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Five RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, and the AFFIRMATION OF

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Five RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, and the AFFIRMATION OF Five RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, AND THE AFFIRMATION OF GOD We saw in earlier chapters how Marcel's identification of those human exp- eriences that are beyond the range of primary reflection, such as the exper- ience of fidelity, lead him in the general direction of the transcendent. Indeed, Marcel's unique development of the relationship between reflection and exp- erience opens up the whole realm of the transcendent for him in a way that escapes most other philosophers working in the same tradition. His approach leads him to present what I regard as a quite unique approach to the question of the existence of God. It is an existentialist approach, to be sure, yet it is not simply based on a faith commitment to God, as we find for example in Kier- kegaard, whose view emphasizes the affective and volitional nature of our rel- ationship with God at the expense, many would argue, of any rational approach to the question. There is a clear rational structure to Marcel's app- roach to the topic of God and religious experience, and it will be our aim to bring out this structure in this chapter. Although often neglected, at least within the discipline of philosophy of religion, there are a number of good reasons for paying careful attention to Marcel's ideas on the matter of God's existence. First, his philosophy is stud- ied by many thinkers precisely because of its profound implications for a phil- osophical approach to religious belief.1 In fact, some regard Marcel's philosophical writings on religious belief as perhaps his most profound contribution to philosophy. According to Seymour Cain (1914–), “From the beginning of his philosophical career, Marcel's main interest has been the interpretation of religious experience, that is, of the relation between man and ultimate reality.”2 Second, it seems that Marcel's account of the human subject does have significant implications for traditional philosophy of rel- igion, and when we say “traditional” we are referring, in particular, to the traditional arguments for the existence of God, and, more generally, to the issue of the nature of an affirmation of God. Third, Marcel's position has some affinity with recent work in Anglo-American philosophy of religion, especially work on the argument from religious experience in the Reformed tradition of philosophy of religion. In recent times, Alvin Plantinga (1932–), Nicholas Wolterstorff (1932–), William Alston (1921–), and John Hick (1922–) have all offered modern versions of the argument for the existence of God based on religious experience. I will suggest later that the general position of these philosophers can be advanced by appeal to the work of 70 THE VISION OF GABRIEL MARCEL Marcel. This in itself would be an important conclusion, given the respect for and influence of the Reformed approach in current philosophy of religion. In what follows, I will focus on: (1) Marcel's understanding of what a rational argument would entail, and whether he believes that the existence of God could be defended by means of rational arguments; (2) Marcel's account of how the individual subject can arrive at an affirmation of God; (3) whether or not his own approach could be regarded as a rational argument; and (4) how his position offers an advance upon the position of the Reformed epistem- ologists. 1. Reflection, Experience and God Philosophers of religion have always been interested in “proofs” for the exist- ence of God, and many of the arguments in the history of the discipline, such as the cosmological and design arguments, have often been presented by various thinkers as “proofs.” More recently, philosophers have been more modest in what they claim for arguments for the existence of God. Today, a philosopher of religion is more likely to say that the arguments for the exis- tence of God show that it is reasonable to believe in God (but may fall short of a “proof”), and perhaps also that they show that belief in God is more reasonable than the alternatives. Indeed, the atheist (or today the secularist or the naturalist) is likely also to make this more modest claim for his or her arguments. It seems that when we are dealing with the subject matter of worldviews (concerning the natures of the universe, human beings and mor- ality, and with what really exists or really is the case), we must settle some of the time for rationality rather than proof. So although the word “proof” is still widely used in discussions of the arguments for God's existence, it is usually with the implication that something less than a scientific-type proof is being offered. It is clear from our earlier exposition of Marcel's distinction between primary and secondary reflection that he would normally regard a rational argument (say for the existence of God), a proof even, as appropriate only in the area of primary reflection. This is because a rational argument attempts to provide a decisive solution to problems of various sorts, and the domain of primary reflection is the domain of problems. Recall that, for Marcel, a “problem” occurs when our pre-reflective lived experience, or being-in-a- situation, throws up a concrete situation which requires our attention (or our “reflection”), and (primary) reflection is then employed by us in an attempt to solve the problem. We noted that a crucial feature of the domain of problems is that any proposed solution to any particular problem must issue from a detached, disinterested inquiry. If some of the premises of a proof, for example, relied for their truth upon my personal involvement in existence, this would obviously constitute a valid objection to the proof (according to the .
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