SENATE Official Committee Hansard

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA SENATE Official Committee Hansard

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE

Reference: India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests

MONDAY, 20 JULY 1998

SYDNEY

BY AUTHORITY OF THE SENATE CANBERRA 1997 INTERNET The Proof and Official Hansard transcripts of Senate committee hearings, some House of Representatives committee hearings and some joint committee hearings are available on the Internet. Some House of Representatives committees and some joint committees make available only Official Hansard transcripts. The Internet address is: http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard

SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE Monday, 20 July 1998

Members: Senator Hogg (Chair), Senator Sandy Macdonald (Deputy Chair), Senators Cook, Eggleston, Lightfoot, Quirke, West and Woodley Participating members: Senators Abetz, Bolkus, Brown, Brownhill, Calvert, Chapman, Colston, Faulkner, Forshaw, Harradine, Margetts and Schacht Senators in attendance: Senators Cook, Hogg, Sandy Macdonald, Margetts and Quirke

Terms of reference for the inquiry:

(i) the implications of India’s nuclear tests, and the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs of both India and Pakistan, for regional and international security; and

(ii) the Australian Government’s role in international efforts to constrain nuclear weapon and ballistic missile proliferation in South Asia. WITNESSES

BHATTACHARYA, Dr Debesh, Director, Centre for South Asian Studies, Faculty of Economics, University of Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales 2006 ...... 2

DOHERTY, Mr Denis William, National Coordinator, Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition, and State Secretary, Pax Christi New South Wales, 109 Lennox Street, Newtown, New South Wales ...... 30

HANSON, Dr Marianne Jean, International Relations and Asian Politics Research Unit, Department of Government, University of Queensland, Queensland 4072 . 61

MALIK, Dr Mohan, Director, Defence Studies Program, Deakin University, Gee- long, Victoria 3217 ...... 45

MASSELOS, Dr James Cosmas, 61 Corunna Road, Stanmore, New South Wales . . 18

McDONALD, Mr Hamish, 17 Rawson Avenue, Queens Park, New South Wales 2022 74 Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 1

Committee met at 9.30 a.m.

CHAIR—I declare open this public meeting of the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee which is inquiring into the matter of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests. This is the first public hearing conducted by the committee on this matter. The Senate referred the matter to the committee on 28 May 1998 for inquiry and report by 4 November 1998.

To date, the committee has received 33 submissions, all of which have been made public. The committee expects to receive additional submissions. Further public hearings will be held tomorrow in Canberra and in Perth on Wednesday. I welcome Dr Debesh Bhattacharya to this hearing.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 2 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998

[9.31 a.m.]

BHATTACHARYA, Dr Debesh, Director, Centre for South Asian Studies, Faculty of Economics, University of Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales 2006

Dr Bhattacharya—I am not sure whether I am appearing as the Director or in my personal capacity. I am not sure about that.

CHAIR—We will take it as your personal capacity.

Dr Bhattacharya—Right.

CHAIR—The committee prefers all evidence to be given in public but, should you at any stage wish to give any part of your evidence in private, you may ask to do so and the committee will consider your request. The committee has before it a written submission from you. Are there any alterations or additions you would like to make to your submission at this stage?

Dr Bhattacharya—Quite a few grammatical mistakes. I think I can submit a corrected copy later on.

CHAIR—Thank you. For the purpose of obtaining an accurate record, could you remain behind at the end of the proceedings so the Hansard officer can verify information that you have provided to the hearing. I now invite you to make an opening statement and then we will proceed to questions.

Dr Bhattacharya—At the outset I would like to say a few things about myself. I have an Australian passport. I have been living in Australia for 30 years. I am married to an Australian, and our kids are always supporting Australia, even against India, which is my country of origin. Especially whenever there is a cricket match between India and Australia it creates a problem for me because there is one against three, which is not a good thing.

Nevertheless, in a sense I was quite upset, and publicly I condemned the nuclear testing of both India and Pakistan, not so much because of the Australian stand but because I felt the opportunity cost of such test is quite high. Neither India nor Pakistan can afford the kind of luxury their political parties have been taking with the nuclear weapons program. So my stand is condemnatory of the Indian and Pakistan testing.

I think they have increased tension in the region. A nuclear arms race cannot be afforded by the countries. Also, I find regional tension is only increased, although both countries are denying that. Nevertheless, there are some fundamental disagreements I have got with the group of five, group of eight and also the Australian government stand.

First of all, the international community in the way it has been defined in the last five or six years is as if it means only two countries—the United States and Britain. Quite a few times I feel upset that these countries represent only five per cent of the global population, and whenever they want to take very unpopular measures they always say it is the wish of the international community. In my mind, nuclear weapons are not only problems for the

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 3

South Asian region now; it is a global problem. I am glad to say that at least some countries are prepared to do some kind of inquiry.

Consequently, I would like to state categorically here that I am prepared to give a ‘No’ for the nuclear arms race. At the same time I am prepared to understand the complexities of the situation which somehow has bypassed the Australian government’s response to the nuclear issues. Let me make the position quite clear what I mean by that. First of all, Australia has to be extremely careful that it does not follow policies which are detrimental to Australian national interest.

Secondly, Australia should have to answer the charges of double standard. If you are going to impose any sanctions on the offending party, at least the sanctions could be comprehensive but there are no sanctions on wheat exports, I am glad to say. That is almost $300 million worth of exports from Australia at this point.

The Indian government would immediately ask, ‘Why, if you really feel so strongly against our nuclear test, didn’t you impose sanctions on wheat exports to India?’ That double standard is also extended to the Australian attitude towards nuclear testing and the Indian attitude to the nuclear position in the globe over the last 50 years.

I remember the Maralinga test when the Australian government of that day invited a nuclear power to explode a nuclear device in this country. I also remember that during the last 50 years no single Australian leader has ever asked the United States to apologise for dropping two atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only country which has been the victim of nuclear weapons. Japan was not a nuclear country and Japan was almost beginning to surrender at the end of the Second World War.

When American nuclear powered fleets come to the Australian shore, Australian governments always welcome them. If India and Pakistan try to follow the United States— after all the United States has done more than 1,200 nuclear tests—suddenly they find even their parliamentarians are not welcome. The double standard is going to be noted in the subcontinent.

Also, the Prime Minister’s statement was very offensive, talking about the dirt poor country, as if the poor people do not love their country—it is a luxury for them. The poor are quite capable of loving their country and sometimes their sovereignistic tendencies and jingoism are well manifested. Basically they should be concerned with their national security. If the rich countries like Australia are concerned about their national security it is quite justifiable for the poor countries to be concerned about their national security.

I still find, despite trying to explain it during the last 30 years, that Australia still does not understand the complexities of South Asia. The complexities are that since 1954 India has been saying the total elimination of nuclear bombs, weapons of mass destruction is their official policy. In 1965 India was the first country to suggest that phased withdrawal of existing nuclear weapons must be the policy of the United Nations. In the 1968 non- proliferation treaty that was completely disregarded. As late as 1988, Rajiv Gandhi, the late Prime Minister of India, was asking for the action plan exactly on that ground, that there

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 4 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998 should be phased elimination and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. That has never been taken seriously.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s China has become quite hegemonistic and in a sense it is documented that China has been exporting missile technology to Pakistan as well as to Iran. It is a CIA report; it is not an Indian government report. Nevertheless, the strange part throughout the second term of the Bill Clinton presidency is that he has been trying to establish a strategy of partnership with China. He is prepared to ignore India completely. India has been asking for some kind of guarantee from the United States that China, with its export of missile technology, China with its influence in Burma or Myanmar, is no longer going to be accepted as a kind of impartial mediator in a South-East Asian regional dispute.

Unfortunately, Australia thought that Kashmir is the only issue, that maybe India and Pakistan are not the only countries which are creating the problem; it is not that simple. The United States has also asked Bangladesh to provide a base for stationing some of their armed forces, for shore leave and things like that. As a result of that, India has become more concerned in the 1990s about there being some kind of encirclement of India. On the east, there is Burma and Bangladesh, and the United States wants influence in Bangladesh. On the north, nothing has been done about the Chinese exporting missile technology to Pakistan and, on the west, there is Pakistan. More fundamentally, the problem that has come up is that Indian criticism has not been taken seriously.

My position is that I understand what India did but I do not justify it. I think the present government of India has fallen for the simple mistake of thinking that its popularity will definitely be enhanced by cheap, short-term political moves. I am not sure whether this government will last but, nevertheless, they completely forgot that action will take place in both China and Pakistan and, predictably, Pakistan replied. As a result, I hope that this will be a case where both countries at least have given a jolt to the nuclear apartheid of the NPT and CTBT.

My position is that CTBT of 1996 has more or less been a slap in the Indian face by Australia. Despite Indian opposition; India has repeatedly said that there is no control and no time limit for existing nuclear countries, that they are only interested in horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, much to the detriment of the existing 32,000 nuclear weapons among the group of five permanent Security Council members. The problem is that the rest of the world also thinks that nuclear weapons are bad for every human being. Consequently, not only should the group of five not be allowed to keep their nuclear weapons but nuclear weapons everywhere must be completely eliminated. Thank you.

CHAIR—Thank you Professor.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—To which country is India’s nuclear deterrent mainly directed?

Dr Bhattacharya—I think it is mainly directed towards China. There is no doubt about that. Remember in 1962, there was a war between India and China. India lost that war. China could have easily completely defeated India. From that time onwards, the whole non- aligned movement, the leadership of India and China was different—we were brought up

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 5 with the slogans, ‘Hindi and Chini Bhai Bhai’ which means Indians and Chinese are brothers. That has been completely forgotten. In some sense I think China is now trying to behave as if it has overtaken India in everything and that it has to be one of the super powers which should be in charge of maintaining peace in every region it belongs to.

So Indian nuclear deterrence is directed towards China, not towards Pakistan. Somehow Australians do not take India that seriously because it is a poor country, but its population is 980 million. If the existing trends continue, by the year 2020, Indian population will have taken over the Chinese population and it will be the most populous country in the world.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—What importance do you believe the Indian government places on the building of a strong, firm and continuing relationship with China?

Dr Bhattacharya—I think this present government made a mistake. The defence minister in India, George Fernandes, as soon as he became the defence minister, immediately publicly shouted that China is our potential enemy No. 1. Obviously, you do not conduct your defence or international policies that way. That was a mistake.

Nevertheless, as time goes by, India is beginning to be seriously concerned. Despite India’s protestations to the United States and to the group of five that this export of missile technology is not good for our region, and that they should do something about China, the United States—instead of punishing China—is establishing China as a strategic partner. Consequently, we say that it is about time we looked after our national security in our own way.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—You mentioned that it was your understanding that China had delivered missile technology to Iran and Pakistan. What delivery method does the Indian government have or propose to have?

Dr Bhattacharya—At present the Indian government is not saying much about the delivery control command structure, except the kind of jingoistic line that we are prepared to do anything we need to do for our security. Basically, I think it is in a very fragmented state and not that developed. India is a democratic country and the Indian government is answer- able. One thing you have to admire is that there has never been a military coup d’etat in India during the last 60 years. It is a surprise, but the military have generally always behaved as if they are inferior to the civilian rule. In a sense, whatever India does, there is always going to be some kind of democratic checks and balances. So the delivery structure is in the process of being fully developed and we might know about it later on.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Are you saying that the command and control for any nuclear capability that India has is in line with the actual development of weapons or do you believe the command and control structure lags somewhat behind?

Dr Bhattacharya—I think the latter is true, that India does lag behind in terms of a command and control structure. One thing I did not mention, but which I think the committee will be aware of, is that towards the latter part of 1997 Pakistan developed the Ghauri missile. Ghauri was one of the invaders in the 16th century: he invaded India and defeated some of the Hindu rulers. Symbolism plays a very important role so the missile was named

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 6 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998 after him. India also started using the names Prithvi and Agni, which suggests that they are playing some funny games in the timing of the missiles.

India was so concerned about this issue that it raised it in talks with the United States. India told them that China was supporting the development of long-range missiles and that they should do something about it but the Americans did not do anything about that.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—This action by India is in breach of the comprehensive test ban arrangements. In terms of timing, are you surprised that it happened now? Are you surprised it has not happened earlier or later? Can you put it in the context of the Indian political environment at the moment and explain why it happened now?

Dr Bhattacharya—I can explain it. Firstly, India is not a signatory to the present CTBT.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—I knew that; I put it in that context.

Dr Bhattacharya—India has not broken any international law. It has not broken any international treaty as such. My reading of this, and I might be wrong, is that this 17-party regime, the BJP—Bharatiya Janata Party—is a very nationalist party. We have complained about it for a long time. If it gets the chance, it will do serious damage to the secularism concept of India.

The Barbri Mosque destruction in 1992 created a lot of race riots. I was very concerned about the emergence of BJP as a serious political party. My reading of it is that they chose that time because they were quite concerned that they would not last out the full five years. But the majority of the Indian population do not like the way the rest of the world attacks India. They think that India should have been invited to become a member of the Security Council—after all, it is the second largest populous country.

India has not done as well as China over the last 20 years but its economic growth record—seven per cent per annum until last year—is quite impressive. There is also the emergence of the middle class: it has grown from 250 million to 300 million. That is a huge purchasing power and it ought to be taken more seriously by the rest of the world.

So the easy, popular feeling is that they said, ‘Look, we could not care less whatever the Americans said; we explode nuclear bomb.’ This is the reason that I think it was done at this point of time, because immediately popularity of that government went up by 91 per cent. One opinion poll in India today suggests that 91 per cent of Indians support it. We have seen exactly the same thing in Pakistan, that it was domestically very popular.

When the time goes by, as at present in India, already opposition figures—people like us who have been commenting that India made a mistake—that kind of thing is also coming from the left-wing opposition in India that maybe the timing was not correct.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Does this so-called Hindu nationalism concern you?

Dr Bhattacharya—Very much so. With the whole fabric of Indian society, I believe the rest of the world ought to realise that there are 130 million Moslems living in India—and I

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 7 was very lucky to meet some of them in England. I was more surprised, pleasantly, that these Moslems love India a lot more than I do. They came from their country as well.

If anything happens to Kashmir—and I know there are lots of political parties which are prepared to use that kind of issue to make these 130 million Indian Moslems second-class citizens permanently—that whole Indian society will be fragmented in the kind of race war which they might take in terms of religion to rid them completely. I cannot imagine what would happen to India.

CHAIR—Following on from Senator Macdonald, if the nuclear tests are associated with this rise and wave of nationalism that is sweeping the country, how does one ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used, either accidentally, inadvertently, or through unauthorised use?

Dr Bhattacharya—The leadership for nearly 40 years have checked it. Remember that India exploded a nuclear device way back in 1974, and that is 24 years ago. All the indicators were that India knew how to explode nuclear bombs if they wanted to, but they did not do it. Despite all the occasional fights between Hindus and Moslems, a surprising degree of civility exists towards each religion in India. After all, India consists of so many different religions. There are more Christians in India than in Australia. India is a melting pot that way.

Consequently, democracywise, I come from West Bengal where there is a large number of Moslem people, and there has not been one single race riot or religious riot, communal riot, in West Bengal during the last 40 years. The political leadership does not want to exploit the divisional tendencies among the population. I am not worried about that bit; it is not going to happen in India, but I am more worried about Pakistan because that has had so many times military coup d’etats, and, whenever they lose something, there is a possibility the military generals will go all the way.

The advantage about India and Pakistan is that if you go to the border at Amritsar, which is just a five-minute walk, you cannot use nuclear weapons when both countries would be completely wiped out. The military people know about it, the civilian leaders also know about it and, as a result, there has been no tendency by either country to use nuclear weapons. It is a kind of deterrent, you might say. It existed even in 1990, when, in Kashmir, there was almost a complete war between India and Pakistan.

Let us hope that, like the Soviet Union and the United States at that time had their nuclear deterrents, knowing full well about MAD, mutually assured destruction, India and Pakistan would do exactly the same thing, and there would be no nuclear war.

Senator MARGETTS—Professor, I found your presentation very interesting, especially in relation to the role of China. I must admit that I have been fascinated to see the different responses that the Australian government has made to various countries in relation to nuclear proliferation. Being a Green senator, I am concerned about nuclear proliferation everywhere. I am very interested to see that the government responses are quite different whether it is China, France, India, Pakistan or, indeed, Israel.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 8 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998

After the Chinese nuclear testing, I recall visiting, with some other parliamentarians, the Chinese ambassador in Australia. At the time he mentioned that he was concerned about Australia’s role in supplying nuclear material to South Korea or, if you like, turning a blind eye to the plutonium build-up in Japan. Do you have any comments in relation to the sort of domino theory—India is concerned about China, China is looking over its shoulder at Korea or Japan—and whether or not Australia’s role in supplying uranium, reacting in the same way, might be adding to that?

Dr Bhattacharya—I tend to share your misgivings about Australia’s double standards. I also find it very difficult to see Australian governments exporting uranium to cities of countries which have been nuclear proliferators or which are also friends of nuclear proliferators. To my mind, the best decision for Australia would be complete stoppage of exporting uranium to any country in the world, because nuclear weapons are so horribly destructive.

We know that nine million people died in the First World War and 56 million people died in the Second World War. If there is a nuclear holocaust on the Indian subcontinent, almost 500 million or 600 million people would die. If the Australian government wants to take a kind of ethically justifiable position, double standards are always going to be pointed out.

For us it is all right if the Americans have 32,000 nuclear weapons. These days we can speak nothing evil of China and hear nothing evil of China and all is more or less justified. I have done it myself. I wrote two articles about the Chinese economy in glowing terms in the mid-1970s. Now I find that China has become one of the group five countries. Double standards are double standards as far as I am concerned. I tend to justify your stand much more readily than any other stand in Australia on that issue.

Senator MARGETTS—Professor, you mentioned countries that Australia might sell uranium to that have been involved with proliferation. Are there any particular countries that you are worried about more than others to whom Australia currently may sell uranium?

Dr Bhattacharya—I think France is one country. I am also concerned when I find that Australia is still exporting uranium to any country which is potentially a nuclear power. The existing CTBT is completely hopeless because it allows the existing nuclear powers to keep on keeping their nuclear weapons and a kind of nuclear apartheid. If Australia exports to any country which is a friendly country of the United States—Britain, France, China; I do not think Russia is much of a problem these days—then I think we have to be concerned about it.

Senator MARGETTS—Professor, our foreign affairs department give us assurances that if we sell uranium to France we know where every atom goes. Can you explain the mechanism by which France may be able to proliferate utilising Australian uranium?

Dr Bhattacharya—I do not really know. I am not an authority about the way uranium from Australia goes to France. Because France is a nuclear country and France has double standards about nuclear weapons—it is all right for France to have nuclear testing in the South Pacific, but they criticise India and Pakistan for testing nuclear weapons on their own

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 9 soils—I find that France does not deserve to get anything which might proliferate nuclear weapons. Consequently, I would be opposed to it.

Senator MARGETTS—There was another issue you brought up. You mentioned the CTBT. Can I take us back to when Australia was involved with helping to negotiate for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty? If my memory serves me right, that was 1995. The official line from the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evans, was that the most achievable outcome was to protect the interests of the nuclear powers and to maintain a call for non- proliferation from all other countries and not to insist on a timetable for nuclear weapons removal from the nuclear powers. To your knowledge, was that view shared by countries like India? Did they believe that that was the most achievable outcome or did they think that there might be more achieved through a natural timetable?

Dr Bhattacharya—No, that was not the view of the Indian government. As a matter of fact, the Indian government at that time was the United Front government, which is now in opposition in India. Australia took a leading role on the CTBT negotiations in 1995. It did not do any follow-up activity of the Canberra Commission, which is much more interesting and much more exciting.

I think former Senator Gareth Evans was completely wrong if he thought that we are only concerned about the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. India’s point was: give us a timetable—the year 2010 or 2020—for the withdrawal of all existing, about 40,000, nuclear bombs. There was complete silence. Despite Indian opposition, the Australian government took it to the General Assembly at the persistence of the USA.

In some respects, I think I am quite justified in thinking that in most of international foreign policy Australia is not taking an independent line. It is still following what America dictates, which is contrary to the national interest. American alliance is important. I know about that. Nevertheless, India feels that Australia could be a little more independent than always trying to follow the American line in international affairs.

Senator MARGETTS—I am going to be a bit controversial here. Professor, some people would say, ‘Well, India would say that, wouldn’t they?’ Are you aware of other countries who shared India’s concern at the time?

Dr Bhattacharya—I think these days you have to realise that if you oppose the United States on anything you become ostracised. Because India did not sign the CTBT, India had to pay a price. The price was that last time they lost the election on the Security Council membership. Japan became the member. You can call it ‘cheque book’ diplomacy or ‘power’ diplomacy, but any country who does not accept that the United States is the No. 1 superpower and that it has more or less everything under control is going to be punished. So I am more interested in thinking about the non-aligned movement. I am more interested in thinking about the developing countries. I am more interested in thinking about ASEAN. Their reaction to India not signing was not that serious compared to what Australia did and the United States did.

Senator MARGETTS—I remember Indonesia was furious at the time with Australia’s role in those negotiations.

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Dr Bhattacharya—Indonesia did not say even one criticism after the 11 May and 13 May nuclear explosions. ASEAN has been relatively quiet about it because they have a better perception of their national interest. Let me conclude on this next point because I think it is important. I care about Australia. This is my home now. I want Australia to have an independent policy which is satisfying Australian national interest. For Australia now to impose non-trade sanctions, like withdrawing diplomats, is completely contrary to Australian national interest.

This week, American Deputy Secretary Talbot and Assistant Secretary Inderfurth are going to India to talk about negotiations with them, while Australia has no ministerial representation. How can Australia talk to Indians if they do not allow even the Attorney- General of India to come here? He is not a politician. He does not belong to any political party. Everybody knows he is an international jurist, an eminent jurist at that. He was not allowed to come because somebody here in Foreign Affairs must have thought that, because he is attorney-general, he must be attorney-general for a political party. He is not even a member of the parliament. The Australian government did not allow him to come.

Senator MARGETTS—Thank you very much.

Senator QUIRKE—In your submission, you make the statement in part (c) on page 2:

. . . the former won a war against India in 1962— you were referring to China— and the latter threatened India with a possible nuclear attack if Bangladesh were to be liberated from Pakistan—

I presume that is the 1971 episode. I am not aware of that. When did they threaten India with nuclear attack?

Dr Bhattacharya—This one has been in international fora now for the last now 28 years. What happened was that Henry Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, told the Indian Prime Minister at that time that Pakistan is one country—West Pakistan and East Pakistan. It is true that there were 10 million refugees coming from what is now Bangladesh and they were living in Calcutta. Henry Kissinger said, ‘We do not wish to see the end of Pakistan the way it is.’ Because Pakistan was a member of Cento at that time, he threatened India that there would be nuclear weapons coming to the country if they completed dismemberment of Pakistan.

