THE INTERPRETATION OF BY THE NEOPLATONIST SIMPLICIUS Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 The doctrines of Parmenides of the one being and of the world of seem­ ing were—as is well known—interpreted in different ways in the course of the history of philosophy, and even in twentieth-century historic-philosophical research, there is no agreement on the meaning of the two parts of the poem. Regarding the one being there are four attempts of explanation to be dis­ tinguished: (1) The being is material; (2) the being is immaterial; (3) it is the esse copulae or must be seen as a modal category; (4) it is the entity of being ("Sein des Seienden"). This latter interpretation, if we can call it an in­ terpretation, is chiefly influenced by Heidegger. The Doxa-part, however, is seen as (1) a more or less critical doxography; (2) a second-best, hypothetic explanation of phenomena which is not truth but verisimilitude; (3) a systematic unit together with the first part, the aXijdtLa. We do not have to discuss the differences between the outlined explanations separately;1 in the following, we shall show that some modern interpretations were already ex­ pressed in a similar way in antiquity. With this, we shall concentrate especially on the Neoplatonist Simplicius who in his commentary on 's Physics expounds the first part of the Parmenidean poem completely and, in addition, the most important doctrines of the second part.

I Aristotle says2 that Melissus and Parmenides had not conceded any reality besides the essence of sensible things, but that they had been the first to recognize that objects of knowledge are ungenerated and unchangeable— the unchangeable is the object of necessary and universal cognition—and that they had applied the characteristics of the ungenerated and unchanging to the sensible.3 Alexander of Aphrodisias4 explains Aristotle's statement in this way: According to Parmenides and Melissus only the sensible is being. Knowledge concentrates upon being. That, of which there is knowledge, is unchangeable. Thus, the sensible is unchangeable. On basis of these con­ siderations, Parmenides and Melissus transferred by mistake to the sensible what is to be applied to unchanging substances. Yet it is clear that the single sensible thing is not identical with the unchangeable one being; for the single sensible things come to be and perish, but the being is ungenerated and imperishable. From this, there arises the problem how we must understand— insofar as its accuracy is not contested—Aristotle's statement on the Parmenidean being, namely, just what in the realm of the sensible is un- SIMPLICIUS ON PARMENIDES 31 changeable being, TUV aladrtrccv ovaia5 could mean the unchangeable univer­ sal essence of sensible things, yet it could as well be conceived as something else. From Eudemus, fr. 12, quoted by Simplicius6 emerges that considera­ tions like this were made soon after Aristotle, "In the first book of Physics, Eudemus is talking about Parmenides, and he wrote this, as it is reported by Alexander; for I did not find it in the Eudemus-text, 'He hardly means the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 universal.7 For an object of that kind was not yet looked for, and that what Parmenides attributes to being does not permit this assumption, but it emerged from the considerations later on. For how will the universal be "equal from the centre"8 and such as this? As is said, almost all statements like this will be true of the sky'." According to Eudemus9 reason for equating the Parmenidean being with the sky is Parmenides, fr. 8, 43, "On every side it is like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere." Simplicius10 rejects this exposition referring to Parmenides, fr. 8, 22, "Nor it is divisible, since it is all alike": The sky is not indivisible, nor is it alike to a sphere, but it is the most accurate sphere of all natural things." The exposition given by Eudemus is akin to that given by Theophrastus: The Parmenidean being is the cosmos.12 The identification of the being with the essence of sensible things, or the sky, or the cosmos seems to be in contrast with Parmenides, fr. 3. In all probability, the words TO yap avrb votiv eariv Tt nal tlvoti mean with Parmenides, "For the same thing can be thought of as can be."13 Plotinus un­ derstood them in another way, "Parmenides . . . identified being and mind and thus did not place the being among the sensible things: 'For the same is to think and to be' says he."14 So Plotinus identifies the Parmenidean being with the voiis: Being is mind; and this interpretation of Parmenides made its way in Neoplatonism. As Simplicius is transmitting the greatest number of frag­ ments of the way of truth and is giving a continuous interpretation,15 we are going to treat his exposition here.

