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Symantec Encryption Desktop 10.5 for Macos User Guide

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Symantec Encryption Desktop 10.5 for Macos User Guide Symantec Encryption Desktop for macOS User Guide 10.5 Last updated: July 2020 Copyright statement Broadcom, the pulse logo, Connecting everything, and Symantec are among the trademarks of Broadcom. Copyright© 2020 Broadcom. All Rights Reserved. The term "Broadcom" refers to Broadcom Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. For more information, please visit www.broadcom.com. Broadcom reserves the right to make changes without further notice to any products or data herein to improve reliability, function, or design. Information furnished by Broadcom is believed to be accurate and reliable. However, Broadcom does not assume any liability arising out of the application or use of this information, nor the application or use of any product or circuit described herein, neither does it convey any license under its patent rights nor the rights of others. Contents About Symantec Encryption Desktop 10.5 for macOS 7 What's New in Symantec Encryption Desktop 10.5 for macOS 7 Using this Guide 7 “Managed” versus “Unmanaged” Users 8 Conventions Used in This Guide 8 Who Should Read This Document 9 About Symantec Encryption Desktop Licensing 9 About Symantec Encryption Desktop Licensing 9 Checking License Details 10 If Your License Has Expired 11 Technical Support 11 Symantec Encryption Desktop Basics 15 Symantec Encryption Desktop Terminology 15 Product Components 15 Terms Used in Symantec Encryption Desktop 16 Conventional and Public Key Cryptography 18 Using Symantec Encryption Desktop for the First Time 19 Installing Symantec Encryption Desktop 23 Installing and Configuring Symantec Encryption Desktop 23 Installing the Software 23 Upgrading the Software 24 Licensing Symantec Encryption Desktop 27 Running the Setup Assistant 27 Uninstalling Symantec Encryption Desktop 28 Moving Your Symantec Encryption Desktop Installation from One Computer to Another 28 The Symantec Encryption Desktop User Interface 31 Accessing Symantec Encryption Desktop Features 31 Symantec Encryption Desktop Main Screen 32 Using the PGP icon in the Menu Bar 33 Using the PGP Dock Icon 34 Using the macOS Finder 35 Notifier alerts 35 Notifier for Messaging 36 Symantec Encryption Desktop and the Finder 39 Overview 39 Encrypt, Sign, or Encrypt and Sign 39 Shred 41 Decrypt/Verify 41 ii Contents Mount or Unmount a PGP Virtual Disk Volume 42 Import a PGP Key 43 Add the Public Portion of PGP keys to Your Keyring 43 Extract the Contents of a PGP Zip Archive 43 Viewing the Encryption Desktop Log 44 Working with PGP Keys 45 Viewing Keys 45 Creating a Smart Keyring 46 Creating a Keypair 47 Expert Mode Key Settings 48 Protecting Your Private Key 49 Protecting Keys and Keyrings 50 Backing up Your Private Key 50 What if You Lose Your Key? 51 Distributing Your Public Key 51 Placing Your Public Key on a Keyserver 52 Including Your Public Key in an Email Message 53 Exporting Your Public Key to a File 53 Getting the Public Keys of Others 54 Getting Public Keys from a Keyserver 54 Getting Public Keys from Email Messages 55 Working with Keyservers 55 Using Master Keys 56 Adding Keys to the Master Key List 56 Deleting Keys from the Master Key List 57 Managing PGP Keys 59 Examining and Setting Key Properties 59 Adding and Removing Photographs 60 Managing User Names and Email Addresses on a Key 61 To delete a name/email address from your key 62 Importing Keys and X.509 Certificates 62 Importing X.509 Certificates Included in S/MIME Email Messages 62 Changing Your Passphrase 63 Deleting Keys, User IDs, and Signatures 63 Disabling and Enabling Public Keys 64 Verifying a Public Key 65 Signing a Public Key 66 Revoking Your Signature from a Public Key 67 Granting Trust for Key Validations 67 To grant trust to a key 68 Working with Subkeys 68 Using Separate Subkeys 69 Viewing Subkeys 69 Creating New Subkeys 70 Specifying Key Usage for Subkeys 70 Revoking Subkeys 71 Removing Subkeys 71 Working with ADKs 72 Adding an ADK to a Keypair 72 Contents iii Updating an ADK 72 Removing an ADK 73 Working with Revokers 73 Appointing a Designated Revoker 73 Revoking a Key 74 Splitting and Rejoining Keys 74 Creating a Split Key 74 Rejoining Split Keys 75 If You Lost Your Key or Passphrase 77 Reconstructing Keys with Symantec Encryption Management Server 77 Creating Key Reconstruction Data 77 Reconstructing Your Key if You Lost Your Key or Passphrase 79 Securing Email Messages 81 How Symantec Encryption Desktop Secures Email Messages 81 Incoming Messages 82 Understanding Annotations on Incoming Messages 83 Outgoing Messages 84 Securing Sent Items on IMAP Servers 84 Using Offline Policy 84 Services and Policies 85 Viewing Services and Policies 86 Creating a New Messaging Service 86 Editing Message Service Properties 88 Disabling or Enabling a Service 89 Deleting a Service 89 Multiple Services 89 Troubleshooting PGP Messaging Services 90 Creating a New Security Policy 91 Regular Expressions in Policies 95 Security Policy Information and Examples 96 Working with the Security Policy List 99 Editing a Security Policy 99 Editing a Mailing List Policy 99 Deleting a Security Policy 102 Changing the Order of Policies in the List 103 Symantec Encryption Desktop and SSL/TLS 103 Key Modes 105 Determining Key Mode 106 Changing Key Mode 106 Encoding Formats 107 Viewing the Encryption Desktop Log 107 Viewing Email with PGP Viewer 109 Overview of PGP Viewer 109 Supported Email Clients 110 Opening an Encrypted Email Message or File 110 Copying Email Messages to Your Inbox 111 Exporting Email Messages 111 PGP Viewer Preferences 112 Security Features in PGP Viewer 112 iv Contents Protecting Disks with Symantec Drive Encryption 115 About Symantec Drive Encryption 116 Encrypting Boot Disks 117 How does Symantec Drive Encryption Differ from PGP Virtual Disk? 117 Licensing Symantec Drive Encryption 117 Prepare Your Disk for Encryption 118 Supported Disk Types 119 Supported Keyboards 119 Best Practices Recommendation 120 Enabling and disabling System Integrity Protection in macOS version 10.11 or later 120 Ensure Disk Health Before Encryption 120 Calculate the Encryption Duration 121 Run a Pilot Test to Ensure Software Compatibility 121 Determine the Authentication Method for the Disk 121 Encrypting a Disk 122 Supported Characters 122 Encrypting the Disk 123 Encountering Disk Errors During Encryption 125 Using a Symantec Drive Encryption Encrypted Disk 125 Authenticating at the PGP BootGuard Screen 126 Authenticating With a User Name 127 Maintaining the Security of Your Disk 127 Viewing Key Information on an Encrypted Disk 127 Modifying the System Partition 127 Adding Other Users to an Encrypted Disk 127 Deleting Users From an Encrypted Disk 128 Changing User Passphrases 129 Re-Encrypting an Encrypted Disk 129 Backing Up and Restoring 129 Uninstalling Symantec Encryption Desktop from Encrypted Disks 130 Using Symantec Drive Encryption in a Symantec Encryption Management Server-Managed Environment 130 Symantec Drive Encryption Administration 130 Creating a Recovery Token in a Managed Environment 131 Using a Recovery Token 131 Recovering Data From an Encrypted Drive 132 Creating and Using Recovery Disks 132 Decrypting an Encrypted Disk 133 Moving Removable Disks to Other Systems 134 Accessing Data on Encrypted Removable Disks 134 Special Security Precautions Taken by Symantec Encryption Desktop 135 Passphrase Erasure 135 Virtual Memory Protection 135 Memory Static Ion Migration Protection 135 Other Security Considerations 136 Technical Details About Encrypting Boot Disks 136 Using PGP Virtual Disk 139 About PGP Virtual Disk 139 Creating a New PGP Virtual Disk 140 Contents v Viewing the Properties of a PGP Virtual Disk 142 Using a Mounted PGP Virtual Disk 142 Mounting a PGP Virtual Disk 143 Unmounting a PGP Virtual Disk 143 Set Mount Location 144 Compacting a PGP Virtual Disk 144 Re-Encrypting PGP Virtual Disks 144 Working with Alternate Users 145 Adding Alternate User Accounts to a PGP Virtual Disk 145 Deleting Alternate User Accounts From a PGP Virtual Disk 146 Disabling and Enabling Alternate User Accounts 146 Changing Read/Write and Read-Only Status 147 Granting Administrator Status to an Alternate User 147 Changing User Passphrases 148 Deleting PGP Virtual Disks 148 Maintaining PGP Virtual Disks 149 Mounting PGP Virtual Disk Volumes on a Remote Server 149 Backing up PGP Virtual Disk Volumes 149 Exchanging PGP Virtual Disks 150 The PGP Virtual Disk Encryption Algorithms 150 Special Security Precautions Taken by PGP Virtual Disk 151 Passphrase Erasure 151 Virtual Memory Protection 151 Memory Static Ion Migration Protection 152 Other Security Considerations 152 Using PGP Zip 155 Overview 155 Creating PGP Zip Archives 156 Opening a PGP Zip Archive 157 Verifying Signed PGP Zip Archives 158 Shredding Files with PGP Shredder 159 Using PGP Shredder to Permanently Delete Files and Folders 159 Shredding Files using the PGP Shredder icon 160 Shredding Files using the Shred Files Icon in the Symantec Encryption Desktop Toolbar 160 Shredding Files using the Shred Command from the File menu 161 Shredding Files in the Finder 161 Setting Preferences 163 Accessing Symantec Encryption Desktop Preferences 163 General Preferences 163 Keys Preferences 165 Master Keys Preferences 166 Messaging Preferences 166 Proxy Options 168 Disk Preferences 169 Notifications Preferences 170 Advanced Preferences 171 vi Contents Working with Passwords and Passphrases 173 Choosing whether to use a password or passphrase 173 The Passphrase Quality Bar 174 Creating Strong Passphrases 175 What if You Forget Your Passphrase? 176 Saving Your Passphrase in the Keychain 176 Using Symantec Encryption Desktop with Symantec Encryption Management Server 179 Overview 179 For Symantec Encryption Management Server Administrators 180 Manually binding to a Symantec Encryption Management Server 181 Index 183 About Symantec Encryption Desktop 1 10.5 for macOS Symantec™ Encryption Desktop, Powered by PGP Technology is a security tool that uses cryptography to protect your data against unauthorized access. 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