Senator QUIRKE—Are you suggesting that the United States threatened India with a nuclear attack?

Dr Bhattacharya—With nuclear attack, and it has also been mentioned by the high commissioner here.

Senator QUIRKE—What evidence do you have of that?

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 11

Dr Bhattacharya—The high commissioner here raised it in one of those interviews with Kerry O’Brien.

Senator QUIRKE—The Indian High Commissioner?

Dr Bhattacharya—The Indian High Commissioner; but there was no criticism. General- ly, if somebody like that raises it, the American Information Service would immediately object. We knew that it was in a New York review of books that Henry Kissinger said that that cold woman—meaning Mrs Indira Gandhi—ought to be taught a lesson, but Mrs Indira Gandhi did not listen. Ultimately, she liberated Bangladesh. The proof of this kind of thing— it is one person against another—is in what kind of discussions Mrs Indira Gandhi and Henry Kissinger had.

Senator QUIRKE—With all due respect, it sounds like a pretty good excuse for developing nuclear weapons in India if you are making these sorts of points, because I do not think anyone other than the Indian High Commissioner would take that seriously.

Dr Bhattacharya—I take it quite seriously.

Senator QUIRKE—I know you do and I am sure he does as well, but I do not think anyone else would take it too seriously.

Dr Bhattacharya—America is the only country which has dropped nuclear bombs against a non-nuclear—

Senator QUIRKE—The United States also threatened China once with conventional weapons to defend India in the late 1960s by the same administration.

Dr Bhattacharya—No, the 1960s administration was the Kennedy administration.

Senator QUIRKE—No, it was not the Kennedy administration; it was the Nixon administration. They threatened the conventional bombing of China from Guam with B52s if China and India started having another shooting match up on the north frontier. So it is not totally one-sided.

Dr Bhattacharya—No. The United States did support India against China in the 1962 war. That is quite evident. There is no doubt about that. And the Soviet Union, being a socialist country, for the first time in the history of socialism, supported a non-socialist country like India against China in the 1962 war. An important point is: India lost that war. India has every right to be concerned about their security.

Senator QUIRKE—I agree. But the case you are making out here is that the rest of the world, or at least most of the Western World, are out to get India, therefore, India has the right to make whatever weapons it wants to. I put this to you: I suspect what India has done with its tests there—I will come back to that in a moment—is that it is actually now going to start an arms race not only in the subcontinent but in Persia and possibly even in Indonesia.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 12 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998

If India persists with what it is doing now, the result will be the proliferation of not only nuclear weapons but also delivery systems and probably thermonuclear weapons in a whole range of other countries that were threshold countries. They now will take India’s lead, or will do it for the very same argument that you are making out that India needs these weapons.

Dr Bhattacharya—My argument is that India did not need these weapons if all those weapons were completely eliminated. If you plan that only five countries should be allowed to have nuclear weapons, the rest of the world will not stand by. Every country, even if it is Libya with only three million people, if they feel that they are going to be bullied by the United States or whatever power, will be thinking or dreaming of nuclear weapons as a kind of nuclear deterrence.

Senator QUIRKE—Libya bullied by the United States?

Dr Bhattacharya—Libya has been bullied by the United States. In 1986 the Americans dropped a bomb. Anyway that is outside our terms.

Senator QUIRKE—Dropped a series of bombs in retaliation for what Libya did in West Germany and in other parts of the world.

Dr Bhattacharya—That has not been documented. My main point—

Senator QUIRKE—They threatened India with nuclear weapons and that has not been documented either and you are using that as the argument.

Dr Bhattacharya—The point here is that some innocent children were lost because of that bombing. The point here is that no country should be allowed to have nuclear weapons. If some countries are allowed to have nuclear weapons, and if they threaten other countries, then the potential victims should always dream about nuclear weapons. So let us have a regime of complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. That would be much better. If you are concerned about Indonesia, Indonesia would be in exactly the same position if they found their relationship suddenly deteriorated with respect to China. Already there is a point that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were victims. Some time China may say something and immediately Indonesia might think about it.

The solution to the problem of nuclear weapons is not that the existing regime should not be allowed to have the weapons. The solution is complete elimination. If the Australian government really wants to do something about it, they should take the Canberra Commis- sion report a lot more seriously than they have done so far.

Senator QUIRKE—Is it your view that the present regime in India, and for that matter the regime in Pakistan, is going to be more or at least as responsible as citizens as some of the other nuclear powers? Do you believe their governments will be as responsible with the use, making sure the technology does not get sold off to other countries? Will the nuclear triggers in these countries be in as safe hands as they have been in, at least in the last 50 years, with the existing nuclear powers hands?

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Dr Bhattacharya—That is debateable. China exploded nuclear bombs in 1962.

Senator QUIRKE—In 1964 actually.

Dr Bhattacharya—A hydrogen bomb in 1967.

Senator QUIRKE—The first nuclear test was in 1964.

Dr Bhattacharya—It is now documented—not from the Indian government but from the CIA sources and American government sources—that China has been exporting missile technology to Pakistan. If a nuclear country like China is allowed to do this proliferation of missile technology, then you have to realise that the Indian stand since 1974, when they exploded their nuclear bombs, is that they have not exported any technology to anybody. Even a poor country like India has always maintained that there should not be proliferation of nuclear weapons. If that is the record, we cannot say that about existing nuclear powers. In that kind of situation, the benefit of the doubt has to be given to the Indian government. Despite the knowledge they have had, they have never proliferated nuclear weapons to the rest of the world because it is a kind of evil, and Indians generally know that these kinds of weapons of mass destruction are not going to be tolerated for the future generation of Indians.

Senator QUIRKE—What do you know about the tests that the Indians conducted? There were five tests, I understand. They made an argument that there were five tests. At least some of them were pretty low yield which indicated that they were building nuclear triggers for a thermonuclear bomb. Do you know anything about that?

Dr Bhattacharya—I have read exactly the same report as you said. One of the things which I found out later, 13 May, they said they were after the nuclear trigger so that they can explode with efficient technology a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb. Indians initially were gloating, but last month reports have been very cautious and conservative. One of the things you have to understand is that the United States were so upset because the CIA failed to detect anything about that testing. This is one of the reasons the Americans want to punish. The Indian testing has proved the CIA is incompetent and they have not done their job properly.

CHAIR—I want to pursue the issue of India ever hoping to match both qualitatively and quantitatively the gap between China’s nuclear force and India’s claimed capability. It seems to me that, if this is an India versus China battle, then India will never match the level that China has reached in the development of its nuclear weapons. So why would one see India persisting with their nuclear development if really they are never going to match the development that has been reached in China at this stage?

Dr Bhattacharya—The problem is that Indian ruling elites will not see it that way.

CHAIR—But that is the reality.

Dr Bhattacharya—They will not accept that is the reality. Look at before 1949 Chinese liberation. Indians standard of living was very poor, but it is comparable to that of China. It

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 14 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998 is only in the last 20 years that China has had double digit economic growth. They have attained a level whereby they can really cut it as a superpower. But that is not going to be permanent. The moment they start their privatisation, a lot of Chinese people will be losing their jobs, a lot of banks will fall and Chinese economic development will no longer be double digit.

The middle classes in India are as prosperous as the middle classes in China. India’s ruling elites feel that the rest of the world do not take us seriously, but will once we achieve our economic growth at a much faster rate. By the year 2020, India will have the largest population and will be the largest democracy in the world, so we cannot say that India will never be able to achieve that kind of parity in terms of economic development with China.

CHAIR—But it is not its economic development that I am concerned with; it is the nuclear development. It seems to me that this rush of blood to the head for nationalism within India is saying that we will achieve some sort of nuclear deterrence in parity with the Chinese because they are the real threat that we are confronted with, when the reality is that that is not going to happen. All we will see then, if one accepts that it is purely and simply an India versus China syndrome that we are looking at, is a knock-on effect to all those Middle East nations and other South Asian nations who are saying, ‘India is developing nuclear weapons at a far greater rate than they will ever need or ever use trying to reach parity with China,’ and the others will be saying, ‘How are we going to defend ourselves?’ So then in effect we have an escalation of the nuclear arms race, which is something none of us want.

Dr Bhattacharya—I share your perception because I am happily comfortably living in Sydney, the most beautiful city in the world. But the perception in India is that these Indian people think, after our experience in the 1962 war and the way China was rapidly developing and proliferating, that Indian security concerns are a lot more important to them and they believe—however wrongly and however incorrectly to our mind—that the security concerns are more relevant than their economic needs. They say, ‘Without security, nobody is going to give us the guarantee that China is not going to cause mischief by giving it to Pakistan and then Pakistan attacking India, having another war on Kashmir or something like that.’ Indian perception is our security concerns come before our economic needs.

It is horrible to think that a country like India will be spending that much money on nuclear bombs. But the opportunity cost is too high. Nevertheless, if they tell you that security needs come before our economic needs, what is going to be your answer to that?

CHAIR—I do not see how they can use that argument validly given the structure of their economy and given their relationship with other Asian nations in particular and Middle East nations. I just see that we are headed down the path for a gross display of nationalism, which to me could override everything and see the nuclear weaponry used to substantiate the nationalism that has been flourishing and generating over a period time. That is my real concern.

Dr Bhattacharya—My real concern is that extreme nationalism is a menace to human civilisation, I agree. But whether Indian nuclear bombs are because of extreme nationalism has to be debated. The security concerns of India cannot be ignored. Australian government

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 15 perception that in no way India can ever match China is the kind of defeatist attitude on the part of Indian leaders, they will never admit that. In that case China has got a head start, but we will catch up China in no time.

If they say that, I cannot say, ‘Your security concerns are not that important. You have to concentrate completely on your economic needs because the achievement of security needs are more important than economic needs’—that is the standard reply. India would say, ‘We are against any kind of nuclear proliferation. It is not good for us. We are forced to do it. We will be very happy if all the countries which have got nuclear weapons’—and here ‘all the countries’ mainly means China and the United States—‘give up their nuclear bombs.’

CHAIR—I understand that argument, but adding more nations to the number of nuclear players certainly does not give any credence to that argument being put forward. Surely one should be looking at no new players and reducing the weaponry that exists for the existing players and reducing their capacity to produce weapons over time. Surely that is the way to go.

Dr Bhattacharya—One might object to reducing. Complete elimination—

CHAIR—Yes. But, being quite practical and quite realistic about this, you are not going to do that overnight.

Dr Bhattacharya—But the statement is that come the year 2020—

CHAIR—You can make the statements, but the reality is—

Dr Bhattacharya—Americans are not prepared to make that statement—and also Britain.

CHAIR—That is another issue that I think has to be addressed. But adding another nation or another two nations to the Nuclear Club is certainly not the way to go.

Dr Bhattacharya—On the other hand, those two nations would say, ‘Have you looked after our security concerns? Have you done anything to eliminate tension in that region, which has been prevalent since 1990?’ In 1988 the Indian government gave the slogan: ‘Action for complete elimination of nuclear weapons’. For you to say that it is unrealistic and then allow the existing nuclear apartheid to continue is something Indians would not accept.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—In your opening statement you said as an example of the United States’ double standards they are the only people who used atomic weapons and that was at the end of World War II. I think you made the point that Japan was on the verge of surrender. I would contest that allegation and that suggestion. I think that was rather an expedient comment by you.

The second comment I would like to make is the concerns I do have particularly are about command and control. From what you read and what you have said earlier I find that the current command and control in India’s nuclear capability is highly disturbing. I think that is a point that should be made.

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Finally, your talk of western double standards, your allegations of potential US nuclear attack and your justification through any political nationalism do not convince me that Indian security comes before its economic needs. I think the lines you have run are just pure political expediency. You have not convinced me that the program can in any way be justified.

Following on from what Senator Hogg said, it just leaves open the potential to raise the nuclear expectations of all our neighbours of South-East Asia in a non-peaceful way. Before you make a comment on that, I just ask you one question. Does India have any nuclear power stations?

Dr Bhattacharya—Yes, India has nuclear power stations. In Trombay, Indians have been using nuclear power stations for electricity generation for a long time. About six or seven per cent of Indian electricity demands are met by the power stations.

I am failing to convince you that generally nuclear weapons are highly inflationary, not only for India, but for highly capitalist technology with full involvement. They report that in the United States more than $US3 trillion has been spent on nuclear programs. Just imagine if the Americans were devoting that money for alternatives on health, education and all the other public services. Americans would not have a single poor person.

In every country nuclear ‘wasted’—as I call it now—has been fantastic. If you think that the command structure of the present devolved Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia and Ukraine and other places is reliable in the eyes of the western world, if in the present situation after Tiananmen you are prepared to say that the Chinese command structure is reliable, knowing full well that China has proliferated—documented evidence is there—I think you are unfair to the Indians if you think that they are going to be different from the present Russian regime or the Ukrainian regime or the Chinese regime. Consequent- ly, I am more optimistic. I am prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt.

Fundamentally there is no difficulty in your position because, in terms of opportunity, when every western country talks about economic development, it is true they have economic development, but they still have lots of poor people, unemployed people, and the working poor in the United States are still there. The black and white problem is still there. It is not paradise. No country has been able to solve their problems.

Wouldn’t it be better if a country like India insists on no first use of nuclear weapons, a complete moratorium on testing, more or less telling the rest of the world, ‘Don’t tell us what to do; we have followed your advice, exactly the way you have done’? The United States still refuses to give the guarantee of no first use to any non-nuclear country. If you stop doing that, you are always making excuses that Americans cannot be taught because it is not realistic to expect they should give up their super power status. They are not the chosen people. They have the same capabilities as the rest of the world. It is only in terms of military they might be ahead of the rest of the world.

Human civilisation goes in cycles. There is a possibility that the 22nd century may be the years of the Asians. Somehow American hegemony will not be accepted by the rest of the world. In terms of human civilisation, you have to take a long-term perspective. We all make

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 17 allowances for the group of five now because it is not realistic to expect them to eliminate nuclear weapons and ask the countries which are nuclear ‘have-nots’ to not do anything like that because you might restore the ambition of other potential nuclear countries. It is not because of Indian testing that the other potential nuclear countries are now trying to plan. It is simply because they find that the existing regime of nuclear apartheid cannot be ethically, morally and international law-wise justified by any sensible person.

Senator MARGETTS—I have a final question. In response to your statement that Japan was on the verge of surrender, Senator Macdonald said that it was a politically expedient comment. I am assuming that you have used references to justify that comment, and I must say that I have heard that before—that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in fact nuclear tests, using humans as guinea pigs, to see what would happen. Could you assist the committee, perhaps on notice, by providing your reference material for reaching the conclusion that the nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were tests that were not necessary for the end of the war?

Dr Bhattacharya—As you see, I have read the history of the war, and I find that history is also religion for the benefit of big conquerors. The United States now refuses to admit that they had that letter on 5 August whereby the Japanese had surrendered, and it is absolutely true that the military there wanted to find out the efficiencies of their new toys. One test was not enough; they wanted the second one, despite the fact that everybody else was really horrified when they saw what happened in Hiroshima. So the Nagasaki test also took place.

As a scholar and an academic, I find it very difficult to substantiate, because the people who perpetuated that crime always said, ‘No, we didn’t receive it.’ So, consequently, we have this kind of haggling now about whether the Americans knew that the Japanese were going to surrender or not before they exploded the nuclear bomb. Even if Japan was not going to surrender, there was absolutely no justification for the United States to drop the bombs—not one bomb, but two bombs. I am prepared to say that the American position is morally indefensible. The Australian government representatives, when they talk about India and Pakistan, never ask the Americans to apologise for dropping that bomb. That is indefensible as well.

CHAIR—Thank you, Professor.

Proceedings suspended from 10.34 a.m. to 10.50 a.m.

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MASSELOS, Dr James Cosmas, 61 Corunna Road, Stanmore, New South Wales

CHAIR—Welcome, Dr Masselos. In what capacity do you appear before the committee?

Dr Masselos—I am here in my own capacity, although in other roles I am a Reader in History at Sydney University and I am President of the South Asian Studies Association of Australia and New Zealand, but I am not representing their views.

CHAIR—The committee prefers all evidence to be given in public but, should you at any stage wish to give any part of your evidence in private, you may ask to do so and the committee will consider your request. The committee has before it a written submission from you. Are there any alterations or additions that you would like to make to your submission at this stage?

Dr Masselos—Yes, there is a phrase I would like to alter. It is on page 5, the very last line. I would like to replace it with ‘Australia as being a small nation’. In other words, add ‘nation’ and then ‘and, in India’s terms, largely irrelevant’. That probably reflects better the sort of opinions that I came across.

CHAIR—Are there any other changes?

Dr Masselos—No.

CHAIR—For the purposes of obtaining an accurate record, could you remain behind at the end of the proceedings so that the Hansard officer can verify information that you have provided to the hearing. I now invite you to make an opening statement and then we will proceed to questions.

Dr Masselos—Thank you. There are a couple of points I need to make. Most of the points I have made are in my submission and I will not repeat them. I want to say that what I have written here does not necessarily reflect my own personal views about nuclear weapons, nor their usage, but it reflects my interpretation of what Indians were thinking at the time. I think it is important to understand what Indian attitudes are and to see how they treat the situation, whatever one’s dislike or otherwise might be of nuclear deterrents. Indians feel very strongly about it and it is necessary to understand that position.

I would also like to say that the views I have put here are the views of people with whom I came into contact. I was in India during May and I had lots of discussions with a large number of different people—debates and arguments as well as casual contacts where people would come up and make points. What I have put here reflects the views of the people I met and my analysis of it. How far that is typical of all of India is another matter and I do not claim to be representing those views.

On the other hand, many of my contacts were repeating positions that were already being expressed in newspapers and on radio and television and often they picked up points that were being made. I could perhaps have written this submission doing an analysis of the newspapers’ responses of the time, but the difference was that, in these discussions, which

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were often very heated, I was able to push and probe points and so get a better sense of how people felt.

My sample is not terribly large. I perhaps argued with 40 to 50 people and perhaps another 40 or 50 people made comments in passing. I do not know whether that is statistical- ly significant, but what I think is interesting is that generally, with everybody I met, there was a congruence in position and attitude. It is amazing how many people agreed, and this was irrespective of political party or even like or dislike of the current government.

Many of my friends disliked the current government, but they were very much in favour of India having the bomb. They did not see it as a party political thing in the ultimate analysis, nor was it going to make them vote for the present government again—this is in terms of contacts I had; it may be different at a mass level elsewhere. So virtually everybody had similar attitudes, and what was coming out was an underlying nationalism. Indians are proud of their country. They want to be proud of it, and they have a point of view which relates to their geographic position. As I said, what came through very strongly was a general kind of consensus.

Towards the end of my submission I have a number of bullet points on page 6 which summarise pretty much the kinds of points that emerged from my earlier discussion and the sorts of things that were there. I could read them through, but perhaps it is unnecessary for me to do so as it is there. In that case, if it is agreeable I will take that as read.

CHAIR—That is fine.

Dr Masselos—In addition, perhaps I should have had another bullet point which was that most of my contacts did not necessarily expect that India would ever use the bomb. They felt that, by exploding it, India had achieved a sufficient end, that India had shown Pakistan, China and the rest of the world what it could do. Others, however, felt that by possessing the bomb the country had acquired a kind of invulnerability from attack or from the consequences of any Indian attack. This view was not particularly well formulated, but there was a sense of having achieved protection for themselves, that nobody could now threaten them in the way they had been under threat before.

Again, I emphasise that the tests touched undercurrents of national pride and reactions against how India has been perceived and treated by other nations. They provided an umbrella under which a whole range of different views, often contradictory views, came together. One must not see it only as a simple, single response; there are very different things that merge. Those are the additional bullet points I would add.

In conclusion, in my text I drew some general points which are some of my reflections. They were done rather quickly. Perhaps the real point is the final one, which relates to the whole geopolitical situation. This is not merely a subcontinental issue between India and Pakistan; it is an Asia issue. It relates to the whole problem of China and it also relates, as I see it, to China’s control of Tibet and the areas immediately north of India.

In a sense, the whole geopolitics mean that even if India and Pakistan were to come to an agreement—which seems to be the thrust of international relations at the moment—it

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would seem to me that without coming to an understanding with China which is effective, a via media between them, the whole nature of military engagement will not be particularly affected. I would broaden it into a whole geopolitical situation. That is all I have to say.

Senator MARGETTS—Dr Masselos, I found your paper very interesting. If there is a common thread in a few of the submissions, it is the link with the concern with China rather than specifically with Pakistan, although obviously you have made the link with China providing technology and assistance to Pakistan—military technology in particular. Where does the buck stop in your opinion? India can blame China and China, as I have mentioned, can blame militarisation and weapons in South Korea or plutonium in Japan. Where does the buck stop? Can Australia be considered innocent in all of this?

Dr Masselos—I have not talked to officials, but the general feeling of my friends is that India is threatened by China because it is vulnerable to Chinese attack in a way that India would be unable to respond to. If one accepts the premise that the subcontinent is a possible explosion point in terms of world peace, then one must look at a major international solution, and that has to bring in China and America in terms of working out something. I think Australia perhaps can do something there. I think that is up to you as a committee to make recommendations.

The larger picture is important, and Indians that I know are very much concerned with the larger picture. The larger picture is an immediate neighbour; it is not somebody that is very distant. Where does the buck stop? Indians are aware of what the situation is. They may have particular points of posture that they will adopt, but they also have a fairly strong sense of the nature of power configurations in their region. If something were worked out that was suitable, I am sure they would accept it. I am sorry; that does not really answer your question.

Senator MARGETTS—There are a couple of questions that spring from that in different directions. Do you have any sense that China could be brought to the world negotiating table with their own nuclear non-proliferation and how that might be achieved?

Dr Masselos—No, I have no knowledge of the Chinese situation. I work on India. That is my field. I have been lecturing on Indian history since 1965. I am sorry, I cannot answer that.

Senator MARGETTS—That is okay, but that is one area perhaps we might be able to follow up on. The view has been expressed that the international negotiations that took place on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the comprehensive test ban—but give me the non- proliferation treaty—were part of a type of nuclear apartheid because they tended to pretend that the nuclear weapon states could get off scot-free and not have to commit themselves to a program for nuclear weapons reduction. Is that the feeling you are getting? Do you think there really would be a commitment from India to get rid of their own weapons if there was a serious commitment from the nuclear weapon states to go down that path?