II

Parmenides distinguished physics and metaphysics as did ihe Pythagoreans, , Empedocles, and .16 Regarding Parmenides, this issues from the two parts of the poem and from the state­ ment made by Aristotle,17 "As to the question, whether the being is one and unchanging, this is no question concerning nature."18 In his metaphysics, i.e., in the part dealing with truth, Parmenides revep'.o nis doctrine of the one be­ ing, while in the physics, i.e., in the Doxa, he is pleading a two-principles- theory.19 At a surface inspection, however, the distinction spoken of cannot be seen; it escapes most people because of its indistinct treatment.20 The problem of apxv rules the thinking of Parmenides in the same way as that of his predecessors; accordingly, the two parts of the poem have but one subject, though it is revealed in different ways: the principle of everything. 32 KARL BORMANN

Nevertheless, the two parts must be sharply distinguished: In the metaphysics, Parmenides knows the principle to be one, unchangeable, and determined;21 that means that Parmenides is not speaking of a natural ele­ ment, nor is Melissus, but "of the true being";22 in the physics, Parmenides regards a pair of contraries as the principles of becoming and perishing things. Before we discuss how Simplicius gave a new interpretation to the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 Parmenidean doctrine of being, let us show how he comprehends the Doxa- part.

Ill

Light or "aitherial fire" and night,23 the principles of the Doxa-part, were expounded by Aristotle as fire and earth, "... Parmenides erects hot and cold, which he calls fire and earth, into principles";24 "Parmenides . . . supposes that there are ... in some sense two causes . . . hot and cold, or fire and earth . . .";25 "Parmenides . . . posits two causes and two principles, calling them hot and cold, i.e. fire and earth. . . ,"26 Moreover, Aristotle states27 that Parmenides ranged the fire with the existent and the earth with the non-existent. This is a misunderstanding of Parmenides, fr. 8, 53-54, "For they made up their minds to name two forms, of which they must not name one only." On the identification of the principles of the Doxa-world with fire and earth, see furthermore Theophrastus, Phys. Op. fr. 628 and Hippolytus I 11, l;29 these two passages identify fire with the active principle and earth with potentiality. Theophrastus, Phys. Op. fr. 6 is transmitted by Alexander of Aphrodisias and quoted by Simplicius as well.30 The equation of the night-element and earth is obviously a mistake, as is remarked by Simplicius31 according to Alexander:32 Parmenides posited in the Doxa "fire and earth, or better, light and darkness" as principles, what did not prevent Simplicius from calling—under the influence of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Alexander—the principles of the world of seeming 'fire' and 'earth'.33 If we do not take account of Simplicius naming the two "forms"34 fire and earth, his expositions are correct; for further characterization, he closely follows Parmenides, "Parmenides posited the first pair of opposites as elementary principles of the becoming things; he called the pair of opposites light and darkness,35 or fire and earth, or dense and rare,36 or the same and the other."37 It is conditioned by Aristotle that Theophrastus and Hippolytus called fire the active and earth the passive principle,38 "for they treat fire as having a nature which fits it to move things, and water and earth and such things they treat in the contrary way." Aristotle probably understood Parmenides, fr. 8, 57-59 in this way. The polemics of Simplicius against this interpretation arise from the Theophrastus-fragment transmitted by Alexander:39 If Alexander like Parmenides sees the sensible as the subject of the Doxa, then his rendering, SIMPLICIUS ON PARMENIDES 33 which says that Parmenides—according to the opinion of "the many"—has expounded the phenomena as coming from natural causes, is right, as far as he is taking the sensible for the subject of the Doxa. But if Alexander thinks the words of the Doxa-part to be utterly wrong,40 and if he thinks Parmenides to be positing light or fire as efficient cause, then his assumption is not correct.41 To prove this, Simpiicius42 quotes Parmenides, fr. 8, 50—61. Parmenides does Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 not call the account of the Doxa-part "simply false" but "deceitful," "because it slipped from the intelligible truth down to the region of seeming, to the sensible."43 David Ross44 takes the view that Simpiicius explains the transition from truth to Doxa in the same way as Aristotle,45 "Aristotle describes the transition from the 'way of truth' to the 'way of opinion' by say­ ing that though Parmenides thinks that of necessity only TO bv exists, he is forced to follow the observed facts and therefore to admit two causes, TO bv and TO fir) bv. I.e., Parmenides is supposed to allow a lower order of reality to the sensible world and to set about the explanation of it, even though this ex­ planation is not in accordance with his account of true reality. Simpiicius describes his procedure in the same way (Phys. 39.10)". The transition from truth to Doxa,46 however, is only seemingly explained by Simpiicius in the same way as it is by Aristotle; the transition from intelligible to sensible47 has to Simpiicius the same meaning as the downward way from the realm of being—which following neoplatonic reasoning must be regarded as identity of thinking and being—to the region of coming-to-be and perishing. 'Intelligible' and 'sensible' illustrate two regions of hypostasis: Parmenides and Melissus "assumed a double hypostasis, that of the true being, i.e. the in­ telligible, and that of the becoming, i.e. the sensible,"48 the latter of which they named not a simply being but a seemingly being; and that is, in confor­ mity with the Parmenidean conception, the reason for the being to imply the region of truth and for the becoming to imply the region of seeming.49 From this there derives that David Ross's explanation is at least erroneus. As for the opinion of Theophrastus and Alexander that the element of fire is the efficient cause, there is the unambiguous definition given by Parmenides that the efficient cause in the world of Doxa is "the goddess who steers all."50 She is, as is proved by fr. 13,51 the cause for the gods, too, "First of all gods she devised Eros." On the immediately following note52 that the goddess furthermore accompanies souls into the unseen and from the unseen to light, see K. Bormann, Parmenides p. 220, annot. 118,8. On the authority of Simpiicius, the Parmenidean doctrine of the Doxa is in its consequences gone down to Empedocles: Empedocles says nothing that contradicts to the doctrines of Parmenides and Melissus; he conceives the an­ tithesis of elements in the same way as Parmenides and declares the goddess, who dwells in the center of the cosmos and causes all becoming, to be the un­ iversal cause; moreover, Empedocles, like Parmenides, regards the inferior efficient causes as opposed to one another.53 Aristotle, too, is influenced by 34 KARL BORMANN

