A Comparative Study of the First Computer Literacy Programs for Children in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, 1970-1990
Making Citizens of the Information Age: A Comparative Study of the First Computer Literacy Programs for Children in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, 1970-1990
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Citation Boenig-Liptsin, Margarita. 2015. Making Citizens of the Information Age: A Comparative Study of the First Computer Literacy Programs for Children in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, 1970-1990. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences.
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Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Making Citizens of the Information Age:
A comparative study of the first computer literacy programs for children in
the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, 1970-1990
A dissertation presented
by
Margarita Boenig-Liptsin
to
The Department of History of Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
History of Science
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
August 2015
© 2015 Margarita Boenig-Liptsin All rights reserved.
Dissertation Advisor: Professor Sheila Jasanoff Margarita Boenig-Liptsin
Making Citizens of the Information Age: A comparative study of the first computer literacy programs for children in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, 1970-1990
ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I trace the formation of citizens of the information age by comparing visions and practices to make children and the general public computer literate or cultured in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. Computer literacy and computer culture programs in these three countries began in the early 1970s as efforts to adapt people to life in the information society as it was envisioned by scholars, thinkers, and practitioners in each cultural and sociopolitical context. The dissertation focuses on the ideas and influence of three individuals who played formative roles in propelling computer education initiatives in each country: Seymour Papert in the United States,
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in France, and Andrei Ershov in the Soviet Union.
According to these pioneers, to become computer literate or computer cultured meant more than developing computer skills or learning how to passively use the personal computer. Each envisioned a distinctive way of incorporating the machine into the individual human’s ways of thinking and being—as a cognitive enhancement in the
United States, as a culture in France, and as a partner in the Soviet Union. The resulting human-computer hybrids all demanded what I call a playful relationship to the personal computer, that is, a domain of free and unstructured, exploratory creativity. I trace the realization of these human-computer hybrids from their origins in the visions of a few pioneers to their embedding in particular hardware, software, and educational curricula,
iii through to their development in localized experiments with children and communities, and finally to their implementation at the scale of the nation. In that process of extension, pioneering visions bumped up against powerful sociotechnical imaginaries of the nation state in each country, and I show how, as a result of that clash, in each national case the visions of the pioneers failed to be fully realized. In conclusion, I suggest ways in which the twentieth-century imaginaries of the computer literate citizen extend beyond their points of origin and connect to aspects of the contemporary constitutions of humans in the computerized world.
iv Table of Contents Acknowledgements ...... vii! Chapter 1: C is for Computer ...... 1! Imagining the computer literate citizen around the world ...... 20! Unlocking the human with the computer ...... 31! Chapter 2: Building the Computer Literate Nation ...... 38! Imagining information societies ...... 41! United States – An age of anxiety...... 44! France – A prepared evolution ...... 53! Soviet Union – The tame information volcano ...... 60! Adapting to information societies ...... 65! United States – Computer Literacy ...... 66! France – Culture informatique ...... 75! Soviet Union – Second literacy...... 103! Comparing Information Societies and Strategies of Adaptation ...... 114! Chapter 3: Entrepreneurs of the Mind ...... 118! Seymour Papert ...... 120! Papert and Jean Piaget ...... 121! LOGO – A children's computer language ...... 126! From literacy to fluency ...... 131! Growing LOGO at MIT – “A totally different learning environment” ...... 138! Microworlds ...... 139! Constructionism ...... 141! Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber ...... 148! La ressource humaine ...... 149! Making the Centre Mondial Informatique ...... 154! Life of the Center: A “window open onto the human resource” ...... 159! Each person as entrepreneur of the mind ...... 170! Andrei Ershov ...... 172! Early work at the Computing Center in Novosibirsk ...... 173! Algorithmic thinking ...... 176! “School Informatics”: Algorithmic thinking for all ...... 181! Enhancing the natural capacities of the mind ...... 187! Chapter 4: Experiments in Play ...... 190! United States ...... 201! LOGO experiments with learning and learners ...... 202! The child epistemologist and the computer Rorschach ...... 206! France ...... 226! Research-actions in the neighborhood ...... 227! Setting up an informatique environment ...... 230! Soviet Union ...... 241! Experiments in building a new society ...... 242! Young programmers at camp ...... 244! Masters of play ...... 262! Chapter 5: A Return to Rules ...... 266! United States ...... 271!
v National developments of computer literacy ...... 272! The Lamplighter School Project ...... 280! The fate of the computer fluent subject ...... 286! France ...... 290! The Centre Mondial Informatique (1981-1985) ...... 292! Informatique pour tous (1985-1989) ...... 300! Simulation-at-large ...... 306! Soviet Union ...... 310! Visions at odds ...... 311! Ontologies of computers, ontologies of humans ...... 317! Nations of users ...... 322! Chapter 6: Constitutions of the human in the computerized world ...... 327! Computer literacy legacies ...... 327! Constitutions of the human ...... 331! Bibliography ...... 343!
vi Acknowledgements
This dissertation is a collective work. I am grateful from the bottom of my heart to--
Sheila Jasanoff, Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, Rebecca Lemov, Anne Monius, Jean- Pierre Dupuy-- For teaching me ways of thinking, for your example of scholarship and intellectual life, and for your faith in me. You have guided me in this project from its vaguest first formulations to its last period and your teachings will continue to form it--and me--in the future.
Sheila, again, and never enough-- For taking me on as your apprentice and helping to forge, word by painstaking word, intuitions into arguments.
Shana Rabinowich, Linda Schneider, Jacqueline Karaaslanian, Jean-Charles Bédague, Ksenia Tatarchenko, Loren Graham, Georges-Louis Baron, Yuri Pervin, Jacques Baudé, Jacques Perriault, Sarah Walker-- For generously sharing your experience and your time, for your helpfulness, and your patience.
Yan Liu, Oriana Walker, Ardeta Gjikola, Jenna Tonn, Megan Shields-Formato, Ben Hurlbut, Gili Vidan, Adriana Ortega, Sebastian Pfotenhauer, Joakim Juhl, Zara Mirmalek, Rachel Douglas-Jones, Daniel Prashanth, Larisa Lehmer-- For your friendship, for listening and thinking together, and for our future projects together.
Ana Maria & Jeff Boenig, Tetja Natasha & Bob Flournoy, Babushka Alla & Dedushka Vasya, Abuelitos, Ded Feliks, and Tetja Rita-- For your unwavering nurture in all ways.
My mother Tania, my father Oleg, my husband (½ Dr.) Edward, and Max-- For you.
vii
(Stoop) if you are abcedminded, to this claybook, what curios of signs (please stoop), in this allaphbed! Can you rede (since We and Thou had it out already) its world?
James Joyce, Finnegans Wake
We are creating a new company, called Alphabet (http://abc.xyz). […] We liked the name Alphabet because it means a collection of letters that represent language, one of humanity's most important innovations, and is the core of how we index with Google search!
Larry Page, “G is for Google”
viii Chapter 1: C is for Computer
For over fifty years, Time magazine has selected a “Person of the Year," the person who, "for better or for worse...has done the most to influence the events of the year” (Time Person of the Year: 75th Anniversary Celebration 2002). In its January 3,
1983 issue, Time announced that, for 1982, the “Machine” had become the “Person of the
Year” (Friedrich et al. 1983).