Dr Masselos—The Indian rhetoric was very much that if all the other nations get rid of their nuclear armaments then India would be prepared to do so. Again I have no idea as to how far this is the view of the government or the bureaucracy, but certainly this was a

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popularly expressed view. There was very much the sense that the nuclear nations were a closed club and that what had effectively happened was that a set of power relations had been stratified and had been set in stone for all time and that this set of relationships that was established by the nuclear club was not in fact meeting the needs and the changing parameters of power in the world. In other words, it was not taking into account the processes of change and development that were occurring.

Senator MARGETTS—I would also add that, if I am reading it correctly, your submission links in this perception of apartheid with racism or exploitative paternalism or something of that nature in relation to countries like Australia and India. I also got the sense from your submission that India was tired of being treated in a similar way by the western world. I am just wondering whether or not, though, the bid for the Security Council by India will actually be enhanced, or whether western powers will simply use the tests as a further excuse to show that India would not be responsible enough to be a member of the Security Council.

Dr Masselos—Indians do have very much a sense of a new kind of world imperialism which excludes them and which tries to dominate them, and there is that sense of an apartheid by—if I may use the term—first world nations. How far India’s bombs will affect its Security Council bid will depend upon how far other nations regard the tests as having been responsible, and, partly, I would see this as a matter of PR. Newspaper accounts of India’s diplomacy since the explosions, aiming to show that it is a responsible nation and that it will use its nuclear power properly, may counteract that. In any case, India’s attempt to get a seat on the Security Council was always going to be very difficult. I would see this as part of an ongoing process. One will not be looking at it for an immediate result in the immediate future.

Senator MARGETTS—So it was more a case of dealing with the immediate disdain and they will work on their strategies later?

Dr Masselos—I think so, yes. They clearly have some strategy in place in the way they have been sending people around the world to try to cut off some of the after-effects—and also by making Pakistan’s explosions look ad hoc and irresponsible. I think Indian reactions have also done that.

Senator MARGETTS—Can I just get a sense of what may have sparked off—not just the nuclear testing—this enhancement of Indian nationalism in recent times?

Dr Masselos—It is a mix of things. Part of it relates to the fact that this is the 50th anniversary of India’s independence and, over the past two years, whatever government has been in power has been pushing this. So there is an undercurrent of the fact that India has survived 50 years, and it has survived as a democracy and so on. I think it also reflects the self-confidence of India’s middle class, which has been doing very well, which is very large and which has been trumpeted around the world as being a very significant group. Some specific parts of it may in fact relate to the kinds of images that the current government has been establishing—a sense of Indianness, swadeshi, that is, things made from India and so on. It is in this sense also, perhaps, that India is more than the sum of all its problems. It is

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a country that continually has problems in one area or another, but it is a country that seems to be ongoing.

Senator MARGETTS—I am really curious to see whether there are any links that are right wing nationalist in a number of countries to the opening out of free trade. Can you see any link there?

Dr Masselos—No, it is not an issue I have thought of. I have no specific comments on that.

Senator MARGETTS—Thank you very much.

CHAIR—Could I pursue the issue of the geopolitics?

Dr Masselos—Yes.

CHAIR—One of the parts of this inquiry is to look at Pakistan and India’s involvement in exploding nuclear devices. I have read a submission from a Devin Hagerty to this inquiry, who is supposed to appear but unfortunately will not be appearing at this stage. He refers to the imbalance in conventional weapons brought about as a result of American policies in the late 1980s in Pakistan, and that that may well have forced Pakistan into forging a closer alliance with China, which even he concedes is a traditional sort of alliance anyway. What role has that the played, given that there has been a perceived imbalance in conventional weapons, let alone nuclear weapons, to drive this whole issue?

Dr Masselos—India’s argument is that there must always be an imbalance because of the fact that it has immensely larger frontiers and many more areas which it needs to patrol and control and protect itself from. China and Pakistan from the 1960s have always had close ties and this comes and goes. They must be increasing because Karachi is now in a sense one of China’s outlets for export, I understand. There is a road that goes through the Pamirs down into Karachi and this obviously is important to China. There will be quid pro quos.

Pakistan will always feel there is an imbalance. Its population is 150 million or 200 million, but India’s is 950 million. I am not sure what the current figures are, but inevitably Pakistan will always feel threatened by this enormous country right beside it. Even in economic terms, I remember once being in Pakistan and talking to some economist friends and wondering about a common market between India and Pakistan and looking at SAARC and how far that could work as a prototype. Their comments were that the Indian economy—if there were an open market—would just destroy Pakistan and that they could not meet it. It is the same sort of thing with the military. Of course, Pakistan has a very strong military tradition and, therefore, it is more likely to feel particularly threatened in military things.

The imbalance has always been there, and whenever Pakistan tries to redress the balance, India’s response will be that it has to be bigger still, because it in fact has to police all these other areas, whether it is its sea frontiers or northern frontiers with Tibet and China.

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CHAIR—How does one deal with that between India and China where there is an even greater imbalance? India sees itself having to build up its arsenal, whether it be conventional or nuclear, to counterbalance the power and influence that they see China holding over the region. It seems to me that we are in a situation where a dog is chasing its tail and will never catch it.

One will never catch up with the other. The imbalance will always remain and India will be numerically a lesser power in terms of nuclear and conventional weaponry to China, and Pakistan will be inferior to India based on the evidence before us. How does one reconcile these differences to bring about some world order or peace in our region?

Dr Masselos—I think India would not necessarily be concerned with the India-Chinese imbalance, excepting in so far as it was affected. Here it seemed to me that this relates to the equality of India’s conventional forces in terms of its borders with China and Tibet, and the problem of India being faced with a threat from missiles which are aimed at India.

In terms of the border confrontations, perhaps India and China are nearing parity. India’s concern is with its immediate surrounds and its own safety. Indians should feel that in terms of their borders they are fairly safe. Their problem, as I read it, is with the threat from long- range delivery systems from China. That is something that, obviously, they are redressing when they are building up their own missile capacities. It is a bit like a dog chasing its tail.

CHAIR—With a huge economic impact on the people who can least afford it within all of those nations, whether it be in Pakistan, India or in China.

Dr Masselos—Of course, yes. You obviously have the figures for India’s defence budget, but one of the points that my Indian friends make is that, in terms of other nations, it is still a very small proportion. It is still much less than most other countries spend on defence. In terms of a country of its size and needs, it is surprisingly little and this has always been the Indian government’s answer to its internal critics as well as external ones.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—I would like to ask you about some of the opinions of the people you spoke to in India. You mentioned this when you were speaking to Senator Margetts about the Security Council. Do the Indians that you speak to or know think that the testing will enhance India’s chance of being asked to be a member of the Security Council, or do they believe the opposite might be the case?

Dr Masselos—They did not link the two issues together, although President Narayanan had been travelling around pushing this view just before the explosions. It was not a matter of concern. There was pride. Perhaps one or two of my contacts did say it would force people to put them in, but they did not link the two together. It was not seen in that way at a popular level.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Do they link the role of the Chinese in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program? Do they talk about that?

Dr Masselos—Yes.

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Senator SANDY MACDONALD—They do. All the time?

Dr Masselos—Yes, and this is why they were very proud of their own bomb. They said it was not part of the proliferation; they had actually made it on their own.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Part of their nationalistic fervour was that they had developed it on their own?

Dr Masselos—Yes.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Do Indians regard China as trying to encircle India through military aid both to Pakistan and Burma?

Dr Masselos—Yes, although in earlier discussions with people, they are particularly concerned with the naval build-up by China in Myanmar. Again, the South-East Asian dimensions of that did not feature at this time in the discussions, but they have this sense of a Pakistan-China axis. The tone of it was intensified during this period.

I do not think it is a coincidence, as I have said in my report, the defence minister in the weeks before the explosions was very much talking about China and taking a much stronger line than I had expected on the inauguration of the new government.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—The next question I would like to ask you is, in a general sense, about the relationship between India and Australia which, I think in a trade sense, has been building up increasing momentum such as the New Horizons program last year. I guess there is probably not a great understanding of India from our point of view and probably not a very great understanding of Australia from their point of view. You mentioned in your submission that Australia’s response to the nuclear tests was, to Indians, surprising and incredulous. Given Australia has been in the forefront of arms control and disarmament measures for a long time, why do you think India could have been so surprised with Australia’s response?

Dr Masselos—They were surprised, not in terms of Australia’s role in armaments control, but in terms of Australia’s role in India. They did not see Australia as really having a significant investment in India to be making this kind of comment. According to their views, Australia has not really been a player in the Indian scene. It does not have big investments—although I know there are some that have begun. Because it has not been a significant influence and so on, the reaction was, ‘What is this country doing?’ It was really very strange. This is amongst people whom I knew and who therefore knew Australia quite well.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Do you think our reaction was disproportionate or, rather, not in line with the reactions of other like-minded South-East Asian nations? Or do you think because we are who we are what we say is taken a little bit more seriously?

Dr Masselos—No, it came through on the television as being particularly strong and, somehow, even the one or two people who were opposed to nuclear weaponry and nuclear explosions among my friends and contacts, could not see the response in those terms. It did

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come through, particularly in the bites on television as being somewhat strong and—I am just trying to think of the word—

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—I know exactly what you mean. I just wonder whether in fact you were particularly sensitive to it?

Dr Masselos—Personally, I do not like explosions and I rather liked the response, or any statement against nuclear explosions but, in fact, as an Australian I was aware of it. But again, my friends would make these points and occasional contacts would come up to me and, knowing I was an Australian, say, ‘Why has your government done this?’ So I was actually singled out and there was this total incomprehension. As I say, it relates partly to a reading of Australia’s situation in terms of an almost knee-jerk reaction; and, possibly, it was not handled as well as it might have been.

Australia, in the subcontinent, over the decades, has actually had a very good record. It was one of the first countries to recognise Bangladesh 20 years ago and so on. It has often been a leader of opinion in world councils. On the other hand, if a lot of other countries had followed Australia’s line then it would have looked much better, even a week or so later, but it was not. Therefore, Australia looked much more as being out on a limb than it was. I know that there are some countries that did support it, but they did it somewhat differently.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—They are a lot further away. I suspect that the problems are that Australia is in the unique position in that it is geographically part of Asia. I am sure the Canadians made exactly the same comment, but they do not have ATV beaming it straight into the subcontinent at 12.30 at night.

Dr Masselos—Star television was also covering it. Although Australia sees itself as part of Asia, one should remember that London is closer to Delhi than Sydney is to Delhi. New York and Delhi are almost the same distance apart as Sydney and Delhi. It takes about 14 hours or 15 hours flying time each way.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Which way do you go, east or west? How do you go from Delhi to New York?

Dr Masselos—You go via Europe. It is about 13 hours flying.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Are there direct flights?

Dr Masselos—No, I think there is a stopover interchange. Perhaps Air India flies directly. Our perception is that we are close, whereas for Indians Australia has for a long time been at the end of the line. This has really changed in the past five years or so, partly with the commercialisation of Australian universities. On some television channels one would see ads from various universities, two-minute commercials, about what a great university it was and what a great city it was in. It was not an ad for my university, but I have seen one for another university. Whole supplements are taken out in the papers. There is that sort of thing. Australia has become a tourist destination as well as a student destination.

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My own relevance in India over the years has changed because many people will now contact me to find out about sending their nephews, or sons, or daughters, or nieces, or friends, or relatives to Australia. We are now part of that scene in a way we have not been before.

Senator QUIRKE—I do not think there is too much I can go on with that others have not asked. We had lots of comment about India and what India has done but very little about Pakistan, which is in our terms of reference. You must have a fair few contacts in Pakistan as well as India?

Dr Masselos—Yes, I have a few, but I have not been in touch with them and I was not in Pakistan at the time, and so I have no real sense of it. I am aware that my report does not cover that, but I have no specific knowledge. I felt it was improper for me to put things which would just be gleaned from the press anyway.

Senator QUIRKE—Obviously, one of the things that the Indians have done in this exercise is that they have touched off at least a substantial arms race in that end of the world, and probably a nuclear arms race. How do your friends react to that? Do they see it totally in Indian terms for security? Are they aware of the fact that the probability is now that there will be four or five other countries at least in that end of the world that will be looking very seriously at acquiring this or other technologies to counter what India has done?

Dr Masselos—My conclusion is that nothing has really changed. The arms race had already begun. When Pakistan sent up its Ghauri missile and then India sent up Shakti, there was a battle in names even. The Pakistani one was said to be named after the Muslim emperor king who had ravaged India in the past, and so India sent up Shakti, which is named after the Hindu female goddess.

There had already been a battle going on and that battle was about achieving nuclear delivery systems. Pakistan’s bomb technology presumably goes back to the time when India had its first explosion in 1974.

As I have said, I think that what has been achieved is a transparency. For any nation to be surprised that India let off its bomb and to be working out its policies in response to it now would suggest that its government has been particularly blind in the past as to what has been happening. This is not a new situation. As I said in my report, the papers reported that Rajiv Gandhi was going to let off a bomb in the 1980s and that Narasimha Rao was going to let one off in the 1990s. It was stopped by American pressure. The prime minister before Vajpayee, Gujral, who was a United Front person, stated that he would have done so if he had remained in government.

It is already a fait accompli. The nations that are thinking of doing it already had the technology and the will. It might very well be that since international sanctions are not going to work for India—in fact, there is a saving operation to protect foreign businesses and investments to cordon them off from the very effects—that other nations might see it as more possible to do it and to work out their bombs.

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In the initial days after India’s first explosions there was talk in the press of an Israeli- Indian alliance which had an implicit anti-Islamic nations policy, and that talk very quickly disappeared. Of course, India has a very large investment in west Asia, economically and in terms of goodwill, so that cannot be pushed no matter what the views of a particular government may be.

I am sorry, I am meandering, but to come back to your point, I do not think that much has changed. The weapons struggle was already there, and even if we were not talking of nuclear weapons we have already seen that there has been an arms race between these nations. In a sense, as my friends said to me, part of it is the sense that India is alone and not part of this axis that is being built up, and it no longer has its own linkages in the way it once had in the Cold War situation.

Senator QUIRKE—So you are saying, in essence, that India is alone because it has pursued a diplomacy over the years of basically being allied with the Soviet bloc.

Dr Masselos—It is not alone in terms of the non-aligned nations, but there is an awareness of the nature of geopolitical power, yes. Russia and India seem to have retained a good relationship but it is no longer as potent as it once was.

Senator QUIRKE—Where do they get their conventional armaments from now? When I was in India 16 or 17 years ago I saw the great parade they have on 26 January. A lot of Russian stuff was there—Russian air fighters, Russian tanks and Russian artillery. There was some local home-grown stuff which looked vaguely Russian as well. Where do they get their technology from now? Is it all in-house?

Dr Masselos—I do not know for a fact. Obviously, they are left with a lot of MIGs, and because the arrangement was that India would also assemble and manufacture, presumably they also have a repair thing.

I read a report recently about, I think it was, naval ships which were being made with German technology in India. They have drawn from everywhere. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the problems of soft currency and barter arrangements, they have run into difficulties. Machine guns were coming from Bofors in Sweden at one point. Remember that rather disastrous episode? There are many more in-house things. India is building up expertise. It is certainly not self-sufficient. I cannot answer you fully on that.

Senator QUIRKE—The Indian armaments industry is becoming much more substantial.

Dr Masselos—Yes. Indians have always boasted that they have the third largest number of scientists in the world, and that is after America and the Soviet Union. Their IITs, institutes of technology, are world class. They provide feeders. Many scientists who are trained there end up in America, and they are world class, so one should not underestimate the capability that is there.

An example I can think of is when America refused to let India have a super computer for its calculations. The public story, and I have no privileged information, was that they brought together a number of other computers and got something that was as good as what

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the Americans would not let them have. So often the denial of something in fact leads to an indigenous thing which can or cannot work.

Senator QUIRKE—I note in your submission you visited Mumbai, which I understand is Bombay. Where the hell is Trivandrum?

Dr Masselos—It is in Kerala.

Senator QUIRKE—Is that what it has always been called?

Dr Masselos—Yes. It has another name which is even worse.

Senator QUIRKE—I thought it might have been a renaming of some place I had already been to.

Dr Masselos—I must say I always write Bombay, but I in fact got my computer to change it to Mumbai.

CHAIR—As we are talking about Mumbai, at page 4 of your submission, in your discussions with your contacts in Mumbai, they raised with you that the defence minister had been strong on rhetoric against the Chinese people in the month prior to the tests actually happening. It would seem that they were laying the platform for these tests, regardless of what was happening anyway. This was obviously very much premeditated by the Indians.

It seems to me that if, as your contacts indicate, there is painted a picture of the Chinese as being ‘the enemy’, in effect, then you will sooner or later get everyone to believe it. It seems to me that probably the groundwork that was being done, according to your evidence, was to set up a quite antagonistic relationship or further antagonise the relationship with China anyway. Is that a fair enough assessment?

Dr Masselos—Underlying feelings towards China are very mixed and have been since 1962, the Chinese war. Particular governments smoothed things out or not, as the case may have been and according to what the situation was. The reading that I got from my contacts was very much a strong sense of an underlying fear of China, and certainly the new defence minister, George Fernandes, pushed that rhetoric in his public statements and speeches.

CHAIR—So it was really setting up the environment for the furtherance of these tests, anyway.

Dr Masselos—Yes. Although, given the enormous response in support, it would not have mattered if they had not done that, I think.

CHAIR—That is the other thing that worries me in your submission. You talk about the national pride in the nation being the dominant attitude which fuelled the national euphoria. That is very frightening indeed. Do you have any comment on any bilateral negotiations that may have taken place between India and Pakistan in recent times and how those negotiations or dialogue could in any way ameliorate some of the tensions in that area?

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Dr Masselos—I am sorry; I would need to do a bit more homework on that.

CHAIR—If you would take that on notice. I understand that there were a number of bilateral discussions between India and Pakistan covering such areas as peace and security, violations of air space and line of control, the working boundary, terrorism, drug trafficking and economic and commercial cooperation. They were covering a wide range of issues and, of course, embroiled in the peace and security area was the issue of disarmament, nuclear proliferation and the development and deployment of missiles.

I understand those negotiations had broken down for a period of time. They had resumed after a three-year break in March 1997. It would seem that those negotiations now must be almost shot to pieces. India would not accept a third party before as a broker and now, I would imagine, would not accept a third party getting those negotiations back. It would seem, though, that that would be fairly essential.

Dr Masselos—Yes. India’s position on Kashmir, which is one of the points that keeps on coming back as the critical issue, is that Kashmir is an internal matter. This is an issue that Pakistan will not agree with. Although India and Pakistan have fought in 1964, 1971 and 1948, generally what seems to happen is that they seem to come to an edge where things will be critical and then they withdraw. You might argue that with the situation on Siachen Glacier, where they confront each other, there is a kind of continual warfare.

Both sides see the other’s intelligence outfits as interfering with the internal affairs of each other. Certainly in Pakistan in particular there is often a sense of antagonism to India as being the necessary part of the political profile virtually of whoever is in power. But, at the same time—apart from Kashmir—there is nothing that either of them can gain. There is no territory that India wants in Pakistan. What would India do with Lahore if it were able to get there? Similarly, if Pakistan got to Amritsar, what would it do with it?

So, in a sense, the contention concerns Kashmir but a war will not necessarily solve that problem. Perhaps one would hope for an international agreement on Kashmir and a guaran- teeing of the solution. When you look at things, you see that the two countries come together and it almost looks as if it is going to explode again and then they withdraw. Even with the present Prime Minister, Mr Vajpayee, it is interesting that, when he was foreign affairs minister in the first Janata government, at that time everybody said that he had taken a very sympathetic and pro-Pakistani line; that he had done more to improve relations with Pakistan than Congress had done in years.

CHAIR—I am afraid that is where we have to leave it. We thank you for your appearance today, Dr Masselos.

Dr Masselos—Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear.

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[11.47 a.m.]

DOHERTY, Mr Denis William, National Coordinator, Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition, and State Secretary, Pax Christi New South Wales, 109 Lennox Street, Newtown, New South Wales

CHAIR—I welcome Mr Doherty. In what capacity do you appear before the committee?

Mr Doherty—I am the National Coordinator of the Anti-Bases Campaign. I am also the State Secretary of Pax Christi New South Wales.

Mr Doherty—Yes. On page 5, between 1 and 2, I should have put that Australia supports what is commonly known as the Group of 8 initiative.

CHAIR—Are there any other alterations or additions?

Mr Doherty—I brought along some extra documentation. I have not got copies for everyone.

CHAIR—That is fine. We will accept that as evidence before the committee.

Mr Doherty—I have a copy of what I referred to just then. It is called the Group of 8 initiative, and it is an initiative of eight nations, which I will talk about later. That is a copy of the resolution that they have put to the UN.

CHAIR—If I could stop you there, I should point out that we have Senator Margetts in Western Australia on the telephone as well, so you may well need to be a little more explicit when you are talking so as to describe the document.

Mr Doherty—I have a document here which is the resolution of what is called the Group of 8, which is a resolution from Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden to the United Nations regarding general disarmament and a nuclear free world. I have a covering letter from the charge d’affaires of Costa Rica recommending that the United Nations accept a convention for the banning of nuclear weapons. I have the first three or four pages of that convention. It is a document that is over 100 pages long, and I have pulled down, from a web site again, three or four pages, but I will give that to Hansard. In case you want the full text, you can get it off the web.

CHAIR—We will take what you are tabling as additional to your submission. We will have that photocopied and circulated to the members of the committee as soon as we reasonably can.

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For the purpose of obtaining an accurate record, could you remain behind at the end of the proceedings so that the Hansard officer can verify information that you have provided to the hearing. We would be most grateful for that. I now invite you to make an opening statement and then we will proceed to questions.

Mr Doherty—I think it would be fair to say, and to point it out firmly and strongly to begin with, that I come from a total abolition of nuclear weapons perspective. The other thing I want to emphasise is that the second part of your term of reference is the more important part of your inquiry. Emphasis on India and understanding what has happened in India is very important, but what we can do here in Australia is the more important.

What I should have said in my opening is that it does not matter who has a nuclear weapon, whether it is a so-called western democracy, whether it is an Asian, Islamic, Christian, capitalist or communist country, nobody can justify having nuclear weapons. Our emphasis, and Australia’s emphasis as a middle power, could be quite crucial in abolishing nuclear weapons.

I most seriously urge the Australian government to take on a role of abolishing nuclear weapons. As a middle power and a power that does not have nuclear weapons, we could be in a great position to abolish nuclear weapons. I say ‘could’ deliberately because we have muddied the waters. We are very, very strongly implicated in the nuclear weapons cycle. It is up to the Australian government to extricate itself from this particular position it is in and to do something for the whole world, not just for Australia.