Parmenides in stating opposites to be principles54 which does not mean that he followed Parmenides, who described the generation of the changeable things unto the parts of the animals, in all views.55

IV Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021

The Parmenides-fragments 2, 6, and 7 are dealing with the "ways of in­ quiry"; the "ways" are mentioned in fr. 8, 1-2 and 8, 16—18 as well. The two latter passages presuppose already a rejection of the wrong ways, "One way only is left to be spoken of, that it is";56 "but it has surely been decided, as it must be, to leave alone the one way as unthinkable and nameless, for it is no true way, and that the other is real and true." Therefore, we have to consider only fragments 2, 6, and 7. Fragment 2 is speaking of two ways of inquiry, and they are conceived as the only ones to be thought of: Being is—nothing is. With the refusal of the second way which should be leading to reality of the nothing, there are refus­ ed those doctrines which according to Parmenides are attributing reality to the nothing, as for instance Anaximander's remarks on the airapov which is principle of reality. At the same time, along with the second way, the oldest Pythagorean system is refused, as far as it contained the dualism of "limit—unlimited." Moreover, Parmenides reduces the acceptance of becoming and perishing to be reality to the position of the second way. Frag­ ment 6, 3—9 sketches out a third way which has no goal, but leads back to itself and therefore is not a way of inquiry proper. It incorporates the opinions of men who unconsciously regard to be and not to be as being the same and not the same; Parmenides may be reckoning Heraclitus and other predecessors among them. Fr. 7 refers to this third way.57 Though there are serious reasons for the way shown in fr. 7 to be the second way, such an inter­ pretation would require to separate fr. 7, 1—2 from the rest of the fragment; furthermore, the plural "things that are not"58 would not be explained sufficiently.59 Simplicius makes a clear difference between the second way and the position touched in fr. 6 and includes fr. 7,2 in the second way,60 "Parmenides blames those who unify being and not-being in the intelligible, 'to whom to be and to be-not are the same, yet not the same,'61 and advises against the way that looks for not-being, 'But do thou hold back thy thought from this way of enquiry';62 then he utters, 'One way only is left to be spoken of, that it is....' "" Simplicius does not call in question that the "nonexistent things" of fr. 7,1 mean the simply not being.64 "The void, same as the not-being, has no place in the wholly being. 'But do thou hold back thy thought from this way of enquiry,165 says the great Parmenides."66 As far as Simplicius applies fr. 7,2 to the second way, which implies the existence of the nothing, he follows who in Sophistes67 sees the nothing rejected by the words of fr. 7,1—2. Aristotle obviously appeals to Plato's Sophistes68 and assumes fr. 7,1 to be a SIMPLICIUS ON PARMENIDES 35 controversy against the second way. The passage from Plato's Sophistes gives at the same time information on how the words of Simplicius,69 "Parmenides blames those who unify being and not-being in the intelligible" are to be con­ ceived. Simplicius regards fr. 6, 8—9 not at all as a criticism of the opinion of men who take becoming and perishing for real and thus believe in the identity of to be and to be-not,70 but he applies fr. 6, 8—9 to statements like those we Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 can read in Plato's Sophistes 258 d 5 sq., "Whereas, we have," in contrast with Parmenides, "not only proved that things which are not are, but we have shown what form of being not-being is; for we have shown the nature of the different to be existent. . . ." Plato identifies not at all being and simply not being, as was correctly seen by Porphyrius;71 but Porphyrius is wrong72 thinking that Plato has taken the not-being for the generated being, "but he obviously found the not-being in the separation from the intellectual ideas,"73 that means, not in the realm of the intelligible, of VOJITOV, but in the intellec­ tual, the voipbv. On the basis of this explanation, Plato is not in the risk to be touched by Parmenides's verdict. Plato reached the view that there are many beings, not because he equated not-being and being, but because he saw the difference between the one and the being and posited the being as "complete, not divided into pieces."74 The rejection of the nothing by Parmenides shall prove the uniqueness of the being, "or else prove the uniqueness of that what is beyond the being," and is therefore made before the actual doctrine of being.75 Aristotle characterizes this rejection