The Reform of Forest Legislation in Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, and Indonesia.* •
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Making the Law of the Jungle: The Reform of Forest Legislation in Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, and Indonesia.* • Eduardo Silva, David Kaimowitz, Alan Bojanic, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/glep/article-pdf/2/3/63/1818633/152638002320310536.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 Francois Ekoko, Togu Manurung, and Iciar Pavez1 The debate over sustainable development induced many developing nations to reform their forest policy, a process that frequently culminated in new forest leg- islation. Most of the literature on forest policy reform, often generated by policy research organizations, concentrates on the causes of deforestation and pre- scribes policies to correct the problem. The conditions necessary for the adop- tion of those recommendations in policy receives little attention beyond occa- sional mention of the need for political will. A better understanding of what affects the “political will” necessary to inºuence forest policy may help policy research organizations to participate more effectively in the policy process. This requires knowing who the key players are and what motivates and constrains them.Silva,Making Kaimowitz, the Law of Bojanic,the Jungle Ekoko, Manurung, and Pavez Some argue that the “Law of the Jungle” prevails where forest policy is concerned; forests are lawless places where the strong prey on the weak and gov- ernment ofªcials come around only to collect an occasional bribe. Better to fo- cus on technical issues, to work with international organizations and non- governmental organizations (NGOs) to control deforestation, and to avoid pol- itics and the state as much as possible. This view overlooks the fact that forests are economic resources and that technical matters such as land use planning, taxation, extraction rates, ªnes and policing quickly become political issues as those affected struggle to protect their interests. Moreover, laws frequently crown the politics of policy reform. Forest legislation sets the principles, norms, institutions, and processes that regulate access to and use of forest resources, and penalizes infractions. If setting those conditions were so inconsequential the principal actors would hardly spend so much time and energy inºuencing them. Moreover, because legislative reform is comprehensive it draws all stake- * For a comprehensive list of acronyms used in this article please refer to Appendix 1. 1. The authors thank the Center for International Forestry Research for its support of this project and remain indebted to Bob Gwynne and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful com- mentary on earlier versions. Global Environmental Politics 2:3, August 2002 © 2002 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 63 64 • Making the Law of the Jungle holders into the public arena. For these reasons, it is an excellent subject for studying the conditions that affect when, if, and how those actors, including policy research organizations, inºuence the reform process. This article examines factors that conditioned the ability of the principal actors to inºuence new forest legislation in Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, and Indonesia, countries that represent the world’s three largest humid forest zones: the Amazon Basin, the Congo Basin, and South East Asia. Moreover, the diver- sity of conditions raises signiªcant questions about the focus of policy debates Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/glep/article-pdf/2/3/63/1818633/152638002320310536.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 and actor effectiveness that could be tested in future research. Bolivia, Camer- oon, and Indonesia all have vast forests and substantial timber sectors. Costa Rica has a smaller and weaker forest sector. There are also differences in depend- ence on international conditions and in political systems. The investigation unfolds in four sections. The ªrst speciªes four analyti- cally distinct policy paradigms that inºuenced the policy prescriptions of the major actors. The second section deªnes key actors, links them to policy para- digms, and examines the institutional and economic conditions that affect their capabilities. The third section analyzes how actors, interests, and their power resources inºuenced outcomes in the individual cases. Based on the case mate- rial, the fourth section generalizes about the conditions that affected the ability of actors and institutions to inºuence the policy process. It also offers summary comparative tables of conditions and outcomes. The analysis is based on in- tensive ªeld research in each of the countries as part of a project sponsored by the Center for International Forestry Research. The data were culled from author interviews with key participants in the policy reform process, cross checked by primary sources ranging from congressional records, minutes of committee meetings, policy documents of key state, international, and civil so- ciety institutions, and from the press. In some cases, authors also participated in the process. Contending Approaches to Reform Drawing from Dryzek,2 we argue that four major discourses about sustainable forestry offer distinct diagnoses of problems in forest policy and prescriptions for reform. These discourses consist of simplifying assumptions and cause and effect relationships that structure options, deªne the universe of relevant data, and rule out the consideration of alternative paradigms. Policy-makers and stakeholders use these arguments and data to support their own interests in pol- icy debates, seeking to make new policy conform to their paradigm. The dis- courses of the victors provide the content of new forest laws. First, the “market friendly” paradigm reºects the international trend to- wards reliance on markets and less government intervention. This policy narra- tive views government intervention as the main problem.3 Ineffective govern- 2. Dryzek 1997. 3. Repetto and Gillis 1988. Silva, Kaimowitz, Bojanic, Ekoko, Manurung, and Pavez • 65 ment policies undervalue forests, which, in turn, causes poor forest manage- ment. Log export restrictions, the administrative allocation of concession areas, and low stumpage fees artiªcially cheapens timber and remove incentives for wise management. They also encourage over-capacity in processing, leading to artiªcially high demand for timber. Excessive regulation discourages long-term forest management and induces companies to log only high value timber. Short concession periods have similar effects. Given this diagnosis, the answer is to 4 promote clear property rights and freer markets. Valuing ªscal restraint, advo- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/glep/article-pdf/2/3/63/1818633/152638002320310536.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 cates of the market friendly approach seek to weaken public forestry bureaucra- cies and partially privatize policy formulation and implementation. They en- courage governments to discontinue subsidizing forest plantations; subsidies are inefªcient and will be unnecessary once policy-makers remove market dis- tortions that discourage long-term investment in timber production. The second inºuential policy narrative is the technocratic planning ap- proach, born of the developmentalist perspectives of the 1960s and 1970s and the European and American schools of scientiªc forest management.5 This pol- icy narrative views forestry issues as technical problems best left to professional foresters in the public bureaucracies. It favors government planning and regula- tion to help guide forest industries because the paradigm assumes forest indus- tries require government support and supervision. Proponents endorse the use of trade, industrial, and technological policies to promote forest industries and ensure their long-term sustainability. They focus on timber production and pro- cessing, although they also mention other issues.6 The social forestry paradigm represents a third perspective and is a subset of Dryzek’s social ecology paradigm.7 This view rejects both free markets and traditional government bureaucracies. The central tenet is that local communi- ties should control forests and beneªt from them. Government intervention should support that goal and not favor large companies. While some market- friendly policies may be appropriate, each must be judged with regards to its ef- fects on local communities. Traditional foresters and government ofªcials merit mistrust, since their actions have often harmed forest communities, while com- munities’ indigenous knowledge deserves more attention. Finally, we have the conservation paradigm. Although it cuts across the other narratives, its deªning characteristic is its emphasis on environmental ser- vices.8 Conservationists themselves can be divided into those who favor market- friendly strategies, those who support government intervention, and those that look to the grassroots. The ªrst group argues for market-based mechanisms to encourage carbon sequestration, genetic prospecting, and eco-tourism, and pri- vate management of protected areas.9 The second looks to regulation of forest 4. World Bank 1992. 5. FAO 1985. 6. MIRENEM 1990. 7. Dryzek 1997. 8. MINAE 1997a. 9. MINAE 1997a. 66 • Making the Law of the Jungle conversion and land use and government policing of protected areas.10 The third focuses on ensuring that communities beneªt from conservation.11 Actors, Interests, and Power The major actors in the forest policy reform process generally cast their policy prescriptions in terms of these contending discourses. Moreover, although some of the principal international policy research organizations