Going to the main part of the submission, I want to draw a background to India’s tests. India had always refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty and the CTBT because it recognised that there was a system in the world that it called nuclear apartheid. I in no way support them getting nuclear weapons but I understand what they are saying. What right has one country to have nuclear weapons and to say to other countries that they cannot have them.

It also comes in the background that Pakistan was testing missiles. The United States was testing missiles using sub-critical tests. There have been over 30 sub-critical tests since the NPT was signed, and not a word of complaint has come from countries like our own. It is also testing weapons in cyberspace, in simulations. Surprisingly enough, the United States also said that it no longer regarded the fact that a country did not have nuclear weapons as a reason for not using nuclear weapons on it. During the Iraq crisis in February this year, the United States said they were going to use a B61 bomb, which is a nuclear weapon. They call it a bunker buster.

Senator QUIRKE—Is it a fuel air explosive?

Mr Doherty—No, it is a nuclear weapon. It is not a fuel air; it is a bunker buster. It is a nuclear weapon, a B61. This is an outrageous escalation of nuclear warfare. Normally, we have had mutually assured destruction. Now the United States has said it could use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. So, when India tested its weapons, it did so with this sort of background.

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Skipping on to Pakistan, I must confess I am not very aware of Pakistan, I am more an expert on India, although I do not claim to have any particular Indian expertise. The thing that happened to me recently was that I had the privilege of a 2½ hour conversation with the High Commissioner, and he sent me this massive document here which deals with India’s response. He was virtually sneering at Australia’s position. I have quoted in here something that he said in his letter, ‘Physician heal thyself.’

There is also an earlier statement where he said in response to a letter from peace and environmental groups in Sydney:

I hope you will not mind my saying that it has been our experience that in disarmament negotiations the Non Aligned countries like India seldom, if ever, receive support or understanding from Australia for measures that we propose for nuclear disarmament, within a reasonable time frame. There is a general feeling that because of Australia’s dependence on an extended US nuclear security guarantee for its own security and for the promotion of its regional security interests, it is just not in a position to urge the need for nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time frame, as Senator Evans had urged before the International Court of Justice. There is, in our view, a contradiction of virtually depending on the nuclear deterrent of a foreign power on the one hand, and being enthusiastic about the nuclear disarmament on the other. In our view, we should aim at the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2010.

That is India’s approach. The Indians claim that Pakistan was given help from China and that with China now receiving technological help from the US, they feel that that technology will pass to Pakistan. So India feels very threatened.

The implication for Australia is very important. I mentioned the US alliance. I mentioned that in 1994, in the Australian prepared white paper, it said:

We will continue to rely on the extended deterrence of the US nuclear capability to deter any nuclear threat or attack on Australia.

In my submission I go on to say:

The Australian Government because of this alliance does not act independently in world bodies such as the UN.

The previous government, when Senator Evans was giving evidence, urged nuclear weapon states to disarm within a reasonable time frame. I have not seen any concrete actions. There has been some rhetoric from our present foreign minister but I have not seen any actions.

I also go on to say in my submission:

The day to day presence of the bases in Australia is our concrete expression of our support for nuclear wars, nuclear war fighting and nuclear weapons. Without the satellite ground stations in Australia, the US would be deprived of 1/3 of the earth’s surface to target and threaten.

So how can we stand up to India and complain about what they are doing when we ourselves are so implicated.

I also mentioned some recent hypocritical things that the Australian government has done. In 1991, during the lead up to the Gulf War massacre, Gareth Evans said he did not care if the US used nuclear weapons against Iraq, a non-nuclear country. Again, in the recent Gulf crisis, no Australians complained about the B61. In 1997, last year, there was no

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 33 complaint from the Australian government. In fact, there was even encouragement for the United States to bring a nuclear powered and armed submarine within the Great Barrier Reef. Further on I go on to say we have our uranium and we are upgrading our reactors. We have really got to be serious about nuclear disarmament, and these are the things we have got to think about and do.

Finally, I plead with the government, as I did in the beginning, that Australia supports what is known as the Group of 8 initiative. It quotes from the Canberra Commission. You all recall the Canberra Commission, which was encouraged by both the major powers. It goes on to say:

We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of the Canberra Commission in their Statement that ‘the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used—accidentally or by decision—defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again’.

This is the position we are coming from. This is what the Australian government can do. Rather than hectoring India, you can support the Group of 8. If you read those countries, you will realise they are all countries that are not defended by nuclear weapons. We could be one of those as well. Then by the year 2000, and that is the badge I am wearing, we have this thing called ‘The Abolition 2000’. We want the beginnings of a convention in the UN. This is over a hundred pages long and is produced by a group of international lawyers. We want the Australian government to support this in the UN to take some definite steps. We want the Australian government to take some practical steps about disengaging itself. For example, it could do what New Zealand did and not allow nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered warships into our country.

If you go to the appendix from SIPRI, the Stockholm Institute for Peace and Research Studies, you get the number of tests that have happened over the years. I think you all probably already know them. The US has had over a thousand and Russia or the Soviet Union over 700. When you stack Pakistan and India against these sorts of figures, while it is serious, it is not as bad as what the nuclear-weapon states have been doing, without any complaint from the Australian government.

Then go to the second appendix which says that the US has these sorts of weapons ready to go. They have 3,000 weapons ready to go at this moment. The Indian High Commissioner assured me that their nuclear warheads are separate from their missiles or bombs. He said that they have entered into a no-first-use policy. China is the only nuclear weapon state that will sign a no-first-use policy and there is no complaint from the Australian government to the US about these positions. It is the same for the UK. The UK has 160 weapons ready to go and the French have 288 or something in that region. Again, there is no complaint from Australia and these are the people supposed to be allies.

Here is a piece of recent breaking news. You remember that there has been a world war crimes court. In that court, India pushed that the use of nuclear weapons be classified as a war crime. The United States has objected to that. India is almost schizophrenic, but at least in some things it is doing the right thing. It is probably best if I leave it there.

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Senator QUIRKE—Firstly, I would like to congratulate you on your submission. I think it was a good submission and an interesting one, particularly the information enclosed in the appendices, that I found useful in coming to grips with the issue.

I accept the argument you are putting forward that the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China are very much more substantial nuclear powers than India and Pakistan are at this stage. Presumably that will continue to be the case well into the future. What is your response to the argument that India and Pakistan have now in effect opened the door to a greater round of proliferation of nuclear weapons and, particularly, in the Indian subcontinent and in the countries surrounding that region?

Mr Doherty—I think that there is a nightmare scenario that the weapons go to various countries to the west of Pakistan and then Israel reacts, and so on, and so we have proliferation. While what I am suggesting seems rather far-fetched, it is the only way to go. Abolition is the only way to go.

India has said through their High Commissioner, and through some of their public statements in here, that they are prepared to get rid of their weapons. They have a long history of trying to get rid of nuclear weapons. The High Commissioner mentioned the name of someone to me who he called the dove of Indian politics—and I do not know Indian politics well enough. He said that the United States is only interested in two sorts of people, the rich and those who have the bomb. He said, ‘We cannot be rich, so we went and got the bomb,’ so now America will possibly sit up and listen to them.

Getting back to your question, I think we could get to a nightmare scenario. But if countries like our own move for nuclear disarmament, it will not be easy. I am sorry, Senator, I am not quite sure which party you are from, but you will get from the United States the sort of bitter attack that Mr Sinclair got from the Netanyahu government when they were a little critical. That is the sort of attack we will be under if we do that. You saw the sort of attack that New Zealand got from the United States. But that is what we need to do. To stop a nightmare scenario happening, a middle power like ourselves could be an honest broker.

Senator QUIRKE—I will come back to your attitude to the United States in a minute. One of the things that I think stimulated the creation of this committee, and we are looking at it, is the fact that India, even though their first detonation was back in 1974, have been a closet nuclear power since that time. I even remember one of the Indian prime ministers saying that they had totally gotten rid of all the technology—I think Rajiv Gandhi made that statement. As an aside, I would take on board what the High Commissioner says with a dose of salts because India at least has said once before that it has got rid of these weapons.

I think the fear that I have, and that I am sure some of my other colleagues have, is that in the schema of things it is going to be very much more difficult, as you recognise, to rid the world totally of nuclear weapons. We have reached a much more dangerous world as a result of testing that has taken place in the Indian subcontinent. In fact, there are regimes which are probably even less democratically responsible than India and Pakistan that could use this or could see these tests as a sign that they need to, or should, acquire these weapons themselves.

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I guess in essence one of the fears that I have is that we may see the states right throughout what used to be known as Persia in the next 10 years developing and reaching a stage where they too will have nuclear weapons programs and possibly missile programs that in fact could give very effective delivery systems.

Mr Doherty—When you have a situation where the world can be destroyed 20 times over, what is six new weapons? I know it is a terrible thing to say. One can say a certain country is run by a group of, say, maniacs, but we know in all sorts of countries all sorts of groups get up and do all sorts of funny things. One cannot sustain an argument of saying, ‘They’re a group of maniacs, therefore we have to have weapons.’ That argument smacks of a certain amount of misunderstanding. Take, for example, Iran. Iran allows investigation of its atomic weaponry by the IAEA—the International Atomic Energy Agency. Israel does not. Who is more of a looney? Looney is too harsh a word.

CHAIR—I do not think you have used the best example there. I have some sympathy with the argument, but I do not know if they—

Mr Doherty—Iran does allow that on certain categories. We have a lot of prejudice against those countries, and I am sure they are a lot more sophisticated than we give them credit for. But, at the same time, we also have to look at our backyard. What the Indian Commissioner said was that the countries in South Asia are in a position to sneer at us, and they have so much evidence. They say, ‘How can you tell us what to do when you are living under a nuclear umbrella?’ Then you have a country like New Zealand. That is what I am saying. That is the point that he is making.

Senator QUIRKE—So you do not accept the argument that some countries are going to be less responsible with these weapons than others?

Mr Doherty—I think it is a junior argument. The crucial question is to get rid of nuclear weapons totally. It is going to be a long process, but by the year 2000—18 months away—at least if the countries could agree to demob them, that would be a step, and that is a step we could take. We would be in a position to take it. We are very influential.

Senator QUIRKE—As a comment on your submission and in fact on your evidence here today, you see the United States as being the chief country that is holding back disarmament. That is the impression that I get through your submission and your evidence.

Mr Doherty—It is the powerhouse pushing nuclear weapons. When the French were testing out here a few years ago, they agreed not to test anymore. The only reason they did that was because the United States took them on board. The United States, the United Kingdom and France—using cyber testing and subcritical testing—instead of making the weapons safer, are making bigger and better and meaner ones, and this is what the problem is.

So the United States is the powerhouse pushing the development of nuclear weapons. It is not in any way pushing disarmament or non-proliferation. It has broken the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by subcritical testing and cybertesting. There is another treaty—I have forgotten the name of it, but there is a thing that says it can check through what it has

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 36 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998 in its arsenal to make sure that it is safe—which it is using that to improve its weapons, not to get rid of them. It has cut down. It did have something like 16,000 warheads, and it says it is going to cut down to 6,000, but even 6,000 is unacceptable.

The United States is crucial in this. You saw how the United States behaved about war crimes just recently. It tried to prevent a war crimes tribunal, and it stopped the Indians from saying, ‘Let’s make nuclear weaponry a war crime.’ It has to be a war crime. If you aim a nuclear weapon anywhere, you cannot hit a nuclear target. You have to hit so many acres of land and destroy everything around it for the next 20 years, like what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so it is well recognised that it breaks all the rules of war.

I am very critical of the United States. I am critical of all—China, everyone—who have nuclear weapons. If we are aligned with them, then we are complicit, and we are supporting and encouraging them.

Senator MARGETTS—There are a couple of questions I would like to ask. Was Australia considered an honest broker in the 1995 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, if not, why not?

Mr Doherty—I do not think Australia was. My memory of it was that Australia took the US line which was, ‘Keep the nuclear club, and leave it at that.’ I am sorry, I am a bit vague on that. That is as clear as I can remember.

Senator MARGETTS—The role that the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gareth Evans, took was to bring on the non-aligned groups, led by Indonesia, and there was a lot of pressure I guess put by a lot of countries, including Australia, for that to happen. But the official statement was that the intermediate position of keeping proliferation from non- nuclear and threshold states was more achievable than a timetable for elimination of nuclear weapons. Would you comment on that? I will just throw in that the parallel was that Australia’s official position on landmines was that the more achievable position was simply to ban a specific type of landmine, and other countries—especially this developed country— said, ‘No. The best position is to ban anti-personnel landmines, and then we’ll all get onside.’ Would you like to comment on achievable versus non-achievable positions in terms of disarmament?

Mr Doherty—Again, ‘achievable’, in relation to nuclear disarmament, is that every country agrees to disengage warheads from their projectiles. That should be the first step. And then, through a series of open and transparent measures, these weapons should be deconstructed and buried—or whatever they do with the remains. I think that is achievable.

Admittedly it was the Indian High Commissioner who said that when the non-aligned powers meet together, it does not rate a mention in the Australian media, even though there are 150 countries involved. When the G8 meet, it gets massive, blanket coverage—every time they look around they get a photograph taken. No-one takes any notice of what the non- aligned countries are saying, yet there are well over 150 of those countries. We need to take more notice of what the non-aligned countries are saying and not just concentrate on the G8. The nuclear weapons states have to take notice of what the non-aligned countries are saying—and countries like New Zealand. It is achievable that Australia could be an honest

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 37 broker if it did some of the things that we are asking such as starting to disengage itself. I think these things are achievable rather than conjuring up threats and reasons for having the bases here.

When we first had those bases here, the people of Alice Springs were told it was for space research. Then later on they were told it was making sure that the Soviets did something about weapons control. Then they were told the bases were protecting us from the Russians. Then when the so-called Soviet threat disappeared, what happened was that Australia built four more radomes. We have also increased our military exercises with the United States by a ratio of six to eight times. And yet we are a country without threat. So we are in one of the best positions to do achievable things and to put pressure on the United States.

We had a forum in the United States just a few days ago when Premier Carr and Premier Jeff Kennett were in Washington for a special leaders forum. The defence minister got up and said, ‘We are together militarily and so on.’ So if Australia pulled out of this sort of stuff—this madness called nuclear weaponry—it would have an enormous impact, both on the people of the United States and on the nuclear weapons states. So I think this word ‘achievable’ is a bit of a cop-out. It is almost a compromise to say something is achievable, we have got to look at abolition; I know I sound hard line, but there is no alternative.

Senator MARGETTS—The concept that has been put to us this morning is that a number of Indians, and perhaps the Indian government, believe that by conducting nuclear tests they may be considered in the future as a potential member of the Security Council. I put it to you that that might not be such a different argument than the one used by ANSTO that having a nuclear reactor allows us to take a seat on the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr Doherty—I cannot find any fault with that, I think that is—

Senator MARGETTS—The same logic applies.

Mr Doherty—That is right. I think that the ANSTO position is absolutely crazy and who wants to be into that position? We know that the Atomic Energy Agency was involved in flag-swapping Australian uranium so that it went into French bombs—so they are a fairly compromised mob anyway.

As far as the Security Council goes, I do not know whether it will be accepted, but I think that the United Nations—and this is another topic—has a dreadful organisation when a group of five can just dictate and ignore what the majority of countries are saying. So I see an ambition to be in the Security Council as, again, an ambition for a compromised organisation and that we should be having a more democratic UN than the one we have at the moment.

Senator MARGETTS—I have just a final question. The whole theme of the role of the perceived threat of China has been brought up throughout this morning. Of course, if you ask the Chinese ambassador he will say that you cannot ask China to disarm or stop testing

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 38 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998 whilst Australia sells uranium to South Korea or turns a blind eye to plutonium build up in Japan. Where does the buck stop?

Mr Doherty—A lot of the things we have heard this morning, although I have only heard the previous speaker, were concentrating on India—and that was fair enough because that is his expertise. But the buck has to stop with what we can do as Australians in the world. That is where we have to go. So when we are involved in exporting uranium, we are implicated and we are not in a position to hector or to lecture countries in South Asia. We have those poor people camped out at Jabiluka at the moment trying to stop that. We have no guarantee whether, if there is a change of government after the next election, Jabiluka will stop or whether uranium mines will be closed. But we need, from whatever government eventuates, a promise that they will close those mines down and that we will get out of that, because uranium is the driving force behind nuclear weapons.

Senator MARGETTS—Thank you very much.

CHAIR—At page 2 of your submission you say:

Another factor was the testing in Pakistan of new ballistic missiles with China’s help was seen by India as a provocation.

You then say at the fifth paragraph:

In fact the nexus of US transferring technology to China and then on to Pakistan is cause for much disquiet for the Indian Government.

What technology transfer are you referring to there?

Mr Doherty—Apparently the US is transferring some nuclear technology to China.

CHAIR—And you are saying that that in turn is being transferred into Pakistan?

Mr Doherty—I am saying that India believes that that will gradually trickle down into Pakistan, as it has in the past. Backing up what the previous speaker said, for the Indians it was a cause of much pride that they were able to develop all their own stuff whereas Pakistan needed fairy godmothers—as he called it—like North Korea and so on to give them scuds and China to give them nuclear technology.

CHAIR—Whilst the focus has been on nuclear, I did raise with an earlier witness today the issue of a submission by a Devin Hagerty who was going to appear as a witness before this committee but has not been able to do so. His submission referred to an article published in his name called ‘South Asia’s nuclear balance’. It was interesting that he referred there to the fact that Pakistan had in effect been denied conventional weapons as a result of decisions by the United States back in the 1980s. He referred to the Pressler amendment, I think it was, which denied some $530 million worth of arms sales to Pakistan. I was interested in what you are saying there, given that the Pakistanis no doubt hold the Americans responsible for the imbalance, in their eyes, in conventional weapons. We discussed with one of the earlier witnesses the geopolitics of the area—the alliance between Pakistan and China and the way that is viewed by India—and how it sets up a fairly

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 39 complex framework environment in which politics operate in that part of the world. I am just wondering if you can sustain in some way by evidence the flow-on effect of the technology from US to China to Pakistan, or is this part of the mythology that is being built up in the area? This is what I am concerned about.

Mr Doherty—That paragraph is largely an understanding of what I got from talking to the Indian High Commissioner. The perception of India is that eventually technology will be transferred, as gradually technology was transferred previously—if it happened once it will happen again.

CHAIR—Is this nuclear technology or is this missile technology?

Mr Doherty—Either or.

CHAIR—It is all.

Mr Doherty—The Indians also said—and I had not remembered this; and I am not sure of the date, but say it was 1974 when Bangladesh turned into Bangladesh rather than East Pakistan—that, apparently, the 7th Fleet floated into the Bay of Bengal and aimed their nuclear weapons at them. This is one of their memories of the United States. So India feels isolated, as your previous speaker said. It feels they are ignored on the world stage even though it is a massive country. It does feel that it is being encircled.

He mentioned the fact that, apparently, Clinton said that China should take more interest in South Asian affairs, which filled the Indians with dread, because that is the last thing they want. They think they can look after their own affairs. They do not need China to take more interest.

CHAIR—It seems to me that the environment in which all of this is happening is like a vortex, where we are going down and down in the spiral and everything is hastening the problem as you get further down into the vortex. I am wondering what the circuit breaker in all of this will be. I have heard your proposition that there should be a total abolition of nuclear weapons—and I am not against that myself. My difficulty is that getting an immediate reality of that situation. The problem I have currently is that two wrongs never make a right, but the two explosions that took place from Pakistan or India had not in my mind—regardless of how one might perceive the Australian position or the world position— advantaged the spread of nuclear weapons. It has disadvantaged it.

Primarily I come from not being able to resolve the other problems myself instantaneous- ly, at least in the condemnatory position of what has taken place with India and Pakistan. In trying to understand the rationale, I have great difficulty. It seems as if it is built on nationalism, euphoria, internal politics in India and the external politics with China and Pakistan. What is the trigger? What is the circuit-breaker for all of this? There must be a circuit-breaker.

Mr Doherty—They have suggested it. India has suggested the circuit breaker. The circuit breaker is that they want an end to what they call nuclear apartheid.

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CHAIR—But by increasing the number of people with nuclear weapons, that does not necessarily—

Mr Doherty—They always had them.

CHAIR—That is right, and their way out of the problem in the first place was to have surrendered any capacity or ability to have made nuclear weapons.

Mr Doherty—Possibly, but we just saw what they said in that recent thing. They said they wanted the use of nuclear weapons declared a war crime. They have also said that they agree with the eight-nation initiative, and they are prepared to sign it if the US and others will sign it. So they are pushing for total elimination by the year 2010. They are also in negotiation with Pakistan on a no-first-use policy.

CHAIR—That is one of the other things that I have raised concern about—the bilateral discussions and dialogue between India and Pakistan in the wake of the nuclear tests. As I understand it, they had got to a stage of having been resumed in about March 1997 after having been in a limbo state for about three years, and, whilst progress was slow, at least there was an opportunity, an avenue, for progress to be made. I do not know—and I presume some expert will appear before this committee who will tell us—the stage at which those negotiations are at.

Mr Doherty—They say that the two prime ministers are going to meet in September. One of the things they are going to nut out is that both countries agree to no first use, that their present—I have forgotten what the technical term is—warheads are not connected to the projectiles. The other thing is that there was a person representing Friends of the Earth with me and we said to him, ‘This is the scenario: Muslim activists create a situation in Kashmir; India responds militarily; Pakistan responds in a nuclear way; and then you respond.’ And he just laughed. He said, ‘That’s impossible. One, we’ve got Kashmir under control. Secondly, there are more Muslims in India than there are in Pakistan and everybody is related to everybody else so it would be like brothers killing sisters and vice versa.’ The previous speaker did speak about what has happened whenever India has had an opportunity. In one of the wars they were something like 50 miles away from Karachi and they pulled back. So, apart from Kashmir, they have no territorial desire to swallow up Pakistan or vice versa.

CHAIR—Yes, but they also may have read the article by Sun Soo.

Mr Doherty—All right. But this is a lot more positive. India is a lot more positive. I know you think I am terrible criticising the United States all the time, but the High Commis- sioner came down and spoke to us for 2½ hours. If we appear outside the United States consulate, we get hit by every police and security force in Australia. I went to the United States consulate with an envelope, and I had Protective Services, private security, New South Wales special branch and New South Wales uniform all there within two minutes. All I had in my hand was an envelope.

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That is how we were treated. Then they sent some CIA bod down from the 23rd floor, and he called me an alien. I said, ‘I thought we were supposed to be allies.’ Here we had the High Commissioner at least prepared to talk.

CHAIR—I see the position you are coming from.

Mr Doherty—The United States is fairly aggressive in lots of ways. They are not nice guys in white hats all the time.