as follows,76 "Parmenides . . . claiming that besides the existent nothing non-existent exists, he thinks that of necessity the existent is one thing and nothing else." The Aristotelian diction is transform­ ed by Theophrastus77 into a syllogism, "What is besides being, is not-being, not-being is nothing, so one is the being."78 Eudemus79 renders another text, "What is besides being is not-being, but furthermore, being is predicated in one meaning, so one is the being." Apparently, Simplicius did not find this passage in his copy of the Eudemus text, as we can see from a remark follow­ ing the quotation,80 "Whether Eudemus has written this exactly in this way, I cannot say; but in the Physics, he writes on Parmenides as follows, whence the quotation may be composed. . . ." There follows81 a longer excerpt from Eudemus which contains polemics against Parmenides. It is influenced by Aristotle,82 and Simplicius uses it only as a possible proof of the before- mentioned quotation of Eudemus. To Simplicius, the premises of the Theophrastic syllogism are implied in Parmenides, fr. 2, 3—8;83 the fact that the sentence "to be and to be-not are the same" is wrong, arises from Parmenides, fr. 6.84 The not-being is not even to be asked about.85

V The being does not belong to the region of coming-to-be and perishing,86 the reason of which is given by Simplicius as follows:87 Things which come to 36 KARL BORMANN be and perish are not before they have come into being; when they are perish­ ed, they are no more. And when they seem to be, they are not to be called be­ ing in the literal sense, because, while becoming and perishing, their being is not "resting by itself."88 The Heraclitean river-image89 illustrates that the becoming is nearer to not-being than to being.90 "For the being has other signs, as Parmenides says."91 The signs of the being which we do not need to Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 discuss92 here in detail, are according to Simplicius mentioned in fr. 8, 3-14:93 The being is entire, unique, immovable, without end;94 it was not in the past nor will it be some time; it is not starting from nothing nor can there arise anything from what is not.95 Hence arises this on the account of Simplicius: (1) Being did not start from being, for there was no being before it. Obviously, Simplicius understands the words "it was not in the past. . . . "96 as if they denied the possibility that unchangeable being resulted from a superordinate being. (2) Nor did being start from not-being; the reason given by Simplicius is this:97 Not-being does not exist; furthermore, under condition that being started from not-being, there is no reason that it came up exactly when it did and not earlier nor later. The latter reason is taken from fr. 8, 9—10, "And what need would have driven it on to grow, starting from nothing, at a later time rather than an earlier?" In Parmenides, this obviously means only: At no point in time, neither earlier nor later, did being spring from nothing.98 (3) Being did not start from "partly being, partly not-being; for the partly being and partly not-being has no existence before the simply being, but after it."99 This third possibility which Simplicius sees rejected in fr. 8, 12, is not named, however, in the transmitted text of fr. 8, 12, the manuscripts present for fr. 8, 12 « firi eovros or in nr) OVTOS or 'ix yt nv OVT- 101 os IOO The interpretation rendered by Simplicius may indicate that he reads in fr. 8, 12 in wr^ tovros instead of CK HV tovros.™1 Even if we leave Simplicius's interpretation out of account, the text transmitted by fr. 8, 12 needs correction. In fr. 8,6 is asked for the origin of being. There can be three answers: (1) Being is generated by not-being; this suggestion is refused in fr. 8, 7—11. (2) Being is generated by being. This alternative must be expressed in addition to fr. 8, 11; but there, if we accept the text transmitted, the deriva­ tion out of nothing is refused again. (3) Being is not coming into being; this is the solution given by Parmenides in fr. 8, 13-14.103 On the different altera­ tions suggested, see K. Bormann, Parmenides pp. 40 and 144. While taking the passage of fr. 8, 6—10, which we just considered, for a refusal of the assumption that the unchangeable simply being could be generated by the non-existent, in another passage which follows later on, Simplicius uses the same fragment to show that changeable things cannot come up from not-being:104 What comes to be must come from being; if it came up from not-being, there would be no reason for it to start at the mo­ ment at which it starts and not earlier or later.105 The fact that the same argument and the same fragment, in one way serving for refusal of the opi- SIMPLICIUS ON PARMENIDES 37