The cover illustration for this issue shows George Segal's iconic plaster sculptures of two human figures, a man in the foreground and a woman further back, sitting near two micro-computers. The people are white, like blank slates, sitting passively in front of the lively, active computers displaying colored graphs on their screens. They appear
"other" in relation to the machines that have, as Time's caption reads, "moved into" what seems like their home. As if flash-frozen to capture the last moment of virgin humanness, the woman reclines on a wicker chair, not looking at the machine, while the man looks at the screen but does not touch the keyboard. With a stillness somewhere between holding one's breath and not breathing they seem to wait for the machines to complete their work. The stark difference between the blank, motionless people and colored, "running" computers creates an attenuated sense as if any second now, with a final push, the computer's activity will spill out of its framing screen and "move inside" the people.
The Time magazine cover reflected a reality of the early 1980s as experienced by people in the Western world and in Japan, where the micro-computer was increasingly
1 seen in public places like libraries and community centers, in the workplace, in schools,
and in the home. In addition to their growing visibility in daily life, computers were used
to run more and more industries and provide infrastructure for governmental activities.
This phenomenon was described by observers in different parts of the world as
"computerization" or "informatization" of society. They predicted that the computer's
presence and influence in human lives would only grow with the machines becoming
smaller, faster, and cheaper.
Some worried, as people had with regard to many technologies before computers,
that computerization would lead to computers replacing people by taking over central
aspects of human activity, such as work and thought, and making people slaves to the
machines.1 In the early 1970s, simultaneously in different parts of the world, an alternate
discourse began to emerge in which the computer was seen as the ideal instrument for
adapting people to the demands of life in the information age. This is the position from
which the Time article was written. Instead of claiming that the computer would take
over human functions or replace the human, it drew attention to the beginning of a new
era in the human-computer relationship enabled by the so-called “desktop revolution”
that had “brought the tools that only professionals have had into the hands of the public”
(Friedrich et al. 1983, 14 citing Marvin Minsky, a cognitive scientist and artificial
intelligence pioneer at the Massachsetts Institute of Technology). In the new world-order
brought about by this computer revolution, people would work, learn, and play together
with (rather than in opposition to) computers.
1 Science fiction narratives frequently discussed the theme of loss of human authority and control to machines in dystopian narratives of computers run amok, see, for example Stanley Kubrick’s 2001 Space Odyssey (1968). 2
According to journalists, industry leaders, and politicians who spoke of the
“computer revolution” in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the promised revolutionary potential of computers was due to the scale of their introduction into society at large. Although computers had been transformative to the defense, scientific, and business operations of developed nations since the 1950s, only when the idea of computers in “the hands of the public” became envisioned as a possibility did it make sense to speak in terms of the “computer revolution.” 2 At this population-wide scale, questions about the relationship of people to these thinking machines took on new significance. 3 Discussions of the so-called “computer revolution” translated into discussions about the boundary between the person and the machine: about what is proper to computers and what is proper to people; what computers can and cannot help people with; what the limits of artificial intelligence are or should be.
Contemporary scholars who investigated directly the human-computer relationship described how the computer profoundly transformed the person. For example, in 1984 Sherry Turkle used participant-observation and repeat clinical studies to investigate how people's interaction with computers informed their sense of self and sense of the world as psychological beings (Turkle 1984). Turkle’s seminal work
2 The term “computer revolution” figures prominently in many American works from the late 1970s and 1980s (For example, see the cited Time article 1983; T. Nelson 1977; Brod 1984; Service and Investigations 1985). In these examples, the authors use the term “revolution” to refer to the consequences of computers at the population-wide scale. The revolutionary potential of computers was considered both from the economic perspective (computers and computer-controlled industrial robots replacing workers) and from the more philosophical consequences of replacing and challenging human minds. 3 This debate about the relationship of human to (specifically) the computer machine, can be traced back to the “imitation game” described in the famous paper by Alan Turing, “Computer Machinery and Intelligence” (1950) . In Turing’s paper the relationship was only a thought experiment since no actual computer existed with which one could play such a game. 3 concluded that computers were more than just playthings or tools for accomplishing tasks: they had become for people “objects to think with” about their own mental processes and about the boundary between humans and machines. For Turkle’s contemporary, Donna Haraway, the “cyborg,” or hybrid between human and machine, was an agent of social and political change made possible by the new computer technologies and their attendant discourses (Haraway 1985). The cyborg, according to
Haraway, was not necessarily a new physical entity created through the introduction of technology into the body. Rather, it was an allegorical figure whose existence in the imagination and in narratives circulating through society already challenged existing categories such as gender and race and led to social transformation. In studying the human-computer relationship, both Turkle and Haraway found that the most important revolutionary potential of the computer for the person lay not in its use as a tool, but in the way that the technology prompted each person to re-think his or her identity as a human being (e.g., as conscious, alive, biological, or being of a particular gender, culture or race).
Even before the publication of these important works recognizing the
“revolutionary” re-thinking of the human in light of the mass introduction of computers into society, people sought actively to shape the direction that this revolution would take.
One of the most direct efforts centered on expanding the role of computers in education.
Around the world, mathematicians, teachers, artists, parents, and politicians debated the role that the computer should play in the education of children and in the formation of the future "citizens of the information age." Computers had been used in some university and even primary and secondary school classrooms in the United States since the early
4 1960s. They were, however, used mainly as tools to assist in classroom instruction, like drilling students in multiplication and division.
In the early 1970s, simultaneously and relatively independently from one another, very different conceptions of the use of computers in education began to emerge in developed countries around the world. Pioneers of this alternative approach in all three countries called for making the knowledge of how to program, use, and think with, or even like, the computer a basic skill of the general population. This new approach to computers in education was called a new “computer literacy" in English and also referred to as literacy in Russian4. In French it was referred to as a new culture (culture informatique). Despite the differences in the skills, knowledge, and sensibilities implied by these terms and as practiced in each country, each variant of the new culture of literacy presumed that the computer had to reconstitute the human—to become part of a person’s cognitive and bodily habits and, by doing so, suffuse that person's sense of self, her values and ways of relating to and living with others. For its advocates, this new literacy was a way to help people adapt to this revolutionary moment and to the demands of the ensuing information age.5
In revolutionary moments throughout history, those in power attempt to re-form subjects to correspond to the new social order. Revolutions, whether in science (Kuhn
1962) or in social order (Taylor 2004), can be conceptualized in terms of changes in collectively held belief systems, as "the overthrow of one no longer sufficient imaginary
4 Unless otherwise specified, all translations from the Russian and French throughout the dissertation are my own. 5 The ideas of what life in the information age entailed and what forms of adaptation were imagined to be necessary differed across the three countries that I study. I explore these differences and their significance in Chapter 2. 5 by another that looks more promising” (Jasanoff 2015, 329). Such imaginaries can be
utopian or dystopian. For example, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), written
against the backdrop of revolutionary social control and rising imaginaries of eugenic
tinkering, citizens were raised artificially from human embryos in special conditioning
centers and children were educated through sleep-learning processes where they were fed
subconscious messages to shape them into identities appropriate for their place in the
“new world.” In Huxley’s dystopian science fiction, the process of forming people is
direct, violent, and involves technological intervention. The leaders applied coercive
techniques (reproductive hatcheries, brainwashing) to force people into pre-defined social
niches.
Education, and specifically the teaching of literacy, or the basic capacity to read
and write, has historically been a popular, and often positive6, technique to form people.