CHAIR—They have not come near me, I must admit—yet. Could you clarify one other comment that you made? You were referring to a US threat of nuclear weapons against Iraq. What were the exact circumstances in which the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq was made?

Mr Doherty—In 1991?

CHAIR—Yes.

Mr Doherty—I have the cutting in the office.

CHAIR—Could you take that on notice and forward it to us?

Mr Doherty—Yes. It is a quote from Senator Evans. People had said, ‘Don’t go and support them over there’ and they said, ‘Oh, no, we have to do something about that nasty person, Saddam Hussein,’ and he said, ‘I don’t care even if they use nuclear weapons.’ That is what Gareth Evans said when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs.

CHAIR—Was that said in the context of the threat of chemical and biological weapons being used?

Mr Doherty—No, it was said in the build-up to the war. The other thing he is very keen on and which Senator Evans said, when he appeared before the International Court of Justice, was that the nuclear weapons states should disarm within a reasonable time frame. And there has been no movement on that. They cannot see any and I cannot see any. There have probably been some very nice statements made, but I cannot see any action that has happened.

CHAIR—There has been a change of government in that period of time.

Mr Doherty—I know, but—

CHAIR—It is very hard when you are in opposition to promote those things.

Mr Doherty—But, with respect, when you were in the government there was not much movement either. When Howard said ‘We are going to be more pro-US than the Labor government,’ Keating rolled around on the floor laughing. He said, ‘How can you be more pro-US than we have been?’

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CHAIR—I do not think it is a matter of being pro-US. I think the Labor government, when it was in power, moved substantially along the path of ensuring the CTBT—

Mr Doherty—You heard Senator Dee Margetts. The position you took on nuclear proliferation was not very progressive.

Senator MARGETTS—It was announced as being progressive but it was not seen by the rest of the world in the same way.

Mr Doherty—That is right.

CHAIR—I do not know if the rest of the world would necessarily say that, Senator Margetts. I think that is more a debating point rather than—

Mr Doherty—No, it is not a debating point. It is a reality. The reality is that the Australian government took the US position, and this is what happens in all international forums. Whether it is a Labor or a Liberal government, you take the US position. You do not take a disarmament position.

CHAIR—That may be your perception—and I cannot speak for the Liberals—but that is certainly not the way that Labor perceives things. It may well be that things may not happen at the pace that you would desire them to happen, but nonetheless they are happening. The strategies that are being put in place by some of my colleagues might not achieve the end at the same time and with the same degree of swiftness that you might like but, nonetheless, they are headed very much in that direction.

Senator MARGETTS—I could say that might be a debating point, too.

CHAIR—That is right, Senator Margetts.

Mr Doherty—Just to take a simple position, a recent report from India said that they were very frightened about Indian and Pakistan tests because they did not have the infra- structure to wage nuclear weapons; they did not have the satellite and targeting procedures. The United States does because it has the bases here. All that network of bases right across the world aids and abets nuclear weapons fighting and targeting.

During the Hawke-Keating government, the Hawke government made it easier for the United States to keep those bases here, by putting through—and by the way, it was done outside of caucus; it was done in a presidential way—a law that said that Australia had three years in which to give notice. In 1988, they signed Pine Gap off for 10 years. In 1995, during the Labor government, we were outside parliament house calling for you to give them notice to quit. Two weeks ago, in half an inch in the Sydney Morning Herald, it was said that the lease has been signed for another 10 years, and the Australian people have never been told what goes on at those bases and what they are used for. Labor is just as—I am sorry to be hectoring you here like this, but—

CHAIR—You are not hectoring me, I can assure you.

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Mr Doherty—Labor is just as responsible as any Liberal government has been in this sort of backing up and supporting the United States nuclear strategy and, whichever government it is, it is time that some movement was made. I do not accept that there has been progress, but even if it is progress, it is so minuscule. I do not accept minuscule; we do not have that sort of time. India is saying 2010. We are saying the year 2000 just to accept the concept.

CHAIR—I do not accept that India has any credibility now, neither does Pakistan, in this area of nuclear disarmament.

Senator MARGETTS—What credibility has Australia got?

CHAIR—A lot more.

Mr Doherty—No, it has not. It has not got any credibility.

CHAIR—That is a view where we will beg to differ.

Mr Doherty—What evidence can you give? I can mount all this evidence; these are the sorts of things—

CHAIR—Well, what you might claim to be evidence, but I do not necessarily accept it.

Mr Doherty—The United States has an army and a navy, and so on. It does not have six different armies and navies: it has a nuclear army. If you exercise with them, you are supporting a nuclear army. If you exercise with the navy, the navy is a nuclear navy; you are exercising with a nuclear navy and a nuclear air force.

CHAIR—I hear your view. Your view has been made known to the committee and, undoubtedly, it has been said before and will be said again.

Mr Doherty—Will you urge the government to support the Group of 8?

CHAIR—I am not here to do anything other than to take evidence at this stage and then we will write a report.

Mr Doherty—This is really important; it is really crucial.

CHAIR—I understand the view that you are coming from and I hear the words that you put to the committee. They will be weighed up in the committee’s final deliberations.

Mr Doherty—I just want to say, if you are an anti-nuclear activist in this country, you are confined to the margins. The other day, I went to renew my passport. Because I stood up against anti-nuclear activity in Queensland last year, the Queensland police have put a bar on my passport for a measly $300—because I stood up for nuclear disarmament. This is the sort of government and society we have got.

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CHAIR—I do not think that is within the terms of reference of this particular hearing, but undoubtedly you have now put on the transcript what you needed to put. Thank you, very much.

Proceedings suspended from 12.50 p.m. to 1.50 p.m.

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MALIK, Dr Mohan, Director, Defence Studies Program, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria 3217

CHAIR—I welcome Dr Mohan Malik to this hearing. The committee prefers all evidence to be given in public but, should you at any stage wish to give any part of your evidence in private, you may ask to do so and the committee will consider your request.

The committee has before it a written submission from you. Are there any alterations or additions you would like to make to your submission at this stage?

Dr Malik—Yes. I would like to submit copies of four articles which have been published since I wrote my paper. These four articles tend to reinforce the arguments I presented in my submission.

CHAIR—Thank you. The four articles can be identified as follows: Analysis from the East-West Centre No. 38, 15 June 1998, ‘International response to nuclear tests in South Asia: the need for a new policy framework’, by Muthiah Alagappa. The next is an article from the Far Eastern Economic Review, under the fifth column, ‘Heed South Asia’s concerns’ by Marshall M. Bouton. Next is an article from the Far Eastern Economic Review of 25 June 1998 under the heading of foreign relations, ‘Comrades-in-Arms’, by Ahmed Rashid in Islamabad. The last article is from The Times of India, 9 July 1998, headed ‘US should initiate a "Helsinki" process for Asia’, by M.L. Sondhi.

For the purposes of obtaining an accurate record, could you remain behind at the end of the proceedings so that the Hansard officer can verify information that you have provided to the hearing? I now invite you to make an opening statement and then we will proceed to questions.

Dr Malik—As I said in my submission, the key point I have made is that nuclear tests by India and Pakistan need to be seen in the broader, geopolitical framework, to the extent far beyond the narrow confines of South Asian geopolitics.

I believe that the Indo-Pakistani rivalry framework tells only part of the story because it precludes discussion of the China-India dimension, which largely drives the Indian nuclear weapons program. Understanding the China-India and India-Pakistan nexus is critical to formulating an effective South Asia policy.

Security in South Asia cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of Asia-Pacific in this age of globalisation and economic interdependence. A more inclusive and integrated policy framework is required. This framework would take into account all the outside nations, especially China, and recognise the significance of India, which is only likely to increase as a major power in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century. This policy framework would require engagement rather than sanctions and isolation.

As far as the non-proliferation regime is concerned, we should not confuse the end with the means. A non-proliferation regime is a means to an end. If a non-proliferation regime does not enhance security, if it undermines security, then it is very difficult to get nation states to comply with the non-proliferation regime.

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In the South Asian context, the nuclear proliferation chain started with China when China conducted its first bomb test in 1964. India’s nuclear weapons program was a response to China’s nuclear weapons program. So, in the beginning when India refused to sign the 1967 NPT, Pakistan was not a consideration. In 1974, when India tested its first nuclear bomb, Pakistan was not a consideration. In fact, if Pakistan were the only security concern, India would have liked to see South Asia remain a nuclear-free zone because India’s superiority in conventional arms provides India with a huge leverage vis-a-vis Pakistan.

After the 1971 war, which led to a dismemberment of Pakistan and a widespread feeling in India’s defence and foreign policy establishment that Pakistan would never again pose a threat to India’s security, it was felt that the time had come to negotiate with China some kind of settlement. So India’s nuclear weapons program has always had its origins in the China dimension.

With India and Pakistan having gone nuclear, there are concerns as the domino theory has it that other states might follow the Indian example and countries in the Middle East— like Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya—and North Korea and Japan in North-East Asia could go nuclear. But I would say that we need to keep in mind the vital fact that India and Pakistan were not NPT signatories, so the international community or the UN Security Council could not do much, apart from imposing sanctions.

Other countries are NPT signatories and, if anyone of these countries decides to go nuclear in violation of the NPT, the UN Security Council can take military action against that country, including pre-emptive strikes. So the South Asian region has been nuclear for a long period of time.

I also believe that the time for rolling back the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan has gone by, although our objectives should be to prevent escalation, not attempt to roll back the nuclear test program, because it is not going to happen. Any UN security resolution— what I have in mind is the June 5 UN Security Council resolution which calls upon India and Pakistan to sign the NPT and the CTBT—to roll back the nuclear weapons capability is not going to succeed because it does not take into account the vital fact of China-India rivalry.

Much like China, India sees itself as a major power with wider security concerns in the Persian Gulf, the Bay of Bengal, the northern Indian Ocean and South-East Asia and it wants to acquire a nuclear weapons capability as a deterrent against threats in the future. Here China is the most important consideration. Australia and Japan reacted to China’s emergence as a great power by strengthening their security alliances with the US, but India had nowhere to go. India’s security treaty with the Soviet Union had come to an end.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided a counterweight after the Americans refused to provide a nuclear umbrella in the 1960s. The Soviet Union provided that security umbrella to India. Now, in the post-Cold War world, India, as a growing power, felt increasingly friendless and lonely. That is how Samuel Huntington, who went to India before India’s tests, described India: as a lonely and friendless power in the emerging world order. The Indians responded by saying that he was late with the thesis that he came up with in

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1993—on the nexus between the Islamic and Confucian civilisations—because India had already lived with that kind of nexus between Pakistan and China for 30 years.

China has played a very important role not only in setting off this nuclear proliferation chain but also in aggravating it by setting off the nuclear arms race in the sub-continent. Now, if you believe what President Clinton has been saying since his visit to China, China has emerged as a regional stabiliser. But it was the 1995 devaluation of Chinese currency which led to the financial crisis in 1997 in South-East Asia and it was China’s transfer of nuclear weapons and missile technologies to Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia which led to the nuclear proliferation in 1998, so China is a very important factor. China is the most important actor inducing India to go nuclear and, in turn, provoking Pakistan to go nuclear.

My key argument is that the Sino-Indian rivalry is going to intensify in the 21st century. India is offering itself as an economic and military counterweight to China. Some have held the view that India should not have evoked the China threat because India-China relations had improved over the last 10 years. But these last 10 years also saw Pakistan getting $US3 billion worth of conventional weaponry, and that does not include complete nuclear missile systems, in addition to missile technology from China. That is in violation of all of the nuclear non-proliferation arms treaties that China had agreed to.

During the last seven years, we also saw Burma effectively moving into China’s embrace. Burma and Pakistan having closer military alliances with China was interpreted as China’s further encirclement of India. To break free of this ‘made in China’ straitjacket, India had to do something drastic. The feeling was that after the Cold War India and the US would emerge as strong allies and that India would be seen as an effective counterweight to China. There was no doubt that the US wanted India to emerge as a counterweight to China but not as a nuclear power. India, on the other hand, saw its nuclear missile capability as an integral component of its China policy, something which could not be negotiated away.

So what should we do now that proliferation has occurred? As I said before, the most important task is to prevent escalation and to persuade the two countries to put in place nuclear confidence and security-building measures. I am not very confident about the no first use pledge because India did not accept China’s no first use pledge, and there is no reason for Pakistan to accept India’s no first use pledge as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. But there are a number of other confidence-building measures which could be put in place with the help of the five nuclear weapon states.

India and Pakistan are now engaged in negotiations with the five states, and especially with the US, over the adherence to the CTBT, and that may happen in the near future. Going by all of the indications that are emerging, Pakistan has added that it is willing to de-link its CTBT stance from the Kashmir dispute and India is also negotiating separately with the US. Both countries have indicated a willingness to accede to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. So the damage that has been done to the non-proliferation regime can be contained. Effective command and control systems need to be put in place so that there is no risk of war by miscalculation.

More importantly, there is a need to persuade China to take into account India’s security concerns, whether they are in the Bay of Bengal vis-a-vis Burma, in the northern Indian

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Ocean or in South Asia. All of India’s neighbours have acquired their complete military arsenals from China; 90 per cent of their weapons systems come from China. China has engaged in this game of containment and encirclement by proxy, mainly because it does not wish to see India emerging as a challenger to China’s primacy in the Asia-Pacific. While all Asian countries have taken as a given China’s rise as a great power and have started fashioning their strategy towards China, India seems committed to acquiring economic and military capabilities across the board to emerge as a counterweight, as a challenger, to China.

As long as the China-India rivalry is not contained, China-India tensions will continue. In this context, I may as well mention that they have a disputed border which has not been resolved, and that can be contrasted with China’s willingness to reach a negotiated settlement of its border disputes with Russia and the newly independent central Asian states. But China has refused to settle the boundary with India. The recognition of the McMahon line was a basis of settlement between Burma and China in 1964-65, soon after the India-China war. This is mainly because China’s strategy is to keep India under pressure.

My key argument is that security on the subcontinent must be viewed in a broader Asian context, not in the subcontinental context. There has been a tendency to exclude South Asia from the general conceptualisation of the Asia-Pacific. If you believe Gareth Evans, Australia is an Asian country but India is not Asian enough to deserve entry into APEC and the Asia- Europe Summit and other regional organisations. We need to understand what is driving these countries in the subcontinent, both India and Pakistan. India’s nuclear drive can be explained in terms of status and security imperatives, but Pakistan’s is solely in terms of security.

In the domain of security, a more useful conceptualisation of Asia and the Pacific would centre on China as the core that links North-East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia and central Asia, with the US and Russia as other critical players. In this conceptualisation, the regional overlay is primarily determined by the interaction of the US, China, Japan, Russia and India, and I believe that a five-power balance of power will emerge. Paul Dibb and I have worked on this over the years, that it would be in the best interests of middle ranking powers like Australia if there is a polycentric balance of power which would come with all kinds of checks and balances and make sure that no regional power, be it China, India, Japan or Russia, ever gets to dominate the whole of the Asia-Pacific.

Senator MARGETTS—I found your ideas very interesting. A number of the people giving evidence have obviously drawn attention to the importance of China, and you have talked about the encircling by China and the arming by China of countries surrounding India. In a nutshell—I might have missed this in your presentation—what it is that irks China about India?

Dr Malik—The key objective of China’s Asian policy has been to prevent the rise of a true Asian challenger, an Asian power, as a peer competitor. Just as the objective of US policy has been to prevent the emergence of a peer competitor at a global level, China has sought to discourage the rise of Asian powers which can challenge China’s status as the ‘middle kingdom’ of the Asia-Pacific. There is an old Chinese saying that one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers, and this goes back to the 1950s or the 1940s, to Tibet, to the China-India war and everything that China has done since then.

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No other Asian country has ever backed and armed another Asian country as China has backed and armed Pakistan over the last 30 years in such a consistent manner over such a long period of time. So there is obviously a key strategic objective that Pakistan and now Burma fulfil in China’s strategy for the 21st century. They tie India down to the south of the Himalayas and thereby prevent its rise as a major challenger to China’s primacy of the Asia- Pacific.

Over 30 years of perceiving India—and China has always known that there are only two countries, Japan or India, which have the might, or the numbers, or the intention, to match China, to counter China—China has embarked upon a policy of keeping India under pressure by arming its neighbours and by supporting insurgency movements in India’s minority regions.

Senator MARGETTS—The $2 billion that you have quoted in your paper for Burma’s military regime, does that amount of money and the amount of armaments that you mention that are going to Pakistan, does that mean that China has some degree of control over Pakistan and/or Burma, or is it simply to, as you say, prevent India rising by themselves? Burma strikes me as being an interesting example in that China actually has a level of control over those countries by that level of military aid.

Dr Malik—Yes. As far as Pakistan is concerned in international relations, it is said the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Soon after the 1962 war with India, China and Pakistan settled their boundary and, since 1963, they have been the best of allies because both serve each other’s purposes quite well.

In addition to promoting a counterweight to India, since it has been the recipient of western military technology like F16s, for example, China has had access to those weapons systems which Pakistan has bought from France, from Britain, from the US for the last three decades. China has also used Pakistan, gone through Pakistan, to establish ties with other Islamic countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia.

I make the point that it was China’s transfers of intermediate range ballistic missiles in 1988 to Saudi Arabia which was done through Pakistan. Pakistan acted as their emissary and intermediary. That preceded the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and China. At that time, Saudi Arabia had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, not with China. So weapons systems, weapon transfers have been used for diplomatic, economic and strategic purposes by China in a very clever manner with Iran, for example, and Iraq for that matter.

Military aid to these countries serves China’s broader strategic objective in the sense that they provide a valuable US hostage in the Middle East. In the event of a crisis in South-East Asia, South Asia or east Asia, in the event of multiple regional contingencies, MRCs as Americans call them, if there is a crisis in the Middle East and a crisis erupts in South-East Asia, then the US will have to decide which one is more important for its national interests, leaving the rest for China to sort it out.

Over the period of the second Clinton administration, a number of policy statements were made which argued that China should play a greater role in South Asia and South-East Asia.

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If you read what James Kelly and others have been saying, including William Cohen’s predecessor, defense secretary William Perry, there is reason to believe that some American strategists and policy makers believe that China sees South Asia and South-East Asia as its legitimate sphere of influence just as the US sees Latin America as its legitimate sphere of influence. They believe that if China is allowed to dominate South Asia it would not impinge upon the US and its allies’ interests in North-East Asia and the Pacific, which is more important to the US.

Senator MARGETTS—Fascinating.

Dr Malik—It is a clear division of labour, basically—spheres of influence, so to speak. As far as Burma is concerned, because of its isolation since 1998, especially since 1990, because nobody would trade with Burma and Burma was isolated, China has taken advantage of Burma’s isolation to fulfil its greater economic and strategic objectives, and Burma provides China entry into the Indian Ocean. If there is a conflict and the Malacca Straits are blocked, then Burma provides another route for the transportation of Chinese goods.

Senator MARGETTS—Right. A number of people have indicated that the current situation internationally with nuclear non-proliferation is that, if the international community can continue to let the acknowledged five nuclear states off the hook without implementing a firm timetable for disarmament, then there is no way that India or Pakistan will ever get to the negotiating table and be prepared to sign any nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I am not sure whether you are suggesting India ever would, if the nuclear five signed on, but I would be interested to hear that. If we assume we all want to work towards a world without nuclear weapons, what is the role Australia could play and how could Australia assist in, for instance, disarming China and any other regional nuclear state?

Dr Malik—I am not very optimistic about India, or Pakistan for that matter, acceding to the NPT. But, as far as CTBT is concerned, I think it is a question of time. Both are at the moment engaged in negotiations with the US and both sides are trying to find out each other’s bottom line. What India is asking for is the lifting of trade embargoes and access to high technology, especially civilian nuclear technology which it has been denied because of its refusal to sign the NPT. Whether that will happen or not, I am not very optimistic in the short-term. I think a chill has descended on India-US relations and they are not going to improve under the Clinton administration.

But, as far as Pakistan is concerned, Pakistan is in a weaker position, mainly because of its smaller economy, although it aspires for equality and parity with India. I think it is a self- destructive course to embark upon but, if Pakistan is an equal of India—whose economy is much larger than Pakistan’s—then Vietnam is an equal of China or New Zealand is an equal of Australia and Mexico should be competing with the US. But, again, the roots of this India-Pakistan rivalry go much deeper, and it is understandable why Pakistan wants to compete with India. So, before it signs the CTBT or the NPT, Pakistan would still be guided by what India does.

Now what India will do in the future will also be determined by what China will do. That is why I am making the point that, over the years, China has been very critical to the whole nuclear arms control process. As Des Ball has been saying, China has the most active

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 51 nuclear weapons program, and CTBT again is a non-proliferation treaty which perpetuates, freezes, the nuclear capabilities of the five nuclear weapon states and gives them the right to improve upon their nuclear weapons. What they are going for now is mini-nukes, miniaturised nuclear weapons, and the new technology makes it possible to use nuclear weapons in remote areas in limited conflicts. Limited conflicts will be the way of the future for limited purposes.

Senator MARGETTS—Which leads me to the question—and this may well be the last question from me: what would be an appropriate action from the international community, including Australia, to try to prevent nuclear proliferation in the way that you have described from countries like China—very powerful countries? What would be the appropriate action? What helpful things could Australia do?

Dr Malik—Ideally speaking, a nuclear weapons convention which would bring together all the nuclear weapon states and those who have active nuclear weapons programs where all parties in a non-discriminatory manner go for it. The Canberra declaration on nuclear weapons could pave the way. This is a proposal which, if it is implemented, could help us get rid of weapons of mass destruction. But, being a realist, I do not see that happening in the near future. When we talk of nuclear weapons we are talking of the quest for advanced technology. Today it is nuclear weapons; tomorrow it may be something else. Great powers require advanced military technology even if they do not face any threats to their security.

There is a linkage here in the power game in the international system. China is trying to emerge as a counter to the US—as a superpower. It believes that, since the demise of the Soviet Union, the world is highly imbalanced, and China sees itself as a power whose time has finally come. Arms control measures and non-proliferation regimes tend to slow down weapons proliferation, but they never prevent completely weapons proliferation.

Senator MARGETTS—But what you say is that, if possible, it may be useful for this committee to actually talk to Chinese government representatives in the course of this inquiry about their angles as well so that we can get a better handle on this whole three-way or five-way pressure.

Dr Malik—Yes, one of the articles that I have submitted today talks about this sort of nuclear arms control conference based on the Helsinki process which could bring together China, the US, Russia, India, Pakistan and Japan to discuss nothing but nuclear arms control and to make sure that this does not lead to an open nuclear arms race between China and India and India and Pakistan which would prompt Russia and the US to take counter measures as well. As it is, a debate is going on in the US Congress over the need for the deployment of ballistic missile defences. If these measures are not taken, you will see the five nuclear weapon states heading in the direction of ballistic missile defences, which are very costly but nobody knows how effective they are.

