Intentionality Contra Physicalism on the Mind’S Independence from the Body
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PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI VOL. 20, NO. 2 © 2018 Intentionality contra Physicalism On the Mind’s Independence from the Body DALLAS WILLARD† Department of Philosophy University of Southern California Los Angeles, California BRANDON RICKABAUGH Department of Philosophy Baylor University Waco, Texas [email protected] 0DQ\SHUVRQVWRGD\ZKRUHJDUGWKHPVHOYHVDVVFLHQWL¿FDOO\PLQGHG² and who today does not—hold that only ignorance or nuttiness could explain anyone’s believing that the mind is independent of the body (mind-body dualism).1 David Braddon-Mitchel and Frank Jackson, for example, describe dualism as, “akin to explaining lightning in terms of Thor’s anger, and hence LV IXQGDPHQWDOO\ SULPLWLYH DQG SUHVFLHQWL¿F´2 Patricia Churchland calls ABSTRACT: We argue for the mind’s independence from the body. We do so by making several moves. First, we analyze two popular kinds of reasons which have swayed many to adopt the independence of the mind from the body. Second, we advance an argument from the ontology of intentionality against the identity thesis, according to which the mind is identical to the brain. We try to show how intentionality is not reducible to or identical to the physical. Lastly, we argue that, contrary to what many materialists contend, the concept of a mind, understood as an immaterial substance, existing independently of the body is both coherent and empirically evidenced. 1. This paper has an unusual genesis. In the fall of 2011, while a graduate student at Biola University, arrangements were made so that I (Brandon) could study with Dallas Willard at the University of Southern California. I was interested in learning from Dallas about knowledge by acquaintance, intentionality, and phenomenology. Dallas passed two years later. In the summer of 2018, I visited the Dallas Willard library collection at Westmont College. There I found, among other things, a handwritten lecture by Dallas. I realized the notes were complete enough that I could turn them into a publishable paper. With the permission of Dallas’s daughter, Becky Willard-Heatley, I edited, revised, and expanded the original arguments and research so as to further Dallas’s academic work and apply some of what I learned from Dallas. The result is this paper. I am incredibly grateful to the Willard family for their support and encouragement in my efforts to bring this work to fruition. I would also like to thank Diane Ziliotto, who oversees the 'DOODV:LOODUGFROOHFWLRQIRUKHUKHOSLQ¿QGLQJWKHRULJLQDOOHFWXUHQRWHV 2. David Braddon-Mitchel and Frank Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 8. 498 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI mind-body dualism, “an outdated theoretical curiosity.”3 Marcelo Sabatés compares belief in the immaterial mind to belief in elves and chupacabras.4 Steven Horst offers a less sensationalized appraisal: “a casual observer of recent philosophy of mind would likely come to the conclusion that, amidst DOO RI WKH GLVDJUHHPHQWV EHWZHHQ VSHFLDOLVWV LQ WKLV ¿HOG WKHUH LV DW OHDVW one thing that stands as more or less a consensus view: the commitment to a naturalistic philosophy of mind.”5 Certainly, there are interesting reasons for rejecting mind-body independence. But they are not conclusive reasons, by any means. Even those who reject mind-body independence have argued that the standard reasons for doing so are both exaggerated and ultimately fail.6 Instead of dwelling upon the issues now, we wish to point out that to the contrary, most human beings,7 and most of the great philosophers,8 have EHOLHYHGWKDWWKHPLQGZDVWRVRPHVLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHHLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKH body. In this paper, we wish to point out the sorts of reasons which provide philosophical grounds for the many persons who have accepted mind-body independence.9 In section 2 we consider whether or not there are any recent advances in knowledge which successfully undercut these reasons for mind- body independence. In doing so, we advance an argument in favor of mind- 3. Patricia Churchland, Brain Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 173. 4. Marcelo H. Sabatés, “Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind,” in Encyclopedia of Phi- losophy, 2005, accessed May 10, 2017, http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclope- dias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/reductionism-philosophy-mind. 5. Steven Horst, “Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophy Compass 4 (2009): 219. 6. See, e.g., William Lycan, “Giving Dualism Its Due,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009): 551–6; and José Gusmão Rodrigues, “There Are No Good Objections to Substance Dualism,” Philosophy 89 (2014): 199–222. 7. A number of studies in the cognitive sciences conclude that belief in mind-body inde- pendence is ubiquitous across both human history and socioeconomic divides and naturally present in early stages of human development. See, e.g., Paul Bloom, Descartes’s Baby: How WKH6FLHQFHRI&KLOG'HYHORSPHQW([SODLQV:KDW0DNHV8V+XPDQ (New York: Basic Books, 2004); P. Rochat and T. Striano, “Social-Cognitive Development in the First Year,” in Early Social Cognition: Understanding Others in the First Year of Life, ed. P. Rochat (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, 1999), 3–34; V. A. Kuhlmeier, P. Bloom, and K. Wynn, “Do 5-Month-Old Infants See Humans as Material Objects?,” Cognition 94 (2004): 95–103; Henry M. Wellman and A. K. Hickling, “The Mind’s ‘I’: Children’s Conception of the Mind as an Ac- tive Agent,” Child Development 65 (1994): 1564–80. For a philosophical analysis of the natural- ness of belief in mind-body independence, see, Uwe Meixner, “The Naturalness of Dualism,” in After Physicalism, ed. Benedickt Paul Göcke (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 25–47. 8. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Butler, Reid, and Kant, to name only a few, were all mind-body dualists of one kind of another. 9. Of course, most people hold to independence without these arguments. See footnote 6 for works on how most people naturally form belief in mind-body independence (substance dual- ism) without argument, but often by experience of one’s self. DALLAS WILLARD AND BRANDON RICKABAUGH 499 body independence from the ontological nature of intentionality.10 We argue for at least the claim that facts about intentionality can be described entirely with no need to incorporate facts about physical things. Our argument in this section explains why intentionality cannot be naturalized, cannot be reduced to or identical to the physical. Of course, this may not directly prove that any human mind is, in fact, independent of a corresponding body, that some disembodied mind or minds actually do exist. In section 3 we argue for the FODLPWKDWWKHKXPDQPLQGLVLQGHSHQGHQWRIDQ\ERG\E\UHÀHFWLQJRQSKH- nomenological and evidential considerations. Our main thesis, however, is that the ontological nature of intentionality is compelling evidence against physicalism. 1. Consciousness and the Nature of Intentionality What, then, are the considerations which have led the majority of per- VRQVLQFOXGLQJSKLORVRSKHUVWRKROGWKDWWKHPLQGKDVDVLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHH of independence from the body? To introduce these considerations, we must ¿UVWFDOODWWHQWLRQWRDZLGHUDQJHRIIDFWVWRZKLFKHYHU\KXPDQEHLQJKDV access.11 The range of facts which we have in mind includes, as typical mem- bers, the following: my seeing you and my believing that you are awake. My hoping to convince you of the possibility that mind is independent of the body. My awareness of my leg gone to sleep. Your hearing my words. Your understanding of what I say (or your not understanding it). My sudden real- ization that one of my utterances was not actually correct. My anxiety over pollution. My decision to have breakfast in the cafeteria at work. My remem- bering to get some gas for my car. Your feeling pride in an accomplishment. Your behaving courageously or wisely. Your being depressed. Your love of music or dancing and so forth. You have before you a wide range of facts which we might agree to de- nominate the range of experiences (states of consciousness) or dispositions to have certain experiences. It is, indeed, the range of facts with which every person is most familiar, and about which she is in a position to correctly report unending details.12 If we were inclined to seek for any general char- 10. For an alternative criticism of naturalism from the ontology of intentionality, see, John J. Haldane, “Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality,” Inquiry 32 (1989): 305–22. 11. Because of the phenomenological nature of our arguments, it is essential that we retain WKH¿UVWSHUVRQSHUVSHFWLYH+HQFHZKHQVLJQL¿FDQWZHVKLIWIURPUHIHUULQJWRRXUVHOYHVDV FRDXWKRUVWRWKH¿UVWSHUVRQSHUVSHFWLYH$VZLWKDOOSKHQRPHQRORJLFDODUJXPHQWZHLQYLWHWKH UHDGHUWRFRQVLGHUWKHLUH[SHULHQFHRIFRQVFLRXVQHVVIURPWKHLURZQ¿UVWSHUVRQSHUVSHFWLYHLQ WKHVH¿UVWSHUVRQUHÀHFWLRQV 12. For the purposes of our argument, we needn’t assume the Cartesian thesis that introspec- tion gives us incorrigible beliefs. That may be true. However, all we need is that introspection gives us defeasible knowledge about our conscious states. This is the kind of knowledge that QHXURVFLHQWLVWVPDNHXVHRILQYDULRXVH[SHULPHQWVZKLFKUHO\RQ¿UVWSHUVRQUHSRUWV 500 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI acterization of the range of facts in question, the most successful proposal would probably turn out to be the character of intentionality. Each experi- ence we have—with only a few questionable cases—has intentionality as each is of or about something other than itself.13 My awareness of my leg gone to sleep, for example, is an experience or state