Literacy is a powerful tool to educate the public in the terms and values of the altered
imaginary, to inscribe the revolution in the hearts of the human subject, and so to make
people into able citizens of the new order.7 For example, the Reformation theologian
William Tyndale translated the Bible into vernacular English with the goal to “[cause a
boy that driveth the plough to know more scripture] than the clergy of the day” (Coggan
1968, 18). By writing the Bible in a language that many could understand, Tyndale’s
purpose was to give everyone, including children, access to the scriptures so that they
6 The extent to which literacy is a positive or violent tool for forming people has been, and remains, much debated (on the violent nature of literacy, see Stuckey 1991). Scholars point out that at the same time as literacy defines for people particular frames for self and world-views that can be considered limiting, it also, through these same frames teaches structures with which people can better express themselves and be more independent. 7 In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson (1982) has argued that the specific social order established by the foundation of the nation-state has been enabled and sustained by public literacy. 6 might be able to interpret them for themselves rather than to rely on the institution of the church. Tyndale’s act helped to spread the values of the Reformation in England and was perceived as a threat to the established powers of church and crown for which he paid with his life. In the case of the Reformation, access to a previously arcane religious text not only made an individual relationship with God into what some scholars have referred to as a “citizenship” (Furet and Ozouf 1977), but was used as a vehicle to fuel transformations to the socio-political order that also strengthened the institution of public literacy.
Public literacy campaigns have also followed socio-political revolutions.
Literacy, in this context, is an instrument of what Michel Foucault called
“governmentality,” or the techniques states and other powerful organizations use to discipline their subjects through schooling and training (Foucault 1977b), as opposed to overt force or violence on their bodies, as in Huxley’s novel. The power of literacy to re- form people after changes in the social order was recognized in debates about the future of countries following decolonization, when both national sovereignty and individual identities were being re-formulated (Arnove and Graff 1987; Collins and Blot 2003). One of Vladimir Lenin’s first reforms after the revolution of 1917 was to launch the mass- literacy campaign known as LikBez (short for the Russian likvidatsiija bezgrammotnosti, or "liquidation of illiteracy") to "eradicate illiteracy" in the newly Soviet population
(Clark 2000). Most recently, following the 2014 revolution in Ukraine, the question whether children should be taught to be literate in Ukrainian or Russian, or both, became a point of contention and even cause for military action (Stelmakh and Korytska 2014).
In all of these examples, literacy campaigns formed people by inculcating values through
7 the teaching of particular practices of reading and writing. From the correct way to hold a pen and form letters on the page to rules of grammar that encouraged particular styles of prose and speech, literacy training became a seamless and invisible part of people's quotidian life, disciplining body, mind, and spirit.8 Change in literacy accompanies changes in social order. So it is not surprising that in the 1980s, just as Time magazine announced the revolution in the human-computer relation, the United States, French, and
Soviet governments all supported local and national campaigns to make schoolchildren computer literate. The computer literacy programs, like language literacy in other revolutions, were strategic sites for re-forming the person with the technology of the computer for the envisioned demands of life in the so-called information age.
These programs are excellent places to look at in trying to understand this historical period in which, as contemporaries claimed, the meaning of people as humans
8 Anthropologists like Marcel Mauss (La Technique du corps 1936) and André Leroi-Gourhan (“L’illusion technologique” 1960; La geste et la parole 1964) have studied how the use of a tool shapes and is shaped by the practices of the hand as well as how the use of a tool informs consciousness and the attitude to reality. Learning how to wield a pen – the foundation of literacy – in a manner that is deemed beautiful and correct is simultaneously an exercise in corporal and moral discipline. So basic is this idea taught to all school children that adages have emerged in different cultures to instruct the student in a proper way. In an image of a French classroom from 1900, “Plus fait douceur que violence,” (“Be more gentle than violent”) is a message on the blackboard that hangs over the scene and is at once a moral lesson, a tip for correctly holding the pen, and a model of calligraphy for the students to aspire to (see, for example, a photograph of a classroom from the 1900 at the Musée National de l’Éducation, Rouen, France). In Russian, the "pressure--gently" (nazhim-nezhno) formula emphasizes the same light touch. A firm but light touch was necessary in order to have a fluid use of the pen, which could continue for some time (without cramping the hand of the writer) and produce beautiful, flowing letters on the page, and not destroy the gentle quill of the fountain pen or break or too quickly blunt the pencil. The union of the pen and the human hand and the idea of the ideal written product created this attention to lightness and gentleness in wielding the pen was an early, embodied and moral lesson of literacy. Learning computer literacy, as I describe in Chapter 4, came with the need to master new techniques of the body. Although using the keyboard and computer mouse are a different anthropological given than holding a pen, (and scientific studies have been made on the effect of this difference on people's capacity to hold a pen, write in cursive, as well as on their thinking and composition of texts) the "pressure--gently" message may still apply. Images of fingers fluttering over keyboards illustrated the catalog of the CMI and are a feature of almost every film about computers, particularly ones in which students are shown working with the computer or learning to do so. 8 inhabiting the planet underwent a profound change thanks to the proliferation of thinking machines. But how do we historicize this moment? What precedents and vocabularies exist for attempting to characterize how people are formed at the intersection of rapid changes in technology and society?
One source is studies of technology that take the formation of human subjectivity as their core concern. For example, Sherry Turkle’s (2011) and Natasha Dow-Schüll’s
(2012) recent works used interviews and ethnographic observation of technology users to focus on what transpires between person and machine and how people fulfill their needs for community or escape through their relationship with the technology. Turkle argued that the daily use of internet-connected devices leads to a state of being “alone together.”
Dow-Schüll examined the relationship of gamblers to gambling machines. She found that by purposefully subjecting themselves to what she called the “machine zone” individuals were able to use machine gambling as a way to manage the contingencies and anxieties in their lives.9 Both studies captured consequential—and concerning—aspects of contemporary human-computer relationships; however, both focus on the voluntary use of the technology, as an activity chosen by the individual and informed by technological design rather than by top-down, culturally conditioned programs to remake humans in information societies.10
In a place-specific and robust study, Eden Medina, a historian of computing, explored the role of political context in relation to technology formation in her book
9 See Also Rob Horning’s blog post “Reparative compulsions” (2013), where he applies and develops Dow-Schüll’s observations about the machine zone to social media interactions. 10 In her paper for the History of Recent Social Science Conference (June 6-7, 2015), Marcia Holmes used the history of the training of computer programmers in the 1950s and 1960s in the American Systems Development Corporation to speak about the formation of the creative liberal subject with the computer. 9 about the relationship between the cybernetics movement in Chile and the building of
Salvador Allende’s socialist government (2011). Medina argues that sociotechnical projects like Project Cybersyn are key sites for understanding how revolutionary ideals are implemented in daily life. Although she is interested in how revolutions materialize into new world orders, she does not discuss the way in which the new sociotechnical order imagined and pursued by the leaders of Project Cybersyn reflected on the subjectivity of Chileans.
A work that combines attention to subjectivity as well as to broader historical context in which it unfolds is Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual
Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (1999). Hayles examined how the idea of information as disembodied that arose in the field of cybernetics contributed to the creation of the state of being “posthuman.” By paying attention to the body and materiality in narratives about the posthuman, Hayles finds that the posthuman is actually
“grounded in embodied actuality” and, as such, is an important resource “for thinking the articulation of humans with intelligent machines” (287). Although she investigates how powerful ideas in history of computing have influenced human subjectivity, Hayles does not study how these ideas are embedded in or conditioned by specific institutional channels or practices (such as education curricula or state-society relations) that then do the work of forming people into posthuman subjects. Relatedly, although Hayles is careful to say that the experience of the posthuman is limited to some populations of people in the developed world (and particularly in the United States), her study does not allow us to say anything about the posthuman in other cultures.
10 Taken together, these works suggest that a different kind of study is needed in order to understand the formation of the human in a computerized world: a study that links broad-scale collective visions to their influence on people through particular institutions, practices, and technologies; that narrates the transformations in individual people in relation to changes in social order; and that looks at the developments of computers in society in different countries at the same time so as to say something more generally about the mutual shaping of computers and human subjectivity.
