Credit Ratings and the Auditor's Going
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CREDIT RATINGS AND THE AUDITOR’S GOING- CONCERN OPINION DECISION ABSTRACT This study addresses the question whether credit ratings are considered in auditors’ going- concern assessments. Given credit rating agencies’ private information access, experience and expertise, I predict that credit ratings and especially credit rating downgrades contain incremental information for auditors’ going-concern opinion (GCO) decisions. Furthermore, I investigate if the association between credit rating and GCOs, and credit rating downgrades and GCOs varies as a function of local auditor industry specialization. Based on a sample of financially distressed, U.S. public companies with Standard and Poor’s credit ratings between 2000 and 2011, I find evidence of a strong association between credit ratings and the probability of auditors issuing a GCO. In particular, companies experiencing rating downgrades are more likely to receive a GCO, and specifically more recent and more severe downgrades are associated with a higher probability of a GCO. Finally, I find modest evidence that the association between credit ratings and GCOs differs between local auditor industry specialists and non-specialists. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that credit ratings provide incremental information to auditors. Keywords: going-concern audit opinion; credit rating (changes); auditor industry specialization 2 INTRODUCTION Since the recent financial crisis, the creditworthiness of companies and the likelihood to survive in the near future are in the spotlight again as an issue of concern for stakeholders, academics and regulators. Two parties that can issue a public warning signal on the financial situation of a company are external auditors and credit rating agencies. Surprisingly, however, to the best of my knowledge, prior research has not examined the relationship between the issuance of a going-concern opinion (GCO) and companies’ credit ratings. In this study, I examine the influence of credit rating levels and changes on the auditor's propensity to issue a going concern opinion. I expect and find that worse credit ratings are associated with a higher likelihood of auditors issuing a GCO. Moreover, auditors are more likely to issue a GCO if credit ratings have recently been downgraded. I also analyze if these associations vary as a function of auditor industry specialization. Consistent with the view that auditors incorporate the information content of credit ratings, I find a strong association between credit rating levels as well as credit rating downgrades and the probability of auditors issuing a GCO. These results contribute to the recent discussion on auditor’s GCO decision as well as potential regulatory changes with respect to auditing as well as credit rating agencies. Once a year, shortly after fiscal year-end, auditors issue the audit report, which states whether the auditor assesses the going-concern assumption as valid. Either the company receives a clean report and is expected to survive the next year, or the auditor expresses doubts that the firm will survive the next year by issuing a GCO. Credit rating agencies report on the creditworthiness of the obligor (Standard & Poor’s 2012). Contrary to audit reports, credit ratings can be updated at any time during the year and credit ratings are measured on ordinal scales, ranging from AAA, i.e. extremely strong capacity to meet financial obligations, to D, 3 which indicates default. Given that credit rating agencies monitor their ratings on an ongoing basis (Standard & Poor’s), credit ratings are expected to be adjusted on a timelier basis than audit reports. Investors are particularly concerned about information on whether a company is in financial distress and whether it faces the risk of bankruptcy. Although the issuance of a GCO is not intended to be a prediction of bankruptcy (AICPA 1993), “investors appear to expect the auditor to provide them with a warning of approaching financial failure” (Chen and Curch 1996, 118). Likewise, stakeholders and particularly creditors expect credit rating agencies to adjust the company’s credit rating to reflect the risk of approaching bankruptcy. Since both audit reports and credit ratings are perceived as indicative of potential financial failure, are publicly available and entail credible information (Blay et al. 2011; Ederington and Goh 1998), I examine if credit ratings and credit rating downgrades are related to auditors’ decisions to issue GCOs. I expect to find a positive association between worse credit ratings and GCOs and credit rating downgrades and GCOs for several reasons. First, credit rating agencies could be considered third-party specialists from whom auditors could derive information because companies are allowed to share private information with credit rating agencies without having to disclose it publicly (e.g., SEC 2000; Jorion et al. 2005; Poon and Evans 2011). Given that credit rating agencies are specialized, they are likely better at identifying relevant facts, analyzing these and drawing conclusions. Second, the