LESSONS FROM
Mumbai Terrorist Attack –26/11/2008
Ajay Kumar Tomar Jt. C.P., Ahmedabad MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police TARGETS MUMBAI 26/11 Module – I
CST CAMA & ALBLESS HOSPITAL OUTSIDE METRO CINEMA VILE PARLE GIRGAUM CHOUPATTY
Module-II
LEOPOLD CAFE THE TAJ MAHAL & PALACE HOTELS.
Module – III
Module-IV
TRIDENT - OBEROI HOTELS
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11 THE TEN MEN
Team I----- CST Ismail Khan@ Abu Ismail (Dera Ismail khan) leader of all teams. Md.Azmal Ameer Iman@ Abu Muzahid (Okara ) Team II & III----- Taj Hfeez Arshad@ Bada Abdul Rahman (Multan) Javed @ Abu Ali (Okara) Leopold hotel to Taj Shoeb@ Sahib (Sialkot) Nazeer @ Abu Umar ( Faislabad) Training Locations Team IV----- Nariman house 1). Muzaffarabad in POK Nasir @ Abu Umar (Faislabad) 2). Battal Hillocks in Manshera Babar Imaran @ Abu Aksha ( Multan) 3). Karachi. Team V----- Oberoi Chota Abdul Rehman ( Multan) SIM cards were purchased in Fahadullah @ Abu Fahad (Okara) Kolkata
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11 Kuber – The Transit Boat of Terrorists
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11 TERROR ATTACKS ON MUMBAION 26.11.2008 TO 28.11.2008
• Around 20 hrs- terrorists reached Budhwarpet jetty - clad in Cargo pants and T-shirts - packed their AK-47 rifles - divided in 5 groups of two in each- took available Taxis - proceeded to their targets.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
THE PLACE WHERE THE TERRORISTS LANDED IN MUMBAI
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
CHATRAPATI SHIVAJI TERMINUS(CST)
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
Terrorists caught on CCTV camera at Mumbai CST
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
Mumbai CST Train Station just after the attack
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
THETHE WAY WAY FROM FROM CST CST TO TO CAMA CAMA HOSPITAL HOSPITAL
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
CST TO CAMA HOSPITAL
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
Terrorist crossingIGP ATS, GujaratTimes Police of India Lane MUMBAI 26/11
ATTACK ON CAMA HOSPITAL ON 26.11.2008
• CAMA Hospital is located near CST and Azad Maidan Police Station
• The same team which attacked CST proceeded to CAMA Hospital. They killed people who came in the way
• They went to a road side hut at the compound of CAMA Hospital, took some drinking water and killed the inmate.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
SRI KARKARE AND OTHERS TRAVELLED IN THIS VEHICLE
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
BULLET PENETRATION IGPPOINTS ATS, Gujarat ON THEPolice VEHICLE MUMBAI 26/11
GIRGAUN CHOWPATTY ON 26.11.2008
• The terrorists tried to take a ‘U’ turn but the car was stuck on the road divider.
• The Police personnel rushed towards the car. One un-armed constable tried to snatch the AK-47 from Ismail, but Ismail opened fired at the constable killing him on the spot.
• How ever other police personnel reacted swiftly and opened fire at Ismail.
• Injured Ajmal was apprehended immediately.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
SCODA CAR WHICH WAS USED BY ISMAIL AND AZMAL WHERE ISMAIL KILLED AND AZMALIGP APPREHENDED ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
AZMAL GETTING TREATMENT IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
LEOPOLD CAFÉ - GOKUL RESTAURANT - TAJ MAHAL & PALACE HOTELS
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police TERROR ATTACK AT TAJ(4 TERRORISTS)
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
Leopold Cafe just after the AttackIGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
Steps of the Leopold Cafe: Broken cutlery and glass; and a few blood stains
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
TAJ IN FLAMES
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
THE OBEROI TRIDENT
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
The Nariman House
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11 ATTACK ON NARIMAN HOUSE
• Nariman House is a residential apartment 6 floor building - 1 Km from Colaba PS.
• Also called CHABAD House – Ultra Orthodox Jews residing in this building.
• The 1st floor -as Congregation Hall -2nd floor as library - remaining floors - as residential apartments of Jews.
• It has only one stair case and one lift.
• Located in crowded residential locality.
• Two terrorists gained entry - killed all the inmates and took position on upper floors.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
ATTACK ON NARIMAN HOUSE
• The terrorists covered the stair case and lift making it difficult for the forces to enter into the building, thus necessitating air dropping.