Senator MARGETTS—Thank you very much. I found that very useful.

Senator COOK—Dr Malik, I apologise that I was not here for the beginning of your remarks and, therefore, may not understand fully what you are saying. From what I heard you say, it seemed to me that your contribution to this inquiry was one to explain what the

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strategic balance was in nuclear weapon states surrounding India and why it was in India’s self-interest—I deduced from that—to test nuclear weapons and demonstrate to the world its nuclear capability. I find that interesting but, as an Australian, my concern is Australia’s role in this and to encourage actively and constructively in whatever way a lessening not a justification for nuclear weapons testing.

I will ask you a couple of direct questions to begin with. First of all, where is India under territorial threat by China at the present time?

Dr Malik—China and India have an active territorial dispute. The question of Tibet has not yet been resolved. I will be repeating some of the arguments that I have already made. China has deployed intermediate range missiles in Tibet if you believe Jane’s Defence Weekly and Jane’s Intelligence Review, including the DIA reports, the Defense Intelligence Agency reports, from the US. China has been modernising its conventional and nuclear forces. China has deployed 75 SU27s that it bought recently from the Soviet Union in Tibet. China and Pakistan have a very active military alliance. Since 1990, China and Burma have established a very close military relationship and China has established bases in the Bay of Bengal to monitor electronic surveillance bases, to monitor India’s missile testing—India’s testing of intermediate range missiles and naval activities.

If countries like Australia feel concerned and threatened by the rise of China in the 21st century and want to take counter measures, India has even greater concerns because it has gone to war with China. India has a territorial dispute which has not been resolved; it is home to 150,000 Tibetan refugees; the Dalai Lama still lives there. China and Pakistan are engaged in active military collaboration and all of India’s smaller South Asian neighbours have acquired their military arsenal from China. That should not be seen as a threat to India’s security interests. I am not talking about a threat to India’s territorial integrity; I am talking about a threat to India’s security interests.

When we talk of India, we should also keep in mind that, very much like China, India sees itself as the great Asian power whose time has come. If it does not disintegrate and if it continues to grow at five to seven per cent, in 20 years time, India will be the third largest economy in Asia after China and Japan. It will be the most populist country, the largest democracy and it will have the largest market in the world if its population continues to grow. India has its own great power ambitions from the Persian Gulf to the Bay of Bengal in the northern Indian Ocean. India is not going to let China come into the Bay of Bengal and do nothing.

Senator COOK—What confuses me is the fact that the Chinese economy is growing at a fairly rapid clip, even despite the Asian economic difficulties, at around four to five per cent. It is emerging as an economic power of considerable weight and will, at this rate of growth, eclipse the United States some time after the year 2020 in GNP terms.

What throws me, though, is that you seem to be talking about this issue only in a military context. I am asking you to correct me if I am wrong in this understanding of your evidence, but security depends on an ability to have a modern weapons system. Great power status seems to devolve to having nuclear weapons capability. Dare I say that is a very bleak outlook, if that be the outlook. What I am more interested in hearing about is what forces are

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 53 there in India that would want to end India’s weapons capability? What forces are there for signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to the non-proliferation treaty?

I find it difficult to understand why a country like India—and this goes for Pakistan as well, I have to say—should complain that the world community takes an adverse view of explicit weapons testing and talks about economic relationships in a way adverse to India’s national interest. India complains about that as if it did not see, as logically as night follows day, that this type of behaviour would bring forth a world view of that nature.

Dr Malik—I will take your points one by one. I have addressed some of these points in the paper I have submitted.

Senator COOK—I apologise that I have not seen that.

Dr Malik—I must admit that I see myself as a geo-politician, so I am talking in terms of security and military as the key concern, but I am not trying to downplay the economic dimension of security. You cannot, as the Soviet Union’s case showed, be a first world military power and a third world economic power. That contradiction leads to the disintegra- tion of the country. If India—or China, for that matter—wants to emerge as a great power in military terms, it will have to have a very sound economic system to sustain that kind of power.

If you go by India’s military expansion in the 1980s, it all came to nought, mainly because in the late 1980s India acquired nuclear submarines and went in for major expansion, which became a cause of concern to Australia and South-East Asian countries. But that all came to an end after 1991 when it had balance of payments crises and other economic crises one after another. That is why it had to liberalise its economy.

Senator COOK—Dare I say when its major international sponsor, the Soviet Union, collapsed in a heap.

Dr Malik—Yes. As for the point that geopolitical concerns will not be important in the future, I do not believe that view. I always tell my students that the more things change, the more they remain the same in international relations. After the Second World War, for five years or so, there was a widespread feeling that, having fought two world wars, we should forget about the balance of power and we should forget about military means. We should have faith in the UN and multilateral institutions. The liberal school of international relations was dominant for not more than five years. Since the end of the Cold War, the liberal school of international relations has been predominant, saying that economic issues and economic security will overtake traditional geopolitical military concerns. Yes and no. You cannot isolate economic security from military security. Economic interests and security interests impinge upon each other.

Why did India decide to explode nuclear bombs at a time when it is not in a strong economic position? I think 1995 and 1996 mark a turning point, with two events. That is a very good example of the direction we should proceed if we are really serious about the non- proliferation and arms control process. The year 1995 saw the indefinite extension of the

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NPT, which basically created what India calls perpetuated nuclear apartheid. It created nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots.

Senator COOK—Australia is a nuclear have-not and we are not offended by that.

Dr Malik—Australia depends on the US nuclear security umbrella.

Senator COOK—Yes, but we are not a nuclear weapons power.

Dr Malik—Yes.

Senator COOK—And we have renounced that option. It is within our economic capability to do that. All I am saying is that we would rather it would be different, we would rather nuclear weapons states accelerated plans for containment and disarmament, and we would rather that they ceased testing weapons in a way which is injurious to Australia’s wellbeing, but we are not offended by that. Unless one’s self-image is that they want to be a superpower and nuclear capability is a symbol of superpower status—is it as simple as that?

Dr Malik—That is the case.

Senator COOK—Are we just talking about pride here and not commercial and economic commonsense?

Dr Malik—Australia does not have the ambitions that China and India have—ambitions of being a great power and of having what the Chinese call ‘comprehensive national strength’, which includes military, economic and technological strength.

Australia does not have a nuclear weapons state on its borders. Australia does not have two nuclear weapons states—one weapons state and a nuclear capable state, before Pakistan tested—which are closely aligned and hostile towards Australia.

Why did India test it? I want to give another reason. In the CTBT negotiations, if you look at those negotiations carefully, it was China which insisted that if we did not sign the CTBT—the US was willing to let India keep its nuclear option—China said that it would not sign the CTBT if India did not sign it. The Chinese brought in a provision or clause called the ‘entry into force’ provision, which required all the 44 countries to sign the CTBT for it to come into force.

That meant that India could no longer keep its nuclear option open indefinitely. By September 1999—that is, next year—if India had not tested, sanctions would have been imposed against India. They would not have been individual countries’ aid sanctions but tight UN Security Council mandated sanctions similar to the ones imposed against Iraq. CTBT negotiations cornered India. That treaty was deadlocked in Geneva.

Senator COOK—Can I just pick up this point to make sure I understand it? Are you saying that under the CTBT, if India never tested its nuclear weapons, then it would have been in defiance and sanctions would have been applied against it? On what basis?

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Dr Malik—If India had not signed the CTBT by September 1999.

Senator COOK—If it had not joined the club and promised to limit its tests.

Dr Malik—Arms control negotiations, if they try to corner a country, then that is how it reacts. The point that I made was that the purpose of a non-proliferation regime is a means to an end. The end is security. Non-proliferation cannot work if it undermines security. If it promotes security, yes, it will work. If it is seen as undermining a country’s security, then it will not work. Objectives should be to maintain and enhance security.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Like Senator Cook, I apologise for not being here for your opening statement. One of the things I find most concerning is the delivery command and control of the Indian nuclear potential. Would you like to make some comments about what your view about it is?

Dr Malik—We are all concerned about the non-existent command and control systems. In my paper I have talked about scenarios. You cannot rule out the possibility of these nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremists—say, Kashmiri separatists, or religious fanatics—the threat is more than conventional war. The possibility of interstate war between India and Pakistan or India and China breaking out is very remote. There is a real risk of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. There is the risk of nuclear accidents, nuclear terrorism. It is very serious both in the subcontinent and in China because all three countries are very weak states. Especially in India and Pakistan, the next few years are going to be very critical, mainly because they have not thought through the implications of what they have done. They have not put in place a command and control system. Anybody who is familiar with the region knows how lax security controls are in that part of the world.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—You have said that the two concerns for India moving towards its current nuclear testing stage are the ongoing domestic political considerations—for instance, its desire to be seen as a superpower—and its threat from China, real or perceived. If you were to apportion the reasons for the current testing program, how would you apportion their motive—current political reasons, or a continuing threat from China?

Dr Malik—India’s nuclear tests were preceded by Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes’ statements calling China a bigger potential threat than Pakistan and describing how this country was being encircled by Chinese military activities and alliances. But here one should know that India has lived with the China threat for more than 30 years now but, up until recently, it was the policy of successive governments in India not to talk about a China threat. That policy has undergone a change, even before the BJP came to power. It happened in 1996-97 during the CTBT negotiations, because India was hoping that China would support India’s stance on the CTBT. In fact China, along with the other four nuclear weapon states, took a position which was highly critical—an anti-India position in the CTBT negotiations, by forcing India’s hands. It was in 1996 that Indian officials, policy makers and leaders started talking openly in terms of a China threat and the need to take counter measures.

Domestic politics always plays a very important role. It impinges upon foreign policy. Had the BJP not come to power—well, there are two views on that. I will take you back to

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1982 when Indira Gandhi eventually came to power. The first time India tested was in 1974; then she lost power after she imposed the emergency, and she came back to power in 1980 and she asked the scientists literally for another series of nuclear tests. But then came the Indo-US summit. She went to Washington DC and met Ronald Reagan, and that was the time when India started liberalising its economy, looking towards the US or the West to diversify its sources of markets and technology imports.

Then, in December 1995, the Congress Prime Minister, Mr Rao, ordered preparations for a nuclear test series. That was a Congress government, not the BJP government. The US satellite picked up images of test preparations. Frank Wisner, the US Ambassador to New Delhi, went and confronted the foreign secretary with those satellite images of test preparations, and the government backed down. That was a few months before Indian general elections.

On the nuclear option, whether you talk to the communists, the BJP or the Congress, they are all united that India needs to have a nuclear deterrent.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Do you think, if the BJP had not been elected, these tests would have taken place?

Dr Malik—Yes and no.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Yes and no?

Dr Malik—Again. The BJP has always been committed to making India a nuclear power. It may not have happened in 1998; it may have happened in the year 2000 or 2001 with any government that would have come to power—a left wing government as there was before the BJP came to power, or the Congress government—and the Congress ex-Prime Minister in his statement after India tested nuclear bombs said he would have done the same thing, if not now, in two years time. Indian security experts believe that India would have tested in the year 2000 or 2001, in the 21st century, to announce its arrival as a nuclear weapons state, and blamed the CTBT negotiations for forcing India’s hands to go nuclear.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—The belief of encirclement of Chinese aid to Pakistan and perhaps to Burma, is that something that has built over the last few years or has it just been a continuing burr under the saddle?

Dr Malik—I am sorry; China and Burma?

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—China and Burma and China and Pakistan?

Dr Malik—The China-Pakistan relationship goes back to one year after the India-China war, 1963. I repeat that Sam Huntington, the American political scientist who came up with the theory of clash of civilisations, went to India a few months before these nuclear tests and described India as a ‘lonely and friendless power’.

During the Cold War years, the Soviet Union provided a counterweight to China as far as India was concerned. With the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, that

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Indo-Soviet security agreement had come to an end. There was a feeling of vulnerability and isolation, and India applied for membership of APEC and ASEAN. It eventually got into ASEAN in 1995, but that was in spite of opposition from the US. If you go through what the Indian media articles by opinion makers, commentators on foreign affairs, editors of major Delhi newspapers, you will find they say that India has been ignored, India has not been given its due, mainly because it has not got economic and military capability. That is a contributing factor, not the main factor though.

As far as Burma is concerned, it goes to back to early 1990, whereas China and Pakistan have had that military relationship for 30 years, more than three decades, and it intensified in the 1990s when China transferred nuclear technology and missile technology to Pakistan. They were complete missile systems: M-11 missiles and M-9 missiles. As far as Burma is concerned, that is recent. Over the last seven or eight years, Burma has moved into China’s orbit.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—I have two more questions. You mentioned the delivery of missiles to Pakistan. What delivery platforms does India propose—what delivery platforms does it have?

Dr Malik—It has Mirages, MIG-29s, SU-27s, SU-30s and two missile systems which are in production and deployment. One has been deployed, the Privthi, a short-range ballistic missile system which can target all major cities in Pakistan and southern China.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—We are all very concerned about the relationship that Australia has with India. It is a developing relationship and a considerable amount of effort has been put into it over the last few years. It appears that India has reacted strongly against criticism in response to their tests and I ask, given Australia’s prominent anti-proliferation role over the last 10 years with nuclear testing in the Pacific and one thing and another: wouldn’t this response from Australia have been entirely expected from the Indian government?

Dr Malik—Yes, I would say so. The reactions of key western countries should not have come as a surprise to the Indian government.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—I understand our criticism has been a considerably high priority in comparison with nations of a similar size.

Dr Malik—I am not the right person to comment on that. I think Professor Marika Vicziany at Monash University and Dr Meg Gurry at Latrobe have done a lot of work on Australia-India relations over the years. They are the experts to comment on that. My area of expertise is nuclear arms control, China-India relations and other issues. But I understand that India has been very upset with Australia for a number of reasons over the last seven or eight years. One reason is Australia’s opposition to India’s membership of APEC.

When then Senator Gareth Evans was Foreign Minister, he tried to propose the discussion of bilateral security problems in the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation. That was another irritant. Then there were the CTBT negotiations. It was Australia, at the behest of the US and Richard Butler, which took the treaty to the UN which

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 58 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998 was deadlocked—the CTBT—in Geneva. The CTBT should have been negotiated there because that was the right forum—the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. It was an unusual step to take that treaty to New York and get it approved by the General Assembly. When all the 44 countries sat down to discuss the CTBT, it was agreed that this was the forum where we would reach agreement on this treaty. Also, there has been no prime ministerial visit to India or from India to Australia since 1986. I think it was in 1986 when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Australia. Since then there has been no bilateral visit at that level.

Senator QUIRKE—I get the impression from what you are saying—and I will put it in blunt words—that, in a sense, you are almost comfortable with the Indian nuclear deterrent because what you see in the next century is that China’s domination hegemony over the whole of Asia is going to be at least challenged by one other source. When you were talking earlier about your own work with that of Paul Dibb, you made the comment that a polycentric world was better than one that was dominated by one particular power. Am I getting the right impression?

Dr Malik—Being an academic, I have the luxury of just explaining what has happened, why it has happened and what may happen. Nobody can feel comfortable with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As I said, I belong to the realistic school of international relations and I believe that today we have nuclear weapons which represent advanced military technology, and tomorrow it may be information warfare technologies or something else. You cannot stop countries that want to emerge as great powers from acquiring capabilities across the board—all kinds of nuclear, information warfare and space capabilities. Those that have the capability will go for it.

The key point in international relations is to see to it that competition amongst great powers does not end up in war, and it does not lead to destructive rivalry where countries in the region are forced to choose sides, as happened in the Cold War. Management of this competition amongst great powers and management of this rivalry, which should be kept within limits, are the tasks for policy makers. In human history there have been attempts to bring about disarmament but that has not succeeded—let us be realistic.

Senator QUIRKE—You said that the Chinese have transferred complete missile technology over to Pakistan including, presumably, warheads and a whole range of other things—all the stuff that goes with it. What was Pakistan testing then? Were they testing crude devices of their own construction?

Dr Malik—Do you mean why did Pakistan need to test?

Senator QUIRKE—Yes.

Dr Malik—You have to understand the dynamics of the India-Pakistan rivalry. Pakistan has to do what India does and Pakistan has to react to India’s actions. Pakistan’s obsession with India is explained and matched by India’s obsession with China. India wants everything that China has and Pakistan wants everything that India has. If Pakistan had not tested, doubts would have been raised about the credibility and reliability of Pakistan’s nuclear

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 59 weapons—whether Pakistan had, firstly, reliable and, secondly, usable nuclear weapons or not. They had to go in for tests.

Senator QUIRKE—Obviously, the things they tested were much cruder devices than what you would expect to find on the end of a Chinese missile.

Dr Malik—Yes, it is obvious now. Soon after testing, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif thanked China for its contribution. It is obvious that China has not provided Pakistan with technology for a fusion bomb or a hydrogen bomb so what it has is a basic nuclear device.

CHAIR—I have a question on the issue that you have just raised: that Pakistan is obsessed with India and India is obsessed with China. The thing that I am concerned about here is that China is an established nuclear weapons state with known capabilities, yet India is just on the verge. If India wants to be the player as seems to be portrayed by yourself, to reach the stage that China is at and to be the counterbalance to China will certainly mean that a great deal of the resources of India will have to be devoted to that. I cannot see in the foreseeable future, even if there were a great intensity within the program within India, that India will reach that countervailing balance that it claims to be seeking with China. It seems to me that we are in an endless spiral here.

Dr Malik—That is a good point. My reading of what they are saying in India is that India is not going to engage in a competition with China in this sense: numbers of warheads and delivery systems. China, as everybody knows, has other security concerns apart from India—the US and Russia—so China’s nuclear arsenal would always be bigger than India’s. If India tries to achieve parity with China, that will be very costly and destructive— counterproductive.

CHAIR—So why should India try to do anything at all?

Dr Malik—What it is saying is that it wants a minimum nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis China and Pakistan. Pakistan also seeks a minimum nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis India. India seeks a minimum nuclear deterrent. That could be not more than 200 warheads.

CHAIR—Do we know how many?

Dr Malik—How many do they have?

CHAIR—Do we know how many constitute the minimum?

Dr Malik—One thing is for sure: these countries cannot afford to engage in that Cold War type US-Soviet rivalry for supremacy in nuclear weapons. They do not need to; they do not have to; they cannot afford to, even if they want to. What constitutes ‘minimum’? It is if you can target what they call the counterforce and countervalue targets. If you have the capability for both counterforce and countervalue—that means key population and industrial centres and military centres—you can be confident that you have achieved the minimum deterrence that leads to prevention of war between nuclear-armed states.

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CHAIR—Dr Malik, we will have to leave it there. We have now gone over time. We thank you for your presence here today as you have come from Melbourne to give us your expert evidence. Thank you.

Dr Malik—Thank you.

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[3.00 p.m.]

HANSON, Dr Marianne Jean, 77 Dell Road, St Lucia, Brisbane, Queensland 4067

CHAIR—Welcome. In what capacity do you appear?

Dr Hanson—I am here as a private individual. I lecture in international relations at the University of Queensland and specialise in research on arms control issues.

Senator QUIRKE—Are you related to any federal member of parliament?

Dr Hanson—I am most definitely not related to any federal member of parliament.

CHAIR—The committee prefers all evidence to be given in public but should you at any stage wish to give any part of your evidence in private, you may ask to do so and the committee will consider your request. The committee has before it a written submission from you. Are there any alterations or additions you would like to make to your submission at this stage?

Dr Hanson—No, there are not.

CHAIR—For the purpose of obtaining an accurate record, would you remain behind at the end of proceedings so that the Hansard officer can verify information you have provided during the hearing. I now invite you to make an opening statement and then we will proceed to questions.

Dr Hanson—Thank you. First of all, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to present these views in person. I would like to preface my comments to you by stating clearly at the outset that I deplore India’s and Pakistan’s decisions to test nuclear weapons and to acquire a nuclear status. It will undoubtedly make the relationship much more dangerous than it already is and it has the potential to do immeasurable damage to the nuclear non- proliferation cause. What I will say here and what is contained in my submission is therefore in no way an attempt to justify India’s and Pakistan’s actions but rather to try to explain some of the thinking that informed those actions and to suggest ways in which Australia and the international community can act to contain the damage done and work towards ensuring non-proliferation and ultimately the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Certainly, there are very strong domestic reasons which sparked India’s decision to test, but there are also external reasons—reasons outside the region, global, structural reasons— which I think played some part in precipitating the decision. Essentially, there exists a widespread and growing view that the existing nuclear weapon states are not moving towards serious nuclear disarmament and appear unlikely to relinquish their own nuclear capacities. This is despite pledges from these states to reduce and eliminate their own arsenals.

Against this background, states like India, Pakistan and now quite possibly others have decided that they too require and can legitimately possess a nuclear weapons capability. It does not take a lot, I think, to recall the nature of nuclear weapons. We are all aware of the

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 62 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998 severity of their destructive effects, the catastrophic consequences which would result from their use and also the fact that nuclear weapons are invariably targeted at civilian popula- tions.

The revulsion against such a class of weapons is already widely evident. Interestingly, there is similar revulsion at even the testing of such weapons. We saw this in the international public reaction to the Chinese test, followed by the French tests and, more recently, the Indian and Pakistani tests.

Despite the nature of nuclear weaponry and the revulsion that accompanies this class of weapons, during the Cold War it was assumed that little could be done to achieve serious reductions or move towards elimination. With the ending of the Cold War, there were new hopes that arms control measures not achievable in the era of US-Soviet hostility might now be possible. Importantly, a number of well-respected individuals and organisations now lead the call for nuclear weapons elimination.

Unlike the Cold War era when many advocates of disarmament were dismissed as naive idealists and perhaps had little understanding of the complexities of the politics involved, in recent years we have seen a number of high profile and highly respected individuals and organisations supporting the call for elimination. These include policy makers, scientists, military leaders and politicians. They include individuals, for instance, such as our own Richard Butler, Robert McNamara, the previous United States Secretary of Defense, Professor Robert O’Neill, Professor of the History of War at Oxford, and numerous others. Some of the organisations involved in this cause are the Stimson Centre, a very respected think-tank which specialises in security issues, the Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which is affiliated with the US government.

One of the most important calls for elimination, I believe, is that put out in the Canberra Commission report. That report and the other related research of the bodies I have mentioned show that nuclear weapons have no military or political utility. They are unusable on the battlefield, inappropriate against the threat of chemical or biological weapons or even against the danger of nuclear terrorism. The Canberra Commission report’s main argument is that the risk of retaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far outweigh any possible benefit imputed to their ability to deter acts of aggression. If there is no utility in these weapons, it is in the international community’s best interests to eliminate them. Perpetuating a nuclear weapons culture can only increase the risk of accidental or strategically irrational use and, of course, can only increase the risks of further proliferation or proliferation by other states.

