Wintershall Dea
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
urgewald EXPANSION AT ANY COST Wintershall Dea Gas is part of the problem, not part of the solution Content Introduction . 3 Company Overview . 4 Climate Ambitions . 6 (1) Methane emission controls at the production sites . 6 (2) Offset-payments . 6 (3) Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies . 6 (4) Fossil-gas based hydrogen production . 7 Lobbying-activities . 8 Controversial activities . 8 Fracking gas production in Argentina . 8 Nord Stream 2 . 9 High-risk offshore and Arctic projects . 9 Conclusion . 10 Cover: Oil rig in Norway ©AGL Photoproductions/Getty Images Photoproductions/Getty ©AGL rig in Norway Oil Cover: 2 Introduction The first half of 2021 broke ground for legal precedents authoritative energy and climate scenarios . According to ensuring action on climate . In March, Germany’s consti- the recently published net zero pathway by the Internation- tutional court ruled that the country’s government must al Energy Agency (IEA), the development of new oil and gas ramp up its climate ambitions that were found to be partly resources - except projects already committed as of 2021 unconstitutional . Just two months lat- - is incompatible with the goal of limit- er the District Court of the Hague ruled ing global warming to 1.5 C°.3 Instead of Wintershall Dea plans that Royal Dutch Shell must reduce its phasing out its fossil fuel dependence overall emissions by 45% by 2030. a 30% increase in its and investing in alternative sectors, These important decisions bolstered oil and gas production Wintershall Dea is further entrenching renewed calls for stricter measures to until 2023. its fossil business model . Meanwhile, cut emissions and speed up the ener- the company is advocating for more de- gy transition . All the while, Germany’s largest oil and gas pendence on fossil gas in the political arena, pushing the company Wintershall Dea is planning a significant expan- “bridge-fuel” narrative on all communication channels. sion of its fossil business under the public radar . This background briefing provides a factual basis for in- The company seeked to raise more capital by listing its vestors and other stakeholders of Wintershall Dea. It shares on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange as part of an initial briefly describes and analyses Wintershall Dea’s climate public offering (IPO).1 The money would have been used to destructive business strategy and lack of climate ambi- fund Wintershall Dea’s fossil fuel expansion strategy, name- tions . It also highlights a number of highly controversial ly a 30% increase in its oil and gas production in less than business activities that pose excessive risk and harm to 2 two years . This stands in stark contradiction to the most frontline communities . urgewald Recommendations for Wintershall Dea’s stakeholders: ● Investors should divest from Wintershall Dea and assets will turn out to be liabilities in the foresee- reject buying its shares during and after its Initial able future. Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, and Public Offering . The company’s business model is Goldman Sachs must retreat as arranging banks in not in line with the Paris Climate targets . Even Fatih Wintershall Dea’s IPO . Birol, executive director of the IEA, warns that con- tinued financing of oil and gas projects may turn out ● The German government and the EU Commission to be “junk investments”. must set a clear fossil fuel phase-out strategy, in- cluding production and consumption-side meas- ● Asset managers have a fiduciary duty not to invest ures . Oil consumption and production must end in the company, as the resulting fossil fuel lock- by 2040 and and gas by 2035 respectively. Regula- in would harm their beneficiaries. Further invest- tions must be drawn up to initiate a fast, managed, ments will aggravate systemic risks, including and just phase-out of oil and gas production. future financial crises and catastrophic climate change . ● NGOs, civil society, social movements and jour- nalists must expose Wintershall Dea’s fossil fuel ● Financial institutions must cease providing finan- expansion business model. Phasing out gas and cial services to Wintershall Dea, including insur- oil production quickly and fairly must be an integral ance, underwriting, and lending. Wintershall Dea’s part of Germany’s energy transition . 