to more developed regions. As a result, the population of the Northern Caucasus has been growing. In agricultural production, incomes have been rising due to import substitution and automation of workflows based on innovative firmware, especially smart devices. They enable rational situational decision making based on real-time measurement and analysis of production processes. Such management leads to a significant increase in crop yields with a simultaneous reduction in costs. In our view, the intellectual skills of personnel who service innovative equipment are of fundamental importance in this context. The formation of human capital with a higher intellectual level requires the development of the education system and investment in institutions for advance training of personnel and the development of new competencies. This helps to create a system with positive feedback, self-regulation and development. As a result, employment in the area of research and innovation is stabilizing. The stability of system relationships in the economy of the Northern Caucasus has stood

69 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the test of the crises of 2008-2009 and 2014-2015. Consequently, the established innovative development trend should also be seen as fundamental for government agencies responsible for the development strategy of the Northern Caucasus and investment in its infrastructure.

LEGAL POLICY IN THE ECONOMY AND THE SPECIFICS OF RUSSIAN ETHNIC CULTURE

Olga KURILKINA Ph.D. (Law), Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Law, the Chekhov Taganrog Institute, Branch of Rostov State Economic University (Taganrog, Russian Federation)

Aleksey OVCHINNIKOV D.Sc. (Law), Professor, South Russia Institute of Management, the Branch of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Civil Service under the President of the Russian Federation (Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation)

Irina SAMOYLOVA Ph.D. (Philos.), Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Law, the Chekhov Taganrog Institute, Branch of Rostov State Economic University (Taganrog, Russian Federation)

Irina STETSENKO D.Sc. (Pedagogy), Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Law, the Chekhov Taganrog Institute, Branch of Rostov State Economic University (Taganrog, Russian Federation)

Svyatoslav FEDORENKO Ph.D. (Law), Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Law, the Chekhov Taganrog Institute, Branch of Rostov State Economic University (Taganrog, Russian Federation)

70 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016

ABSTRACT

his article deals with the traditions, ar- culture. We regret to point out that contem- chetypes, and specifics of Russian porary legal science does not take the T ethnic culture responsible for the pri- above into account; instead, it consistently orities, values, and trends of legal policy in destroys the archetypes and values of Rus- the economy and business activity. Con- sia’s legal culture, which should be safe- vinced that state-building should take into guarded amid the rising threat of all-out account the traditional values of a non-lib- commercialization of the law and deliberate eral state, the authors turned to methods of creation of a global society of consumerism philosophical-legal analysis of legal reality, and “rational egoism.” The latest method- the philosophy of religion and contempo- ological achievements of branch legal sci- rary criminology, and the latest achieve- ences confirm that the theoretical conclu- ments of psychology, legal axiology, and sions of outstanding figures of the historical anthropology in their research. Throughout school of jurisprudence (Savigny, Hugo, their history, Russians have demonstrated Puchta, and Montesquieu’s On the Spirit of that they can be successful in economic the Laws) were absolutely correct and that policy and the business sphere; this means each lawyer should bear in mind that law that the Russian state should develop in making and law enforcement must corre- line with the values of Russian ethnic cul- late with the mentality, spirit, and traditions ture and rely on its potential and traditions. of the nation. There are no universal values The history of Russia, and the history of law common to the whole of mankind, however in Russia as its part, is closely related to the destruction of religious traditions under- Orthodox culture (the Soviet period, a prod- mines legal consciousness and the moral uct of folk ideas about the common social basis of law in essentially every society, ideals and values, was no exception). This even though the understanding of law is means that Russians belong to a very spe- limited to the civilizational and cultural cific political and legal tradition and legal framework of language and mentality.

KEYWORDS: priorities of legal policies, liberal values, legal and moral values, national economy.

Introduction

The legal policy of the state should correspond to the national-cultural traditions of the nation and its legal archetypes; otherwise legal novelties move away from the “spirit of the nation,” its mentality, and archetypes, while the law loses its legitimacy to become “dead law” or “bookish law.” This explains why in recent years, new methodological trends have appeared in the study of legal culture and the legal policy of states related to identifying the deepest roots of national juridical awareness. Studies of national legal archetypes are one such trend.1

1 See: A. Ovchinnikov, A. Mamychev, D. Mamycheva, “Sociocultural Bases of State—Legal Development Coding,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy, No. 6 (3S4), 2015, pp. 67-74.

71 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Literature Review

The term “archetype” is rarely used in the legal literature; exceptions are few and far between. A recent study of parliamentarianism based on the psychological theory of law pointed to a wide gap between political archetypes and legal novelties.2 The author demonstrated that the ideas of the Rus- sian constitutionalists of the early twentieth century about the immediate transfer to a parliamentary monarchy or republic were a utopia: they corresponded neither to the archetypes of folk legal awareness, nor to the values of constitutionalism. The constitutionalists preferred to ignore the fact that the positive experience of English parliamentarianism was based on the norms of constitutional development; they tried to plant the results of longstanding constitutional development in the “unfertilized soil” of Russian legal awareness. However, the situation required a consistent policy for implementing constitutional archetypes in the legal culture of people and the ruling elite. In their recent works, Alexey Mamychev3 and Andrey Mordovtsev4 identified the importance and role of political archetypes. They pointed to the numerous specifics of Russian political and legal ethnic culture and supported the recent reforms as corresponding to the political and legal mentality. Other authors, too, dealt with the ethnocultural specifics of the legitimization of law and governance.5 Natalya Taeva finds it reasonable to explain the decisions of the Constitutional Court of the RF by means of traditions and archetypes.6 She writes that in its decisions the Constitutional Court pro- ceeds, among other things, from the traditions of Russian society, the mentality of Russian citizens, legal archetypes, and the fact that in Russia the social reproductive role of the woman is traditionally respected. Gadis Hajiev writes of his personal experience in comprehending constitutional-legal reality as a reflection of certain constitutional-legal archetypes, which brought him to understand the continuity of constitutional-legal development, within which constitutional legal ideas go beyond the temporary framework to become part of constitutional reality and determine the present and future ideological foundations.7 Konstantin Aranovskiy goes even deeper into the problems of archetypes and relies on the term to analyze the constitutional-legal traditions of Russia.8 He believes that the Constitution cannot be followed as a way of life in every set of circumstances and in every environment; it is an expression of legal faith of sorts and is built on a certain set of images understood and accepted by a constitutionally organized society. To be efficient, the Constitution must rely on a set of legal behav- ioral skills related to national archetypes.9 After analyzing the specifics of preliminary investigation, Prof. Leonid Golovko described a situation created in a pretrial procedure by a change in paradigms as “institutional chaos” rooted in a

2 See: V.V. Kochetkov, “Yuridicheskoe obosnovanie parlamentarizma rossiiskimi konstitutsionalistami nachala XX v.,” Rossiysky yuridichesky zhurnal, No. 6, 2014, pp. 177-185. 3 See: A. Ovchinnikov, A. Mamychev, D. Mamycheva, op. cit. 4 See: A.Y. Mordovcev, T.V. Mordovceva, A.Y. Mamichev, “The Convergence of Law: The Diversity of Discourses,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy, No. 6 (3), 2015, pp. 262-270. 5 See: P.P. Baranov, A.I. Ovchinnikov, A.Y. Mamychev, “The State Authority Constitutional Legitimacy in Modern Russia,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy, No. 6 (5S3), 2015, pp. 201-208. 6 See: N.E. Taeva, “Nekotorye problemy vyiavleniya konstitutsionno-pravovogo smysla norm Konstitutsionnym sudom RF,” Konstitutsionnoe i munitsipalnoe pravo, No. 12, 2014, pp. 24-28. 7 See: G.A. Hajiev, “O prostranstvenno-vremennom myshlenii v konstitutsionnom prave (voprosy yuridicheskoy ontologii i aksiologii),” Sravnitelno-kostitutsionnoe obozrenie, No. 6, 2011. 8 See: K.V. Aranovskiy, Konstitutsionnaya traditsiya v rossiyskoy srede, St. Petersburg, 2003, p. 632. 9 See: V.Y. Lyubashits, A.Y. Mordovcev, A.Y. Mamychev, M.V. Vronskaya, “State: Typological Analysis of Evolutionary Forms,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy, No. 6, (3S4), 2015, pp. 83-90.