• Two terrorists were killed in Nariman house.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
Smoke emanatingIGP fromATS, Gujarat Nariman Police House MUMBAI 26/11
Commandos Attempt Air Assault to Free Nariman House Jewish Hostages
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
EXPLOSION OF IED OF RDX IN TAXI
• The team of terrorists which attacked the CST boarded the taxi at Budhwarpet - left a bag containing an IED with RDX while getting down at CST.
• Later the driver of the taxi picked up three other passengers to go to Mahalaxmi
• The IED exploded at Vileparle near SantaCruz killing all the people in the vehicle.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
VILLEPARLE CAR EXPLOSION IGP ATS, Gujarat Police MUMBAI 26/11
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Lessons to be learnt from Mumbai Terrorist Attack Incident • The terrorists who perpetrated the Mumbai mayhem were foot soldiers of ‘LeT.’ • Kasab’s interrogation reveals that 500 such trained terrorists are ready for deployment. • When news started pouring in from Trident, Oberoi, Taj, Ville Parle, there was total confusion. There were no Crisis Management Group or Command Centre to co-ordinate the efforts, movements and deployment of resources.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Golden Hour
Close to 80% killings took place within the first hour of this terrorists attack at various locations. During this hour the Police response was brave but chaotic. The strategy of the terrorists was to kill maximum number of people at selected locations in a short time and then take hostages to a vantage point in highrise buildings and thereafter prolong the situation as long as possible.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police • In each police unit there are many internal security schemes, but there is no scheme for such terrorist attacks. We need to prepare the scheme urgently. • In important cities we need to identify structures that are iconic and which are frequented by the rich / powerful and people from foreign countries. • For each structure / building we need to make crisis response plans, with details such as layout, locations of CCTV, stairs, emergency exits etc.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police • In hotel Taj the terrorists controlled the building so effectively that the police did not know how many of them were there. From 6th floor they had the entry point in their sight / control. Hence they were able to keep security forces at bay.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police • The weapons, equipments, ammunitions, teargas, bullet-proof jackets, barricades should be distributed in such a way in the city that they can be available without any loss of time. • The QRT (Quick Relief Team) should also be stationed at strategic locations and we must reduce the response time. • The telephone and mobile numbers of key services like Hospital, Fire brigade, Municipal Corporations, Army, Air Force, CRPF, RAF and NSG so that atleast two key persons could be contacted on mobile numbers and landline numbers.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police • It is very important to keep the place of incident well cordoned to avoid crowding and to keep the media away. • The worst part of Mumbai operation was that media was allowed to make it a spectacle, the terrorists inside always knew what were security forces doing and how they were being tackled because they were in live touch with their HQ through mobile phones. • However, a senior Police officer should hold periodical media briefing so that media is provided necessary information and the rumours do not spread.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police • The SOP’s should be known to all concerned agencies and individuals and must be rehearsed so that we move like a machine. • As a part of our exercise mock drill must be conducted to replicate this scenario. • When news started pouring in from one location after another there was stunned silence in the Police Control Room and PHQ and there was a palpable fear that the terrorists were going to target the PHQ and CP’s office.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Time log of events
21:48 hrs Control Room is informed about firing at Leopold Café. Within 2 minutes nakabandi instructions are issued.
21:53 hrs Message about firing at CST Rly. Stn.
22:03 hrs Message about firing at Taj hotel.
22:08 hrs Message about firing at Trident Oberoi.
22:30 hrs Message about firing at Nariman House.
22:47 hrs Blast in Ville Parle.
22:49 hrs Blast at Bandra. IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Police Response
22:20 hrs JCP Crime and JCP L&:O reach Control Room.
22:26 hrs Nakabandi was ordered and officers were rushed to different locations.
23:26 hrs JCP informs the DGP and Chief Secretary that this situation cannot be handled by the Police and we will need the Special Armed forces.
23:31 hrs Govt. of India was informed.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Police Response
23:40 hrs •The JCP Mumbai informed CRPF HQ in Mumbai to rush forces. •150 RAF personnel were the first to reach and they were sent to Oberoi and Taj hotels. •They told they can cordon the locations and they can’t do any other operations.
02:14 hrs •14 MARCOS marine commandos reached the Control Room and sent to Taj and Oberoi hotels. •They reached the CCTV control rooms of both the hotels and take no other action.