The “coproductionist” branch of the field of Science and Technology Studies
(STS) pioneered by Sheila Jasanoff has developed methods to make sense of the emergence of a new idea of the human at the interface of technological and social systems. "Increasingly," Jasanoff writes in her definition of the concept of coproduction,
"the realities of human experience emerge as joint achievements of scientific, technical, and social enterprise" (2004a, 33). The basic insight of the coproductionist approach is that our ideas about what the world is, as a matter of fact, and what the world ought to be, as a matter of social choice, are formed together. The idiom of coproduction builds upon the fundamental understanding in the field of STS that scientific conceptions of the world and the technological artifacts embodying them are contingent on cultural histories and material circumstances (Shapin and Schaffer 1985). However, coproduction goes beyond the static claims that humans and non-humans exist together as hybrid formations, in ever-tighter "imbroglios" (Latour 1993; 1999), or that "artifacts have politics" (Winner
1986). Instead, it focuses on the dynamic re-formations of the world, and of the human experience in it, as products of scientific, technological, and social activity.
11 The coproductionist insight about the dynamic formation of the epistemic, material, and social worlds invites investigation into how institutions created by people to order society, such as law, are coproduced along with science and technology. STS work on “bioconstitutionalism” examines the way in which the life sciences and technologies interact with social and political lives to redefine what it means to be human--a characterization that is foundational to all constitutional orders (Jasanoff 2011b).
Bioconstitutionalism identifies a “constant, mutually constitutive interplay of biological and legal conceptions of life” – a dynamic in which transformations in understandings of what life is activate rethinking of law at the most basic level (2011b, 3). This work shows how scientific and technological developments are made on terrain already steeped in constitutional thinking, although, as Jasanoff indicates, these are constitutions with a small "c"—comprising not only written rules but a variety of unwritten norms generated by custom, informal behaviors, and institutional practices (10). The term constitution in the STS context refers simultaneously to the makeup of the human being ("to constitute," the verb) and to the norms according to which people live (the small "c" version of
"constitution," the noun). Going beyond the domain of biology, the work on bioconstitutionalism provides a more general model for how to understand the linking of ontological and normative orders during times of change and how the presence of formal and informal (explicit and implicit) normative structures inform the ways in which people engage in re-making the world in the context of new and emerging technologies.
If we view the moment of formation of people through the computer literacy programs during the so-called computer revolution as moments of constitutional change, we are led to the following questions: How has the computer come to reconstitute the
12 human since those early days of its diffusion through society? Who is the person of the personal computer? What can we say about her constitution, or her make-up as a human being and the norms according to which she lives? These are the questions that explore in my dissertation by studying the phenomenon of computer literacy. To get to the heart of these issues, I compare public educational programs to make children computer literate, or computer cultured, from their rise around the turn of 1970 to their peak in the mid-1980s, in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union—three countries where computer literacy projects were particularly active and which adopted an array of approaches to the task.
This dissertation extends STS work on constitutionalism to the history of computer, or information, technologies by looking at the impact of computer education programs on ideas of what it means to be a competent, functioning member of the computer society. I ask how acquiring the technical knowledge of working with computers, termed the new "literacy" or the new "culture," shaped an (altered) idea of the human being as subject and citizen. At the same time, I show through comparison how ideas of the human being and the citizen particular to each nation-state informed the design of the technology and the institutions that propagated the new literacy or culture of computing.
Professionals, such as programmers or neurosurgeons, and, increasingly, lay people, can use computer technologies to tinker with foundational elements of human subjectivity. For example, electronic implants (e.g. neural implants) can therapeutically replace or extend sensory capabilities. Similarly, but with no need for physical intrusions, knowledge of programming can become the basis for forming new
13 solidarities,11 thus influencing basic constitutional ideas of personhood and citizenship.
Less explicitly, but perhaps more powerfully, it is largely accepted in Western society
that knowledge and use of computers are linked to basic values and concepts that are
important to the constitutional order. For example, in explaining Edward Snowden's
actions, his supporters and opponents alike pointed to his occupation as a programmer,
his involvement in geek communities such as Ars Technica, and even his generational
affiliation.12 Snowden, after all, was born in the year of Time magazine’s “Machine of
the Year,” and therefore came of age in a world occupied not only by thinking humans
but also by thinking machines. Everything that observers chose to say about Snowden
implied that his values, his sense of self, and his feeling of responsibility were constituted
by the new "computer culture." Indeed, one can see the Snowden affair as an example of
a technologically mediated "constitutional moment" (Jasanoff 2011b) in which the
pervasive influence of computers on how we govern ourselves made it possible for a
person steeped in that culture to become a particular kind of dissident citizen.13 To make
sense of moments like these in our own day it is essential to first understand the history
of the computer's development in society that made such moments possible. The history
of computer literacy, culture informatique, and second literacy movements, all three of
which sought to make the general publics of three different countries knowledgeable
about computers, provides over two-decades of such formative moments. “Literacy” as
11 For example, consider the kind of community projects organized with and around the LilyPad Arduino sewable electronics platform (see, http://lilypadarduino.org/). 12 For example, see Broader and Shane (2013), Gellman and Markon (2013), and Brumfiel (2015). 13 Snowden's "citizenship" is frequently evoked in relation to his revelations. This is not just because of his difficulty in finding a nation that would accept him after his revelations (reference), but also the pseudonym "Citizenfour" that he chose with which to sign his original email to the journalist where he reveals his findings about the NSA (Poitras 2014). 14 in "computer literacy" or "culture" as in culture informatique, sit at the intersection of the two meanings of “constitution”: they encompass both the (technical) knowledge that makes up competent people in a certain kind of society and the normative frames according to which people in these societies should live among others.
My focus on the development of computer education and citizenship relates my project to the history of the human sciences. This branch of the history of science concerns itself with how social order is made and sustained through scientific and technological practices (broadly defined to include psychology and economics) that, in turn, are themselves made and remade from the structures of the social order.14 The history of pedagogy, the method and practice of teaching, is the subtopic in the history of human sciences that comes closest to my interests in computer literacy. In their 1976 article in the history of pedagogy, “Head and Hand: Rhetorical Resources in British
Pedagogical Writing, 1770-1850,” Steven Shapin and Barry Barnes argued that all pedagogical approaches are “developed on the basis of particular conceptions of the constitution of the mind, the nature of thought, and the relationship of knowledge and thinking” (Shapin and Barnes 1976, 231). The authors show how these conceptions that inform pedagogy served to maintain particular constellations of social order. The discourses and practices surrounding computer literacy programs—pedagogical writings in different forms—similarly depended upon conceptions of the developing mind, of knowledge, and of computers. Moreover, these conceptions helped to imagine and construct particular forms of social order, such as the link between creativity (a quality
14 Defined in this way, the history of human sciences shares the intellectual interests of STS. 15 that some of computer literacy advocates sought to foster with their programs) and a liberal national society in Cold War America (Cohen-Cole 2009; 2014).
Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose's (1994) model of “therapeutic authority” is helpful for thinking about the way in which the entrepreneurs of computer literacy programs hoped their efforts would not only give children computer skills but form their ways of thinking and knowing to be citizens in the information age. Miller and Rose identify the introduction of psychology-based explanations and interventions in areas of life previously unconcerned with psychology, such as industrial relations and organizational functioning. Part of the way in which this form of “therapeutic authority” extended itself was by supporting the rise of a new form of professional education after the end of World
War II that sought to “engage [their subjects] at the level of their personality and experience” instead of merely teaching a set of skills (1994, 38). This kind of education is an example of Michel Foucault's notion of power as “action upon the conduct of conduct,” a process by which power from a few individuals can influence many without direct coercion (Foucault 1982, 221). By studying the role that computer literacy plays in forming particular kinds of people, with ways of knowing that are supposed to be activated in the future, my project concentrates on the exercise of “therapeutic authority” by computer literacy entrepreneurs to shape the future of society, a practice whose relationship to the personal computer has not yet been systematically explored.
As becomes apparent even from Shapin and Barnes’ essay on the history of pedagogy (1976), psychology is a major influence on this sub-field, and a preoccupation of the history of human sciences as a whole. The role of psychology in the history of
16 human sciences is problematic because psychological approaches seem to dominate the
very understanding of the “human.” By making a comparison with the Soviet Union
where Western psychology with its focus on individual minds (particularly Freud's
psychoanalysis) was officially banned (M. A. Miller 1998), and where alternative
psychological and social conceptions of the human flourished, my dissertation
contributes to disentangling any seemingly given relationship that may appear to exist
between the computer and a psychological understanding of the human.
Scholars from sociology, government, and history of science and technology have
recently paid much attention to how interaction with computer technologies changes the
way that people engage with society. The engagement with on-line worlds is said to
undermine vitality of human communal relationships (Turkle 2011)15 or empower
individual’s voices in the public sphere (Kahne, Middaugh, and Allen 2015; Zuckerman
2013). In their recent book on digital citizenship, Jennifer Light, Danielle Allen and
contributors to their volume characterize the nature of social power, or the capacity of
members of civic society for political participation, in the contemporary digital age
(Allen and Light 2015). They found that with social networks and other digital tools,
people practice new and different forms of participation in politics and they concluded
from this that participation in politics in the digital age is different from the pre-digital
era. Yet, they do not consider how this changed nature of participation in turn transforms
the meaning of politics or democracy, which they hold as given. In contrast, my account
15 There are also authors, notably Rainie and Wellman (2012), who dispute Turkle’s argument that the use of networked information technology makes us “alone together.” This goes to show that the pro and cons of technological effect on the human communal relationships are a much debated topic today. 17 examines the way that a political order is being reconstituted in the process of making citizens computer literate rather than merely adapted to a fixed category of citizen.16 If we take seriously both the idea of constitutionalism in STS and the insight that literacy changes subjectivity as it "patterns the soul," as Plato described,17 or makes a different entity of society, as Marshall McLuhan (1962) famously concluded,18 then we must recognize that the very idea of contemporary citizenship is coproduced with the concept of computer literacy. In other words, I treat citizenship not as an a priori that can be defined abstractly, but rather as an emergent phenomenon that is actively reconfigured in the process of a public becoming computer literate, and hence becoming members of an altered imagined community (Anderson 1982).
By making people computer literate or infusing them with culture informatique, the pioneers of computer education envisaged giving people a sense of belonging that articulated in new ways the relationship between the local, the national and the global.
By intervening in public education systems, to which nation-states delegate the authority to form their citizens, they actively involved themselves in citizen-making. Nation-
16 Some political theorists (e.g., Beiner 1995) have argued that the emergence of notions like "human rights," which contains an individual-universal dialectic, pose a challenge for the practice of citizenship. In my study, this individual-universal dialectic surfaces frequently. For example, Jean-Jacques Servan- Schreiber's idea of la ressource humaine (which I introduce in Chapter 2) sets up a dialectic between the unique individual- who possesses this resource and the universality that this concept evokes. If we treat citizenship as a dynamic notion that reflects realities of human subjectivity coproduced with developments in technology, then it is not surprising to find overlapping layers of citizenship that bridge the local and global in new ways. 17 In The Republic, Book VI, Socrates asks: "Do you think, then, that there is any difference between the blind and those who are veritably deprived of the knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who have no vivid pattern in their souls and so cannot, as painters look to their models, fix their eyes on the absolute truth, and always with reference to that ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of it establish in this world also the laws (nomima) of the beautiful, the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard and preserve those that are established?" (Plato 1946, 484c d). 18 In fact, McLuhan postulated the emergence of a new kind of person with literacy and printing, which he termed “typographic man.” 18 specific institutions, such as the educational system or the computer industry, were
necessary conduits for computer literacy programs to reach the scales of diffusion the
pioneers intended. Yet, at the same time as they depended upon them, these programs
challenged these institutions to transform themselves in light of a certain leveling
universal (supra-national) imaginary of the computer and the computer literate person.
For example, the very idea of the "information age" was defined both in terms of national
realities and interests and as a stage of global development aspired to by many nations.
In this way the term assumed the existence of an overarching reality shared among
nations. Computer literate people around the world would be able to access this reality,
while leaving behind their non-computer literate compatriots. I explore the ways in
which the idea of the "citizen" in relation to "the information age" both depended upon19
and challenged the traditional understanding of citizenship as grounded in a national
affiliation20 and facilitated the emergence of a sense of belonging to an imagined global
community.21
19 For example, I show in Chapter 2 how the very terms used to describe the programs--computer literacy, culture informatique, and second literacy--were strongly influenced by their respective national histories and constitutional orders. 20 The Logo classroom can be seen as a kind of training ground for the development of a holistic and communitarian model of citizenship as “achieved membership in a self--determining ethical community." This model of citizenship is attributed to Aristotle. It is in contrast to the Lockean one that Jünger Habermas described as the “individualist and instrumentalist,” “organizational model” of citizenship, in which citizenship is “received membership in an organization which secures a legal status” (Charles Taylor, cited in Habermas 1995). The existence of different models of citizenship led Habermas to argue that the association of nationalism and citizenship was, for a brief period of time, a historical contingency and is not a conceptual link. 21 On the emergence of a global imaginary, see Jasanoff (2012) and Miller (2015). 19 Imagining the computer literate citizen around the world
No venture in world-making would be possible without a vision to provide a
blueprint for it and to inspire others to join the cause. A recent turn in coproductionist
STS work has been to recognize the importance of aspirational collective imaginations of
the future that a community strives to achieve and the role of technologies in fueling and
realizing these imaginations. In a 2015 work, Dreamscapes of Modernity, Jasanoff
defines a "sociotechnical imaginary" as a "collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and
publicly performed vision of a desirable future, animated by shared understandings of
forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in
science and technology” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 4). Imaginaries of "computer literate"
societies highlight how material technologies can be "tools to think with," to borrow
Turkle's term, not only at the level of and for the benefit of a single individual (even
though they were personal computers intended for individual use), but for collectives as they together imagine the ways that knowledge of the computer can be an answer to constitutionally important issues of what constitutes a functioning member of the polity.
These include ideas about what kind of knowledge, skills, and sensibilities are necessary to be a full member of a society envisioned as having particular characteristics, and what are the right relationships between subjects and institutions, such as schools, states, and businesses. In other words, the framework of sociotechnical imaginaries directs our attention to the embedding of the ideas of the individual pioneers in their technical creations and expressions about desirable lives in their respective socio-political cultures and in the world at large. The imaginaries framework makes it possible to ground the formation of computer technology in the everyday realities and norms (structures) of
20 social life. Symmetrically, it also allows one to see how the technology and the people
who championed it were agents that challenged the established structures to influence the
development of society in the directions that they deemed right and good.
Sociotechnical imaginaries arise from locally specific cultural contexts and draw
upon the normative resources, histories, identities, and beliefs of these cultures. To be
able to say something general about the formation of the person of the personal computer
requires looking comparatively at events in different cultures. A strength and at the same
time a limitation of most histories of computing is that they are deeply anchored in the
cultural context of a single country, or even a single region (e.g. the Silicon Valley). This
anchor allows authors to understand deeply the development of computer technology in
relation to the values, ways of being, and history of a particular group or community, but
it also prevents them from doing justice to the breadth of the computer revolution. They
do not account for the reasons why computers came to be seen around the world--in very
different cultural and political milieus--as effective tools for realizing social goals by
actively forming people (such as moving all of society toward a better imagined future, or
diagnosing perceived social problems that only the computer could properly address)22.
Furthermore, they do not account for the ways in which computer education pioneers
defined as the need, not just of a few elites, but of the general public collectively, and in
particular of children, to know computers intimately.
22 Eden Medina in Cybernetic Revolutionaries (2013) is a model work in the history of computing that studies how Chilean social order was reimagined with cybernetics. 21 I use the method of cross-national comparison23 to study the imaginations and
practices surrounding computer literacy programs for children, as well as the reception
and development of these imaginaries in the cultural and sociopolitical contexts of the
United States, France, and Soviet Union. Although many countries in the developed
world instituted computer literacy programs by the 1980s, these three countries make a
particularly interesting comparison because of the spectrum of culture, political thought,
and computing traditions that they represent and because of the positions they occupied
in the world order of the second half of the twentieth century. At the same time that these
differences existed and exerted influence on the development of the computer literacy
programs, ideas, actors, and artifacts circulated among the three countries and facilitated
the development of national programs that defined themselves at times in relationship
with and at other times in opposition to one another.
Three axes of comparison stand out from the commonalities and differences
represented by the United States, France, and Soviet Union as especially significant for
the development of their respective computer literacy programs: 1) the political system,
2) the openness or closedness of society, 3) the traditions of thinking the human.
During the period of study, each country occupied a different position on the
continuum of political systems from the market-based United States to socialist France to
communist Soviet Union. Each political system had its own visions, practices, and
23 Examples from comparative historiography that I draw upon include Sheila Jasanoff's Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (2004a) and John Carson’s The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence, and Inequality in the French and American Republics, 1750-1940 (2007). Jasanoff argues that regulation of new technologies (as opposed to education) reflects fundamentally different underlying presumptions about the role and responsibility of states. Carson shows how the different uptake of intelligence tests in France and the US point to different understandings of the state’s project of creating functioning citizens and discriminating among them. 22 institutions of subjectivity, that is, for my purposes, of the relationship of the individual
to the collective and to the nation-state. Pioneers of computer literacy saw the new
knowledge of the computer as a way to explicitly redefine this relationship (as in France)
or hypothesized that it would be redefined in the process of acquiring the new computer-
related knowledge and skills (as in the United States and Soviet Union). Although in
each case computer literacy projects became national projects, each nation uniquely
combined an individual pioneer’s initiative with the activities of the computer industry
and the national education system to realize the project. The study of computer literacy
in the context of these three political systems helps to better make sense of the greater
imaginaries in which computer literacy was embedded. It also helps to understand what
role the knowledge of the computer played in the context of the Cold War, both from the
perspective of the two world hegemons (the United States and the Soviet Union) as well
as of the politically “in between” France.24
The United States, France, and the Soviet Union also can be compared on an axis
from relatively more open to more closed societies. The concept of the “open society”
was advanced by philosopher Karl Popper who defined it as one in which individuals
make personal decisions as opposed to having decisions made for them by others (Popper
1945). According to this definition, democratic societies are considered to be more open
than authoritarian societies because they allow their citizens personal freedoms (of
movement, expression, belief) and provide transparent mechanisms and institutions for
securing these freedoms. In all three countries, a computer literate general public was
24 For justification of how France occupied an “in between” place during the Cold War, see Pierre Grosser (1995; 1997). 23 considered, for better or for worse, to lead to a more open society. Comparison of computer literacy and culture programs in countries of variable social openness (from the relatively open United States and France to the closed Soviet Union) helps to understand the promises and meanings of forging openness with technology.
The third axis of comparison concerns the traditions of thinking about the human, and therefore also the human-computer relationship, in each country. In the United
States popular and scholarly thinking about the human-computer relationship drew extensively upon cognitive psychology. For example, drawing upon her training in psychology in The Second Self, Turkle described the computer as a Rorschach test: a device upon which multiple forms can be projected, each of which reveals something about the individual personality of the beholder (Turkle 1984, 20).25 The characterization of a computer as Rorschach test was consistent with the aspect of constructionism advanced by Seymour Papert, an American pioneer of computers in education, which holds that the child can activate her character and individual style of learning through interaction with the computer as an adaptable, personalized learning tool—a tool that is pliable (within the constraints of the program) in the child's hands. In my comparative study, I situate Turkle's metaphor of “computers as Rorschach” in the particular socio- cultural context in which this metaphor arose. The Rorschach test was a specific type of psychological instrument that operated with particular assumptions about the human and within defined social relationships between the test's administrators and its subjects.
Similarly, the idea of the “computer as Rorschach” derives from a particular
25 In “Image of Self” (1990) Peter Galison explains in detail how the ambiguous inkblot of the Rorschach takes on a definite form in light of the subject's self-realization through the act of perception and verbalization. 24 understanding of the human relationship to computers, and hence has implications for how the computer should be employed in education.
In France and the Soviet Union, where there was less attention to the computer as an intellectual technology of the individual, the “computer as Rorschach” metaphor was not prevalent. Instead, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the leader of a French computer literacy project advanced the notion of the computer as a tool of decolonization while the leader of the Soviet projects, Andrei Ershov, used the metaphor of the jockey and horse as well as the Biblical Trinity (comprised of programmer, program, and computer) to describe the computer programmer. These metaphors, and the different traditions of thinking the human on which they rested, influenced the ways in which computers were used in education. Thinking the human as I use that idea here spans the psychological approaches in the United States to more macro-social political approaches in France, to the superficially competitive (horse racing) and yet still deeply internal (soul-oriented
Trinity) approaches in the Soviet Union. These variations in the way that ideas of the human and of citizenship were articulated through computer literacy programs in the three countries enrich our understanding of the social history of the computing age.
Cross-national comparison across three countries with varied political, social, and intellectual contexts helps to reveal meta-phenomena, such as allegiance to particular sociotechnical imaginaries, that may either go unnoticed when studying only one cultural context or be taken as a given instead of as the product of a particular time and place. To take one particularly relevant example: some histories of computing written by American scholars emphasize how mainframe computers developed in the “Closed World” of the
Cold War. The problem with such studies is that the historians have tended to hold a
25 static image of the Soviet Union, centering on Cold War bipolarity. Paul Edwards
(1996), for example considers Marxism to be an “ideology” that he factors into his definition of discourse, as if ideology is monolithic. Yet, a closer reading of the engineering and cultural climate within the Soviet Union suggests that multiple allegiances, conflicting philosophies, and diverse engineering solutions were mobilized to deal with computing challenges, just as there were reciprocal (and varied) perspectives on computing and citizenship in the United States.
On the opposite end of the spectrum from “Closed World” histories about mainframe computers are popular recent accounts of personal computing that focus on the PC's revolutionary nature, arguing that PCs have brought about a uniformly “open world” (see, for example, Friedman 2005). Just like the Closed World histories of mainframe computers, works that praise the PC's contribution to an “open” global world neglect the cultural particularities that have contributed to different experiences with and expectations for the computer. Both types of histories are the result of writing from the vantage point of a single culture that results in a false one-country-versus-the-rest-of-the- world dynamic. Thus, the “rest” of the world appears either as the determinate cause of internal events (as in the Closed World accounts) or, inversely, as the bare, open slate upon which the experiences of one country are projected.
The comparative method, applied in this particular moment of transition from mainframe computers reserved for experts to personal tools, even playthings, of the general public and of children, allows me to go beyond the national contexts of literacy programs to say something about the characteristics of computer literacy that the national imaginaries have in common. Comparison allows each case to highlight something
26 present or absent in the other cases. By these means, the researcher can escape the silo of the nation state, highlight distinctiveness, and locate sources and implications more accurately. This methodology, layered on top of a world in which there is already a circulation of people, ideas, and artifacts, fills out the global projection of particularity.
Thus, we see people who are constituted both by the traditions and values of their own local selves (rooted in particular national cultures) and by the new knowledge of the computer that they consider to have in common with others beyond their own nation.
In sum, the STS lens of constitutionalism, the framework of sociotechnical imaginaries, and the method of cross-national comparison provide the theoretical and methodological pillars of this dissertation. These frameworks and methods have also informed how I defined the scope of an ambitious three-nation case study and selected the empirical material with which to examine it. My empirical sources consist in the first place of unpublished archival documents (project proposals, correspondence, grant applications) of the three pioneers of the programs in the three nations: Seymour Papert in the United States, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in France, and Andrei Ershov in the
Soviet Union. I also examined a wide range of secondary sources: curricula, textbooks, software programs, and hardware design; transcripts of governmental hearings and political speeches; contemporary magazine, newspaper, and television articles and broadcasts, and films and novels from general culture, expressing views about public knowledge of the computer. Finally, I read articles and books by other writers on these educational programs and on the early history of personal computing more generally. To my knowledge, no one has ever brought this empirical material together, never
27 comparatively, and not with the goal of understanding the constitution of the human in a
computerized world.
Some of the individuals who are central to my study, their programs (e.g.
Informatique pour tous), and technologies (e.g. LOGO programming language) that I
analyze have been extensively written about in histories of the use of technology in
education and histories of computing.26 As noted, however, these works tend to focus on
events within a single country and are primarily interested in chronicling the development
of a technology or its application to education. The puzzle of how humans changed as
computers went from large machines accessible only to experts with special knowledge
and authorization to necessary implements for everyone in modern societies--and even
objects of child's play-- remains outside the scope of these studies.
Some scholars have addressed aspects of the computer "going public," yet have
not formulated their questions in terms of the constitutions of the human subject and
hence have looked at different material to address the topic. Historians of computing
have documented the invention of the personal computer, the process of computerization
of society, and the introduction of computers into public life. Some of their work focuses
on the design of the computer's physical components, such as the invention of the
transistor and the miniaturized circuit (Riordan and Hoddeson 1997) the design of lay-
appropriate interfaces (Bardini 2000) as primary reasons for the computer's wide public
uptake. Others focus on the role played by the computer industry in its search for new
26 On Papert’s LOGO, see Cynthia Solomon (1986), Robert Taylor (1980), Bill Ferster (2014). On French culture informatique programs, see Jean-Pierre Dufoyer (1988), Georges-Louis Baron and Eric Bruillard (1996), Michelle Harrari (2000) On Ershov’s second literacy projects, see Ksenia Tatartchenko's dissertation (Tatarchenko 2013; and forthcoming), Gregory Afinogenov (2013). 28 markets (Hertzfeld 2005). Many describe the individual inventiveness and entrepreneurial spirit of a few computer pioneers who pursued radical and frequently misunderstood visions (Freiberger and Swaine 1984; Waldrop 2002; Markoff 2005;
Isaacson 2014). The stories of these pioneers and of the professional circles of computer programmers is frequently pitted against “ordinary people” or the computer uninitiated lay public (Campbell-Kelly 1996). In most of these narratives, a few (usually male) pioneers deliver shiny, ready-made devices and programs to the eagerly awaiting masses.
Although I too follow the work of a small number of male visionaries, my attention to the collective imaginaries to which they contributed, but which also shaped them, helps to embed these individuals’ agency in larger social structures. Thus, I examine how the visions of the pioneers were articulated in relation to and together with their ideas of the child, the public, and the citizen that their programs intended both to serve and form. The imaginaries framework also draws attention to the ways in which these visions were resisted and contested.
From the history of computing literature, the recent work of Joy Rankin (2015) comes closest to the questions and subject matter of this dissertation. In her dissertation,
Rankin examines the history of computer time-sharing systems used in select American schools and universities in the 1960s and 1970s in order to answer the question “How did computing become quotidian?” Rankin argues that the origins of the personal computing culture lie in the rich educational uses of computers, where students and their teachers were “more than users” but rather creative innovators of user-friendly computing systems. In various parts of her dissertation, Rankin mentions that the people who invented the programming language BASIC and the computing system PLATO believed
29 that their work contributed to new forms of community building and offered opportunities for the “expansion of democracy” (Rankin 2015, 19). Rankin does not, however, investigate what democracy meant for the pioneers or how it connected to knowledge of the computers. Although she says her actors believed university students could and should learn programming, she does not pursue why they thought this knowledge would be important. Going beyond Rankin’s work, I investigate the ways in which pioneers of computers in education articulated ideas of computer users together with ideas about democracy. I argue that to answer the question “How did computing become quotidian?” we need to examine the sociotechnical imaginaries of the computer literate person that offer insights into what computing was imagined to be good for, why people should know it, and what they should know about it.
Sherry Turkle's early and influential study of how computers are evocative
"objects to think with" showed how computers transformed the way that people, especially children, think about themselves, and how people are drawn to this technology.
From the side of reception, her work explains how computers became so widely used by the general public because of what they offered and how they developed human psychology (Turkle 1984). These studies rightly point to the myriad intertwined causes-- individual and collective, public and private, push and pull--that led to the transformation of the computer from an expert tool of the few to "moving into" households, schools, and workplaces, as announced by Time’s 1983 Person of the Year issue.
30 Unlocking the human with the computer
Children were the primary subjects of these programs. The focus on children introduces special considerations pertaining to the role of childhood within each society, commonly held assumptions about children’s needs, abilities, and vulnerabilities, and visions of children’s play.27 Ideas of children as “the future” and as especially in need of becoming computer literate and at the same time as most capable (in contrast to adults) of doing so “naturally” were present to different extents in the three countries. Given this attention to children and the privileged place that child’s play occupied in each society, it is particularly striking that the emancipatory unlocking and fulfilling capacity of the computer could best be achieved, the pioneers in all three countries believed, through a playful relationship to the computer. Play with computers as part of computer literacy programs took many forms and could be categorized according to the four characteristics of play identified by French sociologist Roger Caillois (1961): competition, chance, mimicry (role playing, simulation), or even at the limit, vertigo, an out-of-body sense- experience of the kind produced by rapid spinning or ecstatic dancing. Play, it was believed, would enable the computer to become seamlessly a part of the human self, so that interaction with the computer could yield the maximum envisioned satisfaction and benefit. I use the term “interplay” to describe relationship with the computer characterized by play (as opposed to use) and one in which both sides (the person and the computer) mutually influence one another.
27 On the configuration of the child as user and player of computer games today and the relationship of this play to learning, see Grimes (Grimes 2015). 31 Different imaginaries of the computer "literate" or "cultured" person in different
countries led to the production of different styles of interplay and different types of
human-computer hybrids. It is helpful to think of each human-computer hybrid as a type
of "cyborg." "Cyborg" is a term used to describe an animal or human organism that has
internalized a technology in order to adapt better to a new environment (Clynes and
Kline 1960). The term was coined in 1960 by Clynes and Kline, who were concerned
with making it possible for human beings to go to space (Kline 2009).28 Clynes and Kline
conceived the main problem of human space flight to be an incompatibility between the
human body and the environment. Their innovation was to adapt the body to the
environment instead of creating an environment hospitable to the body (e.g. the space suit
is an example of the latter). They proposed to implant an osmotic pump into the body so
that drugs could be pumped into the organism in order to maintain homeostasis. The
imaginary of the computer literate human being in all three national cases similarly
entailed internalizing the computer in order to enable the individual, and, in turn, make
society as a whole, better able to adapt to the envisioned demands of the information age.