72 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 model of preliminary investigation that does not correspond to the archetype.10 By archetypes he means models of legal institutions: “There are three possible models by which preliminary investigation can be organized. Any contemporary state must choose one of them.” All analysts of legal policy in the economy and business activity should bear in mind the presence of archetypes. Anna Murunova has demonstrated that Western patterns alone are not enough to build a market economy in Russia; borrowed patterns must be used rationally to stabilize civil com- merce.11 The market should be adapted to the people; it should become part of the mass consciousness and touch upon the hierarchy of values concealed in collective ideas and associated with legal archetypes. The author writes that all economic forecasts of market reforms are never realized because mentality is always ignored. Reforms should be harmonized with the social and psychological features of an ethnicity, the dominants of the national character, and the traditions of thinking that together form the mentality of the people. From the moral point of view, criminal law, one of the basic branches of common, traditional law, and the most conservative of them, is based on rules rooted in hoary antiquity that can be described as first social regulators. Religious-moral values are conceptually important in criminal law, which explains why Alexander Boyko offers an addition to Art 7 of the Criminal Code of the RF: “Violation of the fundamental moral and religious precepts in the course of a premeditated crime excludes the exemption of the criminal from criminal liability and punishment and rules out all other types of stimulation.”12 In fact, fundamental cultural archetypes are especially important in criminal law; they should be taken into account in law making and law enforcement. For example, the archetype of truth and restoration of justice demands that a crime be avenged, even if the law-enforcement structures are inactive. Alexander Boyko suggests that the law should envisage exempting from criminal responsibility those who commit state crimes and crimes against the administration for moral reasons and dismiss the responsibility of those who commit crimes due to the refusal of law- enforcers to provide legal redress. Vladimir Kulygin has pointed to the fact that “the fundamental principles of legal mentality, the first legal prototypes—archetypes, are mainly related to criminal law today, which is still closely related, due to its specifics, to ethical and philosophical problems of good and evil.”13 Other authors have rightly pointed out that criminal regulations appeared not only because the philosophical problem of good and evil needed to be resolved, but also because people needed security.14

Methods and Materials

Here we have recurred to methods of philosophical-legal analysis of legal reality, the philosophy of religion and contemporary criminology, and the latest achievements of psychology, legal axiology, and anthropology. The latest methodological achievements of branch legal sciences show that the theoretical conclusions of the historical school of jurisprudence were absolutely correct. Since the time of Savigny,

10 See: L.V. Golovko, “Razvitie rossiyskogo predvaritelnogo sledstviya i sravnitelno-pravovye arkhetipy dosudebnogo proizvodstva,” in: Sbornik nauchno-practicheskikh trudov. Rassledovanie prestupleniy: problemy i puti ikh resheniya, Akademiya SKRossii, No. 3, 2014, p. 191. 11 See: A.V. Murunova, “Priznaki predprinimatelya v rossiiskom i zapadnom pravovom mentalitete,” Predprinimatelskoe pravo. Prilozhenie Bizness i pravo v Rossii i za rubezhom, No. 3, 2013, pp. 9-12, 12 A.I. Boyko, Nravstvenno-religioznye osnovy ugolovnogo prava, Rostov-on-Don, 2007. 13 V.V. Kulygin, Etnokultura ugolovnogo prava, Moscow, 2002, p. 36. 14 See: N.V. Ghenrikh, “Predmet ugolovnogo prava v kontekste teoreticheskikh problem pravoponimaniya,” Zhurnal rossiskogo prava, No. 9, 2010, pp. 58-69.

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Hugo, Puchta, and Montesquieu’s On the Spirit of the Laws, every lawyer should keep in mind that law making and law enforcement must correlate with the nation’s mentality, its spirit, and its traditions. There are no universal values shared by the whole of mankind. However, even though the understanding of law is not of universal consequence and limited to the civilizational and cultural framework of language and mentality, the destruction of religious traditions causes loss of legal awareness and undermines the moral basis of law in essentially every society.

Results and Discussion

A certain part of Russia’s intellectual and business elite cannot grasp the simple truth that any reform must correspond to the archetypes of national culture, be conservative, and demonstrate continuity. By juridical archetype, we mean the prototypes of legal axioms and principles of legal awareness rooted in individual psychology but formed under the pressure of social and legally important communications. Being prototypes, ideas, and value systems, archetypes go deep into the historical and cultural prerequisites of the legal mentality; they create the matrices of one’s own and others’ behavior, awareness, and understanding. Carl Jung (1875-1961) widely used the concept of archetype in analytical psychology to describe universal images of the collective unconscious; we cannot and should not ascribe this concept to the sphere of the unconscious alone: archetypes predetermine thinking and understanding. We can even say that juridical or legal archetypes are the horizon and the context for understanding law, legal facts, legal norms, customs, traditions, and values. In recent years, revived Orthodox spirituality and the growing number of Orthodox Christians in Russia have stirred up a lot of skepticism about the prospects for the country’s political and economic development within the nation’s Orthodox identity. Russian Orthodox ideas about the world are allegedly archaic, excessively ascetic, and not rational, while the labor ethics of Orthodox people do not lead the nation to material and economic prosperity within the global capitalist model of a market economy.15 Those who criticize Russian culture insist that since the Early Middle Ages, the history of Rus- sia has been determined by certain “archetypical” Russian features: a servile psychology, suppressed personal dignity, intolerance of the opinions of others, and a groveling mixture of hatred, envy, and veneration of foreign power. They insist that from time immemorial Russians have admired a strong- armed leader and appreciated his ruthlessness, that throughout their history they have readily obeyed authority, and that even today Russians “are longing for a Master.” This context is hardly suitable for economic reforms. It comes as no surprise that certain experts invite Russians to borrow the Protestant ethic of labor and economy: “Protestantism returned Chris- tianity to its original principles and to the primacy of faith over ‘good deeds’ as the foundation of salvation. Today, Russia badly needs this transformation.” This invites the following objections.  First, the law-abidance of Russians is the main archetype of their consciousness, making possible the country’s complete restoration in two post-war five-year periods; their law- abidance made them tolerant of all experiments in state governance. In the twentieth century alone, the Russian people were exposed to reforms much more frequently than any other nation in the history of mankind. Today, Russia’s legal system is developing and flourishing despite the mind-boggling social injustice, social stratification unrivaled anywhere in the world, and privatization of national wealth unheard of in world history. The