nion that the unchanging being came up from nothing, in the other way ser­ ving for a proof that changeable being, i.e., "what comes to be," could not come up from nothing, is easily explained: If we consider the unchangeable being to be generated, then with a consideration like this the opinion is linked that the unchangeable being belongs to the realm of things that come into be­ ing and is something changeable. But the argument that nothing can come up Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 from the non-existent holds good even for the unchangeable being which, because of its coming-to-be, would not be unchangeable. The true being, however, is ungenerated; it is neither generated by being nor by not-being106 and therefore has neither a beginning nor an end in time.107 The ungenerated being is autarchical, because it is simply being and not non-existent; being autarchical, it is perfect, being perfect, it has an end and a conclusion.108 From autarky and absolute perfection of the being results its invariance, "What is changing is in need of that what makes it change; therefore, the be­ ing is unchangeable."109 The unchanging autarchical being is numerically one;110 it is neither genus nor species nor accident but substance."'

VI

The unchanging autarchical being is nothing from the region of material things, this arises from its indivisibility."2 Nor does it belong to the region of soul;"3 "for the substance of soul implies alteration, even in accordance with the Eleatics.""4 Moreover, the words "since it is now, all at once, continuous" and "abiding the same in the same place it rests by itself'"5 indicate that being is a unity in essence, potentiality, and effect; "6 a unity like this transcends the hypostasis soul."7 The effort to prove the transcendence of being leads to Simplicius conceding that being may transcend even poten­ tiality and effect."8 The superordinate hypostasis, the intellectual, is characterized by being separated from the intelligible and by returning to it.119 The separation brings about that, in the region of the intellectual, the substantial forms, the ideas, are actually distinct from one another. Hence follows that in the intellectual, there is otherness. Otherness means that something is not that what the one different from it is; therefore, along with the otherness, there appears the not-being. This Platonic meaning of otherness as the non-existent120 may not be presumed regarding Parmenides; the not-being is banned from the realm of the one being.121 There remains the possibility to accept being as a universal, i.e., either as a universal concept formed by abstraction or as a universale in rebus. Without regard to this possibility being already rejected, it is refused by the following consideration: An abstracted concept is neither ungenerated nor imperishable;122 the univer­ sale in rebus is sensible, and therefore it belongs to the realm of Doxa and cannot be "now, all at once,"123 not to mention that in it, there is no unity of thinking and what is thought.124 It would be absurd to mean by the Parmeni- 38 KARL BORMANN

dean being the individual substance:125 The individual substance comes to be and perishes, it is changeable, divisible, sensible, and different from the acci­ dent. The result of this negative definition is: The one being of Parmenides can only be the intelligible, the VOIJTOV.126 What is plurality in the region of the intellectual, is unity in the intelligible,127 namely unity of being and one,128 of thinking, thought, and mind.129 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 Before all plurality, there must be one.130 This sentence does not mean that Simplicius identified the Parmenidean one being with the Neoplatonic 'iv. The Neoplatonic ev is certainly intelligible as it is the highest object to the mind, but it is not at the same time a thinking like the intelligible on the level of the mind.131 The Parmenidean one being is, according to the interpretation by Simplicius, the hypostasis mind, and thus it is the first intelligible princi­ ple. As a cause for limit and limitation, for perfection of all, the being in itself must be perfect and limited, moreover: It must be perfection and the goal of everything.132