However, despite these reports and views and despite the non-proliferation treaty, the CTBT, and indeed the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996—which, again, reiterated that the existing nuclear weapons states do have to fulfil their commitment to disarm—the existing nuclear weapons states do not appear to be moving towards serious reductions. Even if START II does go ahead, we will only see those arsenals reduce down to 6,000 or 7,000 warheads for the US and for Russia. China, France and the UK continue to have hundreds of warheads.

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This situation has only fuelled the nuclear aspirations of states like India and Pakistan. We may well now see other states—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria—either initiate their own programs or reactivate their agendas to acquire a similar capability.

The South Asian tests represented a rude setback but it was not altogether surprising given the inequality of the non-proliferation regime. The question then is: what do we do? What can be done about it now? I think it is important to realise that we are in a critical period in arms control at the moment. I do not share the sense of inevitability about proliferation which a number of other speakers, I think, may share. My primary point is that Australia is perfectly placed to pursue serious nuclear arms reductions by the nuclear weapon states and therefore to reduce the risk of further proliferation. It is by no means evident that we have to accept as a fait accompli that we can have seven, and then possibly 10, and then possibly 15 nuclear-armed states in the world.

There is a crucial role that Australia can play, and we do play a role in the United Nations, in the Conference on Disarmament and in the Canberra Commission report itself. All of these have earned us a reputation as an active player in the international system, pursuing security issues. I have heard very recently from a colleague of mine who returned from visiting the State Department last week that the US does appear to recognise that there is now a very real threat of proliferation and that maintaining that awkward balance in the NPT, maintaining what some have called the apartheid system of nuclear haves and nuclear have nots, cannot be sustained. It appears that the US administration is looking for creative ways to deal with this latest burst of nuclear proliferation; in fact, it has recently ordered 50 more copies of the Canberra Commission and the supporting background papers.

The US it seems views the Canberra Commission report as, if you like, the acceptable face of disarmament, and that is for very good reasons. The Canberra Commission report is the collection of a group of 17 independent analysts, including former politicians, military leaders, scientists, academics, et cetera, as I mentioned before. It also sets out a phased program for the elimination of nuclear weapons, but it put no time frame into its report, which I think was a very wise move because the US and the other nuclear weapon states do not like to feel that they are being browbeaten by something like this. Moreover, the report gave very detailed provisions for monitoring and the verification of this phased move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

With all these points in mind, the Australian government can and should, I believe, reconvene the Canberra Commission. It does seem that people are more receptive to it now than they were in 1996—this is the impression I get from discussions with colleagues and policy-makers in North America and in Europe. Indeed, for most of the organisations involved in the arms control debate, the Canberra Commission report has come to be the chief, and possibly the best, reference point. It is seen as comprehensive and credible.

If the government were to consider reconvening it, I suggest that the Commission’s mandate be altered to address how proliferation can be contained and elimination promoted. It may be possible to include new members onto the Commission, perhaps one each from India and Pakistan, but perhaps also including policy makers from the US and from Russia. These are the two key states in the elimination debate.

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In addition, I suggest that the Australian government seeks to have the Canberra Commission report adopted by the UN General Assembly. It was presented to the General Assembly but it was not offered up for adoption. Similarly, the report could be taken to the Conference on Disarmament and put forward to be adopted as a text, and therefore discussed and used as a basis for an elimination program.

There are also numerous possibilities for utilising our relationship with the US by bilateral diplomacy, pursuing talks towards serious nuclear reductions. So, in sum, Australia can be prominent in leading the way forward. It is perhaps time for a bold foreign policy initiative. It is time to address the crisis that India and Pakistan have provided us with by responding in a visionary way.

It seems to me that the choices are twofold. We can either work towards the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, no matter how difficult this may appear or we will simply have to accept that the spread of nuclear weapons to more states will, in fact, take place.

Senator COOK—That is quite a refreshing series of propositions that you have given us to think about, as far as what practical steps can be taken and what we can recommend. Why was the report of the Canberra Commission not offered up for adoption by the United Nations? What was the problem?

Dr Hanson—I think it is understandable; the new government that came into power did not see the Canberra Commission as something that it had initiated or engineered, and it did not feel that it was its product. I think the coalition government was gracious enough to let the Commission run its course and then take the report and present it to the General Assembly. But my understanding is that Prime Minister Keating and Senator Evans would have sought to have had the General Assembly adopt it as a resolution, which would then of course have generated discussion. It would need to be voted on and it would be tabled and it would then form the basis of more serious talks towards elimination.

Senator COOK—When the report was presented to the UN, did India and Pakistan express a view about the report or is there any recorded attitude by those powers in relation to the report?

Dr Hanson—I am not aware of any particular comment that India or Pakistan may have made on the report itself, there may well be some, but I am not aware of them. However, it is a matter of record that both India and Pakistan have consistently called on the existing nuclear weapons states to make serious moves towards reducing their arsenals. In this sense, I imagine that they would have welcomed the report as some kind of pressure on the existing nuclear weapons states. More recently, I have heard representatives of the Indian and Pakistani government say—and this is in the last few weeks—that the Canberra Commission should be promoted more.

Senator COOK—So there is flagged possible positive attitude to it.

Dr Hanson—Very much so. I believe that that would be the case. India and Pakistan have both repeatedly said that, if we were to move to a nuclear weapons free world, if the

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 65 existing nuclear weapons states were to take serious moves towards disarmament, they would then not embark on a nuclear capability for themselves.

Senator COOK—Since your expertise is in the field of weapons and weapons control, could you address us for a minute on whether you think the use of economic sanctions here is going to quicken the time in which the debate on control of nuclear weapons is brought forward in the case of India and Pakistan or will it weaken it? What is the impact of economic sanctions?

Dr Hanson—There are different views on this. My view is that sanctions, particularly against India, have forced India to adopt an even more recalcitrant position, if we may use that word.

Senator COOK—It is a respectable word, prime ministers have used it.

Dr Hanson—It is digging its heels in and really feeling that the rest of the world is against it, particularly the western world. I think it has only exacerbated that sense of aggrieved injustice that India already feels. I do not see that sanctions will achieve a lot myself. I think that tackling this problem from other angles would be more beneficial.

It is difficult to know what to do because one’s instant reaction is to want to put forward punitive measures on states who violate these norms. They did not actually break any legal conventions because they had never signed the NPT; they had never signed CTBT. Neverthe- less, they violated what appeared to be highly respected universal norms against testing. The original reaction of most governments would be to impose sanctions.

That may have been a short-term strategy but I think it has to be addressed from the security concerns involved, and that would mean addressing the triangular relationship in Asia between China, Pakistan and India. I think also we have to look at the global structures of the non-proliferation regime itself.

Senator COOK—Does the absence of them embolden the hawks to say, effectively, ‘We can do these things and they are economically cost free,’ or, to put it another way, how effective are the sanctions that we have imposed with respect to military cooperation?

Dr Hanson—I do not feel able to judge the effectiveness of those sanctions in terms of military cooperation, so I do not really feel able to comment on that. We are sending a strong message to India. In terms of the actual effect on the ground, I could not comment on that.

Senator COOK—We have heard evidence today that one of the things that contributes to India’s sense of international isolation is that it was not included in APEC for example. It had made some overtures, but not necessarily very strong overtures, to be included in APEC. I am sure someone is going to contradict me on that, but that is how it seemed to me at the relevant time. If Australia were to say to India, ‘We would sponsor you in APEC, but a condition of that would be to move toward signing some of the relevant international treaties on nuclear disarmament or arms control,’ how would that be received at the India-Pakistan end?

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Dr Hanson—I doubt personally that it would have any tremendous effect. I doubt very much that that action alone would result in India actually signing the NPT and the CTBT. In any case we would have to ask ourselves the question: if in fact they did sign it, what does this mean for international security? Do we then have to accept that states are gatecrashing the nuclear club? If we go ahead and persuade them to sign up to these, does that actually make the situation any better? It may make the situation better in the sense that we can probably be assured of no future tests, but it does not resolve the security problem that we have now, which is a dangerous nuclear confrontation in South Asia and the message to other states in the international system that, if you simply go against the grain and test these weapons, then the rest of the world will have no choice but to accept you as a nuclear weapon state. I think that is a very tricky situation—something which we probably would not want to see.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—On one hand you say that the tests will stabilise, rather than destabilise, relations between India and Pakistan. However, the main reason seems that the tests have been targeted at either domestic nationalistic considerations or the China threat. Do you regard the tests as providing, as a by-product, a more stabilised relationship between India and Pakistan?

Dr Hanson—No, in fact I have never said that I see the tests as stabilising the relationship. I pointed out that a couple of other writers have said that they may stabilise relations by bringing things out in the open, but I do not hold that view personally. I think in fact—

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—What did you say in your conclusion? I thought that is how you started off your conclusion.

Dr Hanson—It says ‘as some have noted’, but even those writers point to the wider ramifications of the unravelling of the non-proliferation process. Some do argue that, in fact, if you have got these weapons capabilities out in the open, both states will know where they stand and they are less likely to engage in conflict with each other. I do not personally subscribe to that view.

We have seen plenty of nuclear weapon states being attacked by other states, and the issue of nuclear capability has not made one scrap of difference. You can look at the Vietnam-US war; you can look at the USSR in Afghanistan. Having a nuclear capability does not mean that another state will refrain from engaging in warfare with you. Neverthe- less, there is this argument that having a nuclear status may give you a deterrent capability. Of course what the Canberra Commission would reply to that is that, if in fact we work from a position of zero, if there are no nuclear weapon states to begin with, we do not need that deterrent capability.

So I do not feel there is a lot to be said for openly declaring that status and seeing it as a stabilising factor. I think it is far more likely to be destabilising at the regional level, much more dangerous, and, at the international level, as I say, it represents the unravelling, or what could be the more serious unravelling, of the non-proliferation process.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Pakistan and India have at least one continuing border dispute, don’t they? Is it more than one?

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Dr Hanson—The Kashmir dispute is the most prominent.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—And they have had two full-scale conflicts since partition?

Dr Hanson—Yes. It is estimated that they have lost 20,000 personnel in that conflict. It is a very serious conflict and, even as the tests were occurring, there were border skirmishes with loss of life, as there is on a day-to-day basis.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—So you believe that, having openly declared their access to nuclear weapons, that has made the relationship more unstable?

Dr Hanson—I believe it has, yes, indeed.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—In connection with Australia’s relationship with India, I understand that the interpretation of Australia’s disapproval of the tests has achieved considerable publicity in India. It seems a little surprising in view of Australia’s strong stand in nuclear non-proliferation issues over the last few years—a decade or so and beyond, I expect; I do not know—that our stand was quite understandable. Are you surprised by the Indian reaction?

Dr Hanson—I think India would probably have preferred Australia to have taken a stronger stance in the 1995 NPT review and extension conference which placed more pressure on the nuclear weapon states to disarm. Australia enjoys a fairly good reputation amongst many of the non-nuclear states, many of the non-aligned states, and it is seen as something of a bridge between that group of states and the existing nuclear weapon states— and, of course, our primary ally is the major nuclear weapon state.

Australia has had a very difficult role to play there but it nevertheless is held in high regard because it has consistently called for arms control; it has consistently called for a series of phased arms reductions. It has been prominent in the chemical weapons treaty. Incidentally, there is a case for us being able to disarm. I heard the previous speaker say it does not seem to be possible that humans can move towards disarmament. The Chemical Weapons Convention is, I think, an excellent example of the international community deciding to outlaw a certain class of weapons because of its abhorrent qualities and, in fact, putting in place very strong legal requirements against that. I am sorry; I digressed there.

I feel that India on the one hand has approved of many of the resolutions that we have put forward in the General Assembly. It has generally been supportive of our call for restraint in armaments policies, but I think since May it still sees us as one of the enemies, it still sees us as being very closely aligned with the United States and not pushing strongly, or strongly enough, for more nuclear reductions.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Effective command and control is obviously something that concerns every nuclear state, and those who are observing from outside. Of India and Pakistan, which country would have the most effective—neither are probably very effective—command and control systems?

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Dr Hanson—I am not expert in the actual military relations on the ground in either of those countries, except to say that it does not appear that those command and control operations are very strong in either country. I think that there is good reason to believe that there is a stronger likelihood of a nuclear exchange taking place between those countries precisely because the command, control and intelligence systems are not as well developed as they are in the existing nuclear weapons states. This is not to say it will happen. I still think it is—

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—It is not to say that in some of the existing states the command and control systems are not too flash either?

Dr Hanson—Exactly.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—I should imagine they are not too flash in the Ukraine or places like that?

Dr Hanson—Exactly. In fact, many analysts say that it is just a matter of sheer luck that we have existed for 40 or 50 years without a nuclear weapon being launched inadvertently, accidentally or irrationally.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—As a general comment, you could probably say about the Indian military that it has a clearer and more defined order of battle than most military machines. You might argue that their command and control system is probably as good as any. You might argue that; I do not know.

Dr Hanson—In terms of the nuclear capability, I am not sure that it is. But, again, I do not feel competent enough in terms of the nuts and bolts of military command in those countries to comment any further.

Senator QUIRKE—You said earlier in the piece words to the effect that nuclear weapons have little military or strategic value. The concept of a nuclear battlefield, then, you do not agree with.

Dr Hanson—Absolutely not. In fact, I would highly recommend certain sections of the Canberra Commission report which go into this issue of whether or not nuclear weapons can in fact achieve strategic gains. If you fired a nuclear weapon into the battlefield, you are just as likely to kill your own forces as you are the enemy forces. You are also likely to kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of civilians and devastate the landscape. They are simply not able to be used strategically. I think that privately any military commander would say that. In fact, a lot of military personnel themselves openly say that. Field Marshal Lord Michael Carver of the UK has been at the forefront to say that these weapons are simply not usable in the battlefield.

Senator QUIRKE—What about verification? Obviously, if we were to go down the road of complete disarmament, then I think you said in your paper the argument about totally handing over weapons by existing nuclear weapons states is based on the fact that there will not be the emergence in the future of a rogue state that may acquire this sort of weaponry. How sophisticated are verification systems? Can we rely on that? I point out the Iraqi

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 69 situation earlier this year when we could not ascertain exactly what Iraq had and had not done. In fact, it led to inspectors on the ground going in to check these sorts of things, even with modern satellite technology.

Dr Hanson—Yes. The verification issue is obviously highly important. It is something that all of the existing nuclear weapon states will want to see as being well developed before they will commit themselves to this process. Having said that, verification systems have improved dramatically, even over the last 10 years or so. The Canberra Commission report acknowledges that no verification system could give you absolute certainty of preventing what is called nuclear break-out.

But, in one sense, that is not really what is at issue because sooner or later that would be detected. If it could not be detected in the early stages, it would be detected in the slightly more advanced stages. The question then is: how would the international community react? There are a number of options available to us. None of those options would actually require the international community or an individual state within the international community to have a nuclear weapons capability.

If we wanted to, we would have intrusive measures on the ground, as we do in Iraq. We could apply all kinds of economic and other sanctions and, as a last resort, we would use our highly sophisticated conventional weapons to destroy any detected capability. So, the argument that break-out is possible is true: break-out is possible. The point is, if break-out was to occur in a position of zero, if all nuclear weapon states have in fact renounced the option and we have a position of zero, then one single episode of proliferation—one state, whether it be in India, Brazil or North Korea—taking that decision to go against the trend, becomes far more significant than the situation we have today in which we already have five legitimate states.

If you have a position of zero, then any move from that is going to attract massive international attention and intervention and, if needs be, conventional attack, to stop it. We do not need to have a nuclear capability to either deter that, or respond to that, should it happen.

But, of course, the argument made by many in the elimination debate is that, once you move towards elimination—once you have reached a position of zero—your chances of break-out are really going to be reduced. Break-out is more likely to occur when we have the kind of system that we have today in which there already are some 15,000 or 20,000-odd nuclear warheads on the planet and we have one state saying, ‘Okay, if you can have those weapons, we are also going to develop our capability, either covertly or overtly.’

Senator QUIRKE—Israel, of course, is a nuclear power.

Dr Hanson—Yes.

Senator QUIRKE—It has never tested a weapon but, as I understand it, it has a pretty substantial arsenal at least the size of India’s. Where does it fit into all this?

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Dr Hanson—Israel has said—I believe it has said, at any rate—that it, too, is looking favourably at the question of reduction and elimination. Israel has been fairly coy about this but it has not openly declared its animosity to the non-proliferation process. In fact, Israel has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—I believe it has signed that fairly recently. So we cannot put it in quite the same class as India, Pakistan and the so-called other ‘rogue states’ like Iran and Iraq. I believe that Israel could, in fact, be persuaded to conform to a non-proliferation procedure.

Senator MARGETTS—A lot of what has been said today relates to what is considered to be a nuclear hypocrisy: that Australia treats some countries in one way and other countries in a different way. I notice that even the Canberra Commission report was mostly talking about putting pressure on the United States and the former Soviet Union for disarmament; China did not really get a major mention. What could Australia specifically do to help remove the concerns that China has that might be stopping it from its own disarmament process?

Dr Hanson—To begin with, it should be made clear that China, France and Britain have all indicated that, if the two major nuclear powers move towards serious reduction, they will follow suit. There have been no legal words to this effect; there has been no formal agreement. But China has indicated that it, too, will move towards serious disarmament.

But the initiative does have to come from the two key players and that, of course, is the US and Russia. In many ways, a lot of this debate is focused on putting pressure on the US and Russia. That is not to say, by any means, that the nuclear elimination advocates think that we should not be paying attention to China, France or Britain. Rather, they see that the US especially and, to a secondary degree, Russia are the circuit-breakers in this.

Of course, you have to keep in mind that, when China acquired its nuclear capability, who did it see as its primary threat? For much of the Cold War it saw the Soviet Union as its threat. Once China acquired its nuclear capability, India did the same. After India, you follow suit with Pakistan. So we have to keep in mind the chain reaction here. But it is also quite heartening to know that these three states have indicated their support for a fairly significant set of reductions by the two major nuclear powers and that they will then step into line themselves. It is something that the Canberra Commission refers to in some depth as well.

Senator MARGETTS—In the Canberra Commission report, right near the end of the conclusions there is a reference to ‘stable deterrence’. What is your understanding of its meaning? Obviously, a number of people in the anti-nuclear movement are concerned that it just allows the nuclear weapon states a sort of business-as-usual scenario. Do you see it that way or do you see it as being more positive?

Dr Hanson—I am not sure that I know where you mean. Could you give me the page number, please?

Senator MARGETTS—At the moment I am looking at the executive summary, but I have seen it in more than one place. It is on page 18 of the executive summary and it says:

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Development of durable security arrangements both globally and regionally, including

- the maintenance of a system of stable deterrence while the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is being achieved.

My reading of it at the time was that I thought that that was a little let-out from the nuclear state to bring them on board to be involved with the Canberra Commission and to try to progress things that still allowed them to argue for their own position to a large extent.

Dr Hanson—I have the full report in front of me, so I do not actually have that same page number here. From my previous reading of it, my understanding is that in fact the Canberra commissioners fully understood the security concerns of the existing nuclear weapon states. They were not foolish enough to say, ‘We get rid of these things next year and that’s it.’ They underlined the need for a phased, and probably quite a slow, process towards nuclear elimination. In that transition period—

Senator MARGETTS—It is on page 108 of the full report.

Dr Hanson—Thank you, I have it. In the intervening period between, let us say, the present levels and moving to zero, it would be necessary that stability is ensured between the existing nuclear weapon states. I think what the Canberra commissioners intended was that there would be some kind of international monitoring of the situation and that reductions would be matched by the appropriate parties, so we would not have a case of a grave imbalance, say in Russia, which could not be matched by the USA. So there was the acceptance that, while we have nuclear weapons in existence, deterrents just play a part. It had to be done in a stable, phased and balanced way, and I think this is what was meant by stable deterrence—until we get to that point of zero. That is my understanding of that particular section.

Senator MARGETTS—Although it does also mention the need for the nuclear states to take risks on the basis that nothing will ever be—

Dr Hanson—Exactly. Stable deterrence is not intended to be in any way an encouragement of the nuclear weapon states to keep their weapons. Far from it. It is meant to provide them with security reassurances, but the ultimate goal remains elimination. I think we need to be fairly clear on that point. In fact, this is one reason that the Canberra Commission report seems to be enjoying a little more popularity in Washington at the moment than it was, say, two years ago. I think two years ago there was a certain amount of complacency in the international community. We had had the NPT; we had had the CTBT, and there was a widespread feeling that in fact the non-proliferation issue was sown up. We had a rude shock in May of this year, so I think policy makers, administrators, are now thinking, ‘Perhaps we do need to look at this more seriously.’ But the Canberra Commission, because it addresses these issues in a very realistic and hard-headed way, with security guarantees involved, and without putting any kind of time deadline on the existing nuclear weapon states, is seen as a plausible blueprint by states like America.

Senator MARGETTS—Thank you.

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CHAIR—You made reference there to the debate focusing on putting pressure now on the US and Russia as being the circuit breakers. In respect of the tests that have taken place by Pakistan and India, what is the circuit breaker there, because that is the more immediate case? What will be the circuit breaker that sees them not go down the path of developing their nuclear weapons but, at the same time, will allow them to save face. Because, without a face-saver, India will be committed to continuing its program with ballistic missiles and the like, as will Pakistan. It would seem to me that we need a circuit breaker to chop that episode off. What is it and where will it come from? Who will it come from?

Dr Hanson—Of course, there are ongoing negotiations in the CD—the Conference on Disarmament—at the moment about exactly what status these countries have at the moment. Nobody wants to call them nuclear weapon states because that is an admission that they have gatecrashed the club, and that in fact any state which chooses to can do that and be accepted, albeit unwillingly, into the club of nuclear weapons.

I believe that at the moment it is being considered that they be referred to as ‘nuclear powers’ as opposed to ‘nuclear weapon states’. This is a means of acknowledging that, in fact, they do have a nuclear capability but are not seen in the same way as the five existing nuclear weapon states. That is one thing. It acknowledges what basically has been done and what now cannot be reversed. I think one of the most important things that can be done in this particular case is to push for a no first use pledge by both states and, indeed, we could bring China into the equation as well. For that matter, we could bring all five existing nuclear weapon states into serious discussions on a no first use pledge.

CHAIR—We have already had evidence today that the no first use pledge is hardly likely to be given by either India or Pakistan.