15 See: V.Y. Lyubashits, A.Y. Mordovcev, A.Y. Mamychev, M.V. Vronskaya, op. cit.

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crisis of legal awareness in Russia is caused by the fact that Orthodox values have been pushed aside and forgotten.  Second, the matrix of the archetypes of national culture responsible for the nation’s mentality and worldview cannot be changed by orders from above. This is a long, even centuries- long process. Orthodox archetypes survived in the materialist ideology that dominated in the Soviet Union. The archetype of justice can be used as an example: so far most people prefer to stay away from lawsuits and enforcing their right through litigation. In medieval Euro- pean culture, on the other hand, court contests were noble enterprises for bold men. Reforms cannot transform Russians into farmers and petty merchants, that would take centuries.  Third, the history of economic development of the Russian people disproves the thesis that the Protestant ethic was superior to the Orthodox work ethic. The economic policy of Nich- olas II, the Orthodox czar of the Orthodox people, was ample confirmation that a market economy and Orthodoxy can be combined.  Fourth, the asceticism of Orthodoxy does not hinder, rather it enhances labor ethic. The Orthodox teaching on salvation says that man and God should work together to achieve personal salvation. “Salvation is not an act but a state constantly confirmed by good deeds prompted by love for God and one’s fellow man.” In the Orthodox tradition, the idea of labor as asceticism has always bred in people a very respectful attitude toward labor and professional duties, diligence and honesty, thriftiness and striving for perfection. It is no accident that the scholarly community recognizes the economic success of Orthodox monasteries. Monasteries were engaged in land tilling, vegetable and fruit growing, wine making, apiculture, fishing and crafts; they had dairy farms, made clothes, shoes and silverware, ran metal workshops and joiner’s shops, had tallow-melting and brick-making facilities, tanneries, tar-works, shipyards, machine-building plants, foundries, etc., which means that Orthodoxy is not alien to economic activities. It should be said that St. Nilus of Sora actively objected to what he believed was excessive concentration on production activities; his opponent, another saint of the Russian Orthodox Church, St. Joseph of Volotsk, offered numerous arguments in favor of the economic and production activity carried out by monasteries. The profit and income created by monastery hotels, dwellings, shops, inns, eating houses, fairs, show-booths, etc., as well as the money earned by bank deposits, show that the Orthodox monasteries in Russia were enterprising and knew how to work and earn money. It is not surprising that people preferred to settle close to monasteries and no accident that these settle- ments developed into cities and towns. “Orthodoxy draws attention to sincere and benevolent relations with rivals, it teaches seeing the image of God in them and viewing their success as one’s own lost opportunity. Orthodoxy teaches that each economic situation emerging in the market should be interpreted as an opportunity to perform God’s will by serving people or as a test of fortitude in the face of temptation.” It was the liberal Protestant version of capitalism promoted by the oligarchs and the elite of the “golden billion” countries that pushed the world into a worldwide economic crisis. Most economists and political scientists (M. Delyagin, V. Katasonov, S. Glaziev, and others) are of the same opinion. They are convinced that the Orthodox ethic of economic activity will bring success to Russia and the rest of the world. In 2007, the best experts on the humanities published a book entitled Russkaya doktrina (The Russian Doctrine), which probes deeply into the Orthodox economic theory and has earned the praise of Patriarch Kirill. The Protestant ethic is not based on the Christian, but on the Judaic attitude toward labor and salvation. This was amply confirmed by the fundamental work of German scholar Werner Sombart called Der Bourgeois (English translation The Quintessence of Capitalism). He concluded that the

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Jews played a great role in the development of contemporary capitalism and invented bonds, banks, and stock exchanges as financial mechanisms of speculation and economic management. There are other studies that confirm the same. Fifth, some experts claim that China ensures its economic domination by combining traditional Confucian values with values of the market economy. Russia can achieve the same if the state supports the Orthodox culture. Orthodoxy’s communal and shared values are conducive to the regime of social or moderate capitalism; the book called Domostroy (Domestic Order), a list of practical rules that Orthodox Russians followed in the Middle Ages, is a good example of the Orthodox understanding of the world. The history of Russia is related to the Orthodox culture (the Soviet period was also the result of certain orientations of national consciousness toward common social ideals and values), including the history of law, which shows the political and legal traditions and very specific legal culture of Russian society. Unfortunately, contemporary legal science ignores this fact and is consistently destroying the archetypes and values of Russian legal culture, which should be safeguarded amid the rising threat of all-out commercialization of the law and deliberate creation of a global society of consumerism and “rational egoism.” Supporters of the Western road are convinced that it is more than enough to improve public organizations and political and legal institutions to achieve a breakthrough in social and state development; that these institutions will change Russians’ legal consciousness and mentality; that a new Constitution will transform Russia into a democratic and liberal Europe; and that all Russian misfor- tunes and “social aggression” will be cured by economic prosperity. They ignore the fact that there are deeply rooted ties between social organizations and people’s internal life and that social norms will only be effective if they are understood, accepted, and fully grasped.

Conclusions

Economic prosperity in Russia can only be achieved on the basis of the national Orthodox idea. In the conditions of the new economic and technological order of the twenty-first century, Russia’s sovereignty depends on its people’s willingness to re-industrialize their country. Russia needs a breakthrough; it must exert its national forces to perform a feat of the dimensions of Stalin’s Five- Year Plans. Due to the specifics of the Russian mentality, there are two things that will prompt Rus- sians to make such breakthrough—either under the threat of concentration camps or driven by the dream of a supreme Divine reward. The Church promises this reward to each Orthodox Christian.

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RELIGION IN SOCIETY

ISLAM: LOCAL TRADITIONS AND INNOVATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIA

Vakhit AKAEV Leading Research Associate, Integrated Scientific and Research Institute, RAS; Professor at the UNESCO Chair of Comparative Studies of Spiritual Traditions, their Specific Cultures and Interreligious Dialog for the Northern Caucasus (St. Petersburg), Academician, Academy of Sciences of the Chechen Republic (Grozny, Russian Federation)

Magomed SOLTAMURADOV Assistant Professor, State University of Chechnia, Associate at the Sector of Philosophy and Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Chechen Republic (Grozny, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

slam, rooted in the diverse centuries- other, is no exception. Islam in Daghestan, old religious beliefs, customs, tradi- among the Chechens, Ingush, Kabardians, I tions, and historical and cultural values and Karachays, as well as among the Tatars typical of different regions of Russia, is in- of Tatarstan and the Bashkirs of Bashkorto- evitably different. The Northern Caucasus, stan on the Volga shores, has many local where Islam differs from one ethnicity to an- specifics. The Islamic revival in Russia

77 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS launched by the Gorbachev perestroika in into the limelight known as Wahhabism and the Soviet Union and continued in post-So- Salafism (more frequently described as Is- viet Russia has brought new Islamic trends lamic radicalism).

KEYWORDS: Islam, Sufism, tariqats, traditional Islam, madhhabs, Salafism, Wahhabism, extremist groups.

Introduction

Throughout the centuries of its existence and sociocultural adaptation to Russian reality in the czarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods, traditional Islam has gathered many specifics, some of them being products of its far from simple relations with the Russian Orthodox Church. Local perceptions of Islam took shape under the pressure of regional and ethnocultural factors, as well as the customs and traditions of the peoples who lived in the Caucasus and along the Volga. This means that we can talk about the Caucasian (or even Avar, Chechen, Kabardian, Karachay, etc.), Tatar and Bashkir manifestations of Islam. In fact, Islam came to Russia earlier than Christian Orthodoxy. Its history in Daghestan goes back to the ninth century; some authors (A. Shikhsaidov, A. Alikberov, A. Kisriev, and others) speak of an even earlier date. The history of Islam in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Adygei has been studied by V. Akaev, G. Khizrieva, S. Akkieva, G. Yemelianova, E. Kratov, N. Kra- tova, and S. Liausheva. Rafik Mukhametshin, a well-known expert on religion, has probed deep into the state of Islam in Tatarstan; and Ayslu Yunusova has studied the specifics of Islam in Bashkorto- stan. R. Abdulatipov, R. Gaynutdin, I. Dobaev, R. Landa, A. Malashenko, S. Prozorov, R. Silantiev, and others have written a lot about the past and present of Islam in Russia. Alexey Malashenko has offered interesting, albeit polemical, opinions about the current status of Islam in Russia and pointed to the contradictory trends caused by the penetration into the Russian regions of Islamic movements and trends previously unheard of in our country and all sorts of foundations and branches of foreign Islamic centers.

Local Traditional Islam: Historical and Contemporary Features

Islam came to Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Volga Region more than one thousand years ago and spread far and wide by very different means and routes: it accompanied Arabic conquerors and traveled along with missionaries or independently. It came to the Caucasus in the first half of the seventh century together with the Arab conquerors who reached the Northern Caucasus in 651-652 when Arab military leader Abd ar-Raḥmān ibn Rabīʿah captured Derbent.1 For several centuries, this medieval city remained a center of Muslim culture in the region. Islam was brought to the Volga not by the force of arms, but by the word of missionaries. This is confirmed by the travel notes of Ahmad Ibn Fadlan, an Arab traveler of the tenth century dispatched

1 See: Istoria Dagestana s drevneyshikh vremen to XX veka, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2005, p. 178.

78 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 by Caliph al-Muqtadir of the Baghdad Caliphate to Baltavar, king of the Bulghars (today the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan). His journey took 70 days, during which he summed up his impres- sions about everyday life and the religious situation among the Hazaras, Bashkirs, and Bulghars, among whom he even promoted certain orthodox Islamic precepts.2 Akhmet Yarlykapov, an expert on Islam, made a surprising, albeit doubtful, statement: “The first Muslims arrived in the Caucasus in the first centuries of our era.”3 There were no Muslims in the Caucasus at that time; what is more, there were no Muslims in Mecca: Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam, was born in Mecca in 570. This can be dismissed as a blunder, but there are too many blunders to dismiss them all. The author has written that there are over 70% Shi‘a in Azerbaijan against about 30% Sunnis. He has also written that in Iran “the absolute majority are Sunnis.”4 The real figures indicate the opposite. Islam in the Caucasus, the Volga Region, and Russia as a whole exists in two madhhabs—the Safi‘i and Hanafi. The Safi‘i Islam is popular among the peoples of Daghestan, the Chechens, and the Ingush. As could be expected, the Hanafi madhhab, which predominates in Turkey, is also popular among the Turkic-speaking peoples (the Kabardians, Circassians, and Adighes). Two other madhhabs (out of four)—Maliki and Hanbali—do not exist in Russia. In the late 1980s, however, the followers of so-called Wahhabism, which is based on the Hanbali madhhab, appeared in Russia. This madhhab rejects all novelties and reforms and calls for the purification of Islam through the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad as the most authoritative religious source. The Hanbali school of religious dogmas and laws is officially recognized in Saudi Arabia. In Russia, Islam is a patchwork based on different madhhabs, trends, and ethnocultural specifics, while the Muslims are mainly Sunnis; there are also Shi‘a (mainly Azeris) and a small group of Shi‘a Lezghians who live along the border with Azerbaijan. In Derbent, Shi‘a and Sunnis share the Juma mosque built in the 730s. Sufism, an ascetic and mystical-religious trend in Islam, is very popular among the Sunnis of Daghestan, Chechnia, and Ingushetia. Alikber Alikberov has offered the following definition of Su- fism: “The theory and practice of mysticism in Islam.”5 There are many other definitions, but its most important components are asceticism, mysticism, and the road of spiritual perfection. The Naqsh- bandi, Qadiriyya, and Shadhili tariqats are the most popular in Daghestan, while the former two are popular in Chechnia and Ingushetia. Before and after the 1917 revolution, Ishanism (Sufism) was popular in Bashkortostan; however, according to Ayslu Yunusova, the attempts to revive it have so far failed. The intelligentsia of Bashkortostan, on the other hand, studies Sufism with a great deal of interest (I. Nasyrov, A. Yanguzin, and others).6 From time immemorial, Islam has existed in Russia in the form of popular (parallel) Islam, which is well-adjusted to the local ethnocultural conditions; not infrequently, it was popularized by Sufis who opposed social injustice and promoted spiritual and moral self-perfection. The most outstanding of them became generally recognized spiritual teachers; they were venerated after death, while their burial sites became and remain places of pilgrimage. This makes local ethnocultural traditions very specific; in this way, Islam is adapted to the local (regional) cultural forms. This explains how the regional (Avar, Darginian, Bashkir, Tatar, Chechen, etc.) forms of Islam appeared. Many authors have already written about this phenomenon. Rafik Mukhametshin, a prominent expert on Islam from Tatarstan, has written that the term “Tatar Islam is frequently used in aca-

2 See: Ibn Fadlan’s Journey to Russia: A Tenth-Century Traveler from Baghdad to the Volga River, Marcus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, 2005. 3 A.A. Yarlykapov, “Islam i konflikt na Kavkaze: napravleniya, techeniya, religiozno-politicheskie vzglyady,” in: Etnichnost i religiya v sovremennykh konfliktakh, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2012, p. 607. 4 Ibidem. 5 A.K. Alikberov, Epokha klassicheskogo islama na Kavkaze, Vostochnaya literatura, Moscow, 2003, p. 8. 6 See: A.B. Yunusova, Islam v Bashkortostane, Logos, Moscow, 2007, p. 75.

79 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS demic and popular works, yet its content is practically never revealed.”7 He explains the specifics of Islam in Tatarstan by the fact that “the Muslim Tatar community emerged far from the main Islamic centers in the country, in which religion was not a way of life, but a form and method of survival amid other religions.”8 The political and ideological novelties directly affected the traditional local forms of Islam. Islamist trends, Wahhabism in particular, are gradually spreading across Tatarstan; according to certain experts, “in Tatarstan, separatism is blending with Islamic fundamentalism”9 to become a threat to the government and society. The authors of the quoted report have concluded, without sufficient reason, that “the separatists of all the national republics of the Volga Region could unite on the basis of their enmity toward Christian Orthodoxy as a sign of Russia’s presence…”10 Yunusova, likewise, has written a lot about the local specifics of Islam in Bashkortostan, saying that the pace of re-Islamization is gradually slowing down, the local Muslims are very tolerant, while the local version of Islam is not politicized. It exists in everyday forms and coexists with the traditional attitudes and realities of the pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods, which have nothing in common with Orthodox Islam.11 In Soviet times, Islam, which functioned outside the world Islamic centers, acquired very special dogmas and rituals. Not free in its development and very limited in its practices, Islam lacked the dynamics typical of the Muslim world. Islamic education was poorly developed and inferior to religious education in the Muslim countries: few of the top spiritual leaders could be described as hafiz- es, profound interpreters of Islamic dogmas. According to Valiulla Yakupov, toward the end of Soviet power, official Tatar Islam had exhausted its resources; it was preached by several dozen mullahs, few of whom had an adequate Shari‘a education.12 This fully applied to all the other Muslim regions of Russia. There was no shortage among Soviet/post-Soviet Muslims of those who criticized the situation and wanted to reform Soviet/post-Soviet Islam—Wahhabis, Ikhwan (the Muslim Brotherhood), Al- Ahbash (Association of Islamic Charitable Projects), members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and others. In Rus- sia, these groups were counted among radical fundamentalist or Islamist organizations. They formulated the task of “fixing” traditional Islam or, rather, its replacement with “pure Islam” by setting up the so-called Caucasian Caliphate. This fanned a conflict between the so-called Wahhabis and traditionalists, the ugly forms of which can still be seen in Daghestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Alexey Malashenko makes the unexpected and therefore interesting suggestion that Russia was not surprised by the presence of Islamic radicals in the post-Soviet republics and that, “Its own special services set up ‘Wahhabi cells’ to better understand the true state of mind among the Muslims and prevent opposition,” since in the Soviet Union there were no Islamic dissidents.13

Specifics of the Islamic Revival

In Russia, the specifics of the Islamic revival are closely related to the internal modernizing processes and external impacts. Gorbachev’s perestroika and the political and ideological processes

7 R. Mukhametshin, Islam v Tatarstane, Moscow, Logos, 2007, p. 83. 8 Ibidem. 9 Karta etnoreligioznykh ugroz. Severny Kavkaz i Povolzhie, Institut natsionalnoy strategii, Moscow, 2013, p. 13. 10 Ibid., p. 14. 11 See: A.B. Yunusova, op. cit., pp. 85-86. 12 See: V. Yakupov, Neofitsialny islam v Tatarstane: dvizheniya, techeniya, sekty, Kazan, 2003, p. 18. 13 See: A. Malashenko, Islamskaya alternativa i islamskiy proekt, Ves Mir Publishers, Moscow, 2006, p. 141.