VII The interpretation of the Parmenidean doctrines by Simplicius has the following result: Parmenides distinguished two large regions, the sensible and the non-sensible.133 The sensible is the region of coming-to-be and perishing.134 The non-sensible is divided into the levels of soul, intellectual, and intelligible. The 'tv is not discussed on the occasion of the Parmenides- interpretation. The Parmenidean being is identical with the intelligible. In view of the high esteem that Simplicius shows for Plato and Aristotle, we now have to ask how he interprets their criticism of Parmenides. The answer is: Plato and Aristotle want to prevent misunderstandings.135 Therefore, Plato's criticism aims at the level of the intellectual, in which a plurality of beings is found together with the otherness.136 Aristotle, however, shows by his criticism of Parmenides that the Parmenidean being is not iden­ tical with the sensible.137 Parmenides was not convinced—as we could read by mistake from Aristotle, De Caelo 298 b 21—that the sensible and only the sensible would exist.138 With all criticism of Parmenides given by Aristotle, we always have to consider that Parmenides in Aristotle's opinion "is ob­ viously speaking with insight."139

Karl Bormann University ofKbln, West Germany SIMPLICIUS ON PARMENIDES 39

NOTES

1. To this, see K. Bormann, Parmenides, Hamburg 1971, p. 1-22. 2. Decaelo298b21. 3. Ibid., 298 b 22—24; Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo commentaria, ed. I. L. Heiberg, Berlin 1894, 556, 4—6, comments on this passage as follows: Parmenides and Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 Melissus held the view that all beings are ungenerated, because there is no knowledge about things that come to be and perish; for these things are in a permanent flux. 4. In Simplicius, In De caelo 560, 5—10. 5. Aristotle, De caelo 298 b 21. 6. In Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor priores commentaria, ed. H. Diels, Berlin 1882, 133,23-29. 7. See also In Phys. 131,33-132,4: That Parmenides conceived the true being not as genus but as numerically one substance is made clear by the fact that the genus con­ trary to the true being is predicated of a subject. 8. Parmenides, fr. 8,44. 9. Fr. 13 in Simplicius, In Phys. 143, 5. 10. In Phys. 143, 1 sq. 11. Ibid., 143,7. 12. See Simplicius, In Phys. 28, 5—10; Doxographi Graeci, ed. H. Diels, Berlin 1965,438,11. 13. See K. Bormann, Parmenides, p. 8—10 and 70—72. 14. Plotinus, Enn. V 1, 8, 15-18; compare V 9, 5, 29; I 4, 10, 6 and III 8, 8, 8. 15. In Phys. 142,28-147, 16. 16. Simplicius, In Phys. 21, 17-19; see also 70, 3-71, 16 to Arist. Phys. 185 a 17-19 "Though Parmenides and Melissus do not speak of nature, they touch certain points of interest concerning nature" and the controversy with Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyrius. 17. Phys. 184 b 25. 18. See Simplicius, In Phys. 70, 29. 19. The views of the meaning of the Doxa section were different even in antiquity, see K. Bormann, Parmenides p. 11 and Alexander in Simplicius, In Phys. 71, 5—8. 20. Simplicius, In Phys. 21, 19. 21. Ibid., 21, 29 and 22,24. 22. Ibid., 22, 25. 23. Parmenides, fr. 8, 56.59 and fr. 9, 1. 24. Phys. 188 a 20. 25. Met. 984 b 3-6. 26. Ibid., 986 b 33; De gen. et corr. 318 b 6 and 330 b 14: The principles are fire and earth. 27. Ibid., 986 b 34; De gen. et corr. 318 b 6. 28. Doxographi Graeci 482, 5. 29. Ibid., 564, 19. 30. In Phys. 38, 18 and 71, 6; compare Doxographi Graeci 113 and 482 n a 26 31. Ibid., 25, 16. 32. Ibid., 38,24. 33. See for instance In Phys. 30, 21; 274, 24; 146, 28 is quoted in Arist. Phys. 188 a 20 the same as 179, 31 with the appended note "and light and night or darkness"; 188, 29: Hot and cold are the principles of the Doxa-world; In De caelo 691, 6. 34. Parmenides, fr. 8, 53. 40 KARL BORMANN