Dr Hanson—I am not sure that it is a lost cause. At one point India did offer to commence talks about a no first use pledge. With sufficient international pressure, perhaps the easing of some sanctions and perhaps bringing China into the equation, I still have some hope that a no first use pledge is worth pursuing and that that is something that will take some of the pressure off the very volatile situation that we see in the subcontinent at the moment.

CHAIR—What about a limitation on the missiles because that is the vehicle by which they would deliver any nuclear warhead?

Dr Hanson—Yes.

CHAIR—What about controls in that area?

Dr Hanson—I do not think those controls have been strong enough and, obviously, China has something to answer for in that respect. The missile technology control regime does need to be looked at again. We need to recommit ourselves to a very strong vigorous monitoring of the MTCR.

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CHAIR—There are no further questions. Thank you very much for your appearance before the committee today and for the evidence that you have provided us with. We will weigh your words when we come to write our report.

Dr Hanson—Thank you very much indeed.

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[3.49 p.m.]

McDONALD, Mr Hamish, 17 Rawson Avenue, Queens Park, New South Wales 2022

CHAIR—Welcome, Mr McDonald. In what capacity do you appear today before the committee?

Mr McDonald—I an appearing here today as a private citizen. However, I am a foreign editor of the Sydney Morning Herald and a member of the Australia-India Council.

CHAIR—Thank you. The committee prefers all evidence to be given in public but, should you at any stage wish to give any part of your evidence in private, you may ask to do so and the committee will consider your request. The committee has before it a written submission from you. Are there any alterations or additions you would like to make to your submission at this stage?

Mr McDonald—I would like to add just where the situation goes now.

CHAIR—You can do that when you make an opening statement. I now invite you to make that opening statement and we will proceed to questions after that.

Mr McDonald—As I have put down in the written statement, I believe Australia’s overall approach to India in recent years has been marked by a high level of discontinuity and the resources applied to it, a rather desultory approach to the assessment of the importance of India, and a diffidence in embracing conclusions that many officials and advice have pointed the government towards.

The switch to a more trade based representation in New Delhi in recent years, in the early 1990s, has lead to a significant lapse in our intelligence gathering and political monitoring of India and greatly contributed to the surprise with which the Indian nuclear tests were greeted here.

The appreciation of the Indian position in Australia has been rather thin largely because of that and that we have not attempted to address all the issues that came into play as India took the decision over the past three or four years to move to an actual test of its capability. I believe that had we been more closely attuned to the debates in India we might have had opportunities to influence the course of those debates and to possibly even divert India towards an alternative view of power acquisition in the global sphere and an alternative role for India.

As my written statement indicates, the early 1990s were marked by a rapprochement between India and the Western powers, notably the US, as a consequence of the great shifts in the global strategic picture that took place in the early 1990s with the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of economic ideologies, market ideologies, to replace the previous Cold War scenarios.

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I believe India at that time looked to Australia to help lead it to a more open and cooperative position with the West. There were other countries involved—and I am not saying it all depended on Australia—but, in the case of India’s economic integration with our region, I believe Australia could have played a much more substantive role and a much more positive role than it did. In particular I have noted that India was looking to Australia to open the way for its membership of APEC when memberships were reopened at the end of 1996 or looked like they might be reopened. I remember a huge sense of disappointment in India when Mr Fischer on a visit to open the New Horizons country exposition there at the end of 1996 told the Indians that, in effect, that support would not be forthcoming and that they had no immediate prospects of joining APEC.

I think also that we have tended not to take full account of the great resources of India, the great civilisation or contributions of India to the West, and the growing contributions in terms of the supply of skilled people, scientists and creative industries such as entertainment, software and even in the arts. As a consequence we have not really had the perceptive tools to grasp the full importance of India and the full range of contributions that India could make. I think that, had we and other Western countries been prepared to open up to India more during the early 1990s, we might have encouraged those forces in Indian domestic politics who were pushing for a more open India and an India more aligned with the West, where I believe its political system and cultural tradition puts it most naturally.

I think also that we have tended to score off India somewhat. The quickness of our protest on the nuclear tests took them by surprise. The language that our politicians used— although in the Australian context it was not perhaps remarkable—cut them as rawly as perhaps the sledging by our cricketers does. We often do not understand the slights that can be conveyed across a cultural barrier even when we are talking the same language. Our precipitous cutting of military connections I think will be self-punishing. I do not think that any other Western country has followed suit. We have really closed a window for ourselves into India and Pakistan by shutting down the exchanges of military attaches and military students. I believe it will take many years to replace that window.

In terms of where we go from now, I think the prospects of any quick fix in the subcontinent are rather remote given the domestic political forces that are in train and, in the short term at least, the huge popularity of nuclear testing for both governments. I think our best efforts would be to discourage the weaponisation of both the warhead and missile programs. I think both sides are bluffing considerably in terms of their capability of applying these technologies immediately. It will take considerable time to get them to the point of being reliable weapons fitted together.

I do not believe that, having tested, either government would be in a position, as some have suggested, to sign the CTBT or an NPT, in large part because of my previous assessment that the technologies are too rudimentary for that and their laboratory testing capabilities are as yet undeveloped. I think the prospects of a no first use agreement are also rather remote. It has been offered by India, but such agreements are typically offered by the party to a confrontation that has the preponderance of conventional power, as India does in its confrontation with Pakistan. Pakistan is unlikely to ever sign away the ability to waive the threat of nuclear retaliation if it ever were in a position of being cut in two or dismembered by Indian conventional forces. The military and political aspects of nuclear weapons

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 76 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998 possession are so interwoven that it would be very hard to extricate a military strand to the point where particularly far reaching restraint agreements could be applied.

I have been asking myself what Australia could do to improve the conditions and the setting for India and Pakistan to moderate and restrain their developments and to hold back from full weaponisation and a nuclear arms race. I believe there are several areas in which we could take initiatives. One is to encourage the two big super powers—Russia and America—to continue their nuclear force reductions. Secondly, I think we should work on the three minor nuclear powers and perhaps most on the one where we should have the most influence, the British—as we were partly involved in the development of their deterrent—to bring forces down to a minimum level and perhaps to question the linkage of political greatness with nuclear weapons possession.

Thirdly, I think we should look very hard at the question of nuclear weapons innovation by the existing weapons states. The CTBT does not preclude what are known as sub-critical nuclear tests, which I believe are tests below the level of 10 tonnes of explosives. As members of the committee will recall, prior to the signing of the CTBT, there was a rush of testing by some of the nuclear powers—by France and China—to attain the capability before signing to carry on nuclear testing in the laboratory or via conducting these miniature explosive tests. I believe that contradicts the whole thrust of nuclear non-proliferation and gives rise to justifiable charges of hypocrisy by the nuclear threshold states.

We should be questioning the five nuclear powers to be more transparent on their nuclear experimentation programs, which continue, and to take them at their word that these are designed to maintain the safety of existing weapon systems and not to produce a whole new generation of nuclear weapons—some of them extremely miniaturised possibly—which might lead us into a whole new type of nuclear arms race while the rest of the world is supposed to act under restraint.

CHAIR—Thank you.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—I was very interested in your comments, Hamish. One of the things you said—both in your opening comments and also in the brief you gave us—was that you felt that the withdrawal of our military attaches and links have been self- defeating, on the basis that that had been a conduit of information that has not been available to the Australian government. I think you made the point that that was part of the reason why the Australian government reacted in the way that it did, because there was no forewarning of these tests. I think it is fair to say that knowledge of these tests was probably not very well known at all in the west. Is that fair?

Mr McDonald—I think that is true. We have all read about the lapses in scrutiny of the material that came in from satellites and so on; I think that Australia was not alone in this. In terms of the political assessment of the push for nuclear weapons, I think we were rather poorly served. You may recall that there was a flurry of activity in 1995 when the Ameri- cans picked up what seemed to indicate preparations for a test. There were representations and loud protests made to India at that stage which perhaps deterred them from testing at that time. It seems extraordinary that although we had a government formed two or three

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE Monday, 20 July 1998 SENATE—References FAD&T 77 months before these tests which overtly had in its political platform, ‘development of nuclear weapons,’ that we did not take things up earlier.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Are you sure that we did not?

Mr McDonald—I am not sure that we did not.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Do you think that if the BJP had not been elected India would have tested at some time in the near future?

Mr McDonald—I do not think that it would have. I think only the BJP would have had the—

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—Despite the fact that there was a large level of bipartisan support for the nuclear testing program, and that even people who did not vote for the BJP thought that it was good idea?

Mr McDonald—Yes, I agree. There is a level of support—once it has been done. But, in terms of a government that would have screwed up the courage or bravado to actually do it—I do not see others moving to that. I tend to think they would have tried to keep a position of ambivalence about nuclear weapons going as long as they could, which could have been several more years at least, and possibly indefinitely.

Senator SANDY MACDONALD—You did not refer to this in your opening comments, nor in your submission I think, but the legitimacy of the sanctions—the power to persuade through sabre-rattling on behalf of the major nuclear players and the United Nations and other fora—what legitimacy do you think they have had in India? Do you think they have worried anybody? Are they having an effect? Will they have an effect, or is it just all froth and bubble?

Mr McDonald—I think they do have an effect. India has tried to position itself as a strong supporter of the United Nations, as a member of the non-aligned movement. It is highly sensitive to external criticism. The criticism on the nuclear issue from members or countries associated with what they would call the nuclear club has to be pitched at a level that appeals to the strand of its policies that puts India forward as a leader of the smaller countries and of the weaker countries. They are extremely sensitive to anything that smacks of superiority or a sense that India is not a worthy member of the nuclear club or the great power community and tend to react strongly against that.

Senator COOK—One remark you made earlier was about the direction in our embassy in Delhi toward trade and not toward intelligence gathering. I could just make this as a comment before I come to my question. I do not see that as a weakness. Maybe the lack of resources to do both may be a weakness and it goes to the upgrading of our relationship. Two-way trade is worth $2 billion, which is pitifully low given the nature of India and Australia; $1.5 million our way—

Mr McDonald—I agree. I would not seek to have the trade relationship downgraded or ignored.

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Senator COOK—The other comment I should make is that the Australian response to these tests as well had a lot to do with Australian domestic perceptions and our international profile too. There is a bipartisan desire, albeit from different routes, to build Australia up as being a country among those that evangelise a little against nuclear testing and try to play a good international corporate citizens role. What particularly struck me, if I may on your evidence, is that you believed Australia could have led or influenced the domestic debate in India to a more constructive purpose. Is that opportunity lost forever? Could it be regained if we were to harness a proposition along the lines of saying, ‘We will sponsor your membership, say of APEC, subject to our developing a fuller dialogue on these nuclear issues.’ Is that a realistic proposition or not?

Mr McDonald—I think it is realistic. Obviously the conditions would have to be simply those of dialogue. We could not expect any more than that. I do not think India has any deep seated grudge against Australia or wish to have any tension with Australia. I would think now, given the flux of East Asia, it might be a good time to start drawing into new forums and to open dialogue on new issues such as the global nuclear weapons issue.

I do not know what time would be most appropriate point to start making overtures like that, but the Americans have one of their senior officials, Strobe Talbot, in Delhi at the moment talking to India on these very issues. The Europeans are also engaging India. I think perhaps now that the initial point has been made it would be appropriate, even in the short term—the coming months—to go back to India and say, ‘Let’s talk.’ I am sure we would get plenty of criticism, as we have had from their high commission here about our own history of involvement with nuclear weapons, but that is to be expected and would be part of the process.

Senator MARGETTS—First of all, Mr McDonald, how much of today’s hearing have you managed to sit in on?

Mr McDonald—I arrived just before I began talking so I have not heard very much of it at all.

Senator MARGETTS—There have been some recurring themes today. One has been the very interesting scenario of the role of China and the perceived threat of China using its influence, military aid and so on to surround India. That has been a sticking point—that China was seen to be the bugbear, not Pakistan. The connection there, of course, goes with what you were saying about getting the five nuclear states to put their minds to a firm program for their reductions so that India and Pakistan feel that they are in a better position to commit as well, which leads me to the point that we have also had discussions about Australia’s role in the 1995 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

At the time, the line from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and, I have to say, then Senator Gareth Evans, was that Australia had saved the world from nuclear weapons to a certain extent. Was that your view or do you share the concerns expressed by a number of people today that by letting the nuclear powers off the hook for a firm timetable, they may well have contributed to the situation we are finding ourselves in now?

Mr McDonald—I think at the time I did not see the CTBT as—

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Senator MARGETTS—No, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995.

Mr McDonald—Oh, the renewal, yes. I never saw it as realistically getting the existing powers to agree to a timetable of dismantling nuclear weapons. I personally thought the best hope was the continuation of forced reduction processes and agreements and removal of nuclear weapons from the new states formed out of the Soviet Union and so on. In terms of your earlier point about China and its perceived encircling of India, I think there was a lot of concern in many countries, including India, about the dissemination of nuclear technology and missile technology in West Asia by the Chinese. This was occasionally linked, in India, with the Chinese relationship with Burma as another penetration of a border region of India. I have never really felt that Indians felt threatened by the Chinese militarily. They regarded them with great unease but, apart from the prospect of border skirmishes, I do not think they ever felt that they were under immediate or medium-term threat from the Chinese.

My impression was that the Chinese nuclear threat for India was a rather more conveni- ent political excuse for maintaining their own nuclear program and, now that they have weapons, an excuse to avoid being drawn into a regional nuclear-free zone or nuclear limitation agreement, as was being proposed in the early 1990s. They have always argued that it is not just India and Pakistan but a triangle and you cannot have a nuclear-free South Asia. Even though they have lived for 30 years with a nuclear-armed China, I believe they have kept this notional threat alive to help them justify keeping their nuclear option.

Senator MARGETTS—Although it has been argued this morning that this has been firmly a part of Indian foreign policy for some time, it has been suggested that it is only very recently that they have brought this concern more out in the open.

Mr McDonald—It has been trotted out since they have tested. I have seen nothing in the Chinese nuclear posture to suggest anything has changed for many years. Prior to the election of the BJP government there had been a longstanding process of confidence building with the Chinese and substantive negotiations on the border question. This had been initiated by Rajiv Gandhi in the mid-1980s and was starting to bear fruit in force reductions along the Himalayan border by the mid-1990s.

Senator MARGETTS—If you have the chance to read the submissions that came in from today’s speakers, and if you have any further comments at any stage, I would be interested to hear them.

Mr McDonald—Thank you, Senator, I certainly will look at them.

CHAIR—It could be said that the nuclear test by India was an attempt to popularise the BJP government, which was a fragile amalgam of a number of various parties, and that this really then swept up a wave of nationalism and one fed off the other. What is your response to that? Is that a healthy or an unhealthy situation to be in when you are dealing with nuclear weapons?

Mr McDonald—I think it is unhealthy. It was always a BJP plank to develop nuclear weapons—to get off the fence, in effect. It has had a very striking effect in terms of popular appreciation. I think that was tempered somewhat, at least in elite circles, when Pakistan

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE FAD&T 80 SENATE—References Monday, 20 July 1998 responded so quickly. I am not sure now that the follow-up questions start arising whether it will continue to be so popular.

CHAIR—That is my point: having been so popularist at the time, one would imagine that both India and Pakistan have now locked themselves into a firm path whereby they must continue down the path of experimentation with nuclear weapons and also the development of the delivery systems through ballistic missiles. I have raised with a number of witnesses today the question of what is the circuit-breaker to ensure that that does not occur. What is the basis on which one would say, ‘You’ve had your day; you’ve shown that you can both let off a nuclear device. Let’s stop it there and let’s channel our energies into something far more positive’?

Mr McDonald—I am not sure that there is a circuit-breaker. I cannot see one that would—

CHAIR—Sanctions are not the circuit-breaker?

Mr McDonald—Sanctions have not worked and will not work. I would think, after this, that the best we could hope for would be for India and Pakistan to tone down the rhetoric and to quietly back-pedal or freewheel on their development programs. I would think in Pakistan’s case there is a strong economic leverage that can be exerted. With India, I am not quite sure. It depends very much on the domestic political dynamics, and I would suspect that, if the BJP is in a weak position again, they might be tempted to notch up the nuclear rhetoric and development for domestic political effect. I would think, in the short-term, Pakistan has probably the best prospect to work on in terms of restraint on its part. India will take a lot more persuasion, I think. I must say that, if I could think of a circuit-breaker, I would be only too happy, but I cannot.

CHAIR—Dr Mohan Malik, when he appeared before us today, said that Pakistan is obsessed with India and India is obsessed with China and that, in a very simplistic way, is the view that has come across today—that, so long as India has the potential and the capability that it has, then India, with its desire to be recognised as a world power will aspire to countervail what China has, and then Pakistan will try to countervail what India has, for its own security reasons. And then, of course, you have the alliance that overarches Pakistan and China, so how does one cope with the dilemma?

Mr McDonald—I think what you said put the finger on it. It is not so much an obsession with China, but an obsession on one side of India’s policy with great powers and status. Possibly one could look at the question of great power status and what it means in the current world. At the moment, it is equated with nuclear weapons possession. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the five recognised nuclear-armed powers. Possibly it is a case for a fairly immediate expansion of the permanent Security Council to include non-nuclear powers such as Japan, Germany and perhaps others.

CHAIR—Part of the entree to the Security Council, for those outside the existing five, would be relinquishment of any nuclear capability that they might have or might potentially have? I am trying to use a carrot and stick type approach.

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Mr McDonald—I do not think India would buy that.

CHAIR—I do not think they would either.

Mr McDonald—If you went along and said, ‘Right. You can be in the Security Council tomorrow if you scrap the nuclear weapons,’ I do not think, given all that they have said in the past 50 years, they would be that hypocritical and say yes, even if they were told, ‘Yes. Come on board. You’re a nuclear power.’

I would say an intermediate step is to begin breaking down this notion that greatness in world affairs is linked with nuclear weapons and that possibly enlisting avowedly non- nuclear countries, like Japan or Germany or whoever, onto the permanent Security Council would be a first step. But how it proceeds beyond there, I could not lay down a firm game plan.

CHAIR—So that would be done to the exclusion of India?

Mr McDonald—At this stage, yes.

CHAIR—If you invited Japan and Germany?

Mr McDonald—Yes.

CHAIR—Would that not fuel India’s envy even further?

Mr McDonald—I suppose they could argue that both these countries are under the American nuclear umbrella and that, in effect, they are not pure non-nuclear powers. I do not think it is a foolproof way of doing it but I am saying it is possibly one way of trying to break the psychology of nuclear weapons. As I said earlier, I thought we could really push the smaller nuclear powers to justify their nuclear arsenals.

CHAIR—On a completely different tack, how important is the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan in resolving some of these nuclear problems, because their bilateral relationships have not been good over a long period? There were attempts, which were resurrected in 1997, to try to overcome a number of bilateral issues such as peace and security, violations of air space and line of control, the working boundary, terrorism, drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and that is just to name a few. Those discussions fell in a heap apparently. What are the chances, from your experience, of any real bilateral discussions now being resurrected between the two nations?

Mr McDonald—I think, in the near term, very few; the chances are very limited. The whole history—going back to partition and the raison d’etre of Pakistan and so on—is intrinsic to the tensions of South Asia. The unresolved Kashmir conflict is something that has become such a talisman to both sides that these are almost fundamental flaws in the political geography of South Asia that would be extremely hard to remedy without the passage of perhaps generations.

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We still have politicians in power, on both sides, who remember the partition and the traumas of that. The Indian Home Minister, L.K. Advani, is one of the Hindus expelled from where Karachi is, the Sind Province, and there would be others on the Pakistan side. These visceral hatreds are still first-generation memories and I think it will take probably another 20 or 30 years before new generations move up on both sides and these become rather old historical memories.

Senator QUIRKE—Very early in your address, you were talking about India being isolated, and particularly attempting a rapprochement with the United States over the last so many years. Why is it that India, in particular, and the United States have had this relationship? Is it simply because India cuddled up with the Russians in the 1960s or does it go back before that?

Mr McDonald—No, the Indians and Americans had quite a courtship in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Americans came to India’s aid very strongly in the 1962 border conflict with China and were even mounting CIA type operations across India and Nepal, from Pakistan into Tibet and so on, in those days. As well as this Cold War stuff there was a very strong engagement of American intellect in India. We had J.K. Galbraith as the American Ambassador in New Delhi and a strong American input into the green revolution in Indian agriculture in the 1960s and so on.

It did founder on the intensification of the Cold War in the 1970s, the splitting of Pakistan, the influence of the Soviet Union, the availability of Soviet weaponry and so on, which led to a great distancing of the two countries. Even at the worst times there were efforts to bring them back together in some areas. Indira Gandhi and Ronald Reagan had an unlikely friendship and started some scientific exchanges and so on. In the 1980s you had this huge migration of talented Indian professionals to North America. There are a million people of Indian origin living in North America now, many of them top professionals in computers, software, engineering and so on, so there was strong elite level contact between the two countries.

The changes I mentioned of the early 1990s really led to an upsurge of interest in closer relations with America, mutual investment and exchanges and so on. It has had its ups and downs, but I think both the Americans and the Indians see a higher degree of complemen- tarity between the two countries and a huge interest in the possibilities of exchanges, particularly in high tech, education and so on.

Senator QUIRKE—We had evidence this morning given to us by one person that the Americans had actually, in a nuclear sense, threatened India in the course of the 1971 exchange over Bangladesh. Is there any evidence?

Mr McDonald—When the Indians were intervening in East Pakistan, as it was called, it is a matter of record that they sailed the USS Enterprise into the Gulf of Bengal. That was seen as a warning by the Indians. There was a clear sense that they were being warned with American weaponry of military force at that point.

CHAIR—Was that nuclear or conventional weaponry?

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Senator QUIRKE—It would have been nuclear then, the ships were nuclear.

Mr McDonald—The Enterprise would have been nuclear equipped, so they would have felt—

CHAIR—Was the threat with actual nuclear weaponry?

Mr McDonald—No, it was just sailing the battle group into the Bay of Bengal so it was—

Senator QUIRKE—An occurrence that is done in many flashpoints of the world.

Mr McDonald—Absolutely. That was the first time they had done it into close waters of the Indians.

Senator QUIRKE—But the Indians did not heed the warning, did they?

Mr McDonald—They did not pursue the war against Pakistan to the west. Once the Pakistan army in Bengal was defeated, that was the end of it for the Indians. I guess the warning was: do not take it any further and try to complete the overrun of Pakistan.

CHAIR—Any further questions from Senator Margetts?

Senator MARGETTS—No, thank you, it has been very helpful.

CHAIR—If not, the meeting stands adjourned.

Committee adjourned at 4.40 p.m.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE