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In Support of Federalism Debates No 64 Politorbis Zeitschrift zur Aussenpolitik www.eda.admin.ch/politorbis Revue de politique étrangère Rivista di politica estera In Support of Federalism Debates 1/2017 Contact: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA Directorate of Political Affairs DP Division for Security Policy DSP Politorbis Effingerstrasse 27 3003 Bern Phone: + 41 58 464 37 77 Fax: + 41 58 464 38 39 mailto: [email protected] www.eda.admin.ch/politorbis Die Texte werden normalerweise in der Sprache der Verfasser gedruckt. Der Inhalt muss nicht zwingend mit der Meinung des EDA übereinstimmen. En principe, les articles sont publiés dans la langue de travail de leurs auteurs. Le contenu ne reflète pas nécessairement la position du DFAE. The articles are published usually in the language in which they were written. The contents do not necessarily reflect the views of the FDFA . 2 Politorbis Nr. 64 – 1 / 2017 Politorbis Table of Content Andrea Iff & Nicole Töpperwien Foreword 5 Introduction: In support of federalism debates 7 Part I: Federalism and its Alternatives 11 13 Chapter 1: What is federalism, what are federations? Chapter 2: What are origins, rationales and determinants of federal systems? 19 Chapter 3: What are ‘alternatives’ to federalism? 25 Part II: Context and Process 33 Chapter 4: Federalism in contexts of peace-statebuilding and democratic 35 transitions Chapter 5: Federalism debates as part of peace negotiations, national 39 dialogue and constitution-making Chapter 6: Common issue: who shall participate? 49 Chapter 7: On dynamics of debates on substance and possibilities to manage them 53 Politorbis Nr. 64 – 1 / 2017 3 Part III: On the Substance of Federalism Debates 61 Chapter 8: How to demarcate federal units? 63 Chapter 9: How to distribute powers and resources? 71 Chapter 10: What to consider when establishing the second chamber of 85 parliament? Chapter 11: How much importance shall federalism give to ethnic diversity? 89 Chapter 12: Shall federal units have their own Constitution? 93 Chapter 13: Do federal units have a right to self-determination? 99 Chapter 14: When do federations fail? 105 Chapter 15: What aspects of the federal design determine how centralized 109 or non-centralized a federation is? In Conclusion - After the debate 111 Annex 1: Selected literature 115 Annex 2: List of tables and figures 117 Annex 3: Questions on Federalism 118 4 Politorbis Nr. 64 – 1 / 2017 FOREWORD A Swiss contribution to strengthening good offices and expertise in support of federalism debates The world has become less stable and more unpredictable. Wars are raging, crises have become more acute even on Europe’s eastern fringes and migration flows present major challenges. All of these crises have their own specific causes and characteristics based on global politics and internal demands for better prospects for all communities. These challenges to peace and security have in common the need to reconcile diversity within and beyond national borders. Addressing the challenges posed by diversity must start within countries and it particularly difficult for those recovering from a conflict or an autocratic regime. Federalism is one of the options worth considering by national stakeholders in order to overcome divisions, resolve past conflicts and prevent new ones. Federalism has proven effective in contributing to prevent and resolve conflicts in various culturally-diverse countries undergoing transition. It can help preserve a state identity that encompasses several constitutive groups and accommodate several power-centres to ensure better access to decision-making, resources and services for different ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious or regional groups. This can contribute to a more democratic society and, in turn, prevent conflict. Depending on the context and how it is designed and implemented, federalism can, however, also present risks to the overall system of governance and peace process. New imbalances of power, deeper divisions, the “ethnicisation” of politics and greater corruption at sub-national level are all potential risk. Ultimately, federalism will only work if there is a consensus in favour of living together in the respective societies. Inclusive and transparent debates among political representatives, institutions, civil society and citizens are therefore essential for any country considering the introduction of federalism. Whether the debate is part of a formal constitutional and democratic process or an informal dialogue, the process itself is key to building a common vision and consensus around new power-sharing arrangements. Debates can help explore institutional options to balance interests within state institutions and help prevent and transform violent conflict and political crisis in post-conflict transitions and nascent democracies. They can help clarify what federalism is, what options it offers and what the alternatives are. Debates can help identify the interests behind stakeholders’ positions and also foster the search for win-win solutions and compromises. They also help liaise with various interest groups. In transition contexts, federalism debates can be an integral part of peacebuilding, democracy promotion and peacebuilding efforts. Indeed, they can help settle disagreements through political means and dialogue. As a stable federal state with multiple linguistic and cultural communities, as well a long democratic tradition, Switzerland is often requested to provide recipes to integrate diversity within state institutions and to ensure a fair distribution of power and resources at various levels of the state. Whenever Switzerland presents its experience of federalism, it is particularly careful not to promote the reproduction of the Swiss system in other contexts. In response to requests for support from countries undergoing reform, Switzerland has frequently offered its good offices and shared technical expertise, with a particular focus on organising, stimulating and nourishing existing national debates. This is why Switzerland is still regarded as a trustworthy and credible partner that brings experience and knowledge to the table without pursuing its own hidden agenda. The present publication is the result of a mandate given to two independent Swiss experts and was written in consultation with a wide range of practitioners. It is a further Swiss contribution to strengthening good offices and expertise in support of federalism debates and aims in particular to inform national, international and Swiss mediators, advisers, practitioners and stakeholders who support democratic reforms and peacebuilding processes. It covers the design of processes in a way that mitigates risks of polarisation and violent confrontation and that allows national stakeholders to reflect and reach informed decisions on a range of options for state organisation. Politorbis Nr. 64 – 1 / 2017 5 It also provides an illustration of lessons learned in various contexts. It should be noted that the views expressed in it are solely those of the authors and not in any way those of the Swiss government. I am confident that the present publication and its recommendations will contribute to fruitful debates and inspire current efforts for peace, democracy and stability worldwide. I wish you an insightful and rewarding reading. Heidi Grau, Ambassador Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Human Security Division 6 Politorbis Nr. 64 – 1 / 2017 INTRODUCTION: IN SUPPORT OF FEDERALISM DEBATES In several countries, debates on the introduction of The title of this publication “In Support of Federal- federalism take place. This publication focuses on ism Debates” provokes three questions: Why focus key challenges in federalism debates that are re- on federalism? Why focus on federalism debates? lated to context, process and substance. The pub- Why focus on support to federalism debates? lication targets external supporters to such de- bates, such as experts in peacebuilding, mediators/ Why focus on federalism? About one-fourth of coun- facilitators of dialogue, or technical experts as tries are organized as federations and several others well as involved stakeholders. The publication are considering introducing federalism. Debates on will draw external supporters’ attention to certain the introduction of federalism often take place as key considerations for when they consider sup- a last resort in order to prevent or manage conflict, porting or indeed support federalism debates. in fragile and contested contexts, but also as part of reforms in transition to democracy. Federalism can establish a state organization that allows acknowl- The term ‘federalism debate’ is here used for any kind of edging and accommodating for instance ethnic, discussions or negotiations related to federalism within cultural, linguistic, religious or regional diversity. a political process, whether this process is characterized It can also promote the existence of several pow- as peace negotiations, national dialogue, constitution- er-centers and provide tailored resource sharing making, or any kind of transition process from one gov- between such power centers – within one state. ernance system to another. Federalism can be defined Federalism allows for creating and maintaining as “constitutionally guaranteed self-rule and shared a state identity that can encompass several constitut- rule”. Countries have incorporated federal elements to ing groups. Federalism can contribute to enhancing different extents. A country is called a federation when democracy by instituting
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