35. See Parmenides, fr. 8, 56 fire; fr. 9, 1.3 light and night; fr. 12, 1-2 fire and night. 36. See Parmenides, fr. 8, 59 dense; to "rare" see the catalogue of variants of fr. 8, 57 in K. Bormann, Parmenides, p. 46. 37. See Parmenides, fr. 8, 57-58; Simplicius, In Phys. 30, 20-22; in 30, 23

-31,2 follows fr. 8, 53-59; in 31, 3-7 follows the supposed piece of prose, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 probably a scholion to fr. 8, 56—59, see Diels—Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vor- sokratiker, Berlin 'I960,1 240, 11. 38. Met. 984 b 6. 39. Phys. Op. fr. 6. 40. Simplicius, In Phys. 38, 26. 41. Ibid., 38, 20-28. 42. Ibid., 38, 30-39, 9. 43. Ibid., In Phys. 39, 10-12. 44. Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford 1958, I 133-134. 45. Met. 986 b 28. 46. See also Simplicius, In Phys. 30, 15—16. 47. See In Phys. 30, 15. 48. Simplicius, In De caelo 557, 21-22. 49. Ibid., 557, 22-24; in 557, 25-558, 2 follows Parmenides, fr. 1, 28-32. 50. Simplicius, In Phys. 31, 10-17; Parmenides, fr. 12, 2-6; In Phys. 39, 13 — 16; Parmenides, fr. 12, 1—3. 51. Ibid., 39, 18. 52. Ibid., 39, 19. 53. Ibid., In Phys. 34, 12-17. 54. Ibid., In Phys. 31, 9-10. 55. Simplicius, In De caelo 559, 26—27. 56. Fr. 8, 1-2; the following: fr. 8, 16-18. 57. To the three ways of inquiry see K. Bormann, Parmenides p. 90—106. 58. Fr. 7, 1. 59. K. Bormann, Parmenides p. 106. 60. In Phys. 78, 2 sqq. 61. Parmenides, fr. 6, 8—9. 62. Ibid., fr. 7, 2. 63. Fr. 8, 1-14. 64. See In Phys. 243, 31-244, 2; 143, 29. 65. Parmenides, fr. 7, 2. 66. Simplicius, In Phys. 650, 11-14. 67. 258 d. 68. Met. N 1089 a 2-6; see D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics II 475. 69. In Phys. 78, 2 70. See K. Bormann. Parmenides p. 100. 71. Simplicius, In Phys. 136, 33. 72. Ibid., 136, 34. 73. Ibid., 137, 2-3; see also 100, 23-26. 74. Ibid., 137, 12-15. 75. Ibid., 100, 22-23. 76. Met. 986 b 28. 77. Simplicius, In Phys. 115, 11. Simplicius appeals to Alexander. 78. See Doxographi Graeci 483, 8; further Simplicius, In Phys. 118, 2; 134, 11. 79. Simplicus, In Phys. 115, 13; Simplicus takes also the Eudemus- passage—fr. 11—from Alexander. SIMPLICIUS ON PARMENIDES 41