03:30 hrs Army team reached to the spot but refuses to enter. IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Police Response
04:50 hrs NSG lands at Mumbai Air Port. 06:30 hrs •The DCP traffic somehow arranges BEST buses to get them from Air Port to South Mumbai. •Brigadier Sisodiya of NSG reaches the Police Control Room and asked for detailed briefing. •The JCP requests him to call his men also urgently to save time but valuable time is lost in this whole process. 08:30 hrs NSG reaches Mantralaya and it is decided that they will cover only two locations with 75 men each because of operational and tactical reasons. With 150 men they could not take up third location that is the Nariman House. 09:15 hrs NSG reaches Taj and Oberoi.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police The eye opening lesson Sophisticated use of technology
• The terrorists just got creative. What they really did was to combine some simple tech, and use to deadly effect. • Terrorists used four GPS-enabled handsets to enter India, nine mobile phones for communication and a satellite phone was used to guide terrorists through the attack.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Thuraya Dealer Network in Pakistan The satellite phone from Abu Dhabi-based Thuraya used by the terrorists was what came as a challenge to the authorities.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police THE TECH---GPS and Google Earth What they used it for: Navigating their way to India, planning the attack, getting around Mumbai (likely).
Fighting it
It’s safe to expect that the Google-Earth-nation-security issue will be dredged up again.
There might even be a similar outcry against GPS, but that won’t last long. The bottom line is that both these technologies have caused more good than harm, and it would be a crying shame to limit them in any manner.
GPS is an important tool on aircraft, ships, cars, and now even cell phones. And because a GPS device doesn’t send any personal information to the satellites, it’s impossible to tell who’s using which device. The smarter plan? Master both and use them to plan counter-terrorist activities. IGP ATS, Gujarat Police THE TECH—BlackBerrys What they used it for: Coordinating with each other, tracking news via GPRS(GENERAL PACKET RADIO SERVICE) Fighting it
Thankfully, this isn’t hard – once the authorities know the offending number, they can shut it down, tap its calls, even track the phone’s position. They can also see which sites the phone’s user is visiting, and block them if necessary. As for the news, sites could stop reporting live news – especially if that news talks about the police’s plans. Then again, stopping live news means that nobody knows what’s going on, which means rumours, panic, and all the nastiness that comes with it. As for the e-mail issue, soon after the dispute arose, RIM allowed Indian security agencies to monitor the BlackBerry network, and in July 2008, the service was cleared by the telecom ministry. IGP ATS, Gujarat Police THE TECH—Remailers What they used it for: Telling the media that they were responsible without being traceable. Fighting it
Remailers are actually being fought against even as you read this. Unless you have your own remailers server, you never know when one will be taken down.
However, sitting back and hoping for remailers to vanish is silly at best. Our forces need better experts, and more importantly, time, if they are to trace e-mails through remailers.
So even if the “Deccan Mujahideen” wasn’t really responsible for the attacks, tracing their e-mail can lead us to tomorrow’s attackers.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police The Tech :VoIP Phones What they used it for : “Phoning home” and getting orders from their handlers.
Fighting it
While VoIP calls are difficult to trace and tap, they aren’t impossible. Unfortunately, these can be time-consuming processes, and in a situation like Mumbai, we can’t afford that time. To make its job easier, we need to push for a law that will require VoIP service providers to build backdoors in their software, which law enforcement agencies can use to tap calls when necessary.
The only good thing that emerged from the terrorists using VoIP phones was that the digital trail could potentially lead the authorities to their handlers. If the group was more reluctant to use phones while they conducted the attacks, the trail would have ended at the last terrorist alive. IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Lessons : NSG / Special Forces Briefing
• Whenever NSG is called their briefing should be held at the Air Port only by a knowledgeable local officer who can tell – (i) What is the situation? (ii)Where is the location? (iii)Topography of the surrounding area. (iv)Layout plan of the building. (v)How many policemen are available at the location? (vi)What are the Policemen doing at the location? (vii)Who is the Police Officer incharge at each location? • In Mumbai incident Fire Brigade had all layouts of each building. IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Lesson: Preparing for the worst case scenario
• The Govt. response has to be effective at two levels (i) There has to be a Crisis Management Group with top Govt. officials such as the chief Secretary, the Home Secretary, the D G P, the Secretary Urban Development, CEO GSDMA, Relief Commissioner. • This crisis Management Group will meet at a Control Room where sufficient number of landlines, mobile phones, wireless and satellite phones are available.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police • The local police should have a Command Centre with senior officers like the CP or JCP incharge. This Command Centre should also have the contact numbers of all important Govt. functionaries such as the Municipal corporation, fire brigade, hospitals and media. • This command centre will issue instructions regarding deployment of officers, men equipment and materials in the fastest possible time.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police • When a Mumbai like incident occurs the senior officers face a dilemma whether to rush to the place of occurrence or to sit in a office, hold meeting with other senior officers and take sound decisions based on discussions.
• It is catch 22 situation if they rush to the spot and do the running around, they are unable to get necessary details nor they are able to communicate their decisions systematically and without loss of time.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police • The CP may ask the JCPs and the ACPs to take quick round and reach the nearest P.Stn. which is central / nearest to the place of occurrence.
• The CP may hold emergency meeting in the P.Stn. only and this place can become the command centre.
• The DCPs and ACPs should be asked to rush to the place of occurrence, take a measure of the situation and cordon the area by deploying the police. They should quickly gather as much information as possible about the place, hostages, number of terrorists, fire power etc.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police • In the name of principle of need to know different agencies do not share the intelligence available with them, this principles has to give way to the right to know.
• A similar decision is badly required to be taken at the national level also.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police OTHER POSSIBILITIES
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Cyber Terrorism
• Cyber Terrorism
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Dirty Bomb
• Not a weapon of mass destruction
• Certainly a weapon of mass disruption
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police Emergency Preparedness
• In response to terrorism - Example
– Chechen rebels threatened to use a bundle of radio active material with explosives
– No explosion - A package of Cesium 137 recovered the rebels had buried in a park in Moscow.
– AL Qaeda – Osama – “.. is my religious duty”. RDD could result from a failed nuclear device
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police In 2004
• British Authorities arrested Salahuddin Amin attempting to buy a ‘Radioisotope Bomb’ from Russian mafia in Belgium.
• He was linked to Al-Qaeda
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police In 2004
• British Authorities arrested Dhiren Barot and several associates on various charges including conspiring to commit public nuisance by the use of radio active material. Found guilty and sentenced to life.
• Conducted research on production of dirty bomb to cause injury, fear, terror and chaos.
IGP ATS, Gujarat Police GUJARAT COASTAL: AT A GLANCE
COASTAL AREA – 1660 KM
CONTINENTAL SHELF – 1,64,00 SQ KM
CREEK AREAS – 440 SQ KM
NO. OF PORTS – 41 – 01 MAJOR PORT AT KANDLA – 11 INTERMEDIATE PORTS – 29 MINOR PORTS CARGO HANDLING – 181.5 MILLION TONNES – INCREASE TO 313 MILLION TONNES BY 2015. COSTAL SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS
• CROSS BORDER TERRORISM USING SHIPS/ DHOWS/ TRAWLERS
• INFILTRATION AND SMUGGLING OF DANGEROUS
GOODS THROUGH COAST AND CREEKS
• INFILTRATION DUE TO IMBL VIOLATION BY FISHERMEN
• 1660 KM LONGEST COASTLINE IN INDIA. COSTAL SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS
• PROXIMITY TO PAKISTAN- VULNERABLE TO NEFARIOUS ACTIVITIES OF ISI
• HISTORY OF LANDING ARMS,AMMUNITION AND RDX IN PAST.(E.G.1993 LANDING OF RDX USED IN BOMBAY BLAST AND RECENT KUBER INCIDENT). POINTS TO PONDER
• Special precautions for coastal areas.
• Closer supervision of fishing activities.
• Regular random checking of fishing boats.
– (who is going and who is coming back).
– (what is going and what material is coming).
• Prevent mixing of Indian boats with Pakistani boats. Strict watch near IMBL. POINTS TO PONDER
• Verification process to be made full proof before issuing fisherman cards.
• Intensive awareness campaign in coastal areas amongst fishing community regarding possible threats and regarding signs of anti-national / terror activities, e.g. how to identify suspect activity, individuals & objects and what to do in case of reasonable suspicion?
• Regular checking of security arrangements in the Vital Installations along coastal areas. COASTAL VITAL INSTALLATIONS OF GUJARAT
Cement & Power Project
Crick Kandla & Adani Port IOC IBM Refinery & Vadinar Port Dholera Proposed Port Okha Port & Dwarka Temple
DAHEJ Bhavnagar Port Porbandar Port Hajira
Pipavav Port
Cement, Rayon & Somnath VAPI INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATION
• Do we have better co-coordinating mechanism in place today as compared to 2008?
• Are we conversant with the SOPs for emergent situation?
• Is this awareness widely prevalent at the cutting edge level in our lower formations?
• Do we have Crisis Management Teams (well defined, with proper control rooms and fully equipped?) INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATION
• How about training in effective usage of state-of-the-art equipments purchased and hopefully deployed?
• The recent havoc emanating from social networking caused serious problems (post Assam riots). The enemy has successfully tested another potent weapon. How seriously are we working out the counter measures?