In each of the countries that I studied, this cyborg took a different form. Specifically,
different visions of citizenship in the three countries influenced ideas about the right
forms of the human-computer hybrid in the information age.
28 In his analysis of the work on and allusions to cyborgs by researchers of cybernetics, Ronald Kline has found that the main cybernetics texts were concerned with analogies between humans and machines rather than with the fusion of human and machine that defines the cyborg. Although the difference between making analogies and advocating for fusion are different projects, as Kline describes, they did come together in the case of imaginaries of the computer literate person. Pioneers of computer literacy programs that I study, particularly Papert and Ershov, mobilized the cybernetic analogy between human and machine to advocate for the fusion of human and computer in the form of the computer literate person. 32 This finding contrasts with most work done on cyborgs, where the cyborg is presented as a universal form of hybridity. For example, Turkle (1996) and Haraway
(1985) imply that nature and culture blur in the same ways everywhere and the cyborg combines organism and machine in the same proportions. But there can be different arrangements of human and machine to create the cyborg of the computer era. Is it a human brain in the body of the machine, or vice versa? Are the fingers of the machine attached to the arms of a human? These permutations in the form the cyborg takes are significant because they suggests that, when human-machine hybridizations occur, the whole world will not constituted by the same kind of creature--the neuter cyborg--but rather by people who have incorporated the technologies to different degrees and in different ways. This perspective also deemphasizes the claims about the newfound freedoms of the anonymous “technological polis” (Haraway 1985) inhabited by cyborgs.
Instead, it draws attention to the tensions and relationships among human beings who form a new kind of global collective by virtue of the diverse ways that they integrate computer technology into their ways of thinking and their bodily practices.
In the United States, the computer literate person was widely thought to be someone whose cognitive capacity had been enhanced by the computer. In France, it was someone who had become part of a common culture that had thoroughly internalized the computer. In the Soviet Union, it was a person who worked as one with the machine.
These different fusions of human and computer grew out of different underlying constitutional orders, that is, different ideas about who human subjects are and how they relate and ought to relate, both to one another and to the collective in the envisioned information age. Are computer literate subjects, for example, predominantly
33 psychologically distinct individuals, participants in a collective with intersubjective properties, or members of a common culture with values that permeate how its members think?
Contemporary discussions about machine translation, artificial intelligence, or computer-assisted instruction frequently take human-computer relations to be adversarial.29 Concerns about computerization include the spread of automation that makes people superfluous in the classroom or the workplace (i.e., with computers that do the job of the human better than humans themselves).30 By contrast, a computer literate person as envisioned by the pioneers of the age was to have a "feeling for the mechanism,"31 a sensitivity to the computer that would enable the human operator to intuit what kinds of tasks or problems the computer could be used to resolve and how best to communicate with it. This communication with the computer, or delegation of functions to it, would lead to a deeper, more fully realized humanity in the user, unlocking both creativity (Cohen-Cole 2009; 2014; Rankin 2015) and in other cases reason (Dick 2015). The internalization of computer technology was thus seen as a route to the fulfillment of potential—of the individual (in the case of the US) or of the collective (in the cases of the Soviet Union and France). That fulfillment was envisioned
29 This human v. machine rhetoric is still present in contemporary discussions of machine translation and its distant offspring in the form of on-line translation services (e.g. Google Translate). See, for example, (Lewis-kraus 2015). 30 Concerns about automation were central to the anxieties about computers in all three countries that I study, as I will describe in Chapter 1. Although historian of computing Ron Kline (2009) distinguished concerns about automation from what he defined as cyborgian concerns about the fusion of human and machine, I think that it is helpful to see these concerns together as both expressions of anxiety about the changing relationship between human and machine. I have found in examining expressions of anxieties about computers (e.g. Toffler’s Age of Anxiety) that it is difficult to distinguish between concerns about humans vs. computers from concerns about humans with computers. 31 To adapt Evelyn Fox Keller's phrase, "feeling for the organism," to describe Barbara McClintock's relationship to the organisms she studied (Keller 1983). 34 as leading to emancipation from rigid social structures such as an apparently suffocating educational system (United States) or oppressive citizen-state relations (France).
I trace the formation of human subjectivity with the computer by following sociotechnical imaginaries of computer literacy and culture through the four stages of development identified by Jasanoff (2015): origins in the visions of pioneers, embedding in computer technologies and educational curricula, contestation during local experiments, and extension to the national scale.
In Chapter 2, “Building the Computer Literate Nation,” I compare how the imaginaries of computer literacy, culture informatique, and second literacy originated in the context of three different political cultures in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.
Scholars, thinkers, and practitioners in each country articulated visions of the information society—ideas about how society were being and would be transformed with computerization, and in particular the spread of personal computing. The information society was perceived to different extents as a problem and an opportunity, and I explore how the imaginary of computer literate or cultured person emerged as a solution to social dislocations of the envisioned information society.
In Chapter 3, “Entrepreneurs of the Mind,” I introduce three key visionaries—
Seymour Papert (United States), Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber (France), Andrei Ershov
(Soviet Union)—who worked to advance forms of computer literacy or culture against the backdrop of distinctive national imaginaries of the information society and of the computer literate and cultured citizen of that society. I use the biographies of these three pioneers to explain what computer literacy, culture informatique, and second literacy meant to each of them, respectively. I show that in each of their visions knowledge of the
35 computer was more than a technical skill; it was a way to transform the human mind, how people know and think and learn, with the computer. In the story of each pioneer, we see how each pioneer’s vision grows out of wider background imaginaries and how those imaginaries accommodate or resist the tools, institutions, and pedagogical programs they created to purse their visions.
I turn in Chapter 4, “Playful Experiments with Computers,” to examining how the pioneering educators sought to put their visions to practice. They did so in particular by carrying out experiments in which children were simultaneously subjects of the technologies and teaching curricula they developed and objects of study from whom the visionaries sought to learn about the "right" interactions between humans and computers.
I show how the visionaries valorized specific elements of play in these experiments and how they used computer play for both teaching and learning about the human-computer relationship. Each experiment was a space apart in which the playful relationships that the pioneers considered to be foundational to computer literacy and culture could unfold.
In Chapter 5, “Return to Rules,” I examine the ways the pioneers sought to scale up these experiments to the level of the nation. In extending their visions to the national scale, the pioneers worked with the computer industry and the national education systems in their countries and abroad. The fluid ideals promoted by the pioneers encountered resistance from established institutions, each of which had alternative ideas about the way in which computer technology should form citizens. In the end, national programs to teach computer literacy and culture in each country focused primarily on teaching users of machines as opposed to players who refashioned their identities with the aid of computers in the sense envisioned by the pioneers.
36 In Chapter 6, “Constitutions of the Human in the Computerized World,” I conclude by suggesting ways in which the twentieth-century imaginaries of the computer literate citizen have traveled beyond their points of origin and are connecting to contemporary constitutions of humans in the computerized world.
37 Chapter 2: Building the Computer Literate Nation
Starting in the late 1960s, the computer became foundational to the imagination of a new future in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. In all three countries at approximately the same time, the computer was envisioned as a tool that could transform society by empowering people in particular ways and giving them a new understanding of self and world. In all three cases the route to transformation of the individual and society was to make the computer a part of the general knowledge of the lay public, and of children in particular. In the United States, local and national efforts to introduce computers into education were labeled “computer literacy,” in France as “informatics culture” (culture informatique) and in the Soviet Union as “second literacy” (