80. Ibid., 115, 14. 81. Ibid., 115, 16; see also 120, 6. 82. See Phys. 186 a 24 sqq. 83. Simplicius, In Phys. 116, 25-117, 1. 84. Ibid., 117, 2-14. 85. See In Phys. 28, 8; 78, 5. 86. Simplicius, In Phys. 142, 31 by reference to Parmenides, fr. 8, 1—3. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 87. Ibid., 77, 27. 88. See Parmenides, fr. 8, 29. 89. Fr. 91; Simplicius, In Phys. 77, 32. 90. To this, see Plato, Politeia 477 a: The becoming is found between being and not-being. 91. Simplicius, In Phys. 77, 34; see Parmenides, fr. 8, 2. 92. To this, see K. Bormann, Parmenides p. 139 sqq. 93. In Phys. 78, 11-23. 94. Fr.8,4. 95. Fr. 8, 5-13. 96. Fr. 8, 5. 97. In Phys. 78, 26. 98. See K. Bormann, Parmenides p. 145. 99. In Phys. 78, 27-29. 100. See the catalogue of variants in H. Diels, Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor priores commentaria p. 78 and in K. Bormann, Parmenides p. 40. 101. In Phys. 78, 27. 102. See also H. Diels, named in annot. 100. 103. See K. Bormann, Parmenides p. 142 sq. 104. In Phys. 162, 16. 105. There follows fr. 8, 6-10. 106. In Phys. 162, 12-13. 107. Ibid., 39, 28 = Parmenides, fr. 8, 27. 108. Simplicius, In Phys. 30, 11 to Parmenides, fr. 8, 29-33; see 502, 4; the comparison with a sphere in fr. 8, 43 is a metaphor, In Phys. 146, 29—147, 1. 109. Simplicius, In Phys. 40, 8 to Parmenides, fr. 8, 30-33. 110. Ibid., 131, 34; see In De caelo 557, 15 by reference to Parmenides, fr. 8, 4. 111. See Simplicius, In Phys. 131, 35. 112. Ibid., 143, 1. 113. In Phys. 143, 8 by reference to fr. 8, 38 in the reading olou aKivijTov TtXidcr fw iravr' ovona tivai. To this, see K. Bormann, Parmenides p. 42 and 147—148. 114. Simplicius, In Phys. 143, 11. 115. Parmenides, fr. 8, 5 and 29. 116. Simplicius, In Phys. 143, 16; ousia, dynamis, energeia is a well-known triple term in the philosophy of Proclus. 117. Ibid., 143, 17. 118. Ibid., 29, 16. 119. Ibid., In Phys. 143, 18. 120. See Sophistes 258 d 5. 121. Simplicius, In Phys. 143, 26-30. 122. See Parmenides, fr. 8, 3; The being is ungenerated and imperishable. 123. Parmenides, fr. 8, 5. 124. See Parmenides, fr. 8, 34-36; Simplicius, In Phys. 144, 2-8. 125. Ibid., 144, 8-11. 42 KARL BORMANN

126. See In Phys. 39, 25. 127. Simplicius, In Phys. 143, 26; 144, 12-14. 128. Ibid., 144,14. 129. Ibid., 143, 20; 144, 22-25. 130. Simplicius, In Phys. 29, 8; to this, see Plotinus, Enn. VI 9, 1, 1.

131. See Plotinus, Enn. V 6, 2, 4; V 4, 2, 12; III 8, 9, 7. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/62/1/30/1051769 by guest on 27 September 2021 132. Simplicius, In Phys. 29, 5-11. 133. See In Phys. 79, 29-80, 4. 134. See In Phys. 80, 3-4; In De caelo 556, 12-14; 559, 14-27. 135. Simplicius, In Phys. 148, 11-13; In De caelo 557, 19. 136. Simplicius, In Phys. 147, 17 sqq. 137. Ibid., 148, 7 sqq.; 86, 19 sqq.; 107, 29. 138. Simplicius, In De caelo 558, 12; 559, 14. 139. Simplicius, In De caelo 560, 1-4; see Aristotle, Met. 986 b 27. I thank very much my assistant Carmen Doyle for her translation of this essay into English.

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN A Quarterly Journal Promoting Original and Scholarly Contributions in All Fields of Philosophy

Edited by members of the College of Philosophy and Letters and the Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University.

JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J. Editor

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is published four times a year, in November, January, March, and May. Subscription price $10.00 a year; single copies, $2.50 each. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is indexed in the Catholic Periodical Index and The Philosopher's Index. Copyright ©1976 by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, Saint Louis, Missouri. Permission is required to reprint an article or part of an article. Any contributor who wishes his manuscript returned in the event of its rejection should enclose a stamped self-addressed envelope.

Address all communications to The Editor or The Business Manager, THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, 3700 West Pine Blvd., Saint Louis, Missouri 63108. Foreign subscription agencies: NETHERLANDS: Swet & Zeitlinger, Keilbesgracht 471, Amsterdam; SPAIN: Anaquel Ediciones, Conde de Penalver, 36, Madrid; FRANCE: Office general du livre, \4bis, rue Jean Ferrandi, Paris 6e-