1 https://www.reuters.com/article/basf-results-oil-ipo-idUSL5N2AS4N0 2 https://wintershalldea.com/sites/default/files/media/user-23/files/Factsheet%20Wintershall%20Dea_en.pdf Cover: Oil rig in Norway ©AGL Photoproductions/Getty Images Photoproductions/Getty ©AGL rig in Norway Oil Cover: 3 https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050 3 Arctic drilling in Norwegian Barants Sea Gas production for European Markets Financier of Nord Stream 2 High-risk offshore projects in Latin America Fracking in Vaca Muerta High-risk offshore drilling close to Antarctic Sea Production countries and production sites of controversial projects of Wintershall. Company Overview Wintershall Dea (hereafter Wintershall) is Germany’s larg- est oil and gas company. It was created in May 2019 by a merger of Wintershall Holding GmbH, a subsidiary of chemical giant BASF, and Dea . Dea used to be part of 67 % 33 % RWE until it was bought by LetterOne, an investment firm of four Russian oligarchs under the leadership of Mikhail Fridman and Pjotr Aven. Aven was featured prominently in the Muller Report for his role in the Kremlin’s attempts to create a communication channel to the newly elected Trump administration in 2016 .4 The manager of LetterOne and Chairman of Wintershall’s Supervisory Board is Lord Browne of Madingley, the former CEO of British Petrole- um. His management style is characterised by high-risk Stanley and Goldman Sachs are seen front-runners for expansions and cuts in costs and staff. This strategy was further roles 6. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the un- a key factor that contributed to a series of major accidents stable oil and gas prices, the IPO was postponed . Another in BP-facilities, including the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil delay was announced in June 2021. This time due to the disaster .5 poor performance of oil and gas companies on the finan- cial markets . Tightening climate measures and cheaper Soon after the merger, Wintershall announced its plans renewables will likely make this a permanent trend . for an Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. According to Reuters, Deutsche Bank has been Wintershall is primarily an upstream oil and gas company. named as global coordinator for the listing, while Morgan Its core business activities are field exploration, develop- 4 https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download p.163-166 5 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf 6 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-basf-wintershall-ipo-idINKCN1S11VI 4 ment, and production . Its most important production sites and storage assets in Germany and Western Europe. In re- are in Russia, Norway, and Argentina. Major expansion turn, Wintershall acquired shares in the Yuzhno Russkoye projects exist in Norway, Russia, Mexico, Brazil, Argen- and Achimov gas deposits in western Siberia. Wintershall tina, and the United Arab Emirates.7 Via its subsidiaries participates in the JAGAL, Nord Stream 1, and Nord Stream WIGA and GASCADE, Wintershall also operates an exten- 2 pipelines that connect these fields to the German and sive fossil gas pipeline network in Germany and other Eu- European gas markets .9 ropean countries. The company is an important financier of the controversial pipeline project Nord Stream 2. The recent history of Wintershall was marked by the Covid-19 pandemic, the preparations for the IPO, and a The importance of Russian gas production and the long- massive expansion in exploration and development proj- term partnership with Russia’s state-owned company Gaz- ects. The 2020 oil and gas price shock was a major blow prom can hardly be overstated . Since the collapse of the for the company and made Wintershall drag down the bot- Soviet Union in 1991 onwards, Wintershall Holding GmbH tom-line of its parent company BASF in that year.10 In early and Gazprom have worked in a symbiotic relationship. By 2020, Wintershall announced its plans to increase its oil providing capital, expertise and political networks, Win- and gas production from 590,000 barrels of oil equivalent tershall helped Gazprom become an important supplier per day to 750,000 – 800,000 barrels of oil equivalent per of fossil gas to the growing German economy. Wintershall, day until 2023, which is akin to a 30% increase of produc- in return, profited from selling Russian gas on German tion in two years11 . If these plans go through, it will pro- markets and increasingly from participating in upstream duce more oil and gas than the combined consumption of activities .8 In two successive asset swaps in 2007 and Portugal and Greece .12 2013, Gazprom acquired gas production, transportation, 7 https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/germany-s-wintershall-dea-could-float-up-to-30-of-its-shares-next-year-1.937774 8 https://www.zeitschrift-osteuropa.de/hefte/2013/7/ziemlich-beste-freunde/; Michael Sander. (2010). Deutsch-russische Beziehun- gen im Gassektor. S.95 www.nomos-shop.de/titel/deutsch-russische-beziehungen-im-gassektor-id-79491/ 9 See Urgewald’s report about Nord Stream 2 for further details: https://urgewald.org/nordstream2-report 10 https://report.basf.com/2020/en/managements-report/basf-group-business-year/results-of-operations/net-income-from-sharehold- ings-financial-result-and-income-after-taxes.html 11 https://wintershalldea.com/sites/default/files/media/user-23/files/Factsheet%20Wintershall%20Dea_en.pdf 12 https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6 5 Climate Ambitions Almost all fossil fuel production and consumption must emissions nor how it intends to mitigate them 18. Looking end in the next two decades to keep global warming be- at common industry practices, it is likely that Wintershall low 1.5 degrees.