decision to issue a GCO is rather sensitive (Carcello, et al. 2009) and credit ratings may play a role in this decision. Theory predicts that auditor reporting behavior is influenced by the perceived consequences in terms of expected costs of losing a client, being exposed to third-party lawsuits, and loss of reputation (e.g., Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Vanstraelen 2003). Specifically, Matsumura et al. (1997) 4 present a model of the auditor’s going-concern decision which shows that a potential penalty associated with issuing an incorrect opinion affects the auditors’ expected payoff of issuing a GCO. Ignoring publicly available information is likely to increase this penalty. Hence, this study argues that auditors – who tend to be conservative – are unlikely to ignore public information on the financial condition of a company such as credit ratings, or credit rating changes. In addition to analyzing whether there is an association between credit ratings and GCOs, this study also considers whether this association varies as function of auditor competence, a key driver of audit quality (DeAngelo 1981). Auditors who are industry specialists are arguably more competent to assess the going-concern status of a client company within their specialization compared to non-specialists (e.g., Lim and Tan 2008; Reichelt and Wang 2010 1). Credit rating agencies do not have an irreproachable reputation (e.g. Wyatt 2002) and given auditor industry specialists’ own expertise, auditor industry specialists may reach a different conclusion than credit rating agencies, resulting in a weaker association between credit ratings and GCOs for industry specialists. Examining a sample of financially distressed U.S. firms who were audited between 2000 through 2010 and had a Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit rating outstanding during this time period, this study finds a positive and significant association between credit ratings and the likelihood of receiving a GCO. 2 Specifically, having non-investment grade credit ratings and credit downgrades prior to the audit report significantly increase the likelihood of a GCO for 1 In his working paper, Minutti-Meza (2011) argues that Reichelt and Wang’s findings are actually attributable to differences in client characteristics and the resulting decision to hire a specialist or non-specialist auditor. 2 Credit ratings are coded in reverse order so that the best credit rating is associated with the lowest numerical value, i.e. from AAA (1) to D (10). 5 financially distressed firms. There is some evidence indicating that GCOs of local auditor industry specialists are less sensitive to credit ratings than non-specialists, consistent with specialist auditors relying on their own expertise over that of credit rating agencies. These findings contribute to the already substantial body of research investigating the determinants of the likelihood of a GCO (see Carson et al. 2012 for a review) and may also be of interest to regulators. BACKGROUND The Auditor’s Going-Concern Decision The audit report is the primary means by which auditors communicate information to stakeholders. During the audit, the assumption is made that the audited entity is able to survive in the foreseeable future, i.e. one year beyond the date of the financial statements being audited (AICPA 1972). If auditors find that this going-concern assumption is violated, they are required to modify their going-concern opinion (GCO) (AICPA 1988). Investors value GCOs and alter the market valuation of companies significantly if a GCO is issued (e.g., Blay et al. 2011), consistent with interpreting it as a warning signal of approaching bankruptcy (Chen and Church 1996). Matsumura et al. (1997) developed a model of the economic consequences associated with the going-concern decision to the auditor. They examine two scenarios in which the auditor’s decision might be wrong. First, the auditor might issue a GCO, which is ex post identified as incorrect (Type I error). Secondly, the auditor might make a Type II error, i.e. issue a clean opinion, which is revealed ex post to be incorrect when the client fails. Audit reporting errors 6 usually result in reputational losses and can be quite costly to auditors due to client loss and loss of future quasi rents or potentially high litigation costs (e.g., Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997, Vanstraelen 2003). Given the associated costs, the decision to issue a GCO is quite sensitive (Carcello et al. 2009). The auditor’s decision to issue a GCO is particularly complicated in situations that require the assessment of highly complex or subjective matters. In these situations, auditors or auditees can request assistance from a third-party specialist, i.e. a “person or firm possessing special skills or knowledge in a particular field other than accounting or auditing” (PCAOB 1994). The audit process benefits in many ways from using specialists: First, evidence obtained from an independent, knowledgeable source is deemed more reliable (PCAOB). Second, third party specialists may have access to different information than the auditor.