80 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 closely associated with the Soviet Union’s disintegration added vigor to the spiritual-cultural context in Russia. There was a lot of talk in the expert community about the Islamic revival and the re-Islam- ization (or even additional Islamization) of Central Asia, the Volga Region, Transcaucasia, and the Northern Caucasus. The Islamic revival proceeded in two directions on the basis of ethnocultural and spiritual-religious traditions and under the pressure of the modernizing and global changes, up to and including the appearance of Islamic trends (hitherto absent in Russia) that insisted on a new interpretation of Islam while pursuing a very clear aim—squeezing traditional religious values by means of political tools. The interaction between the novelties and traditions was far from smooth; on many occasions, interaction developed into confrontation. In 1990, the Islamic Revival Party was set up in the Soviet Union with its own regional structures and print media. Its members were known as Wahhabis, while its structures appeared in Dagh- estan, Chechnia, and Karachay; they operated as opposition to “traditional” or “folk” Islam. It was a call (da‘wah) for the purity of monotheism. The local clergy, who, they insisted, had moved away from the strictly monotheist faith and included elements of Sufi practices in the local rituals, etc., were severely criticized and accused of departing from the Quran and the Sunnah; all local features were dismissed as “heretical novelties” (Bid‘ah) and the sin of polytheism (shirk). The traditionalists accused the radicals of neglecting customs and traditions (they were especially critical of the bearded young men seen as a direct violation of the adat) and of moving away from the Hanafi rules.14 For twenty years, the conflicts between the Wahhabis and traditionalists maintained the religious and political tension among the Muslims of Russia, their specifics changing from one region to another (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, the Northern Caucasus, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, etc.). The aim, however, remained the same—traditional Islam must be discredited and the official clergy accused of ignorance as poorly educated. The level of education in the Soviet Union was indeed low. Russia needed Islamic universities to train professional Muslim clergy using the latest educational methodology accepted in the best educational centers of the Muslim world. There is another, no less important aspect of Islamic education in Russia—the Muslim clergy should be trained and their ideological and patriotic development shaped in accordance with a Russian identity. This explains why 40% of the disciplines in Islamic universities are taught in Russian; it is very important to teach the Muslim clergy to be able to argue at a high level with religious extremists, those who oppose the local cultural traditions and who were educated abroad in anti-Russian centers. When analyzing the conflict in Nalchik in 2005 (where religious extremists attacked law and order structures), Svetlana Akkieva pointed to the social roots of radicalism. Amid the severe economic crisis, unemployment, and lumpenization, people, especially young people, might look at radical Islam as a consolidating ideology with no alternatives. Islam presents no threat, while its politicization and structuring guided from abroad by forces determined to launch destructive processes are very dangerous indeed.15 The practical importance of the above must be fully grasped. The author is convinced that to effectively oppose religious extremism, the state should resolve the problem of unemployment among young people, as well as the problem of adequate wages. The Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kabardino-Balkaria should join forces with the state to pay more attention to religious education. Svetlana Akkieva warns against indiscriminate use of the terms “Wahhabi” and “Wahhabism”; the state media are deliberately creating an image of extremist Wahhabis, this means that even moderate or “classical” Muslims might be classified as extremists.

14 See: T.A. Uzdenov, “Islam v Karachae,” available at [http://www.elbrusoid.org/articles/dialog/360077/]. 15 See: S.I. Akkieva, Islam v Kabardino-Balkarskoy Respublike, Logos, Moscow, 2009, p. 101.

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Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, who actively encourages the ethnonational traditions of the Chechens, defused the conflict between the Wahhabis and the followers of the traditional tariqats (the Qadiriyya and Naqshbandi). Religious and political stability in the republic is ensured by an uncompromising struggle against members of extremist and terrorist groups. Their public activities and involvement in public discussions are no longer allowed; today they have gone underground. Ramzan Kadyrov, who never hesitates to harshly criticize the Wahhabis, Al-Ahbash (the Ethi- opians), and members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and insists that there is no other form of Islam apart from the traditional Islam that the Chechens inherited from their ancestors, has become the target of critical Salafi salvoes on the Internet. The religious-political situation in Chechnia is stable; Daghestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino- Balkaria, on the other hand, are exposed to fairly frequent acts of terror organized by religious extremists and supporters of ISIS (the Islamic State). Videos that call on young men to join the “true jihad” unfolding in Syria against Bashar Assad are circulated in Chechnia. Recently, a coup certain young men were planning against Ramzan Kadyrov was disclosed in Argun. In the village of Kur- chaloy, young Wahhabis burned down the ziyarat (mausoleum) of Sufi saint Yangulbi Hajji “to please God.” Today, the republic is increasing its involvement in educational measures to explain to young people that Wahhabism, jihad, and the Islamic State are wrong ideologies.

Activation of Islam and Terminological Confusion

Amid the more active involvement of Islam in the Russian regions and all sorts of movements and trends hitherto unknown in Russia, the academic community has no choice but to borrow terms from its Western colleagues. Some of them are not absolutely correct; others have nothing to do with reality. A. Yarlykapov, in particular, has offered a wide set of terminological novelties, including new Islam, old Islam, universal Islam, true Islam, correct Islam, global Islam, traditional and non-traditional Islam.16 The content remains unclear, while all of them are related to Islamic fundamentalism in Russia. The author does not clarify this term either, while terminological confusion does nothing to elucidate the situation. In fact, by new Islam he means Wahhabism, which is, in fact, a religious-political trend that appeared in the first half of the 18th century thanks to the activities of Hanbali alim Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. In the Soviet Union, it was practically unknown, except to a narrow group of experts, while its followers never showed themselves. Yarlykapov’s position is a far from successful specification of what Malashenko wrote about the revival of Islam in Russia: “We are dealing with new Islam and new Muslims.”17 There is no new Islam in Russia, let alone, new Muslims. This terminological confusion is either deliberate or stems from ignorance. There is no new or old Islam in Russia; there is only one Islam with numerous sects and trends. In this respect, Islam does not stand apart from other world religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism—in which sects and trends are not something out of the ordinary. New Islamic trends

16 See: A.A. Yarlykapov, op. cit., pp. 610-611. 17 A. Malashenko, Islam dlya Rossii, ROSSPEN, Moscow, 2007, p. 46.

82 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 among the Muslims of any country do not mean that a new Islam has appeared to push away the local form of religion. This terminological confusion creates misunderstandings. There is a legend that in his time the Prophet Muhammad said that there would be 73 sects in Islam. Medieval Muslim theologian ash-Shahrastānī wrote that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said, “My ummah will split into seventy-three sects, all of which will be in Hell except one group.” When asked about those who would be saved, the Prophet answered that they were people of the Sunnah and scholarly consensus; when asked what he meant by the Sunnah and scholarly consensus, he answered, “Those who follow that which I and my companions follow.”18 The prophet also said that a group of his community would continue on truth until the coming of the Hour and that “my community will not come together on misguidance.”19 Yarlykapov, who has written that the Northern Caucasus has a great deal of experience in building local caliphates, is hardly right. Indeed, what does he mean? Is he referring to the Imamate of Shamil? It existed for barely twenty years, which cannot be described as “a great deal of experience.” He has also written that “the Caucasian emirate project proved to be very successful”: it is not clear what this project was, who authored it, and where it was implemented. There are no open religious conflicts, but there is a certain amount of tension between the federal center and the Northern Caucasus. Certain experts from the Carnegie Center, Malashenko being one of them, insist that Caucasus-phobia is much more dangerous than the “clash of civilizations.” He describes the Northern Caucasus as the main source of Islamist and separatist tension. This is not a conflict of cultures, but a political problem of the last twenty years, which the Kremlin and the local pro-Russian elites have not yet resolved. There is no doubt that the politicization of Islam is initiated from abroad with the obvious intention of destabilizing the religious-political situation in Russia. The law and order structures keep an eye on the process and sum up the developments in analytical reports. According to Tausoltan Uzde- nov, “the interest shown by foreign states in the Northern Caucasus is not fortuitous. It is a great overestimation to say that all studies of local Islam are geared at politics; we should say, however, that in the last few years, officials of all sorts of international organizations have been frequenting the region to find out the status of the religious, mainly, Islamic structures.”20 At the same time, studies of Islam in Russia and its regions require profound analysis and clear terminological definitions of various aspects because the followers of Islam in the regions of Russia (especially in its traditional regions) are growing increasingly active.

Conclusion

The radical or even extremist religious groups that operate in Russia are far removed from “religion and spirituality; they are pursuing their own aims, settling scores among themselves, and drawing masses of people into the process.”21 They concentrate on fanning enmity inside religions, between religions and peoples and, by the same token, act against the very meaning of Islam that calls for peace and consensus among believers, as well as creative efforts. This was one of the focal points of the final declaration issued by the international theological conference on “Russian Muslims: Rights and Duties” held on 6 March, 2014 in Makhachkala and

18 Ash-Shahrastānī, Kniga o religiyakh i sektakh, Moscow, 1984, p. 27. 19 Ibid., p. 28. 20 T.A. Uzdenov, op. cit. 21 R.G. Abdulatipov, Sudby islama v Rossii: istoria i perspektivy, Mysl, Moscow, 2002, pp. 305-306.

83 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS attended by a delegation of the International Union for Muslim Scholars headed by Secretary-Gener- al Ali Muhiddin al-Qaradaghi. This highly respected Muslim theologian was very open about his position on the terrorist acts in Russia carried out under Islamic slogans that killed imams, teachers, women, and children. He further said that “intimidation and destruction of peaceful people, murders, illegal execu- tions, and explosions in public buildings and other structures are banned as criminal acts” and that they are crimes, very much like “robbery and proliferation of dishonesty on earth” severely punished by Allah. He said that “anyone who is directly involved in acts of terror, incites others, finances them or supports them, either as an individual, group, or state, will be considered a terrorist.”22 It is very important to organize in Russia religious and scientific forums to demonstrate the country’s ethnocultural and ethnoconfessional diversity and expose the criminal nature of extremists and terrorists who abuse Islamic values and call for “worldwide jihad.” There is a great need to understand the moral and humanistic values of Islam and Christianity that reveal common interests and establish tolerant relations and a dialog of human values.

22 Itogovaya deklaratsia Mezhdunarodnoy bogoslovskoy konferentsiii “Rossiiskie musulmane: prava i obyazannosti,” available at [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/241091/].

SHAPING POSITIVE IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHNOCULTURAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE

Irina KARABULATOVA D.Sc. (Philology), Professor, Chief Research Associate, Department of the Sociology of Knowledge; Head, Sector of Ethnopolitical and Sociocultural Security and Communication Technologies, Institute of Socio-Political Research, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation)

Bigaysha AKHMETOVA Ph.D. (Philology), Assistant Professor, Department of the Theory of Languages and Teaching Methods, Baytursynov Kostanay State University (Kostanay, Republic of Kazakhstan)

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Khabiba SHAGBANOVA D.Sc. (Philology), Professor, Department of Sociology, Tyumen State Oil and Gas University (Tyumen, Russian Federation)

Ekaterina LOSKUTOVA Post-graduate student, Institute of Socio-Political Research, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation)

Flera SAYFULINA D.Sc. (Philology), Professor, Department of Tatar Literature and Teaching Methods, Kazan (Volga) Federal University (Kazan, Russian Federation)

Luiza ZAMALIEVA Ph.D. (Philology), Assistant Professor, Department of Tatar Literature and Teaching Methods, Kazan (Volga) Federal University (Kazan, Russian Federation)

Ilya DYUKOV Senior Lecturer, Russian Academy of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture of Ilya Glazunov (Moscow, Russian Federation)

Margarita VYKHRYSTYUK D.Sc. (Philology), Professor, Department of Philological Education, Tyumen State University (Tobolsk, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

ny, particularly a polycultural and information sources and particularly impor- polyethnic society, cannot but be con- tant in view of the various strategies used by A cerned about the ways its ethnic iden- the Islamic State to lure new supporters. tity takes shape and crops up in social con- ISIS recommends itself to its potential sup- texts. Studies of various aspects of this porters as an ideal place where true human problem look especially promising in a con- values are respected and flourish and which temporary society that relies on electronic has already united members of different eth-

85 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS nic communities. The way ethnic identities that form ethnic identity; this problem, how- are being shaped amid the alien cultural ste- ever, has not yet been consistently studied reotypes imposed on them is determined by and adequately represented. Psychologists the way the communities with long-standing and their colleagues working in other fields histories and specific cultures, confessions, have been invariably attracted by the emer- and political preferences cooperate among gence and development of ethnic identity; themselves. Sociocultural coexistence of today, the problems that have moved to the different ethnic groups in an electronic-infor- fore in national politics have added urgency mation society requires social consensus to this and related subjects. Ethnic identity is based on compromises and complementary “inherited” at birth; it becomes consolidated relations between the ethnic majorities and by use of the native language and the cul- minorities. The Islamic State exploits this as- tural environment, which, in turn, suggests pect to promote its ideas. Sociology and the the generally accepted standards of behav- humanities have written a lot about the ways ior and self-realization. Confessional identi- ethnic identities are formed, however em- ty, on the other hand, is a social construct pirical studies offer widely different informa- that might be transformed or even radical- tion about the age and other specifics of the ized. We have identified ethnocultural infor- process of acquiring a personal ethnic iden- mation security as cooperation among all of tity. This is why we have undertaken an its subjects free from social violence that analysis of the place and nature of ethnic helps them meet their requirements through identity in the matrix of the individual’s social personal confidential and ethnoconfessional identity, as well as the age specifics related cognitive communication responsible for the to the samplings of specific ethnic affilia- referential value of the milieu and psycho- tions. In Russia, social studies have never logical health and full-scale personal devel- questioned the importance of the processes opment for all.

KEYWORDS: ethnic identity, political Islam, electronic-information society, Islamic State, sociocultural security.

Introduction

Social identity manifests itself in a special way amid social earthquakes and large-scale social changes. The current transformation of Russian society, which is moving away from the Soviet socioeconomic, political, and sociocultural models and their various outcrops at the societal and everyday levels and in the context of developing market relations, affects all layers of social life, institutionalized forms of sociality, and vectors of social development. The self-awareness of population groups inevitably reflects sociocultural contradictions, the social diversity of the contemporary world, the vagueness of social situations, the diversity of the organizational principles of social entities, types of activity, social roles, and group standards, and the contradictory aspects of cultural intercorrelation. The old cultural borders and values of different social categories, through which the individual used to identify himself and his place in society, are disappearing at the level of individual self- awareness and within the framework of generations. Ethnoconfessional identity, as one of the types of social identity, can be observed among children of school age (primary and the first years of sec- ondary school); it does not crop up as scattered episodes, while its manifestations are not varied.

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People, even very young people, living in a state with all the official signs of independence, invariably associate their national “self” with their citizenship. Ethnic identity in the structure of social identity is even clearer in 8th-11th-grade schoolchildren. Micro- and macro-social factors play an important role in the process. This primarily relates to the educational system that flexibly responded to the social changes in the early 1990s. The radical change of the social system and other social changes of the last few decades have called for a reassessment of the value system.1 Urbanization and the weaker role of the family as a traditional mechanism of ethnocultural transmission and ethnic socialization of the younger generation have increased the role of the state institutions, the educational system in particular. The well-known examples of drawing young people into the ISIS (Varvara Karaulova and others) have revealed that our system of education and upbringing abounds in lacunae filled today by alien cultural elements. This warps personal perceptions and creates negative ethnoconfessional identities and negative attitudes toward the native language and culture. In an electronic-information society, education should become more flexible; it should take into account and rely on the very natural interest of any individual in his roots, history, culture, and stronger solidarity with his ethnic group and should shorten the distance between ethnic groups—a sign that positive ethnic identity is being shaped.

Materials and Methods

Millions of people never question their ethnic identity; their self-awareness helps them to decide who they are and with whom they are willing to side. Ethnic identity is a psychological category that describes subjective awareness of belonging to a specific ethnic community. We have based our research concept on the structural-functional, interactionist, phenomeno- logical, and socio-psychological approaches. Prof. Galina Soldatova has identified five types of digression from the normal positive ethnic identity: ethnic indifference develops in situations when personal identity stands above ethnic identity; ethno-nihilism is the individual’s unwillingness to support his own ethnocultural values; hyper- identity is an ardent desire to achieve ethnic domination; ethno-egoism becomes evident at the verbal level through tension and irritation when dealing with members of other ethnicities; ethno-isolation- ism is the conviction that one’s own people are superior to all others and that mixed marriage and inter-national contacts should be excluded; and national fanaticism means that these people are ready to go to all lengths for the sake of ethnic interests.

Empirical Base

The empirical base consists of studies conducted under the supervision and with the direct participation of the present authors: Within the Shaping Regional Identity in Contemporary Russia project, 650 people were polled in the Tyumen Region in April-May 2008; in Bashkortostan in 2012-2015; in Tatarstan in 2013-2014, and in the Moscow Region in 2014-2016; the sampling was based on gender, age, educational level, type of settlement, and ethnic or confessional identity.

1 See: A.A. Aliev, Ideologiya “musulmanskogo natsionalizma,” INION, Moscow, 2008; E.Yu. Barkovskaya, Sovremennoe gosudarstvo i traditsii kultury upravleniya v islame, RAGS, Moscow, 2008.

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We relied on the Types of Ethnic Identity methods elaborated by Prof. Soldatova and the FPI personal questionnaire to discover the interrelation between the types of ethnic identities and personal specifics: (1) Reverse correlation between national fanaticism and neuroticism significant at the level p < 0.05; the level of neuroticism decreases when the level of national fanaticism increases, and vice versa. The willingness to do anything for the sake of ethnic interests and justification of all sacrifices might lower the neurotic syndromes, and vice versa. (2) Reverse correlation between positive ethnic identity and irritability, the level of significance being p < 0.05. Positive self-perception and positive perception of others might lower shaky emotional states, and vice versa. (3) Direct correlation between positive ethnic identity and communicability, which becomes significant at p < 0.01. An obvious need for communication and the willingness to satisfy it promote positive self-perception and positive perception of others. (4) Direct correlation between national fanaticism and communicability, the significance level being p < 0.05. High figures on the “communicability” scale might indicate that national fanaticism has increased and that ethnic identity stands above personal. (5) Reverse correlation between ethnic indifference and steadiness, the significance level being p < 0.05. If personal identity is higher than ethnic identity, we might diagnose lower defense against stress factors in everyday situations, and vice versa. (6) Reverse correlation between ethnic indifference and openness becomes significant atp < 0.05. The high figures on the openness scale contribute to higher ethnic identity, since the desire for open and confidential cooperation with other people increases and personal identity moves into the background, and vice versa. Between the 1990s and the present, the macrosocial institutional changes in Russian society required adequate theoretical-methodological foundations for their interpretation.

Results

We have confirmed the hypothesis that types of ethnic identity and personal specifics are inter- related. In the future we plan to study the interrelation between types of ethnic identity and psychological defenses that might interest specialists in cross-cultural studies. The family is the foundation of personality development and identification. It shapes basic values, attitudes, and a quest for the meaning of life stemming from the quest for spiritual-moral ideals. The family ties the individual to his national roots, brings him into the context of national history, and makes him aware of his involvement in the destiny of his country. This means that the family also complements the functions of other institutions by harmonizing socialization, individualization, and personal identification. At the same time, the vague outlines of the family as an institution cause unpredictable changes in personality structure. Former ISIS members all point out that verbal propaganda is the strongest weapon of the Islamic State. This explains why about 1,000 British Muslims preferred ISIS to the British Army. Today, the problem of politicization of religion, Islam in particular, has moved to the fore. We must recognize that ISIS emissaries are past masters of verbal propaganda, hence the inflow of people willing to fight in its ranks from practically every country of the

88 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 world with the exception of those where wars and affected behavior are non-existent (Bhutan is a case in point). In the West, political Islam is discussed in the clash of civilizations (Samuel Huntington) context: it is an enemy now and will remain an enemy in the future.2 This approach puts the Islamic Republic of Iran and the al-Qa‘eda terrorist organization on the same footing as elements of “civilizational challenge” or “ideological threat” to Western civilization, which, according to its assertions, relies on liberal democracy and the market economy.3 During the Cold War, the role of the “enemy of the free world” belonged to communism; today, it is shifting to political Islam, or even the Is- lamic world as a whole. Russia cannot share the Western attitude toward political Islam. In Russia, Islam is not alien, either culturally, or in any other respect. Russia is a multiconfessional country with an Orthodox Chris- tian majority and a considerable Islamic minority. In the past [the Soviet Union] was home not only to the Muslims of the Volga Region and the Northern Caucasus, but also to the Muslims of Central Asia. There are no Muslim enclaves in Russia; Muslims and non-Muslims live together, therefore, mixed marriages are nothing unusual.4 Russia is a Eurasian civilization, in which religions do not clash, as often happens in the West: they live side by side, talk to each other, and enrich each other.

Figure 1

Distribution of Answers to the Question “How Do You Normally Respond to People of a Different Religious or Ethnic Affiliation?”

Undecided

Aggressive

Respond negatively and Share of do not conceal this respondents (%) Respond cautiously but do my best not to demonstrate this Do not pay attention to their special features

Interested

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

The above does not exclude the possibility that in Russia too, political Islam might slide into extremism and terrorism to become an acute threat. The Wahhabis, who know how to deal with social, political, and economic challenges, have gained superiority over Islamic universalists. Encouraged and abetted from abroad, Wahhabism has

2 See: J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1994; V.E. Dontsov, Sovremennye islamskie dvizheniya i organizatsii na Blizhnem Vostoke v systeme mezhdunarodnykh itnosheniy, DA MID, Moscow, 2001. 3 See: V.E. Dontsov, op. cit.; A.I. Ionova, “Musulmanskiy natsionalizm” v sovremennoy Indonezii, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1972. 4 See: Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzglyad iznutri, ed. by A. Malashenko and M. Brill Olcott, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2001.

89 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS spread far and wide across the post-Soviet region, even though the responsibility for the phenomenon and its popularity cannot and should not be heaped on foreign sponsors alone.5 This means that in Russia political Islam is a challenge rather than a problem. The West can merely reject it, push it aside, and try to eliminate it. Russia must find peaceful ways and means to de-politicize and de-radicalize it. Political religion is an ideology, pure and simple, that addresses the sacral world and insists on its priority over the profane. Political religions are not “distorted” or “anomalous” interpretations of “true” religions. Any religion performs an ideological function as part of a greater philosophical function. When we talk about politicization of religions, we do not mean that they are used for political purposes, we mean that their political component comes to the fore. Political religion is not a heresy: its political component has merely moved to the fore. Those who have sided with political religions do not speak of themselves as Islamists and “Orthodoxists”—they are Muslims and Orthodox Chris- tians or even “true” Muslims and “true” Orthodox Christians. Their opponents still call them heretics. There is no neutrality in political religions: the difference between “us” and “them” is ontologi- cal. “They” have been created by the forces of evil (the ideologists of political religions say that their opponents have no souls), an agreement with them is impossible, therefore they should be destroyed. This paradoxical combination of cruelty and flexibility is typical of the post-modernist phenomena.6

Figure 2

Distribution of the Answers to the Question about the Interrelation between Religious Extremism and Islam Depending on the Respondent’s Religious Affiliation

47.82 There is an interrelation, very 26.08 much like in other religions 57.57 43.81 Atheists

30.43 Followers of other 52.17 religions No, I can’t see any interrelation 36.36 20.61 Muslims

21.8 Yes, there is an interrelation, I 39.13 Christians do not doubt this 6.06 35.56

0 20 40 60 80

The ideology of political Islam is a set of concepts that might be used at will to build all kinds of ideological constructs. The Islamic ummah is not a national state in the Western meaning of the term, but an ideo- cratic politeia set up to create the best possible conditions for the salvation of the souls of its members.

5 See: Z.S. Arukhov, Ekstremizm v sovremennom islame, Kavkaz Agency, Makhachkala, 1999. 6 See: V.I. Garadzha, Religiovedenie. A textbook, Aspekt-Press, Moscow, 1995; N.V. Zhdanov, Islamskaya kontseptsiya miroporyadka, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, Moscow, 2003; A.I. Ionova, op. cit.

90 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 17 Issue 1 2016

The Sunnis and Shi‘a share a more or less common idea of Islamic democracy as the power of pious and religiously well-educated people, since they alone can understand what people really need. Islamism prefers a wide interpretation of true Muslims and infidels. The world of Islam is opposed to kufr. In the absence of a third alternative, all potential supporters are regarded as Muslims. The Islamist ideal was and remains a worldwide ummah; however, the new generation of Islamists is more interested in struggle than in its results: terrorism is developing into the main method.

Discussion

In their interpretations of “political religion,” scholars proceed from the fundamental works of German political scientist Eric Voegelin and his successors. In fact, the problem of social identity is studied by many branches of scientific knowledge. Methodological foundations of sociology integrate most significant and productive approaches, rather than negate them. Here we have in mind fundamental classical works by Max Weber, Anthony Giddens, and others. At the contemporary development level of sociology, works by T. McPartland, S. Hall, J. Haber- mas, N. Daudrikh, T. Kozlova, M. Zakovorotnaya, I. Kon, O. Malinova, and others can be used to identify the correct methodological approaches to the study of personal identity. Psychologists and sociologists in Russia and abroad—Z. Bauman, U. Beck, A. Giddens, A. Toffler, D. Kellner, and J. Attali—discuss the specifics of shaping social identity in the present sociocultural conditions within the discourse of modernity and post-modernity. Prominent Polish scholar Piotr Sztompka and Russian scholars B. Grushin, A. Malinkina, V. Shapovalova, A. Zakharova, M. Brykina, L. Byzov, A. Zakamulin, A. Priepa, and others have discussed the specifics of Russia’s cultural space. Russian scholars (V. Yadov, E. Danilova, S. Klimova, P. Kozyreva, O. Dudchenko, A. Mytil, G. Diligenskiy, Yu. Levada, V. Miranovich, A. Shadzhe, and others) discuss the specifics of the development of personal identity in a transforming crisis-stricken society. L. Ionina, A. Flier, A. Dugin, E. Semenenko, E. Ustyugova, Z. Mlinar, N. Rybalkina, A. Sharov, A. Glukhikh, V. Martynova, T. Sav- itskaya, V. Lykova, and others study social identity in the context of the sociocultural changes in contemporary society. G. Osipov, M. Gorshkov, N. Tikhonova, M. Lisauskene, V. Popova, T. Rassadina, and others have probed deep into the changes in individual axiological orientations in contemporary Russia. W. Warner, A. Smith, and T. Yakovuk discuss the phenomenon of “common,” “collective,” and “national” identity from the point of view of their mobilizing or integrating role. Yu. Volkov, L. Drobi- zheva, L. Ipatova, A. Lukina, and S. Kropotov have tried to identify the ways of social consolidation in Russia within a study of common Russian identity. This means that much has been written about social identity, but the studies — remain fragmented, they have not achieved a homogenous (in the dialectical unity of the meaningful, structural-logical, and other aspects) reflection of the phenomenon of social identity; — inadequately express the systemic nature of the deep-cutting and many-sided changes of social identity under the impact of Russia’s shift to the market. This means that there is a contradiction among the need to launch comprehensive studies of social identity, the way it is formed and affects social life, and the absence of systemic scholarly studies that could become the sociological solution to a problem of great theoretical and practical importance.

91 Volume 17 Issue 1 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Conclusion

Nothing that has been written so far addresses the problem of an ideological alternative to Is- lamism. Meanwhile, contemporary science needs a different approach: political Islam should not be contemplated as a unique and isolated phenomenon, but as part of the worldwide process of the politicization of religion. We need cross-confessional studies covering different countries and different regions to establish a homogenous approach to political Islam as a religious ideology and a powerful political movement with a solid social basis. This approach alone can help us arrive at a strategy aimed at containing the radical elements of political Islam, formulating an ideological alternative, and preventing its slide into terror. This work is one of the first attempts to find a novel approach to the phenomenon of political Islam. Religiously motivated violence—either in the form of terrorism or any other form of armed struggle—has become one of the most serious challenges. In fact, Islamism challenges the world community and Russia as its part. This means that an alternative to the theology of political Islam should be sought in the sphere of theology. Those who fight for money can be bought; psychologi- cally unstable or brain-washed people can be cured, or their brains can be set right, while convinced people can and should be persuaded to change their minds. To do this we should carry out an in-depth study of their theological basis and worldview in order to offer them different ideas. This is probably the main task of and main challenge to social thought. Political Islam is an ideological challenge; this means that the answer to it lies in the sphere of ideology/theology. Islamic radicalism can be neutralized in people’s minds by an ideological alternative no less, or even more, powerful. It should be formulated in religious terms. So far, the educational level of the Muslim theologians falls short of the task of ideological confrontation with the Islamists. It seems that the religiously oriented intelligentsia that created political Islam could formulate an answer to the ideological challenge of Islamism. The current attempts to present Euro-Islamism and Russian Islam as ideological alternatives to radical Islamism do not hold water.7 The Eurasian project looks like the most adequate alternative and should be further developed. Today, its positive message consists of allied relations between Ortho- doxy and Islam and continued unity of Russia as a unique cultural world and political entity. It is not enough, however, to formulate an ideological alternative to reverse the obvious trends towards the politicization of Islam in Russia; we should soften the effects of a multi-dimensional social crisis in Russia. So far, systemic corruption looks like the highest barrier on this road. Today, the prospects for Russia’s Muslim regions look negative—we might be able to avoid total Islamization, but radical Islamism will be one of the greatest threats to the country’s security.

7 Islamskaia intellektualnaia alternativa v XX veke, ed. by G. Jemal, UMMAH, Moscow, 2005; Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzglyad iznutri.