Schymik, Jan: Earnings Inequality and the Global Division of Labor: Evidence from the Executive Labor Market Munich Discussion Paper No. 2017- Department of Economics University of Munich Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Online at https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.38385 Earnings Inequality and the Global Division of Labor: Evidence from the Executive Labor Market Jan Schymik Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich May 2017 Abstract Many industrialized economies have seen a rapid rise in top income inequality and in the globalization of production since the 1980s. In this paper I propose an open economy model of executive pay to study how offshoring affects the pay level and incentives of top earners. The model introduces a simple principal-agent problem into a heterogeneous firm talent assignment model and endogenizes pay levels and the sensitivity of pay to performance in general equilibrium. Using unique data of manager-firm matches including executives from stock market listed firms across the U.S. and Europe, I quantify the model predictions empirically. Overall, I find that between 2000 and 2014 offshoring has increased executive pay levels, raised earnings inequality across executives and increased the sensitivity of pay to firm performance. JEL Classification: D2,F1,F2,J3,L2 Keywords: Offshoring; Earnings Structure, Inequality; Incentives; Executive Com- pensation Department of Economics, LMU Munich, E-mail:
[email protected] I am particularly grateful to Daniel Baumgarten, David Dorn, Carsten Eckel, Florian Englmaier, Maria Guadalupe, Dalia Marin and conference audiences at the MGSE Colloquium, DFG SPP 1764 Conference IAB Nuremberg 2015 and EARIE Munich 2015 for their valuable comments.